CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2

Bar Exam Questions and Suggested Answers

Bill of Rights
1987-2018

I. POWERS OF THE STATE

1. About a hundred people occupied a parcel of land in Quezon City

belonging to the city government and built shanties thereon which they utilized
for dwelling, sari-sari stores, etc. The City Mayor issued an order directing the
occupants to vacate the structures within five days from notice, otherwise they
would be evicted and relocated and their shanties removed, in order that the
parcel of land could be converted into a park for public use and enjoyment.
The inhabitants of the parcel of land complained to the Commission on Human
Rights urging that the Mayor of Quezon City be stopped from doing what he
has threatened to do. The Commission on Human Rights, after conducting an
investigation and finding that the shanties of petitioners were already being
demolished by then, ordered the Quezon City Mayor and persons
Implementing his order to cease and desist from demolishing petitioners'
shanties under pain of contempt. What have you to say on the validity of the
actuation of the Commission on Human Rights in relation to that of the Quezon
City Mayor? (1997)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The actuation of the Commission on Human Rights is void. In Simon vs.

Commission on Human Rights, 229 SCRA 117. The Court held that the
Commission on Human Rights has no power to issue a restraining order or a
writ of injunction and has no power to cite for contempt for violation of the
restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction. The cease and desist order,
according to the Court, is a semantic Interplay for a restraining order. Its power
to cite for contempt should be understood to apply only to violations of its
adopted operational guidelines and rules of procedure essential to carry out its
investigatory powers, which it is constitutionally authorized to adopt.

2. Due to over-crowding in the public market in Paco, Manila, the City Council
passed an ordinance allowing the lease to vendors of parts of the streets
where the public market is located, provided that the lessees pay to the city
government a fee of P50 per square meter of the area occupied by the lessees.
The residents in the area complained to the Mayor that the lease of the public
streets would cause serious traffic problems to them. The Mayor cancelled the
lease and ordered the removal of the stalls constructed on the streets. Was the
act of the Mayor legal? (1997)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The cancellation of the lease and the removal of the stalls are valid. As
held in Macasiano vs. Diokno, 212 SCRA 464, the lease of public streets is
void, since they are reserved for public use and are outside the commerce of
man.

3. When the State requires private cemeteries to reserve 10% of their

lots for burial of the poor, it exercises its

Answer: (A). eminent domain power

II. POLICE POWER

1. ABC operates an industrial waste processing plant within Laoag

City. Occasionally, whenever fluid substances are released through a
nearby creek, obnoxious odor is emitted causing dizziness among
residents in Barangay La Paz. On complaint of the Punong Barangay, the
City Mayor wrote ABC demanding that it abate the nuisance. This was
ignored. An invitation to attend a hearing called by the Sangguniang
Panlungsod was also declined by the president of ABC. The city
government there upon issued a cease and desist order to stop the
operations of plant, prompting ABC to file a petition for injunction before
the RTC, arguing that the city government did not have any power to
abate the alleged nuisance. Decide with reasons. (2010)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The city government has no power to stop the operations of the plant.
Since its operations is not a nuisance per se, the city government cannot abate
it extrajudicially. A suit must be filed in court. (AC Enterprises, Inc. vs. Frabelle
Properties Corporation, 506 SCRA 625 [2006]).

Alternative: Petition will not prosper. The obnoxious odor emitted from the
processing plant is a nuisance per se which can be summarily abated by the
city government. Even if we consider it a nuisance per accidens, the cease and
desist order to stop the operations of the plant is still valid because there had
been compliance with due process, that is, the opportunity to be heard has
been given.
 2. Batas Pambansa 880, the Public Assembly Law of 1985, regulates
the conduct of all protest rallies in the Philippines.

Salakay, Bayan! held a protest rally and planned to march from

Quezon City to Luneta in Manila. They received a permit from the Mayor
of Quezon City, but not from the Mayor of Manila. They were able to
march in Quezon City and up to the boundary separating it from the City
of Manila. Three meters after crossing the boundary, the Manila Police
stopped them for posing a danger to public safety. Was this a valid
exercise of police power? (2007)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The police officer may disperse the rally peacefully, because the permit
from the Mayor of Quezon City is limited to Quezon City only and does not
extend to the City of Manila and no permit was obtained from the Mayor of
Manila (Batas Pambansa Blg. 880, sec. 13[a]).

3. The security police of the Southern Luzon Expressway spotted a

caravan of 20 vehicles, with paper banners taped on their sides and
protesting graft and corruption in government. They were driving at 50
kilometers per hour in a 40-90 kilometers per hour zone. Some banners
had been blown off by the wind, and posed a hazard to other motorists.
They were stopped by the security police. The protesters then proceeded
to march instead, sandwiched between the caravan vehicles. They were
also stopped by the security force. May the security police validly stop
the vehicles and the marchers? (2007)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The security police may stop the protesters to prevent public

inconvenience, because they were using the expressway for an appreciable
length of time by marching while sandwiched between the caravan vehicles
(Batas Pambansa Blg. 880, sec. 7).

4. The City of San Rafael passed an ordinance authorizing the City

Mayor, assisted by the police, to remove all advertising signs displayed
or exposed to public view in the main city street, for being offensive to
sight or otherwise nuisance. AM, whose advertising agency owns and
rents out many of the billboards ordered removed by the city Mayor,
claims that the City should pay for the destroyed billboards at their
current market value since the City has appropriated them for the public
purpose of city beautification. The Mayor refuses to pay, so AM is suing
he City and the Mayor for damages arising from the taking of his property
without due process nor just compensation. Will AM prosper? Reason
briefly. (2004)
First Alternative Answer:

The suit of AM will not prosper. The removal of the billboards is not an exercise
of the power of eminent domain but of police power (Churchill v. Rafferty, 32
Phil. 580 [19150- The abatement of a nuisance in the exercise of police power
does not constitute taking of property and does not entitle the owner of the
property involved to compensation. (Association of Small Landowners in the
Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343 [1989]).

Second Alternative Answer:

The removal of the billboards for the purpose of beautification permanently

deprived AM of the right to use his property and amounts to its taking.
Consequently, he should be paid just compensation. (People v. Fajardo, 104
Phil. 11958]).

5. Congress passes a law prohibiting television stations from airing

any commercial advertisement which promotes tobacco or in any way
glamorizes the consumption of tobacco products. This legislation was
passed in response to findings by the Department of Health about the
alarming rise in lung diseases in the country. The World Health
Organization has also reported that U.S. tobacco companies haveshifted
marketing efforts to the Third World due to dwindling sales in the
health-conscious American market, Cowboy Levy's, a Jeans company,
recently released an advertisement featuring model Richard Burgos
wearing Levy's jackets and jeans and holding a pack of Marlboro
cigarettes. The Asian Broadcasting Network (ABN), a privately owned
television station, refuses to air the advertisement in compliance with the
law. Decide the constitutionality of the law in question. (1992)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The law is constitutional. It is a valid exercise of police power, because

smoking is harmful to health. In Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates vs.
Tourism Company of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328, it was ruled that a law
prohibiting certain types of advertisements is valid if it was adopted in the
interest of the health, safety, and welfare of the people. In Capital Broadcasting
Company us. Mitchell 333 F Supp 582, a law making it unlawful to advertise
cigarettes on any medium of electronic communication was upheld. The United
States Supreme Court summarily sustained this ruling in Capita! Broadcasting
Company us, Acting Attorney General 405 U.S. 1000. The law in question was
enacted on the basis of the legislative finding that there is a need to protect
public health, because smoking causes lung diseases. Cowboy Levy's has not
overthrown this finding.
 6. The National Building Code and its implementing rules provide,
inter alia, that operators of shopping centers and malls should provide
parking and loading spaces, in accordance with a prescribed ratio. The
Solicitor General, heeding the call of the public for the provision of free
parking spaces in malls, filed a case to compel said business concerns to
discontinue their practice of collecting parking fees. The mall owners and
operators oppose, saying that this is an invalid taking of their property,
thus a violation of due process. The Solicitor General justifies it, however,
claiming that it is a valid exercise police power. Could the mall owners
and operators be validly compelled to provide free parking to their
customers? (2014)

SUGGESTED ANSWER

No, the mall owners and operators cannot be validly compelled to provide
free parking to their customers, because requiring them to provide free parking
space to their customers is beyond the scope of police powers. It unreasonably
restricts the right to use property for business purposes and amounts to
confiscation of property (Office of the Solicitor General vs Ayala Land, Inc. 600
SCRA 617 (2009))

7. The Municipality of Binangonan, Rizal, passed a resolution

authorizing the operation of an open garbage dumpsite in a 9-hectare
land in the Reyes Estate within the Municipality’s territorial limits. Some
concerned residents of Binangonan filed a complaint with the Laguna
Lake Development Authority (LLDA) to stop the operation of the
dumpsite due to its harmful effects on the health of the residents. The
LLDA conducted an on-site investigation, monitoring, testing and water
sampling and found that the dumpsite would contaminate Laguna de Bay
and the surrounding areas of the Municipality. The LLDA also discovered
that no environmental clearance was secured by the Municipality from
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and the
LLDA as required by law. The LLDA therefore issued to the Binangonan
filed a cease and desist order to annul the order issued by the LLDA.
(1995)

(1) Can the Municipality of Binangonan invoke police power to prevent its
residents and LLDA from interfering with the operation of the dumpsite
by the Municipality? Explain.

(2) Can the LLDA justify its order by asserting that health of the residents
will be adversely affected. Explain.

SUGGESTED ANSWERS:

1. No, the Municipality of Binangonan cannot invoke its police power.

According to Laguna Lake Development Authority vs. Court of Appeals, 231
SCRA 292, under Republic Act No. 4850, the Laguna Lake Development
Authority is mandated to promote the development of the Laguna Lake area,
including the surrounding Province of Rizal, with due regard to the prevention
of pollution. The Laguna Lake Development Authority is mandated to pass
upon and approve or disapprove all projects proposed by the local government
offices within the region.

2. Yes, the Laguna Lake Development Authority can justify its order. Since it
has been authorized by Executive Order No. 927 to make orders requiring the
discontinuance of pollution, its power to issue the order can be inferred from
this. Otherwise, it will be a toothless agency. Moreover, the Laguna Lake
Development Authority is specifically authorized under its Charter to issue
cease and desist orders.

8. An ordinance prohibits “notorious street gang members” from

loitering in public places. The police are to disperse them or, if they
refuse, place them under arrest. The ordinance enumerates which
police officers can make arrest and defines street gangs, membership in
them, and public areas. The ordinance was challenged for being vague
regarding the meaning of “notorious street gang members.” Is the
ordinance valid? (2011)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, it leaves the public uncertain as to what conduct it prohibits.

9. Pedro bought a parcel of land from Smart Corporation, a realty firm

engaged in developing and selling lots to the public. One of the
restrictions in the deed of sale which was annotated in the title is that the
lot shall be used by the buyer exclusively for residential purposes. A
main highway having been constructed across the subdivision, the area
became commercial in nature. The municipality later passed a zoning
ordinance declaring the area as a commercial bank building on his lot.
Smart Corporation went to court to stop the construction as violative of
the building restrictions imposed by it. The corporation contends that
the zoning ordinance cannot nullify the contractual obligation assumed
by the buyer. Decide the case. (1989)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The case must be dismissed. As held in Ortigas and Company, Limited

Partnership vs. Feati Bank and Trust Company, 94 SCRA 533, such a
restriction in the contract cannot prevail over the zoning ordinance, because
the enactment of the ordinance is a valid exercise of police power. It is
hazardous to health and comfort to use the lot for residential purposes, since a
highway crosses the subdivision and the area has become commercial.
 10. In the deeds of sale to, and in the land titles of homeowners of a
residential subdivision in Pasig City, there are restrictions annotated
therein to the effect that only residential houses or structures may be
built or constructed on the lots. However, the City Council of Pasig
enacted an ordinance amending the existing zoning ordinance by
changing the zone classification in that place from purely residential to
commercial. “A”, a lot owner, sold his lot to a banking firm and the latter
started constructing a commercial building on the lot to house a bank
inside the subdivision. The subdivision owner and the homeowners’
association filed a case in court to stop the construction of the building
for banking business purposes and to respect the restrictions embodied
in the deed of sale by the subdivision developer to the lot owners, as well
as the annotation in the titles. (2001)

If you were the Judge, how would you resolve the case?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

If I were the judge, I would dismiss the case. As held in Ortigas and
Company Limited Partnership vs. FEATI Bank and Trust Company. 94 SCRA
633 (1979),the zoning ordinance is a valid exercise of police power and
prevails over the contractual stipulation restricting the use of the lot to
residential purposes.

III. EMINENT DOMAIN

1. Mr. Roland Rivera is the owner of four lots sought to be

expropriated by the Export Processing Zone Authority for the expansion
of the export processing zone at Baguio City. The same parcels of land
had been valued by the Assessor at P120.00 per square meter, while Mr.
Rivera had previously fixed the market value of the same at P100 per
square meter. The Regional Trial Court decided for expropriation and
ordered the payment to Mr. Rivera at the rate of P100 a square meter
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1533, providing that in determining
just compensation for private property acquired through eminent domain
proceedings, the compensation to be paid shall not exceed the value
declared by the owner or determined by the Assessor, pursuant to the
Real Property Tax Code, whichever value is lower, prior to the
recommendation or decision of the appropriate government office to
acquire the property. Mr. Rivera appealed, insisting that just
compensation for his property should be determined by Commissioners
who could evaluate all evidence on the real value of the property, at the
time of its taking by the government. He maintains that the lower court
erred in relying on Presidential Decree No, 1533, which he claims is
unconstitutional. How would you decide the appeal? Explain your
answer. (1988)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The decision of the lower court should be reversed. In EPZA v, Dulay, 149
SCRA 305 (1987) the Supreme Court declared PD No. 1533 to be an
unconstitutional encroachment on the prerogatives of the judiciary. It was
explained that although a court would technically have the power to determine
the just compensation for property under the Decree, the court's task would be
relegated to simply stating the lower value of the property as declared either by
the owner or by the assessor. Just compensation means the value of the
property at the time of the taking. It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss
sustained. To determine it requires consideration of the condition of the
property and its surrounding, its improvements and capabilities.

2. The Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Santa, Ilocos Sur

passed Resolution No. 1 authorizing its Mayor to initiate a petition for the
expropriation of a lot owned by Christina as site for its municipal sports
center. This was approved by the Mayor. However, the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Ilocos Sur disapproved the Resolution as there might
still be other available lots in Santa for a sports center. Nonetheless, the
Municipality of Santa, through its Mayor, filed a complaint for eminent
domain. Christina opposed this on the following grounds: 1. the
Municipality of Santa has no power to expropriate; 2. Resolution No. 1
has been voided since the Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproved it for
being arbitrary; and 3. the Municipality of Santa has other and better lots
for that purpose. Resolve the case with reasons. (2005)

SUGGESTED ANSWERS:

a) Under Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160, the power of eminent domain is

explicitly granted to the municipality, but must be exercised through an
ordinance rather than through a resolution. (Municipality ofParanaque v. V.M.
Realty Corp., G.R. No. 127820, July 20, 1998)
b) The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Ilocos Sur was without the authority
to disapprove Resolution No. 1 as the municipality clearly has the power to
exercise the right of eminent domain and its Sangguniang Bayan the capacity
to promulgate said resolution. The only ground upon which a provincial board
may declare any municipal resolution, ordinance or order invalid is when such
resolution, ordinance or order is beyond the powers conferred upon the council
or president making the same. Such is not the situation in this case. (Moday v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107916, February 20, 1997)
c) The question of whether there is genuine necessity for the expropriation
of Christina's lot or whether the municipality has other and better lots for the
purpose is a matter that will have to be resolved by the Court upon
presentation of evidence by the parties to the case.
Eminent Domain; Legal Interest
1993

3. In expropriation proceedings: 1) What legal interest should be

used in the computation of interest on just compensation?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

As held in National Power Corporation vs. Angas. 208 SCRA 542, in

accordance with Article 2209 of the Civil Code, the legal interest should be SIX
per cent (6%) a year. Central Bank Circular No. 416, which increased the legal
interest to twelve percent (12%) a year is not applicable to the expropriation of
property and is limited to loans, since its issuance is based on Presidential
Decree No, 116, which amended the Usury Law.

4. In expropriation proceedings: Can the judge validly withhold

issuance of the writ of possession until full payment of the final value of
the expropriated property? (1993)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, the judge cannot validly withhold the issuance of the writ of possession
until full payment of the final value of the expropriated property. As held in
National Power Corporation vs. Jocson, 206 SCRA 520. it is the rninisterial
duty of the Judge to issue the writ of possession upon deposit of the
provisional value of the expropriated property with the National or Provincial
Treasurer.

Alternative: In Republic vs. Gingoyon, GR no. 166429, Dec. 19, 2005, the SC
held that RA 8974 now requires full payment before the State may exercise
proprietary rights in an expropriation proceeding and making the previous
ruling obiter dictum.
 5. A valid and definite offer to buy a property is a pre-requisite to
expropriation initiated by a local government unit. (2010)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

TRUE. Under the Local Government Code, there must be a prior valid and
definite offer before expropriation proceeding can be initiated (Section 19,
Local Government Code).

6. The City of Pasig initiated expropriation proceedings on a

one-hectare lot which is part of a ten-hectare parcel of land devoted to
the growing of vegetables. The purpose of the expropriation is to use the
land as a relocation site for 200 families squatting along the Pasig river. a)
Can the owner of the property oppose the expropriation on the ground
that only 200 out of the more than 10,000 squatter families in Pasig City
will benefit from the expropriation? Explain. b) Can the Department of
Agrarian Reform require the City of Pasig to first secure authority from
said Department before converting the use of the land from agricultural
to housing? Explain. (1996)

SUGGESTED ANSWERS:

a) No, the owner of the property cannot oppose the expropriation on the
ground that only 200 out of more than 10,000 squatter families in Pasig City
will benefit from the expropriation. As held in Philippine Columbian Association
vs. Pants, 228 SCRA 668, the acquisition of private property for socialized
housing is for public use and the fact that only a few and not everyone will
benefit from the expropriation does not detract from the nature of the public
use.

b) No, the Department of Agrarian Reform cannot require Pasig City to first
secure authority from it before converting the use of the land from agricultural
to residential. According to Province of Camarines Sur vs. Court of Appeals,
222 SCRA 173, there is no provision in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law which subjects the expropriation of agricultural lands by local government
units to the control of the Department of Agrarian Reform and to require
approval from the Department of Agrarian Reform will mean that it is not the
local government unit but the Department of Agrarian Reform who will
determine whether or not the expropriation is for a public use.

7. The Government, through Secretary Toogoody of the Department

of Transportation (DOTr), filed a complaint for eminent domain to acquire
a 1,000-hectare property in l3ulacan, owned by Baldomero. The court
granted the expropriation, fixed the amount of just compensation,
and installed the Government in full possession of the property. (2016)
 [a] If the Government does not immediately pay the amount fixed
by the court as just compensation, can Baldomero successfully
demand the return of the property to him? Explain your answer.
[b] Of the Government paid full compensation but after two years
it abandoned its plan to build an airport on the property, can
Baldomero compel the Government to re-sell the property back to
him? Explain your answer.

SUGGESTED ANSWERS:

[a] If the government does not pay Baldomero the just compensation
immediately, he cannot demand the return of the property to him.
Instead, legal interest should be paid from the time of taking of the
property until actual payment in full (Republic v. Court of Appeals, 383
SCRA 611 [2002]).

[b] With respect to the element of public use, the expropriator should
commit to use the property for the purpose stated in the petition. If not, it
is incumbent upon it to return the property to the owner, if the owner
desires to reacquire it. Otherwise, the judgment of expropriation will lack
the element of public use. The owner will be denied due process and
the judgment will violate his right to justice (Mactan-Cebu Airport
Authority v. Lozada, Sr., 613 SCRA 618 [2010]). If the just
compensation was not paid within 5 years from finality of judgment, the
owner is entitled to recover the property (Republic v. Lim, 462 SCRA
265 [2005]).

8. The National Power and Grid Corporation (NPGC), a government

entity involved in power generation distribution, had its transmissi on
lines traverse some fields belonging to Farmerjoe. NPGC did so without
instituting any expropriation proceedings. Farmerjoe, not knowing any
better, did not immediately press his claim for payment until after ten
years later when a son of his took up Law and told him that he had a right
to claim compensation. That was then the only time that Farmerjoe
earnestly demanded payment. When the NPGC ignored him, he instituted
a case for payment of just compensation. In defense, NPGC pointed out
that the claim had already prescribed since under its Charter it is clearly
provided that "actions for damages must be filed within five years after
the rights of way, transmission lines, substations, plants or other
facilities shall have been established and that after said period, no suit
shall be brought to question the said rights of way, transmission lines,
substations, plants or other facilities." If you were the lawyer of
Farmerjoe, how would you protect and vindicate the rights of your client?
(2014)

SUGGESTED ANSWER

Farmerjoe’s demand for payment is justified and cannot be considered as

prescribed. His demand for payment is an action for the payment of just
compensation and not an action for damages as provided in the Charter of the
National Power and Grid Corporation. It partakes of the nature of a reverse
eminent domain proceeding (or inverse condemnation proceeding) wherein
claims for just compensation for property taken can be made and pursued
(National Power Corporation vs VDa De Capin, 569 SCRA 648 (2008); National
Power Corporation vs Heirs of Sangkay).

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER

I will claim that since National Power and Grid Corporation took the
property traversing the fields of Farmerjoe without first acquiring title through
expropriation or negotiated sale, his action to recover just compensation is
imprescriptible (Republic vs Court of Appeals, 454 SCRA 510 (2005))

9. If the City of Cebu has money in bank, can it be garnished? (1998)

SUGGESTED ANSWER: No, the money of the City of Cebu in the bank
cannot be garnished if it came from public funds. As held in Municipality of
Makati vs. Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 206, 212, public funds are exempted
from garnishment.

10. The City of Cebu expropriated the property of Carlos Topico for use
as a municipal parking lot. The Sangguniang Panlungsod appropriated
P10 million for this purpose but the Regional Trial Court fixed the
compensation for the taking of the land at P15 million. What legal remedy,
if any, does Carlos Topico have to recover the balance of P5 million for
the taking of his land? (1998)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The remedy of Carlos Toplco is to levy on the patrimonial properties of the

City of Cebu. In Municipality of Paoay vs Manaois, 86 Phil 629. 632, the
Supreme Court held: "Property, however, which is patrimonial and which is
held by a municipality in its proprietary capacity as treated by the great weight
of authority as the private asset of the town and may be levied upon and sold
under an ordinary execution." If the City of Cebu does not have patrimonial
properties, the remedy of Carlos Topico is to file a petition for mandamus to
compel it to appropriate money to satisfy the Judgment. In Municipality Makati
vs. Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 206, 213. the Supreme Court said: "Where a
municipality falls or refuses, without justifiable reason, to effect payment of a
final money judgment rendered against it, the claimant may avail of the remedy
of mandamus in order to compel the enactment and approval of the necessary
appropriation ordinance, and the corresponding disbursement of municipal
funds therefor."

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: He can file the money claim with the Commission
on Audit.
 11. The Municipality of Antipolo, Rizal, expropriated the property of
Juan Reyes for use as a public market. The Municipal Council
appropriated P1,000,000.00 for the purchase of the lot but the Regional
Trial Court, on the basis of the evidence, fixed the value at P2,000,000.00.
(1994)
1) What legal action can Juan Reyes take to collect the balance?
2) Can Juan Reyes ask the Regional Trial Court to garnish the
Municipality’s account with Land Bank?

SUGGESTED ANSWERS:

1) To collect the balance of judgment, as stated in Tan Toco vs.

Municipal Counsel of Iloilo, 49 Phil. 52, Juan Reyes may levy on patrimonial
properties of the Municipality of Antipolo. If it has no patrimonial properties in
accordance with the Municipality of Makati vs. Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA
206, the remedy of Juan Reyes is to file a petition for mandamus to compel the
Municipality of Antipolo to appropriate the necessary funds to satisfy the
judgment.

2) Pursuant to the ruling in Pasay City Government vs. Court of First

Instance of Manila, 132 SCRA, 156, since the Municipality of Antipolo has
appropriated P1,000,000 to pay for the lot, its bank account may be garnished
but up to this amount only.

12. The City of Cebu passed an ordinance proclaiming the

expropriation of a ten (10) hectare property of C Company, which
property is already a developed commercial center. The City proposed to
operate the commercial center in order to finance a housing project for
city employees in the vacant portion of the said property. The ordinance
fixed the price of the land and the value of the improvements to be paid C
Company on the basis of the prevailing land value and cost of
construction. (1990)

(1) As counsel for C Company, give two constitutional objections

to the validity of the ordinance.
(2) As the judge, rule on the said objections.

SUGGESTED ANSWERS:
(1) As counsel for C Company, I will argue that the taking of the
property is not for a public use and that the ordinance cannot fix the
compensation to be paid C Company, because this is a judicial question
that is for the courts to decide.
 (2) As judge, I will sustain the contention that the taking of the property
of C Company to operate the commercial center established within it to
finance a housing project for city employees is not for a public use but
for a private purpose. As the Court indicated in a dictum in Manotok v.
National Housing Authority, 150 SCRA 89, that the expropriation of a
commercial center so that the profits derived from its operation can be
used for housing projects is a taking for a private purpose.

I will also sustain the contention that the ordinance, even though it fixes
the compensation for the land on the basis of the prevailing land value
cannot really displace judicial determination of the price for the simple
reason that many factors, some of them supervening, cannot possibly
be considered by the legislature at the time of enacting the ordinance.
There is greater reason for nullifying the use of the cost of construction
in the ordinance as basis for compensation for the improvements. The
fair market value of the improvements may not be equal to the cost of
construction. The original cost of construction may be lower than the fair
market value, since the cost of construction at the time of expropriation
may have increased.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The taking of the commercial center is justified by the concept of
indirect public benefit since its operation is intended for the
development of the vacant portion for socialized housing, which is
clearly a public purpose.

13. In January 1984, Pasay City filed expropriation proceedings

against several landowners for the construction of an aqueduct for flood
control in a barangay. Clearly, only the residents of that barangay would
be benefited by the project. As compensation, the city offered to pay only
the amount declared by the owners in their tax declarations, which
amount was lower than the assessed value as determined by the
assessor. The landowners oppose the expropriation on the grounds that:
(1987)

(a) the same is not for public use; and

(b) assuming it is for public use, the compensation must be based on the
evidence presented in court and not, as provided in presidential decrees
prescribing payment of the value stated in the owner's
tax declarations or the value determined by the assessor, whichever is
lower.

If you were judge, how would you rule on the issue? Why?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:

(a) The contention that the taking of private property for the purpose of
constructing an aqueduct for flood control is not for public use" is untenable-
The idea that "PUBLIC USE" means exclusively use by the public has been
discarded. As long as the purpose of the taking is public, the exercise of power
of eminent domain is justifiable. Whatever may be beneficially employed for
the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use. (Heirs of Juancho
Ardona v. Reyes, 123 SCR A 220 (1983))

(b) But the contention that the Presidential Decrees providing that in
determining just compensation the value stated by the owner in his tax
declaration or that determined by the assessor, whichever is lower, in
unconstitutional is correct. In EPZA v. Dulay. G.R. No. 59603, April 29, 1987, it
was held that
this method prescribed for ascertaining just compensation constitutes an
impermissible encroachment on the prerogatives of courts. It tends to render
courts inutile in a matter which, under the Constitution, is reserved to them for
final determination. For although under the decrees the courts still have the
power to determine just compensation, their task is reduced to simply
determining the lower value of the property as declared either by the owner or
by the assessor. "JUST COMPENSATION" means the value of the property at
the time of the taking. Its determination requires that all facts as to the
condition of the property and its surroundings and its improvements and
capabilities must be considered, and this can only be done in a judicial
proceeding.

14. Madlangbayan is the owner of a 500 square meter lot which was
the birthplace of the founder of a religious sect who admittedly played an
important role in Philippine history and culture. The National Historical
Commission (NHC) passed a resolution declaring it a national landmark
and on its recommendation the lot was subjected to expropriation
proceedings. This was opposed by Madlangbayan on the following
grounds: a) that the lot is not a vast tract; b) that those to be benefited by
the expropriation would only be the members of the religious sect of its
founder, and c) that the NHC has not initiated the expropriation of
birthplaces of other more deserving historical personalities. (2000)

Resolve the opposition raised by Madlangbayan. (5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The arguments of Madlangbayan are not meritorious. According to

Manosca v. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 412 (1996), the power of eminent
domain is not confined to expropriation of vast tracts of the land. The
expropriation of the lot to preserve it as the birthplace of the founder of the
religious sect because of his role in Philippine history and culture is for a public
purpose, because public use is no longer restricted to the traditional concept.
The fact that the expropriation will benefit the members of the religious sect is
merely incidental. The fact that other birthplaces have not been expropriated is
likewise not a valid basis for opposing the expropriation. As held in J.M.
Tuason and Company, Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413
(1970), the expropriating authority is not required to adhere to the policy of "all
or none".

15. A law provides that in the event of expropriation, the amount to be

paid to a landowner as compensation shall be either the sworn valuation
made by the owner or the official assessment thereof, whichever is lower.
Can the landowner successfully challenge the law in court? Discuss
briefly your answer. (1989)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, the landowner can successfully challenge the law in court.

According to the decision in Export Processing Zone Authority vs. Dulay, 149
SCRA 305, such a law is unconstitutional. First of all, it violates due process,
because it denies to the landowner the opportunity to prove that the valuation
in the tax declaration is wrong. Secondly, the determination of just
compensation in expropriation cases is a judicial function. Since under Section
9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation, no law can mandate that its
determination as to the just compensation shall prevail over the findings of the
court.

16. The Republic of the Philippines, through the Department of Public

Works and Highways (DPWH), constructed a new highway linking Metro
Manila and Quezon province, and which major thoroughfare traversed
the land owned by Mang Pandoy. The government neither filed any
expropriation proceedings nor paid any compensation to Mang Pandoy
for the land thus taken and used as a public road.

Mang Pandoy filed a suit against the government to compel payment

for the value of his land. The DPWH filed a motion to dismiss the case on
the ground that the State is immune from suit. Mang Pandoy filed an
opposition. (2001)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
 The motion to dismiss should be denied. As held in Amigable vs. Cuenca,
43 SCRA 300 (1972), when the Government expropriates private property
without paying compensation, it is deemed to have waived its immunity from
suit. Otherwise, the constitutional guarantee that private property shall not be
taken for public use without payment of just compensation will be rendered
nugatory.

17. Congress passed a law authorizing the National Housing Authority

(NHA) to expropriate or acquire private property for the redevelopment of
slum areas, as well as to lease or resell the property to private developers to
carry out the redevelopment plan. Pursuant to the law, the NHA acquired all
properties within a targeted badly blighted area in San Nicolas, Manila except
a well-maintained drug and convenience store that poses no blight or health
problem itself. Thereafter, NHA sold all the properties it has thus far acquired
to a private realty company for redevelopment. Thus, the NHA initiated
expropriation proceedings against the store owner who protested that his
property could not be taken because it is not residential or slum housing. He
also contended that his property is being condemned for a private purpose,
not a public one, noting the NHA`s sale of the entire area except his property
to a private party. If you were the judge, how would you decide the case?
(2008)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
As a judge, I will rule against the NHA. Provided that the particular area was
already excluded because it poses no blight or health problem, there is no need for
the government to rehabilitate it together with the other areas. Also, the power of
expropriation of the NHA cannot be used to benefit private companies by taking the
private property and eventually transferring it to private corporations in the guise of
public use. Under the Power of Eminent Domain as stated in Sec 9 Art. 3 of the
Bill of Rights, private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation. The law is very particular in saying that the private property taken
shall be for public use.

18. The Municipality of Bulalakaw, Leyte, passed Ordinance No. 1234,

authorizing the expropriation of two parcels of land situated in the poblacion
as the site of a freedom park, and appropriating the funds needed therefor.
Upon review, the |Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Leyte disapproved the
ordinance because the municipality has an existing freedom park which,
though smaller in size, is still suitable for the purpose, and to pursue
expropriation would be needless expenditure of the people's money. Is the
disapproval of the ordinance correct? Explain your answer. (2009)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the disapproval of the said ordinance is correct because under the power
of expropriation of private property for public use, there has to be sufficient
necessity for the said project. In the case of Masikip V. City of Pasig, it was held
that another sports facility in Pasig wasn’t needed because there already exists
near the area which is still functional. Under the case at hand, there is already a
freedom park that exists and is still fully functional which means that there is no
necessity to build and procure a new one.

IV. POWER OF TAXATION

1. To address the pervasive problem of gambling, Congress is

considering the following options: (1) prohibit all forms of gambling; (2)
allow gambling only on Sundays; (3) allow gambling only in
government-owned casinos; and (4) remove all prohibitions against
gambling but impose a tax equivalent to 30% on all winnings. (2009)
a. If Congress chooses the first option and passes the corresponding law
absolutely prohibiting all forms of gambling, can the law be validly
attacked on the ground that it is an invalid exercise of police power?
Explain your answer.
b. If Congress chooses the last option and passes the corresponding law
imposing a 30% tax on all winnings and prizes won from gambling,
would the law comply with the constitutional limitations on the
exercise of the power of taxation? Explain your answer.

SUGGESTED ANSWERS:

A. Yes, the law may be validly attack based on the test of reasonableness of
the said law. Under this test, there has to be 1. Lawful Subject which refers to the
interests of the general welfare of the people which requires the interference from
the State and 2. Lawful means which means that the means employed by the State
should be necessary for the accomplishment of its objective and it must not be
unduly oppressive to the people. In this case, prohibiting all forms of gambling is an
invalid exercise of police power because gambling is not inherently wrong and it is
not damaging to the overall health of the community.

B. Yes, the power of taxation may be used as a valid form of the government’s
exercise of police power. The raised tax of 30% to the winnings is a valid form of
police power so as to lessen and discourage the people from excessive gambling.
In this case, there is reasonable necessity of the means employed because it
discourages people but it does not totally limit or prohibit the people from partaking
in gambling.
V. DUE PROCESS OF LAW

1. Macabebe, Pampanga has several barrios along the Pampanga

river. To service the needs of their residentst the municipality has been
operating a ferry service at the same river, for a number of years already.
Sometime in 1987, the municipality was served a copy of an order from
the Land Tansportation Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB),
granting a certificate of public convenience to Mr. Ricardo Macapinlac, a
resident of Macabebe, to operate ferry service across the same river and
between the same barrios being serviced presently by the municipality's
ferry boats. A check of the records of the application of Macapinlac
shows that the application was filed some months before, set for hearing,
and notices of such hearing were published in two newspapers of
general circulation in the town of Macabebe, and in the province of
Pampanga. The municipality had never been directly served a copy of
that notice of hearing nor had the Sangguniang Bayan been requested by
Macapinlac for any operate. The municipality immediately filed a motion
for reconsideration with the LTFRB which was denied. It went to the
Supreme Court on a petition for certiorari to nullify the order granting a
certificate of public convenience to Macapinlac on two grounds: 1.
Denial of due process to the municipality; 2. For failure of Macapinlac to
secure approval of the Sangguniang Bayan for him to operate a ferry
service in Macabebe, Resolve the two points in the petition with reasons.
(1988)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The petition for certiorari should be granted, 1. As a party directly affected

by the operation of the ferry service, the Municipality of Macabebe, Pampanga
was entitled to be directly notified by the LTFRB of its proceedings relative to
Macapinlac's application, even if the Municipality had not notified the LTFRB of
the existence of the municipal ferry service. Notice by publication was not
enough. (Municipality of Echague v. Abellera, 146 SCRA 180 (1986)). 2.
Where a ferry operation lies entirely within the municipality, the prior approval
of the Municipal government is necessary.

2. Norberto Malasmas was accused of estafa before the Regional

Trial Court of Manila. After the trial, he was found guilty. On appeal, his
conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. After the records of his
case had been remanded to the Regional Trial Court for execution, and
after the latter Court had set the date for the promulgation of judgment,
the accused filed a motion with the Court of Appeals to set aside the
entry of judgment, and to remand the case to the Regional Trial Court for
new trial on the ground that he had just discovered that "Atty. Leonilo
Maporma" whom he had chosen and who had acted as his counsel
before the trial court and the Court of Appeals, is not a lawyer. Resolved
the motion of the accused with reasons. (1988)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The motion should be granted and the entry of judgment should be set
aside. An accused is entitled to be heard by himself or counsel. (Art. III, sec.
14(2)). Unless he is represented by an attorney, there is a great danger that
any defense presented in his behalf will be inadequate considering the legal
requisite and skill needed in court proceedings. There would certainly be a
denial of due process. (Delgado v. Court of Appeals, 145 SCRA 357 (1986)).

3. The S/S "Masoy" of Panamanian registry, while moored at the

South Harbor, was found to have contraband goods on board. The
Customs Team found out that the vessel did not have the required ship's
permit and shipping documents. The vessel and its cargo were held and
a warrant of Seizure and Detention was issued after due investigation. In
the course of the forfeiture proceedings, the ship captain and the ship's
resident agent executed sworn statements before the Custom legal
officer admitting that contraband cargo were found aboard the vessel.
The shipping lines object to the admission of the statements as evidence
contending that during their execution, the captain and the shipping
agent were not assisted by counsel, in violation of due process. Decide.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The admission of the statements of the captain and the shipping agent as
evidence did not violate due process even if they were not assisted by counsel.
In Feeder International Line, Pts. Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 842, It
was held that the assistance of counsel is not indispensable to due process in
forfeiture proceedings since such proceedings are not criminal in nature.

Moreover, the strict rules of evidence and procedure will not apply in
administrative proceedings like seizure and forfeiture proceedings. What is
important is that the parties are afforded the opportunity to be heard and the
decision of the administrative authority is based on substantial evidence.

4. Ten public school teachers of Caloocan City left their classrooms

to join a strike, which lasted for one month, to ask for teachers' benefits.
The Department of Education, Culture and Sports charged them
administratively, for which reason they were required to answer and
formally investigated by a committee composed of the Division
Superintendent of Schools as Chairman, the Division Supervisor as
member and a teacher, as another member. On the basis of the evidence
adduced at the formal investigation which amply established their guilt,
the Director rendered a decision meting out to them the penalty of
removal from office. The decision was affirmed by the DECS Secretary
and the Civil Service Commission. On appeal, they reiterated the
arguments they raised before the administrative bodies, namely: (b) They
were deprived of due process of law as the Investigating Committee was
improperly constituted because it did not include a teacher in
representation of the teachers' organization as required by the Magna
Carta for Public School Teachers (R.A. No. 4670, Sec. 9). (2002)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The teachers were deprived of due process of law. Under Section 9 of the
Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, one of the members of the committee
must be a teacher who is a representative of the local, or in its absence, any
existing provincial or national organization of teachers. According to Fabella v.
Court of Appeals, 283 SCRA 256 (1997), to be considered the authorized
representative of such organization, the teacher must be chosen by the
organization itself and not by the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports.
Since in administrative proceedings, due process requires that the tribunal be
vested with jurisdiction and be so constituted as to afford a person charged
administratively a reasonable guarantee of impartiality, if the teacher who is a
member of the committee was not appointed in accordance with the law, any
proceeding before it is tainted with deprivation of procedural due process.

5. At the trial of a rape case where the victim-complainant was a well

known personality while the accused was a popular movie star, a TV
station was allowed by the trial judge to televise the entire proceedings
like the O.J. Simpson trial. The accused objected to the TV coverage and
petitioned the Supreme Court to prohibit the said coverage. As the
Supreme Court, how would you rule on the petition? Explain. (1996)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The Supreme Court should grant the petition. In its Resolution dated
October 22, 1991, the Supreme Court prohibited live radio and television
coverage of court proceedings to protect the right of the parties to due process,
to prevent the distraction of the participants in the proceedings, and in the last
analysis to avoid a miscarriage of justice.

6. The City Mayor issues an Executive Order declaring that the city
promotes responsible parenthood and upholds natural family planning.
He prohibits all hospitals operated by the city from prescribing the use of
artificial methods of contraception, including condoms, pills, intrauterine
devices and surgical sterilization. As a result, poor women in his city lost
their access to affordable family planning programs. Private clinics!
however, continue to render family planning counsel and devices to
paying clients. (2007)

1. Is the Executive Order in any way constitutionally infirm? Explain.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The Executive Order is constitutionally infirm. It violates the guarantees of

due process and equal protection. Due process includes the right to decisional
privacy, which refers to the ability to make one’s own decisions and to act on
those decisions, free from governmental or other unwanted interference.
Forbidding the use of artificial methods of contraception infringes on the
freedom of choice in matters of marriage and family life (Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 415 [1965]). Moreover, the Executive Order violates
equal protection as it discriminates against poor women in the city who cannot
afford to pay private clinics.

2. May the Commission on Human Rights order the Mayor to stop the
implementation of the Executive Order? Explain.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The Commission on Human Rights cannot order the City Mayor to stop the
implementation of his Executive Order, because it has not power to issue writs
of injunction (Export Processing Zone Authority v. Commission on Human
Rights, 208 SCRA 125 [1992]).

3. Question: What is a quasi-judicial body or agency? (2006)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

A quasi-judicial body is an administrative agency which performs

adjudicative functions. Although it is authorized by law to try and decide certain
cases, it is not bound strictly by the technical rules of evidence and procedure.
However, it must observe the requirements of due process.

4. On 29 July 1991, the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB), in response

to public clamor, issued a resolution approving and adopting a schedule
for bringing down the prices of petroleum products over a period of one
(1) year starting 15 August 1991, over the objection of the oil companies
which claim that the period covered is too long to prejudge and foresee.
Is the resolution valid? (1991)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
 No, the resolution is invalid, since the Energy Regulatory Board issued the
resolution without a hearing. The resolution here is not a provisional order and
therefore it can only be issued after appropriate notice and hearing to affected
parties. The ruling in Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation vs.
Alcuaz, 180 SCRA 218, to the effect that an order provisionally reducing the
rates which a public utility could charge, could be issued without previous
notice and hearing, cannot apply.

5. On April 6, 1963, Police Officer Mario Gatdula was charged by the

Mayor with Grave Misconduct and Violation of Law before the Municipal
Board. The Board investigated Gatdula but before the case could be
decided, the City charter was approved. The City Fiscal, citing Section 30
of the city charter, asserted that he was authorized thereunder to
investigate city officers and employees. The case against Gatdula was
then forwarded to office of the Fiscal subsequently recommended
dismissal. On January 11, 1966, the City Mayor returned the records of
the case to the City Fiscal for the submission of an appropriate
resolution but no resolution was submitted. On March 3, 1968, the City
Fiscal transmitted the records to the City Mayor recommending that final
action thereon be made by the City Board of Investigators (CBI).
Although the CBI did not conduct an investigation, the records show that
both the Municipal Board and the Fiscal's Office exhaustively heard the
case with both parties afforded ample opportunity to adduce their
evidence and argue their cause. The Police Commission found Gatdula
guilty on the basis of the records forwarded by the CBI. Gatdula
challenged the adverse decision of the Police Commission theorizing
that he was deprived of due process. (1999)

Is the Police Commission bound by the findings of the City Fiscal? Is

Gatdula's protestation of lack or non-observance of due process
well-grounded? Explain your answers.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The Police Commission is not bound by the findings of the City Fiscal. In
Mangubat v. de Castro, 163 SCRA 608, it was held that the Police
Commission is not prohibited from making its own findings on the basis of its
own evaluation of the records. Likewise, the protestation of lack of due process
is not well-grounded, since the hearings before the Municipal Board and the
City Fiscal offered Gatdula the chance to be heard. There is no denial of due
process if the decision was rendered on the basis of evidence contained in the
record and disclosed to the parties affected.

6. On November 7, 1990, nine lawyers of the Legal Department of Y

Bank who were all under Fred Torre, sent a complaint to management
accusing Torre of abusive conduct and mismanagement. Furnished with
a copy of the complaint, Torre denied the charges. Two days later, the
lawyers and Torre were called to a conference in the office of the Board
Chairman to give their respective sides of the controversy. However, no
agreement was reached thereat. Bank Director Romulo Moret was tasked
to look further into the matter. He met with the lawyers together with
Torre several times but to no avail. Moret then submitted a report
sustaining the charges of the lawyers. The Board Chairman wrote Torre
to inform him that the bank had chosen the compassionate option of
"waiting" for Torre's resignation. Torre was asked, without being
dismissed, to turn over the documents of all cases handled by him to
another official of the bank but Torre refused to resign and requested for
a "full hearing". Days later, he reiterated his request for a "full hearing",
claiming that he had been "constructively dismissed". Moret assured
Torre that he is "free to remain in the employ of the bank" even if he has
no particular work assignment. After another request for a "full hearing"
was ignored, Torre filed a complaint with the arbitration branch of NLRC
for illegal dismissal. Reacting thereto, the bank terminated the services
of Torre. (1999)

(a) Was Torre "constructively dismissed" before he filed his

complaint?
(b) Given the multiple meetings held among the bank officials, the
lawyers and Torre, is it correct for him to say that he was not given
an opportunity to be heard?
Explain your answers.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

a) Torre was constructively dismissed, as held in Equitable Banking

Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, 273 SCRA 352. Allowing
an employee to report for work without being assigned any work constitutes
constructive dismissal.

b) Torre is correct in saying that he was not given the chance to be heard. The
meetings in the nature of consultations and conferences cannot be considered
as valid substitutes for the proper observance of notice and hearing.

7. Give examples of acts of the state which infringe the due process
clause: (1999)
1. in its substantive aspect and
2. in its procedural aspect?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

1.) A law violates substantive due process when it is unreasonable or

unduly oppressive. For example, Presidential Decree No. 1717, which
cancelled all the mortgages and liens of a debtor, was considered
unconstitutional for being oppressive. Likewise, as stated in Ermita-Malate
Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila, 20 SCRA
849, a law which is vague so that men of common intelligence must guess at
its meaning and differ as to its application violates substantive due process. As
held in Tanada v. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446, due process requires that the law be
published.

2.) In State Prosecutors v. Muro, 236 SCRA 505, it was held that the
dismissal of a case without the benefit of a hearing and without any notice to
the prosecution violated due process. Likewise, as held in People v. Court of
Appeals, 262 SCRA 452, the lack of impartiality of the judge who will decide a
case violates procedural due process.

8. The municipal council of the municipality of Guagua, Pampanga,

passed an ordinance penalizing any person or entity engaged in the
business of selling tickets to movies or other publicexhibitions, games
or performances which would charge children between 7 and 12 years of
age the full price of the amount thereof. Would you hold the ordinance a
valid exercise of legislative power by the municipality? Why? (2003)

Suggested Answer:

The ordinance is void. As held in Balacuit v. Court of First Instance of

Agusan del Norte. 13 SCRA 182 [1998], the ordinance is unreasonable. It
deprives the sellers of the tickets of their property without due process. A ticket
is a property right and may be sold for such price as the owner of it can obtain.
There is nothing pernicious in charging children the same price as adults.

9. Ten public school teachers of Caloocan City left their classrooms

to join a strike, which lasted for one month, to ask for teachers' benefits.
The Department of Education, Culture and Sports charged them
administratively, for which reason they were required to answer and
formally investigated by a committee composed of the Division
Superintendent of Schools as Chairman, the Division Supervisor as
member and a teacher, as another member. On the basis of the evidence
adduced at the formal investigation which amply established their guilt,
the Director rendered a decision meting out to them the penalty of
removal from office. The decision was affirmed by the DECS Secretary
and the Civil Service Commission. On appeal, they reiterated the
arguments they raised before the administrative bodies, namely: (b) They
were deprived of due process of law as the Investigating Committee was
improperly constituted because it did not include a teacher in
representation of the teachers' organization as required by the Magna
Carta for Public School Teachers (R.A. No. 4670, Sec. 9). (2003)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The teachers were deprived of due process of law. Under Section 9 of the
Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, one of the members of the
committee must be a teacher who is a representative of the local, or in its
absence, any existing provincial or national organization of teachers.
According to Fabella v. Court of Appeals, 283 SCRA 256 (1997), to be
considered the authorized representative of such organization, the teacher
must be chosen by the organization itself and not by the Secretary of
Education, Culture and Sports. Since in administrative proceedings, due
process requires that the tribunal be vested with jurisdiction and be so
constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a reasonable
guarantee of impartiality, if the teacher who is a member of the committee was
not appointed in accordance with the law, any proceeding before it is tainted
with deprivation of procedural due process.

10. A complaint was filed by intelligence agents by the Bureau of

Immigration and Deportation (BID) against Stevie, a German national, for
his deportation as an undesirable alien. The Immigration Commissioner
directed the Special Board of Inquiry to conduct an investigation. At the
said investigation, a lawyer from the legal department of the BID
presented as witnesses the three intelligence agents who filed the
complaint. On the basis of the findings, report and recommendation of
the Board Of Special Inquiry, the BID Commissioners unanimously voted
for Stevie’s deportation. Stevie’s lawyer questioned the deportation
order (1994)

1) On the ground that Stevie was denied due process because the
BID Commissioners who rendered the decisions were not the
ones who received the evidence, in violation of the “He who
decides must hear” rule. Is he correct?
2) On the ground that there was a violation of due process because
the complainants, the prosecutors and the hearing officers were
all subordinates of the BID Commissioners who rendered the
deportation decision. Is he correct?

SUGGESTED ANSWERS:

1) No, Stevie is not correct. As held in Adamson A Adamson, Inc. vs. Amores,
152 SCRA 237, administrative due process does not require that the actual
taking of testimony or the presentation of evidence before the same officer
who will decide the case.
In American Tobacco Co. v. Director of Patents, 67 SCRA 287, the
Supreme Court has ruled that so long as the actual decision on the merits of
the cases is made by the officer authorized by law to decide, the power to hold
a hearing on the basis of which his decision will be made can be delegated and
is not offensive to due process. The Court noted that: “As long as a party is
not deprived of his right to present his own case and submit evidence in
support thereof, and the decision is supported by the evidence in the record,
there is no question that the requirements of due process and fair trial are fully
met. In short, there is no abrogation of responsibility on the part of the officer
concerned as the actual decision remains with and is made by said officer. It
is, however, required that to give the substance of a hearing, which is for the
purpose of making determination upon evidence the officer who makes the
determinations must consider and appraise the evidence which justifies them.

2) No, Stevie was not denied due process simply because the complainants,
the prosecutor, the hearing officers were all subordinates of the Commissioner
of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation. In accordance with the ruling
in Erianger & Galinger, Inc. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 110 Phil. 470, the
findings of the subordinates are not conclusive upon the Commissioners, who
have the discretion to accept or reject them. What is important is that Stevie
was not deprived of his right to present his own case and submit evidence in
support thereof, the decision is supported by substantial evidence, and the
commissioners acted on their own independent consideration of the law and
facts of the case, and did not simply accept the views of their subordinates in
arriving at a decision.

11. A law interfering with the rights of the person meets the requirements
of substantive due process when (2011)

Answer: (D). the interest of the general public, as distinguished from

those of a particular class, requires such interference.

12. In the morning of August 28, 1987, during the height of the fighting at
Channel 4 and Camelot Hotel, the military closed Radio Station XX, which
was excitedly reporting the successes of the rebels and movements
towards Manila and troops friendly to the rebels. The reports were
correct and factual. On October 6, 1987, after normalcy had returned and
the Government had full control of the situation, the National
Telecommunications Commission, without notice and hearing, but
merely on the basis of the report of the military, cancelled the franchise
of station XX. (1987)

Discuss the legality of the cancellation of the franchise of the station on

October 6, 1987.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The cancellation of the franchise of the station on October 6, 1987, without

prior notice and hearing, is void. As held in Eastern Broadcasting Corp. (DYRE)
v. Dans, 137 SCRA 647 (1985), the cardinal primary requirements in
administrative proceedings (one of which is that the parties must first be heard)
as laid down in Ang Tibay v. CIR, 69 Phil. 635 (1940) must be observed in
closing a radio station
because radio broadcasts are a form of constitutionally-protected expression.

13. The Manila Transportation Company applied for upward adjustment

of its rates before the Transportation Regulatory Board. Pending the
petition, the TRB, without previous hearing, granted a general nationwide
provisional increase of rates. In another Order, TRB required the
company to pay the unpaid supervisory fees collectible under the Public
Service Law. After due notice and hearing, on the basis of the evidence
presented by Manila Transportation Company and the Oppositors, TRB
issued an Order reducing the rates applied for by one-fourth.

Characterize the powers exercised by the TRB in this case and determine
whether under the present constitutional system the Transportation
Regulatory Board can be validly conferred the powers exercised by it in
issuing the Orders given above. Explain. (1987)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The orders in this case involve the exercise of judicial function by an

administrative agency, and therefore, as a general rule, the cardinal primary
rights enumerated in Ang Tibay v. CIR, 69 Phil. 635 (1940) must be observed.
In Vigart Electric Light Co, v. PSC, 10 SCRA 46 (1964) it was held that a rate
order, which applies exclusively to a particular party and is predicated on a
finding of fact, partakes of the nature of a quasi judicial, rather than legislative,
function.

The first order, granting a provisional rate increase without hearing, is valid
if justified by URGENT PUBLIC NEED, such as increase in the cost of fuel.
The power of the Public Service Commission to grant such increase was
upheld in several cases. (Silva v. Ocampo, 90 Phil. 777 (1952); Halili v. PSC,
92 Phil. 1036(1953))

The second order requiring the company to pay unpaid supervisory fees
under the Public Service Act cannot be sustained. The company has a right to
be heard, before it may be ordered to pay. (Ang Tibay v. CIR, 69 Phil. 635
(1940))

The third order can be justified. The fact that the TRB has allowed a
provisional rate increase does not bind it to make the order permanent if the
evidence later submitted does not justify increase but, on the contrary,
warrants the reduction of rates.

14. The Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) General Manager issued an

administrative order to the effect that all existing regular appointments to
harbor pilot positions shall remain valid only up to December 31 of the
current year and that henceforth all appointments to harbor pilot
positions shall be only for a term of one year from date of effectivity,
subject to yearly renewal or cancellation by the PPA after conduct of a
rigid evaluation of performance. Pilotage as a profession may be
practiced only by duly licensed individuals, who have to pass five
government professional examinations.

The Harbor Pilot Association challenged the validity of said

administrative order arguing that it violated the harbor pilots’ right to
exercise their profession and their right to due process of law and that
the said administrative order was issued without prior notice and hearing.
The PPA countered that the administrative order was valid as it was
issued in the exercise of its administrative control and supervision over
harbor pilots under PPA’s legislative charter, and that in issuing the
order as a rule or regulation, it was performing its executive or legislative,
and not a quasi-Judicial function.
Due process of law is classified into two kinds, namely, procedural due
process and substantive due process of law. Was there, or, was there no
violation of the harbor pilots’ right to exercise their profession and their
right to due process of law? (2001)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The right of the harbor pilots to due process was violated. Am held in
Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Philippines,283 SCRA
31(1997) pilotage as a profession is a property right protected by the
guarantee of due process. The pre-evaluation cancellation of the licenses of
the harbor pilots every year is unreasonable and violated their right to
substantive due process. The renewal is dependent on the evaluation after the
licenses have been cancelled. The issuance of the administrative order also
violated procedural due process, since no prior public hearing was conducted.
As hold in Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Court of Appeals, 261 SCRA
237 (1998), when a regulation is being issued under the quasi-legislative
authority of an administrative agency, the requirements of notice, hearing and
publication must be observed.

VI. EQUAL PROTECTION

 1. The Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Youth Association (GBTYA),
an organization of gay, bisexual, and transgender persons, filed for
accreditation with the COMELEC to join the forthcoming party-list
elections. The COMELEC denied the application for accreditation on the
ground that GBTYA espouses immorality which offends religious
dogmas. GBTY A challenges the denial of its application based on moral
grounds because it violates its right to equal protection of the law. (2015)

What are the three (3) levels of test that are applied in equal
protection cases? Explain.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The three kinds of tests applied in equal protection cases are:

a. Strict Scrutiny Test – requires the government to show that the challenged
classifications serve a compelling state interest and that the classification is
necessary to serve that interest. This is used in cases involving classifications
based on race, national origin, religion, alienage, denial of right to vote,
interstate migration, access to courts and other rights recognized as
fundamental

b. Immediate or middle-tier scrutiny test – requires government to show that

the challenged classification serves as an important state interest and that the
classification is at least substantially related to serving that interest. This
applies to suspect classification like gender or illegitimacy.

c. Minimum or rational basis scrutiny – according to which the government

need only to show that the challenged classification is rationally related to
serving a legitimate state interest. This is the traditional rationality test and it
applies to all subjects other than those listed above. (see Bernas Commentary,
in Ang Ladlad v. COMELEC, GR No. 190582, April 8, 2010 for the explanation)

(II) Which of the three (3) levels of test should be applied to the present
case? Explain.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The Rational Basis Test should be applied to the present case. In our
jurisdiction, the Supreme Court declared that the standard of analysis of equal
protection challenges is the rational basis test. Jurisprudence has affirmed that
if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, the
classification shall be upheld as long as it bears a rational relationship to some
legitimate end. In the case at bar, in so far as the party-list system is
concerned, GBTYA is similarly situated as all other groups which are running
for a party-list seat in Congress (Ang Ladlad v. COMELEC).
 2. The Department of Education, Culture and Sports issued a circular
disqualifying anyone who fails for the fourth time in the National
Entrance Tests from admission to a College of Dentistry. X who was
thus disqualified, questions the constitutionality of the circular. (1994)

1) Did the circular deprive her of her constitutional right to

education?
2) Did the circular violate the equal protection clause of the
constitution?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

1) No, the circular did not violate the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. There is a substantial distinction between dentistry students
and other students. The dental profession directly affects the lives and
health of people. Other professions do not involve the same delicate
responsibility and need not be similarly treated. This is in accordance with
the ruling in Department of Education, Culture and Sports vs. San Diego, 180
SCRA 533.

2) No, because it is permissive limitation to the right of education, as it is

intended to ensure that only those who are qualified to be dentists are admitted
for enrollment.

3. X, a Filipino and Y, an American, both teach at the International

Institute in Manila. The Institute gave X a salary rate of P1,000 per hour
and Y, P1,250 per hour plus housing, transportation, shipping costs and
leave travel allowance. The school cited the dislocation factor and
limited tenure of Y to justify his high salary rate and additional benefits.
The same package was given to the other foreign teachers. The Filipino
teachers assailed such differential treatment, claiming it is
discriminatory and violates the equal protection clause. Decide.

Answer: (A). The classification is based on superficial differences.

4. Marina Neptunia, daughter of a sea captain and sister to four

marine officers decided as a child to follow in her father's footsteps. In
her growing up years she was as much at home on board a boat as she
was in the family home by the sea. In time she earned a Bachelor of
Science degree in Marine Transportation, major in Navigation and
Seamanship. She served her apprenticeship for a year in a merchant
marine vessel registered for foreign trade and another year on a
merchant marine vessel registered for coastwise trade. But to become a
full-fledged marine officer she had to pass the appropriate board
examinations before she could get her professional license and
registration. She applied in January 1986 to take examination for marine
officers but her application was rejected for the reason that the law
Regulating the Practice of Marine Profession in the Philippines (Pres.
Dec. No. 97 (1973) ) specifically prescribes that "No person shall be
qualified for examination as marine officer unless he is: (1987)

(a) Male;
(b) Citizen of the Philippines;
(c) At least twenty-one years of age;
(d) Mentally sound and physically fit with normal color vision perception,
as certified by a competent government physician; and
(e) Of good moral character.

Marina feels very aggrieved over the denial and has come to you for
advice. She wants to know:

(1) Whether the Board of Examiners had any plausible or legal basis for
rejecting her application in 1986. Explain briefly.

(2) Whether the 1987 Constitution guarantees her the right to admission
to take the coming January 1988 marine officers examinations. Explain
and cite relevant provisions.

SUGGESTED ANSWERS:

(a) The disqualification of females from the practice of marine profession

constitutes as invidious discrimination condemned by the Equal Protection
Clause of that Constitution (Art. IV, Sec. 1) In the United States, under a
similar provision, while earlier decisions of the Supreme Court upheld the
validity of a statute prohibiting women from bartending unless she was the wife
or daughter of a male owner (Goesart v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) and
denying to women the right to practice law (Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall)
130 (1873), recent decisions have invalidated statutes or regulations providing
for differential treatment of females based on nothing stereotypical and
inaccurate generalizations. The Court held that "classification based on sex,
like classifications based upon race, alienage, or national origin, are inherently
suspect, and must therefore be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny."
Accordingly, the Court invalidated a statute permitting a male serviceman to
claim his spouse as a dependent to obtain increased quarter allowance,
regardless of whether the wife is actually dependent on him, while denying the
same right to a servicewoman unless her husband was in fact dependent on
her for over one half of his support. (Frontierro v Richardson, 411 U.S. 687
(1973); Accord Craig, v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (providing for sale of beer
to males under 21 and to females under 18); Reed v. Reed. 404 U.S. 71 (1971)
(preference given to men over women for appointment as administrators of
estates invalid).

(b) In addition to the Equal Protection Clause, the 1987 Constitution now
requires the State to "ensure the fundamental equality before the law of
women and men" (Art II, Sec. 14) and to provide them with "such facilities and
opportunities that will enhance their welfare and enable them to realize their
full potential in the service of the nation." (Art. XIII, Sec. 14). These provisions
put in serious doubt the validity of PD 97 limiting the practice of marine
profession to males.

4. "X", a son of a rich family, applied for enrolment with the San Carlos
Seminary in Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. Because he had been
previously expelled from another seminary for scholastic deficiency, the
Rector of San Carlos Seminary denied the application without giving any
grounds for the denial. After "X" was refused admission, the Rector
admitted another applicant, who is the son of a poor farmer who was also
academically deficient.

Prepare a short argument citing rules, laws, or constitutional provisions

in support of "X's" motion for reconsideration of the denial of his
application. (1987)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The refusal of the seminary to admit "X" constitutes invidious

discrimination, violative of the Equal Protection Clause (Art. III, Sec. 1) of the
Constitution. The fact, that the other applicant is the son of a poor farmer does
not make the discrimination any less invidious since the other applicant is also
academically deficient. The reverse discrimination practiced by the seminary
cannot be justified because unlike the race problem in America, poverty is not
a condition of inferiority needing redress.

5. Undaunted by his three failures in the National Medical Admission

Test (NMAT), Cruz applied to take it again but he was refused because of
an order of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS)
disallowing flunkers from taking the test a fourth time. Cruz filed suit
assailing this rule raising the constitutional grounds of accessible
quality education, academic freedom and equal protection. The
government opposes this, upholding the constitutionality of the rule on
the ground of exercise of police power. (2000)

Decide the case discussing the grounds raised.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

As held in Department of Education, Culture and Sports v. San Diego,180

SCRA 533 (1989), the rule is a valid exercise of police power to ensure that
those admitted to the medical profession are qualified. The arguments of Cruz
are not meritorious. The right to quality education and academic freedom are
not absolute. Under Section 5(3), Article XIV of the Constitution, the right to
choose a profession is subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and
academic requirements. The rule does not violate equal protection. There is a
substantial distinction between medical students and other students. Unlike
other professions, the medical profession directly affects the lives of the
people.

6. An ordinance of the City of Manila requires every alien desiring to

obtain employment of whatever kind, including casual and part-time
employment, in the city to secure an employment permit from the City
Mayor and to pay a work permit fee of P500. Is the ordinance valid?
(1989)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, the ordinance is not valid. In Villegas vs. Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho,
86 SCRA 270, it was held that such an ordinance violates equal protection. It
failed to consider the valid substantial differences among the aliens required to
pay the fee. The same among it being collected from every employed alien,
whether he is casual or permanent, part-time or full-time. The ordinance also
violates due process, because it does not contain any standard to guide the
mayor in the exercise of the power granted to him by the ordinance. Thus, it
confers upon him unrestricted power to allow or prevent an activity which is
lawful per se.

7. "X" was sentenced to a penalty of 1 year and 5 months of prision

correctional and to pay a fine of P8,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment
in case of solvency. After serving his prison term, "X" asked the Director
of Prisons whether he could already be released. "X" was asked to pay
the fine of P5,000.00 and he said he could not afford it, being an indigent.
The Director informed him he has to serve an additional prison term at
the rate of one day per eight pesos in accordance with Article 39 of the
Revised Penal Code, The lawyer of "X" filed a petition for habeas corpus
contending that the further incarceration of his client for unpaid fines
violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Decide. (1989)

SUGGESTED ANSWERS:

(1) The petition should be granted, because Article 39 of the Revised

Penal Code is unconstitutional. In Tate vs. Short, 401 U.S. 395, the United
States Supreme Court held that imposition of subsidiary imprisonment upon a
convict who is too poor to pay a fine violates equal protection, because
economic status cannot serve as a valid basis for distinguishing the duration of
the imprisonment between a convict who is able to pay the fine and a convict
who is unable to pay it.
(2) On the other hand, in United States ex rel. Privitera vs. Kross, 239 F
Supp 118, it was held that the imposition of subsidiary imprisonment for
inability to pay a fine does not violate equal protection, because the
punishment should be tailored to fit the individual, and equal protection does
not compel the eradication of every disadvantage caused by indigence. The
decision was affirmed by the United States Circuit Court of Appeals in 345 F2d
533, and the United States Supreme Court denied the petition for certiorari in
382 U.S. 911. This ruling was adopted by the Illinois Supreme Court in People
vs. Williams, 31 ALR3d 920.

8. State whether or not the following laws are constitutional. Explain

briefly. (2006)

 A law prohibiting Chinese citizens from engaging in retail trade.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

A law prohibiting Chinese citizens from engaging in retail trade is

unconstitutional, because it violates the guarantee of equal protection of the
laws found in the Bill of Rights (Section 1, Article III of the Constitution). Equal
protection applies even to aliens. It singled out Chinese citizens and did not
include other aliens although they are similarly situated. The prohibition should
have applied to all aliens. For a classification to be valid, it must apply to all
those belonging to the same class (Central Bank Employees Association, Inc.
v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 446 SCRA 999, [2004]).

9. A law is passed intended to protect women and children from all

forms of violence. When a woman perceives an act to be an act of
violence or a threat of violence against her, she may apply for a
Barangay Protection Order (BPO) to be issued by the Barangay
Chairman, which shall have the force and effect of law. Conrado, against
whom a BPO had been issued on petition of his wife, went to court to
challenge the constitutionality of the law. He raises the following
grounds: (2016)

[a] The law violates the equal protection clause, because while
it extends protection to women who may be victims of
violence by their husbands, it does not extend the same
protection to husbands who may be battered by their wives.
Rule on the validity of the grounds raised by Conrado, with
reasons.

SUGGESTED ANSWERS:

[a] The law does not violate the equal protection clause. It is based
on substantial distinctions. The unequal power relationship between women
and men, the greater likelihood for women than men to be victims of violence,
and the widespread gender bias and prejudice against women all make for real
differences (Garcia v. Drilon, 699 SCRA 352 [20131).

VII. SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

1. Johann learned that the police were looking for him in connection with
the rape of an 18-year old girl, a neighbor. He went to the police station a
week later and presented himself to the desk sergeant. Coincidentally.
the rape victim was in the premises executing an extrajudicial statement.
Johann, along with six (6) other suspects, were placed in a police lineup
and the girl pointed to him as the rapist. Johann was arrested and locked
up in a cell. Johann was charged with rape in court but prior to
arraignment invoked his right to preliminary investigation. This was
denied by the judge, and thus, trial proceeded. After the prosecution
presented several witnesses, Johann through counsel, invoked the right
to bail and filed a motion therefor, which was denied outright by the
Judge. Johann now files a petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals arguing that: His arrest was not in accordance with law. Decide.
(1993)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, the warrantless arrest of Johann was not in accordance with law. As
held in Go v. Court of Appeals, 206 SCRA 138, his case does not fall under the
Instances in Rule 113, sec. 5 (a) of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure
authorizing warrantless arrests. It cannot be considered a valid warrantless
arrest because Johann did not commit a crime in the presence of the police
officers, since they were not present when Johann had allegedly raped his
neighbor. Neither can It be considered an arrest under Rule 113 sec. 5 (b)
which allows an arrest without a warrant to be made when a crime has in fact
just been committed and the person making the arrest has personal
knowledge offsets indicating that the person to be arrested committed it. Since
Johann was arrested a week after the alleged rape, it cannot be deemed to be
a crime which "has just been committed". Nor did the police officers who
arrested him have personal knowledge of facts indicating that Johann raped
his neighbor.

2. Larry was an overnight guest in a motel. After he checked out the

following day, the chambermaid found an attache case which she
surmised was left behind by Larry. She turned it over to the manager who,
to determine the name and address of the owner, opened the attache
case and saw packages which had a peculiar smell and upon squeezing
felt like dried leaves. His curiosity aroused, the manager made an
opening on one of the packages and took several grams of the contents
thereof. He took the packages to the NBI, and in the presence of agents,
opened the package, the contents of which upon laboratory examination,
turned out to be subsequently found, brought to the NBI Office where he
admitted ownership of the attache case and the packages. He was made
to sign a receipt for the packages. Larry was charged in court for
possession of prohibited drugs. He was convicted. On appeal, he now
poses the following issues: (1993)
1) The packages are inadmissible in evidence being the product of an
illegal search and seizure;
2) Neither is the receipt he signed admissible, his rights under custodial
investigation not having been observed. Decide.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
On the assumption that the issues were timely raised the answers are as
follows: 1) The packages are admissible in evidence. The one who opened the
packages was the manager of the motel without any interference of the agents
of the National Bureau of Investigation. As held in People vs. Marti, 193 SCRA
57, the constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures refers
to unwarranted intrusion by the government and does not operate as a
restraint upon private individuals. 2) The receipt is not admissible in evidence.

3. Emilio had long suspected that Alvin, his employee, had been passing
trade secrets to his competitor, Randy, but he had no proof. One day,
Emilio broke open the desk of Alvin and discovered a letter wherein
Randy thanked Alvin for having passed on to him vital trade secrets of
Emilio. Enclosed in the letter was a check for P50,000.00 drawn against
the account of Randy and payable to Alvin. Emilio then dismissed Alvin
from his employment. Emilio's proof of Alvin's perfidy are the said letter
and check which are objected to as inadmissible for having been
obtained through an illegal search. Alvin filed a suit assailing his
dismissal. Rule on the admissibility of the letter and check. (2005)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

As held in People v. Marti (G.R. No. 81561, January 18, 1991), the
constitution, in laying down the principles of the government and fundamental
liberties of the people, does not govern relationships between individuals.
Thus, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a
private establishment for its own and private purposes and without the
intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and
seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private individuals, not the law
enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection against unreasonable searches
and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by PRIVATE
INDIVIDUALS so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by
the government. Accordingly, the letter and check are admissible in evidence.
(Waterous Drug Corp. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 113271, October 16, 1997)

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The letter is inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction
declaring the privacy of communication and correspondence to be inviolable is
no less applicable simply because it is the employer who is the party against
whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the
prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a lawful order from the court or when
public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law. Any violation of
this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding. (Zulueta v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107383, February 20,
1996)

4. A witnessed two hooded men with baseball bats enter the house of
their next door neighbor B. after a few seconds, he heard B shouting,
“Huwag Pilo babayaran kita agad.” Then A saw the two hooded men
hitting B until the latter fell lifeless. The assailants escaped using a
yellow motorcycle with a fireball sticker on it toward the direction of an
exclusive village nearby. A reported the incident to PO1 Nuval. The
following day, PO1 Nuval saw the motorcycle parked in the garage of a
house at Sta. Ines Street inside the exclusive village. He inquired with the
caretaker as to who owned the motorcycle. The caretaker named the
brothers Pilo and Ramon Maradona who were then outside the country.
PO1 Nuval insisted on getting inside the garage. Out of fear, the
caretaker allowed him. PO1 Nuval took 2 ski masks and 2 bats beside the
motorcycle. Was the search valid? What about the seizure? Decide with
reasons. (2010)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The warrantless search and seizure was not valid. It was not made as an
incident to a lawful warrantless arrest. (People vs. Baula, 344 SCRA 663
[2000]). The caretaker had no authority to waive the right of the brothers Pilo
and Ramon Maradona to waive their right against unreasonable search and
seizure. (People vs. Damaso, 212 SCRA 547 [1992]). The warrantless seizure
of the ski masks and bats cannot be justified under the plain view doctrine,
because they were seized after invalid intrusion in to the house. (People vs.
Bolasa, 321 SCRA 459 [1999]).

Alternative: No. The search and the seizure are invalid because there
was no search warrant and it cannot be said to be a search incidental to a
lawful arrest. It is the right of all individual to be secured against unreasonable
searches and seizure by the government.

5. One day a passenger bus conductor found a man's handbag left in the
bus. When the conductor opened the bag, he found inside a catling card
with the owner's name (Dante Galang) and address, a few hundred peso
bills, and a small plastic bag containing a white powdery substance. He
brought the powdery substance to the National Bureau of Investigation
for laboratory examination and it was determined to be
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a prohibited drug. Dante
Galang was subsequently traced and found and brought to the NBI Office
where he admitted ownership of the handbag and its contents. In the
course of the interrogation by NBI agents, and without the presence and
assistance of counsel, Galang was made to sign a receipt for the plastic
bag and its shabu contents. Galang was charged with illegal possession
of prohibited drugs and was convicted. On appeal he contends that - A.
The plastic bag and its contents are inadmissible in evidence being the
product of an illegal search and seizure; (3%) and B. The receipt he
signed is also inadmissible as his rights under custodial investigation
were not observed. Decide the case with reasons.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

A. It is admissible... B. The receipt which Galang signed without the assistance

of counsel is not admissible in evidence. As held in People v. Castro, 274
SCRA 115 {1997), since the receipt is a document admitting the offense
charged, Galang should have been assisted by counsel as required by Article
III, Section 11 of the Constitution.
6. In what scenario is an extensive search of moving vehicles
without warrant valid? (2011)

Answer: (D) The driver sped away in his car when the police flagged him
down at a checkpoint.

7. An informer told the police that a Toyota Car with plate ABC 134 would
deliver an unspecified quantity of ecstacy in Forbes Park, Makati City.
The officers whom the police sent to watch the Forbes Park gates saw
the described car and flagged it down. When the driver stopped and
lowered his window, an officer saw a gun tucked on the driver’s waist.
The officer asked the driver to step out and he did. When an officer
looked inside the car, he saw many tablets strewn on the driver’s seat.
The driver admitted they were ecstacy. Is the search valid?

Answer: (C). Yes, the police acted based on reliable information and the fact
that an officer saw the driver carrying the gun.

8. Using the description of the supplier of shabu given by persons who

had been arrested earlier for selling it, the police conducted surveillance
of the area indicated. When they saw a man who fitted the description
walking from the apartment to his car, they approached and frisked him
and he did not object. The search yielded an unlicensed gun tucked on
his waist and shabu in his car. Is the search valid?

Answer: (A). No, the man did not manifest any suspicious behavior that
would give the police sufficient reason to search him.

9. On the basis of a verified report and confidential information that

various electronic equipment, which were illegally imported into the
Philippines, were found in the bodega of the Tikasan Corporation located
at 1002 Binakayan St., Cebu City, the Collector of Customs of Cebu
issued, in the morning of 2 January 1988, a Warrant of Seizure and
Detention against the corporation for the seizure of the electronic
equipment. The warrant particularly describes the electronic equipment
and specifies the provisions of the Tariff and Customs Code which were
violated by the importation.

The warrant was served and implemented in the afternoon of 2

January 1988 by Customs policemen who then seized the described
equipment. The inventory of the seized articles was signed by the
Secretary of the Tikasan Corporation. The following day, a hearing
officer in the Office of the Collector of Customs conducted a hearing on
the confiscation of the equipment.

Two days thereafter, the corporation filed with the Supreme Court a
petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus to set aside the
warrant, enjoin the Collector and his agents from further proceeding with
the forfeiture hearing and to secure the return of the confiscated
equipment, alleging therein that the warrant issued is null and void for
the reason that, pursuant to Section 2 Article III of the 1987 Constitution,
only a judge may issue a search warrant. In his comment to the petition,
the Collector of Customs, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
contends that he is authorized under the Tariff and Custom Code to
order the seizure of the equipment whose duties and taxes were not paid
and that the corporation did not exhaust administrative remedies. Should
the petition be granted? Decide. (1991)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The petition should not be granted. Under Secs. 2205 and 2208 of the
Tariff and Customs Code, customs officials are authorized to enter any
warehouse, not used as dwelling, for the purpose of seizing any article which is
subject to forfeiture. For this purpose they need no warrant issued by a court.
As stated in Viduya vs. Berdiago, 73 SCRA 553, for centuries the seizure of
goods by customs officials to enforce the customs laws without need of a
search warrant has been recognized.

10. Congress is considering a law against drunken driving. Under the

legislation, police authorities may ask any driver to take a "breathalyzer
test", wherein the driver exhales several times into a device which can
determine whether he has been driving under the influence of alcohol.
The results of the test can be used, in any legal proceeding against him.
Furthermore, declaring that the issuance of a driver's license gives rise
only to a privilege to drive motor vehicles on public roads, the law
provides that a driver who refuses to take the test shall be automatically
subject to a 90-day suspension of his driver's license, Cite two [2]
possible constitutional objections to this law. Resolve the objections and
explain whether any such infirmities can be cured. (1992)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
 Possible objections to the law are that requiring a driver to take the
breathalyzer test will violate his right against self-incrimination, that providing
for the suspension of his driver's license without any hearing violates due
process, and that the proposed law will violate the right against unreasonable
searches and seizures, because it allows police authorities to require a driver to
take the breathalyzer test even if there is no probable cause

Alternative Answer: Requiring a driver to take a breathalyzer test does not

violate his right against self-incrimination, because he is not being compelled to
give testimonial evidence. He is merely being asked to submit to a physical test.
This is not covered by the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination.
Thus, in South Dakota vs. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, it was held for this reason that
requiring a driver to take a blood-alcohol test is valid. As held in Mackey vs.
Afontrya 443 U.S. 1, because of compelling government interest in safety along
the streets, the license of a driver who refuses to take the breathalyzer test may
be suspended immediately pending a post-suspension hearing, but there must
be a provision for a post-suspension hearing. Thus, to save the proposed law
from unconstitutionally on the ground of denial of due process, it should provide
for an immediate hearing upon suspension of the driver's license. The
proposed law violates the right against unreasonable searches and seizures. It
will authorize police authorities to stop any driver and ask him to take the
breathalyzer test even in the absence of a probable cause.

11. Around 12:00 midnight, a team of police officers was on routine

patrol in Barangay Makatarungan when it noticed an open delivery van
neatly covered with banana leaves. Believing that the van was loaded
with contraband, the team leader flagged down the vehicle which was
driven by Hades. He inquired from Hades what was loaded on the van.
Hades just gave the police officer a blank stare and started to perspire
profusely. The police officers then told Hades that they will look inside
the vehicle. Hades did not make any reply. The police officers then lifted
the banana leaves and saw several boxes. They opened the boxes and
discovered several kilos of shabu inside. Hades was charged with illegal
possession of illegal drugs. After due proceedings, he was convicted by
the trial court. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction. In
his final bid for exoneration, Hades went to the Supreme Court claiming
that his constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures
was violated when the police officers searched his vehicle without a
warrant; that the shabu confiscated from him is thus inadmissible in
evidence; and that there being no evidence against him, he is entitled to
an acquittal. For its part, the People ofthe Philippines maintains that the
case ofHades involved a consented warrantless search which is legally
recognized. The People adverts to the fact that Hades did not offer any
protest when the police officers asked him if they could look inside the
vehicle. Thus, any evidence obtained in the course thereof is admissible
in evidence. Whose claim is correct? Explain. (2015)
 SUGGESTED ANSWER: Hades’ claim is correct. The evidence obtained
was illegally seized and is thus inadmissible in evidence. A consented
warrantless search, if it exists or whether it was in fact voluntary is a question
of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances. Hades’ mere
silence does not amount to consent. In the absence of such consent, evidence
obtained thereof shall be inadmissible in evidence, in which case precludes
conviction and calls for the acquittal of the accused (Ong v. People, GR No.
197788, Feb. 29, 2012).

12. Typhoon Bangis devastated the Province of Sinagtala. Roads and

bridges were destroyed which impeded the entry of vehicles into the area.
This caused food shortage resulting in massive looting of grocery stores
and malls. There is power outage also in the area. For these reasons, the
governor of the province declares a state of emergency in their province
through Proclamation No. 1. He also invoked Section 465 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160) which vests on the provincial
governor the power to carryout emergency measures during man-made
and natural disasters and calamities, and to call upon the appropriate
national law enforcement agencies to suppress disorder and lawless
violence. In the same proclamation, the governor called upon the
members of the Philippine National Police, with the assistance of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, to set up checkpoints and chokepoints,
conduct general searches and seizures including arrests, and other
actions necessary to ensure public safety. Was the action of the
provincial governor proper? Explain. (2015)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, the action of the governor is not proper. Under the Constitution, it is
only the President, as Executive, who is authorized to exercise emergency
powers as provided under Section 23, Article VI, as well as the callingout
powers under Section 7, Article VII thereof. In the case at bar, the provincial
governor is not endowed with the power to call upon the state forces at his own
bidding. It is an act which is ultra vires and may not be justified by the
invocation of Section 465 of the Local Government Code (Kulayan v. Gov. Tan,
GR No. 187298, July 3, 2012).

13. One day a passenger bus conductor found a man's handbag left in
the bus. When the conductor opened the bag, he found inside a catling
card with the owner's name (Dante Galang) and address, a few hundred
peso bills, and a small plastic bag containing a white powdery substance.
He brought the powdery substance to the National Bureau of
Investigation for laboratory examination and it was determined to be
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a prohibited drug. Dante
Galang was subsequently traced and found and brought to the NBI Office
where he admitted ownership of the handbag and its contents. In the
course of the interrogation by NBI agents, and without the presence and
assistance of counsel, Galang was made to sign a receipt for the plastic
bag and its shabu contents. Galang was charged with illegal possession
of prohibited drugs and was convicted. On appeal he contends that -

(1) The plastic bag and its contents are inadmissible in evidence
being the product of an illegal search and seizure;
(2) The receipt he signed is also inadmissible as his rights under
custodial investigation were not observed. (2%) Decide the case
with reasons. (2002)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

A. The plastic bag and its contents are admissible in evidence, since it was
not the National Bureau of Investigation but the bus conductor who opened the
bag and brought it to the National Bureau of Investigation. As held In People v.
Marti, 193 SCRA 57 (1991), the constitutional right against unreasonable
search and seizure is a restraint upon the government. It does not apply so as
to require exclusion of evidence which came into the possession of the
Government through a search made by a private citizen.
B. It is inadmissible.

14. Some police operatives, acting under a lawfully issued warrant for
the purpose of searching for firearms in the House of X located at No. 10
Shaw Boulevard, Pasig, Metro Manila, found, instead of firearms, ten
kilograms of cocaine.(1990)

(1) May the said police operatives lawfully seize the cocaine?
Explain your answer.
(2) May X successfully challenge the legality of the search on the
ground that the peace officers did not inform him about his right to
remain silent and his right to counsel? Explain your answer.
(3) Suppose the peace officers were able to find unlicensed
firearms in the house in an adjacent lot, that is. No, 12 Shaw
Boulevard, which is also owned by X. May they lawfully seize the
said unlicensed firearms? Explain your answer.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(1) Yes, the police operatives may lawfully seize the cocaine, because
it is an item whose possession is prohibited by law, it was in plain view
and it was only inadvertently discovered in the course of a lawful search.
The possession of cocaine is prohibited by Section 8 of the Dangerous
Drugs Act. As held in Magoncia v. Palacio, 80 Phil. 770, an article
whose possession is prohibited by law may be seized without the need
of any search warrant if it was discovered during a lawful search. The
additional requirement laid down in Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687
 that the discovery of the article must have been made inadvertently was
also satisfied in this case.

(2) No, X cannot successfully challenge the legality of the search simply
because the peace officers did not inform him about his right to remain
silent and his right to counsel. Section 12(1), Article III of the 1987
Constitution provides: "Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right
to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice." As held in People v. Dy, 158 SCRA 111.
for this provision to apply, a suspect must be under investigation. There
was no investigation involved in this case.

(3) The unlicensed firearms stored at 12 Shaw Boulevard may lawfully

be seized since their possession is illegal. As held in Magoncia a
Palacio, 80 Phil. 770, when an individual possesses contraband
(unlicensed firearms belong to this category), he is committing a crime
and he can be arrested without a warrant and the contraband can be
seized.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
In accordance with the rulings in Uy Keytin v, Villareal, 42 Phil. 886 and
People v. Sy Juco, 64 Phil. 667, the unlicensed firearms found in the
house at 12 Shaw Boulevard may not be lawfully seized, since they
were not included in the description of the articles to be seized by virtue
of the search warrant. The search warrant described the articles to be
seized as firearms in the house of X located at 10 Shaw Boulevard.
1987 Bar Questions
Topic: Searches and Seizures; Immediate Control
Year: 1987
Question:
"X" a Constabulary Officer, was arrested pursuant to a lawful court order in
Baguio City for murder. He was brought to Manila where a warrantless search
was conducted in his official quarters at Camp Crame, The search team found
and seized the murder weapon in a drawer of "X". Can "X" claim that the
search and seizure were illegal and move for exclusion from evidence of the
weapon seized? Explain.

Answer:
Yes, "X" can do so. The warrantless search cannot be justified as an incident
of a valid arrest, because considerable time had elapsed after his arrest in
Baguio before the search of his quarters in Camp Crame, Quezon City was
made, and because the distance between the place of arrest and the place of
search negates any claim that the place searched is within his "immediate
control" so as to justify the apprehension that he might destroy or conceal
evidence of crime before a warrant can be obtained. (Chimel v. California, 395
U.S. 752 (1969) ) in Nolasco v. Cruz Pano, 147 SCRA 509 (1987), the
Supreme Court reconsidered its previous decision holding that a warrantless
search, made after 30 minutes from the time of arrest, and, in a place several
blocks away from the place of arrest, was valid. It held that a warrantless
search is limited to the search of the person of the arrestee at the time and
incident to his arrest and for dangerous weapons or anything which may be
used as proof of the offense. A contrary rule would justify the police in
procuring a warrant of arrest and, by virtue thereof, not only arrest the person
but also search his dwelling. A warrant requires that all facts as to the condition
of the property and its surroundings and its improvements and capabilities
must be considered, and this can only be done in a judicial proceeding.

Searches and Seizures; Valid Warrantless Search

Yeare: 2000

Question:
Crack officers of the Anti-Narcotics Unit were assigned on surveillance of the
environs of a cemetery where the sale and use of dangerous drugs are
rampant. A man with reddish and glassy eyes was walking unsteadily moving
towards them but veered away when he sensed the presence of policemen.
They approached him, introduced themselves as police officers and asked him
what he had clenched in his hand. As he kept mum, the policemen pried his
hand open and found a sachet of shabu, a dangerous drug. Accordingly
charged in court, the accused objected to the admission in evidence of the
dangerous drug because it was the result of an illegal search and seizure.
a.) Rule on the objection. (3%)

b.) What are the instances when warrantless searches may be effected? (2%)

Answer:
a) The objection is not tenable. In accordance with Manalili v. Court of Appeals,
280 SCRA 400 (1997). since the accused had red eyes and was walking
unsteadily and the place is a known hang-out of drug addicts, the police
officers had sufficient reason to stop the accused and to frisk him. Since shabu
was actually found during the investigation, it could be seized without the need
for a search warrant.

b) A warrantless search may be effected in the following cases:

a) Searches incidental to a lawful arrest:
b) Searches of moving vehicles;
c) Searches of prohibited articles in plain view:
d) Enforcement of customs law;
e) Consented searches;
f) Stop and frisk (People v. Monaco, 285 SCRA 703 [1998]);
g) Routine searches at borders and ports of entry (United States v.
Ramsey, 431 U.S.606 [1977]); and
h) Searches of businesses in the exercise of visitorial powers to enforce
policeregulations (New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987]).

Searches and Seizure- Waiver of Consent

Year: 1989

Question:
Pursuing reports that great quantities of prohibited drugs are being
smuggled at nighttime through the shores of Cavite, the Southern Luzon
Command set up checkpoints at the end of the Cavite coastal road to search
passing motor vehicles. A 19-year old boy, who finished fifth grade, while
driving, was stopped by the authorities at the checkpoint. Without any
objection from him, his car was inspected, and the search yielded marijuana
leaves hidden in the trunk compartment of the car. The prohibited drug was
promptly seized, and the boy was brought to the police station for questioning.
Was the search without warrant legal?

Suggested answer:
No, the search was not valid, because there was no probable cause for
conducting the search. As held in Almeda Sanchez vs. United States, 413 U.S.
266, while a moving vehicle can be searched without a warrant, there must still
be probable cause. In the case in question, there was nothing to indicate that
marijuana leaves were hidden in the trunk of the car. The mere fact that the
boy did not object to the inspection of the car does not constitute consent to
the search. As ruled in People vs. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1, the failure to object to
a warrantless search does not constitute consent, especially in the light of the
fact.

Alternative answer:
Yes. The requirement of probable cause differs from case to case. In this one,
since the police agents are confronted with large-scale
smuggling of prohibited drugs, existence of which is of public
knowledge, they can set up checkpoints at strategic places, in
the same way that of in a neighborhood a child is kidnapped, it is
lawful to search cars and vehicles leaving the neighborhood or
village: This situation is also similar to warrantless searches of
moving vehicles in customs area, which searches have been
upheld. (Papa vs. Mago, 22 SCRA 857 (1968). The rule is based
on practical necessity.

Year: 1989

Question:
While serving sentence in Muntinlupa for the crime of theft, "X" stabbed
dead one of his guards, "X" was charged with murder. During his trial, the
prosecution introduced as evidence a letter written in prison by "X" to his wife
tending to establish that the crime of murder was the result of premeditation.
The letter was written voluntarily. In the course of inspection, it was opened
and read by a warden pursuant to the rules of discipline of the Bureau of
Prisons and considering its contents, the letter was turned over to the
prosecutor. The lawyer of "X" objected to the presentation of the letter and
moved for its return on the ground that it violates the right of "X" against
unlawful search and seizure. Decide.

Suggested answer:
The objection of the lawyer must be sustained, Section 3(1), Article IV
of the 1987 Constitution provides:
"The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable
except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires
otherwise as prescribed by law."
There was no court order which authorized the warden to read the letter
of "X". Neither is there any law specifically authorizing the Bureau of Prisons to
read the letter of "X", under Section 3(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution, to
interfere with any correspondence when there is no court order, there must be
a law authorizing it in the interest of public safety or order. The ruling of the
United States Supreme Court in the case of Stroud vs. United States, 251 U.S.
15 is not applicable here, because Section 3(1), Article III of the 1987
Constitution has no counterpart in the American Constitution. Hence, in
accordance with Section 3(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution, the letter is
inadmissible in evidence.

Alternative answer:
The objection of the lawyer must be overruled. In Hudson vs. Palmer,
468 U.S. 517, it was held that the constitutional prohibition against illegal
searches and seizures does not extend to the confines of the prison. In Stroud
vs. United States, 251 U.S. 15, the United States Supreme Court held that
letters voluntarily written by a prisoner and examined by the warden which
contained incriminatory statements were admissible in evidence. Their
inspection by the prison authorities did not violate the constitutional prohibition
against illegal searches and seizures. This is an established practice
reasonably designed to promote discipline within the penitentiary.

Searches and Seizures; Aliens (2001)

Is an alien. State whether, in the Philippines, he: Is entitled to the right against
illegal searches and seizures and against illegal arrests. (2%)

Suggested Answer:
Aliens are entitled to the right against illegal searches and seizures and illegal
arrests. As applied in People v. Chua Ho San, 307 SCRA 432 (1999), these
rights are available to all persons, including aliens.

Searches and Seizures; Place of Search (2001)

Aimed with search and seizure warrant, a team of policemen led by Inspector
Trias entered a compound and searched the house described therein as No.
17 Speaker Perez St., Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City, owned by Mr. Ernani
Pelets, for a reported cache of firearms and ammunition. However, upon
thorough search of the house, the police found nothing.
Then, acting on a hunch, the policemen proceeded to a smaller house inside
the same compound with address at No.17-A Speaker Perez St., entered it,
and conducted a search therein over the objection of Mr. Pelets who happened
to be the same owner of the first house. There, the police found the unlicensed
firearms and ammunition they were looking for. As a result, Mr. Emani Pelets
was criminally charged in court with illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition as penalized under P.D 1866, as amended by R.A 8294. At the
trial, he vehemently objected to the presentation of the evidence against him
for being inadmissible. Is Mr. Emani Pelet’s contention valid or not? Why?
(5%)
Suggested Answer:
The contention of Ernani Pelet is valid. As held in People vs. Court of Appeals,
291SCRA 400 (1993), if the place searched is different from that stated in the
search warrant, the evidence seized is inadmissible. The policeman cannot
modify the place to be searched as set out in the search warrant.

Topic: Search and Seizure

Year: 2009
Question:
Crack agents of the Manila Police Anti-Narcotics Unit were on surveillance of a
cemetery where the sale and use of prohibited drugs were rumored to be rampant.
The team saw a man with reddish and glassy eyes walking unsteadily towards them,
but he immediately veered away upon seeing the policemen. The team approached
the man, introduced themselves as peace officers, and then asked what he had in
his clenched fist. Because the man refused to answer, a policeman pried the fist
open and saw a plastic sachet filled with crystalline substance. The team then took
the man into custody and submitted the contents of the sachet to forensic
examination. The crystalline substance in the sachet turned out to be shabu. The
man was accordingly charged in court.
During the trial, the accused:
a. Challenged the validity of his arrest; (2%) and
b. Objected to the admission in evidence of the prohibited drug, claiming that it
was obtained in an illegal search and seizure. (2%) Decide with reasons.
Answer:
A. The man’s arrest is not valid because even if the man had been acting
suspicious upon seeing the police officers and he had red eyes which might indicate
that he might be using prohibited drugs—it is not a sufficient proof that he has been
using prohibited drugs during the time of the arrest. Having red eyes and walking in
a cemetery doesn’t automatically connote a crime and the policemen’s search and
seizure was illegal which made their preceding arrest illegal as well.
B. In the admission of evidence of the prohibited drug found to be in the man’s
fist is not valid because first, despite being suspicious, he was not in “flagrante
delicto” or in the process of committing or about to commit the crime. Granted that
the heroin was closely fixed in his fist, it is not in the plain sight of the police officers
and it should be inadmissible in court. Since it was only seen after the policemen
forcefully opened his hand, the evidence is inadmissible in court and the man
should be acquitted.

I. TOPIC: SEARCH AND SEIZURE; WARRANTLESS SEARCH

YEAR: 2016

QUESTION:
 Ernesto, a minor, while driving a motor vehicle, was stopped at a
mobile checkpoint. Noticing that Ernesto is a minor, SPOT Jojo asked
Ernesto to exhibit his driver's license but Ernesto failed to produce it.
SPOT Jojo requested Ernesto to alight from the vehicle and the latter
acceded. Upon observing a bulge in the pants of Ernesto, the
policeman frisked him and found an unlicensed .22-caliber pistol
inside Ernesto's right pocket. Ernesto was arrested, detained and
charged. At the trial, Ernesto, through his lawyer, argued that,
policemen at mobile checkpoints are empowered to conduct nothing
more than a "visual search". They cannot order the persons riding the
vehicle to alight. They cannot frisk, or conduct a body search of the
driver or the passengers of the vehicle.

Ernesto’s lawyer thus posited that:

[a] The search conducted in violation of the Constitution and

established jurisprudence was an illegal search; thus, the gun
which was seized in the course of an illegal search is the “fruit of
the poisonous tree” and is inadmissible in evidence. (2.5%)

[b] The arrest made as a consequence of the invalid search was

likewise illegal, because an unlawful act (the search) cannot be
made the basis of a lawful arrest. (2.5%)
Rule on the correctness of the foregoing arguments, with
reasons.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

[a] The warrantless search of motor vehicles at checkpoints should

be limited to a visual search. Its occupants should not be
subjected to a body search (Aniag, Jr. v. Commission on
Elections, 237 SCRA 424 [1994]

1). The “stop and frisk rule” applies when a police officer
observes suspicious activity or unusual activity which may lead
him to believe that a criminal act may be afoot. The “stop and
frisk” is merely a limited protective search of outer clothing for
weapons (Luz v. People, 667 SCRA 421 [2012]).

[b] Since there was no valid warrantless search, the warrantless

search was also illegal. The unlicensed .22 caliber pistol is
inadmissible in evidence (Luz v. People, 667 SCRA 421 [2012]).

RIGHT TO PRIVACY
II. RIGHT TO PRIVACY; RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES; EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAUSE
YEAR: 2016

QUESTION:
Paragraphs c, d and f of Section 36 of Republic Act No. 9165 provide:
“Sec. 36. Authorized drug testing. x x x The following shall be
subjected to undergo drug testing: x x x
c. Students of secondary anditertiary schools x x x;
d. Officers and employees of public and private offices x x x;
f. All persons charged before the prosecutor's office with
a criminal offense having an imposable imprisonment of
not less than 6 years and 1 day;”

Petitioners contend that the assailed portions of Sec. 36 are

unconstitutional for violating the right to privacy, the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures and the equal protection clause.
Decide if the assailed provisions are unconstitutional. (5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The drug testing of students of secondary and tertiary schools is valid.

Deterring their use of drugs by random drug testing is as important as
enhancing efficient enforcement. Random drug testing of officers and
employees of public and private offices is justifiable. Their expectation
of privacy in office is reduced. The drug tests and results are kept
confidential. Random drug testing is an effective way of deterring drug
use and is reasonable. Public officials and employees are required by
the Constitution to be accountable at all times to the people and to
serve them with utmost responsibility and efficiency. The mandatory
testing of all persons charged before the prosecutor's office of a criminal
offense punishable with imprisonment of at least six years and one day
is void. They are not randomly picked and are not beyond suspicions.
They do not consent to the procedure or waive their right to privacy
(Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board, 570 SCRA 410
[2008]).

Privacy of Communication (2001)

“A” has a telephone line with an extension. One day, ”A” was talking to “B” over
the telephone. “A” conspired with his friend “C”, who was at the end of the
extension line listening to “A’s” telephone conversation with “B” in order to
overhear the tape-record the conversation wherein “B” confidentially admitted
that with evident premeditation, he (B) killed “D” for having cheated him in their
business partnership. “B” was not aware that the telephone conversation was
being tape-recorded.
In the criminal case against “B” for murder, is the tape-recorded conversation
containing his admission admissible in evidence? Why? (5%)

Suggested Answer:
The tape-recorded conversation is not admissible in evidence. As held in
Salcedo-Ortanez vs. Court of Appeals, 235 SCRA 111 (1994). Republic Act
No.4200 makes the tape recording of a telephone conversation, inadmissible
in evidence. In addition, the taping of the conversation violated the guarantee
of privacy of communications enunciated in Section 3, Article III of the
Constitution.

Topic: Right to Privacy

Year: 2009
Question:
In a criminal prosecution for murder, the prosecution presented, as witness, an
employee of the Manila Hotel who produced in court a videotape recording
showing the heated exchange between the accused and the victim that took place
at the lobby of the hotel barely 30 minutes before the killing. The accused objects
to the admission of the videotape recording on the ground that it was taken without
his knowledge or consent, in violation of his right to privacy and the Anti-Wire
Tapping law. Resolve the objection with reasons. (3%)
Answer:
The said objection should be overruled on the ground that the heated
conversation happened at a lobby of a hotel which is a public area that is open for
everyone to hear and see. Even without his consent, the admission of the video
tape recording should still be acknowledged because the Anti-Wire Tapping Law
only protects speeches and talks of private communication. His right to privacy
cannot be given credence to because the heated exchange occurred in the lobby
area which is a public place.
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

Freedom of Expression; Prior Restraint (1988)

The Secretary of Transportation and Communications has warned radio station

operators against selling blocked time, on the claim that the time covered thereby
are often used by those buying them to attack the present administration. Assume
that the department implements this warning and orders owners and operators of
radio stations not to sell blocked time to interested parties without prior clearance
from the Department of Transportation and Communications. You are approached
by an interested party affected adversely by that order of the Secretary of
Transportation and Communications. What would you do regarding that ban on the
sale of blocked time? Explain your answer.

SUGGESTED ANSWER: I would challenge its validity in court on the ground that it
constitutes a prior restraint on freedom of expression. Such a limitation is valid only
in exceptional cases, such as where the purpose is to prevent actual obstruction to
recruitment of service or the sailing dates of transports or the number and location
of troops, or for the purpose of enforcing the primary requirements of decency or
the security of community life. (Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S, 697 (1931)). Attacks
on the government, on the other hand, cannot justify prior restraints. For as has
been pointed out, "the interest of society and the maintenance of good government
demand a full discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the
conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp incision of
its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under
a hostile and an unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a
clear conscience," (United States v Bustos, 37 Phil. 741 (1918)). The parties
adversely affected may also disregard the regulation as being on its face void. As
has been held, "any system of prior restraints of expression comes to the court
bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity," and the
government "thus carries a heavy burden of showing justification for the imposition
of such a restraint." (New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971)).
The usual presumption of validity that inheres in legislation is reversed in the case
of laws imposing prior restraint on freedom of expression.

Overbreadth Doctrine vs. Void for Vagueness

2010
Answer: Compare and contrast “Overbreadth” doctrine from void-for vagueness
doctrine.
While the overbreadth doctrine decrees that a governmental purpose may not be
achieved by means in a statute which sweep unnecessary broadly and thereby
invades the area of protected freedom a statute is void for vagueness when it
forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common
intelligence cannot necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.
(Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan, 369 vs. SCRA 394 [2001]).

Suggested Answer: Overbreadth and Void for Vagueness doctrine is used as

test for the validity on their faces (FACIAL CHALLENGE) statutes in free
speech cases (freedom of speech). It is not applicable in criminal cases.

Overbreadth doctrine decrees that governmental purpose may not be

achieved by means which sweeps unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade
the area of protected freedoms.
“Void for vagueness doctrine" which holds that "a law is facially invalid if men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application, violates the first essential of due process of law.

Topic: Freedom of the Press; Wartime Censorship

Year: 1987
Question:
In the morning of August 28, 1987, during the height of -the fighting at Channel
4 and Camelot Hotel, the military closed Radio Station XX, which was excitedly
reporting the successes of the rebels and movements towards Manila and
troops friendly to the rebels. The reports were correct and factual. On October
6, 1987, after normalcy had returned and the Government had full control of
the situation, the National Telecommunications Commission, without notice
and hearing, but merely on the basis of the report of the military, cancelled the
franchise of station XX.

Discuss the legality of the action taken against the station on August 28, 1987.

Answer:
(a) The closing down of Radio Station XX during the fighting is permissible.
With respect news media, wartime censorship has been upheld on the ground
that "when a nation is at war many things that might be said in time of peace
are such a hindrance to its efforts that their utterance will not be endured so
long as men fight and that no Court could regard them as protected by any
constitutional right." The security of community life may be protected against
incitements to acts of violence and the overthrow by force of orderly
government. (Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), quoting Justice
Holme's opinion in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); New York
Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) ) With greater reason then may
censorship in times of emergency be justified in the case of broadcast media
since their freedom is somewhat lesser in scope. The impact of the vibrant
speech, as Justice Gutierrez said, is forceful and immediate. Unlike readers of
the
printed work, a radio audience has lesser opportunity to cogitate, analyze and
reject the utterance. (Eastern Broadcasting Corp (DYRE) v, Dans, 137 SCRA
647 (1985) ). In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978), it was held
that "of all forms of communication, it is broadcasting which has received the
most limited First Amendment Protection."

Topic: Right to Liberty

Year: 2008
Question:
The Philippine National Police (PNP) issued a circular to all its members directed
at the style and length of male police officers' hair, sideburns and moustaches, as
well as the size of their waistlines. It prohibits beards, goatees and waistlines over
38 inches, except for medical reason. Some police officers questioned the validity
of the circular, claiming that it violated their right to liberty under the Constitution.
Resolve the controversy. (6%)
Answer:
In this case, the circular issued by the Philippine National Police is valid
because there is a rational connection between the regulation which is the means
employed and the subject of the matter. Provided that these are policemen who
partake to a certain degree—a military role, is assumed to have discipline and
uniformity in behavior, and must be presentable at all times so as to be recognized
immediately as someone who has authority. The said circular does not go over
the mandate of the police and is reasonable enough to impose certain regulations
regarding their appearances.

Topic: Freedom of the Press

Year: 2009
Question:
The KKK Television Network (KKK-TV) aired the documentary, "Case Law: How the
Supreme Court Decides," without obtaining the necessary permit required by P.D.
1986. Consequently, the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board
(MTRCB) suspended the airing of KKK-TV programs. MTRCB declared that under
P.D. 1986, it has the power of prior review over all television programs, except
"newsreels" and programs "by the Government", and the subject documentary does
not fall under either of these two classes. The suspension order was ostensibly
based on Memorandum Circular No. 98-17 which grants MTRCB the authority to
issue such an order.
KKK-TV filed a certiorari petition in court, raising the following issues:
a. The act of MTRCB constitutes "prior restraint" and violates the
constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression; (3%) and
b. While Memorandum Circular No. 98-17 was issued and published in a
newspaper of general circulation, a copy thereof was never filed with the
 Office of the National Register of the University of the Philippines Law
Center. (2%)
Resolve the foregoing issues, with reasons.
Answer:
A. The contention of the KKK-TV cannot be given grounds to because under PD
1986, they were not able to comply with the necessary permit in order to air their
own documentary. The curtailing of their right to present their show is a valid
exercise of police power because the television can be used a medium to spread
false information. Granted that they were not able to procure all the necessary
documents, the MTRCB following PD 1986 may be able to suspend their shows
until they get all the necessary permits required by law.

Topic: Freedom to choose their profession

Year: 2008
Question:
As a reaction to the rice shortage and the dearth of mining engineers, Congress
passed a law requiring graduates of public science high school henceforth to take
up agriculture or mining engineering as their college course. Several students
protested, invoking their freedom to choose their profession. Is the law
constitutional? (6%)
Answer:
Yes. The student’s have the freedom of choosing their own profession and the
burden of rice shortage and death of mining engineers shouldn’t be passed on to
them. In some cases wherein the state has to intervene and prohibit people from
practicing their chosen field is valid particularly and especially if it relates to the
overall health of the people. In the particular case, forcing students to take up
agriculture or mining engineering curtails their right to choose their own profession.
What the government could do, is to raise awareness regarding these programs
and encourage more people to take up agriculture instead of forcing it upon them.

Topic: Freedom of Expression

Year: 2006
Question/s: Samahan Ng Mga Mahihirap (SM) filed with the Office of the City
Mayor" of Manila an application for a permit to hold a rally on Mendiola Street
on September 5, 2006 from 10:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. to protest the political
killings of journalists. However, the City Mayor denied their application on the
ground that a rally at the time and place applied for will block the traffic in the
San Miguel and Quiapo Districts. He suggested the Liwasang Bonifacio, which
has been designated a Freedom Park, as venue for the rally.

1. Does the SM have a remedy to contest the denial of its application for a
permit? 2.5%
Suggested Answer: The Samahan ng mga Mahihirap may contest the denial of
its application for a permit by filing an action in an appropriate court of law (Sec
6(e) Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 880, The Public Assembly Act of 1985.

2. Does the availability of a Freedom Park justify the denial of SM's

application for a permit? 2.5%

Suggested Answer: The availability of a Freedom Park does not by itself justify
the denial of the application for a permit, because a rally may be held in
another public place, such as, in a campus of a government-owned or
operated educational institution or even in a private property, unless there is a
clear and present danger of a substantive evil which the State has the right to
prevent (Section 4, BP 880)

3. Assuming that despite the denial of SM's application for a permit, its
members hold a rally, prompting the police to arrest them. Are the
arrests without judicial warrants lawful? 2.5%

Suggested Answer: Only the leader or organizer can be arrested without a

warrant during the rally for holding a rally without permit, but no person can be
arrested for merely participating in or attending the rally if it was peaceful
(Section 13(a), BP 880). The rally should just be peacefully dispersed (Section
12, BP 880).

4. Is the requirement to apply for a permit to hold a rally a prior restraint on

freedom of speech and assembly?

Suggested Answer: The requirement to apply for a permit to hold a rally is not
a prior restraint on freedom of speech and assembly, becasue the requirement
merely regulates the exercise of the right as to the time, place and manner of
the rally to the extent needed to avoid a clear and present danger of the
substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent. The requirement is
not content-based since the content of the speech is not relevant to the
regulation. (Bayan v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777 and 169838, April 26, 2006,
488 SCRA 226, [2006]).

Topic: Freedom of Expression

Year: 2007
Question/s: The Destilleria Felipe Segundo is famous for its 15-year old rum,
which it has produced and marketed successfully for the past 70 years. Its
latest commercial advertisement uses the line: "Nakalikim ka na ba ng kinse
anyos?" Very soon, activist groups promoting women's and children's rights
were up in arms against the advertisement.

1. All advertising companies in the Philippines have formed an association,

the Philippine Advertising Council, and have agreed to abide by all the
ethicalguidelines and decisions by the Council. In response to the
protests, the Council orders the pull-out of the "kinse anyos" advertising
 campaign. Can Destilleria Felipe Segundo claim that its constitutional
rights are thus infringed?

Suggested Answer: Destilleria Felipe Segundo cannot claim that its

constitutional rights were infringed. In this case, a private assocation formed by
advertising companies for self-regulation was the one who ordered that the
advertisement be pulled out, because Destilleria did not comply with the
association’s ethical guidelines. The guarantee of freedom of speech is a
limitation on state action and not on the action of private parties (Lloyd
Corporation v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 [1971]). The mass media are private
enterprises, and their refusal to accept any advertisement does not violate
freedom of speech (Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democrat Control
Committee, 412 U.S. 94 [1973]).

2. One of the militant groups, the Amazing Amazonas, call on all

government-owned and controlled corporations (GOCC) to boycott any
newspaper, radio or TV station that carries the "kinse anyos"
advertisements. They call on all government nominees in sequestered
corporations to block any advertising funds allocated for any such
newspaper, radio or TV station. Can the GOCCs and sequestered
corporations validly comply?

Suggested Answer: The government-owned and controlled corporations and

the government nominees in the sequestered corporations cannot block any
advertising funds allocatioed for any newspaper, radio or television station
which carries the advertisements of Destilleria Felipe Segundo. Since they are
government entities and officers, they are bound by the guarantee of freedom
of speech. Freedom of speech extends to commercial advertisements
(Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 [1981]). The mere fact that an
advertisement is offensive cannot justify its suppression (Careu v. Population
Services International, 431 U.S. 678 [1977]). The blocking of advertising funds
is a threat to prevent the exercise of the freedom of speech of Destilleria Felipe
Segundo though the fear of consequences. Such a threat qualifies as a prior
restraint (Rosden, The Law of Advertising, Vol. I, pp. 5-1.)

1992

During the recent elections, checkpoints were set up to enforce the election
period ban on firearms. During one such routine search one night, while looking
through an open window with a flashlight, the police saw firearms at the
backseat of a car partially covered by papers and clothes. Antonio, owner and
driver of the car in question, was charged for violation of the firearms ban. Are
the firearms admissible in evidence against him? Explain. If, upon further
inspection by the police, prohibited drugs were found inside the various
compartments of Antonio's car, can the drugs be used in evidence against
Antonio if he is prosecuted for possession of prohibited drugs? Explain.
Answer: a) Yes, the firearms are admissible in evidence, because they were
validly seized. In Valmonte vs. De Villa, 178 SCRA 211 and 185 SCRA 665, the
Supreme Court held that checkpoints may be set up to maintain peace and
order for the benefit of the public and checkpoints are a security measure
against unauthorized firearms. Since the search which resulted in the discovery
of the firearms was limited to a visual search of the car, it was reasonable.
Because of the ban on firearms, the possession of the firearms was prohibited.
Since they were found in plain view in the course of a lawful search, in
accordance with the decision in Magancia vs. Palacio, 80 Phil. 770, they are
admissible in evidence. b) No, the drugs cannot be used in evidence against
Antonio if he is prosecuted for possession of prohibited drugs. The drugs were
found after a more extensive search of the various compartments of the car. As
held in Valmonte vs. De Villa, 185 SCRA 665, for such a search to be valid,
there must be a probable cause. In this case, there was no probable cause, as
there was nothing to indicate that Antonio had prohibited drugs inside the
compartments of his car.

2018

Two police teams monitored the payment of ransom in a kidnapping case.

The bag containing the ransom money was placed inside an unlocked trunk of
a car which was parked at the Angola Commercial Center in Mandaluyong City.

The first police team, stationed in an area near where the car was parked,
witnessed the retrieval by the kidnappers of the bag from the unlocked trunk.
The kidnappers thereafter boarded their car and proceeded towards the
direction of Amorsolo St. in Makati City where the second police team was
waiting.

Upon confirmation by radio report from the first police team that the kidnappers
were heading towards their direction, the second police team proceeded to
conduct surveillance on the car of the kidnappers, eventually saw it enter Ayala
Commercial Center in Makati City, and the police team finally blocked it when it
slowed down. The members of the second police team approached the vehicle
and proceeded to arrest the kidnappers.

Is the warrantless arrest of the kidnappers by the second police team lawful?
(5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

NO. Warrantless arrest to be valid must have the following requisites present
(Homer vs People):
1. The person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has
just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a
crime;
2. Such overt act is done in the presence of or within the view of the arresting
officer.

Here, the members of the second police team or the arresting officers did not
witness the offenders in the act of committing the crime. Thus the warrantless
arrest is not lawful.

III. TOPIC: SEARCH AND SEIZURE; LAWFUL ARREST / RIGHT TO

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
YEAR: 2016

QUESTION:

Pornographic materials in the form of tabloids, magazines and other

printed materials, proliferate and are being sold openly in the streets
of Masaya City. The city Mayor organized a task force which
confiscated these materials. He then ordered that the materials be
burned in public. Dominador, publisher of the magazine, "Plaything",
filed a suit, raising the following constitutional issues: (a) the
confiscation of the materials constituted an illegal search and seizure,
because the same was done without a valid search warrant; and (b)
the confiscation, as well as the proposed destruction of the materials,
is a denial of the right to disseminate information, and thus, violates
the constitutional right to freedom of expression.

Is either or both contentions proper? Explain your answer. (5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

(a) The confiscation of the materials constituted an illegal search and

seizure, because it was done without a valid search warrant. It
cannot be justified as a valid warrantless search and seizure,
because such search and seizure must have been an incident of a
lawful arrest. There was no lawful arrest (Pita v. Court of Appeals,
178 SCRA 362 [1989]).

(b) The argument of Dominador that pornographic materials are

protected by the constitutional right to freedom of expression is
erroneous. Obscenity is not protected expression (Fernando v.
Court of Appeals, 510 SCRA 351 [2006]). Section 2 of Presidential
Decree No. 969 requires the forfeiture and destruction of
pornographic materialS (Nograles v. People, 660 SCRA 475 [2011]).

Topic: Freedom of Expression; Censorship

Year: 2003
Question:

NO IX - May the COMELEC (COMELEC) prohibit the posting of decals and

stickers on “mobile” places, public or private, such as on a private vehicle, and
limit their location only to the authorized posting areas that the COMELEC
itself fixes? Explain.

Suggested Answer:

According to Adiong v. COMELEC. 207 SCRA 712 [1992], the prohibition is

unconstitutional. It curtails the freedom of expression of individuals who wish to
express their preference for a candidate by posting decals and stickers on their
cars and to convince others to agree with them. It is also overboard, because it
encompasses private property and constitutes deprivation of property without
due process of law. Ownership of property includes the right to use. The
prohibition is censorship, which cannot be justified.

Topic: Freedom of Press; Actual Malice

Year: 2004

Question:

(5-a) The STAR, a national daily newspaper, carried an exclusive report

stating that Senator XX received a house and lot located at YY Street, Makati,
in consideration for his vote cutting cigarette taxes by 50 percent. The Senator
sued the STAR, its reporter, editor and publisher for libel, claiming the report
was completely false and malicious. According to the Senator, there I no YY
Street in Makati, and the tax cut was only 20 percent. He claimed one million
pesos in damages. The defendants denied “actual malice,” claiming privileged
communication and absolute freedom of the press to report on public officials
and matters of public concern. If there was any error, the STAR said it would
publish the correction promptly. Is there “actual malice” in STAR’S reportage?
How is “actual malice” defined? Are the defendants liable for damages?

First Alternative Answer:

Since Senator XX is a public person and the questioned imputation is directed

against him in his public capacity, in this case actual malice means the
statement was made with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not (Borja v. Court of Appeals, 301 SCRA
1/1999). Since there is no proof that the report was published with knowledge
that it is false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not, the
defendants are not liable for damage.

Second Alternative Answer:

Since Senator XX is a public person and the questioned imputation is directed

against him in his public capacity, in this case actual malice means the
statement was made with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it is false or not (Borja v. Court of Appeals, 301 SCRA
1/1999). Since it is a matter of public knowledge that there is no YY Street in
Makati, the publication was made with reckless disregard of whether or not is
false. The defendants may be held liable for damages.

2014

The overbreadth doctrine posits that the government: (1%)

(A) must know the extent of its power

(B) when it exercises too much power it is like someone with bad breath – it is
not healthy to society

(C) can enact laws which can reach outside its borders, like long -arm statues

(D) the government is prohibited in banning unprotected speech if a substantial

amount of protected speech is restrained or chilled in the process

(D) the government is prohibited in banning unprotected speech if a substantial

amount of protected speech is restrained or chilled in the process.

2014

Allmighty Apostles is a relatively new religious group and movement with

fast-growing membership. One time, DeepThroat, an investigative reporter,
made a research and study as to what the group’s leader, Maskeraid was
actually doing. DeepThroat eventually came up with the conclusion that
Maskeraid was a phony who is just fooling the simple-minded people to part
with their money in exchange for the promise of eternal happiness in some far
-away heaven. This was published in a newspaper which caused much
agitation among the followers of Maskeraid. Some threatened violence against
DeepThroat, while some others already started destroying properties while
hurting those selling the newspaper. The local authorities, afraid of the public
disorder that such followers might do, decided to ban the distribution of the
newspaper containing the article. DeepThroat went to court complaining about
the prohibition placed on the dissemination of his article. He claims that the act
of the authorities partakes of the nature of heckler’s veto, thus a violation of the
guaranty of press freedom. On th e other hand, the authorities counter that the
act was necessary to protect the public order and the greater interest of the
community. If you were the judge, how would you resolve the issue? (4%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER

If I were the judge, I would rule that the distribution of the newspaper cannot be
banned. Freedom of the news should be allowed although it induces a
condition of unrest and stirs people to anger. Freedom of the press include
freedom of circulation (Chavez vs Gonzales, 545 SCRA 441 (2008))

When governmental action that restricts freedom of the press is based on

content, it is given the strictest scrutiny and the government must show that
there is a clear and present danger as to warrant curtailment of the right of
Deep Throat to distribute the newspaper (Chavez vs Gonzales, 545 SCRA
441(2008))

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER

The action of the government is justified.

The fact that some people had already started destroying properties while
hurting those selling the newspaper can be validly considered by the
government as a clear and present danger, which will justify its banning of the
further distribution of the newspaper containing the article. The test for
limitations on freedom of expression continues to be the clear and present
danger rule-that words are used in such circumstances and are of such a
nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that the lawmaker has a right to prevent (Chavez vs Gonzales,
545 SCRA 441 (2008))

1. TOPIC: Freedom of Expression

YEAR: 2015
QUESTION: When is a facial challenge to the constitutionality of a
law on the ground of violation of the Bill of Rights traditionally allowed?
Explain your answer. (3%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER: Facial challenge to the constitutionality of a

law is traditionally allowed when it operates in the area of freedom of
expression. The established rule is that a party can question the validity
of a statute only if, as applied to him, it is unconstitutional. The
exception is the so-called “Facial challenge". But the only time a facial
challenge to a statute is allowed is when it operates in the area of
freedom of expression. ln such instance, the "overbreadth doctrine"
permits a party to challenge the validity of a statute even though, as
applied to him, it is not unconstitutional, but it might be if applied to
others not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally
protected. lnvalidation of the statute "on its face", rather than "as
applied", is permitted in the interest of preventing a "chilling effect" on
freedom of expression (Justice Mendoza's concurring opinion in Cruz v.
DENR, G.R. No. 135385, December 06, 20001). A facial challenge to a
legislative act is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully since
the challenge must establish that no set of circumstances exists under
which the act would be valid (Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
148560, November 19,20011).
FREEDOM OF RELIGION
Freedom of Religion; Non-Establishment Clause (1988)
Tawi-Tawi is a predominantly Moslem province. The Governor, the Vice-Governor,
and members of its Sang-guniang Panlalawigan are all Moslems. Its budget
provides the Governor with a certain amount as his discretionary funds. Recently,
however, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan passed a resolution appropriating
P100,000 as a special discretionary fund of the Governor to be spent by him in
leading a pilgrimage of his provincemates to Mecca, Saudi Arabia, Islam's holiest
city. Philconsa, on constitutional grounds, has filed suit to nullify the resolution of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan giving the special discretionary fund to the
Governor for the stated purpose. How would you decide the case? Give your
reasons.

SUGGESTED ANSWER: The resolution is unconstitutional First, it violates art. VI,

sec. 29(2) of the Constitution which prohibits the appropriation of public money or
property, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit or support of any system of
religion, and, second, it contravenes art. VI, sec, 25(6) which limits the
appropriation of discretionary funds only for public purposes. The use of
discretionary funds for purely religious purpose is thus unconstitutional, and the
fact that the disbursement is made by resolution of a local legislative body and not
by Congress does not make it any less offensive to the Constitution. Above all, the
resolution constitutes a clear violation of the Nonestablishment Clause (art. III, sec.
5) of the Constitution.
IV. RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF RELIGION
YEAR: 2016

QUESTION:
Fernando filed an administrative complaint against his co-teacher,
Amelia, claiming that the latter is living with a married man who is not
her husband. Fernando charged Amelia with committing "disgraceful
and immoral conduct" in violation of the Revised Administrative Code
and, thus, should not be allowed to remain employed in the
government. Amelia, on the other hand, claims that she and her
partner are members of a religious sect that allows members of the
congregation who have been abandoned by their respective spouses
to enter marital relations under a "Declaration of Pleading
Faithfulness." Having made such Declaration, she argues that she
cannot be charged with committing immoral conduct for she is
entitled to free exercise of religion under the Constitution.
[a] Is Amelia administratively liable? State your reasons briefly.
(2.5%)
[b] Briefly explain the concept of "benevolent neutrality." (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
 [a] Amelia is not administratively liable. There is no compelling state
interest that justifies inhibiting the free exercise of religious beliefs.
The means used by the government to achieve its legitimate objective is
not the least intrusive means (Estrada v. Escritor, 492 SCRA 1 [20061).

[b] Benevolent neutrality means that with respect to governmental

actions, accommodation of religion may be permitted to allow
individuals and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. What
is sought is not a declaration of unconstitutionality of the law but an
exemption from its application (Estrada v. Escritor, 492 SCRA I 12006]).

Topic: Freedom of Religion; Flag Salute

Year: 2003

Question:

No III - Children who are members of a religious sect have been expelled from
their respective public schools for refusing, on account of their religious beliefs,
to take part in the flag ceremony which includes playing by a band or singing
the national anthem, saluting the Philippine flag and reciting the patriotic
pledge. The students and their parents assail the expulsion on the ground that
the school authorities have acted in violation of their right to free public
education, freedom of speech, and religious freedom and worship. Decide the
case.

Suggested Answer:

The students cannot be expelled from school. As held in Ebralinag v. The

Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu. 219 SCRA 2 [1993], to compel
students to take part in the flag ceremony when it is against their religious
beliefs will violate their religious freedom. Their expulsion also violates the duty
of the State under Article XIV, Section I of the Constitution to protect and
promote the right of all citizens to quality education and make such education
accessible to all.

2. Freedom of Religion; Limitations

YEAR: 1998
QUESTION: A religious organization has a weekly television program.
The program presents and propagates its religious, doctrines, and
compares their practices with those of other religions. As the Movie and
Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB) found as
offensive several episodes of the program which attacked other
religions, the MTRCB required the organization to submit its tapes for
review prior to airing. The religious organization brought the case to
court on the ground that the action of the MTRCB suppresses its
 freedom of speech and interferes with its right to free exercise of
religion. Decide. [5%]

SUGGESTED ANSWER: The religious organization cannot invoke

freedom of speech and freedom of religion as grounds for refusing to
submit the tapes to the Movie and Television Review and Classification
Board for review prior to airing. When the religious organization started
presenting its program over television, it went into the realm of action.
The right to act on one's religious belief is not absolute and is subject to
police power for the protection of the general welfare. Hence the tapes
may be required to be reviewed prior to airing. In Iglesia ni Cristo vs.
Court of Appeals, 259 SCRA 529, 544, the Supreme Court held: "We
thus reject petitioner's postulate that Its religious program is per se
beyond review by the respondent Board. Its public broadcast on TV of
its religious program brings it out of the bosom of internal belief.
Television is a medium that reaches even the eyes and ears of children.
The Court reiterates the rule that the exercise of freedom of religion can
be regulated by the State when it will bring about the CLEAR AND
PRESENT DANGER of some substantive evil which the State is duty
bound to prevent, i.e., serious detriment to the mere overriding Interest
of public health, public morals, or public welfare." However, the Movie
and Television Review and Classification Board cannot ban the tapes
on the ground that they attacked other religions. In Iglesia ni Cristo vs.
Court of Appeals,. 259 SCRA 529, 547, the Supreme Court held: "Even
a side glance at Section 3 of PD No. 1986 will reveal that it is not among
the grounds to justify an order prohibiting the broadcast of petitioner's
television program." Moreover, the broadcasts do not give rise to a clear
and present danger of a substantive evil. In the case of Iglesia ni Cristo
vs. Court of Appeals, 259 SCRA 529, 549: "Prior restraint on speech,
including the religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears
but only by the showing of a substantive and imminent evil which has
taken the reality already on the ground."

Freedom of Religion: Flag Salute (ART III)

1997

QUESTION:
Section 28. Title VI, Chapter 9, of the Administrative Code of 1987 requires all
educational institutions to observe a simple and dignified flag ceremony,
including the playing or singing of the Philippine National Anthem, pursuant to
rules to be promulgated by the Secretary of Education. Culture and Sports,
The refusal of a teacher, student or pupil to attend or participate in the flag
ceremony is a ground for dismissal after due investigation. The Secretary of
Education Culture and Sports issued a memorandum implementing said
provision of law. As ordered, the flag ceremony would be held on Mondays at
7:30 a.m. during class days. A group of teachers, students and pupils
requested the Secretary that they be exempted from attending the flag
ceremony on the ground that attendance thereto was against their religious
belief. The Secretary denied the request. The teachers, students and pupils
concerned went to Court to have the memorandum circular declared null and
void. Decide the case.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The teachers and the students should be exempted from the flag ceremony.
As held in Ebralinag vs. Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu, 251
SCRA 569, to compel them to participate in the flag ceremony will violate their
freedom of religion. Freedom of religion cannot be impaired except upon the
showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil which the State
has a right to prevent. The refusal of the teachers and the students to
participate in the flag ceremony does not pose a clear and present danger.

IV. Freedom of Religion: Non-Establishment Clause (ART III)

1997

QUESTION:
Upon request of a group of overseas contract workers in Brunei, Rev. Father
Juan de la Cruz, a Roman Catholic priest, was sent to that country by the
President of the Philippines to minister to their spiritual needs. The travel
expenses, per diems, clothing allowance and monthly stipend of P5, 000 were
ordered charged against the President's discretionary fund. Upon post audit of
the vouchers therefor, the Commission on Audit refused approval thereof
claiming that the expenditures were in violation of the Constitution. Was the
Commission on Audit correct in disallowing the vouchers in question?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the Commission on Audit was correct in disallowing the expenditures.
Section 29(2), Article VI of the Constitution prohibits the expenditure of public
funds for the use, benefit, or support of any priest. The only exception is when
the priest is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution or
government orphanage or leprosarium. The sending of a priest to minister to
the spiritual needs of overseas contract workers does not fall within the scope
of any of the exceptions.

Topic: Freedom of Religion- Convicted Prisoners

Year: 1989

Question:
"X" is serving his prison sentence in Muntinlupa. He belongs to a
religious sect that prohibits the eating of meat. He asked the Director of
Prisons that he be served with meatless diet. The Director refused and "X"
sued the Director for damages for violating his religious freedom. Decide.

Suggested Answer:
 Yes, the Director of Prison is liable under Article 32 of the Civil Code for
violating the religious freedom of "X". According to the decision of the United
States Supreme Court in the case of O'Lone vs. Estate of Shabazz, 107 S. Ct.
2400, convicted prisoners retain their right to free exercise of religion. At the
same time, lawful incarceration brings about necessary limitations of many
privileges and rights justified by the considerations underlying the penal
system. In considering the appropriate balance between these two factors,
reasonableness should be the test. Accommodation to religious freedom can
be made if it will not involve sacrificing the interests of security and it will have
no impact on the allocation of the resources of the penitentiary. In this case,
providing "X" with a meatless diet will not create a security problem or unduly
increase the cost of food being served to the prisoners. In fact, in the case of
O' Lone vs. Estate of Shabazz, it was noted that the Moslem prisoners were
being given a different meal whenever pork would be served.

Alternative answer:
The suit should be dismissed. The Free Exercise Clause of the
Constitution is essentially a restraint on governmental interference with the
right of individuals to worship as they please. It is not a mandate to the state to
take positive, affirmative action to enable the individual to enjoy his freedom. It
would have been different had the Director of Prisons prohibited meatless diets
in the penal institution.

Topic: Freedom of Religion

Year: 2008
Question:
The principal of Jaena High School, a public school wrote a letter to the parents and
guardians of all the school's pupils, informing them that the school was willing to
provide religious instruction to its Catholic students during class hours, through a
Catholic priest. However, students who wished to avail of such religious instruction
needed to secure the consent of their parents and guardians in writing.
a. Does the offer violate the constitutional prohibition against the establishment
of religion? (3%)
b. The parents of evangelical Christian students, upon learning of the offer,
demanded that they too be entitled to have their children instructed in their
own religious faith during class hours. The principal, a devout Catholic,
rejected the request. As counsel for the parents of the evangelical students,
how would you argue in support of their position? (3%)
Answer:
A. No. Provided that in the setup of a public school wherein there is no
particular religion that has to be imposed and the said religious instruction to the
Catholics is only optional and not mandatory, it does not violate the constitutional
prohibition against the establishment of religion. Together with the prohibition
against the establishment of religion is the freedom of the people to practice their
religion. Since the said religious instruction is not mandatory and is open and
optional to all students, it is should be considered valid.
B. As counsel for the parents, I would tell them that they can invoke their right
to freedom of religion and to freely practice it and study even in a public school.
Granted that in the same way, the Catholic teachings will be taught in an optional
matter—the teachings of Christianism should also be open and optional for
everyone in order to avoid discrimination against those who are not Catholics.
Since these programs are only optional, the students may or may not attend such
classes but they still should be given an option to do so.

FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT

Topic: Liberty of Abode; Temporary

Year: 1996

Question:

No 2: The military commander-in charge of the operation against rebel groups

directed the inhabitants of the island which would be the target of attack by
government forces to evacuate the area and offered the residents temporary
military hamlet. Can the military commander force the residents to transfer
their places of abode without a court order? Explain.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, the military commander cannot compel the residents to transfer their
places of abode without a court order. Under Section 6, Article III of the
Constitution, a lawful order of the court is required before the liberty of abode
and of changing the same can be impaired.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER;

Yes, the military commander can compel the residents to transfer their places
of abode without a court order. If there is no reasonable time to get a court
order and the change of abode is merely temporary, because of the exigency,
this exercise of police power may be justified.

TOPIC: Right to Travel; Order of Arrest (1991)

Question:
Mr. Esteban Krony, a Filipino citizen, is arrested for the crime of smuggling. He
posts bail for his release. Subsequently, he jumps bail and is about to leave
the country when the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) cancels his
passport. He sues the DFA, claiming violation of his freedom to travel, citing
the new provision in the Bill of Rights of the 1987 Constitution, to wit: “Neither
shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security,
public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law. Decide the case.
Suggested Answer:
The case should be dismissed. Any person under an order of arrest is under
restraint and therefore he can not claim the right to travel. If he is admitted to
bail his freedom of movement is confined within the country. Therefore, us he
subsequently jumps bail, he cannot demand passport which in effect will
facilitate his escape from the country; he is in fact liable to be arrested anytime.
Indeed, the right to travel under the Constitution presupposes that the
individual is under no such restraint such as that which would follow from the
fact that one has a pending criminal case and has been placed under arrest.

A. Liberty of Abode; Right to Travel (2012)

1. Mr. Violet was convicted by the RTC of Estafa. On appeal, he filed with the
Court of Appeals a Motion to Fix Bail for Provisional Liberty Pending Appeal.
The Court of Appeals granted the motion and set a bail amount in the sum of
Five (5) Million Pesos, subject to the conditions that he secure ‘a
certification/guaranty from the Mayor of the place of his residence that he is a
resident of the area and that he will remain to be a resident therein until final
judgment is rendered or in case he transfers residence, it must be with prior
notice to the court”. Further, he was ordered to surrender his passport to the
Division Clerk of Court for safekeeping until the court orders its return.
(a) Mr. Violet challenges the conditions imposed by the Court of Appeals as
violative of his liberty of abode and right to travel. Decide with reasons.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The right to change abode and the right to travel are not absolute. The
liberty of changing abode may be unpaired upon order of the court. The
order of the Court of Appeals is lawful, because purpose is to ensure that
the accused will be available whenever his presence is required. He is
not being prevented from changing its abode. He is merely being
required to inform the Court of Appeals if he does. (Yap vs. Court of
Appeals, 358 SCRA 564)
(b) Are “Liberty of abode” and the “right to travel” absolute rights? Explain.
What are the respective exception/s to each right if any?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The liberty of abode and the right to travel are not absolute. The liberty of
abode and changing it can be imposed within the limits prescribed by
law upon lawful order of the court. The right to travel may be unpaired in
the interest of national security, public safety, or public health as may be
provided by law. (Section 6, Article II of the Constitution.) In addition, the
court has the inherent power to restrict the right of an accused who has
pending criminal case to travel abroad to maintain its jurisdiction over
him. (Santiago vs. Vasquez, 217 SCRA 633.)
RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION

Topic: Right to Assembly; Public Teachers

Year: 2000

Question:
Public school teachers staged for days mass actions at the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports to press for the immediate grant of their
demand for additional pay. DECS Secretary issued to them a notice of the
illegality of their unauthorized action, ordered them to immediately return to
work, and warned them of imposable sanctions. They ignored this and
continued with their mass action. The DECS Secretary issued orders for their
preventive suspension without pay and charged the teachers with gross
misconduct and gross neglect of duty for unauthorized abandonment of
teaching posts and absences without leave.

a) Are employees in the public sector allowed to form unions? To strike? Why?
(3%)

b) The teachers claim that their right to peaceably assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances has been curtailed. Are they correct?
Why? (2%)

Answer:
a) Section 8, Article III of the Constitution allows employees in the public sector
to form unions. However, they cannot go on strike. As explained in Social
Security System Employees Association v. Court of Appeals. 175 SCRA 686
[1989], the terms and conditions of their employment are fixed by law.
Employees in the public sector cannot strike to secure concessions from their
employer.

b) The teachers cannot claim that their right to peaceably assemble and
petition for the redress of grievances has been curtailed. According to
Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals. 276 SCRA 619 (1997), they can exercise this
right without stoppage of classes.

Topic: Right to Assembly

Year: 2008
Question:

Nationwide protests have erupted over rising gas prices, including disruptive
demonstrations in many universities throughout the country. The Metro Manila
State University, a public university, adopted a university-wide circular prohibiting
public mass demonstrations and rallies within the campus. Offended by the circular,
militant students spread word that on the following Friday, all students were to wear
black T-shirt as a symbols of their protest both against high gas prices and the
university ban on demonstrations. The effort was only moderately successful, with
around 30% of the students heeding the call. Nonetheless, university officials were
outraged and compelled the student’s leaders to explain why they should not be
expelled for violating the circular against demonstrations.

The student leaders approached you for legal advice. They contended that they
should not be expelled since they did not violate the circular, their protest action
being neither a demonstrator nor a rally since all they did was wear black T-shirts.
What would you advise the students? (6%)

Answer:
The wearing of black t-shirts by the students is a part of their freedom of
expression and they cannot be expelled because of it. In the Philippines, we follow
the clear and present danger test to assess if the said act by the students has to be
suppressed because it is substantively evil. Following the same standard, the
wearing of black t-shirts by the students as a form of their freedom of expression in
their protest against the rising gas prices and demonstrations is valid because
there is no necessary evil or disruptive that neither the government nor the school
has to prevent and curtail.

Right to Assembly; Public Teachers (2002) No X - Ten public school teachers

of Caloocan City left their classrooms to join a strike, which lasted for one
month, to ask for teachers' benefits. The Department of Education, Culture and
Sports charged them administratively, for which reason they were required to
answer and formally investigated by a committee composed of the Division
Superintendent of Schools as Chairman, the Division Supervisor as member
and a teacher, as another member. On the basis of the evidence adduced at
the formal investigation which amply established their guilt, the Director
rendered a decision meting out to them the penalty of removal from office. The
decision was affirmed by the DECS Secretary and the Civil Service
Commission. On appeal, they reiterated the arguments they raised before the
administrative bodies, namely: (a) Their strike was an exercise of their
constitutional right to peaceful assembly and to petition the government for
redress of grievances. SUGGESTED ANSWER: (a) According to De la Cruz v.
Court of Appeals, 305 SCRA 303 (1999), the argument of the teachers that
they were merely exercising their constitutional right to peaceful assembly and
to petition the government for redress of grievance cannot be sustained,
because such rights must be exercised within reasonable limits. When such
rights were exercised on regular school days instead of during the free time of
the teachers, the teachers committed acts prejudicial to the best interests of
the service.

Right to Assembly; Public Teachers (2002) No X - Ten public school teachers

of Caloocan City left their classrooms to join a strike, which lasted for one
month, to ask for teachers' benefits. The Department of Education, Culture and
Sports charged them administratively, for which reason they were required to
answer and formally investigated by a committee composed of the Division
Superintendent of Schools as Chairman, the Division Supervisor as member
and a teacher, as another member. On the basis of the evidence adduced at
the formal investigation which amply established their guilt, the Director
rendered a decision meting out to them the penalty of removal from office. The
decision was affirmed by the DECS Secretary and the Civil Service
Commission. On appeal, they reiterated the arguments they raised before the
administrative bodies, namely: (a) Their strike was an exercise of their
constitutional right to peaceful assembly and to petition the government for
redress of grievances. SUGGESTED ANSWER: (a) According to De la Cruz v.
Court of Appeals, 305 SCRA 303 (1999), the argument of the teachers that
they were merely exercising their constitutional right to peaceful assembly and
to petition the government for redress of grievance cannot be sustained,
because such rights must be exercised within reasonable limits. When such
rights were exercised on regular school days instead of during the free time of
the teachers, the teachers committed acts prejudicial to the best interests of
the service.

1992

Olympia Academy, a private university, issued a student regulation for

maintaining order in the school campus and to ensure that academic activities
shall be conducted effectively. Henceforth, every student organization
intending to hold any symposium, convocation, rally or any assembly within
school property and involving at least 20 people must file, for the prior approval
of the Dean of Students, an Application setting forth the time, place, expected
size of the group, and the subjectmatter and purpose of the assembly. The
League of Nationalist Students questions the validity of the new regulation.
Resolve.

Answer:
The regulation is valid. As held In Rarnento us. Mal-abanan, 129 SCRA
359, if an assembly will be held by students in school premises, permit must be
sought from the school authorities, who are devoid of the power to deny such
request arbitrarily or unreasonably. In granting such permit, there may be
conditions as to the time and place of the assembly to avoid disruption of
classes or stoppage of work of the non-academic personnel.

FREEDOM TO CONTRACT

1992
 Sheila, an actress, signed a two-year contract with Solidaridad Films,
The film company undertook to promote her career and to feature her as the
leading lady in at least four movies. In turn, Sheila promised that, for the
duration of the contract, she shall not get married or have a baby; otherwise,
she shall be liable to refund to the film company a portion of its promotion
expenses. a) Does this contract impair, or impinge upon, any constitutionally
protected liberty of Sheila? Explain. b) If Solidaridad Films tries to enforce this
contract judicially, will this constitutionally protected liberty prevail? Explain.

Answer:
a) Yes, the contract impairs the right of Sheila to marry and to procreate. The
case of Loving vs. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 and Zablocki vs. Redhail 434 U.S. 374
recognized the right to marry is a basic civil right. Likewise, the case of Skinner
vs Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 recognized that the right to procreate is a basic
civil right. These rights are part of the liberty protected by the due process
clause in Section 1. Article 1 of the Constitution.
b) Yes, the constitutionally protected liberty of Sheila will prevail, because it
involves basic human rights. The waiver of these basic human rights is void.
What Solidaridad Films is seeking to recover are promotion expenses. These
involve property rights. As held in Philippine Blooming Mills Employees
Organization vs. Philippine Blooming Mills, Inc., 51 SCRA 189, civil rights are
superior to property rights.

Alternative Answer:
The waiver of the right to marry and the right to procreate is valid. Enforcement
of the contract does not entail enforcement of the stipulation not to marry and
not to have a baby. It is limited to a refund of a portion of the promotion
expenses incurred by Solidaridad Films.

Topic: Non-Impairment Clause

Year: 2017
Question:
A bank acquired a large tract of land as the highest bidder in the
foreclosure sale of the mortgaged assets of its borrower. It appears that the
land has been originally registered under the Torrens system in 1922 pursuant
to the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902, the organic act of the Philippine
Islands as a colony of the USA. Sec. 21 of the Philippine Bill of 1902 provided
that "all valuable mineral deposits in public lands in the Philippine Islands, both
surveyed and unsurveyed, are hereby declared to be free and open to
exploration, occupation and purchase, and the land in which they are found to
occupation and purchase, by citizens of the United States, or of said
Islands." Sec. 27 of the law declared that a holder of the mineral claim so
located was entitled to all the minerals that lie within his claim, but he could not
mine outside the boundary lines of his claim.
The 1935 Constitution expressly prohibited the alienation of natural resources
except agricultural lands. Sec. 2, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution contains a
similar prohibition, and proclaims that all lands of the public domain, waters,
minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural
resources are owned by the State. This provision enunciates the Regalian
Doctrine.
May the Government, on the basis of the Regalian Doctrine enunciated in the
constitutional provisions, deny the bank its right as owner to the mineral
resources underneath the surface of its property as recognized under the
Philippine Bill of 1902? Explain your answer. (5%)

Answer:
No. The government may not deny the mineral right vested upon the bank.
Pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902,
therefore, once a mining claim was made or a mining patent was
issued over a parcel of land in accordance with the relative provisions of the
Philippine Bill of 1902, such land was considered private property and no
longer part of
the public domain. The claimant or patent holder was the owner of both the
surface of the
land and of the minerals found underneath.

Since the 1902 Philippine Bill recognized private ownership over the minerals
underneath,
the subsequent ratification of 1935 and 1987 Constitutions
cannot take it away for vested right had already set in.

RIGHTS OF SUSPECTS AND ACCUSED

Rights of the Accused; Right to Bail

1993

Question: Johann learned that the police were looking for him in connection
with the rape of an 18-year old girl, a neighbor. He went to the police station a
week later and presented himself to the desk sergeant. Coincidentally. the
rape victim was in the premises executing an extrajudicial statement. Johann,
along with six (6) other suspects, were placed in a police lineup and the girl
pointed to him as the rapist. Johann was arrested and locked up in a cell.

Johann was charged with rape in court but prior to arraignment invoked his
right to preliminary investigation. This was denied by the judge, and thus, trial
proceeded. After the prosecution presented several witnesses, Johann
through counsel, invoked the right to ball and filed a motion therefor, which
was denied outright by the Judge. Johann now files a petition for certiorari
before the Court of Appeals arguing that: 3) He is entitled to bail as a matter of
right, thus the Judge should not have denied his motion to fix ball outright.
Decide.

Answer: In accordance with Art. III. sec. 13 of the Constitution, Johann may be
denied bail if the evidence of his guilt is strong considering that the crime with
which he is charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua. It is thus not a matter
of right for him to be released on bail in such case. The court must first make a
determination of the strength of the evidence on the basis of evidence already
presented by the prosecution, unless it desires to present some more, and
give the accused the opportunity to present countervailing evidence. If having
done this the court finds the evidence not to be strong, then it becomes the
right of Johann to be admitted to bail. The error of the trial court lies in
outrightly denying the motion for bail of Johann.

Rights of the Accused; Counsel of his Choice

2005
Mariano was arrested by the NBI as a suspect in the shopping mall bombings.
Advised of his rights, Mariano asked for the assistance of his relative, Atty.
Santos. The NBI noticed that Atty. Santos was inexperienced, incompetent
and inattentive. Deeming him unsuited to protect the rights of Mariano, the NBI
dismissed Atty. Santos. Appointed in his place was Atty. Barroso, a bar
topnotcher who was in the premises visiting a relative. Atty. Barroso ably
assisted Mariano when the latter gave a statement. However, Mariano
assailed the investigation claiming that he was deprived of counsel of his
choice. Was the NBI correct in dismissing Atty. Santos and appointing Atty.
Barroso in his stead? Is Mariano's statement, made with the assistance of Atty.
Barroso, admissible in evidence? (5%)

ANSWER: The NBI was not correct in dismissing Atty. Santos and appointing
Atty. Barroso in his stead. Article III, Section 12(1) of the 1987 Constitution
requires that a person under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have no less than "competent and independent counsel preferably of his
own choice " This is meant to stress the primacy accorded to the voluntariness
of the choice under the uniquely stressful conditions of a custodial
investigation' Thus, the lawyer called to be present during such investigation
should be as far as reasonably possible, the choice of the individual
undergoing questioning. The appointment of Atty. Barroso is questionable
because he was visiting a relative working in the NBI and thus his
independence is doubtful. Lawyers engaged by the police, whatever
testimonials are given as proof of their probity and supposed independence,
are generally suspect, as in many areas, the relationship between lawyers and
law enforcement authorities can be symbiotic. Considering that Mariano was
deprived of counsel of his own choice, the statement is inadmissible in
evidence. (People v. Januario, G.R. No. 98252, February 7, 1997)

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: The NBI was correct in dismissing Atty. Santos as

he was incompetent. The 1987 Constitution requires counsel to be competent
and independent. Atty. Barroso, being a bar topnotcher ably assisted Mariano
and there is no showing that his having a relative in the NBI affected his
independence. Moreover, the accused has the final choice of counsel as he
may reject the one chosen for him and ask for another. A lawyer provided by
the investigators is deemed engaged by the accused where he raises no
objection against the lawyer during the course of the investigation, and the
accused thereafter subscribes to the truth of his statement before the swearing
officer. Thus, once the prosecution shows there was compliance with the
constitutional requirement on pre-interrogation advisories, a confession is
presumed to be voluntary and the declarant bears the burden of proving that
his confession is involuntary and untrue. A confession is admissible until the
accused successfully proves that it was given as a result of violence,
intimidation, threat or promise of reward or leniency which are not present in
this case. Accordingly, the statement is admissible. (People v. Jerez, G.R. No.
114385, January 29, 1998)

Custodial Investigation;
Right to Counsel (1988)
Armando Salamanca, a notorious police character, came under custodial
investigation for a robbery in Caloocan City. From the outset, the police officers
informed him of his right to remain silent, and also his right to have a counsel of his
choice, if he could afford one or if not, the government would provide him with such
counsel. He thanked the police investigators, and declared that he fully
understands the rights enumerated to him, but that, he is voluntarily waiving them.
Claiming that he sincerely desires to atone for his misdeeds, he gave a written
statement on his participation in the crime under investigation. In the course of the
trial of the criminal case for the same robbery, the written admission of Salamanca
which he gave during the custodial investigation, was presented as the only
evidence of his guilt. If you were his counsel, what would you do? Explain your
answer.
SUGGESTED ANSWER: I would object to it on the ground that the waiver of the
rights to silence and to counsel is void, having been made without the presence of
counsel. (Art. III, sec. 12(1); People v. Galit, 135 SCRA 465 (1980). The waiver
must also be in writing, although this requirement might possibly have been
complied with in this case by embodying the waiver in the written confession. It
should also be noted that under Rule 134, sec. 3, even if the extrajudicial
confession is valid, it is not a sufficient ground for conviction if it is not corroborated
by evidence of corpus delicti.
Custodial Investigation; Right to Counsel; Receipt of Property Seized (2002)
No VIII. One day a passenger bus conductor found a man's handbag left in the
bus. When the conductor opened the bag, he found inside a catling card with
the owner's name (Dante Galang) and address, a few hundred peso bills, and
a small plastic bag containing a white powdery substance. He brought the
powdery substance to the National Bureau of Investigation for laboratory
examination and it was determined to be methamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu, a prohibited drug. Dante Galang was subsequently traced and found
and brought to the NBI Office where he admitted ownership of the handbag
and its contents. In the course of the interrogation by NBI agents, and without
the presence and assistance of counsel, Galang was made to sign a receipt for
the plastic bag and its shabu contents. Galang was charged with illegal
possession of prohibited drugs and was convicted. On appeal he contends that
- A. The plastic bag and its contents are inadmissible in evidence being the
product of an illegal search and seizure; (3%) and B. The receipt he signed is
also inadmissible as his rights under custodial investigation were not
observed. (2%) Decide the case with reasons. SUGGESTED ANSWER: A. It
is admissible... B. The receipt which Galang signed without the assistance of
counsel is not admissible in evidence. As held in People v. Castro, 274 SCRA
115 {1997), since the receipt is a document admitting the offense charged,
Galang should have been assisted by counsel as required by Article III,
Section 11 of the Constitution.

Topic: Rights of the Accused; Right to Speedy Trial

Year: 2000

Question:
Charged by Francisco with libel, Pablo was arraigned on January 3, 2000,
Pre-trial was dispensed with and continuous trial was set for March 7, 8 and 9,
2000. On the first setting, the prosecution moved for its postponement and
cancellation of the other settings because its principal and probably only
witness, the private complainant Francisco, suddenly had to go abroad to fulfill
a professional commitment. The judge instead dismissed the case for failure to
prosecute.

a) Would the grant of the motion for postponement have violated the accused's
right to speedy trial? (2%)

Answer:
The grant of the motion for postponement would not have violated the right of
the accused to speedy trial. As held In People v. Leviste, 255 SCRA 238 (1996)
since the motion for postponement was the first one requested, the need for
the offended party to attend to a professional commitment is a valid reason, no
substantial right of the accused would be prejudiced, and the prosecution
should be afforded a fair opportunity to prosecute its case, the motion should
be granted.

Topic: Rights of the Accused- Right to Bail: Deportation Case

Year: 1989
Question:
May an alien invoke the constitutional right to bail during the pendency
of deportation proceedings?

Suggested Answer:
No. an alien may not invoke the constitutional right to bail during the
pendency of deportation proceedings. In Harvey vs Santiago, 162 SCRA 840,
it was held that the constitutional guarantee to bail may not be invoked in
deportation proceedings, because they do not partake of the nature of a
criminal action.

Custodial Investigation; Extrajudicial Confession (2001)

No IX- Rafael, Carlos and Joseph were accused of murder before the Regional
Trial Court of Manila. Accused Joseph turned to state witness against his
co-accused Rafael and Carlos, and was accordingly discharged from the
information. Among the evidence presented by the prosecution was an
extrajudicial confession made by Joseph during the custodial Investigation,
implicating Rafael and Carlos who, he said, together with him (Joseph),
committed the crime. The extrajudicial confession was executed without the
assistance of counsel.
Accused Rafael and Carlos vehemently objected on the ground that said
extrajudicial confession was inadmissible in evidence against them.
Rule on whether the said extrajudicial confession is admissible in evidence or
not. (5%)

First Alternative Answer:

According to People vs. Balisteros, 237 SCRA 499(1994), the confession is
admissible. Under Section 12, Article III of the Constitution, the confession is
inadmissible only against the one who confessed. Only the one whose rights
were violated can raise the objection as his right is personal.
Second Alternative Answer:
According to People vs. Jara, 144 SCRA 516(1986), the confession is
inadmissible. If it is inadmissible against the one who confessed, with more
reason it should be inadmissible against others.

RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED; Right to Counsel (2012)

1. Mr. Brown, a cigarette vendor, was invited by PO1 White to a nearby police
station. Upon arriving at the police station, Brown was asked to stand side-by –
side with five (5) other cigarette vendors in a police line-up. PO1 White
informed them that they were looking for a certain cigarette vendor who
snatched the purse of a passer-by and the line-up was to allow the victim to
point at the vendor who snatched her purse. No questions were to be asked
from the vendors.
(a) Brown, afraid of a “set up” against him, demanded that he be allowed to
secure his lawyer and for him to be present during the police line-up. Is Brown
entitled to counsel? Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Brown is not entitled to counsel during the police line-up. He was not yet
being asked to answer for a criminal offense. (Gamboa vs. Cruz, 162
SCRA 642)
(b) Would the answer in (a.) be the same if Brown was specifically invited by
White because an eyewitness to the crime identified him as the perpetrator?
Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Brown would be entitled to the assistance of a lawyer. He was already
considered as a suspect and was therefore entitled to the rights under
custodial investigation. (People vs. Legaspi, 331 SCRA 95)
(c) Briefly enumerate the so-called “Miranda Rights”.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The Miranda warning means that a person in custody who will be
interrogated must be informed of the following:
(a) He has the right to remain silent;
(b) Anything said can be used as evidence against him;
(c) He has the right to have counsel during the investigation; and
(d) He must be informed that if he is indigent, a lawyer will be
appointed to represent him. (Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436.)

I. Custodial Investigation: Police Line-Up (ART III)

1997

QUESTION:
A, while on board a passenger jeep one night, was held up by a group of three
teenagers who forcibly divested her of her watch, necklace and wallet
containing P100.00. That done, the trio jumped off the passenger jeep and fled.
B, the jeep driver, and A complained to the police to whom they gave
description of the culprits. According to the jeep driver, he would be able to
identify the culprits if presented to him. Next morning A and B were summoned
to the police station where five persons were lined up before them for
identification. A and B positively identified C and D as the culprits. After
preliminary investigation. C and D and one John Doe were charged with
robbery in an information filed against them in court. C and D set up, in
defense, the illegality of their apprehension, arrest and confinement based on
the identification made of them by A and B at a police line-up at which they
were not assisted by counsel. How would you resolve the issues raised by C
and D?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The arguments of the accused are untenable. As held in People vs. Acot, 232
SCRA 406, the warrantless arrest of accused robbers immediately after their
commission of the crime by police officers sent to look for them on the basis of
the information related by the victims is valid under Section 5(b).Rule 113 of
the Rules on Criminal Procedure. According to People vs. Lamsing, 248 SCRA
471, the right to counsel does not extend to police line-ups, because they are
not part of custodial investigations. However, according to People vs. Macan
238 SCRA 306, after the start of custodial investigation, if the accused was not
assisted by counsel, any identification of the accused in a police line-up is
inadmissible.

Topic: Custodial Investigation; Extrajudicial confession; Police Line-Up

Year: 1994

Question: An information for parricide was filed against Danny. After the
NBI found an eyewitness to the commission of the crime. Danny was placed
in a police line-up where he was identified as the one who shot the victim.
After the line-up, Danny made confession to a newspaper reporter who
interviewed him.

1) Can Danny claim that his identification by the eyewitness be

excluded on the ground that the line-up was made without
benefit of his counsel?
2) Can Danny claim that his confession be excluded on the ground
that he was not afforded the “Miranda” rights?

Suggested Answers:

1) No, the identification of Danny, a private person, by an eyewitness

during the line-up cannot be excluded in evidence. In accordance
with the ruling in People vs. Hatton, 210 SCRA 1, the accused is not
 entitled to be assisted by counsel during police line-up, because it is
not part of custodial investigation.

2) No, Danny cannot ask that his confession to a newspaper reporter

should be excluded in evidence. As held in People vs. Bernardo,
220 SCRA 31, such an admission was not made during a custodial
interrogation but a voluntary statement made to the media.

2011

Topic: Bill of Rights; Rights of the Accused.

Question: Accused X pleaded not guilty to the charge of homicide against

him. Since he was admitted to bail, they sent him notices to
attend the hearings of his case. But he did not show up, despite
notice, in four successive hearings without offering any
justification. The prosecution moved to present evidence in
absentia but the court denied the motion on the ground that the
accused has a right to be present at his trial. Is the court
correct?

Answer: (A). No, the court is mandated to hold trial in absentia when the
accused had been arraigned, had notice, and his absence was
unjustified.

Topic: Custodial Investigation; Rights

Year: 1996

Question:

No. 3: 1) A, who was arrested as a suspect in a murder case was not

represented by counsel during the "question and answer" stage. However,
before he was asked to sign his statements to the police investigator, the latter
provided A with a counsel, who happened to be at the police station. After
conferring with A, the counsel told the police investigator that A was ready to
sign the statements. Can the statements of A be presented in court as his
confession? Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:

1) No, the statements of A cannot be presented in court as his confession. He

was not assisted by counsel during the actual questioning. There is no
showing that the lawyer who belatedly conferred with him fully explained to him
the nature and consequences of his confession. In People vs. Compil 244
SCRA 135, the Supreme Court held that the accused must be assisted by
counsel during the actual questioning and the belated assistance of counsel
before he signed the confession does not cure the defect.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

Yes, the statements of A can be presented in court as his confession. As held

in People vs. Rous, 242 SCRA 732, even if the accused was not assisted by
counsel during the questioning, his confession is admissible if he was able to
consult a lawyer before he signed.

Topic: Right of the Accused; Presumption of Innocence vs. Presumption

of Theft
Year: 2004

Question:

(5-b) OZ lost five head of cattle which he reported to the police as stolen from
his barn. He requested several neighbors, including RR, for help in looking for
the missing animals. After an extensive search, the police found two head in
RR’s farm. RR could not explain to the police how they got hidden in a remote
area of his farm. Insisting on his innocence, RR consulted a lawyer who told
him he has a right to be presumed innocent under the Bill of Rights. But there
is another presumption of theft arising from his unexplained possession of
stolen cattle- under the penal law.

Are the two presumptions capable of reconciliation in this case? If so, how can
they be reconciled? If not, which should prevail?

Suggested Answer:

The two presumptions can be reconciled. The presumption of innocence

stands until the contrary is proved. It may be overcome by a contrary
presumption founded upon human experience. The presumption that RR is the
one who stole the cattle of OZ is logical, since he was found in possession of
the stolen cattle. RR can prove his innocence by presenting evidence to rebut
the presumption. The burden of evidence is shifted to RR, because how he
came into possession of the cattle is peculiarly within his knowledge.
(Dizon-Pamintuan v. People, 234 SCRA 63 (1994)).

Topic: Custodial Investigation; Extrajudicial Confession

Year: 2013

Question:
No.III. A robbery with homicide had taken place and Lito, Badong and Rollie
were invited for questioning based on the information furnished by a neighbor
that hesaw them come out of the victim's house at about the time of the
robbery/killing. The police confronted the three with this and other information
they had gathered, and pointedly accused them of committing the crime.

Lito initially resisted, but eventually broke down and admitted his participation
in the crime. Elated by this break and desirous of securing a written confession
soonest, the police called City Attorney Juan Buan to serve as the trio's
counsel and to advise them about their rights during the investigation.

Badong and Rollie, weakened in spirit by Lito's early admission, likewise

admitted their participation. The trio thus signed a joint extra-judicial
confession which served as the main evidence against them at their trial. They
were convicted based on their confession. Should the judgment of conviction
be affirmed or reversed on appeal? (5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The judgment of conviction should be reversed on appeal. It relied mainly on

the extrajudicial confession of the accused. The lawyer assisting them must be
independent. City Attorney Juan Buan is not independent. As City Attorney, he
provided legal support to the City Mayor in performing his duties, which include
the maintenance of peace and order (People vs. Sunga, 399 SCRA 624).

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

The judgment of conviction should be reversed. The police officers committed

an offense by confronting the three accused. This is a violation to Section 12,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution, which states that any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have a competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services
of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

The Judgment of conviction should be affirmed if the accused failed to object

when their extrajudicial confession was offered in evidence, which was
rendered it admissible (People vs. Samus, 389 SCRA 93).

Topic: Rights of Suspect and Accused

Year: 2006
Question: State whether or not the following laws are constitutional. Explain
briefly.
  A law denying persons charged with crimes punishable by reclusion
perpetua or death the right to bail. 2%

Suggested Answer: A law denying persons charged with crimes punishable by

reclusion perpetua or death the right to bail is unconstitutional, because
according to the constitution, “All persons, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance
as may be provided by law” (Section 13, Article III of the Constitution).

Topic: Rights of Suspects and Accused

Year: 2006
Question: Select the best answer and explain.

An accused's right against self-incrimination is violated in the following cases:

5%

a. When he is ordered by the trial court to undergo a paraffin test to

prove he is guilty of murder;

b. When he is compelled to produce his bankbooks to be used as

evidence against his father charged with plunder;

c. When he is ordered to produce a sample of his handwriting to be

used as evidence that he is the author of a letter wherein he agreed
to kill the victim;

d. When the president of a corporation is subpoenaed to produce

certain documents as proofs he is guilty of illegal recruitment.

Suggested Answer: The best answer is: C, ordering the accused to produce a
sample of his handwriting to be used as evidence to prove that he is the author
of a letter in which he agreed to kill the victim as this will violate his right
against self-incrimination. Writing is not a purely mechanical act, because it
requires the application of intelligence and attention. Producing a sample of his
handwriting may identify him as the writer of the letter (Beltran v. Samson, 53
Phil. 570, [1929]).

Rights of the Accused; Self-Incrimination (1988)

Dr. Juan Sto. Tomas is a practicing dentist in Marikina, Metro Manila. He was
charged with immorality before the Board of Dentistry by a lady
patient, who claims that Dr. Sto. Tomas took liberties with her
person and kissed her while she was under the treatment at the
latter's clinic. At the initial hearing of the administrative complaint,
the complainant's counsel called the respondent as his first
witness. The respondent through counsel, objected vigorously,
claiming his constitutional right to be exempt from being a
witness against himself. The Board noted the objection, but ruled
 that in the next scheduled hearing, a month and a half later, the
respondent would be called to testify as a witness, as the right he
claims is not available in administrative investigations, but only in
criminal prosecutions. Dr. Sto. Tomas is decided not to testify. As
his lawyer, what would you do? Why?

SUGGESTED ANSWER: I will file a petition for prohibition with prayer for
preliminary injunction with the Regional Trial Court. The privilege
against self incrimination is available not only in judicial
proceedings but also in administrative investigations. In Pascual
v. Board of Medical Examiners, 28 SCRA 344 (1969), it was held
that the revocation of a license as a medical practitioner can be
an even greater deprivation than mere forfeiture of property. In
some aspects it is similar to criminal proceedings and, therefore,
the respondent can not be made to testify as a witness for the
complainant.

Rights of the Accused; Self-Incrimination

2010
No. X. A, the wife of an alleged victim of enforced disappearance, applied for
the issuance of a writ of amparo before a Regional Trial Court in
Tarlac. Upon motion of A, the court issued inspection and
production orders addressed to the AFP chief of Staff to allow
entry at Camp Aquino and permit the copying of relevant
documents, including the list of detainees, if any. Accompanied
by court-designated Commission on Human Rights (CHR)
lawyers, A took photographs of a suspected isolation cell where
her husband was allegedly seen being held for three days and
tortured before he finally disappeared. The CHR lawyers
requested one Lt. Valdez for a photocopy of the master plan of
Camp Aquino and to confirm in writing that he had custody of the
master plan. Lt. Valdez objected on the ground that it may violate
his right against self-incrimination. Decide with reasons.
Answer: The objection of Lt. Valdez is not valid. The right against
self-incrimination refers to testimonial evidence and does not
apply to the production of a photocopy of the master plan of
Camp Aquino, because it is a public record. He cannot object to
the request for him to confirm his custody of the master plan,
because he is the public officer who had custody of it. (Almonte
vs. Vasquez, 244 SCRA 286 [1995]).

Alternative: The objection is without merit. Right against self-incrimination is

not violated because the right is simply against testimonial compulsion. But the
prohibition also extends to the compulsion for the production of documents,
papers and chattels that may be used as evidence against the witness, except
where the State has a right to inspect the same such as in this case.

Pursuant to the production order issued by the court, there can be compulsion
for the production of documents sought in the order.

V. RIGHTS OF SUSPECTS AND ACCUSED

YEAR: 2016

QUESTION:
The contents of the vault of ABC Company consisting of cash and
documents were stolen. Paulyn, the treasurer of ABC, was invited by
the Makati City Police Department to shed light on the amount of cash
stolen and the details of the missing documents. Paulyn obliged and
volunteered the information asked. Later, Paulyn was charged with
qualified theft together with suspects. Paulyn claims her rights under
the Constitution and pertinent laws were blatantly violated. The police
explained that they were just gathering evidence when Paulyn was
invited for a conference and she was not a suspect at that time. Rule
on her defense. (5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, the defense of Parlyn is not valid. When she was invited for
questioning by the Makati City Police Department and she volunteered
information, she was not yet a suspect. Her constitutional rights of a
person under investigation for the commission of an offense under
Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution begins to operate when the
investigation ceases to be a general inquiry upon an unsolved crime
and begins to be aimed upon a particular suspect who has been taken
into custody and the questions tend to elicit incriminating statements
(People v. Marra, 236 SCRA 565 [1994]).

WRITS

Suspension of Writ of Habeas Corpus (ART VI)

1997

QUESTION:
(a) When may the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus be suspended?
(b) If validly declared, what would be the full consequences of such
suspension?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) Under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus may be suspended when there is an invasion or rebellion and
public safety requires it.
(b) According to Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall apply only to persons judicially
charged with rebellion or offenses Inherent to or directly connected with
invasion. Any person arrested or detained should be judicially charged within
three days. Otherwise, he should be released. Moreover, under Section 13.
Article III of the Constitution, the right to bail shall not be impaired even when
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.

SELF-INCRIMINATION

Rights of the Accused: Self-Incrimination (1990)

(Question) No. 4: The privilege of self-incrimination must be timely invoked,
otherwise it is deemed waived.
1. In a CIVIL CASE, the plaintiff called the defendant a hostile witness
and announced that the defendant would be asked incriminating
questions in the direct examination. When should the defendant invoke
the privilege against self-incrimination?
2. In a CRIMINAL CASE, the prosecution called the accused to the
witness stand as the first witness in view of certain facts admitted by the
accused at the pre-trial. When should the accused invoke the privilege
against self-incrimination?
3. In an administrative case for malpractice and the cancellation of
license to practice medicine filed against C, the complainant called C to
the witness stand. When should C invoke the privilege against
self-incrimination?
Explain your answers to the three questions.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(1) As held in Bagadiong v, De Guzman, 94 SCRA 906, the defendant
should take the witness stand and object when a question calling for an
incriminating question is propounded. Unlike in proceedings which are
criminal in character in which the accused can refuse to testify, the
defendant must wait until a question calling for an incriminatory answer
is actually asked. (Suarez v. Tongco, 2 SCRA 71)
(2) As held in Chavez v. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 663, in a criminal
case the accused may altogether refuse to take the witness and refuse
to answer any question, because the purpose of calling him as a
witness for the prosecution has no other purpose but to incriminate him.
 3) As in a criminal case, C can refuse to take the witness stand and
refuse to answer any question. In Pascual v. Board of Medical
Examiners, 28 SCRA 344, it was held that an administrative case for
malpractice and cancellation of the license to practice medicine is penal
in character, because an unfavorable decision would result in the
revocation of the license of the respondent to practice medicine.
Consequently, he can refuse to take the witness stand.

Topic: Rights of the Accused; Self-Incrimination

Year: 2000

Question:
A man was shot and killed and his killer fled. Moments after the shooting, an
eyewitness described to the police that the slayer wore white pants, a shirt with
floral design, had boots and was about 70 kilos and 1.65 meters. Borja, who fit
the description given, was seen nearby. He was taken into custody and
brought to the police precinct where his pants, shirt and boots were forcibly
taken and he was weighed, measured, photographed, fingerprinted and
subjected to paraffin testing. At his trial, Borja objected to the admission in
evidence of the apparel, his height and weight, his photographs, fingerprints
comparison and the results of the paraffin test, asserting that these were taken
in violation of his right against self-incrimination.

Rule on the objection. (2%)

Answer:
The objection of Borja is not tenable. As held in People v. Paynor, 261 SCRA
615 (1996), the rights guaranteed by Section 12, Article in of the Constitution
applies only against testimonial evidence. An accused may be compelled to be
photographed or measured, his garments may be removed, and his body may
be examined.

Topic: Rights of the Accused; Right to Remain Silent

Year: 2013

Question:

No.VII. As he was entering a bar, Arnold - who was holding an unlit cigarette in
his right hand -was handed a match box by someone standing near the
doorway. Arnold unthinkingly opened the matchbox to light his cigarette and as
he did so, a sprinkle of dried leaves fell out, which the guard noticed. The
guard immediately frisked Arnold, grabbed the matchbox, and sniffed its
contents. After confirming that the matchbox contained marijuana, he
immediately arrested Arnold and called in the police.

At the police station, the guard narrated to the police that he personally caught
Arnold in possession of dried marijuana leaves. Arnold did not contest the
guard's statement; he steadfastly remained silent and refused to give any
written statement. Later in court, the guard testified and narrated the
statements he gave the police over Arnold's counsel's objections. While Arnold
presented his own witnesses to prove that his possession and apprehension
had been set-up, he himself did not testify.

The court convicted Arnold, relying largely on his admission of the charge by
silence at the police investigation and during trial.

From the constitutional law perspective, was the court correct in its ruling?
(6%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The court was wrong in relying on the silence of Arnold during the police
investigation and during the trial. Under Article III, Section 12 of the 1987
Constitution, he had the right to remain silent. His silence cannot be taken as a
tacit admission, otherwise, his right to remain silent would be rendered
nugatory. Considering that his right against self-incrimination protects his right
to remain silent, he cannot be penalized for exercising it (People vs. Galvez,
519 SCRA 521).

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

No, the court has erred in its ruling of convicting Arnold relying solely on his
admission of the charge by silence at the police investigation and during trial.
The duty of the lawyer includes ensuring that the suspect under custodial
investigation is aware that the right of an accused to remain silent may be
invoked at any time (People v. Sayaboc, G.R. No. 147201, January 15, 2004).

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: The court correctly convicted Arnold. There is no

showing that the evidence for the prosecution was insufficient. When Arnold
remained silent, he run the risk of an inference of guilt from nonproduction of
evidence in his behalf (People vs. Solis, 128 SCRA 217).

RIGHT AGAINST INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE

Involuntary Servitude
1993

Question: Joy, an RTC stenographer, retired at the age of 65. She left
unfinished the transcription of her notes in a criminal case which was on
appeal. The Court of Appeals ordered Joy to transcribe her notes. She refused
to comply with the order reasoning that she was no longer in the government
service. The CA declared Joy in contempt of court and she was incarcerated.
Joy filed a petition for habeas corpus arguing that her incarceration is
tantamount to illegal detention and to require her to work sans compensation
would be involuntary servitude. Decide.
Answer: Joy can be incarcerated for contempt of court for refusing to
transcribe her stenographic notes. As held In Adoracion v. Gatmaitan, 64
SCRA 132, her incarceration does not constitute illegal detention. It is lawful,
because it is the consequence of her disobedience of the court order. Neither
can she claim that to require her to work without compensation is tantamount
to involuntary servitude. Since courts have the Inherent power to Issue such
orders as are necessary for the administration of Justice, the Court of Appeals
may order her to transcribe her stenographic notes even if she is no longer In
the government service.
Non-Imprisonment for Non-Payment of Debt

1993

Question: Sec. 13 of PD 115 (Trust Receipts Law) provides that when the
entrustee in a trust receipt agreement fails to deliver the proceeds of the sale
or to return the goods if not sold to the entrustee-bank, the entrustee is liable
for estafa under the RPC. Does this provision not violate the constitutional right
against imprisonment for non-payment of a debt? Explain.

Answer: No, Section 13 of Presidential Decree No. 115 does not violate the
constitutional right against imprisonment for non-payment of a debt. As held in
Lee vs. Rodil, 175 SCRA 100, the criminal liability arises from the violation of
the trust receipt, which is separate and distinct from the loan secured by it.
Penalizing such an act is a valid exercise of police power. (See also People vs.
Nitafan, 207 SCRA 730)

DOUBLE JEOPARDY

1988
Double Jeopardy (1988)
The Filipino seamen detained at Kota Kinabalu, allegedly fishing in Malaysian
territorial waters, had been acquitted, after trial, by the sessions
court in the same city. They could not be released and returned
to the Philippines, because the prosecution had appealed the
judgment of acquittal to the Supreme Court of Malaysia. Assume
the situations had been reversed and a Malaysian had been
apprehended in Shasi, Sulu, for an alleged offense, charged
before the Regional Trial Court and after trial acquitted. May the
Provincial Fiscal of Sulu appeal such judgment of acquittal to the
Supreme Court, like what the Malaysians did in the case of the
Filipino fishermen at Kota Kinabalu? Explain your answer.
SUGGESTED ANSWER: No, because it would place the
accused in double jeopardy, contrary to Art. III, sec. 21 of our
Constitution. PD No. 1599 prohibits any person not a citizen to
explore or exploit any of the resources of the exclusive economic
zone and makes violation of the prohibition a crime punishable
by a fine of P2,000.00 to P100,000.00 and/or imprisonment of
not less than 6 months nor more than 10 years. If aliens are
 arrested for fishing within this zone but for some reason are
acquitted, the decision against them cannot be appealed to the
Court of Appeals because that would place them in double
jeopardy. This is so well established that the Supreme Court
turned down many pleas for re-examination of the doctrine first
announced in Kepner v. United States. 11 Phil. 669 (1904). The
doctrine is said to be part and parcel not only of settled
jurisprudence but also of constitutional law. Nor does it matter
that the accused are aliens. This guarantee has been applied
even to aliens without thought of their citizenship. (See e.g.,
People v. Ang Chio Kio, 95 Phil. 475 (1954) (Chinese previously
convicted of murder); People v. Pomeroy, 97 Phil 927 (1955)
( American previously convicted of rebellion with murder, arson
and robbery).

1993

Question: A Pajero driven by Joe sideswiped a motorcycle driven by Nelson

resulting in damage to the motorcycle and injuries to Nelson. Joe sped on
without giving assistance to Nelson. The Fiscal filed two informations against
Joe, to wit: (1) reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with
physical injuries under Art. 365, RPC, before the RTC; and (2) abandonment
of one's victim under par. 2 Art 275, before the MTC.

Joe was arraigned, tried and convicted for abandonment of one's victim in the
MTC. He appealed to the RTC. It was only a year later that he was arraigned in
the reckless imprudence charge before the RTC. He pleaded not guilty.

Subsequently, the RTC affirmed the decision of the MTC relative to the
abandonment of one's victim charge. Joe filed a petition for
review before the Court of Appeals, invoking his right to double
Jeopardy, contending that the prosecution for abandonment
under Art. 275 of the Revised Penal Code is a bar to the
prosecution for negligence under Article 365 of the same Code.
Decide.

Answer: Joe cannot claim that his conviction for abandoning his victim in
violation of Article 275 of the Revised Penal Code is a bar to his
prosecution for negligence under Article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code. As held in Lamera v. Court of Appeals, 198 SCRA
186, there is no double jeopardy, because these two offenses
are not identical. Reckless imprudence is a crime falling under
 the chapter on criminal negligence, while abandonment of one's
victim is a crime falling under the chapter on crimes against
security. The former is committed by means of culpa, while the
latter is committed by means of dolo. Failure to help one's victim
is not an offense by itself nor an element of reckless imprudence.
It merely Increases the penalty by one degree.

VI. TOPIC: DOUBLE JEOPARDY

YEAR: 1999

QUESTION:

Discuss the right of every accused against double jeopardy? (2%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

According to Melo v. People, 85 Phil. 766, the rule of double jeopardy

means that when a person was charged with an offense and the case
was terminated by acquittal or conviction or in any other manner without
his consent, he cannot again be charged with the same or identical
offense.

VII. TOPIC: DOUBLE JEOPARDY

YEAR: 1999

QUESTION:

On October 21, 1986, 17 year old Virginia Sagrado brought a complaint

against Martin Geralde for consented abduction. With the accused
pleading not guilty upon arraignment, trial ensued. After trial, a
judgment of conviction was rendered against Geralde. When the case
was appealed to it, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the
Trial Court, ratiocinating and ruling as follows: "This is not to say that
the appellant did nothing wrong...she was seduced by the appellant with
promises (of marriage) just to accomplish his lewd designs." Years later,
Virginia brought another complaint for Qualified Seduction. Geralde
presented a Motion to Quash on the ground of double jeopardy, which
motion and his subsequent motions for reconsideration were denied:

May Geralde validly invoke double jeopardy in questioning the

institution of the case for Qualified Seduction? He placed reliance
principally on the "same evidence" test to support his stance. He
asserted that the offenses with which he was charged arose from the
same set of facts. Furthermore, he averted that the complaint for
Qualified Seduction is barred by waiver and estoppel on the part of the
complainant, she having opted to consider the case as consented
abduction. Finally, he argued that her delay of more than eight (8) years
 before filing the second case against him constituted pardon on the part
of the offended party. How would you resolve Gerald's contentions?
Explain. (4%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Geralde cannot invoke double jeopardy. According to Perez v. Court of

Appeals, 168 SCRA 236, there is no identity between consented
abduction and qualified seduction. CONSENTED ABDUCTION requires
that the taking away of the offended party must be with her consent,
after solicitation or cajolery from the offender, and the taking away of
the offended party must be with lewd designs. On the other hand,
QUALIFIED SEDUCTION requires that the crime be committed by
abuse of authority, confidence or relationship and the offender had
sexual intercourse with the woman. The delay in filing the second case
does not constitute pardon, according to Article 344 of the Revised
Penal Code, to be valid the pardon of the offender by the offended party
must be expressly given.

VIII. TOPIC: DOUBLE JEOPARDY; REQUISITES

YEAR: 1999

QUESTION:

What are the requisites of double jeopardy? (2%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

As held in Cuison v. Court of Appeals, 289 SCRA 159, for a claim of

double jeopardy to prosper, the following requisites must concur: (1) a
first jeopardy has attached; (2) the first jeopardy was validly terminated;
and (3) the second is for the same offense. A first jeopardy attaches: 1.
upon a valid complaint or information; 2. before a competent court; 3.
after arraignment; 4. a valid entry of plea; and 5. the dismissal or
termination of the case without the express consent of the accused.

Double Jeopardy (ART III)

1997

QUESTION:
The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila approved an ordinance (No. 1000)
prohibiting the operation in the streets within the city limits of taxicab units over
eight years old (from year of manufacture). The imposable penalty for violation
thereof is a fine of P4, 000.00 or imprisonment for one year upon the erring
operator. Thereafter and while the city ordinance was already in effect.
Congress enacted a law (Republic Act No. 500) prohibiting the operation in the
streets of cities throughout the country of taxicab units beyond ten years old.
The imposable penalty for violation thereof is the same as in Ordinance No.
1000. A, an owner/operator of a taxicab unit operating in the City of Manila,
was charged with violation of the city ordinance. Upon arraignment, he
pleaded not guilty; whereupon, trial was set five days thereafter. For failure of
the witnesses to appear at the trial, the City Court dismissed the case against
A. The City Prosecutor of Manila forthwith filed another information in the same
court charging A with violation of Republic Act No. 500 for operating the
taxicab unit subject of the information in the first case. The accused moved to
dismiss the second case against him invoking double Jeopardy. How would
you rule on A's motion if you were the Judge?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
If I were the judge, I would grant the motion. The dismissal of the first case
for failure of the witnesses to appear terminated the first jeopardy. As held in
Caes vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 179 SCRA 54, the dismissal of a case
for failure of the witnesses for the prosecution to appear constitutes an
acquittal. The acquittal of A for violation of Ordinance No. 1000 bars his
prosecution for violation of Republic Act No. 500. Under Section 21, Article in
of the Constitution, if an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction
or acquittal under either bars another prosecution for the same act.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
If I were the judge, I would deny the motion. The dismissal of the first case is
void and does not give rise to double jeopardy. The dismissal of the first case
is arbitrary and denied the prosecution due process of law. The trial was set
five days after the arraignment. There was no sufficient time to subpoena the
witnesses and this was the first time the witnesses failed to appear. As held in
People vs. Declaro 170 SCRA 142, the dismissal of a case for failure of the
witnesses to appear at the initial hearing is arbitrary and void and does not
give rise to double jeopardy.

Double Jeopardy (2002) No IX. A Tamaraw FX driven by Asiong Cascasero,

who was drunk, sideswiped a pedestrian along EDSA in Makati City, resulting
in physical injuries to the latter. The public prosecutor filed two separate
informations against Cascasero, the first for reckless imprudence resulting in
physical injuries under the Revised Penal Code, and the second for violation of
an ordinance of Makati City prohibiting and penalizing driving under the
influence of liquor. Cascasero was arraigned, tried and convicted for reckless
imprudence resulting in physical injuries under the Revised Penal Code. With
regard to the second case (i.e., violation of the city ordinance), upon being
arraigned, he filed a motion to quash the information invoking his right against
double jeopardy. He contended that, under Art. III, Section 21 of the
Constitution, if an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or
acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same
act He argued that the two criminal charges against him stemmed from the
same act of driving allegedly under the influence of liquor which caused the
accident. Was there double jeopardy? Explain your answer (5%) FIRST
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: Yes, there is double jeopardy. Under the second
sentence of Article III, Section 21 of the Constitution, if an act is punished by a
law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar
to another prosecution for the same act. In this case, the same act is involved
in the two cases. The reckless imprudence which resulted in physical injuries
arose from the same act of driving under the influence of liquor. In Yap v.
Lutero, G.R. No. L-12669, April 30, 1959, the Supreme Court held that an
accused who was acquitted of driving recklessly in violation of an ordinance
could not be prosecuted for damage to property through reckless imprudence
because the two charges were based on the same act. In People v, Relova,
148 SCRA 292 (1987), it was held that when there is identity in the act
punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall
bar prosecution under the other. SECOND ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: There is
no double jeopardy because the act penalized under the Revised Penal Code
is different from the act penalized by the ordinance of Makati City. The Revised
Penal Code penalizes reckless imprudence resulting in physical injuries, while
the ordinance of Makati City penalizes driving under the influence of liquor.

Double Jeopardy
Year: 2000

Question:
Charged by Francisco with libel, Pablo was arraigned on January 3, 2000,
Pre-trial was dispensed with and continuous trial was set for March 7, 8 and 9,
2000. On the first setting, the prosecution moved for its postponement and
cancellation of the other settings because its principal and probably only
witness, the private complainant Francisco, suddenly had to go abroad to fulfill
a professional commitment. The judge instead dismissed the case for failure to
prosecute.

Would the reversal of the trial court's assailed dismissal of the case place the
accused in double jeopardy? (3%)

Answer: Since the postponement of the case would not violate the right of the
accused to speedy trial, the precipitate dismissal of the case is void. The
reversal of the dismissal will not place the accused in double Jeopardy.

Double Jeopardy (2001)

For the death of Joey, Erning was charged with the crime of homicide before
the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela. He was arraigned. Due to numerous
postponements of the scheduled hearings at the instance of the prosecution,
particularly based on the ground of unavailability of prosecution witnesses who
could not be found or located, the criminal case was pending trial for a period
of seven years. Upon motion of accused Erning who invoked his right to
speedy trial, the court dismissed the case.
Eventually, the prosecution witnesses surfaced, and a criminal case for
homicide, involving the same incident was filed anew against Erning. Accused
Erning moved for dismissal of the case on the ground of double jeopardy. The
prosecution objected, submitting the reason that it was not able to present the
said witnesses earlier because the latter went into hiding out of fear. Resolve
the motion.(5%)

Suggested Answer:
The motion should be granted. As held in Case vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court,179 SCRA 54 (1989),the dismissal of a criminal case predicated on the
right of the accused to a speedy trial amounts to an acquittal for failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt and bars his subsequent prosecution for the
same offense.

Topic: Right to Bail; Double Jeopardy

Year: 2008
Question:
JC, a major in the Armed Forces of t\he Philippine, is facing prosecution before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for the murder of his neighbor whom he
suspected to have molested his (JC's) 15-year old daughter.
a. Is JC entitled to bail? Why or why not? (3%)
Answer:
A. In the case at hand, JC is not entitled to bail because as a
general rule, bail is not a matter of right particularly when the
offense charged carries with it the punishment of reclusion
perpertua or any higher degree. Provided that JC is accused with
the crime of murder, he cannot be allowed to post bail.

2002

A Tamaraw FX driven by Asiong Cascasero, who was drunk, sideswiped

a pedestrian along EDSA in Makati City, resulting in physical injuries to the
latter. The public prosecutor filed two separate informations against Cascasero,
the first for reckless imprudence resulting in physical injuries under the Revised
Penal Code, and the second for violation of an ordinance of Makati City
prohibiting and penalizing driving under the influence of liquor. Cascasero was
arraigned, tried and convicted for reckless imprudence resulting in physical
injuries under the Revised Penal Code. With regard to the second case (i.e.,
violation of the city ordinance), upon being arraigned, he filed a motion to quash
the information invoking his right against double jeopardy. He contended that,
under Art. III, Section 21 of the Constitution, if an act is punished by a law and
an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to
another prosecution for the same act He argued that the two criminal charges
against him stemmed from the same act of driving allegedly under the influence
of liquor which caused the accident. Was there double jeopardy? Explain your
answer (5%)
Answer:
Yes, there is double jeopardy. Under the second sentence of Article III,
Section 21 of the Constitution, if an act is punished by a law and an ordinance,
conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution
for the same act. In this case, the same act is involved in the two cases. The
reckless imprudence which resulted in physical injuries arose from the same
act of driving under the influence of liquor. In Yap v. Lutero, G.R. No. L-12669,
April 30, 1959, the Supreme Court held that an accused who was acquitted of
driving recklessly in violation of an ordinance could not be prosecuted for
damage to property through reckless imprudence because the two charges
were based on the same act. In People v, Relova, 148 SCRA 292 (1987), it was
held that when there is identity in the act punished by a law and an ordinance,
conviction or acquittal under either shall bar prosecution under the other.
Alternative Answer:
There is no double jeopardy because the act penalized under the
Revised Penal Code is different from the act penalized by the ordinance of
Makati City. The Revised Penal Code penalizes reckless imprudence resulting
in physical injuries, while the ordinance of Makati City penalizes driving under
the influence of liquor.

EX-POST FACTO LAWS AND BILLS OF ATTAINDER

(Topic) Bill of Attainder (1990)

(Question) No. 1; Executive Orders Nos. 1 and 2 issued by President Corazon
C. Aquino created the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG)
and empowered it to sequester any property shown prima facie to be ill-gotten
wealth of the late President Marcos, his relatives and cronies. Executive Order
No. 14 vests on the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction to try hidden wealth cases. On
April 14, 1986, after an investigation, the PCGG sequestered the assets of X
Corporation, Inc.
(1) X Corporation, Inc. claimed that President Aquino, as President,
could not lawfully issue Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2 and 14, which have the
force of law, on the ground that legislation is a function of Congress. Decide.
(2) Said corporation also questioned the validity of the three executive
orders on the ground that they are bills of attainder and, therefore,
unconstitutional. Decide.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(1) Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2 and 14 were issued in 1986. At that time
President Corazon Aquino exercised legislative power…
(2) Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2 and 14 are not bills of attainder.
 A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without
judicial trial.
Accordingly, it was held in Bataan Shipyards and Engineering Company.
Inc. v. Presidential Commission on Good Government that Executive
Orders Nos. 1, 2 and 14 are not bills of attainder, because they do not
inflict any punishment. On the contrary, they expressly provide that any
judgment that the property sequestered is ill-gotten wealth is to be
made by a court (the Sandiganbayan) only after trial.
Topic: Bill of Attainder
Year: 1987
Question:
Congress passed a law relating to officials and employees who had served in
the Government for the period from September 21, 1972 up to February 25,
1986.

(a) One provision of the law declared all officials from the rank of assistant
head of a department, bureau, office or agency "Unfit" for continued service in
the government and declared their respective positions vacant.

(b) Another provision required all the otherbofficials and employees to take an
oath of loyalty to the flag and government as a condition for their continued
employment.

Are the two provisions valid? Why?

Answer:
(a) The law is a bill of attainder by which Congress, by assuming judicial
magistracy, in effect declares all officials and employees during martial law
(September 21, 1972- February 25, 1986) as disloyal and, on this basis,
removes some while subjecting others to a loyalty test. With respect to the
provision declaring positions vacant, even the power to reorganize can not be
invoked because under the Freedom Constitution such power can be
exercised only by the President and only up to February 25, 1987. Since the
law under question was presumably passed after February 25, 1987 and by
Congress, it is unconstitutional.

(b) With respect to the provision requiring the loyalty test, loyalty as a general
rule is a relevant consideration in assessing employees' fitness. However, the
requirement in this case is not a general requirement but singles out "martial
law" employees and therefore is administered in a discriminatory manner.
Loyalty, therefore, while a relevant consideration in other circumstances, is
being employed in this case for an unconstitutional purpose.

Ex post facto law and bill of attainder

Year: 2007
Question: Lawrence is a Filipino computer expert based in Manila who
invented a virus that destroys all the files stored in a computer. Assume that in
May 2005, this virus spread all over the world and caused $50 million in
damage to property in the United States, and that in June 2005, he was
criminally charged before the United States courts under their anti-hacker law.
Assume that in July 2005, the Philippines adopted is own anti-hacker law, to
strenthen existing sanctions already provided against damage to property. The
United States has requested the Philippines to extradite him to U.S. courts
under the RP-US Extradition Treaty.

Assume that the extradition request was made after the Philippines adopted its
anti-hacker legislation. Is the Philippines under the obligation to extradite
Lawrence?

Suggested Answer: The Philippines is under no obligation to extradite the

Lawrence. There was no anti-hacker law in the Philippines when Lawrence was
charged in the United States; hence, an extradition of Lawrence is tantamount
to ex post facto application of the Philippine anti-hacker law, prohibited by
Section 22, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.