SECTION 1 - FCP

SACLOLO VS CAR

FACTS:

PHILIPPINE TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE COMPANY VS NLRC

FACTS:

PT&T (Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Company) initially hired Grace de Guzman specifically as
“Supernumerary Project Worker”, for a fixed period from November 21, 1990 until April 20, 1991 as
reliever for C.F. Tenorio who went on maternity leave. She was again invited for employment as
replacement of Erlina F. Dizon who went on leave on 2 periods, from June 10, 1991 to July 1, 1991
and July 19, 1991 to August 8, 1991.

On September 2, 1991, de Guzman was again asked to join PT&T as a probationary employee where
probationary period will cover 150 days. She indicated in the portion of the job application form
under civil status that she was single although she had contracted marriage a few months
earlier. When petitioner learned later about the marriage, its branch supervisor, Delia M. Oficial,
sent de Guzman a memorandum requiring her to explain the discrepancy. Included in the
memorandum, was a reminder about the company’s policy of not accepting married women for
employment. She was dismissed from the company effective January 29, 1992. Labor Arbiter
handed down decision on November 23, 1993 declaring that petitioner illegally dismissed De
Guzman, who had already gained the status of a regular employee. Furthermore, it was apparent
that she had been discriminated on account of her having contracted marriage in violation of
company policies.

ISSUE: Whether the alleged concealment of civil status can be grounds to terminate the services of
an employee.

HELD:

The policy of PT&T is in derogation of the provisions stated in Art.136 of the Labor Code on the
right of a woman to be free from any kind of stipulation against marriage in connection with her
employment and it likewise is contrary to good morals and public policy, depriving a woman of her
freedom to choose her status, a privilege that is inherent in an individual as an intangible and
inalienable right. The kind of policy followed by PT&T strikes at the very essence, ideals and
purpose of marriage as an inviolable social institution and ultimately, family as the foundation of the
nation. Such policy must be prohibited in all its indirect, disguised or dissembled forms as
discriminatory conduct derogatory of the laws of the land not only for order but also imperatively
required.
RAYRAY VS CHAEKYUNG LEE

FACTS:

Rayray married Lee in 1952 in Pusan, Korea. Before the marriage, Lee was able to secure a marriage
license which is a requirement in Korea prior to marrying. They lived together until 1955. Rayray
however later found out that Lee had previously lived with 2 Americans and a Korean. Lee
answered by saying that it is not unusual in Korea for a woman to have more than one partner and
that it is legally permissive for them to do so and that there is no legal impediment to her marriage
with Rayray. Eventually they pursued their separate ways. Rayray later filed before lower court of
Manila for an action to annul his marriage with Lee because Lee’s whereabouts cannot be
determined and that his consent in marrying Lee would have not been for the marriage had he known
prior that Lee had been living with other men. His action for annulment had been duly published and
summons were made known to Lee but due to her absence Rayray moved to have Lee be declared in
default. The lower court denied Rayray’s action stating that since the marriage was celebrated in
Korea the court cannot take cognizance of the case and that the facts presented by Rayray is not
sufficient to debunk his marriage with Lee.
ISSUE: Whether or not Rayray’s marriage with Lee is null and void.
HELD: The lower court erred in ruling that Philippine courts do not have jurisdiction over the case.
As far as marriage status is concerned, the nationality principle is controlling NOT lex loci
celebracionis. The lower court is however correct in ruling that Rayray’s evidence is not sufficient to
render his marriage with Lee null and void. Rayray said that the police clearance secured by Lee is
meant to allow her to marry after her subsequent cohabitation/s with the other men – which is
considered bigamous in Philippine law. The SC ruled that the police clearance is wanting for it lacks
the signature of the person who prepared it and there is no competent document to establish the
identity of the same. Also, through Rayray himself, Lee averred that it is ok in Korea for a person
who cohabited with other men before to marry another man. This is an indication that Lee herself is
aware that if it were a previous marriage that is concerned then that could be a legal impediment to
any subsequent marriage. Rayray cannot be given credence in claiming that his consent could have
been otherwise altered had he known all these facts prior to the marriage because he would lie to
every opportunity given him by the Court so as to suit his case.
MANUEL VS PEOPLE

FACTS:

This case is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of Court of Appeals affirming the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, convicting the petitioner for the crime of
bigamy.

Eduardo P. Manuel, herein petitioner, was first married to Rubylus Gaña on July 18, 1975, who,
according to the former, was charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter imprisoned and was never
seen again by him after his last visit. Manuel met Tina B. Gandalera in January 1996 when the latter
was only 21 years old. Three months after their meeting, the two got married through a civil wedding
in Baguio City without Gandalera’s knowledge of Manuel’s first marriage. In the course of their
marriage, things got rocky and Gandalera learned that Eduardo was in fact already married when he
married him. She then filed a criminal case of bigamy against Eduardo Manuel. The latter’s defense
being that his declaration of “single” in his marriage contract with Gandalera was done because he
believed in good faith that his first marriage was invalid and that he did not know that he had to go to
court to seek for the nullification of his first marriage before marrying Tina. The Regional Trial
Court ruled against him sentencing him of imprisonment of from 6 years and 10 months to ten years,
and an amount 0f P200,000.00 for moral damages.

Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA where he alleged that he was not criminally liable for
bigamy because when he married the private complainant, he did so in good faith and without any
malicious intent. The CA ruled against the petitioner but with modification on the RTC’s decision.
Imprisonment was from 2 years, months and 1 day to ten years. Pecuniary reward for moral damages
was affirmed.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error of law when it ruled that
petitioner’s wife cannot be legally presumed dead under Article 390 of the Civil Code as there was
no judicial declaration of presumptive death as provided for under Article 41 of the Family Code.

2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error of law when it affirmed the award
of Php200,000.00 as moral damages as it has no basis in fact and in law.

HELD:
1. The petition is denied for lack of merit. The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or
evil intent when he married the private complainant. As a general rule, mistake of fact or good faith
of the accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo; such defense negates malice
or criminal intent. However, ignorance of the law is not an excuse because everyone is presumed to
know the law. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat. Where a spouse is absent for the requisite period,
the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage only after securing a judgment declaring the
presumptive death of the absent spouse to avoid being charged and convicted of bigamy; the present
spouse will have to adduce evidence that he had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was
already dead. Such judgment is proof of the good faith of the present spouse who contracted a
subsequent marriage; thus, even if the present spouse is later charged with bigamy if the absentee
spouse reappears, he cannot be convicted of the crime.

The court ruled against the petitioner.

2. The Court rules that the petitioner’s collective acts of fraud and deceit before, during and after his
marriage with the private complainant were willful, deliberate and with malice and caused injury to
the latter. The Court thus declares that the petitioner’s acts are against public policy as they
undermine and subvert the family as a social institution, good morals and the interest and general
welfare of society. Because the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioner’s
perfidy, she is not barred from claiming moral damages. Considering the attendant circumstances of
the case, the Court finds the award of P200,000.00 for moral damages to be just and reasonable.

ZULUETA VS CA

FACTS:

This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch X) which ordered petitioner to return documents and papers
taken by her from private respondent's clinic without the latter's knowledge and consent.

Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982,
petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother,
a driver and private respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband's
clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his
alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs.
The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for
disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband.

Issue:

(1) Whether or not the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence;

Held:

(1) No. Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The
constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be]
inviolable" is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her
husband's infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced.
The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order [from a] court
or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation of this
provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding."
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and
cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person,
by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and
the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.

The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged.
Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected
spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to
any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for
specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for
each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity
that each owes to the other.

The review for petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

DUNCAN VS GLAXO

FACTS:

Tecson was hired by Glaxo as a medical representative on Oct. 24, 1995. Contract of employment
signed by Tecson stipulates, among others, that he agrees to study and abide by the existing company
rules; to disclose to management any existing future relationship by consanguinity or affinity with
co-employees or employees with competing drug companies and should management find that such
relationship poses a prossible conflict of interest, to resign from the company. Company's Code of
Employee Conduct provides the same with stipulation that management may transfer the employee
to another department in a non-counterchecking position or preparation for employment outside of
the company after 6 months.

Tecson was initially assigned to market Glaxo's products in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte area
and entered into a romantic relationship with Betsy, an employee of Astra, Glaxo's competition.
Before getting married, Tecson's District Manager reminded him several times of the conflict of
interest but marriage took place in Sept. 1998. In Jan. 1999, Tecson's superiors informed him of
conflict of intrest. Tecson asked for time to comply with the condition (that either he or Betsy resign
from their respective positions). Unable to comply with condition, Glaxo transferred Tecson to the
Butuan-Surigao City-Agusan del Sur sales area. After his request against transfer was denied, Tecson
brought the matter to Glaxo's Grievance Committee and while pending, he continued to act as
medical representative in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area. On Nov. 15, 2000, the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board ruled that Glaxo's policy was valid...

ISSUE:

Whether or not the policy of a pharmaceutical company prohibiting its employees from marrying
employees of any competitor company is valid
RULING:

On Equal Protection

Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas, marketing strategies, and other
confidential programs and information from competitors. The prohibition against pesonal or marital
relationships with employees of competitor companies upon Glaxo's employees is reasonable under
the circumstances because relationships of that nature might compromise the interests of the
company. That Glaxo possesses the right to protect its economic interest cannot be denied.

It is the settled principle that the commands of the equal protection clause are addressed only to the
state or those acting under color of its authority. Corollarily, it has been held in a long array of US
Supreme Court decisions that the equal protection clause erects to shield against merely privately
conduct, however, discriminatory or wrongful.

The company actually enforced the policy after repeated requests to the employee to comply with the
policy. Indeed the application of the policy was made in an impartial and even-handed manner, with
due regard for the lot of the employee.

On Constructive Dismissal

Constructive dismissal is defined as a quitting, an involuntary resignation resorted to when continued

STAR PAPER CORP. VS SIMBOL

FACTS:

At bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 03,
2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 73477 reversing the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) which affirmed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter. The following facts were presented:

(a) The respondents were all regular employees of the company;

(b) On October 27, 1993, Simbol was hired by the company. He met Alma Dayrit, also an employee
of the company. He married her on June 27, 1998. Prior to the marriage, Ongsitco advised the
couple that should they decide to get married, one of them should resign pursuant to a company
policy promulgated in 1995. Simbol resigned on June 20, 1998.

(c) On February 5, 1997, Comia was hired by the company. She met Howard Comia, a co-employee
whom she married on June 1, 2000. Ongsitco likewise reminded them pursuant to the
aforementioned company policy. Comia resigned on June 30, 2000.

(d) Simbol and Comia alleged that they did not resign voluntarily; they were compelled to resign in
view of an illegal company policy.
(e) On July 29, 1994, Estrella was hired by the company. She met Luisito Zuniga, also a co-worker,
whom petitioners claimed to be a married man who got Estrella impregnated. The company allegedly
could have terminated her services due to immorality but she opted to resign on December 21, 1999.

(f) Estrella alleged that she had a relationship with co-worker Zuniga who misrepresented himself as
a married but a separated man. After he got her pregnant, she discovered that he was not
separated. Thus, she severed her relationship with him to avoid dismissal due to company policy.

(g) On November 30, 1999, Estrella met an accident and had to recuperate for twenty-one (21)
days as advised by the doctor of the Orthopaedic Hospital. On December 21, 1999 but she found
out that her name was on hold at the gate. She was directed to the personnel office and handed a
memorandum that stated that she was being dismissed for immoral conduct. Estrella was asked to
submit an explanation but she was dismissed nonetheless. She resigned because she was in dire need
of money and resignation could give her the thirteenth month pay.

On May 31, 2001, Labor Arbiter Del Rosario dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.

On January, 11, 2002, NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter.

On August 8, 2002, NLRC denied the respondents’ Motion for Reconsideration through a
Resolution.

On August 3, 2004, the CA reversed the NLRC decision and declared that:

(a) The petitioners’ dismissal from employment was illegal:

(b) The private respondents are ordered to reinstate the petitioners to their former positions without
loss of seniority rights with full backwages from the time of their dismissal until actual reinstatement;
and

(c) The private respondents are to pay petitioners’ attorney’s fees amounting to 10% of the award
and the cost of the suit.

Hence, this petition.

Issues:

The issues raised by this petition are:

(1) Whether or not the CA erred in holding that the subject 1995 policy/ regulation is violative of the
constituional rights towards marriage and the family of employees and of Article 136 of the Labor
Code: and

(2) Whether or not the respondents’ resignations were far from voluntary.

Held:

(1) No. The CA did not err in holding that the subject 1995 policy/ regulation is violative of the
constitutional rights towards marriage and the family of employees and or Article 136 of the Labor
Code:
(ARTICLE 136. Stipulation against marriage. – It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a
condition of employment or continuation of employment that a woman employee shall not get
married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman employee shall be
deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a
woman employee merely by reason of her marriage.)

ONG VS ONG

FACTS:

William Ong and Lucita Ong have been married for more than 20 years when Lucita filed a
complaint for Legal separation under Article 55 par. (1) of the Family Code.

Lucita alleged that since their third year of marriage, her husband William subjected her to physical
violence like slapping, kicking and pulling her hair and bang her head against the concrete
wall.and been violent towards their three children. He would scold them using his belt buckle
to beat them. One day after a violent quarrel wherein William hit Lucita on several different parts of
her body, pointed a gun at her and asked her to leave the house which she did.

Lucita’s statements about William’s abusive behavior were corroborated by her sister Linda Lim. Dr.
Vicente Elinzan whom Lucita consulted the day after she left her conjugal home also testified about
her injuries.

The trial court granted Lucitas petition for legal separation which the CA affirmed

William then filed this petition for review on certiorari

-On the decision denying all of Lucita’s allegations and that he never inflicted physical harm on her
or their children.

-He also argued that the real motive of Lucita and her family in filing the complaint is to deprive
him of his control and ownership over his conjugal properties with Lucita.

-That the CA overlooked some facts of the case which warrant an exception to the general rule that
questions of fact cannot be the subject for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

-The CA erred in relying on the testimonies of Lucita her sister and their parents’ doctor Dr.
ElinZano since their testimonies are tainted with relationship and fraud and since Lucita abandoned
the family home she has also given a ground for legal separation and therefore should NOT- be
granted one pursuant to Art. 56 par. 4 of The family code – Where both parties have given
ground for legal separation
ISSUE: WON Lucita Ong should be granted a decree on legal separation

HELD:

The claim that the real motive of Lucita in filing the case is for her family to take control of the
conjugal properties is absurd. Lucita left because of her husband’s repeated physical violence and
grossly abusive conduct. That the physical violence and grossly abusive conduct were brought to
bear upon Lucita have been duly established. He can derive no personal gain from pushing for the
financial interests of her family at the expense of her marriage of 20 years and the companionship of
her husband and children

The assessment of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses is given great respect.
Relationship alone is not enough to discredit and label a witness’ testimony as biased and
unworthy of credence. Witnesses Linda Lim and Dr. Elinzano gave detailed and straightforward
testimonies the court finds that their testimonies are not tainted with bias.

The abandonment referred to by the Family Code is abandonment without justifiable cause for more
than one year. Lucita left William due to his abusive conduct, such does not constitute abandonment
contemplated in the said provision

PETITION DENIED: Lucita should be granted a decree of legal separation

SSS VS JARQUE VDA. DE BAILON

FACTS

In 1955 Clemente Bailon and Alice Diaz married in Barcelona, Sorsogon. 15+ years later, Clemente
filed an action to declare the presumptive death of Alice she being an absentee. The petition was
granted in 1970. In 1983, Clemente married Jarque. The two live together untile Clemente’s death in
1998. Jarque then sought to claim her husband’s SSS benefits and the same were granted her. On the
other hand, a certain Cecilia Baion-Yap who claimed that she is the daughter of Bailon to a certain
Elisa Jayona petitioned before the SSS that they be given the reimbursement for the funeral spending
for it was actually them who shouldered the burial expenses of Clemente. They further claim that
Clemente contracted three marriages; one with Alice, another with Elisa and the other with Jarque.
Cecilia also averred that Alice is alive and kicking and Alice subsequently emerged; Cecilia claimed
that Clemente obtained the declaration of Alice’s presumptive death in bad faith for he was aware of
the whereabouts of Alice or if not he could have easily located her in her parent’s place. She was in
Sorsogon all along in her parents’ place. She went there upon learning that Clemente had been
having extra-marital affairs. SSS then ruled that Jarque should reimburse what had been granted her
and to return the same to Cecilia since she shouldered the burial expenses and that the benefits
should go to Alice because her reappearance had terminated Clemente’s marriage with Harque.
Further, SSS ruled that the RTC’s decision in declaring Alice to be presumptively death is erroneous.
Teresita appealed the decision of the SSS before the Social Security Comission and the SSC affirmed
SSS. The CA however ruled the contrary.
ISSUE: Whether or not the mere appearance of the absent spouse declared presumptively dead
automatically terminates the subsequent marriage.
HELD: There is no previous marriage to restore for it is terminated upon Clemente’s death.
Likewise there is no subsequent marriage to terminate for the same is terminated upon Clemente’s
death. SSS is correct in ruling that it is futile for Alice to pursue the recording of her reappearance
before the local civil registrar through an affidavit or a court action. But it is not correct for the SSS
to rule upon the declaration made by the RTC. The SSC or the SSS has no judicial power to review
the decision of the RTC. SSS is indeed empowered to determine as to who should be the rightful
beneficiary of the benefits obtained by a deceased member in case of disputes but such power does
not include the appellate power to review a court decision or declaration. In the case at bar, the RTC
ruling is binding and Jarque’s marriage to Clemente is still valid because no affidavit was filed by
Alice to make known her reappearance legally. Alice reappeared only after Clemente’s death and in
this case she can no longer file such an affidavit; in this case the bad faith [or good faith] of
Clemente can no longer be raised – the marriage herein is considered voidable and must be attacked
directly not collaterally – it is however impossible for a direct attack since there is no longer a
marriage to be attacked for the same has been terminated upon Clemente’s death.

GOMEZ VS LIPANA

FACTS:

The defendant-appellant, Joaquin P. Lipana, contracted two marriages: the first with Maria Loreto
Ancino in 1930 and the second with Isidra Gomez y Aquino in 1935. At the time of the second
marriage the first was still subsisting, which fact, however, Lipana concealed from the second wife.

On December 17, 1943 the spouses of the second marriage acquired by purchase a piece of land in
Cubao, Quezon City, for the price of P3,000.00. The Torrens title for the property (Transfer
Certificate No. 25289 of the Register of Deeds for Quezon City) was issued on February 1, 1944, in
the name of “Joaquin Lipana married to Isidra Gomez.” On July 20, 1958 Isidra Gomez died
intestate and childless, and survived only by her sisters as the nearest relatives. On August 7, 1961
Ofelia Gomez, judicial administratrix of her estate, commenced the present suit, praying for the
forfeiture of the husband’s share in the Cubao property in favor of the said estate. Reliance is placed
on Article 1417 of the old Civil Code, the Spanish text of which provides:

La sociedad de gananciales concluye al disolverse el matrimonio o al ser declarado nulo.

El conjuge que por su mala fe hubiere sido causa de la nulidad, no tendra parte en los bienes
gananciales.

The society of joint property concludes after the marriage dissolves or on having been declared void.
The conjuge that for his bad faith will have been a cause of the nullity, will not have part in the
community properties.

The trial court, ruling that the second marriage was void ab initio and that the husband was the one
who gave cause for its nullity, applied the aforequoted provision and declared his interest in the
disputed property forfeited in favor of the estate of the deceased second wife.
In the present appeal by the defendant he attributes two errors to the trial court: (1) in allowing a
collateral attack on the validity of the second marriage and in holding it to be bigamous and void ab
initio; and (2) in holding that Article 1417 of the Spanish Civil Code is applicable in this case.

ISSUE: WON a collateral attack on the validity on the second marriage in holding it to be bigamous
and void ab initio.

WON that Article 1417 of the Spanish Civil Code is applicable in this case.

HELD:

Yes. The party who challenges the validity of the second marriage can be challenged collaterally.
There is no suggestion here that the defendant’s 1930 marriage to Maria Loreto Ancino had been
annulled or dissolved when he married Isidra Gomez in 1935, and there is no proof that he did so
under the conditions envisioned in sub-section (b). the burden is on the party invoking the exception
to prove that he comes under it; and the defendant has not discharged that burden at all, no evidence
whatsoever having been adduced by him at the trial. Indeed, he contracted the second marriage less
than seven years after the first, and he has not shown that his first wife was then generally considered
dead or was believed by him to be so.

On the second issue, the conjugal partnership formed by the second marriage was dissolved by the
death of the second wife; and there has been no judicial declaration of nullity except possibly in this
very action, filed after dissolution by death had taken place and when Article 1417 of the Spanish
Civil Code was no longer in force.

Even though the said provision was no longer in force it is still presumed, with respect to the spouse
who acted in bad faith, that neither the marriage nor the conjugal partnership ever existed, and hence
such spouse has no right to share in the conjugal properties; but this legal effect of such presumption
derives from the premise that Article 1417 is still in force, and in any event is of doubtful application
if it would be in derogation of and to the prejudice of the right of the other spouse of the first
marriage in the conjugal partnership formed thereby, which includes properties acquired by the
husband during its existence.

The only just and equitable solution in this case would be to recognize the right of the second wife to
her husband, and consider the other half as pertaining to the conjugal partnership of the first
marriage.

The decision appealed from is reversed and the complaint is dismissed, without pronouncement as to
costs.
YAP VS CA

FACTS:

Petitioner Francisco Yap was convicted of the crime of estafa for misappropriating amounts
equivalent to P5,5 Million. After the records of the case were transmitted to the Court of Appeals, he
filed a motion to fix bail pending appeal. The CA granted the motion and allowed Yap to post bail in
the amount of P5,5 Milion on condition that he will secure “a certification/guaranty from the Mayor
of the place of his residence that he is a resident of the area and that he will remain to be so until
final judgment is rendered or in case he transfers residence, it must be with prior notice to the court
and private complainant.” He sought the reduction of the bail but it was denied. Hence, he appealed
to the SC. He contended that the CA, by setting bail at a prohibitory amount, effectively denied him
his right to bail. He also contested the condition imposed by the CA that he secure a
certification/guaranty, claiming that the same violates his liberty of abode and travel.

Issues:

1. Whether the proposed bail of P5,500,000.00 was violative of petitioner's right against excessive
bail.

2. Whether the condition imposed by the CA violative of the liberty of abode and right to travel.

Held:

1. Right to Bail

The setting of the amount at P5,500,000.00 is unreasonable, excessive, and constitutes an effective
denial of petitioner’s right to bail. The purpose for bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused
at the trial, or whenever so required by the court. The amount should be high enough to assure the
presence of the accused when required but no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this
purpose. To fix bail at an amount equivalent to the civil liability of which petitioner is charged (in
this case, P5,500,000.00) is to permit the impression that the amount paid as bail is an exaction of the
civil liability that accused is charged of; this we cannot allow because bail is not intended as a
punishment, nor as a satisfaction of civil liability which should necessarily await the judgment of the
appellate court.

2. Liberty of abode and right to travel

The right to change abode and travel within the Philippines, being invoked by petitioner, are not
absolute rights. Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution states:

The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by
law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall
the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public
safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.
The order of the Court of Appeals releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful order as
contemplated by the above provision. The condition imposed by the Court of Appeals is simply
consistent with the nature and function of a bail bond, which is to ensure that petitioner will make
himself available at all times whenever the Court requires his presence. Besides, a closer look at the
questioned condition will show that petitioner is not prevented from changing abode; he is merely
required to inform the court in case he does so. (Yap vs Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141529, June 6,
2001)

BALOGBOG VS CA

FACTS:

Ramonito and Generoso Balogbog filed an action for partition and accounting against their Aunt
Leoncia and Uncle Gaudioso for partition and accounting of their grandparents’ estate at the Court of
First Instance of Cebu City which was granted by the latter. Leoncia and Gaudioso appealed to the
Court of Appeals but the latter affirmed the lower court’s decision.

Basilio Balogbog and Genoveva Arnibal died intestate in 1951 and 1961 respectively. They have
three children, Leoncia, Gaudioso and Gavino, their older brother who died in 1935. Ramoncito and
Generoso was claiming that they were the legitimate children of Gavino by Catalina Ubas and that,
as such they were entitled to the one-third share in the estate of their grandparents. However,
Leoncia and Gaudioso claimed they are not aware that their brother has 2 sons and that he was
married. They started to question the validity of the marriage between their brother Gavino and
Catalina despite how Gaudioso himself admitted during a police investigation proceeding that indeed
Ramonito is his nephew as the latter is the son of his elder brother Gavino.

In the efforts of Ramoncito and Generoso to prove the validity of their parent’s marriage, they
presented Priscilo Trazo, 81 years old then mayor of Asturias from 1928 to 1934 and Matias Pogoy
who both testified that he knew Gavino and Catalina to be husband and wife and that they have three
children. Catalina herself testified that she was handed a “receipt” presumably the marriage
certificate by Fr. Jomao-as but it was burned during the war.

On the other hand,Leoncia claimed that her brother Gavino died single at the family residence in
Asturias. She obtained a certificate from the local Civil Registrar of Asturias to the effect that the
office did not have a record of the names of Gavino and Catalina which was prepared by Assistant
Municipal Treasurer Juan Maranga who testified in the hearing as well.

Leoncia and Gaudioso contended that the marriage of Gavino and Catalina should have been proven
in accordance with Arts. 53 and 54 of the Civil Code of 1889 because this was the law in force at the
time of the alleged marriage was celebrated.

Art. 53 provides that “marriages celebrated under the Civil Code of 1889 should be proven only by a
certified copy of the memorandum in the Civil Registry, unless the books thereof have not been kept
or have been lost, or unless they are questioned in the courts, in which case any other proof, such as
that of the continuous possession by parents of the status of husband and wife, may be considered,
provided that the registration of the birth of their children as their legitimate children is also
submitted in evidence”.
ISSUE: Whether or not Gavino and Catalina’s marriage is valid.

HELD:

Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the trial court and Court of Appeals in rendering Gavino
and Catalina’s marriage as valid and thus entitle Ramonito and Generoso one third of their
grandparents’ estate.

The court further states that Arts. 42 to 107 of the Civil Code of 889 of Spain did not take effect,
having been suspended by the Governor General of the Philippines shortly after the extension of that
code of this country. Therefore, Arts. 53 and 54 never came into force. Since this case was brought
in the lower court in 1968, the existence of the marriage must be determined in accordance with the
present Civil Code, which repealed the provisions of the former Civil Code, except as they related to
vested rights, and the rules of evidence. Under the Rules of Court, the presumption is that a man and
a woman conducting themselves as husband and wife are legally married.

Albeit, a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, failure to present it would
not mean that marriage did not take place. Other evidence may be presented where in this case
evidence consisting of the testimonies of witnesses was held competent to prove the marriage of
Gavino and Catalina in 1929, that they have three children, one of whom, Petronilo, died at the age
of six and that they are recognized by Gavino’s family and by the public as the legitimate children of
Gavino.