Lao v. Medel, A.C. No. 5916, July 1, 2003 PDF
Lao v. Medel, A.C. No. 5916, July 1, 2003 PDF
Lao v. Medel, A.C. No. 5916, July 1, 2003 PDF
SYNOPSIS
The Supreme Court suspended the respondent lawyer from the practice of law for one (1)
year for gross misconduct for failure to pay his debts and for issuing worthless checks as
payment for his loan from complainant. The Court held that membership in the legal
profession is a privilege. It demands a high degree of good moral character, not only as a
condition precedent to admission, but also as a continuing requirement for the practice of
law. In this case, respondent fell short of the exacting standards expected of him as a
guardian of law and justice. CcHDaA
SYLLABUS
DECISION
PANGANIBAN , J : p
The deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of worthless checks constitute
gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with one-year suspension from
the practice of law.
The Case and the Facts
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This administrative case stems from a Complaint-Affidavit 1 filed with the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) by Selwyn F. Lao. Atty. Robert
W. Medel was charged therein with dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct
unbecoming an attorney.
The material averments of the Complaint are summarized by the IBP-CBD in this wise:
"The Complaint arose from the [respondent's] persistent refusal to make good on
four (4) RCBC checks totaling [t]wenty [t]wo [t]housand (P22,000.00) [p]esos.
These dishonored checks were issued by defendant in replacement for previous
checks issued to the complainant. Based on the exchange of letters between the
parties, it appears that [respondent], in a letter dated June 19, 2001, had
committed to 'forthwith effect immediate settlement of my outstanding obligation
of P22,000.00 with Engr. Lao, at the earliest possible time, preferably, on or before
the end of June 2000.' Again, in a letter dated July 3, 2000, the [respondent] made
a 'request for a final extension of only ten (10) days from June 30, 2000 (or not
later than July 10, 2000), within which to effect payment of P22,000.00 to Engr.
Lao.' Needless to say, the initiation of this present complaint proves that contrary
to his written promises, Atty. Medel never made good on his dishonored checks.
Neither has he paid his indebtedness." 2
In his Answer 3 dated July 30, 2001, Atty. Medel reasons that because all of his proposals
to settle his obligation were rejected, he was unable to comply with his promise to pay
complainant. Respondent maintains that the Complaint did not constitute a valid ground
for disciplinary action because of the following:
"(a). Under Sec. 27, Rule 138 of the Rules, a member of the Bar, may be disbarred
or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct,
or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or
for a wil[l]ful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly
or wil[l]fully appearing as an attorney for a party to case without authority so to
do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice;
"(a.1). Applying the afore-cited legal provision to the facts obtaining in the present
case, it is clear that the offense with which the respondent is being charged by the
complainant, is merely a violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. 22, for
brevity), which is a special law, and is not punishable under the Revised Penal
Code (RPC, for brevity). It is self-evident therefore, that the offense is not in the
same category as a violation of Article 315, paragraph 2, (d), RPC, which is
issuing a post-dated check or a check in payment of an obligation, with
insufficient funds in the drawee bank, through false pretenses or fraudulent acts,
executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, which is a
crime involving moral turpitude;
"(b). If the respondent is to be disciplined by the Supreme Court, under Sec. 27,
Rule 138 of the Rules, for the issuance of a worthless check, in violation of B.P.
22, for payment of a pre-existing obligation to the complainant, then, verily, the
said Rule 138, Sec. 27, would be a cruel and an unjust law, which the Honorable
Supreme Court would not countenance; TADIHE
The defense proffered by respondent is untenable. It is evident from the records that he
made several promises to pay his debt promptly. However, he reneged on his obligation
despite sufficient time afforded hint. Worse, he refused to recognize any wrongdoing and
transferred the blame to complainant, on the contorted reasoning that the latter had
refused to accept the former's plan of payment. It must be pointed out that complainant
had no obligation to accept it, considering respondent's previous failure to comply with
earlier payment plans for the same debt.
Moreover, before the IBP-CBD, respondent had voluntarily committed himself to the
payment of his debts, yet failed again to fulfill his promise. That he had no real intention to
settle them is evident from his unremitting failed commitments. His cavalier attitude in
incurring debts without any intention of paying for them puts his moral character in serious
doubt.
Verily, lawyers must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, to the
courts and to their clients. As part of those duties, they must promptly pay their financial
obligations. Their conduct must always reflect the values and norms of the legal
profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. On these
considerations, the Court may disbar or suspend lawyers for any professional or private
misconduct showing them to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good
demeanor — or to be unworthy to continue as officers of the Court. 12
It is equally disturbing that respondent remorselessly issued a series of worthless checks,
unmindful of the deleterious effects of such act to public interest and public order. 13
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates all members of the bar to
obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law. Rule 1.01 of the Code specifically
provides that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct." In Co v. Bernardino, 14 the Court considered the issuance of worthless checks as
a violation of this Rule and an act constituting gross misconduct. It explained thus:
"The general rule is that a lawyer may not be suspended or disbarred, and the
court may not ordinarily assume jurisdiction to discipline him for misconduct in
his non-professional or private capacity (In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 569 [1923]). Where,
however, the misconduct outside of the lawyer's professional dealings is so gross
a character as to show him morally unfit for the office and unworthy of the
privilege which his licenses and the law confer on him, the court may be justified
in suspending or removing him from the office of attorney (In Re Sotto, 38 Phil.
569 [1923]). AIDTSE
We likewise take notice of the high-handed manner in which respondent dealt with
Commissioner Cunanan during the July 4, 2002 hearing, when the former was expected to
settle his obligation with complainant. We cannot countenance the discourtesy of
respondent. He should be reminded that the IBP has disciplinary authority over him by
virtue of his membership therein. 15
Thus, it was imperative for him to respect the authority of the officer assigned to
investigate his case. Assuming that he had a very important personal matter to attend to,
he could have politely explained his predicament to the investigating commissioner and
asked permission to leave immediately. Unfortunately, the former showed dismal behavior
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by raising his voice and leaving without the consent of complainant and the investigating
commissioner.
We stress that membership in the legal profession is a privilege. 1 6 It demands a high
degree of good moral character, not only as a condition precedent to admission, but also
as a continuing requirement for the practice of law. 17 In this case, respondent fell short of
the exacting standards expected of him as a guardian of law and justice. 18
Accordingly, administrative sanction is warranted by his gross misconduct. The IBP Board
of Governors recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for two years.
However, in line with Co v. Bernardino, 19 Ducat Jr. v. Villalon Jr. 20 and Saburnido v.
Madroño 2 1 — which also involved gross misconduct of lawyers — we find the suspension
of one year sufficient in this case.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Robert W. Medel is found guilty of gross misconduct and is hereby
SUSPENDED for one year from the practice of law, effective upon his receipt of this
Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt with more
severely.
Let copies of this Decision be entered in the record of respondent and served on the IBP,
as well as on the court administrator who shall circulate it to all courts for their information
and guidance.
SO ORDERED. ScCEIA
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Corona,
Carpio Morales, Callejo, Sr. and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Quisumbing and Austria-Martinez, JJ., is on official leave.
Footnotes
7. Id., pp. 77-79. The case was deemed submitted for decision on February 1, 2003, for
failure of respondent to file an appeal of the IBP-CBD Board of Governors' Resolution No.
XV-2002-598.
8. IBP-CBD's Report, p. 2; rollo, p. 78.
9. Ibid.
10. Resolution No. XV-2002-598; rollo, p. 76.
11. Maligsa v. Atty. Cabanting, 338 Phil 912, May 14, 1997.
12. Ibid; Co v. Bernardino, AC No. 3919, January 28, 1998; Nakpil v. Valdes, 286 SCRA 758,
March 4, 1998; Calub v. Suller, 323 SCRA 556, January 28, 2000; Cruz v. Jacinto, 328
SCRA 636, March 22, 2000.
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13. People v. Tuanda, 181 SCRA 692, January 30, 1990; citing Lozano v. Martinez, 146
SCRA 324, 338 & 340, December 18, 1996.
14. Supra, per Bellosillo, J.
15. Toledo v. Abalos, 315 SCRA 419, September 29, 1999.
16. Dumadag v. Lumaya, 334 SCRA 513, June 29, 2000; Arrieta v. Llosa, 346 Phil. 932,
November 28, 1997; NBI v. Reyes, 326 SCRA 109, February 21, 2000.
17. Nakpil v. Valdes, supra; Rayos-Ombac v. Rayos; 285 SCRA 93, January 28, 1998; Co v.
Bernardino, supra; Igual v. Javier, 324 Phil. 698, March 7, 1996.
18. Radjaie v. Alovera, 337 SCRA 244, August 4, 2000.
19. Supra.
20. 337 SCRA 622, August 14, 2000.
21. 366 SCRA 1, September 26, 2001.