Tigno v.

Spouses Aquino 444 SCRA 61 (2004)

FACTS:

1. Spouses Aquino filed a complaint against Isidro Bustria which sought to enforce an alleged sale by
Bustria to the Aquinos of a 120,000 square meter fishpond located in Dasci, Pangasinan. The conveyance
was covered by a Deed of Sale dated 2 September 1978.

2. A compromise agreement was entered into between them whereby Bustria agreed to recognize the
validity of the sale, and the Aquinos agreed to grant Bustria the right to repurchase the same property
after the lapse of seven 7 years.

3. Bustria died and was substituted by his daughter, Zenaida B. Tigno. On 1 December 1989, Tigno
attempted to repurchase the property by filing a Motion for Consignation and depositing 230,000 with
the RTC, but this was opposed by the Aquinos arguing that the right to repurchase was not yet
demandable and that Tigno had failed to make a tender of payment.

4. RTC denied the Motion for Consignation.

5. Tigno filed an action for Revival of Judgment. The Aquinos filed an answer wherein they alleged
that Bustria had sold his right to repurchase the property to them in a deed of sale.

6. Among the witnesses presented by the Aquinos during trial were Jesus De Francia, the
instrumental witness to the deed of sale, and former Judge Cariño, who notarized the same. These two
witnesses testified as to the occasion of the execution and signing of the deed of sale by Bustria.
Thereafter, in their Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence, the Aquinos offered for admission the deed
of sale purportedly executed by Bustria

7. The admission of the Deed of Sale was objected to by Tigno on the ground that it was a false and
fraudulent document which had not been acknowledged by Bustria as his own; and that its existence
was suspicious, considering that it had been previously unknown, and not even presented by the
Aquinos when they opposed Tigno's previous Motion for Consignation.

8. RTC refused to admit the Deed of Sale in evidence. RTC then ruled in favor of Tigno. The RTC therein
expressed doubts as to the authenticity of the Deed of Sale, characterizing the testimonies of De Francia
and Cariño as conflicting. The RTC likewise observed that nowhere in the alleged deed of sale was there
any statement that it was acknowledged by Bustria; that it was suspicious that Bustria was not assisted
or represented by his counsel in connection with the preparation and execution of the deed of sale or
that Aquino had raised the matter of the deed of sale in his previous Opposition to the Motion for
Consignation.

9. CA reversed the decision of RTC and ruled in favor of Spouses Aquino. The appellate court
ratiocinated that there were no material or substantial inconsistencies between the testimonies of
Cariño and De Francia that would taint the document with doubtful authenticity; that the absence of the
acknowledgment and substitution instead of a jurat did not render the instrument invalid; and that the
non-assistance or representation of Bustria by counsel did not render the document null and ineffective.
It was noted that a notarized document carried in its favor the presumption of regularity with respect to
its due execution, and that there must be clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant
evidence to contradict the same.

ISSUE: W/N the deed of sale was notarized properly, hence admissible as evidence

RULING: No. SC ruled in favor of Tigno. RTC decision is reinstated.

RATIO: The notarial certification of the Deed of Sale reads as follows:

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES)

PROVINCE OF PANGASINAN ) S.S.
MUNICIPALITY OF ALAMINOS )

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 17th day of October 1985 at Alaminos, Pangasinan both
parties known to me to be the same parties who executed the foregoing instrument.

FRANKLIN CARIÑO
Ex-Officio Notary Public
Judge, M.T.C.
Alaminos, Pangasinan

There are palpable errors in this certification. Most glaringly, the document is certified by way of a jurat
instead of an acknowledgment. A jurat is a distinct creature from an acknowledgment. An
acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before some competent officer or
court and declaring it to be his act or deed; while a jurat is that part of an affidavit where the officer
certifies that the same was sworn before him.

But there is an even more substantial defect in the notarization, one which is determinative of this
petition. This pertains to the authority of Judge Franklin Cariño to notarize the Deed of Sale.

It is undisputed that Franklin Cariño at the time of the notarization of the Deed of Sale, was a sitting
judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Alaminos. Municipal Trial Court (MTC) and Municipal Circuit
Trial Court (MCTC) judges are empowered to perform the functions of notaries public ex officio under
Section 76 of Republic Act No. 296, as amended (otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948) and
Section 242 of the Revised Administrative Code. However, as far back as 1980 in Borre v. Moya, the
Court explicitly declared that municipal court judges such as Cariño may notarize only documents
connected with the exercise of their official duties. The Deed of Sale was not connected with any official
duties of Judge Cariño, and there was no reason for him to notarize it.

Most crucially for this case, we should deem the Deed of Sale as not having been notarized at all. The
validity of a notarial certification necessarily derives from the authority of the notarial officer. If the
notary public does not have the capacity to notarize a document, but does so anyway, then the
document should be treated as unnotarized.

What then is the effect on the Deed of Sale if it was not notarized? True enough, from a civil law
perspective, the absence of notarization of the Deed of Sale would not necessarily invalidate the
transaction evidenced therein. Article 1358 of the Civil Code requires that the form of a contract that
transmits or extinguishes real rights over immovable property should be in a public document, yet it is
also an accepted rule that the failure to observe the proper form does not render the transaction
invalid. Thus, it has been uniformly held that the form required in Article 1358 is not essential to the
validity or enforceability of the transaction, but required merely for convenience.

The Deed of Sale, invalidly notarized as it was, does not fall under the enumeration of public documents;
hence, it must be considered a private document. The nullity of the alleged or attempted notarization
performed by Judge Cariño is sufficient to exclude the document in question from the class of public
documents. Even assuming that the Deed of Sale was validly notarized, it would still be classified as a
private document, since it was not properly acknowledged, but merely subscribed and sworn to by way
of jurat.

Being a private document, the Deed of Sale is now subject to the requirement that before any private
document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be
proved.
The Deed of Sale was offered in evidence by Aquinos, hence, the burden falls upon the Aquinos to prove
its authenticity and due execution. However, the SC observed that no receipts were ever presented by
the respondents to evidence actual payment of consideration by them to Bustria, despite the allegation
of the respondents that the amount was covered by seven receipts. Also of note is the fact that there
are glaring differences as to the alleged signature of Bustria on the Deed of Sale and as it otherwise
appears on the judicial record.

As the Supreme Court declared in the case of Tigno v. Aquino, “we have even affirmed that a sale of real
property though not consigned in a public instrument or formal writing, is nevertheless valid and binding
among the parties, for the time-honored rule is that even a verbal contract of sale or real estate
produces effects between the parties” (444 SCRA 61).

Fuentes v. Buno 560 SCRA 22 (2008)

FACTS:

1. Geronimo Fuentes filed a complaint wherein he alleged that he is one of the nine heirs of
Bernardo Fuentes, their father, who owned an agricultural land located at San Jose, Talibon, Bohol.

2. He also alleged that respondent judge prepared and notarized an "Extra-Judicial Partition with
Simultaneous Absolute Deed of Sale" of the said agricultural land, executed by complainant’s mother
Eulalia Credo Vda. de Fuentes, widow of Bernardo Fuentes, and Alejandro Fuentes, on his own behalf
and on behalf of his brothers and sisters, including Geronimo Fuentes, as heirs/vendors and one Ma.
Indira A. Auxtero, as vendee.

3. In the aforesaid document, the aforementioned agricultural land was sold, transferred and
conveyed by the heirs/vendors to the vendee despite the fact that in his Special Power of Attorney
(SPA), he merely appointed his brother, Alejandro Fuentes to mortgage said agricultural land but not to
partition, much more to sell the same.

4. According to complainant Geronimo Fuentes respondent judge notarized said document as ex-
officio Notary Public, thereby abusing his discretion and authority as well as committing graft and
corruption.
5. In defense, respondent judge contended that he could not be charged of graft and corruption,
since in a municipality where a notary public is unavailable, a municipal judge is allowed to notarize
documents or deeds as ex-officio notary public.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent judge has authority to notarize the documents

RULING: No. While Section 76 of Republic Act No. 296, as amended, and Section 242 of the Revised
Administrative Code authorize MTC and MCTC judges to perform the functions of notaries public ex
officio, the Court laid down the scope of said authority.

SC Circular No. 1-90 prohibits judges from undertaking the preparation and acknowledgment of private
documents, contracts and other deeds of conveyances which have no direct relation to the discharge of
their official functions. In this case, respondent judge admitted that he prepared both the document
itself, entitled "Extra-judicial Partition with Simultaneous Absolute Deed of Sale" and the
acknowledgment of the said document, which had no relation at all to the performance of his function
as a judge. These acts of respondent judge are clearly proscribed by the aforesaid Circular.

While it may be true that no notary public was available or residing within respondent judge’s territorial
jurisdiction, as shown by the certifications issued by the RTC Clerk of Court and the Municipal Mayor of
Talibon, Bohol, SC Circular No. 1-90 specifically requires that a certification attesting to the lack of any
lawyer or notary public in the said municipality or circuit be made in the notarized document. Here, no
such certification was made in the Extra-Judicial Partition with Simultaneous Deed of Sale. Respondent
judge also failed to indicate in his answer as to whether or not any notarial fee was charged for that
transaction, and if so, whether the same was turned over to the Municipal Treasurer of Talibon, Bohol.
Clearly, then, respondent judge, who was the sitting judge of the MCTC, Talibon-Getafe, Bohol, failed to
comply with the aforesaid conditions prescribed by SC Circular No. 1-90, even if he could have acted as
notary public ex-officio in the absence of any lawyer or notary public in the municipality or circuit to
which he was assigned.

Case Digest: Gambino v. NBP Officials

MAXIMINO GAMIDO Y BUENAVENTURA, petitioner, vs. NEW BILIBID PRISONS (NBP) OFFICIALS,
respondents.

G.R. No. 114829, 1 March 1995.

 DAVIDE, JR., J.:

The Supreme court required Atty. Icasiano M. dela Rea to show cause why no disciplinary action should
be taken against him for making it appear in the jurat of the petition in this case that petitioner Gambino
subscribed the verification when in truth and in fact the petitioner did not.

In his explanation, Atty. dela Rea admitted having executed the jurat without the presence of petitioner,
who was imprisoned in the New Bilibid Prisons at the time of notarization.

He said he did it in the honest belief that since it is jurat and not an acknowledgement, it would be
alright to notarize without the petitioner’s presence since he knew the latter.

ISSUE: W/N executing a jurat without the presence of the person swearing is proper.

RULING: No.

A jurat is that part of an affidavit in which the officer certifies that the instrument was subscribed and
sworn to before him.

Accordingly, in a jurat, the affiant must sign the document in the presence of and take his oath before a
notary public or any other person authorized to administer oaths.

An acknowledgment, on the other hand, shall be made before a notary public in which the notary public
shall certify that the person acknowledging the instrument or document is known to him and that he is
the same person who executed it, and acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed.

It is obvious that the party acknowledging must likewise appear before the notary public or any other
person authorized to take acknowledgments of instruments or documents.

The claim or belief of Atty. dela Rea that the presence of petitioner was not necessary for the jurat
because it is not an acknowledgment is patently baseless.

His prior acquaintance and friendship with petitioner provides no excuse for non-compliance with his
duty. If Atty. dela Rea were faithful to his duty as a notary public and if he wanted to accommodate a
friend who was inside a prison, he could have gone to the latter's cell.

Thus, Atty. dela Rea committed grave misconduct when he agreed to prepare the jurat in the petition in
this case in the absence of petitioner, making it appear that the latter personally signed the certification
of the petition and took his oath before him when in truth and in fact the said petitioner did not.

COQUIA v. LAFORTEZA
 Flordeliza E. Coquia Vs. Atty. Emmanuel Laforteza

A.C. No. 9364

February 8, 2017

FACTS:

Atty. Laforteza was a former Clerk of the RTC, Branch 68, Lingayen, Pangasinan, having assumed office in
November 17, 2004 until January 31, 2011.

On February 1, 2011, Atty. Laforteza transferred to the Department of Justice.

On February 6, 2012, this Flordeliza E. Coquia filed a petition for disbarment against Atty. Laforteza, for
Conduct Unbecoming of a Lawyer due to the unauthorized notarization of documents. C

Coquia asserted that under the law, Atty. Laforteza is not authorized to administer oath on documents
not related to his functions and duties as Clerk of Court of RTC. Thus, the instant complaint for
disbarment for conduct unbecoming of a lawyer.

On January 12, 2012, the Office of the Bar Confidant referred the complaint to Atty. Cristina B. Layusa,
Deputy Clerk of Court and Bar Confidant, Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court, for appropriate
action.

On March 19, 2012, the Court resolved to require Atty. Laforteza to comment on the complaint against
him. In compliance, Atty. Laforteza submitted his Comment where he denied the allegations in the
complaint. Atty. Laforteza recalled that on January 7, 2009, while attending to his work, fellow court
employee, Luzviminda Solis, wife of Clemente, with other persons, came to him. He claimed that
Luzviminda introduced said persons to him as the same parties to the subject documents.

Luzviminda requested him to subscribe the subject documents as proof of their transaction considering
that they are blood relatives. Atty. Laforteza claimed that he hesitated at first and even directed them to
seek the services of a notary public but they insisted for his assistance and accommodation. Thus, in
response to the exigency of the situation and thinking in all good faith that it would also serve the
parties' interest having arrived at a settlement, Atty. Laforteza opted to perform the subscription of the
jurat. He, however, insisted that at that time of subscription, after propounding some questions, he was
actually convinced that the persons who came to him are the same parties to the said subject
documents.

Atty. Laforteza likewise denied that there was conspiracy or connivance between him and the Solis. He
pointed out that other than the subject documents and Coquia's bare allegation of conspiracy, no
evidence was presented to substantiate the same. Atty. Laforteza lamented that he was also a victim of
the circumstances with his reliance to the representations made before him.

In a Joint-Affidavit of Clemente and Luzviminda, both denied to have connived or conspired with Atty.
Laforteza in the preparation and execution of the subject documents.

On October 11, 2012, the Court resolved to refer the instant case to the IBP for investigation, report and
recommendation. In its Report and Recommendation dated December 18, 2013, the IBP-Commission on
Bar Discipline (CBD) recommended that the instant complaint be dismissed for lack of sufficient
evidence.

However, in a Notice of Resolution, the IBP-Board of Governors resolved to reverse and set aside the
Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD, and instead reprimanded and cautioned Atty. Laforteza to
be careful in performing his duties as subscribing officer.

ISSUES:

Whether or not Atty. Laforteza acted in abuse of his authority in committing an unauthorized notarial
act.

Whether or not Atty. Laforteza violated is in violation of the notarial law of the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice.

HELD:

We concur with the findings of the IBP-Board of Governors, except as to the penalty.

In the instant case, we find that Coquia failed to present clear and preponderant evidence to show that
 Atty. Laforteza had direct and instrumental participation, or was in connivance with the Solis' in the
preparation of the subject documents. The Court does not thus give credence to charges based on mere
suspicion and speculation.

Consequently, the empowerment of ex officio notaries public to perform acts within the competency of
regular notaries public under the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice is now more of an exception rather
than a general rule.

In the instant case, it is undisputed that Atty. Laforteza notarized and administered oaths in documents
that had no relation to his official function. The subject documents are both private documents which
are unrelated to Atty. Laforteza's official functions. The civil case from where the subject documents
originated is not even raffled in Branch 68 where Atty. Laforteza was assigned. While Atty. Laforteza
serve as notary public ex officio and, thus, may notarize documents or administer oaths, he should not
in his ex officio capacity take part in the execution of private documents bearing no relation at all to his
official functions.

It is undisputed that Atty. Laforteza failed to comply with the rules of notarial law.

Hence, a notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the
very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and
truth of what are stated therein.

While Atty. Laforteza was merely an ex-officio notary public by virtue of his position as clerk of court
then, it did not relieve him of compliance with the same standards and obligations imposed upon other
commissioned notaries public. However, this Court can no longer acquire administrative jurisdiction
over Atty. Laforteza for the purpose of imposing disciplinary sanctions over erring court employees since
the instant complaint against him was filed after he has ceased to be a court employee.

WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, Atty. Emmanuel E. Laforteza's notarial commission, if there is any,
is REVOKED, and he is DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of one (1)
year. He is likewise STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with
more severely.

Problem Areas in Legal Ethics – Gross Misconduct – Malpractice of Law – Misconduct

In 2007, Corazon Nevada, filed a disbarment case against Atty. Rodolfo Casuga. Nevada
alleged the following:

1. That Atty. Casuga acquired several pieces of jewelry from her; the jewelries include diamond
earrings and diamond rings amounting P300,000.00. and a Rolex gold watch worth $12,000.00;
that Casuga assured her that he will sell them; but despite repeated demands, Casuga never
remitted any money nor did he return said jewelries.
2. That in 2006, Casuga, taking advantage of his close relationship with Nevada (they belong to the
same religious sect), Casuga represented himself as the hotel administrator of the hotel (Mt.
Crest) that Nevada own; that as such, Casuga was able to enter into a contract of lease with one
Jung Chul; that he negotiated an office space with Chul in said Hotel for P90,000.00; that Casuga
notarized said agreement; that he forged the signature of Edwin Nevada (husband); that he never
remitted the P90k to Nevada.

In his defense, Casuga said:

1. That Nevada actually pawned said jewelries in a pawnshop; that she later advised Casuga’s wife
to redeem said jewelries using Mrs. Casuga’s wife; that Casuga can sell said jewelries and
reimburse herself from the proceeds; that he still has possession of said jewelries.
2. That he never received the P90,000.00; that it was received by a certain Pastor Oh; that he was
authorized as an agent by Edwin Nevada to enter into said contract of lease.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is merit in Atty. Casuga’s defense.

HELD: No. Atty. Casuga is in violation of the following:
1. Gross Misconduct: Casuga misrepresented himself as a duly authorized representative of
Nevada when in fact he was not. He never adduced evidence showing that he was duly authorized
either by Edwin or Corazon. He also dialed to adduce evidence proving that he never received
the P90k from Chul. On the contrary, a notarized letter showed that Casuga did receive the
money. His misrepresentations constitute gross misconduct and his mere denial does not
overcome the evidence presented against him.
2. Violated Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility: It is his duty as a lawyer to
account for all moneys and property of his client that may come to his possession. This is still
applicable even though said property/money did not come to his possession by virtue of a lawyer-
client relationship. He failed to adduce evidence to prove his claim that Nevada pawned said
jewelries. He never presented receipts. Further, even assuming that Nevada did pawn said items,
Casuga was still duty bound to return said jewelries upon demand by Nevada.
3. Violation of Notarial Rules: He signed a document (contract of lease) in behalf of another
person without authorization. His forgery made him an actual party to the contract. In effect he
was notarizing a document in which he is party in violation of the notarial rules (Secs. 1 and 3,
Rule IV).
4. Malpractice of Law: As a summation of all the above violations, Casuga is guilty of Malpractice
and Misconduct. Such act is punishable under Sec. 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. However,
the Supreme Court deemed that disbarment is too severe a punishment against Casuga. He was
suspended for 4 years from the practice of law. His notarial commission was likewise revoked
and he is disqualified to be a notary public while serving his suspension. The Supreme Court
emphasized: the penalty of disbarment shall be meted out only when the lawyer’s misconduct
borders on the criminal and/or is committed under scandalous circumstance.

Reyes v Glaucoma - June 17, 2015 (employer-employee relationship)

Facts:
Petitioner Jesus Reyes filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the respondents. Petitioner alleged
that on Aug. 1, 2003, he was hired by respondent as administrator of the latter's Eye Referral Center. He
performed his duties as administrator and continuously received his monthly salary of P 20,000.00 until
the end of January 2005.Beginning Feb. 2005, respondent withheld petitioner's salary without notice but
he still continued to report for work. He wrote a letter to respondent Manuel Agulto, who is the Executive
Director of respondent corporation regarding his salaries since Feb. as well as his 14th month pay for
2004. He did not receive any response from Agulto. Afterwards, he was informed by the asst. Executive
Director that he is no longer the Administrator of ERC, his office was padlocked and closed, and he was
not allowed by the security guard to enter the premise of the ERC The respondents claimed that there is
no employer-employee relationship between them because respondents had no control over the petitioner
in terms of working hours as he reports for work at any time of the day and leaves as he pleases.
Respondents also had no control as to the manner in which he performs his alleged duties as consultant.
With this, petitioner was not illegally dismissed by the respondent.

Issue: WON employer-employee relationship exists between the petitioner and the respondents.
Held:
No, Before a case for illegal dismissal can prosper, an employer-employee relationship must first
beestablished.Thus, in filing a complaint before the LA for illegal dismissal, based on the premise that he
was anemployee of respondents.Etched in an unending stream of cases are four standards in determining
the existence of an employer-employeerelationship, namely: (a) the manner of selection and engagement
of the putative employee; (b) the mode of paymentof wages; (c) the presence or absence of power of
dismissal; and, (d) the presence or absence of control of the putative employee's conduct. Most
determinative among these factors is the so-called "control test."Indeed, the power of the employer to
control the work of the employee is considered the most significantdeterminant of the existence of an
employer-employee relationship
.
This test is premised on whether the person forwhom the services are performed reserves the right to
control both the end achieved and the manner and means usedto achieve that end.Well settled is the rule
that where a person who works for another performs his job more or less at his own pleasure,in the
manner he sees fit, not subject to definite hours or conditions of work, and is compensated according to
theresult of his efforts and not the amount thereof, no employer-employee relationship exists.What was
glaring in the present case is the undisputed fact that petitioner was never subject to definite
workinghours. He never denied that he goes to work and leaves therefrom as he pleases. In fact, on
December 1-31, 2004, hewent on leave without seeking approval from the officers of respondent
company. On the contrary, his letter simplyinformed respondents that he will be away for a month and
even advised them that they have the option ofappointing his replacement during his absence. This Court
has held that there is no employer-employee relationshipwhere the supposed employee is not subject to a
set of rules and regulations governing the performance of his dutiesunder the agreement with the
company and is not required to report for work at any time, nor to devote his timeexclusively to working
for the company.Aside from the control test, the Supreme Court has also used the economic reality test in
determining whether anemployer-employee relationship exists between the parties. Under this test, the
economic realities prevailing withinthe activity or between the parties are examined, taking into
consideration the totality of circumstances surroundingthe true nature of the relationship between the
parties. This is especially appropriate when, as in this case, there is nowritten agreement or contract on
which to base the relationship. In our jurisdiction, the benchmark of economicreality in analyzing possible
employment relationships for purposes of applying the Labor Code ought to be theeconomic dependence
of the worker on his employer

Baylon v. Almo (2008)

Doctrine:
 • Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive
public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries
public. Notarization converts a private document into a public document thus making
that document admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A
notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts,
administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon the
acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a private instrument.
• Notaries public should not take for granted the solemn duties pertaining to their office.
Slipshod methods in their performance of the notarial act are never to be
countenanced. They are expected to exert utmost care in the performance of their
duties, which are dictated by public policy and are impressed with public interest

Facts:

Lanuzo Jr. bought a parcel of land from Nangyo. Flocerfida (complainant, Lanuzo Jr.’s wife) went
to pay the real estate taxes on the land, but found out that the land was earlier sold by Nangyo to a
certain Santos. She was able to obtain the Deed of Sale from the Assessor’s office, which was verified by
Atty. Borongon as the Notary Public. This Deed of Sale was signed by the spouses Nangyo as co-vendors
and was notarized in 2004. However, it was found out that Primitiva Nangyo (one of the signees) died in
1997.

Flocerfida then filed a complaint against Atty. Bongon for falsification of documents and
violation of notarial rules. She alleged that Atty. Bongon conspired with Nangyo to defraud her and her
husband.

Issue:

1. W/N Atty. Bongon violated the rules on notarial practice

Held/Ratio:

1. YES, Atty. Bongon was sentenced to 1-year suspension from the practice of law and 2 years
disqualification from being a notary public.

While the investigators found no evidence to show that Atty. Bongon conspired to defraud the
Lanuzo’s and intentionally falsified the documents, the facts clearly showed that he notarized
the deed of sale wherein one of the signatories was not in his presence. Notaries public should
not notarize a document unless the persons who signed it are the same persons who executed
and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and the truth of what are stated
therein.

In this case, Atty. Bongon’s notarization would make it appear that Primitiva appeared before
him in order to notarize a document, which is impossible given that she was already dead at the
time. Atty. Bongon failed to exercise utmost diligence in the performance of his functions as a
notary public. By notarizing the questioned deed, he engaged in unlawful, dishonest, immoral,
or deceitful conduct.
 AMORA vs COMELECG.R. No. 192280

FACTS:
On December 1, 2009, petitioner Sergio G. Amora, Jr. filed his Certificate of Candidacy for
Mayor of Candijay, Bohol.
To oppose Amora, the Nationalist People’s Coalition fielded Trygve L. Olaivar for the mayoralty
post. Respondent Arnielo S. Olandria was one of the candidates for councilor of the NPC in the
same municipality.

On March 5, 2010, Olandria filed before the COMELEC a Petition for Disqualification against
Amora.Olandria alleged that Amora’s COC was not properly sworn contrary to the requirements
of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Olandria pointed
out that, in executing his COC, Amora merely presented his Community Tax Certificate (CTC) to
the notary public, Atty. Oriculo Granada (Atty. Granada), instead of presenting competent
evidence of his identity. Consequently, Amora’s COC had no force and effect and should be
considered as not filed.

Atty. Granada counters that while he normally requires the affiant to show competent evidence
of identity, in Amora’s case, however, he accepted Amora’s CTC since he personally knows
him.

Amora was victorious in the local elections. A week later, COMELEC EN BANC
granted Olandria’s petition.Thus, this case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner should be disqualified by presenting his community tax certificate as
competent evidence of identity in executing his COC.

HELD:
No. An improperly sworn COC is not equivalent to possession of a ground for disqualification.
Neither OEC and LGC provides for such nor can the courts infer this as an additional ground
for disqualification.
Laws prescribing qualifications for and disqualifications from office are liberally construed in
favor of eligibility. Competent evidence of identity is not required in cases where the affiant is
personally known to the Notary Public, which is the case herein.
The purpose of election laws is to give effect to, rather than frustrate, the will of the voters.

[A.C. No. 8254 (Formerly CBD Case No. 04-1310) : February 15, 2012]
NESA ISENHARDT, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. LEONARDO M. REAL, RESPONDENT.Facts:
Allegedly, on 14 September 2000 respondent notarized a SPA supposedly executed by complainant but
the latternever appeared to the former as she was in Germany at that time.
The SPA authorizes complainant’s brother to
mortgage her real property located in Antipolo City.Complainant presented a certified true copy of her
Germanpassport
]
and a Certification from the BID indicating that she arrived in the Philippines on 22 June 2000 and left
thecountry on 4 August 2000. The passport further indicated that she arrived again in the Philippines only
on 1 July2001.Complainant submitted that because of responde
nt’s act, the property subject of the SPA was mortgaged and
later foreclosed by the Rural Bank of Antipolo City.In his answer, respondent denied the allegations in the
complaint and claimed that she met the complainant throughher brother Wilfredo Gusi and sister-in-law
Lorena Gusi who seek advice for a computer business which will befinanced by the complianant.
Respondent also claimed that Sps Gusi and the complainant appeared onSeptember 14,2000 in his office
to have the SPA notarized. The parties signed and presented TCTs and the original TransferCertificate of
the property subject of fhte SPA.He further averred that his services was engaged by the Gusi in a civil
case but it was discontinued because of non-payment of his services. Furthermore, he claimed that the
claims of the complainant has already prescribed and theSPA was never used to prejudice third person
and did not cause grave injury to the complainant. The IBP Board of Governors issued a resolution
adopting the report and recommendationand of the Investigating Commissioner. Afterdue proceeding,
found respondent guilty of gross negligence as a notary public and recommended that he besuspended
from the practice of law for one year and disqualified from reappointment as notary public for two
(2)years.Feel aggrieved, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Resolution. This
was, however,denied by the IBP Board of Governors in a Resolution dated 11 December 2009.Issue:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of gross negligence as a notary public.
Ruling:The SC sustained the findings and recommendation of the IBP. The SC held that the findings of the Investigating
Commissioner are supported by evidence on record, as well as applicable lawsand rules. Respondent violated his oath as a
lawyer and the Code of Professional Responsibilitywhen he made it appear that complainant personally appeared before him
and subscribed an SPAauthorizing her brother to mortgage her property.A notary public should not notarize a document unless
the person who signs it is the same personwho executed it, personally appearing before him to attest to the contents and the truth
of whatare stated therein. This is to enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of the signatureof t
he acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the party’s free act.
Suchprovision is embodied in Section 1, Public Act No. 2103, otherwise known as the Notarial Lawand which further was
further emphasized in Section 2 (b) of Rule IV of the Rules on NotarialPractice of 2004.R
espondent’s claim of prescription of the offense pursuant to Section 1, Rule VIII of the Rules
of Procedure of the Commission on Bar Discipline, the rule should be construed to mean twoyears from the date of discovery
of the professional misconduct. To rule otherwise would causeinjustice to parties who may have discovered the wrong
committed to them only at a much laterdate. In this case, the complaint was filed more than three years after the commission of
the actbecause it was only after the property was foreclosed that complainant discovered the SPA.The duties of a notary public
is dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest It isnot a meaningless ministerial act of acknowledging
documents executed by parties who arewilling to pay the fees for notarization. It is of no moment that the subject SPA was not
utilizedby the grantee for the purpose it was intended because the property was allegedly transferredfrom complainant to her
brother by virtue of a deed of sale consummated between them. What is
being penalized is respondent’s act of notarizing a document despite the absence of one of the

parties. By notarizing the questioned document, he engaged in unlawful, dishonest, immoral ordeceitful conduct.A notarized
document is by law entitled to full credit upon its face and it is forthis reason that notaries public must observe the basic
requirements in notarizing documents.Otherwise, the confidence of the public in notarized documents will be undermined