Law Case Digest
Law Case Digest
Law Case Digest
Pilipinas Shell
FACT:
Pilipinas Shell subsequently filed two separate claims for the refund or credit of the
excise taxes paid on the foregoing sales, totaling P49,058,733.09. Due to the
inaction of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) on its claims, Pilipinas Shell
decided to file a petition for review with the CTA.CTA Second Division rendered its
Decision granting Pilipinas Shell’s claim but at a reduced amount of P39,305,419.49
The arguments raised by the CIR are basically the same as those raised before the
CTA Second Division and En Banc, that is, Pilipinas Shell is not entitled to a
refund/credit of the excise taxes paid on its sales and deliveries to international
carriers for the following reasons: (1) excise taxes are levied on the
manufacturer/producer prior to sale and delivery to international carriers and,
regardless of its purchaser, said taxes must be shouldered by the
manufacturer/producer or in this case, Pilipinas Shell; (2) the excise taxes paid by
Pilipinas Shell do not consitute taxes erroneously paid as they are right fully due
from Pilipinas Shell as manufacturer/producer of the petroleum products sold to
RULING:
NO. Under the doctrine of stare decisis, the Court must adhere to the principle of law laid
down in Pilipinas Shell and apply the same in the present case, especially since the facts,
issues, and even the parties involved are exactly identical. Thus, the Court hereby holds
that Pilipinas Shell’s claim for refund/tax credit must be granted pursuant to Pilipinas
Shell, as its petroleum products sold to international carriers for the period of November
2000 to March 2001 are exempt from excise tax, these international carriers being exempt
from payment of excise tax under Section 135(a) of the NIRC.
Immutability of Judgment
Facts: the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Libel
and, accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a period of
one (1) year, eight (8) months, and twenty-one (21) days to two (2) years, eleven (11)
months, and ten (10) days, and to pay the costs of suit. Aggrieved, petitioner moved for
reconsideration, which was, however, denied for being filed 2 days late. Consequently,
he was arrested and taken into custody. Petitioner filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion
praying that the RTC: (a) reopen the criminal proceedings against him; (b) allow him to
file a notice of appeal. The RTC denied petitioner’s Urgent Omnibus Motion and,
likewise, denied due course to his Notice of Appeal. the RTC found as immaterial
petitioner’s contention that he did not receive the Order of his conviction, considering
that he filed his Motion for Reconsideration two (2) days beyond the prescribed 15-day
period reckoned from the promulgation of the RTC order. the CA affirmed the RTC
ruling in toto.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner belatedly filed his Motion for Reconsideration, thus,
rendering said judgment final and executory
Ruling: Yes.
Under the doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of judgment, a decision that has
acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in
any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and
law, and whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the
land. Any act which violates this principle must immediately be struck down. Nonetheless,
the immutability of final judgments is not a hard and fast rule as the Court has the power
and prerogative to relax the same in order to serve the demands of substantial justice
considering: (a) matters of life, liberty, honor, or property; (b) the existence of special
orcompelling circumstances; (c) the merits of the case; (d) a cause not entirely attributable
to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (e) the lack of
any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; and (f) that the other
party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.
Under the doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of judgment, a decision that
has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be
modified in any respect. Nonetheless, the Court has the power relax the same in order
to serve the demands of substantial justice. In a catena of similar cases where the
accused failed to perfect their appeal on their respective judgments of conviction, the
Court corrected the penalties imposed, notwithstanding the finality of the decisions
because they were outside the range of penalty prescribed by law. There is thus, no
reason to deprive herein petitioner of the relief afforded the accused in the aforesaid
similar cases.
FACTS: Jose Liongson, the deceased husband of respondent Yolanda Liongson, filed a
complaint for damages based on malicious prosecution against Spouses Navarra and
Spouses Bernardobefore the Regional Trial Court. Petitioners argue that it is beyond
the power of the CA to amend its original decision in this case, dated December 8,
2011, for it violates the principle of finality of judgment and its immutability. They
point out that the said CA decision had acquired finality, hence, it could no longer be
modified in any respect even if the modification was meant to correct erroneous
conclusions of fact or law, or it would be made by the court that rendered it or by the
highest court of the land.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred and violated the principle of immutability of
judgment
HELD: Well-settled is the rule that a judgment that has acquired finality "becomes
immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the
modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether it
be made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land." The
rationale of this doctrine is to avoid delay in the administration of justice and in order
to put an end to judicial controversies.
The issue posed before the Court is not of first impression. It involves three conflicting
final and executory judgments rendered by the RTC and the CA.
Where a certain case comprises two or more conflicting judgments which are final and
executory, the Court, offered three (3) options in resolving the same. First, the court
may opt to require the parties to assert their claims anew; second, to determine which
judgment came first; and third, to determine which of the judgments had been
rendered by a court of last resort.
University of the Philippines vs Hon. Pura Ferrer-Calleja.
(211 SCRA 451; GR No. 96189, July 14. 1992, Narvasa, C.J.)
FACTS:
ISSUES:
Wheter or not the professors, associate professors and assistant professors are
considered exercising manegerial or highly confidential function? And should there
be a bargaining unit separate and distinct from that of the non-academic employees
of UP?
Executive Order No. 180, and its Implementing Rules and Regulations
CASE HISTORY:
August 7, 1990 - Director Calleja ruled on the matter. She declared that xx should
embrace all the regular rank-and-file employees, teaching and non-teaching, of the
University of the Philippines, including all its branches” and that there was no
sufficient evidence “to justify the grouping of the non-academic or administrative
personnel into an organization unit apart and distinct from that of the academic or
teaching personnel. Motion for reconsideration was denied.
RULING:
OPINION:
FACTS:
Civil Case No. MC08-3660 was raffled on July 21, 2008 xxx, there is no need to spin the
roulette, which was used in the raffle of cases, since it was only the court of the undersigned
which has not received its share of civil cases with application force a TRO/Injunction for the
particular “round.” Judge Valenzuela clarified that FGU Insurance Corporation was not a party
in Civil Case No. MC08-3660. He assured that all the parties in Civil Case No. MC08-3660 were
given the opportunity to argue for or against the issuance of the TRO; that although he
had granted a period of five days to STRADCOM within which to file its own
comment/opposition to Martizano’s application for the TRO, he did not wait anymore for
STRADCOM’s written comment/opposition owing to the public interest involved and the
urgency of resolving the issues concerning DO 2007-28. He said that the nonimposition of a
bond on Martizano was justified under Rule 58, Section 4(b) of the Rules of Court; that he
denied the motion to dismiss because the requisites for the grounds relied upon were not met; and
that the supposed anomaly attending the raffle proceedings was only the product of GSIS’s
“polluted mind.
ISSUE:
Were the respondents properly held administratively liable for violating the standing rules on the
raffle of cases?
RULING:
NO. The Court dismisses Administrative charges against the respondents. Given the urgent
nature of TRO or injunction cases, each of them had to be immediately attended to. This
peculiarity must have led to the adoption of the practice of raffling such cases despite their
number being less than the number of the Branches in Mandaluyong City. The practice did not
absolutely contravene Circular No. 7 in view of the circular itself expressly excepting under its
fourth paragraph, supra, any incidental or interlocutory matter of such urgent nature (like a TRO
application) that might not wait for the regular
raffle.
The urgent nature of an injunction or TRO case demands prompt action and immediate attention,
thereby compelling the filing of the case in the proper court without delay. To assume that a
party desiring to file an injunction or TRO case will just stand idly by and mark time until his
favored Branch is the only Branch left without an assigned injunction or TRO case is obviously
speculative. Moreover, the “anomalous situation” is highly unlikely in view of the uncertainty of
having the favored Branch remain the only Branch without an injunction or TRO case following
the series of raffle.
FACTS:
The RTC ruled that the mortgage contract and the promissory notes prepared by
Solidbank, which the Spouses Jonsay signed in blank, were contracts of adhesion;
that Solidbank failed to take into account Momarco’s payments in the two years
preceding 1998 totaling P24,277,293.22 (this amount was not disputed by
Solidbank); that the interest rates, ranging from 19% to 30%, as well as the
penalties, charges and attorney’s fees imposed by Solidbank, were excessive,
unconscionable and immoral, and that Solidbank has no carte blanche authority
under the Usury Law to unilaterally raise the interest rates to levels as to enslave
the borrower and hemorrhage its assets. CA rendered judgment affirming the RTC
in toto, but later reversed its decision, the CA not only found the parties’ mortgage
contract valid, but also declared that Solidbank’s extrajudicial foreclosure of the
mortgage enjoyed the presumption of regularity.
ISSUE:
RULING: YES
The rule is that while the decision of a court becomes final upon the lapse of the period to
appeal by any party, but the filing of a motion for reconsideration or new trial interrupts or
suspends the running of the said period, and prevents the finality of the decision or order
from setting in. A motion for reconsideration allows a party to request the adjudicating
court or quasi-judicial body to take a second look at its earlier judgment and correct any
errors it may have committed. As explained in Salcedo II v. COMELEC, 312 SCRA 447
(1999), a motion for reconsideration allows the adjudicator or judge to take a second
opportunity to review the case and to grapple anew with the issues therein, and to decide
again a question previously raised, there being no legal proscription imposed against the
deciding body adopting thereby a new position contrary to one it had previously taken.