Foreign Direct Investment and The Environment: Pollution Haven Hypothesis Revisited
Foreign Direct Investment and The Environment: Pollution Haven Hypothesis Revisited
Foreign Direct Investment and The Environment: Pollution Haven Hypothesis Revisited
Paper prepared for the Eight Annual Conference on Global Economic Analysis,
Lübeck, Germany, June 9 - 11, 2005
* School of Economic, University of East Anglia, Norwich, United Kingdom and Department
of Economics, Bayero University, Kano, Nigeria. e-mail: [email protected]
Foreign Direct Investment and the Environment:
Pollution Haven Hypothesis Revisited
Aliyu, Mohammed Aminu
Abstract
impact of “dirty” FDI in host countries, on annual CO2 total emission; total
use. Using disaggregated FDI data, panel data regression, we found that,
I. INTRODUCTION.
The problem of foreign exchange constraints in economic growth and role of foreign
investment in developing countries has been recognised since the works of Chenery
and Strout, (1966) Chenery and Bruno, (1962), McKinnon, (1964). Foreign
investment is expected to bridge the internal resource and savings gap, increase
managerial abilities, reduce the foreign exchange shortage and improve balance of
liberalisation, and the robust results from empirical studies on the role of trade as
engine of growth. (Balassa, 1978, Bhagwati and Srinivasan, 1983, Krueger, 1997)
But, trade liberalisation and free movement of capital has also become an important
environmental issue. Some argue that environmental quality is a normal good and
1
that, free trade and the resulting economic growth would lead to cleaner environment.
(EKC) which is due to Shafik and Bandyopadhyay (1992), Seldon and Song (1994),
Trade is governed by the law of comparative advantage which postulate that efficient
exchange of goods leads to optimal outcomes. In this process, as agent of free trade,
hard to transfer resources; the increasing return to scale theory which is used to
explain intra-industry trade all assumed that trade is benign and also overlooked the
geographical range into other areas, including other countries in search for cheaper
The Pollution haven hypothesis refers to the possibility that foreign investment could
foreign capital and local environmental standards. When firms avoid environmental
foreign firms, especially, and the desperate attempt to woo and tame foreign capital
2
by poor countries might sometimes force these countries to lower the country-specific
regulation. Direct and strict environmental regulation may increase production cost,
for this reason and in attempt to promote investment and attract foreign capital, trade
a. Pollution Haven:
The pollution haven hypothesis has three dimensions. The first is the relocation of
policies to developing countries where similar policies do not exist, are lax or not
enforced. Accordingly, global free trade would encourage polluting industries and
(industrial and nuclear energy production), in developing countries. This issue was
the subject of the Basle Convention on hazardous waste. The last dimension is the
timber and other forest resources, etc. All the dimensions relate to conscious
decisions on environmental policy and how they impact on the environment, future
Esty and Gentry (1997 cited in OECD 1997) outlined three types of FDI namely,
market seeking; production platform seeking and resource seeking FDI. We add low
cost seeking FDI. The cost include labour cost, operating cost, factor cost etc. The
first two categories provided by Esty and Gentry are less likely to be sensitive to
3
environmental policy/cost. Industries in the third category may be sensitive
environmental cost especially because of the increased global competition and the
The pollution haven hypothesis therefore has two empirical consequences, namely:
b. Previous Studies:
reported that differences in pollution across states do not affect plant location
decisions and concluded, “more than twenty years of empirical research has been
or that weak regulation attract investment”. Copeland and Taylor (2003) found that,
effects of pollution on FDI movement depend not on stringency of policy but also on
the type of instrument used. Xing (1998) reported strong evidence on the impact of
Taylor (1994) argued that on the whole, free trade increases world pollution because,
increased world income and its skewed distribution, means for a given endowments
4
and trade frictions, a country could import clean goods if its income is sufficiently
high.
Lofdalh (2002) argued that the activities of MNCs, collectively, have increased the
scale of international trade and production, thereby increasing cross border trade and
rivalry and conflict amongst them. By reducing transaction costs and responding to
multinationals new plant location decision and found evidence that, heterogeneous
environmental policies across countries do matter. Levinson and Tylor (2003) argued
that, industries in the US, where abatement cost has increased most, there is largest
increase in net imports i.e. are these goods are produced elsewhere.
Eskeland and Harrison (1997) argued that foreign firms are significantly more energy
efficient and use cleaner types of energy than local firms. They challenge the
pollution haven hypothesis and argued that, liberalisation of trade and increased
foreign investment in Latin America has not been associated with pollution intensive
industrial development and concluded that, protected economies are more likely to
5
OECD (1997) contended that, data on whether FDI is sensitive to stringency is sparse
and that, foreign capital flows to a wide range of industries some which are “dirty”,
some of which are clean. While low cost operation could be an objective of FDI flow
abroad, foreign firms generally seek consistent environmental regulation rather than
lax environmental policy, they are also likely to make new investment that protect
cost of compliance.
could migrate. Other firms subject to impediments in mobility may use time rather
than location to respond to/mitigate the adverse effects of regulatory changes. This
option is particularly important for firms extracting natural resources, who attempt to
(2002) studied the extent to which firms engaged in oil and gas industry adjust the
regulations.
Raspiller, S. and N. Riedinger (2004) observed that in France, paradoxically, the most
pollution intensive goods are imported relatively more from the most environmentally
stringent countries and that, the pollution intensity of the imported goods remains
positively related to the environmental stringency of the country where they are
6
produced. This suggests that, environmental cost is not a major determinant of
some industries like petroleum and petro-chemicals, paper and pulp, cement, wood
and timber; environmental and technological factors, most “dirty” industries are basic
because of capital scarcity, although Lucas, (1990) has dismissed this as a factor of
capital mobility; and increase in the share of service industry in developed countries’
a. Measures of stringency
These standards could be classified into different forms: ambient quality standards;
Barde (1995)
Different variables have been used in previous studies as proxy for assessing the level
protection treaties, especially those that cover transboundary pollution; index of water
and air ambient and emission standards; effluents intensity of output; level of
7
reduction in carbon, lead emission, water pollutants etc; comparative indices of
related taxes.
and global common in international environmental protection (Johal and Ulph, 2002),
While advocates of comparative advantage claim that trade bring mutual benefits to
countries, it however assumes that all costs are internalised. Many studies have
surveyed the literature on openness and growth, and the environmental Kuznet's
curve, and reported that the opposite may be true. Low and Yeats (1992) reported
that, there has been a large increase in the average number of countries with revealed
to non-polluting industries. The same expansion has occurred in all the polluting
8
sectors. “Dirty” industries account for largest share of exports of some developing
countries and there is a reduction in “dirty” goods exports from industrial countries.
That is to say that, while pollution intensive industries are being dispersed
also indicated that most “dirty” industries are capital intensive with high factor
intensity.
Less developed countries could have actual and reveal comparative advantage in
industries’ production. This is also because other factors which are related to the
environment in the process of production like labour intensity, high return to capital,
There are many plausible reasons why there is higher pollution intensity and loose
normal goods. At higher income there is higher demand for safe environment.
Wealthier people tend to demand better environmental quality, support stricter laws
and enforcement concerns, purchasing costly green goods. Poor people who depend
more on the environment than the wealthy lack the means to express the demand.
9
Another reason may be the absence of, weak or un-enforced environmental
of the private sector and the interest it seek to protect, the share of multinational
corporations in the ownership of industries. While the first three reasons could be
benign, part of the development process, the last reason could have serious
repercussion for the role of trade and investment in developing countries. Newell
(2001)
The fear that, nation states may, acting independently, engage in a race to the bottom
in setting weak environmental standards in order to gain strategic trade advantage and
However, industries choose location where expected profits are highest which
involves a combination of factors like labour market conditions, market size and
Corporate power of the multinationals, through direct and indirect means, has made
additional cost and give countries with lax regulation a comparative advantage in
10
domestic firms are influenced by environmental regulations, foreign firms are not
because they provide economic stimuli, benefits of foreign investment, more jobs,
The likely consequences of lax environmental regulation are not only distorting trade
patterns and comparative advantage but, may likely trigger competition for loose
regulatory policy or “race to the bottom”, which could further undermine the initial
run. Industries that loose the right to pollute might loose comparative advantage
Secondly, if these industries affected employ less educated workers, with low labour
demand elasticity, then this portion of the labour force could be most hard hit. (Jaffe
et al, 1995) Environmental investment due to stringent policy could crowd out other
investment by firms. The crowding out of firms and dislocation of industries to other
countries could create a set of social cost. Declining manufacturing in certain sector
11
III. DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
a. The Hypothesis:
While openness and trade liberalisation would promote economic growth at both
local and global level, it is imperative to address the concern raised on the possible
negative impact of trade and trade policy on the environment. Multinational firms
seek to maximise profit and view alternative locations offering different combinations
theoretical and empirical issues that arise from this is, to what extent do firms actually
Most of the literature on this topic prior to 1997 could not control for heterogeneity,
because they used cross-section analysis and treats pollution regulation as exogenous.
These studies linked cross section variation in investment and trade flows to industry,
other variables like factor cost. Most of the studies reported that, spatial differences in
environmental regulation have no or little effect on investment and trade flows. The
more recent studies which have taken account of endogeneity of pollution policy and
recognised that, country/industry specific variables may affect trade and investment
flows, found that environmental policy do affect trade and investment flows.
All the empirical studies we have come across on this topic used highly aggregated
data and implicitly overlooked heterogeneity among multinational firms and spatial
12
regions, this masked the overall impact of stringent control policies. We suspect that,
industries like the service industry is environment friendly. Firms are heterogeneous
in their factor inputs, lobbying power and whether outputs are exported or consumed
locally. All these have implications for environmental policy, pollution and firm’s
location decision.
We disaggregate foreign investment across sectors and determine the impact of policy
analyse their contribution to the level of environment pollution in host countries using
It will also be desirable to determine the impact of policy on relocation and new
investment decision rather than relocation. It is also important to determine if the rate
and pattern of change in “dirty” industries is similar or different from other industries.
We collected two types of data for 11 years, 1990 to 2000. FDI inflow data for
Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago - and FDI outflow for eleven developed/OECD
13
Sweden, Switzerland, UK. For the purpose of this research, Mexico, though a
Another reason for including Mexico among net FDI receivers is, there were concerns
at the inception of the NAFTA of the possibility of “dirty” investment relocating from
the US to Mexico. (Markusen, 1999) So also is the recent trade dispute on Tuna
exports into the US because of concern over fishing methods which US alleged are
harmful to Dolphins and the US refusal to allow Mexican haulage firms to transport
goods into the US because of environmental concerns has been attributed to the use of
Our choice of which country to include is dictated by data availability. While data
was available for many countries, some of the data is highly aggregated. For others,
the data is disaggregated but, for too few years. We therefore, had to limit the number
of countries because of the need to synchronise the data and make it possible to run a
panel data regression. Unfortunately, data is not available for most of the high FDI
receivers like the “emerging economies” of East Asia and countries of Eastern
Europe. It would have been interesting to include these countries, especially because,
they are noted for their high pollution intensity and the use of “dirty” energy in
production. FDI outflow from developed countries is available from 1989 to 2002. It
countries. However, FDI inflow and outflow data is not available for the biggest
14
Not all FDI is environmentally harmful. Therefore, disaggregated FDI data was
collected (for both developed and developing countries) in order to determine “dirty”
investment and it’s correlation with environmental policy (stringency) in the FDI
exporting country. We also examined the impact of “dirty” investment inflow and
countries
Our definition of “dirty” investment/sectors is due to Mani and Wheeler (1997). They
determined major polluting, “dirty” sectors by the use of emissions intensities based
computed by the World Bank in collaboration with the US EPA and the US Census
Bureau” From which they computed average sectoral rankings for conventional air
pollutants, water pollutants, and heavy metals, which was finally aggregated to
Data for the 1850-2002 was collected for Carbon emissions from energy use, non-
Temperature in °C, Commercial energy use (kt of oil equivalent), emissions from
public electricity and heat producers (in Million metric tons carbon dioxide),
OECD and non-OECD countries data were obtained on Coal, Crude Oil, Nuclear,
energy intensities, and whether change in FDI flow/inflow is related to the energy
15
intensity and its by-product – pollution levels. Most of the energy sources are either
are, environmental tax in the OECD countries, and the “Environmental Sustainability
index” ESI, 2002 prepared by the Global Leaders for Tomorrow, World Economic
University; and Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy. We however dropped
the ESI data because it is still new, only two years data, and because, the underlying
environmental tax as a proxy as a proxy for stringency. Data was obtained from the
whether the outflow is due to increased prosperity and the need to break new grounds
and because FDI flow and GDP have been increasing world wide.
variables and explanatory variables. The Explanatory variables were set against
16
c. Panel Data Results:
In the case of net FDI receivers or the less developed countries, we attempt to
examine if FDI inflow is correlated with the level of pollution in these countries. We
used data from four major pollutants namely, CO2, total concentration of known
pollutants, level of temperature and energy use. We also included GDP in order to
17
Temperature in C° = Lag FDI-inflow + lag GDP
In most of our regression results we noted that Hausman test is spurious, because the
data failed to meet the asymptotic assumptions of the Hausman test. We are unable to
choose between the “fixed effect” and “between effect”. Most of the equations also
Both FDI and GDP are positively correlated and statically significant in explaining
the movements in CO2 emissions. GDP and the constant are found to be statistically
while FDI is not. Both FDI and GDP are not significant in explaining the movements
significant in explaining the rise in energy use over time in the selected countries,
18
while FDI is not. We could therefore conclude that, FDI is only significant in
In the case of FDI outflow from OECD countries, both GDP and environmental
policy are statistically significant in explaining the outflow of “dirty” FDI to less
developed countries. However, GDP is ‘more significant’ than the FDI in explaining
IV. CONCLUSION.
Our results indicate that, environmental policy is important in explaining the outflow
of FDI from OECD countries to less developed countries. This is not surprising since
investors are sensitive to all types of tax. However, at the other end of the spectrum,
we were unable to find evidence that, FDI inflow into developing countries is
responsible for the level of environmental pollution and energy use. FDI is however
The implications of these results is that, less developed countries should continue to
attract FDI because of its contribution GDP and economic growth, the foregoing
taxes, by increasing production cost have increased the amount of FDI abroad
Disaggregated data on FDI is scanty and full of problems. It is hoped that in future
both the data collection and reporting will improve. In the case of empirical works
19
cited, the quality of evidence both statistical and case study is poor compared with
For those studies that reported a positive impact of environmental policy on FDI and
positive impact of FDI on pollution levels, a more systematic and rigorous study is
required to determine the relative weight of factors that affect FDI movements given
impact their business activities on the environment that could arise by design and by
show the link between FDI and environmental policy sould be complemented by data
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NOTES ON DATA SOURCES
1. Foreign investment data was sourced form the UNCTAD on-line data base.
4. Data was also sourced from the BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2004 on
oil consumption - barrels and tonnes; gas production and consumption, primary
energy consumption and electricity generation.
5. Missing data on energy production and consumption was obtained from the United
Nation’s Statistical Yearbook for various years.
6. Most of the data was in US dollars. However, some of the data obtained which were
reported in local currencies were converted into US dollars using either annual
exchange rate or Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). We had to do a double conversion
for Italy - which is currently within the Euro zone - before and after the introduction
of the Euro.
7. Emission data was also obtained from the Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT),
an information and analysis tool on global climate change developed by the World
Resources Institute, which provides a comprehensive database of greenhouse gas
emissions data and other climate-relevant indicators.
21
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APPENDICES
1 371 Iron and Steel 371 Iron and Steel 372 Non-Ferrous Metals 371 Iron and Steel
2 372 Non-Ferrous Metals 372 Non-Ferrous Metals 371 Iron and Steel 372 Non-Ferrous Metals
3 369 Non-Metallic Min. Prd. 341 Pulp and Paper 351 Industrial Chemicals 351 Industrial Chemicals
4 354 Misc. Petroleum, Coal Prd. 390 Miscellaneous Manufacturing 323 Leather Products 353 Petroleum Refineries
5 341 Pulp and Paper 351 Industrial Chemicals 361 Pottery 369 Non-Metallic Min Prd.
6 353 Petroleum Refineries 352 Other Chemicals 381 Metal Products 341 Pulp and Paper
7 351 Industrial Chemicals 313 Beverages 355 Rubber Products 352 Other Chemicals
8 352 Other Chemicals 311 Food Products 383 Electrical Products 355 Rubber Products
9 331 Wood Products 355 Rubber Products 382 Machinery 323 Leather Products
10 362 Glass Products 353 Petroleum Refineries 369 Non-Metallic Min. Prd. 381 Metal Products
26
ENVIRONMENTAL TAXES AS A PERCENTAGE OF GDP IN OECD COUNTRIES – 1995 T0 2000
4.5
4
1995 2000
3.5
3
% of GDP
2.5
1.5
0.5
Weighted average
Germany
Denmark
Norway
Greece
Belgium
Sweden
Australia
Canada
Austria
France
Netherlands
Finland
Ireland
Japan
Spain
UK
USA
Source: Environmentally related taxes database (OECD, 2003)
27
FDI OUTFLOW FROM SELECTED OECD COUNTRIES – IN MILLION DOLLARS
FDI Outflow 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Canada 569.407 109.781 317.007 595.33 1911 1310.39 367.747 2627.71 2884.58 2143.08 11134.8
Denmark 239.745 302.679 498.021 510.591 387.012 630.515 292.163 1226.51 878.737 761.418 1714.98
Finland 291.761 291.761 291.761 2191.91 3125.64 1207.58 2256.83 3661.44 6476.17 3758.51 13868.4
Germany 12260.1 10558.3 8633.1 5706.7 8325.2 11375.5 8381.71 13595.6 74298.1 34353.9 32813.6
Iceland 6.35566 12.8734 -0.9091 1.86054 13.9969 12.9767 -4.6804 29.7689 23.9257 56.5656 71.0706
Italy 1254.49 1233.27 994.807 1577.81 1974.7 1130.21 1060.34 2901.39 2120.06 4384.19 3497.33
Japan 11881.6 8908.21 6919.54 6900.28 7950.75 10320.1 13270 14023.5 9395.36 29124.9 8294.29
Netherlands 5402.06 8202.97 8870.12 8489.49 9719.22 8720.73 16152.9 10635.8 29085.2 25656.2 42519.8
Sweden 6763.11 2312.88 -1670.4 715.771 1824.11 4486.65 1239.49 7121.15 4153.19 5924.57 11949.7
Switzerland 2575.05 2325.49 3502.81 3339.54 4943.77 4395.13 4235.47 8147.17 5037.65 4872.19 12239.9
UK 7227.93 8511.16 8093.43 7934.76 21249.8 18665.8 15183.9 18927 21460.7 71096.1 20137.4
28
FDI INFLOW IN FOURTEEN SELECTED NET FDI RECEIVING COUNTRIES – IN MILLION DOLLARS
FDI Inflow 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Argentina 597 597 597 980 1882 2371 3192 3746 1851 1964 1529
Armenia 44.2 44.2 44.2 44.2 44.2 44.2 44.2 44.2 44.2 82.4 22
Brazil 2753 2753 2753 2753 2753 2753 2753 3075 4695 12061 8320
Chile 171.9 171.9 171.9 560.2 475.1 389 980.6 624.3 620.9 837.8 251.5
Columbia 132.6 211.9 104.3 257.9 466.6 758.7 869.7 907.1 629.1 2137.4 221.3
Indonesia 3979 3979 3979 3438.9 18770.8 26851.3 15962.9 23014.5 8381.8 6929.3 10629.5
Khazastan 44.7 44.7 44.7 44.7 62.5 559.5 1216.8 430.8 183.8 55.3 -418.28
Mexico 7529.3 7529.3 7529.3 7529.3 7529.3 4991.2 5030.9 7388.6 5151.2 9020.5 9155.2
Pakistan 187.1 187.1 187.1 187.1 187.1 187.1 187.1 187.1 156 121.9 220.3
Paraguay 14.2 39.6 85.1 44.5 65.3 93.8 64.2 44.4 78.2 64.5 63.3
Poland 1815.4 1815.4 1815.4 1815.4 1815.4 1815.4 1815.4 1488.4 2176.9 1749.8 2085.4
Slovania 969.6 969.6 969.6 969.6 969.6 1168.7 1237.7 1345.5 2074.9 1803 1700.1
Thailand 1211.7803 934.23992 687.75591 451.51862 211.88867 566.48605 708.00616 1859.4886 2165.5746 1267.9431 1868.3686
Trinidad 2 2.6 0.1 1.6 132.5 4.5 7.3 10.6 11.2 6.8 6.8
29
GDP (CONSTANT 1995 US$) – IN MILLION US$
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
ARGENTINA 187869 211671.4 236946.7 250942.9 265588.4 258031.9 272292.5 294378.3 305712.4 295362.6 293032.2
ARMENIA 5466.443 4826.869 2809.238 2562.025 2700.374 2886.7 3056.017 3157.509 3389.281 3501.127 3711.195
BRAZIL 603537.9 611384 608327 638135 675785 704168 723180.5 747045.5 747792.5 753774.9 786941
CHILE 42998.76 46425.76 52125.88 55767.54 58950.82 65215.86 70050.64 75228.73 78181.06 77286.93 80687.55
COLOMBIA 74107.82 75886.25 78836.82 83082.5 87931.04 92505.6 94407.38 97645.83 98190.64 94212.3 96651.61
INDONESIA 138426.7 150785.1 161672.6 173400.4 186474.9 202132 217580.5 227806.6 197903 199468.7 209239.2
KAZAKHSTAN 32450.51 28880.95 27350.26 24834.04 21704.95 19925.15 20024.77 20365.19 19978.25 20517.67 22528.4
MEXICO 265258.6 276458.5 286490.3 292078.4 304974.6 286166.8 300913.9 321291.7 337453.8 349679 372888.4
PAKISTAN 48393.45 50842.91 54760.81 55723.37 57792.92 60674.67 63615.32 64260.63 65899.43 68311.43 71209.71
PARAGUAY 7688.641 7878.514 8020.298 8352.784 8610.647 9016.098 9130.52 9366.676 9327.35 9372.629 9344.438
POLAND 99272.65 92323.57 94723.98 98323.49 103436.3 110676.9 117317.5 125295.1 131309.2 136692.9 142160.6
SLOVENIA 19300.34 17582.61 16633.15 17098.88 18005.12 18743.33 19399.34 20291.71 21062.8 22158.06 23177.33
THAILAND 111029.6 120531.8 130274.9 141023.9 153698 167895.8 177803.9 175365.6 156934.7 163888.4 171487.1
TRINIDAD TOBAGO 4973.66 5107.048 5022.918 4950.14 5126.478 5329.214 5539.442 5731.889 6052.325 6480.808 6926.398
30
TEMPERATURE IN C°
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
ARGENTINA 0.000605 0.00054 0.00047 0.0004 0.00034 0.00027 0.00021 0.00016 0.0001 5.6E-05 2E-05
ARMENIA 2.61E-05 2.2E-05 1.8E-05 1.1E-05 8.5E-06 6.9E-06 5.1E-06 3.9E-06 2.5E-06 1.3E-06 5.3E-07
BRAZIL 0.001314 0.00118 0.00104 0.00091 0.00077 0.00064 0.0005 0.00037 0.00024 0.00013 4.8E-05
CHILE 0.000206 0.00019 0.00017 0.00015 0.00013 0.00011 8.6E-05 6.4E-05 4.2E-05 2.3E-05 7.9E-06
COLOMBIA 0.000306 0.00027 0.00024 0.00021 0.00017 0.00014 0.00011 7.8E-05 4.9E-05 2.5E-05 9.3E-06
INDONESIA 0.001025 0.00093 0.00083 0.00073 0.00062 0.00051 0.0004 0.00029 0.00019 0.00011 4.1E-05
KAZAKHSTAN 0.000996 0.00084 0.00068 0.00053 0.0004 0.0003 0.00021 0.00014 9.1E-05 4.8E-05 1.8E-05
MEXICO 0.001711 0.00152 0.00132 0.00113 0.00094 0.00075 0.00058 0.00042 0.00028 0.00015 5.6E-05
PAKISTAN 0.000418 0.00038 0.00034 0.00029 0.00025 0.0002 0.00016 0.00012 7.6E-05 4.2E-05 1.5E-05
PARAGUAY 1.59E-05 1.5E-05 1.3E-05 1.2E-05 1E-05 8.4E-06 6.4E-06 4.7E-06 3.1E-06 1.6E-06 5.3E-07
POLAND 0.001779 0.00155 0.00134 0.00113 0.00092 0.00074 0.00056 0.00039 0.00024 0.00013 4.4E-05
SLOVENIA 7.03E-05 6.2E-05 5.4E-05 4.7E-05 3.9E-05 3.2E-05 2.5E-05 1.8E-05 1.1E-05 6.1E-06 2.2E-06
THAILAND 0.000677 0.00062 0.00056 0.0005 0.00043 0.00036 0.00028 0.0002 0.00012 6.8E-05 2.5E-05
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO 6.61E-05 5.8E-05 5.1E-05 4.3E-05 3.5E-05 2.9E-05 2.3E-05 1.6E-05 1.1E-05 6.8E-06 2.6E-06
31
TOTAL CONCENTRATIONS OF KNOWN POLLUTANTS IN ppmv
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
ARGENTINA 0.12309 0.11551 0.10751 0.09886 0.09019 0.08059 0.07061 0.05965 0.04728 0.03368 0.01783
ARMENIA 0.00442 0.00395 0.00348 0.00265 0.00225 0.00202 0.00172 0.00149 0.00118 0.00082 0.00047
BRAZIL 0.27504 0.25976 0.24331 0.22624 0.20787 0.18803 0.16587 0.14021 0.11115 0.07862 0.04206
CHILE 0.04468 0.04241 0.04016 0.03769 0.03501 0.03191 0.02844 0.0243 0.0193 0.01387 0.00703
COLOMBIA 0.06121 0.0575 0.05361 0.04931 0.04465 0.03972 0.03444 0.02882 0.02236 0.01511 0.00821
INDONESIA 0.21917 0.20878 0.19677 0.18415 0.16926 0.15303 0.1345 0.11399 0.09069 0.06592 0.03669
KAZAKHSTAN 0.1694 0.15111 0.13262 0.11324 0.09631 0.08081 0.06669 0.05379 0.04175 0.02888 0.01587
MEXICO 0.34361 0.32154 0.29803 0.27331 0.24781 0.21995 0.19262 0.1628 0.12954 0.09163 0.0494
PAKISTAN 0.08762 0.08297 0.07807 0.0726 0.0665 0.05992 0.05261 0.04436 0.03534 0.02546 0.0136
PARAGUAY 0.00339 0.00323 0.00308 0.0029 0.00267 0.0024 0.00208 0.00176 0.00139 0.00096 0.00047
POLAND 0.33776 0.31216 0.28605 0.25953 0.23197 0.20485 0.17574 0.14274 0.10909 0.07507 0.03897
SLOVENIA 0.01414 0.01317 0.01224 0.01133 0.01033 0.00927 0.00809 0.00678 0.00525 0.00366 0.00193
THAILAND 0.14402 0.13768 0.13063 0.12263 0.11323 0.10247 0.08932 0.07392 0.0571 0.04104 0.02202
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO 0.01364 0.01275 0.01187 0.01083 0.0098 0.00887 0.00788 0.00668 0.00554 0.00414 0.00232
32
CO2 FOSSIL FUEL TOTAL EMISSIONS
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
ARGENTINA 29948 31527 32449 31257 32905 32554 34375 35647 36108 38676 37715
ARMENIA 0 0 1004 759 778 930 699 883 917 822 958
BRAZIL 55298 58377 58702 61372 64050 68126 75453 78777 82180 82669 83930
CHILE 9643 9166 9580 9739 11238 12064 13762 15850 16430 17062 16239
COLOMBIA 15268 15263 16561 17215 18077 16112 16217 17273 18100 15252 15955
INDONESIA 45224 43471 49453 53879 54857 50861 68776 68946 53490 55908 73572
KAZAKHSTAN 0 0 68967 58423 53716 45184 37829 34910 33368 30753 33099
MEXICO 102435 101285 107946 100826 105902 100235 100058 104995 110933 112659 115713
PAKISTAN 18566 18527 19834 21214 23060 23057 25473 25439 26274 27025 28604
PARAGUAY 617 609 715 804 954 1094 1080 1133 1143 1180 999
POLAND 94865 93912 92571 95583 92093 94572 98606 95260 88434 85747 82245
SLOVENIA 0 0 3361 3443 2959 3799 4004 4177 3978 3936 3986
THAILAND 26130 31671 34586 38874 43161 49483 55239 57221 50743 53316 54216
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO 4619 5707 5718 4582 5263 5523 5707 5626 5827 6784 7195
33
ENERGY USE (kt OF OIL EQUIVALENT)
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
ARGENTINA 45038.59 46421.22 48833.71 48636.68 52493.7 53079.25 54876.53 58042.41 59628.78 61779.16 61469.41
ARMENIA 0 0 4298.48 2260.35 1420.03 1670.51 1790.11 1875.26 1907.93 1845.45 2060.72
BRAZIL 132508.6 134290.4 136393.2 140582.8 147663.7 153496 161789.8 170221.8 175769.8 179904.8 183165
CHILE 13629.62 14106.42 15507.51 15945.71 17201.98 18439.25 20137.33 22092.56 22636.16 25293.84 24403.36
COLOMBIA 25014.24 25254.06 26258.7 27549.03 28510.56 29827.26 30426.72 30398.89 30978.96 28081.1 28785.52
INDONESIA 92815.78 99944.72 102361.6 110789.1 115161.2 123068.9 127275.4 131911.7 131272.4 136666 145574.7
KAZAKHSTAN 0 0 79661.32 65538.92 58271.88 51690.5 44795.3 39467.37 38862.91 35731.87 39063.16
MEXICO 124030 129296.1 132204.2 132423.7 136792.4 132714.1 136807.5 141513.3 147953.7 149908.3 153513.2
PAKISTAN 43424.34 44818.79 47591.87 50068.32 52026.12 54315.47 56799.59 58070.16 59287.47 62618.13 63950.6
PARAGUAY 3088.96 3161.13 3202.21 3292.13 3596.5 3951.31 4232.89 4456.5 4306.65 4140.45 3929.5
POLAND 99846.69 98481.95 97307.95 101312.9 96728.86 99870.25 107480.1 103423.3 97452.64 93481.91 89975.38
SLOVENIA 0 0 5007.75 5302.89 5554.62 5957.9 6266.27 6627.92 6505.37 6394.78 6539.91
THAILAND 43227.47 46457.78 49701.61 52376.89 56209.29 63196.38 68878.78 71199.41 66497.56 70473.88 73618.34
TRINIDAD & TOBAGO 5795.06 5730.31 6319.17 6062.91 5759.88 5779.02 6444.47 6024.07 6955.66 8059.44 8664.78
34
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT:
INWARD AND OUTWARD FLOWS AND STOCKS
COUNTRY/GROUP INDICATOR
35