Mathematical Structuralism
Mathematical Structuralism
Mathematical Structuralism
Table of Contents
1. The Main Idea
2. Taking on the Metaphysics: The Ante Rem Approach
3. Getting by without Ontology: Structuralism without (Ante Rem) Structures
4. References and Further Reading
1. The Main Idea
David Hilbert’s Grundlagen der Geometrie [1899] represents the culmination of a
trend toward structuralism within mathematics. That book gives what, with some
hindsight, we might call implicit definitions of geometric notions, characterizing them
in terms of the relations they bear to each other. The early pages contain phrases
such as “the axioms of this group define the idea expressed by the word ‘between’
. . .” and “the axioms of this group define the notion of congruence or motion.” The
idea is summed up as follows:
We think of . . . points, straight lines, and planes as having certain mutual relations,
which we indicate by means of such words as “are situated,” “between,” “parallel,”
“congruent,” “continuous,” etc. The complete and exact description of these
relations follows as a consequence of the axioms of geometry.
Hilbert also remarks that the axioms express “certain related fundamental facts of
our intuition,” but in the book—in the mathematical development itself—all that
remains of the intuitive content are the diagrams that accompany some of the
theorems.
So, for the ante rem structuralist, in the places-are-offices mode, singular terms
denoting places are bona fide singular terms, and variables ranging over places are
bona fide variables, ranging over places. Places are bona fide objects.
Structures are prior to places in the same sense that any organization is prior to the
offices that constitute it. The natural number structure is prior to “6,” just as
“baseball defense” is prior to “shortstop” or “U.S. Government” is prior to “Vice
President."
What is this notion of priority? For the non-mathematical examples such as baseball
defenses and governments, one might characterize the priority in terms of possible
existence. To say that A is prior to B is to say that B could not exist without A. No
one can be a shortstop independent of a baseball defense; no one can be vice
president independent of a government (or organization). Unfortunately, this
articulation of the priority does not make sense of the mathematical cases. The ante
rem structuralist follows most ontological realists in holding that the mathematical
structures and their places exist of necessity. It does not make sense to think of the
natural number structure existing without its places, nor for the places to exist
without the structure.
The dependence relation in the slogans for ante rem structuralism is that
of constitution. Each ante rem structure consists of some places and some
relations. A structure is constituted by its places and its relations, in the same way
that any organization is constituted by its offices and the relations between
them. The constitution is not that of mereology. It is not the case that a structure is
just the sum of its places, since, in general, the places have to be related to each other
via the relations of the structure. An ante rem structure is a whole consisting of, or
constituted by, its places and its relations.
3. Getting by without Ontology: Structuralism
without (Ante Rem) Structures
Some philosophers find the existence of ante rem structures extravagant. For such
thinkers, there are other ways to preserve the structuralist insights. One can take
structures to exist, but only in the systems that exemplify them. Metaphysically, the
idea is to reverse the priority cited above: structures are posterior to the systems that
exemplify them—although, again, it may prove difficult to articulate the relevant
notion of priority. This would be an Aristotelian, in re realism. On a view like this,
the only structures that exist are those that are exemplified. I do not know of any
philosophers of mathematics who articulate such a view in detail. I mention it, in
passing, in light of the connection between structures and traditional universals.
Another, perhaps ontologically cleaner, option is to reject the existence of structures,
in any sense of “existence.” On such a view, apparent talk of structures is only a façon
de parler, a way of talking about systems that are structured in a certain way. The
view is sometimes dubbed eliminative structuralism.
The eliminativist can acknowledge the places-are-objects orientation when
discussing structures or, to be precise, when discussing structured systems, but he
cannot understand such statements literally (without adopting an error theory). For
the eliminativist, the surface grammar of places-are-objects statements does not
reflect their underlying logical form, since, from that perspective, there are no
structures and there are no places to which one can refer.
The ante rem structuralist and the eliminativist agree that statements in the places-
are-objects mode imply generalizations concerning systems that exemplify the
structure. We say, for example, that the vice president presides over the senate, and
this entails that all vice presidents preside over their respective senates. The chess
king can move one square in any direction, so long as the move does not result in
check. This entails that all kings are so mobile, and so immobile. Of course, the
generalizations themselves do not entail that there are any vice presidents or chess
kings—nor do they entail that there are any structures.
The eliminative structuralist holds that places-are-objects statements are just ways
of expressing the relevant generalizations, and he accuses the ante rem structuralist
of making too much of their surface grammar, trying to draw deep metaphysical
conclusions from that. The same goes for typical statements in pure
mathematics. Those, too, should be regimented as generalizations over all systems
that exemplify the given structure or structures. For example, the statement “For
every natural number n there is a prime p>n” is rendered:
In any natural number system S, for every object x in S, there is another
object y in S such that y comes after x in S and y has no divisors in S other than itself
and the unit object of S.
In general, any sentence Φ in the language of arithmetic gets regimented as
something like:
The sailing is not completely smooth for the eliminative structuralist, however. As
noted, this view takes the places-are-offices perspective to be primary—paraphrasing
places-are-objects statements in those terms. Places-are-offices statements, recall,
presuppose a background of objects to fill the places in the systems. For
mathematics, the nature of these objects is not relevant. For example, as noted,
anything at all can play the two-role in a natural number system. Nevertheless, for
the regimented statements to get their expected truth-values, the background
ontology must be quite extensive.
Suppose, for example, that the entire universe consists of no more than
10100,000 objects. Then there are no natural number systems (since each such system
must have infinitely many objects). So for any sentence Φ in the language of
arithmetic, the regimented sentence Φʹ would be vacuously true. So the eliminativist
would be committed to the truth of (the regimented version of) 1+1=0.
In other words, a straightforward, successful eliminative account of arithmetic
requires a countably infinite background ontology. And it gets worse for other
branches of mathematics. An eliminative account of real analysis demands an
ontology whose size is that of the continuum; for functional analysis, we’d need the
powerset of that many objects. And on it goes. The size of some of the structures
studied in mathematics is staggering.
Even if the physical universe does exceed 10100,000 objects, and, indeed, even if it is
infinite, there is surely some limit to how many physical objects there are (invoking
Cantor’s theorem that the powerset of any set is larger than it). Branches of
mathematics that require more objects than the number of physical objects might
end up being vacuously trivial, at least by the lights of the straightforward,
eliminative structuralist. This would be bad news for such theorists, as the goal is to
make sense of mathematics as practiced. In any case, no philosophy of mathematics
should be hostage to empirical and contingent facts, including features of the size of
the physical universe.
In the literature, there are two eliminativist reactions to this threat of vacuity. First,
the philosopher might argue, or assume, that there are enough abstract objects for
every mathematical structure to be exemplified. In other words, we postulate that,
for each field of mathematics, there are enough abstract objects to keep the
regimented statements from becoming vacuous.
Some mathematicians, and some philosophers, think of the set-theoretic hierarchy
as the ontology for all of mathematics. Mathematical objects—all mathematical
objects—are sets in the iterative hierarchy. Less controversially, it is often thought
that the iterative hierarchy is rich enough to recapitulate every mathematical
theory. Penelope Maddy [2007, 354] writes:
Set theory hopes to provide a dependable and perspicuous mathematical theory that
is ample enough to include (surrogates for) all the objects of classical mathematics
and strong enough to imply all the classical theorems about them. In this way, set
theory aims to provide a court of final appeal for claims of existence and proof in
classical mathematics . . . Thus set theory aims to provide a single arena in which the
objects of classical mathematics are all included, where they can be compared side-
by-side.
One might wonder why it is that a foundational theory only needs “surrogates” for
each mathematical object, and not the real things. For a structuralist, the answer is
that in mathematics the individual nature of the objects is irrelevant. What matters
is their relations to each other (see Shapiro [2004]).
Hellman mobilizes the logical modalities for his eliminative structuralism. Our
arithmetic sentence Φ becomes
In any logically possible natural number system S, Φ[S].
It is logically necessary that for any natural number system S, Φ[S].
In contemporary logic textbooks and classes, the logical modalities are understood
in terms of sets. To say that a sentence is logically possible is to say that there is a
certain set that satisfies it. Of course, this will not do here, for the same reason that
the modalist cannot define the modality in terms of possible worlds. It is especially
problematic here. It does no good to render mathematical ‘existence’ in terms of
logical possibility if the latter is to be rendered in terms of existence in the set-
theoretic hierarchy. Again, the modalist takes the notion of logical possibility to be
a primitive, explicated by the theory as a whole. For more on this program, see
Hellman [1989], [2001], [2005].
To briefly sum up and conclude, the parties to the debate over how to best articulate
the structuralist insights agree that each of the major versions has its strengths and,
of course, each has its peculiar difficulties. Negotiating such tradeoffs is, of course,
a stock feature of philosophy in general. The literature has produced an increased
understanding of mathematics, of the relevant philosophical issues, and how the
issues bear on each other, and the discussion shows no signs of abating. For
additional discussion see "The Applicability of Mathematics."
4. References and Further Reading
Armstrong, D. [1986], “In defence of structural universals,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64, 85-
88.
As the title says.
Awodey, S. [1996], “Structure in mathematics and logic: a categorical perspective,” Philosophia
Mathematica (3) 4, 209-237.
Articulates a connection between structuralism and category theory.
Awodey, S. [2004], “An answer to Hellman’s question: 'Does category theory provide a framework for
mathematical structuralism?',” Philosophia Mathematica (3) 12, 54-64.
Continuation of the above.
Awodey, S. [2006], Category theory, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Readable presentation of category theory.
Benacerraf, P. [1965], “What numbers could not be,” Philosophical Review 74, 47-73; reprinted
in Philosophy of mathematics, edited by P. Benacerraf and H. Putnam, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey,
Prentice-Hall, 1983, 272-294.
Classic motivation for the (eliminative) structuralist perspective.
Bernays, P. [1967], “Hilbert, David” in The encyclopedia of philosophy, Volume 3, edited by P. Edwards,
New York, Macmillan publishing company and The Free Press, 496-504.
Chihara, C. [2004], A structural account of mathematics, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Account of the application of mathematics in “structural” terms, but without adopting
a structuralist philosophy.
Frege, G. [1976], Wissenschaftlicher Briefwechsel, edited by G. Gabriel, H. Hermes, F. Kambartel, and
C. Thiel, Hamburg, Felix Meiner.
Frege, G. [1980], Philosophical and mathematical correspondence, Oxford, Basil Blackwell.
Hale, Bob, [1996], “Structuralism’s unpaid epistemological debts,” Philosophica Mathematica (3) 4,
124-143.
Criticism of modal eliminative structuralism.
Hand, M. [1993], “Mathematical structuralism and the third man,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 23,
179-192.
Critique of ante rem structuralism, on Aristotelian grounds.
Hellman, G. [1989], Mathematics without numbers, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Detailed articulation and defense of modal eliminative structuralism.
Hellman, G. [2001], “Three varieties of mathematical structuralism,” Philosophia Mathematica (III) 9,
184-211.
Comparison of the varieties of structuralism, favoring the modal eliminative version.
Hellman, G. [2005], “Structuralism,” Oxford handbook of philosophy of mathematics and logic, edited
by Stewart Shapiro, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 536-562.
Comparison of the varieties of structuralism, again favoring the modal eliminative
version.
Hilbert, D. [1899], Grundlagen der Geometrie, Leipzig, Teubner; Foundations of geometry, translated
by E. Townsend, La Salle, Illinois, Open Court, 1959.
Hilbert, D. [1935], Gesammelte Abhandlungen, Dritter Band, Berlin, Julius Springer.
Lewis, D. [1986], “Against structural universals,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64, 25-46.
As the title says.
Linnebo, Øystein [2008], “Structuralism and the Notion of Dependence,” Philosophical Quarterly 58,
59-79.
An ontological eliminative structuralism, using set theory as the (non-structural)
background foundation.
MacBride, F. [2005], “Structuralism reconsidered,” Oxford Handbook of philosophy of mathematics and
logic, edited by Stewart Shapiro, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 563-589.
Philosophically based criticism of the varieties of structuralism.
Maddy, P. [2007], Second philosophy: a naturalistic method, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
McLarty, C. [1993], “Numbers can be just what they have to,” Nous 27, 487-498.
Connection between category theory and the philosophical aspects of structuralism.
Pagès, J. [2002], “Structural universals and formal relations,” Synthese 131, 215-221.
Articulation and defenses of structural universals.
Resnik, M. [1981], “Mathematics as a science of patterns: Ontology and reference,” Nous 15, 529-550.
Philosophical articulation of structuralism, with focus on metaphysical issues.
Resnik, M. [1982], “Mathematics as a science of patterns: Epistemology,” Nous 16, 95-105.
Philosophical articulation of structuralism, with focus on epistemological issues.
Resnik, M. [1992], “A structuralist’s involvement with modality,” Mind 101, 107-122.
Review of Hellman [1989] focusing on issues concerning the invoked notion of
modality.
Resnik, M. [1997], Mathematics as a science of patterns, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Detailed articulation of a realist version of structuralism.
Shapiro, S. [1997], Philosophy of mathematics: structure and ontology, New York, Oxford University
Press.
Elaborate articulation of structuralism, with focus on the various versions; defense of
the ante rem approach.
Shapiro, S. [2004], “Foundations of mathematics: metaphysics, epistemology, structure,” Philosophical
Quarterly 54, 16-37.
The role of structuralist insights in foundational studies.
Shapiro, S. [2008], “Identity, indiscernibility, and ante rem structuralism: the tale of i and -
i,” Philosophia Mathematica (3) 16, 2008, 285-309.
Treatment of the identity relation, from an ante rem structuralist perspective, and the
metaphysical nature of structures.
Author Information
Stewart Shapiro
Email: [email protected]
The Ohio State University, U.S.A. and
University of St. Andrews, United Kingdom