Land Reforms
Land Reforms
Land Reforms
INTRODUCTION
Objectives are:
The basic objectives of land reforms are GROWTH and SOCIAL JUSTICE.
Consolidation of holdings
Fixation of ceiling on land holding
Regulation of rent
Ownership rights
Security of tenant
Abolition of intermediates between the tenant and the state
Tendency reforms are divided into sub parts
In the radical nationalist approach , there has been formally adopted by most of the
state government, however his approach could not contribute much.
INTRODUCTION
The major objective of land reforms in free India was to abolish intermediaries and to
bring changes in the revenue system that would be favourable to cultivators. The
process of abolition of Zamindari, Jagirdari, Ryotwari etc. system had started even
before the constitution of India came into effect.
Zamindari Abolition Acts The first important agrarian reform after independence was
the abolition of the Zamindari system. The process of passing Zamindari abolition
bills had started even when the constitution of India was not enacted. A number of
provinces such as United Provinces (UP), Central Provinces , Bihar, Madras, Assam,
Bombay had introduced such bills on the basis of a Zamindari Abolition committee,
chaired by G.B. Pant. However, there re was a widespread concern that he
Zamindars would make every effort to cause delay in acquisition of their lands. When
constitution was passed, right to property was enshrined as fundamental right under
article 19 and 31. The provinces passed the Zamindari Abolition Acts but all these
acts were challenged in the court on account of their constitutional validity. The
supreme court upheld the rights of Zamindars. To secure the constitutional validity of
these state acts, the parliament passed first amendment (1951) within 15 months of
enactment of the constitution and second amendment in 1955. By 1956, Zamindari
abolition act was passed in many provinces. Due to conferment of land rights,
around 30 lakh tenants and share-croppers were able to acquire the ownership
rights over a total cultivated area of 62 lakh acres throughout the country due to
these acts. On the other hand, the compensation paid to Zamindars was generally
small and varied from state to states.
The zamindar (landlord) had the right to keep the land idle.
He had a right to fix initially any rent he pleased but after the expiry of ten
years the rent becomes liable to enhancement or abatement .In certain
cases he had right to eject the tenants thus the cultivators had no fixity of
tenure and fixity of rent. This defective land system was one of the causes
of low productivity of agriculture in India during British period. Thus in
order to increase the agricultural production it was necessary to remove
the intermediaries who were parasites, racketeers ,operators of the
tenantry and the source of all the ills of rural society.
Everybody must work - Everybody must work- The concept that who does
not make a return in the share of produce or social service equivalent to or
more than what he consumes is a drone and drag on social and economic
progress . Every section of people must perform a definite economic
function .The various classes of intermediaries functioning as rent-
receivers whether as zamindars or taluqdars or under-proprietors or other
subordinate holders, did nothing to improve the land and left the land and
the tenantry where they were and indeed in a plight worse than before. In
order to make everybody work it was desirable to remove the zamindars.
Landlordism was British evil - It may be noted that the zamindar class
was created as a social base by the British to help them in consolidation
and maintaining their rule and acted as a check on progressive forces.
History tells that in Avadh after the first independence war of 1857, the
estates (taluqas) were given to those who had given shelter to English
people during the revolution or who had handed over the freedom fighters
to the British Government .Thus zamindars were granted lands as a
bakshish (reward) for their act, which may be called a treachery to the
nation therefore the abolition of zamindari system was necessary to
prevent any further accrual of benefit to treacherers descendants since
the evil of landlordism was a British creation hence it must end with the
British rule of India.
There were, however, certain important weaknesses in the manner in which some of
the clauses relating to zamindari abolition were implemented in various parts of the
country. For example, in Uttar Pradesh, the zamindars were permitted to retain lands
that were declared to be under their ‘personal cultivation’. What constituted ‘personal
cultivation’ was very loosely defined ‘(making) it possible for not only those who tilled
the soil, but also those who supervised the land personally or did so through a
relative, or provided capital and credit to the land, to call themselves a
cultivator’.1 Moreover, in states like Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and Madras, to begin with
(i.e., till land ceiling laws were introduced) there was no limit on the size of the lands
that could be declared to be under the ‘personal cultivation’ of the zamindar. This,
despite the fact that the Congress Agrarian Reforms Committee (Kumarappa
Committee) in its report of 1949 had clearly stipulated that ‘only those who put in a
minimum amount of physical labour and participate in actual agricultural operations’
could be said to be performing ‘personal cultivation’. Also, the committee had
envisaged a limit or ceiling on how much land could be ‘resumed’ for ‘personal
cultivation’, under no circumstances leading to the tenant’s holding being reduced to
below the ‘economic’ level.2
The result in actual practice, however, was that even zamindars who were absentee
landowners could now end up retaining large tracts of land. Further, in many areas,
the zamindars in order to declare under ‘personal cultivation’ as large a proportion of
their lands as possible often resorted to large-scale eviction of tenants, mainly the
less secure small tenants. (This was to be followed by further rounds of evictions
once the land ceilings and tenancy legislations came into being, cumulatively leading
to a major blot in the record of land reforms in India.)
Retaining large tracts under ‘personal cultivation’ was only one way through which
the landlords tried to avoid the full impact of the effort at abolition of the zamindari
system. Several other methods were used to resist the bringing in of zamindari
abolition legislation and their implementation. Since such legislation had to be
passed by the state legislatures, the landlords used every possible method of
parliamentary obstruction in the legislatures. The draft bills were subjected to
prolonged debates, referred to select committees and repeated amendments were
proposed so that in many states like Uttar Pradesh and Bihar several years passed
between the introduction of the bills and the laws being enacted.
Even after the laws were enacted the landlords used the judicial system to defer the
implementation of the laws. As we saw earlier, they repeatedly challenged the
constitutionality of the laws in the courts, going right up to the Supreme Court. In
Bihar, where the landlords put up the maximum resistance, they tried to block the
implementation of the law even after they lost their case in the Supreme Court twice.
They now refused to hand over the land records in their possession, forcing the
government to go through the lengthy procedure of reconstructing the records.
Further, implementation of the law was made difficult and, as much as possible,
skewed in favour of the zamindar, by the collusion between the landlords and
particularly the lower-level revenue officials. Such collusion was helped by the fact
that in zamindari areas many of the revenue officials were former rent-collecting
agents of the zamindars. At all levels involving the legislative, judicial and executive
arms of the state, the landlords put up resistance.
The study showed that after the Zamindari Abolition, in U.P. as a whole, one third of
the total area under agricultural holdings was held under bhumidhari tenures, a little
less than two third under Sirdari and less than one per cent by asamis. Figures for
the State and for the sample villages are given in the following table.
Notes:
(1) The area figures both for the State as well as sample villages are the averages
for three years, viz. 1957-58 to 1959-60.
(2) Figures for the State are computed from Rental and Holding Registers of the
Board of Revenue by Baljit Singh A Misra.
Source: Baljit Singh and Shridhar Misra, A Study of Land Reforms in Uttar Pradesh.
Calcutta, 1964, p.121.