CARABEO v.

CA  Aggrieved, Carabeo filed a petition for certiorari, alleging that grave abuse of
G.R. No 178000 and 178003, Dec 04, 2009 discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction attended the approval of his
preventive suspension.
Topic: Laws on Public Officers; Introductory Concepts; F. Code of Conduct: RA 6713  Carabeo filed another petition before the CA where he prayed, among others, that
Secretary Teves be cited for contempt of court.
FACTS:  On 31 October 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered a Joint Decision, DISMISSING the
 The Department of Finance-Revenue Integrity Protection Service (DOF-RIPS), consolidated cases
composed of private respondents filed a complaint with the Office of the
Ombudsman against Carabeo, Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the Office of the
Treasurer of Parañaque City. ISSUE/S:
 The complaint pertinently alleged:  WON CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
o In September 1981, CARABEO first occupied the position of Revenue Collection jurisdiction in:
Clerk at the Office of the City Treasurer of Parañaque earning an annual gross (1) ruling that the failure to provide implementing rules of EO 259 does not render the same
salary of Eight Thousand Four Hundred Pesos (P8,400.00). unenforceable;
o As the present City Treasurer (In-charge of Office) at the City of Parañaque, (2) sustaining the preventive suspension imposed by the Ombudsman on Carabeo; and
CARABEO receives an annual gross salary of Two Hundred Ninety One (3) not considering the complaint against Carabeo a violation of Section 10 of RA 6713 which
Thousand Thirty Six Pesos (P291,036.00). entitles Carabeo to be informed beforehand and to take the necessary corrective action.
o The net worth of CARABEO, based on his Statements of Assets Liabilities and
Net Worth (SALNs), from the time he commenced employment at the Parañaque RULING:
Treasurer's Office in 1981 has ballooned from P114,900.00 to approximately P7.5
Million in the year 2004. HSIDT We dismiss the petition.
o Equally noticeable as the drastic increase in his net worth is the steady
accumulation of various expensive properties by CARABEO and his spouse (1) ruling that the failure to provide implementing rules of EO 259 does not render the same
ranging from real properties to vehicles to club shares ownership. unenforceable;
o However, CARABEO did not declare most of the foregoing vehicles in his  The question on EO 259's enforceability is immaterial to the validity of the charges
SALNs. against Carabeo.
o The records of the Land Transportation Office however belie this declaration of
ownership of only three vehicles and later (in year 2004), of only one vehicle, (2) sustaining the preventive suspension imposed by the Ombudsman on Carabeo;
with the LTO certification that CARABEO and/or his spouse owns at least seven  The preventive suspension order was legal.
vehicles including the expensive Ford F150 and Honda CRV.  Carabeo contends that there must be prior notice and hearing before the Ombudsman
o Also, CARABEO and/or his spouse acquired the 1,000 sq.m. Tagaytay property may issue a preventive suspension order.
in year 2001 but this substantial property acquisition was not reflected in the  The contention is bereft of merit. Settled is the rule that prior notice and hearing are
SALNs of CARABEO for said year as well as for the subsequent year. not required in the issuance of a preventive suspension order, such suspension not
o CARABEO's failure to disclose his and his spouse's ownership of the foregoing being a penalty but only a preliminary step in an administrative investigation.
Tagaytay property and vehicles in the pertinent SALNs amounts to a violation of  As held in Nera v. Garcia:
Section 7 of RA 3019 and Section 8(A) of RA 6713 requiring him to file under oath o If after such investigation, the charges are established and the person
the true and detailed statement of his assets as well as those of his spouse. investigated is found guilty of acts warranting his removal, then he is removed
o Any anticipated claim to the effect that CARABEO's wife has business or dismissed. This is the penalty.
undertakings that should explain their acquired wealth cannot also be given  Moreover, there is nothing in the law, specifically Section 24 of RA 6770, or
credence. Our inquiry with the BIR further showed that CARABEO's spouse, The Ombudsman Act of 1989, which requires that notice and hearing precede the
Cynthia, had no tax payments reflected on the Bureau's records, except for a one- preventive suspension of an erring public official.
time tax payment of approximately three thousand pesos (representing capital  Under Section 24 of RA 6770, two requisites must concur to render the preventive
gains tax for one transaction). Such information provided by the BIR shows that suspension order valid.
CARABEO's spouse had no substantial income that can justify the foregoing o First, there must be a prior determination by the Ombudsman that the evidence
property acquisitions. of respondent's guilt is strong.
 the Office of the Ombudsman directed Secretary Teves to place Carabeo under o Second, (a) the offense charged must involve dishonesty, oppression, grave
preventive suspension for a period not to exceed six months without pay. misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant
 the Court of Appeals issued a 60-day Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office may
the enforcement of Carabeo's preventive suspension. prejudice the case filed against him.
 These requisites are present here. The Ombudsman justified the issuance of the
preventive suspension order in this wise:
 o deliberate failure of respondent Carabeo to disclose all of his supposed the public are able to monitor movement in the fortune of a public official; it is a
properties in his SALN, particularly the vehicles which are registered in his name valid check and balance mechanism to verify undisclosed properties and wealth.
involves dishonesty which, if proven, warrant his corresponding removal from  Significantly, Carabeo failed to show any requirement under RA 3019 that prior notice
the government service. of the non-completion of the SALN and its correction precede the filing of charges for
o Second, being the OIC of the Office of the City Treasurer's Office of Parañaque, violation of its provisions.
respondent Carabeo's continued stay thereat may prejudice the outcome of the
instant case, he being the head of that particular office, albeit in an Officer-in-  Based on the foregoing, the Court of Appeals did not commit grave abuse of
Charge capacity. discretion in rendering the assailed decision.
o Third, the evidence of guilt against him is strong. It bears stressing that as the  Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
current OIC of the Office of the City Treasurer's Office of Parañaque receiving as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
only an annual gross salary of P291,036.00, it is highly inconceivable how  It exists where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
respondent Carabeo could have legally acquired all these real and personal passion or personal hostility. It must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
properties. evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at
o Fourth, respondent's unauthorized foreign travels abroad numbering fifteen (15) all in contemplation of law. No abuse, much less grave abuse, attended the Court of
times between the years 1996 to 2004, indicates that he has financial resources Appeals' judgment in these cases.
which could not be legally justified relying solely on his declared income.
 Whether the evidence of guilt is strong is left to the determination of the Ombudsman
by taking into account the evidence before him. LO CHAM v. OCAMPO
 Moreover, Carabeo cannot claim any right against, or damage or injury that he is 77 Phil. 636, 638 (1946)
bound to suffer from the issuance of the preventive suspension order, since there is no
vested right to a public office, or even an absolute right to hold it. Topic: B. Scope of Authority; Doctrine of Necessary Implication
 Public office is not property but a "public trust or agency." While their right to due
process may be relied upon by public officials to protect their security of tenure FACTS:
which, in a limited sense, is analogous to property, such fundamental right to security  Gregorio T. Lantin, a doctor of medicine and lawyer, Acting Chief, Medico-Legal
of tenure cannot be invoked against a preventive suspension order which is a Section, Division of Investigation, Department of Justice, was given an assignment by
preventive measure, not imposed as a penalty. Acting Secretary of Justice Ramon Quisumbing in a letter dated October 8, 1945,
 An order of preventive suspension is not a demonstration of a public official's guilt, which reads:
which can be pronounced only after a trial on the merits.
"SIR:
(3) not considering the complaint against Carabeo a violation of Section 10 of RA 6713 which "Pursuant to the request of the City Fiscal of manila and in accordance with the
entitles Carabeo to be informed beforehand and to take the necessary corrective action. provision of section 1686 of the Revised Administrative Code, you are hereby
 Carabeo's non-disclosure of assets in his SALN constitutes a violation of RA 3019, temporarily detailed to this office effective today, to assist him in the discharge of his
among others. duties with the same powers and functions of an assistant city fiscal."
 Carabeo claims that the complaint against him involves a violation of Section 10, RA
6713, or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and  Following his detail, Doctor Lantin signed and filed informations in the aforesaid
Employees, which entitles him to be informed beforehand of his omission and to take cases after, presumably, conducting preliminary investigations.
the necessary corrective action.  Thereafter, the attorneys for the defendants filed motions to quash on the ground that
 While Section 10 of RA 6713 indeed allows for corrective measures, Carabeo is Gregorio T. Lantin has no authority to sign information as assistant city fiscal of
charged not only with violation of RA 6713, but also with violation of the Revised Manila. When two of these motions were denied and one was sustained, the losing
Penal Code, RA 1379, and RA 3019, as amended, specifically Sections 7 and 8 thereof. parties instituted the instant proceedings for certiorari.
 In Ombudsman v. Valeroso, the Court explained fully the significance of these
provisions, to wit: ISSUE/S:
o Section 8 above, speaks of unlawful acquisition of wealth, the evil sought to be  WON Gregorio T. Lantin has the authority of to sign information as assistant city
suppressed and avoided, and Section 7, which mandates full disclosure of wealth in fiscal of Manila.
the SALN, is a means of preventing said evil and is aimed particularly at curtailing
and minimizing, the opportunities for official corruption and maintaining a RULING:
standard of honesty in the public service. "Unexplained" matter normally results
from "non-disclosure" or concealment of vital facts. SALN, which all public officials  Section 1686 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by section 4 of
and employees are mandated to file, are the means to achieve the policy of Commonwealth Act No. 14, provides:
accountability of all public officers and employees in the government. By the SALN, o "SEC. 1686. Additional counsel to assist fiscal. — The Secretary of Justice may appoint
any lawyer, being either a subordinate from his office or a competent person not in
 the public service, temporarily to assist a fiscal or prosecuting attorney in the former practice of the Attorney General to which we have alluded portrays a
discharge of his duties, and with the same authority therein as might be exercised distinction between and separation of the two powers or sets of powers.
by the Attorney General or Solicitor General."  The power of the Attorney General to sign information, as we have pointed out, owed
 It will be noted that the law uses general terms. its being, not to the powers legitimately pertaining to his office as Attorney General
 It is a general rule of statutory interpretation that provisions should not be given a but to the special provision authorizing him to assist fiscals. And it may be pertinent
restricted meaning where no restriction is indicated. Just as the express enumerate of to know that when the Attorney General's power to assist provincial fiscals ceased, he
persons, objects, situations, etc., is construed to exclude those not mentioned, stopped signing informations.
according to a well-known maxim, so no distinction should be made none appears to  The phraseology of section 17 of Act No. 867 before cited also affords an illustration of
be intended. the idea that the authority to assist is separate and apart from the general powers of
 This is not an arbitrary rule but one founded on logic. It is fair to presume that if the the Attorney General. In the language of this section, the person appointed was
legislature had wanted to forbid the lawyer appointed to assist the fiscal, to sign (1) to assist the fiscal in the discharge of his duties and
informations, make investigations and conduct prosecutions, it would have said so or (2) to represent the Attorney General in such matters.
indicated its intention by clear implication.  If the two phrases meant the same thing, then one of them would be superfluous.
 We need to be reminded that of all the functions of the fiscal, those referred to are the There is no apparent reason for holding that one or the other was a surplusage.
most important and outstanding and the ones in which the fiscal usually needs aid.
 There is nothing so sacrosanct in the signing of complaints, making of investigations
and conducting of prosecutions that only an officer appointed by the President or one
expressly empowered by law may be permitted to assume these functions. APRUEBA v. GANZON
 Certainly a lawyer who is invested with the same authority as might be exercised by G.R. No 138570, Oct. 10, 2000
the Attorney General or Solicitor General is presumed to be competent to be entrusted
with any of the duties, without exception, devolving on a prosecuting attorney. Topic: C. Kinds of Authority; Ministerial
 That the person designated in a particular instance does not measure up to the
educational specifications imposed by law is beside the point. It does not detract from FACTS:
the conclusion that, in the light of the high standard of training and experience  On October 24, 1960, petitioners Salvador Aprueba and Asuncion Modoc filed with
required, there is no anomaly and no injustice is committed in lodging on the person the Court of First Instance of Iloilo a petition for a mandamus against respondent City
designated by the Secretary of Justice those powers of the prosecuting attorney which Mayor of Iloilo City,
we have named.  they are owners and operators of a cafeteria located in Stall 17-C of the city market
 The duties of a public office include all those which truly lie within its scope, those  respondent city mayor ordered his policemen to close it for alleged violation of city
which are essential to the accomplishment of the main purpose for which the office ordinance as they did on same date despite their protest;
was created, and those which, although incidental and collateral, are germane to, and  petitioner Aprueba was informed by the latter that the store could only be reopened
serve to promote the accomplishment of the principal purposes. (43 American if petitioners paid all their back accounts,
Jurisprudence, 68, 70.)  that after paying the back accounts, respondent still refused to allow reopening of the
 The authority to sign informations make investigations and conduct prosecutions is store and instead chided him for working against respondent's candidacy in the last
within the inferences to be gathered from the circumstances which prompted the elections; that respondent told petitioner Aprueba to comply with health rules and
passage of section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 144 and it predecessors. regulations which he did;
 It is not to the point to inquire whether the Solicitor General has now the power to  that respondent told him later that the store space would be used as an extension
sign informations. Granting that he does not retain such power, a question which we (bodega) of the city health office;
do not decide, this circumstance nevertheless does not alter the result at which we
have arrived.  respondent filed an answer with counterclaim denying the material allegations of said
 The reason is that the power to sign informations, make investigations and conduct complaint and alleging as defense that the remedy of mandamus cannot be resorted to
prosecutions is inherent in the power "to assist" a prosecuting attorney, as these words for the purpose of compelling him to reopen the stall,
are used in the Administrative Code.  petitioners' privilege to remain therein rests on an implied contract of lease and that
 It does not emanate from the powers of the Attorney General or Solicitor General obligations that rest solely on contract cannot be enforced by mandamus where there
conferred upon the officer designated by the Secretary of Justice; is no question of trust or official duty;
 it is ingrained in the office or designation itself.
 The powers of the Solicitor General bestowed on the appointee to assist the fiscal must  the trial court issued an order dismissing the petition, which in pertinent part, reads:
be held as cumulative or an addition to the authority to sign informations, which is  ". . . the remedy of mandamus applied for by the petitioner is not the proper remedy
inherent in his appointment. but if at all, the action must be an action for specific performance based on a
 In other words, the clause "with the same authority therein as might be exercised by contractual obligation.
the Attorney General or Solicitor General" does not exclude the latter authority. The
  The right to the occupancy of stall No. 17-C of the Public Market of the City of Iloilo FIRST PHIL. HOLDINGS v. SANDIGANBAYAN
by petitioner is but a privilege which the respondent Mayor may or may not grant but G.R. No 88345, Feb. 01, 1996
not a duty enjoined upon him by law by reason of his position."
Topic: C. Kinds of Authority; Ministerial
ISSUE/S:
 WON the Court of First Instance correctly dismissed the petitioners' petition for FACTS:
mandamus.  In Civil Case No. 0035 pending before the respondent Sandiganbayan, the PCGG
prays for the return, reconveyance, accounting and restitution — with damages — of
RULING: certain funds and properties which were allegedly acquired by private respondents
through "abuse of right and power and through unjust enrichment".
 An exit Note that the refusal of respondent to allow reopening of the cafeteria is  The herein petition states that part of these funds and properties are some 6,299,177
predicated on the provision of Section 10 (m) of the City Charter which states: sequestered shares of stock in the Philippine Commercial International Bank
"SEC. 10. General duties and powers of the Mayor. — The mayor shall have immediate (PCIBank) which were allegedly acquired by the respondent spouses, as beneficial
control over the executive functions of the several departments of the City, and owners, in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended, and
shall have the following general duties and powers: therefore subject to forfeiture in favor of the Republic for being "unexplained wealth".
xxx xxx xxx  Said shares were allegedly purchased from petitioner by respondent Romualdez
"(m) To grant and refuse municipal licenses and to revolve the same for violation of using respondents Equities and Narciso as "his dummy buyers", with "no or negligible
the conditions upon which they were granted, or if acts prohibited by law or 'cash out' ".
municipal ordinance are being committed under the protection of such licenses or  On April 27, 1988, respondent Court granted the motion for intervention of
in the premises in which the business for which the same have been granted is respondent Trans Middle East (Phils.) Equities, Inc. (Equities, hereafter), which claims
carried out, or for any other good reason of general interest." ownership of said shares as well as the corresponding rights appurtenant to
 Moreover, the privilege of petitioners to obtain a renewal of the permit (after the ownership, like the right to vote the shares and to receive dividends.
implied lease contract expired) rested on the sound discretion of respondent and  On December 28, 1988, petitioner, First Philippine Holdings Corporation, Inc. (FPHCI)
refusal on his part to grant the continuance of the privilege (especially after (formerly Meralco Securities Corporation), filed its own "Motion for Leave to
petitioner Aprueba's alleged violation of city ordinance by allowing co-petitioner Intervene and to Admit Complaint in Intervention"
Modoc to operate business in stall 17-C) cannot be the subject of an action  In the aforementioned assailed Resolutions, the respondent Court denied petitioner's
for mandamus. motion for intervention because —
 In a long line of decisions, the Court had held that mandamus will not issue to control 1) The "right sought to be enforced . . . aside from being contingent, is not only
or review the exercise of discretion of a public officer where the law imposes on him personal between FPHC (petitioner herein) and Trans Middle East
the right or duty to exercise judgment in reference to any matter in which he is Philippine Equities and Edilberto S. Narciso, Jr., but also intra-corporate
required to act (Blanco vs. Board 46 Phil. 192; Lee Wing vs. Collector, 30 Phil. 363; see in nature . . . ." — The Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction "cannot extend to
II Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 170-171). intra-corporate controversies nor to the nullification of sale between two
 And where the legal rights of petitioners, as in the present case, are not well-defined, or more private persons nor to cases filed by private persons against
clear, and certain, the petition for mandamus must be dismissed (Viuda de Zamora vs. perceived cronies" and
Wright, 53 Phil. 613). 2) The intervention "will unduly delay the proceedings and prejudice the
 The privilege of operating a market stall under license is always subject to the police adjudication of the rights of the original parties."
power of the city government and may be refused or granted for reasons of public
policy and sound public administration. ISSUE/S:
 Such privilege is not absolute but revocable under an implied lease contract subject to  WON FPHCI have the Right to Intervene particularly in the "return, reconveyance,
the general welfare clause. accounting and restitution — with damages" of the 6,299,177 PCIBank shares in favor
 Another rule is that a contractual obligation, as the lease to petitioner Aprueba of the of the Republic
stall in question, is not a duty specifically enjoined by law resulting from office, trust,  WON the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction to declare as void the sale of such shares to
or station, and the rule universally accepted is that mandamus never lies to enforce the respondents Narciso and Equities as alleged dummies of respondent Romualdez and
performance of contractual obligations (City of Manila vs. Posadas, 40 Phil. 309; to return them to FPHCI
Florida & Peninsular R. Co. vs. State ex rel. Tansvere, 20 LRA 419).  WON If the answer to both questions is in the affirmative, did respondent Court
 As the trial court correctly observed, petitioners' remedy is an action for specific abuse its discretion in denying the Motion for Intervention, and may the writ
performance, if proper, based on a contractual obligation (Quiogue vs. Romualdez, 46 of mandamus be issued to compel it to grant such motion?
Phil. 337; Jacinto vs. Director, 49 Phil. 853) and not mandamus.
 o "It is therefore indubitable that in view of the extraordinary nature of sequestration,
RULING: parties who claim ownership or interest in the subject matter of sequestration
The First Issue: Does FPHCI Have proceedings before the Sandiganbayan have no other recourse than intervention in
the Right to Intervene? the litigation before the Sandiganbayan, whose decision is subject to review
 Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not originally impleaded in a on certiorari exclusively by this Court, for no other court or forum has jurisdiction
proceeding, becomes a litigant therein to enable him to protect or preserve a right or over proceedings for the recovery of ill-gotten wealth."
interest which may be affected by such proceeding.  Indeed, in the face of such previous rulings, the inescapable conclusion is that the
 Its purpose, according to Francisco, is "to settle in one action and by a single judgment instant intervention must be allowed otherwise the Sandiganbayan will not be able to
the whole controversy (among) the persons involved". determine the ultimate owner of the shares under sequestration.
 Under the rule above-quoted, intervention shall be allowed when a person has:
* a legal interest in the matter in litigation;  In understanding the extent of the jurisdiction of respondent Court over cases
* or in the success of any of the parties involving the validity of sales contracts which ordinarily would be within the powers
* or an interest against the parties of ordinary courts to resolve, or which normally are taken cognizance of by an
* or when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or disposition of administrative agency like the Securities and Exchange Commission tasked to handle
property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof. intra-corporate disputes, it helps to keep in mind the rationale for such exclusivity of
 We have no doubt that petitioner has a legal interest in the shares which are the jurisdiction, thus:
subject of the controversy. At the very least, it is "so situated as to be adversely "The rationale of the exclusivity of such jurisdiction is readily understood. Given
affected by a distribution or disposition of the (sequestered shares) in the custody of the magnitude of the past regime's 'organized pillage' and the ingenuity of the
the court." plunderers and pillagers with the assistance of the experts and best legal minds
 Unquestionably, the shares are sequestered and thus are "in the custody of the court," available in the market, it is a matter of sheer necessity to restrict access to the lower
because by sequestration properties are placed in the control of a court to preserve courts, which would have tied into knots and made impossible the Commission's gigantic
them and/or to prevent their sale, encumbrance or disposition pending the task of recovering the plundered wealth of the nation, whom the past regime in the
determination of the legality or illegality of their acquisition and their true ownership. process had saddled and laid prostrate with a huge $27 billion foreign debt that has
No such final determination is possible unless the parties who have legitimate but since ballooned to $28.5 billion." (emphasis supplied)
conflicting claims are made parties or, as in this case, allowed to intervene in the main  That allowing the intervention may entail some delay in the proceedings in Civil Case
action. No. 0035 is of no moment. After all, there may be even longer delays and, worse,
confusion in processes and rulings, and uncertainty in results, if petitioners were to be
The Second Issue: Does Sandiganbayan authorized and/or required to file a separate action to litigate the herein matter.
Have Jurisdiction over the Subject Matter?
 The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan has been clarified in the case of PCGG vs. Hon.
Emmanuel G. Peña, etc., et al., thus: The Third Issue: Will Mandamus Lie?
". . . Under Section 2 of the President's Executive Order No. 14 issued on May 7,  In resolving to deny petitioner's motion for intervention, respondent Court abused its
1986, all cases of the Commission regarding "the Funds, Moneys, Assets, and discretion because, clearly, the question of ownership of the shares under
Properties Illegally Acquired or Misappropriated by Former President Ferdinand sequestration is within its jurisdiction, being an incident arising from or in connection
Marcos, Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, and their Close Relatives, Subordinates, with the case under its exclusive and original jurisdiction.
Business Associates, Dummies, Agents, or Nominees" whether civil or criminal, are  the respondent Court has jurisdiction to entertain both complaints and answers in
lodged within the "exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan" and all intervention over properties under sequestration by the PCGG.
incidents arising from, incidental to, or related to, such cases necessarily fall  With the denial of its intervention, petitioner is deprived of a remedy in law to recover
likewise under the Sandiganbayan's exclusive and original jurisdiction subject to its property alleged to have been taken illegally from it.
review on certiorari exclusively by the Supreme Court."  As provided under Rule 12, Sec. 2 (b), intervention shall be allowed "in the exercise of
 This ruling was reiterated in six (6) subsequent cases which were decided jointly and discretion" by a court.
where the Court held:  Ordinarily, mandamus will not prosper to compel a discretionary act.
". . . "all incidents arising from, incidental to, or related to, such cases," such as the  But where there is "gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice or palpable excess of
dispute over the sale of the shares, the propriety of the issuance of ancillary writs or authority" equivalent to denial of a settled right to which petitioner is entitled, and
provisional remedies relative thereto, the sequestration thereof, which may not be there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy, the writ shall issue.
made the subject to separate actions or proceedings in another forum."  In Antiquera vs. Baluyot, et al., 21 such exceptions were allowed, "because the discretion
 In Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, must be exercised under the law, and not contrary to law."
o "Intervention is not an independent action, but is ancillary and supplemental to an
existing litigation. Since the respondent Sandiganbayan has the exclusive and
original jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 0025, it has likewise original and exclusive
jurisdiction over the private respondents' action for intervention therein."
 CSC v. RICHARD CRUZ  The Court's starting point for this outcome is the "no work-no pay" principle — public
G.R. No 187858, Aug 09, 2011 officials are only entitled to compensation if they render service.
 We have excepted from this general principle and awarded back salaries even for
Topic: D. Rights and Privileges; Right to Compensation unworked days to illegally dismissed or unjustly suspended employees based on the
constitutional provision that "no officer or employee in the civil service shall be
FACTS: removed or suspended except for cause provided by law";
 The respondent, Storekeeper A of the City of Malolos Water District (CMWD), was  to deny these employees their back salaries amounts to unwarranted punishment
charged with grave misconduct and dishonesty by CMWD General after they have been exonerated from the charge that led to their dismissal or
Manager (GM) Nicasio Reyes. suspension.
 He allegedly uttered a false, malicious and damaging statement(Masasamang tao ang  The present legal basis for an award of back salaries is Section 47, Book V of
mga BOD at General Manager) against GM Reyes and the rest of the CMWD Board of the Administrative Code of 1987.
Directors (Board); Section 47.Disciplinary Jurisdiction. — . . . .
 four of the respondent's subordinates allegedly witnessed the utterance. (4)An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory, and in case the
 The dishonesty charge, in turn, stemmed from the respondent's act of claiming penalty is suspension or removal, the respondent shall be considered as having been
overtime pay despite his failure to log in and out in the computerized daily time under preventive suspension during the pendency of the appeal in the event he wins
record for three working days. an appeal. (italics ours)
 The respondent denied the charges against him. On the charge of grave misconduct,  This provision, however, on its face, does not support a claim for back salaries since it
he stressed that three of the four witnesses already retracted their statements against does not expressly provide for back salaries during this period; our established
him. rulings hold that back salaries may not be awarded for the period of preventive
 On the charge of dishonesty, he asserted that he never failed to log in and log out. He suspension as the law itself authorizes its imposition so that its legality is beyond
reasoned that the lack of record was caused by technical computer problems. The question.
respondent submitted documents showing that he rendered overtime work on the  To resolve the seeming conflict, the Court crafted two conditions before an employee
three days that the CMWD questioned. may be entitled to back salaries:
 GM Reyes preventively suspended the respondent for 15 days. Before the expiration a) the employee must be found innocent of the charges and
of his preventive suspension, however, GM Reyes, with the approval of the CMWD b) his suspension must be unjustified.
Board, found the respondent guilty of grave misconduct and dishonesty, and  The reasoning behind these conditions runs this way: although an employee is
dismissed him from the service. considered under preventive suspension during the pendency of a successful appeal,
CSC RULING the law itself only authorizes preventive suspension for a fixed period; hence, his
 The respondent elevated the findings of the CMWD and his dismissal to the CSC, suspension beyond this fixed period is unjustified and must be compensated.
which absolved him of the two charges and ordered his reinstatement. In CSC  The CSC's rigid and mechanical application of these two conditions may have resulted
Resolution No. 080305, the CSC found no factual basis to support the charges of grave from a misreading of our rulings on the matter; hence, a look at our jurisprudence
misconduct and dishonesty. appears in order.
 The CSC, however, found the respondent liable for violation of reasonable office rules
for his failure to log in and log out. It imposed on him the penalty of reprimand but Jurisprudential definition of exoneration
did not order the payment of back salaries.  The mere reduction of the penalty on appeal does not entitle a government employee
to back salaries if he was not exonerated of the charge against him. This is the Court's
CA RULING teaching in City Mayor of Zamboanga v. CA.
 Applying the ruling in Bangalisan v. Hon. CA, the CA found merit in the respondent's  Bangalisan reiterated that the payment of back salaries, during the period of
appeal and awarded him back salaries from the time he was dismissed up to his suspension of a member of the civil service who is subsequently ordered reinstated,
actual reinstatement. The CA reasoned out that CSC Resolution No. 080305 totally may be decreed only if the employee is found innocent of the charges which caused
exonerated the respondent from the charges laid against him. the suspension and when the suspension is unjustified.
 the Court distinguished preventive suspension from suspension pending appeal for the
purpose of determining the extent of an employee's entitlement to back salaries.
ISSUE/S:  The Court ruled that under Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292, there are two kinds of
 WON The Respondent is entitled to back salaries after the CSC ordered his preventive suspension of civil service employees who are charged with offenses
reinstatement to his former position, consonant with the CSC ruling that he was guilty punishable by removal or suspension:
only of violation of reasonable office rules and regulations. o (i) preventive suspension pending investigation and
o (ii) preventive suspension pending appeal;
RULING: o compensation is due only for the period of preventive suspension pending
We deny the petition for lack of merit. appeal should the employee be ultimately exonerated.
  A careful reading of these cases would reveal that a strict observance of the second  We find that the CA was correct in awarding the respondent his back salaries during
condition for an award of back salaries becomes important only if the employee is not the period he was suspended from work, following his dismissal until his
totally innocent of any administrative infraction. reinstatement to his former position. The records show that the charges of grave
 where the employee is completely exonerated of the administrative charge or misconduct and dishonesty against him were not substantiated. As the CSC found,
acquitted in the criminal case arising from the same facts based on a finding of there was no corrupt motive showing malice on the part of the respondent in making
innocence, the second requirement becomes subsumed in the first. Otherwise, a the complained utterance. Likewise, the CSC found that the charge of dishonesty was
determination of the act/s and offense/s actually committed and of the corresponding well refuted by the respondent's evidence showing that he rendered overtime work
penalty imposed has to be made. on the days in question.
 We fully respect the factual findings of the CSC especially since the CA affirmed these
Unjustified suspension factual findings. However, on the legal issue of the respondent's entitlement to back
 On the suspension/dismissal aspect, this second condition is met upon a showing that salaries, we are fully in accord with the CA's conclusion that the two conditions to
the separation from office is not warranted under the circumstances because the justify the award of back salaries exist in the present case.
government employee gave no cause for suspension or dismissal.  The first condition was met since the offense which the respondent was found guilty
 This squarely applies in cases where the government employee did not commit the of (violation of reasonable rules and regulations) stemmed from an act (failure to log
offense charged, punishable by suspension or dismissal (total exoneration); or the in and log out) different from the act of dishonesty (claiming overtime pay despite
government employee is found guilty of another offense for an act different from that his failure to render overtime work) that he was charged with.
for which he was charged.  The second condition was met as the respondent's committed offense merits neither
dismissal from the service nor suspension (for more than one month), but only
Bangalisan, Jacinto and De la Cruz illustrate reprimand.
the application of the two conditions  In sum, the respondent is entitled to back salaries from the time he was dismissed by
 Bangalisan, Jacinto and De la Cruz all stemmed from the illegal mass actions of public the CMWD until his reinstatement to his former position — i.e., for the period of his
school teachers in Metro Manila in 1990. The teachers were charged with grave preventive suspension pending appeal. For the period of his preventive suspension
misconduct, gross neglect of duty, and gross violation of civil service law, rules and pending investigation, the respondent is not entitled to any back salaries per our
regulations, among others. The then Secretary of Education found them guilty and ruling in Hon. Gloria.
dismissed them from the service. The CSC, on appeal, ordered the teachers reinstated,
but withheld the grant of their back salaries.
 Under this factual backdrop, we applied the two conditions and distinguished
between the teachers who were absent from their respective classes because they
participated in the illegal mass action, on one hand, and the teachers who were absent for
some other reason, on the other hand.
 With respect to the teachers who participated in the illegal mass actions, we ruled that
they were not entitled to back salaries since they were not exonerated. We explained
that liability for a lesser offense, carrying a penalty less than dismissal, is not
equivalent to exoneration. On the second condition, we ruled that their suspension is
not unjustified since they have given a ground for their suspension — i.e., the
unjustified abandonment of their classes to the prejudice of their students, the very
factual premise of the administrative charges against them — for which they were
suspended.
 With respect to the teachers who were away from their classes but did not participate
in the illegal strike, the Court awarded them back salaries, considering that: first, they
did not commit the act for which they were dismissed and suspended; and second,
they were found guilty of another offense, i.e., violation of reasonable office rules and
regulations which is not penalized with suspension or dismissal. The Court ruled that
these teachers were totally exonerated of the charge, and found their dismissal and
suspension likewise unjustified since the offense they were found to have committed
only merited the imposition of the penalty of reprimand.
 These cases show the Court's consistent stand in determining the propriety of the
award of back salaries. The government employees must not only be found innocent
of the charges; their suspension must likewise be shown to be unjustified.

The Present Case