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Current practices in
electronic surveillance
in the investigation of
serious and organized crime

United Nations publication FOR UNITED NATIONS USE ONLY

ISBN ???-??-?-??????-?
ISSN ????-????
Sales No. T.08.XI.7
Printed in Austria
ST/NAR.3/2007/1 (E/NA) V.09-86322­—October 2009—500
 UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME
Vienna

Current practices in
electronic surveillance in the investigation of
serious and organized crime

United Nations
New York, 2009
UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATION
Sales No. E.09.XI.19
ISBN 978-92-1-148246-1
Contents

1. INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

1.1 The issue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

1.2 “Electronic surveillance” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.3 The process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.4 Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.5 Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.6 Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.7 Definitions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

2. MULTILATERAL AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES

AND ISSUES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

2.1 The international framework. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

2.2 Cross-border cooperation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2.1 Cross-border cooperation: jurisdictional issues and challenges. 9
2.2.2 Intangible data held on computer networks
spanning several countries. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.2.3 Mutual legal assistance treaties (MLATs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.2.4 Multilateral agreements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.2.5 Other networks and programmes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

3. regulation: warrants and authorizations . . . . . . . . . 13

3.1 When is a warrant or authorization required? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

3.2 The applicant. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.3 The authorizing body . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.3.1 Who authorizes the use of electronic evidence
gathering techniques?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.3.2 Surreptitious electronic evidence gathering by consent. . . . . . . 16
3.4 Notice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.5 Contents of warrant application. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.6 Justification for warrant. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.7 What a warrant authorizes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

iii
 3.7.1 Scope. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.7.2 Duration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.8 Use of surveillance data. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.8.1 Use of surveillance data: intercepted communications. . . . . . . 21
3.8.2 Transcription. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.8.3 Information obtained about persons or offences
not the subject of the warrant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.8.3 Chain of custody. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.9 Reporting requirements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.9.1 Reports to issuing judge. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.9.2 Annual reports. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.10 Implications of non-compliance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.11 Emergency or urgent circumstances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

4. Other principles governing electronic

evidence gathering by law enforcement. . . . . . . . . . . . 29
4.1 Reasonable expectancy of privacy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
4.1.1 Right to respect for private life in the European Court
of Human Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

5. Additional Policy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

5.1 Regulation of other users of electronic surveillance: private security . . 33
5.2 Regulating the use of changing technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

6. additional challenges. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
6.1 Resource constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
6.2 Training. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
6.3 Technological challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
6.3.1 Telephone number portability and roaming. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
6.3.2 Email, chat and voice over internet protocol (VOIP) . . . . . . . 36
6.3.3 Pre-paid mobile telephones and internet cafés. . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
6.3.4 Telecommunications service providers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
6.3.5 Tracking. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

7. Request for comment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

iv
 1.  Introduction

1.1. The issue
The value of employing electronic surveillance in the investigation of some forms of
serious crime, in particular organized crime, is unquestionable. It allows the gathering of
information unattainable through other means. Some countries have utilized surreptitious
electronic surveillance for nearly a century. For others it is a more recent phenomenon, and
for some it is not yet utilized at all.

The use by law enforcement of electronic surveillance should not be an investigative tool
of first resort, instead its use should be considered when other less intrusive means have
proven ineffective or when there is no reasonable alternative to obtain crucial information
or evidence. Even when electronic surveillance is appropriate, it will generally need to be
used in conjunction with other investigation methods in order to be most effective.

For those jurisdictions without any regulation, or with legislation which is lacking in some
respect, the challenge is to develop a balanced system for the use of electronic evidence
gathering. The balance which needs to be struck is that between the effective use of
electronic evidence gathering and the protection of citizens’ rights. This includes balancing
the cost of utilizing these methods against the ultimate public benefit gained from a
conviction. These considerations should be weighed carefully by legislators, prosecutors,
law enforcement and the like.

It should also be noted that in some countries the existence of a federal system of gover­
nance means that electronic surveillance can be regulated at both a local and at a national
level. Federal law will often apply where the investigation is into crime that crosses borders,
however, organized crime is of course also investigated by local law enforcement. It is not
possible for this document to comprehensively consider regulation of individual states,
regions or provinces within countries, although their mention will occur where valuable
examples arise.

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CURRENT PRACTICES IN ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SERIOUS ORGANIZED CRIME

1.2  Electronic surveillance

The term “electronic surveillance” covers an array of capabilities and practices. To better
understand what is meant by electronic surveillance, it is useful to break it down into parts.
Surveillance has previously been defined on the basis of covert/overt distinctions, or
determined according to the level of contact with the target, whether remote or direct.
These distinctions might, arguably, create a false dichotomy, particularly in the context
of modern surveillance technologies, where overt/covert lines are not as easy to draw. Thus,
a framework based on function is perhaps more useful. The table below provides some
examples. Although this too is flawed in that modern surveillance technologies will often
have multiple capabilities (see below discussion at section 5.2 on regulating technologies
with multiple capabilities).

Audio surveillance Visual surveillance Tracking surveillance Data surveillance

Phone-tapping. Hidden video surveillance Global positioning systems Computer/internet
devices. (GPS)/transponders. (spyware/cookies).
Voice over internet In-car video systems. Mobile phones. Blackberries/mobile
protocol (VOIP). phones.
Listening devices Body-worn video devices. Radio frequency identifi­ Keystroke monitoring.
(room bugging). cation devices (RFID).
Thermal imaging/forward Biometric information
looking infrared. technology (retina scans
at airports etc).
CCTV.

This document confines its consideration of surveillance practices to electronic surveillance

and not other forms of surveillance such as the use of covert operatives. Thus, for the
purposes of this document, the terms “surveillance” and “electronic surveillance” are
synonymous and used interchangeably.

1.3 The process
In December 2007 the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) com-
menced the first of a series of meetings with expert representatives from law enforcement
and prosecutorial and judicial authorities of Member States. The first informal expert group
meeting on electronic evidence gathering was held from 3-5 December 2007 at the Vienna
International Centre. A second regional expert group meeting for South-East Asian
countries was held 17-18 March 2009 at the Digital Forensic Centre in Seoul. The
meetings each brought together a small group of law enforcement officials and legal experts
from different countries and regions. It is anticipated that more regular expert group
meetings are to follow.

The initial goal of these meetings was to utilize participants’ expertise and experiences to
develop a training manual for electronic surveillance. However, due to the complexity of

2
 Introduction

this issue, it was decided that as a first step it would be useful to draft a comparative study
of surveillance regulation and practices, drawing primarily upon the expert group meetings
but also by completing more general research in the area. The document will broadly
outline the use of and challenges faced by law enforcement and investigative authorities in
a range of jurisdictions in the collection, use and storage of electronic evidence through
surveillance.

1.4 Objectives
The purpose of conducting a comparative study of electronic evidence gathering is to
outline current practices that will serve as an important reference tool for Member States
in the regulation and use of electronic evidence gathering in the investigation of serious
crime. Essentially, this document aims to:
• Contribute to an improved understanding of the global practical and legal issues
presented by the use of electronic surveillance in evidence gathering, handling
and use.
• Provide an account of the challenges faced by law enforcement and investigative
authorities in the use of electronic evidence gathering in the investigation of
serious crime.
• Provide some guidance, options and ideas for countries developing policy or
regulation of electronic evidence gathering in the investigation of crime.
This document aims to assist legislative drafters, policymakers, legal practitioners, law
enforcement and other investigative authorities involved in or considering electronic
evidence gathering. It hopes to provide a comprehensive outline of measures and options
which may be considered for incorporation into respective legal systems and operational
procedures subject to the particular social, political and economic circumstances of
their countries.

1.5  Scope
Countries with greater resources for policing and investigative techniques tend to have a
longer history of both regulation and use of special investigative techniques. This will be
reflected somewhat in the research, however, this does not represent any kind of bias, but
merely an unavoidable limitation reflective of modern and historical economic realities.

Despite these limitations, the preparation of this document involved broad research across
a range of regions, despite a scarcity of information in some. Thus a variety of jurisdictions
and approaches are considered. Further national examples will be added and expanded
upon as they are provided by participants in ongoing regional expert group meetings.

In this document, UNODC is concerned only with electronic surveillance for the investi-
gations of serious crime. Although, it is acknowledged that electronic evidence gathering
techniques may be appropriate for use in the investigation of less serious offences.

3
CURRENT PRACTICES IN ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SERIOUS ORGANIZED CRIME

1.6  Structure
This document begins by outlining the multilateral and international framework within
which electronic evidence gathering takes place in section two. Following this the focus
shifts to national regimes in section three which pays particularly attention to the process
and regulation of the authorization of electronic surveillance at a domestic level. Policy
considerations, principles and rights which temper the use of electronic surveillance
are discussed in section 4. The primary concern in this regard is the protection of an
individual’s right to privacy, a right necessarily infringed in the conduct of surveillance.
Section five canvasses the speed of technological development and the difficulties rapid
technological advancement might present to legislators, as well as the regulation of
private security personnel. Finally section six concludes by discussing the technical and
administrative challenges associated with the use and regulation of electronic surveillance.

1.7 Definitions
Where possible the following definitions have been taken from the United Nations
Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (TOCC):

Organized criminal group shall mean a structured group of three or more persons,
existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more
serious crimes or offences established in accordance with this Convention, in order to
obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit.

Serious crime shall mean conduct constituting an offence punishable by a maximum

deprivation of liberty of at least four years or a more serious penalty.1 (The jurisdictional
disparities between what constitutes “serious crime” are discussed further below).

Special investigation techniques means techniques applied by law enforcement in the con-
text of criminal investigations for the purpose of detecting and investigating serious crimes,
and aimed at gathering information in such a way as not to alert the target persons.2

Warrant shall include “authorization” and “direction”.3

Surveillance (or “electronic surveillance”) is rarely itself defined in the legislation

delineating its use. Instead, relevant provisions will often provide a definition of “intercept”,
“communication” and other more device-specific definitions, which range from succinct to

1
United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime Art 2.
2
Council of Europe Committee of Ministers, Recommendation Rec (2005) 10 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on
“special investigative techniques” in relation to serious crimes including acts of terrorism, https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=849269
&BackColorInternet=9999CC&BackColorIntranet=FFBB55&BackColorLogged=FFAC75 at 5 February 2009.
3
The terms “authorization” and “direction” are used by some jurisdictions to denote an authority which is, for our purposes, the
same as that of a warrant, and thus these three terms are used interchangeably.

4
 Introduction

complex. For the purposes of this document, and in the context of law enforcement,
surveillance is the collection or monitoring of information about a person or persons through
the use of technology. This document will focus on surveillance for the stated purpose of
preventing crime or prosecuting offences.

Electronic surveillance: see section 1.1.

5
 2.  Multilateral and International
Approaches and Issues

2.1 The international framework

The United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (TOCC) is
the fundamental international instrument calling upon Member States to criminalize
organized and serious crime globally. Its purpose is to promote cooperation to prevent and
combat transnational organized crime more effectively and constitutes the foundation
document for the UNODC’s anti-organized crime initiatives. Article 20 of this document
refers to “special investigative techniques”.

Article 20 of the TOCC provides that:

2.  For the purpose of investigating the offences covered by this Convention, States
Parties are encouraged to conclude, when necessary, appropriate bilateral or multilateral
agreements or arrangements for using such special investigative techniques in the context
of cooperation at the international level. Such agreements or arrangements shall be
concluded and implemented in full compliance with the principle of sovereign equality of
States and shall be carried out strictly in accordance with the terms of those agreements
or arrangements.

3.  In the absence of an agreement or arrangement as set forth in paragraph 2 of this

article, decisions to use such special investigative techniques at the international level shall
be made on a case-by-case basis and may, when necessary, take into consideration financial
arrangements and understandings with respect to the exercise of jurisdiction by the States
Parties concerned.

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CURRENT PRACTICES IN ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SERIOUS ORGANIZED CRIME

The domestic regulation of electronic surveillance does not occur in a vacuum. Regional and
international considerations are also relevant, including domestic obligations under inter­
national instruments. The right which is most frequently referred to in this context and is
generally most juxtaposed against the use of surveillance is the right to privacy. The right to
protection from arbitrary invasion of privacy is a fundamental human right, laid down in
article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). The ICCPR
has 160 state parties and thus creates obligations which stretch across most of the world.

Article 17 of the ICCPR:

1.  No one shall be subject to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family,
home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation

2.  Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks

The European Convention on Human Rights also contains a similar provision protecting
the privacy of its citizens. Claims in the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) have
been made pursuant to article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights which
protects the “right to respect for private life” (see further at 4.1.1 of this document).

Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights stipulates:

1.  Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his
correspondence

2.  There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right
except such as in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the
interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for
the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.

The ECHR has dealt with several cases involving electronic surveillance conducted by law
enforcement.4 These are expanded upon further in section 4.1.1 of this document.

Concern for the protection of the right to privacy has also been enshrined in the
CoE’s European Code of Police Ethics. The Code specifically protects an individual’s
right to privacy vis-à-vis police conduct. Further, the CoE Code stipulates that the use of
data obtained by police shall be dealt with in accordance with international data protection
principles.5
4
Case of the Association for European Integration and Human Rights and Ekimdzhiev v Bulgaria (no. 62540/00) 28 June 2007;
Elahi v United Kingdom (no. 30034/04) 20 September 2006; Hewitson v United Kingdom (no. 50015/99) 27 August 2003; Khan v
United Kingdom (no. 35394/97) 12 May 2000; Malone v United Kingdom (no. 8691/79) 2 August 1984. Note that the Human Rights
Act 1998 (UK) adopted the European Convention on Human Rights into United Kingdom law and this may have contributed to a
disproportionate increase in cases from the United Kingdom being brought before the ECHR in the last decade.
5
Council of Europe, European Code of Police Ethics, ss 41 and 42. The “data protection principles” were established in 1980 by the
OECD. They broadly prohibit the unlawful storage of personal data, the storage of inaccurate personal data, or the abuse or
unauthorized disclosure of such data.

8
 MULTILATERAL AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES AND ISSUES

2.2  Cross-border cooperation

As organized crime increases its global reach, it is important that law enforcement also
have (at least) reciprocal global capabilities. Indeed with the increased globalization of
organized criminal networks, the need for effective cross-border cooperation is likely to
increase. In practice, requests for assistance for cross-border electronic evidence gathering
or surveillance is often avoided for both practical reasons to do with efficacy, and frustra-
tion with bureaucratic delays.

2.2.1  Cross-border cooperation: jurisdictional issues and challenges

Cross-border investigations present unique challenges to law enforcement and other
investigating authorities. The use of electronic evidence gathering in another jurisdiction
will require a request from the investigating jurisdiction to the country in which surveil-
lance is anticipated to occur. The latter will likely only pursue an investigation where
the relevant offence is also an offence under their own criminal law. Practically this is
often the case. However, ongoing electronic evidence gathering from one jurisdiction
into another is rarely smooth or speedy. In the actual initiation of electronic evidence
gathering, bureaucratic procedures and red-tape can cause relatively lengthy delays. In
addition, the jurisdiction requested to conduct the surveillance will want to understand
the evidence so far obtained in order to determine whether an offence against their
criminal law, has been, is being, or is likely to be committed.

Evidence obtained in a country other than that in which the criminal trial will occur
can be of questionable admissibility. Domestic law in this area is complex and invariably,
jurisdictions will each possess somewhat different systems to maintain the chain of
custody. More generally, where evidence has been gathered in a jurisdiction not the host
of the criminal trial, it may be difficult to satisfy the local legal requirements regarding
admissibility of evidence.

In both expert group meetings, participants noted that requesting data from another
jurisdiction is problematic. Challenges faced in this respect include:

• Delay;

• A lack of commitment and flexibility from the authority from which evidence is
requested;

• The form in which evidence is provided to the requesting jurisdiction is one that
can cause prosecutorial challenges;

• Differing definitions of serious criminal offences between jurisdictions.

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CURRENT PRACTICES IN ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SERIOUS ORGANIZED CRIME

2.2.2 Intangible data held on computer networks spanning

several countries
The cross-jurisdictional challenge is compounded by the increase in intangible data held
on foreign servers but accessible locally. The 2009 expert group meeting raised the issue of
accessing data hosted in another jurisdiction, such as information stored on a foreign
computer network, but accessible domestically. Discussion centred on the extent to which
this presents a legal predicament in which one of two implications will follow. Either it
will be necessary to limit what law enforcement can do, or law enforcement will be
conducting investigations which could be unlawful in the jurisdictions hosting the data
they are accessing. This predicament is further exacerbated where the jurisdiction of the
network hosting the electronic data is not known.

2.2.3  Mutual legal assistance treaties (MLATs)

Article 18 of the TOCC extends an obligation on states parties to provide mutual legal
assistance in the investigation and prosecution of serious offences. The provision of
mutual assistance appears to be reflected in some, but few, of the national legislative
instruments regulating electronic evidence gathering.6 Organizations such as EUROJUST
and EUROPOL facilitate and encourage cross-border cooperation regionally, but such
initiatives are not found across all regions. Thus, there is scope for further development of
effective strategies to assist and encourage mutual legal assistance in the investigation and
prosecution of serious offences.

Historically MLATs have played an important role in cross-border criminal investigation.

In general such treaties seek to expedite and assist cross-border cooperation in criminal
investigations. Usually each country will designate an authority for direct communication
between the countries or jurisdictions in such instances where cross-border assistance may
be required. However, no MLAT gives open permission for cross-border surveillance to
occur; they merely operate, in the most part, to create open lines of communication. An
authorization or warrant is only valid in the country in which it was obtained. If
country A wishes to conduct surveillance in country B it may offer the grounds on which
it considers such surveillance necessary, but ultimately it is country B’s sovereign decision.
Assistance may be denied where the offence is not one mutually recognized by the
countries parties to the agreement or where certain offences are specifically excluded.

2.2.4  Multilateral agreements

With the increasing speed of technological advancement, communication and world travel,
the internationalization of crime has also grown exponentially. In this context multilateral
agreements are of increasing relevance.

6
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (UK) s 5.

10
 MULTILATERAL AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES AND ISSUES

The EU Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters was adopted on 29

May 2000. It provides an example of multilateral cooperation in cross border surveillance.

The Convention ‘aims to encourage and modernise cooperation between judicial, police
and customs authorities within the Union as well as with Norway and Iceland by supple-
menting provisions in existing legal instruments and facilitating their application.’1

Articles 17-20 deal with the interception of communications and provide the basis upon
which a request for interception can occur and require that the receiving Member State
shall undertake to comply with such a request.2

1 
European Commission, Justice and Home Affairs <http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/criminal/assistance/wai/fsj_criminal_
assistance_en.htm> at 3 January 2009.
2 
Similarly, the Inter-American Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters has been in force since 1996 and has
more than 20 state parties in the Americas, however, it does not specifically consider telecommunications interception nor
surveillance

Where no MLAT or other relevant treaty or agreement exists, the TOCC may itself serve
as a basis for cooperation between Member States.

In the expert group meetings frustration was expressed with the delay that can be caused
to an investigation by following international protocols. Participants commented that
currently informal cooperation seemed a more effective cross-jurisdictional tool. That is,
having personal contacts in foreign investigating agencies. The primary problem with this
approach is that if formal mechanisms are not followed the evidence gathered may be
inadmissible in court in the requesting jurisdiction.

2.2.5  Other networks and programmes

Informal and formal networks of those involved in the investigation of serious crime are
increasingly valuable for the smooth operation of cross-border cooperation in electronic
evidence gathering. In both expert group meetings, participants were unanimous in their
support for further initiatives to improve cross-border cooperation. One example of recent
efforts in this regard comes out of the United Kingdom.

The United Kingdom Crown Prosecutors Service is currently putting forward a proposal
for the establishment of a “Global Prosecutors E-Crime Network” (GPEN), an initiative
supported by the International Association of Prosecutors. Their proposal points out that
the global increase in internet use has

[C]lear implications for law enforcement and prosecution agencies as criminals exploit
the opportunities that information and communication technology provides. On the
internet, there are no global boundaries for criminals and it is widely recognised that
e-crime is the most rapidly expanding form of criminality. The technical nature of such
cases is increasing, as is the availability of the tools with which to commit these crimes.

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CURRENT PRACTICES IN ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SERIOUS ORGANIZED CRIME

There is also an increasing number of sophisticated international computer attacks.

So it is essential that prosecutors are able to both advise police officers during the
investigation and prosecute such cases effectively.

To this end, the GPEN will consist of a secure website which serves as a database for
prosecutors from all over the world and also provides online training courses and
presentations.

Other networks that focus on cross-border surveillance issues include:

• The Cross Border Surveillance Working Group

• The AGIS programme, which is focused on operational issues (organized by Aus-
tria and includes countries neighbouring Austria)
• International Surveillance Committee. This group meets once a year and includes
Australia, New Zealand, the United States, Canada, the Netherlands and the
United Kingdom.
• European Electronic Surveillance Working Group
• European Judicial Network7
• Red Iberoamericana de Cooperación Jurídica Internacional (IBERRED)
• Southeast European Prosecutors Advisory Group
• The International Association of Chiefs of Police

7
See in relation to mutual legal assistance in criminal matters: www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=475&lang
=EN&mode=g# at 3 January 2009.

12
 3. Regulation: Warrants and
AuthoriZations

3.1  When is a warrant or authorization required?

The use of electronic evidence gathering techniques by law enforcement is commonly
regulated by a warrant-based system, subject to some form of oversight.8 Not all electronic
surveillance will require a warrant. Electronic surveillance conducted by law enforcement
in a public place will not always require a warrant. This will usually include, for example,
visual surveillance such as in-car video systems, body-worn video devices9 and police-
monitored CCTV. These forms of surveillance are typically regulated by codes of practice
and guidelines, if at all.10

Where surveillance is conducted in a situation where the subject of surveillance would

hold a reasonable expectation of privacy, then a warrant will usually be required. These
forms of surveillance include for example the interception of communication such as
via landline phones, mobile phones and VOIP and the installation and monitoring of
8
Interception of Communications and Surveillance Ordinance (Hong Kong) ch 589, s 3; Criminal Procedure Code (Germany) s 100a;
Criminal Procedure Code (Republic of Serbia) arts 226 and 228; Code of Criminal Procedure (Poland) ch 26; Code of Criminal Procedure
(Slovakia) s 88; United States Code Title 18 ch 119 ss 2510-2519; Crimes Act 1961 (New Zealand) part 11A; Canadian Security
Intelligence Service Act (R.S., 1985, c. C-23) (Canada) part II; Criminal Code (R.S., 1985, c. C-46) (Canada) part XV ss 487.01 and
492.1; Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (UK); Surveillance Devices Act 2004 (Australia); Telecommunications (Interception and
Access) Act 1979 (Australia); Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of Communication-related Information Act 2002
(South Africa).
9
For example, the United Kingdom has trialled and subsequently introduced the use of cameras in the hats of police officers. See:
Home Office, Police and Crime Standards Directorate, ‘Guidance for the Police use of Body-Worn Video Devices’ (2007) http://police.
homeoffice.gov.uk/news-and-publications/publication/operational-policing/guidance-body-worn-devices?view=Binary at 5 February 2009
10
For example: Home Office, Police and Crime Standards Directorate, ‘Guidance for the Police use of Body-Worn Video Devices’
(2007) http://police.homeoffice.gov.uk/news-and-publications/publication/operational-policing/guidance-body-worn-devices?view=
Binary at 5 February 2009; Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner for British Columbia, Public Surveillance System
Privacy Guideline, (2001) www.oipc.bc.ca/advice/VID-SURV(2006).pdf at 5 February 2009. Note also that codes of practice and
guidelines also exist for the practice of covert surveillance, however, these are usually complementary to a legislative regime, for example
see: United Kingdom Home Office, Covert Surveillance Code of Practice http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/ripa/publication-search/
ripa-cop/covert-cop?view=Binary at 5 February 2009.

13
CURRENT PRACTICES IN ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SERIOUS ORGANIZED CRIME

tracking devices. The attainment of authorization in advance ensures that the evidence is
obtained lawfully which may have implications for the admissibility of that evidence.

Where a warrant to conduct surveillance is not required, there are usually other factors limit-
ing its use. These include consideration of the subject’s reasonable expectation of
privacy, the attainment of some other permission (albeit non-judicial),11 and the requirement
of notice for overt surveillance, which are discussed in this document in sections 3.2 and 4.

The method of regulation in this regard varies. In some jurisdictions authority to conduct
surveillance is issued by the court in accordance with legislation. In other countries, the
courts have a primary regulatory role. That is, a judge may permit surveillance to occur on
the merits of the case without any legislative restrictions.

3.2 The applicant
In some jurisdictions an application for a warrant to intercept communication must first
be approved by a very senior public servant, such as the Attorney-General, before the
application may be heard before a judge.12 In some countries an authorization may also be
applied for by other public servants of a specified level of responsibility.

It should be noted that the respective roles of prosecutor and law enforcement officer differ
substantially in common law as compared to civil law jurisdictions. Whereas in common
law systems, police have relative autonomy over the investigative process, in civil law
systems this is not necessarily the case. The public prosecutor often plays a leading role in
overseeing the conduct of the investigation. In many civil law systems, for example, the
prosecutor is able to authorize a warrant to conduct electronic surveillance.13 Conversely, in
traditional common law systems, the prosecutor can never issue warrants.

The United States federal jurisdiction offers an example of an exception to this general
trend. While, technically speaking, the prosecutor neither issues nor applies for the warrant,
it is standard practice that the prosecutor approves and oversees the application, as
prepared by law enforcement officers, before it is reviewed by a judge.

The applicant for electronic surveillance was the subject of some debate at the 2009 expert
group meeting. Opinions were divided as to whether the prosecutor should have oversight
in relation to applications for authorization to conduct electronic surveillance. The group
11
See for example Anti-Corruption Act 1997 (Malaysia) s 39 which allows the Public Prosecutor to authorize the interception of
communications; or section 184(2) and 184.2 of the Canadian Criminal Code which permits the interception of communications
where the consent of the originator or intended recipient of the communication has been obtained. Note also that there are often general
exceptions for the incidental interception of communications by telecommunications personnel, for example section 3(3) of the
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (UK).
12
Title 18 Chap 119 § 2516 US Code
13
Code of Criminal Procedure (Slovak) s 88; Criminal Procedure Code (Germany) s 100b(1); Police Act (Poland) art 19a(3); Anti-
Corruption Act 1997 (Malaysia) s 39(1).

14
 regulation: warrants and authoriZations

was divided largely down civil law/common law experience and it is clear that there is a
difference between the two systems on this issue.

In general, common law countries argued that for reasons of accountability it was
important that the officer applying was the person/s conducting the investigation (usually,
but not always, police). In civil law countries it is viewed that only prosecutors should have
the authority to appear before a judge to apply for authorization. Given that this matter is
one of structures fundamental to both systems and which are unlikely to change, the
question of which system is to be preferred is moot. Difference along similar lines also
arose in relation to whether the prosecutor should have the capacity to authorize electronic
surveillance (see below at section 3.3).

3.3 The authorizing body

3.3.1  Who authorizes the use of electronic evidence gathering techniques?

Where a warrant for electronic surveillance is required, jurisdictions tend to use one of
three authorities to oversee and permit surveillance to be carried out. These authorities are
(in no particular order):

• Judge
• Prosecutor
• Commission/commissioner or other authority
Some jurisdictions have set up special independent commissions or authorities to oversee
the use of electronic surveillance by the government, including by law enforcement.

In the state of Queensland in Australia, section 324 of the Crime and Misconduct Act 2001
allows the Governor in Council to appoint a “public interest monitor” to monitor applica-
tions for, and the use of, surveillance warrants and covert search warrants. It specifically
states that the person must not be a member of the police service or the Office of Public
Prosecutions.

In other jurisdictions permission to conduct electronic surveillance in the investigation

of serious crime is a matter for the prosecutor.

In Poland the prosecutor may authorize surveillance and the recording of the content of
telephone conversations in order to detect and obtain evidence for pending proceedings
or to prevent a new offence from being committed.

Whether a prosecutor could or should be authorized to permit electronic surveillance

without further oversight was a subject discussed at the 2009 expert group meeting.

15
CURRENT PRACTICES IN ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SERIOUS ORGANIZED CRIME

Some participants expressed concern that a prosecuting authority might not be sufficiently
far removed from the investigation to make an independent decision on the use of surveil-
lance as balanced against the subject’s right to privacy.

3.3.2  Surreptitious electronic evidence gathering by consent

In some countries where a person who is a party to the conversation consents to the
conversation being taped, that is sufficient to allow electronic evidence gathering to occur
and for its recorded form to be admissible as evidence. This is the case notwithstanding
that other parties to the conversation may have no knowledge that the recording is taking
place. The rationale for this approach is that if conversations to which one party consents
to recording were inadmissible, then the court would ultimately not hear the conversation.
Instead it would be reliant on the testator’s memory as to what was said as he or she
recounted it to the court. Advocates of this approach suggest that it ensures that the court
hears the most accurate evidence.

Pursuant to section 184.2 of the Canadian Criminal Code, a private communication may
be intercepted where a person who is a party to the conversation consents. There must
still be an application for authorization brought before a judge. However, there are fewer
elements which must be proven in order for this type of authorization to be granted as
compared to a situation where no party consents or knows about the interception. The
judge needs to be satisfied that:

(a)  there are reasonable grounds to believe that an offence against this or any other
Act of Parliament has been or will be committed; and

(b)  either the originator of the private communication or the person intended by
the originator to receive it has consented to the interception; and

(c)  there are reasonable grounds to believe that information concerning the offence
referred to in paragraph (a) will be obtained through the interception sought

As a result, the application is thus less onerous to prepare and, arguably, also less onerous
to process.

Other jurisdictions do not require any form of authorization where a party to the
conversation consents to the recording. This is particularly useful where an undercover
operative is involved.

In new legislation proposed in New Zealand the recording of a voluntary conversation by

a consenting party will not require any form of authorization. Nor is there any restriction
on audio recording of private conversations if entry onto the premises where the conver-
sation has occurred is pursuant to lawful authority and that authority covers the right to
hear the things being recorded.

16
 regulation: warrants and authoriZations

3.4 Notice
In some countries there is a requirement that after covert surveillance has taken place, the
subjects of the surveillance must be notified that this has occurred. Although this is usually
subject to exceptions and will not necessarily include all those persons who were recorded
or observed partaking in the relevant communication or activity such as non-targeted
family and friends of the suspect.

In Canada, section 196 of the Criminal Code requires that within 90 days of the intercep-
tion (or other period fixed by the judge issuing the authorization) of the interception, the
person who was the object of the interception shall be notified in writing of such
interception.

Where the investigation is continuing an extension of time can be granted by a judge of a

superior court on application by the Attorney-General or the Minister. This exception to
the notice requirement applies not only where the investigation of the initial offence is
continuing but also where the initial surveillance uncovered evidence of other crimes not
the subject of the first warrant. The extension of the period within which notice must be
given is not to exceed three years.

Similarly, in Japan the Act on the Interception of Communications requires that the subject
of intercepted communications must be notified of the interception within 30 days of the
surveillance having been completed. Where an ongoing investigation might be compro-
mised by such notice, a district court judge can extend the period of time within which the
subject must be notified.

Other countries require notice to be given not whenever surveillance is conducted but
instead only when it has been conducted unlawfully.

Section 48 of chapter 589 of the Hong Kong SAR Ordinance requires that where the
interception of communications is deemed to have occurred unlawfully, notice must be
given to the person targeted.

3.5  Contents of warrant application

Where a warrant-based system of regulation is in place, there are usually requirements as
to what an application for a surveillance warrant must contain. Typically these will include
the following:

• The subject/target of surveillance and an outline of the facility and location

of surveillance;

17
CURRENT PRACTICES IN ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SERIOUS ORGANIZED CRIME

• The necessary duration of the surveillance;

• An outline of the investigative techniques that have been tried and failed or why
they cannot be employed;
• The justification for the use of surveillance (further discussed below);
• To whom the warrant is issued.

In the new surveillance regime being introduced in New Zealand, warrant applications can
be made orally, electronically or by personal appearance. Personal appearance can be
dispensed with where the judicial officer is satisfied that there is adequate information to
enable a decision to be made without the personal appearance of the applicant.

3.6  Justification for warrant

Each jurisdiction elucidates in differing terms the circumstances that must exist in order
for a warrant for the use of electronic surveillance to be issued. The applicant must
generally prove that the use of electronic surveillance is necessary in the interests of national
security or for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime.

Sometimes for the use of phone-tap or interception devices, the applicant must show that
the relevant crime falls within a stipulated category of “serious crime”. What constitutes
“serious crime” varies between countries. As mentioned above, under the TOCC, a serious
crime is one that under national legislation is punishable by a sentence of four or more
years. States parties to the TOCC should review whether their electronic surveillance
regime is in line with the Convention.

Some countries use the maximum term of imprisonment as a benchmark for measuring
“serious crime”, others create a list of offences considered “serious crimes”. However,
certain offences appear to arise almost universally. These include the investigation of
terrorism-related offences, treason, and serious violent offences such as murder and
kidnapping. At the lower end of the scale there is more disparity. For example, in some
instances the investigation of theft and fraud related offences may be sufficient for the issue
of a warrant.14 Some jurisdictions also permit the issue of electronic surveillance warrants
where the matter of concern affects the country’s economic well-being15 or is part of an
intern­ational agreement of mutual assistance.16 Others provide that a warrant for the use of
a surveillance device may be issued for the investigation of any crime, provided that the
issuing judge is satisfied of certain matters.17

14
Criminal Procedure Code (Germany) s 100a; Crimes Act 1961 (New Zealand) s 312B; Title 18 Chap 119 § 2516 US Code.
15
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (UK) s 5; Title 18 Chap 119 § 2516 US Code
16
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (UK) s 5
17
Criminal Code (Canada) s 184.2(2)(a) and (3); Listening Devices Act 1984 (New South Wales, Australia) ss 15-16.

18
 regulation: warrants and authoriZations

Often legislation will expressly outline the factors that a decision-maker must consider in
determining the grant of a warrant for the use of surveillance for the investigation of crime.
Obviously the basis for such an application will be that there are reasonable grounds to
believe a relevant offence has been, will be or is being committed.18 Other factors for
consideration commonly include:
• The evidentiary value of the evidence that the surveillance is likely to obtain;19
• Whether there are alternative means of obtaining the evidence sought;20
• Whether it is in the best interests of the administration of justice to issue the
warrant.21
The applicant’s belief that the perpetration of a particular serious crime is imminent or
ongoing, and that its investigation necessitates the use of electronic surveillance, must meet
a certain standard of reasonableness.22 The onus is upon the applicant to prove that their
belief meets this standard. Evidence of “reasonable belief ” is typically provided in one of
three ways: in writing, on oath, or both in writing and on oath. While many jurisdictions
do not specify the precise matters to which the written or oral evidence must attest, others
are quite specific about its requisite content. In addition, the presiding judge will have
legislative (if not inherent) authority to require additional evidence to be provided.

3.7  What a warrant authorizes

3.7.1  Scope
Warrants for the use of surveillance by law enforcement are limited in scope. Most national
systems which regulate the use of electronic surveillance will prescribe the information that
a corresponding warrant must contain. This is usually substantively the same as that
required within the application, which is both logical and necessary for law enforcement
to understand the scope of lawful surveillance which they have been permitted. Conse-
quently, and to a large extent, the warrant will mirror the application. Thus the duration,
target and location and type of surveillance will appear on both the application and the
warrant. The latter will differ from the former at the discretion of the decision-maker.23

The warrant will usually authorize the installation and retrieval of a surveillance device into
or onto a specific place or thing. Sometimes there is a requirement that if the circumstances
that justified the use of surveillance (and thus also the warrant) cease to exist, the person
responsible for the surveillance will be obligated to cease the surveillance.24

18
Criminal Code (Canada) s 487.01; see also Crimes Act 1961 (New Zealand) s 312B; Criminal Procedure Code (Germany) s 100a.
19
Listening Devices Act 1984 (New South Wales, Australia) s 16.
20
Crimes Act 1961 (New Zealand) s 312B and 312C; see also R v Araujo [2000] 2 S.C.R. 992 (Canada) which established in the
Canada that in order to satisfy the investigative necessity test set out in 186(1)(b) of the Criminal Code, the police must establish that
there is no other reasonable method of investigation.
21
Criminal Code (Canada) s 487.01.
22
This standard will vary somewhat between jurisdictions.
23
See 2.2.2 for a list of typical requirements for the content of a surveillance warrant application
24
Criminal Procedure Code (Germany) s 100b (4); Title 18 Chap 119 § 2510(5) US Code; Surveillance Devices Act 2004 (Australia) s 21.

19
CURRENT PRACTICES IN ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SERIOUS ORGANIZED CRIME

In Australia, section 21 of the Surveillance Devices Act stipulates that where the chief
officer is satisfied that the use of a surveillance device under a warrant is no longer
necessary for the purpose of enabling evidence to be obtained of the commission of a
relevant offence or the location or identity of the offender, then that chief officer must
take steps to ensure that the use of the surveillance device is discontinued.

In general, the principles or policy considerations which limit the use of electronic
evidence surveillance in the investigation of serious crime include:

• Necessity: that the use of electronic evidence gathering is necessary to gather the
evidence or information required.
• Subsidiarity: that other less intrusive forms of inquiry or investigation are not
sufficient to gather the confidentiality: that there are mechanisms in place to
protect the confidentiality of the information obtained, including the privacy of
third parties not the subject of the authorization or warrant.
• Judicial control: that the process of evidence gathering is overseen by a judge or
independent other of a certain requisite and specified level of authority.
• Proportionality: that the intrusion into privacy is proportionate to the seriousness
of the suspected offence and the evidence it is anticipated will be obtained.

Where these principles do not specifically appear (in one form or another) in legislation
they are sometimes incorporated into other regulatory instruments such as codes of
practice.25

For example, in Guatemala’s recently enacted Regulations for the Application of the
Investigative Technique of Telephone Tapping and Other Forms of Interception of Communica-
tions, principles limiting the use of telecommunications interceptions are specifically listed
as follows:

Article 3. Principles. The principles guiding this special technique shall be:

(a)  Principle of necessity. The principle of necessity shall be understood to mean

that there is a need to use the technique of interception of communications where
existing investigative techniques reveal the use, in offences committed by members of
organized criminal groups, of communication methods identified in the Law against
Organized Crime;

(b)  Principle of confidentiality.The principle of confidentiality shall be understood to

mean the requirement that the activities forming part of this special technique shall
be known only to the officials authorized by the law;

25
See for example paragraphs 2.4 to 2.5 of the United Kingdom Home Office ‘Covert Surveillance Code of Practice’ issued pursu-
ant to section 71 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000.

20
 regulation: warrants and authoriZations

(c)  Principle of judicial control. The principle of judicial control shall be understood
to mean the requirement that the activities forming part of this special technique
shall be known only to the officials authorized by law;

(d)  Principle of appropriateness. The principle of appropriateness shall be under-

stood to mean that, in view of the nature of the offence concerned, it may be decided
that the interception of communications will be effective in obtaining background
information that will make it possible to avoid, interrupt or throw light on the
commission of offences by members of organized criminal groups.”

3.7.2  Duration
The length of time for which a warrant may authorize the use of electronic surveillance
is usually expressly limited in the legislation. The duration varies between jurisdictions
which regulate this, and ranges from 10 days to three months.26 However, most systems
that stipulate a time period for surveillance also provide that extensions of time may be
permitted, where necessary, upon application to the original issuer. Additionally, the issuer
will usually retain the right to revoke the warrant at any time.

3.8 Use of surveillance data

There are limitations on the use of data, recordings and images acquired as a result of
electronic surveillance. Where evidence is obtained through the use of surveillance not
authorized under a warrant, its admissibility becomes questionable. Conversely, where
evidence has been lawfully obtained pursuant to a warrant or relevant authorization, it is
likely to be admissible, subject to ordinary rules of evidence. Rules regarding the
admissibility of evidence play a somewhat lesser role in civil law jurisdictions due to the
wide-ranging discretion of the trial judge to act as inquisitor and call what evidence he/she
thinks fit and also, arguably, because there is no jury to “taint”.

3.8.1  Use of surveillance data: intercepted communications

In India, pursuant to section 46 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Amendment Act

2004, evidence gathered by the interception of communications is admissible as evidence
against the accused provided that the accused has been furnished with a copy of the
authorizing order under which the interception occurred at least 10 days before trial.
Alternatively, where it is not possible to give 10 days notice, the evidence may still be
admissible provided that the judge determines that the failure to give 10 days notice does
not prejudice the proceedings.

26
Act on Interception of Electronic Communication (Japan) (10 days); Criminal Procedure Code (Germany) s 100b (2) (3 months);
Code of Criminal Procedure 1997 (Poland) art 238 (3 months); Code of Criminal Procedure (Slovakia) s 88 (6 months); Regulation of
Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (UK) s 9 (3 months for standard warrants); Surveillance Devices Act 2004 (Australia) s 17 (90 days).

21
CURRENT PRACTICES IN ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SERIOUS ORGANIZED CRIME

This can be compared with the situation in the United Kingdom and Hong Kong SAR.
It should be noted, however, that the United Kingdom might soon be amending its
legislation in this regard.

Conversely, in the United Kingdom the evidence obtained by interception of communi­

cations is prima facie inadmissible in proceedings, subject to certain exceptions.1 The
primary use of intercepted material is as information to assist an investigation. Once that
intercepted material has served its purpose in this regard, it is destroyed.2
1 
These exceptions include in any proceedings for a relevant offence. What constitutes a relevant offence is specifically defined
and primarily includes offences against telecommunications and interception legislation rather than serious criminal offences.
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (UK) ss 17 and 18.
2 
Note that this position is currently under review in the United Kingdom.

In Hong Kong SAR conversations recorded as a result of the interception of communi­

cations are not ever admissible as evidence. Rather a witness must attest to the conversa-
tion as he or she heard it. Police have expressed concern that the admission of the recorded
data as evidence might compromise police methods by alerting organized crime syndicates
to the techniques used.

3.8.2  Transcription

At the first expert group meeting, participants pointed out that transcribed evidence of
recorded conversations is often questioned by defence counsels on the basis of its accuracy.
The transcribing of audio into a verbatim transcript is often a tedious and lengthy task
relegated to clerks not necessarily familiar with the case. It is important to ensure that the
transcript of recorded voices is precisely accurate in order not to leave the prosecution’s
case exposed to what would be a legitimate attack by the defence counsel should the
transcription be inaccurate. This is especially important where the material to be tran-
scribed is in a foreign language. It is thus crucial that such transcription is diligently
monitored by persons intimately involved in the case.

The Spanish system avoids this dilemma entirely by requiring that all transcription be
undertaken by a clerk of the court in the presence of both counsel for the defence and
prosecution. Any disagreement as to the accuracy of the transcription is thus resolved at
this stage of proceedings, rather than during the trial.

Although in some countries it is the audio itself that is played to the court, it is the
transcripts which decipher conversations which are often muffled or virtually inaudible.
As such, conflicts over accurate transcription are likely to continue even where the audio is
admissible as evidence. Therefore it is advisable to have available and offer both the audio
and a transcript of the audio to the trier of fact.

22
 regulation: warrants and authoriZations

3.8.3 Information obtained about persons or offences not the subject of

the warrant
The situation becomes more complex where a warrant was obtained to conduct covert
surveillance on person A and in doing so evidence is obtained against person B. Similar
evidentiary issues arise where evidence of offences other than those for which the warrant
was obtained is discovered. At least one jurisdiction specifically provides that such
information may be disclosed to other law enforcement officers as appropriate, or other-
wise used in the proper performance of law enforcement duties.27 Another allows such
information to be retained as long as it is necessary for the protection of national security
or the prevention or detection of serious crime.28 This is an area in which there is no
consistency of approach between jurisdictions. Two examples of converse approaches are
provided below.

In Canada, where the authorized electronic surveillance uncovers evidence of an offence

not mentioned in the authorizing warrant, the surveillance may continue unabated.
The evidence thus obtained is considered “windfall evidence” and is lawful. However, if
an extension of time is required, beyond that authorized in the initial warrant, the addi-
tional offences or suspects discovered must be mentioned in the subsequent application.

The Canadian approach is in contrast to that of Spain.

In Spain, if a judicial authorization is given for electronic evidence gathering to be

conducted and the subsequent surveillance uncovers information pertaining to additional
offences not anticipated or mentioned in the initial authorization then surveillance must
cease. The overseeing judge must be contacted in order to obtain authority for the
electronic evidence gathering to continue and to include the gathering of evidence in
relation to the additional offence/s.

3.8.4  Chain of custody

Maintaining the integrity of the material obtained through electronic surveillance is
essential for ensuring that it will be admissible as evidence in court. This issue was raised
at both expert group meetings. Countries tend to take slightly different approaches to
maintaining the integrity of evidence.

In relation to the interception of communications, in Japan all conversations in the author-

izing period are recorded and then sealed by the person conducting the electronic
surveillance. That material is then kept by the judge and is admissible as evidence.

27
Title 18 Chap 119 § 2517(5) US Code.
28
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (UK) ss 15(3) and (4)(a).

23
CURRENT PRACTICES IN ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SERIOUS ORGANIZED CRIME

In Jordan, where the originals of all recordings of intercepted communications are sent to
the court for safekeeping, the investigating agency retains only the copies.

The length of time for which captured electronic surveillance data is stored is also important
and may have implications for rights of the person/s subject to the surveillance.

In Italy, at the end of the trial the judge directs the prosecutor as to what is to be done with
the electronic evidence gathered. For example, if no crime was found to have been proven
the computer may have to be returned, or if paedophilia was found to be on it, the judge
may order that the computer be destroyed.

In other jurisdictions the length of time for which material is retained will depend on
whether it is relevant to other ongoing investigations, and the length of time in which the
accused has a right to appeal. It should be noted that retaining material for long periods
can raise technical issues: technology is quickly outdated and as a result the medium needed
to play such recordings become obsolete.

3.9 Reporting requirements
Although not a universal requirement, it is common practice that reports are required to
be compiled detailing the issuance and use of surveillance warrants.29 Where reporting
requirements exist, there are two distinct types, each operating as a check on the use of
surveillance warrants by law enforcement. The first is regular reporting or updates to the
issuing judge on the success or otherwise of the electronic surveillance, this occurs during
the term of the surveillance. The second is statistical reporting, usually annual, which will
often include, among other things, details of the number of warrants applied for, approved
and refused.

3.9.1  Reports to issuing judge

A number of systems call for the law enforcement officer to whom the warrant was
provided to report to the issuing judge as to the manner in which the power conferred by
the warrant was exercised, and the results obtained.30 Some countries require that the judge
be given an update on the progress of the electronic evidence gathering every few days.
Moreover, due to the confidential nature of electronic surveillance operations, reporting is
often done either orally in front of the judge who authorized the surveillance or a written
report is personally delivered to the judge. In our initial expert group meeting some

29
Criminal Procedure Code (Germany) s 100e; Crimes Act (New Zealand) s 312P; Criminal Code (Canada) s 195.
30
Crimes Act 1961 (New Zealand) s 312P; Criminal Procedure Code (Germany) s 100e; Spanish Criminal Law Procedure art 579.

24
 regulation: warrants and authoriZations

participants found this unnecessarily onerous, particularly where reporting must be done
in person as often as every 72 hours. This may require some flexibility when frequent
reporting is required, for example, every few days.

In India the authority appointed to issue orders of authorization to intercept communica-

tions may require regular reporting at intervals that he/she thinks fit. The regular reports
should indicate that progress has been made towards the authorized objective and that
there is a continued need for ongoing interception.1

1 
The Prevention of Terrorism Act 2002 (India) s 42(2).

3.9.2  Annual reports

Other systems require a more general annual report, which will usually include statistical
details such as the number of surveillance device warrants applied for, approved and
refused.31 Some jurisdictions require that the report lists the number of persons arrested, or
against whom proceedings were commenced, as a result of surveillance carried out pursu-
ant to a warrant.32 At least one country requires a tally of the number of warrants approved
and declined by each respective judge.33

However, during the first expert group meeting it was noted that such reports can paint a
false picture. For example, a distorted impression can be given where reports require a list
of the number of warrants issued compared against the number of convictions in that year.
Trials often last longer than a year and the conviction that is the result of the electronic
evidence gathering may not occur until years after the surveillance was conducted. These
reports remain of value but care should be taken in interpreting their contents.

3.10  Implications of non-compliance

As mentioned above, in those jurisdictions where authorization is required for the conduct
of electronic evidence gathering, it is usually an offence to either intercept communica-
tions, or conduct covert surveillance without a warrant, particularly in circumstances where
the subject has a reasonable expectation of privacy.34 Thus, prima facie the officer who
conducted such surveillance will be criminally liable. However, this is subject to a number
of exceptions, including for example where a warrant has been obtained35 or where the
officer is acting on good faith that the surveillance has been authorized.36

31
Criminal Code (Canada) s 195.
32
Interception of Communications and Surveillance Ordinance ch 589 div 5 s 49 (Hong Kong); Criminal Code (Canada) s 195(2).
33
Interception of Communications and Surveillance Ordinance ch 589 div 5 s 49 (Hong Kong).
34
For example: Criminal Code (Canada) s 184(1); Interception of Communications and Surveillance Ordinance (Hong Kong) ch 589
div 5 ss 4-5;
35
For example Interception of Communications and Surveillance Ordinance ch 589 div 5 s 4 (Hong Kong); Telecommunications
(Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Australia) s.7
36
Criminal Code (Canada) s 184(2); Interception of Communications and Surveillance Ordinance ch 589 div 5 s 65 (Hong Kong).

25
CURRENT PRACTICES IN ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SERIOUS ORGANIZED CRIME

Criminal liability of the officer who conducted unlawful surveillance is rarely (if ever)
pursued. Instead, in common law jurisdictions, the most significant outcome of failing to
conduct the relevant surveillance lawfully is that evidence obtained will be inadmissible in
proceedings against the suspect. This is not necessarily so in civil law countries where
evidence obtained by the unlawful use of electronic surveillance will not necessarily render
it inadmissible.

Unlawful surveillance, or unlawful use or disclosure of information obtained by surveil-

lance, may also constitute a breach of respective privacy laws and this could expose an
agency or individual to a civil suit.

Section 54 of the Hong Kong SAR Interception of Communications and Surveillance

Ordinance imposes an obligation on the head of a department to report non-compliant
behaviour to the Police Commissioner on Interception of Communications and Surveil-
lance. The report should include details of the case as well as any disciplinary action taken
in respect of the officer/s responsible.

In Denmark and Norway electronic evidence gathering is conducted under the super­
vision of the prosecutor. If the prosecutor proceeds with electronic evidence gathering
methods without judicial authorization, this will not render the evidence obtained inadmis-
sible. Instead this will be a factor that the judge considers at trial and will affect the weight
to be given to the information obtained as a result. Nevertheless, illegal electronic evidence
gathering by a prosecutor is a very rare occurrence. If it is not the result of an honest
mistake, it can result in disciplinary action, including criminal charges.

3.11  Emergency or urgent circumstances

Often regulating instruments will contain special provisions for a situation where law
enforcement or the relevant investigating authority reasonably believes that urgent or
emergency circumstances exist and that these circumstances require the immediate use of
electronic evidence gathering or the interception of communications. As with other areas
of surveillance, there is no universal approach across jurisdictions.

In situations constituting an emergency, legislation will usually permit the use of covert
surveillance either without a warrant or with the authorization of an office-bearer of
lesser authority than that usually required. What constitutes an emergency is usually where
there is a serious and imminent threat to national security, persons or property,37 but
may also include circumstances where valuable evidence might be lost without the use
of surveillance.38

37
Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Australia) s 10; Surveillance Devices Act 2004 (Australia) s 28; Criminal
Code (Canada) s 184.4; Title 18 Chap 119 § 2518(7) US Code.
38
Police Act (Poland) art 19; Interception of Communications and Surveillance Ordinance (Hong Kong) s 20.

26
 regulation: warrants and authoriZations

In the Republic of Korea, where there is an imminent risk of a serious crime being commit-
ted which may cause death or serious injuries to individuals, the investigating officer may
conduct electronic surveillance without the authorization of the court. However, he or she
must obtain judicial approval of the use of surveillance within 36 hours of the surveillance
having begun.

An emergency authorization will sometimes be limited in duration, in some jurisdictions

only a few days39 and it is often required that during this time steps are taken to make an
application for a warrant to be issued, either retrospectively40 (as per the example above) or
for any necessary ongoing surveillance which will extend beyond the period permitted
under the emergency authorization.

In Australia, emergency authorizations to conduct electronic surveillance may be issued

where there are serious risks to person or property, or a risk of loss of evidence.1 The
law enforcement officer who possesses such concerns may apply to an “appropriate
authorizing officer” for authorization in these circumstances. The appropriate authorizing
officer is a Commissioner of Police or Senior Executive of the Australian Federal Police,
where ordinarily judicial authorization would be required.2

1 
Surveillance Devices Act 2004 (Cth) pt 3.
2 
Note that this Act does not apply to telecommunications interception, as that particular form of special investigative technique
is regulated separately in Australia. However, the Act does apply to listening devices, tracking devices, data surveillance devices and
optical surveillance devices.

39
See for example Interception of Communications and Surveillance Ordinance (Hong Kong) s 21 allows emergency authorization
of surveillance for a period of up to 48 hours.
40
Title 18 Chap 119 § 2518(7) US Code.

27
 4. Other Principles Governing
Electronic Evidence Gathering
by Law Enforcement

4.1 Reasonable expectation of privacy

As mentioned earlier, there is a clear and inherent tension between the consideration of the
right to privacy held by citizens and the legitimate security concerns of governments. The
potential of electronic evidence gathering to interfere with the right to privacy is often a
paramount consideration in determining the use of electronic surveillance, whether or not
a warrant is required. The right to privacy has been exercised by persons the subject of
surveillance as a shield against the admissibility of the captured material as evidence.41
Obviously, this is especially so where the right to privacy has been enshrined as a human
right in domestic legislation, or implied through judicial interpretation into respective
constitutions, or other legislation.42

In this regard, it is worth noting that in the last decade the relevant reports of various
national law reform commissions have consistently viewed the interest of the State in
conducting surveillance as balanced against the citizen’s right to privacy.43 Thus, from a
policy standpoint, surveillance and the right to privacy are indeed juxtaposed. The “right
to privacy” argument is more easily overcome where surveillance has occurred in a public
place or where there is no reasonable expectation of privacy. However, there is an increasing
perception that a reasonable expectation of privacy can exist outside the places traditionally
thought of as “private”.

41
For example: Khan v United Kingdom (Application No 35394/97) Judgment 20 May 2000 (ECHR); Hunter v Southam Inc.
(1984) 2 S.C.R 145 (Canadian Supreme Court); Kyllo v United States 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (US Supreme Court).
42
European Convention on Human Rights art 8; Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) sch 1; Canadian Charter of Human Rights art 8;
Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America; Constitution of Spain art 18; Constitution of South Africa art 14
43
For example: Australian Law Reform Commission ‘Review of Australian Privacy Law’ (2007); Law Reform Commission of
Ireland, ‘Report on Privacy: Surveillance and the Interception of Communications’ (1998); The Law Reform Commission of Hong
Kong, ‘Report on Privacy: Regulating the Interception of Communications’ (1996).

29
CURRENT PRACTICES IN ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SERIOUS ORGANIZED CRIME

The recent guidance issued by the United Kingdom Home Office on police use of Body
Worn Video Devices (such as those installed in the hats worn by police officers) notes that
“recordings of persons in a public place are only public for those present at the time, so
those situations are therefore still regarded as potentially private”.1
1 
Home Office, Police and Crime Standards Directorate, ‘Guidance for the Police use of Body-Worn Video Devices’ (2007)
http://police.homeoffice.gov.uk/news-and-publications/publication/operational-policing/guidance-body-worn-devices?view=
Binary at 5 February 2009.

4.1.1 Right to respect for private life in the European Court of

Human Rights
The ECHR is given particular attention because it is the only regional legal institution
which has dealt comprehensively with right to privacy considerations in relation to
electronic evidence gathering by law enforcement and because the examples it provides are
both relevant and comprehensive.
Article 8 provides that everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his
home and his correspondence (see section 2.1 for a full reproduction of article 8). There
have been several cases before the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) where
article 8 has been invoked to challenge the admissibility of evidence obtained by electronic
surveillance in criminal trials. Two examples are provided below. The first a specific instance
challenging the admissibility of electronic evidence gathering and the second a case where
the legitimacy of an entire act was challenged in the ECHR on the basis that it provided
for possible breaches of the right to respect for private life.

Khan v United Kingdom1

In this case the applicant had travelled from Pakistan to England with a friend. At the airport
in England the friend was found to have heroin in his possession with a street value of about
£100,000. The applicant, Khan, was also interviewed and denied any involvement. He had no
drugs in his possession, and was subsequently released. Khan then visited a friend. In this
residence (for other unrelated reasons) the police had installed a listening device. Khan was
subsequently recorded having a discussion in which he admitted that he had been a party to
the importation of drugs. Consequently he was charged with drug importation offences.
The applicant alleged that the recording of conversation which took place constituted a
violation of article 8 of the ECHR.The United Kingdom Government did not dispute that the
surveillance constituted a breach of article 8 § 1 but contended that it was in accordance
with article 8 § 2. That is, they argued that the use of covert surveillance was in accordance
with the law and necessary in a democratic society for the prevention of crime.
The European Court of Human Rights held unanimously that the interference with the
applicant’s right to private life was not in accordance with the law. In part this was because,
at the time of the alleged intrusion, the United Kingdom had only guidelines and no legislative
regime for the use of covert surveillance by the police.Thus there was no law with which the
surveillance could accord.
1  (Application No 35394/97) Judgment 20 May 2000 (ECHR).

30
 other principles governing electronic evidence gathering by law enforcement

While the legislative gap that existed in the United Kingdom at the time of the above
decision has since been remedied, the implications of this decision for those EU jurisdictions
without regulation of covert surveillance remain pertinent. Where electronic surveillance
is unregulated it may constitute a breach of article 8 and, if so, thus leave the work of
prosecutors and law enforcement in gaining a conviction in local courts open to further
appeal. Additionally, decisions of the ECHR resonate beyond the EU to those countries
States Parties to the ICCPR or those which have the right to privacy constitutionally or
legislatively enshrined.

The ECHR has also heard at least one case that challenged the legitimacy of surveillance
regulating legislation in and of itself, on the basis that the relevant legislation permitted
behaviour that would be in violation of article 8.44 In that case it was found inter alia that
there had been a violation of article 8 and that the law did not afford sufficient protections
against the risks of abuse inherent in any system of covert surveillance.

44
Case of the Association for European Integration and Human Rights and Ekimdzhiev v Bulgaria (no. 62540/00) 28 June 2007.

31
 5.  Additional Policy Considerations

5.1 Regulation of other users of electronic surveillance: private security

In the context of the increasing use of private security firms to conduct what are/were
essentially law enforcement activities, the regulation of private investigators and security
personnel is worth considering. Moreover, it is a topic that was briefly broached by one
country with lesser-developed surveillance regulation during our initial expert group
meeting.

Generally private investigators and security personnel are subject to separate regulation
which limits their capacity to engage in electronic evidence gathering. Private security are
often regulated domestically through a system of licensing where certain criteria must be
met before a licence is issued. The licence will permit certain limited and specified guarding
or investigative activities.

Our research has not uncovered a regulatory regime that explicitly permits surreptitious
telecommunications interception by private investigators. Private security firms may be
able to use other forms of covert electronic evidence gathering such as bugs or video
surveillance devices in situations where the subject does not have a reasonable expectation
of privacy. It is not uncommon that legislation protecting personal data will also include
consideration of the role and affect of private detectives or investigators in this regard.45

5.2 Regulating the use of changing technologies

Regulation of the use of surveillance by law enforcement (and others) changes regularly
and is under frequent review. This is due in part to the rapid development of technology
and also in response to domestic policy concerns.

45
See for example Personal Data Protection Code (Italy) Title XI s 135.

33
CURRENT PRACTICES IN ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SERIOUS ORGANIZED CRIME

By way of illustration, some of the formal reviews of surveillance regulation recently

completed, and ongoing, are listed below:

• New Zealand. In June 2007, the New Zealand Law Commission released its report
on “Search and Surveillance Powers” which recommends fundamental changes to
the regulation of surveillance in New Zealand. To date, the only surveillance activi-
ties subject to regulation in New Zealand are the interception of communications
by police and the use of tracking devices by police and customs. This has created
uncertainty for law enforcement in the conduct of criminal investigations.46
• Australia.
• In September 2007, the Australian Law Reform Commission released its report
entitled “Review of Australian Privacy Law”, which included consideration of
communications interception legislation.
• The Victorian Law Reform Commission is currently reviewing the regulation
of the use of surveillance in public places.
• United States. On October 2 2007, the United States Congress Committee
on Energy and Commerce announced its investigation into warrantless
wiretapping.47
• Hong Kong. In 2007, the Hong Kong Law Reform Commission released its report
“Privacy: The Regulation of Covert Surveillance”.48
• South Africa. The South African Law Reform Commission is in the final stages of
its inquiry into privacy and data protection, its discussion paper, released in late
2005, recommended greater regulation of data protection.49

Surveillance devices will often now have multiple capabilities, and as a result national
systems are having to develop regulation which can deal with multifunction devices and
even devices or surveillance capabilities which might not yet exist.

New proposed legislation in New Zealand proposes a residual warrant scheme to account
for new surveillance technologies. Thus where a new technology is anticipated for use to
conduct surveillance in a criminal investigation, the investigating officer may apply for a
warrant permitting its use despite the fact that the legislation has not yet anticipated that
particular device or function. This avoids the situation where a new evidence is deemed
inadmissible because it was unauthorized where the lack of authorization occurred only
because the technology used was not anticipated in the legislation.

46
New Zealand Law Commission, Search and Surveillance Powers (2007) 25-26.
47
United States Congress Committee on Energy and Commerce, Committee Opens Investigation into Warrantless Wiretapping
http://energycommerce.house.gov/Press_110/110nr98.shtml at 5 February 2009.
48
Hong Kong Law Reform Commission, Privacy and the Regulation of Covert Surveillance (2006) www.hkreform.gov.hk/en/
publications/rsurveillance.htm at 5 February 2009.
49
South African Law Reform Commission, Discussion Paper 109: Privacy and Data Protection, www.doj.gov.za/salrc/
dpapers.htm at 5 February 2009.

34
 6.  Additional Challenges

6.1 Resource constraints
Electronic evidence gathering is necessarily a costly endeavour. It requires technology
adequate to undertake the surveillance, which must be frequently updated to ensure that
it remains effective. Additionally it requires sufficient manpower to not only undertake
the surveillance or interception but also to process the information obtained. Often the
material collected is in significant quantities and might take several officers a very lengthy
period to disseminate. Thus the strain on resources is significant and may discourage
investigative agencies and law enforcement from conducting such investigations.

6.2 Training
In the 2009 expert group meeting some participants emphasized that lack of specialist
training for law enforcement significantly hindered their capacity to engage in electronic
evidence gathering to any significant degree. Moreover, prosecutors and judges are not
always aware of the latest technological advances for the conduct of electronic
surveillance.

Training in the laws, regulations and operative procedures for conducting overt electronic
surveillance should be mandatory for investigative officers involved in managing such
techniques. Training is recommended also for other officials such as prosecutors and judges
who will be involved in cases where such evidence is or may be used.

The Commission of the European Union recognizes regional judicial training as a new and
important task for the European Union in particular in facilitating mutual legal assistance
between Member States. In the Communication from the Commission to the European
Parliament and the Council it is noted:

35
CURRENT PRACTICES IN ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SERIOUS ORGANIZED CRIME

“The adoption of a corpus of legislation that has become substantial and must now
be implemented by the practitioners of justice, coupled with the development of
the mutual recognition principle, which rests primarily on a high degree of mutual
confidence between the Member States’ judicial systems, means that judicial training
is now a major issue.”

6.3 Technological challenges
Inevitably regulation will always be playing catch-up with technological developments.
And is not always the case that the technological advancements are in the hands of the
investigators before they are in the hands of criminals. Resource constraints in particular
limit the attainment and thus use of hi-tech surveillance equipment and technologies by
investigating authorities. Some of the current technological challenges faced by law enforce-
ment and investigators in pursuing electronic evidence gathering were discussed in the
expert group meetings, particular that which took place in 2007. Some of the issues raised
are listed below and they highlight the increasing complexity of such investigations.

6.3.1  Telephone number portability and roaming

Telephone number portability means that consumers can change telecommunication
service providers (TSPs) without changing their phone number. In addition, mobile phones
can roam different TSP networks. This can make it difficult for investigators to identify
which service provider through which to intercept communications and this in turn can
cause delay to investigations and thus risk failing to obtain important evidence.

6.3.2  Email, chat and voice over internet protocol (VOIP)

Email, chat and VOIP present unique technical and legal challenges. VOIP interception
allows monitoring to occur in real-time. However, this risks the inadvertent recording or
monitoring of material which could be legally privileged.50 If the material is privileged it is
not only likely to be inadmissible as evidence but it could throw into question the other
evidence gathered in the investigation by the same technique.

Interception or monitoring of computer information is also complicated by the suspect’s

use of wireless internet hot-spots in places such as cafes, airports and other areas where free
wireless internet services are available. In addition, legitimate computer software packages
can create technological obstacles. A range of privacy protection and virus protection
software is now available to consumers. Because the software is designed to protect
personal computers from attack, the software can interfere with computer-based electronic
evidence gathering.
50
Generally, information or a conversation is considered legally privileged where its content is being divulged for the purpose of
receiving legal advice

36
 additional policy considerations

6.3.3  Pre-paid mobile telephones and internet cafés

Participants at the 2007 expert group meeting pointed out that the use of pre-paid mobile
telephones by persons suspected of involvement in organized crime rendered tracking and
interception of communications difficult if not near impossible. Similarly, the use of VOIP
at internet cafés prevented easy interception of communications.

In Italy it is a requirement that every person who purchases a mobile phone (whether
pre-paid or on a plan), and every person who utilizes an internet café, must provide
identification to the proprietor. The proprietor is required to keep a register of all such
purchases. The Italian police have an agreement with one telecommunications provider
which provides them with instantaneous access to the register of telephone owners.
Other European countries have indicated that they will likely soon follow suit.

6.3.4  Telecommunications service providers

Telecommunications service providers (TSPs) play an important role in enabling the inter-
ception of communications. Participants in the initial expert group meeting suggested that
although TSPs are generally cooperative, there have been instances where they have been
reluctant to comply when there is no actual or perceived commercial advantage in doing
so. Some countries have dealt with this by enacting legislation which not only requires
TSPs to ensure that their networks are compatible with interception requirements of police
but also that any request for assistance by law enforcement or the relevant authority is
complied with, regardless of the cost.

In Canada and in France there have been difficulties where TSPs have refused to cooperate
with law enforcement unless they were paid. In Canada some TSPs encrypt or encode
telecommunications so that even if intercepted the communications could not be
deciphered. The dollar amounts the service providers demanded to permit access to the
pure communication have been substantial and in some instances severely hindered the
immediate furtherance of the investigation.

Some participants in the 2007 expert group meeting advocated the idea that TSPs should
be offered immunity from liability for undertaking any acts pursuant to a warrant or
authorization. Others baulked at the prospect of legal immunity for any party, including
prosecutors and law enforcement, on the basis that all should be held accountable for their
actions. It was pointed out by those of the latter perspective that where the interception
was lawful and undertaken pursuant to a warrant, then no prosecution against them would
succeed in any case.

Some participants had found that there was a lack of adequate training for the staff of
TSPs, and that this could hinder a criminal investigation. Where information was required
from them, TSPs were often unsure of what they could legally provide to the police. Thus

37
CURRENT PRACTICES IN ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SERIOUS ORGANIZED CRIME

the level of cooperation from TSPs can differ depending on whether their staff (rightly or
wrongly) believe they are allowed to disclose information or enable electronic evidence
gathering to occur. Thus, improved training of relevant telecommunications staff was
suggested in order to better facilitate the smooth operation of an investigation.

In 1994 the United States introduced the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement
Act which amended the United States Code. It clarified the obligations of telecommunica-
tions service providers to cooperate with and assist law enforcement in the interception
of telecommunications. Included among a service providers’ duties is an obligation to
ensure that equipment and services are installed, designed or modified to have necessary
surveillance capabilities. It requires telecommunications companies to assist law enforce-
ment when requested, and to do so in a timely fashion.

The Act also establishes the “Department of Justice Telecommunications Carrier Compliance
Fund” for making payments to telecommunications service providers and manufacturers
to assist in the cost of becoming compliant with the Act.1

1 
Title 47 Chap 9 § 1021 US Code.

6.3.5 Tracking
Tracking devices throw up another set of technological challenges. These devices are quite
heavily power dependant and thus their use can be limited to that which their power
source (often batteries) can sustain. Similarly, when tracking a suspect using the built-in
GPS in a mobile phone, pulling the location drains the battery of the mobile phone.

When regulating for tracking devices it is important that legislators bear in mind not
only the use of tracking devices which can be covertly installed into or onto objects by
authorities but also the use of technology which already exists in objects such as GPS in
cars and mobile-phones. That is, any system of authorization should anticipate the use by
law enforcement of tracking devices already existent in the suspect’s possession.

38
 7. Request for Comment

This document has broadly outlined some of current practices and challenges in electronic
evidence gathering in the investigation of serious and organized crime. It has been devel-
oped with the aim of helping member states in a increasingly complex area. Comment on
this document is welcomed and would be of great assistance. Also, the provision of relevant
law, guidelines and training materials from all jurisdictions would be gratefully received
and may be sent to Ms. Karen Kramer, Senior Expert, at [email protected]

39
 Vienna International Centre, PO Box 500, 1400 Vienna, Austria
Tel.: (+43-1) 26060-0, Fax: (+43-1) 26060-5866, www.unodc.org

Current practices in
electronic surveillance
in the investigation of
serious and organized crime

United Nations publication USD 11

Printed in Austria ISBN 978-92-1-148246-1
ISBN 978-92-1-148246-1
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*0986322*
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