PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. MARIO SANTIAGO, Alias Payo, Accused-Appellant
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. MARIO SANTIAGO, Alias Payo, Accused-Appellant
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. MARIO SANTIAGO, Alias Payo, Accused-Appellant
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Accused-appellant appeals from the Decision of Branch 33 of the Regional Trial Court of Nueva
Ecija dated March 5, 1997[1] in Criminal Case No. 1217-G, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Mario Santiago
alias Payo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape penalized under Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and hereby sentences him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua; and to indemnify the complaining witness Michelle Mana
the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency.
SO ORDERED.[2]
The accusatory portion of the Information to which accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty
upon arraignment, and under which he was tried and convicted, states:
That on or about the 7th day of July, 1994, in the Municipality of Guimba, Province of
Nueva Ecija, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, by means of force and intimidation did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of Michelle C. Mana,
against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
During the trial, the prosecution established that between 12:00 to 12:30 in the early morning of
July 7, 1994, complainant Michelle Mana was in bed with her daughter, then aged one year and seven
months, on the second floor of their house at Barangay Triala, Guimba, Nueva Ecija when she heard a
noise downstairs. She went downstairs and noticed that the back door of their house was left
open. Thinking it was her husband, she called to him but when no one answered, she returned upstairs
and saw the accused follow her. Michelle screamed, and tried to grab something by which she can
defend herself. Accused-appellant, however, poked a lingkaw, or scythe, on her neck and pinned her
against the wall with his left hand. Michelles daughter woke up and cried. Accused-appellant ordered
Michelle to get the child from the bed and place her on the floor, which she heeded. With the scythe
still pointed at her neck, accused-appellant ordered the victim to remove her walking shorts and
underwear and when she resisted, threatened to kill her and her daughter. On cross-examination,
Michelle stated that it was accused-appellant who pulled down her walking shorts and underwear with
his left hand while leveling the scythe on her daughter with his right hand. [3] Accused-appellant started
kissing her, then went on top of her and performed the sexual act for about five minutes. Before
accused-appellant left, he threatened Michelle that if she told anyone about what happened, her whole
family will be killed.
Bringing her daughter along, Michelle went to the house of her parents-in-law, also in Barangay
Triala, and told them of what happened. Her father-in-law fetched Michelles husband, who was then
working in their ricefield. After being told of what happened, her husband and her mother-in-law
accompanied her to the barangay captain to report the incident. In the morning of July 7, 1994, the
barangay captain, together with a councilman and a barangay tanod, arrested accused-appellant, after
which he was escorted by a police officer to the municipal police station for investigation.
The other prosecution witnesses consisted of the following: Wilfredo Mana, the husband of
Michelle; Lydia Bautista Mana, the mother-in-law of the victim; Dr. Antonio Boado, Jr., who examined
Michelle after the incident; and SPO2 Virgilio de Guzman, who retrieved accused-appellant from the
custody of the barangay captain and brought him to the police station.
In his testimony, Dr. Boado stated that his examination of Michelle bore a negative finding of
spermatozoa. There were also no injuries noted on Michelles body. Dr. Boado attested that his findings
are not conclusive as to whether the victim had in fact engaged in sexual intercourse.
The testimonies of Wilfredo Mana, Lydia Mana and Virgilio de Guzman support complainants
account as to the events which transpired after the rape. Wilfredo Mana and Lydia Mana knew of the
incident only after the victim herself told them. Virgilio de Guzman came to know about it when the
barangay captain of Triala sent for him to arrest accused-appellant. While in his testimony, de Guzman
stated that he heard accused-appellant state to a certain Inspector Paras at the police station that
complainant was his girlfriend and that they had sexual intercourse with her consent, [4] this statement
was not set into writing.[5]
For his part, accused-appellant denied the rape and stated that at the time he was alleged to have
raped Michelle, he was asleep in their house, also in Barangay Triala. The defense also presented
accused-appellants mother, Paula Santiago, to corroborate his alibi.
Accused-appellant stated that he went to bed at about 9:00 in the evening of July 6, 1994 and woke
up at 6:00 the next morning. He came to know of the accusation against him only when his mother,
who heard about it at a nearby store, told him. He then decided to go to the house of the barangay
captain to clarify the charges. On his way there, he saw the barangay captain and Virgilio de Guzman,
who arrested him and brought him to the police station.
Paula Santiago corroborated all aspects of her sons story, especially concerning the part of his
being in bed on the night of July 6, 1994. She stated that she even woke up at around 12:30 a.m. and
saw accused-appellant sleeping on the mat next to hers.
The trial court rejected the defenses of denial and alibi interposed by accused-appellant in the face
of complainants positive identification of him as the assailant. The trial court also found no reason to
doubt the forthright statements of complainant considering that her re-telling of the incident in question
necessarily brought shame and embarrassment on her and her family.
Accused-appellant comes before us with this lone assignment of error: that the court a quo has
erred in finding that his guilt has been proved beyond reasonable doubt. He would have us reconsider
his evidence on alibi, and how it would have been physically impossible for him to have committed the
rape when he was clearly at a different place at the time.
It is well-settled that alibi is a weak defense. For it to prosper, the accused must establish that he
was so far away that he could not have been physically present at the place of the crime, or its
immediate vicinity, at the time of its commission. [6] Where there is even the least chance for the
accused to be present at the crime scene, the alibi seldom will hold water.[7]
It is accused-appellants testimony that at about 12:00 to 12:30 in the morning of July 7, 1994, he
was asleep in his house. His claim is buttressed by the testimony of his own mother, who affirmed that
he was indeed sleeping next to her at the time in question. Also according to accused-appellants
mother, the house of Michelle Mana was about 400 meters away from the house of the victim. [8] We
are hard put to treat the foregoing as credible and convincing proof that he could not have been at the
scene of the crime. Considering that alibis are so easy to fabricate with the aid of immediate family
members or relatives, they assume no importance in the face of positive identification, as in the instant
case by the rape victim herself.
In People vs. Ramirez, 266 SCRA 335,[9] the Court enumerated three settled principles in the
review of rape cases: (1) an accusation of rape can be made with facility and while the accusation is
difficult to prove, it is even more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove the
charge; (2) considering that, in the nature of things, only two persons are usually involved in the crime
of rape, the testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with great caution; and (3) the evidence
for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from
the weakness of the evidence for the defense.
It will be remembered that the findings of the medical examination of Michelle Mana, as admitted
by Dr. Boado himself, are not per se indicative of whether she had been through sexual intercourse,
much less whether such had been committed against her will. These findings, however, do no damage
to the prosecutions case for it is now settled that a negative sperm-detection test is immaterial to the
crime of rape, it being firmly settled that the important consideration in rape is penetration and not
emission.[10] The absence of spermatozoa in the complainants vagina does not disprove the
commission of rape, because there may be a valid explanation for such absence, as when the semen
may have been washed away or when the rapist failed to ejaculate. [11] Nor does the absence of physical
injuries on the victims body negate rape, because this crime can also be committed through
intimidation, such as by threatening the victim with a scythe,[12] as in this case.
Thus, the instant rape case is one of multifarious cases where there are no identified witnesses, and
where the evidence effectively boils down to the complainants word against the accuseds. However, a
pronouncement of guilt arising from the sole testimony of the victim is not unheard of, so long as her
testimony meets the test of credibility. [13] This is especially true in the crime of rape the evidentiary
character of which demands so much on the part of the victim --- it entails her to submit to an
examination of her private parts, and to subject the sordid details of her story to a public trial and
against a given presumption of the accuseds innocence. Hence, it is not unusual for lower courts in
cases of rape to convict on the basis of the sole testimony of the victim, upon an ascertainment that she
is motivated solely by the desire to have her honor avenged and for the culprit to meet his just
punishment. As this Court succinctly stated in People vs. Borja, 267 SCRA 370, a victim who says she
has been raped almost always says all there is to be said.
We affirm the trial courts finding upholding the credibility of the testimony of complainant
Michelle Mana and agree that her accusations bore no apparent ulterior motive other than to tell the
truth and seek justice for herself. Her positive identification of accused-appellant as the perpetrator of
the rape is well-taken, her vision during the incident having been aided by the light of a lampara [14] and
also because she knew accused-appellant for quite some time.[15] We also find entirely plausible the
fear which forced her to succumb to accused-appellants heinous wishes, as her life and even her
daughters were being threatened.
Having scrutinized the records and weighed the evidence anew, we are left convinced, contrary to
the assailment in accused-appellants lone assignment of error, that the guilt of accused-appellant has
been proven beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt, as we have invariably held,
does not mean such degree of proof, as excluding the possibility of error, as to produce absolute
certitude, but only requires moral certainty.[16]
The evidence having established that the rape was committed by the use of intimidation, we find
the imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua to be in accord with Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code.[17]
We also affirm the award of civil indemnity, in the amount of P50,000.00, consistent with present
case law which treats the same as mandatory upon the finding of fact of rape. [18] Further in accordance
with recent jurisprudence[19] to grant moral damages to victims of rape without need for pleading or
proof of the basis thereof, we modify the trial courts ruling to add an award of P50,000.00 as and for
moral damages. For, as this Court stated in People vs. Ignacio, 294 SCRA 542, any victim of rape,
regardless of age, status, social or professional position, religious orientation, or sexual preference,
would suffer physical pain, emotional outrage, mental anxiety and fright. The rape victims testimony,
once found credible, speaks for itself.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Nueva Ecija finding Mario Santiago
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, and ordering him to pay Michelle Mana the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) by
way of civil indemnity, is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant is further
ordered to pay Michelle Mana moral damages in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00).
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban, and Purisima, JJ., concur.