8.

) Dormitorio vs Fernandez

Doctrine: A final executory judgment of a trial court may be novated by subsequent

Facts:

 Municipality of Victorias owns several parcels of lands in Victorias, Negros

 On Dec. 7, 1948, Lazalita bought Lot No. 1, Block 16 w/an area of 230 sq. meters.
Upon full payment, a deed of definite sale and a certificate of title were executed in
favor of buyer. He possessed the land for 8 continuous years & he introduced
permanent & valuable improvements thereon.

 1955: Sps Dormitorio bought Lot No. 2, Block 16 from the Municipality w/an area of
343 sq.meters. They were able to obtain a transfer Certificate of Title although they
have not taken actual possession of said property. They subsequently filed an
ejectment suit against Lazalita. Upon investigation, it was discovered that the land
originally bought by Lazalita was converted into a municipal road (Jover St.) and the
lot he was occupying actually belonged to the sps.

 CFI Ruling: ordered Lazalita to vacate the place & pay a monthly rental of P20.00 to
Dormitorio. (1961)

 Lazalita’s contention for appealing: he filed a case against the Municipality since
the value of his permanent improvements & building introduced/constructed on the
Dormitorios’ lot have far exceeded the original purchase price of the land. Based on
the land’s fair market value, it is now saleable at present at P20.00/sq. meter.

 The Municipality’s answer: The Municipality agreed to amicably settle the case by
giving Lazalita another lot if they could open their newly proposed subdivision or pay
him back the amount necessary & just for him to acquire another lot for his
residence & for the expenses of transferring his present residential house thereto.

 Important fact: The parties in the ejectment case agreed that the decision in that
case would no longer be enforced & executed in relation to the amicable settlement
reached by Lazalita & the municipality. In 1965, the parties agreed and submitted an
"Agreed Stipulation of Facts" before the court. Accordingly, judgment was
rendered based on the same.

 Thereafter, the Dormitorios filed a writ of execution for the enforcement of the earlier
judgment by the Court ordering Lazalita to pay 20 pesos monthly rental and to
vacate said property.
 The petition was granted. However, Judge Fernandez set aside said writ of
execution on the ground that it was obtained by means of fraud,
misrepresentation and concealment of the true facts of the case by making it
appear that the case was still enforceable (even if it had already been novated by
a subsequent agreement by the parties). It found out that the said order was
granted based on a decision of the Court on Sept. 5, 1961 (prior to the Agreed
Stipulation of Facts submitted by both parties on Feb. 12, 1965)

Issue:
W/N there is novation in the case

Held:

Yes, there is novation in the case.

The agreement filed by the parties in the ejectment case created as between them new
rights and obligations which naturally superseded the judgment of the municipal court.

Under the law (Art. 1292) , the compromise agreement created obligations between the
parties w/c naturally superseded the judgment of the municipal court. Therefore, the
judge properly set aside the writ of execution mistakenly issued.

In this case, the presence of animus novandi is undeniable nor is there anything novel
in such an approach. When after judgment has become final, facts & circumstances
transpire w/c render its execution impossible/unjust, the interested party may ask the
court to modify/alter the judgment to harmonize the same w/justice & the facts (Moilna
vs .de la Riva). In this case, we have a stronger case since there is a later decision
expressly superseding the decision in the ejectment case.

There is no merit likewise to the point raised by petitioners that they were not informed
by respondent Judge of the petition by private respondent to set aside the writ of
execution. The order granting such petition was the subject of a motion for
reconsideration. 16 The motion for reconsideration was thereafter denied. 17 Under the
circumstances, the failure to give notice to petitioners had been cured. That is a well-
settled doctrine. 18 Their complaint was that they were not heard. They were given the
opportunity to file a motion for reconsideration. So they did. That was to free the order
from the alleged infirmity. Petitioners then cannot be heard to claim that they were
denied procedural due process.
Full case:

G.R. No. L-25897 August 21, 1976

AGUSTIN DORMITORIO and LEONCIA D. DORMITORIO, petitioner

Graciano H. Arinday, Jr. for petitioners.

Antonio L. Balinas for respondent.

FERNANDO, Acting C.J.:

The filing of this suit for certiorari could have been avoided had there full awareness by petitioners of
the legal import and significance of a later decision involving the parties. If such were the case, they
would have realized that no grave abuse of discretion, no abuse of discretion for that matter, could
be imputed to respondent Judge for issuing the challenged order, setting aside a writ of execution
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conformably to a petition for relief by private respondent Serafin Lazalita. Insofar as pertinent, it is
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worded thus: "That the above-mentioned order of Execution to be set aside is based on the decision
of the Honorable Court dated September 5, 1961 in the above-entitled case which is no longer
enforceable, and executory by virtue of the "Agreed Stipulation of Facts" entered into by the Plaintiffs
and Defendants in Civil Case No. 6553, and which said "Agreed Stipulation of Facts" was the basis
for the judgment of the Honorable Court dated February 12, 1965. That the parties and subject
matter in Civil Case No. 5111 and Civil Case No. 6553 are the same except that the plaintiffs in Civil
Case No. 5111 were the defendants in Civil Case No. 6553, and vice-versa; ... That in the "Agreed
Stipulation of Facts" in Civil Case No. 6553 which was the basis of the Honorable Court judgment
dated February 12, 1965, it was agreed by the defendant spouses Dormitorio, who are the plaintiffs
in Civil Case No. 5111 that the defendant Serafin Lazalita should be reimbursed for his expenses in
transferring his house to another Lot to be assigned to him by the Municipality of Victorias, and that
the Decision in Civil Case No. 5111 shall not be enforced and executed anymore; That by means
of fraud, misrepresentation and concealment of the true facts of the case, the plaintiffs were able to
mislead the Honorable Court, thru an Ex-Parte Motion to issue by mistake an Order for the issuance
of a Writ of Execution by making this Honorable Court believe that the Decision of September 5,
1961 is still enforceable and executory; ..." Respondent Judge granted the relief prayed for and set
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aside the writ of execution, in view of the conclusion reached by him that such later decision, arrived
at as the result of a compromise between the same parties, evidenced by the agreed stipulation of
facts, was clear proof of an animus novandi and thus superseded the previous judgment which as a
result of an ex parte motion was mistakenly ordered executed. Such a conclusion is borne out by a
study of the records of the case. certiorari does not lie.

The decision in the aforecited Civil Case No. 6553, which as contended by private respondent, a
submission that earned the approval of respondent Judge, sufficed for the lifting of the writ of
execution, pursuant to the decision in Civil Case No. 5111 deemed superseded, started with a
stipulation of facts. Thus: "When this case was called for hearing the parties submitted an Agreed
Stipulation of Facts duly signed by the parties and their respective counsel, as follows: "[Agreed
Stipulation of Facts]," Come now the parties, in the above-entitled case, represented by their
respective counsel and before this Honorable Court, respectfully submit the following agreed
stipulation of facts: 1. That the defendant Municipality of Victorias, is the owner of several parcels of
lands in Victorias, Negros Occidental, known as Lots Nos. 102 and 120 and 138 and 102-New,
which [are] consolidated and subdivided into small lots for sale to the inhabitants thereof; the lots
were sold by the Municipality, either in cash or installment for ten (10) years at [one peso] (P1.00)
per square meter; 2. That on December 7, 1948, the plaintiff Serafin Lazalita, bought from the
Municipality of Victorias, Lot No. 1, Block 16 of the consolidated-subdivision plan PCs-118 having an
area of Two Hundred Thirty (230) Square Meters, payable in installment at [one peso] (P1.00) per
square meter, and in the year 1958, upon full payment by plaintiff Lazalita of the purchase price of
the land, a deed of definite sale was executed in his favor by the then Municipal Mayor Montinola of
Victorias, Negros Occidental, and thereafter a Certificate of Title No. T-23098 covering the property,
was issued him by the Register of Deeds of Bacolod, Negros Occidental; 3. That from February 7,
1948, until about eight continuous years thereafter, plaintiff had been in full and peaceful possession
of the said land, and he introduced permanent and valuable improvements thereon, [namely] fruit
trees, like coconuts, avocados, pumelos and oranges, which have long been fruit bearing, and built a
house of strong materials, valued at P5,000.00; 4. That plaintiff Lazalita, was placed in possession of
the said Lot No. 1, Block 16 of the subdivision plan of Victorias, by the persons designated by the
Municipality to take charge of the sale of said lots to the people, and from the time, he had occupied
by same, up to the present, there has not been a change in the location thereof, as described in the
Certificate of Title covering the property, now registered in plaintiff's name; 5. That about the year
1955, however, the other co-defendants herein — the spouses Agustin Dormitorio and Leoncia D.
Dormitorio, purchased also, from the defendant Municipality of Victorias, their lot known as Lot 2,
Block 16, of the same consolidation-subdivision plan PCs-118, having an area of Three Hundred
Forty-Three (343) Square meters, in cash, at [one peso) (P1.00) per square meter. Immediately
thereafter, the Dormitorios, obtained a transfer Certificate of Title known as T-18189 for their
property, from the Office of the Register of Deeds, Bacolod, Negros Occidental. However, the
spouses Dormitorio, have not taken actual possession of the land, they have purchased from the
defendant Municipality of Victorias, up to the present; 6. That on December 12, 1958, the spouses
Dormitorio, brought a suit against the plaintiff Lazalita, for Ejectment and the conflict between them
was made known to the office of the Municipal Mayor and the Council of Victorias, who tried to settle
the matter between the parties — Dormitorio and Lazalita. Later, a private Land Surveyor, was hired
by the Municipality of Victorias, and it was found out, according to said Surveyor, Mr. Ceballos, that
the Lot sold by the Municipality of Victorias, to the plaintiff, was converted into the new Municipal.
Road known as "Jover Street" and that the lot presently occupied by him, is supposed to be the lot
No. 2, bought by the spouses Dormitorio from the Municipality of Victorias; and so, availing of the
said discovery, the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch V, Presided over by Hon.
Jose F. Fernandez, rendered judgment in that case No. 5111, in favor of Dormitorio, ordering the
plaintiff herein Lazalita, to vacate the land and to pay a monthly rental of P20.00, to said Dormitorio,
besides his Attorney's fees; 7. That Lazalita, having failed to appeal from said judgment in Civil Case
No. 5111 of this Honorable Court, brought this present action, against the Municipality of Victorias,
and joined the Dormitorios, as formal parties, because of the value of his permanent improvements
and building introduced or constructed on Lot No. 2, Block 16, ascertained to be that, very lot
purchased by Dormitorio from the defendant Municipality of Victorias, which building and
improvements, have far exceed then, the original purchase price of the land; 8. That the present fair
market value of residential lots in the Poblacion of Victorias, ranges between P15.00 to P25.00 per
square meter and the lots in controversy, are saleable at present, at P20.00 per square meter; 9.
That the Municipality of Victorias, under the present administration, is willing to amicably settle the
case, now before this Honorable Court, by giving the plaintiff another lot, if they could open their
newly proposed subdivision, or pay back Lazalita the amount necessary and just for plaintiff to
acquire another lot for his residence, and for the expenses of transferring his present residential
house thereto. ....:" Then, as noted in the decision, the parties did respectfully pray "that judgment
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be rendered by this Honorable Court, on the basis of the foregoing agreed stipulation of facts, and
on such other basis just and equitable, without special pronouncement of costs." So it was granted
5
in the dispositive portion of such decision: "[Wherefore], judgment is hereby rendered in accordance
with the above-mentioned Agreed Stipulation of Facts." 6

grave abuse of discretion when he set aside the writ of execution is thus clearly apparent. He had no
choice on the matter. That was made even more evident in the answer to the petition filed by
respondents. It must have been the realization by petitioners that certiorari certainly did not lie that
led to their not only failing to make an attempt at a refutation of what was asserted in the answer but
also failing to appear at the hearing when this case was set for oral argument. As noted at the
outset, this petition must be dismissed.

1. What was done by respondent Judge in setting aside the writ of execution in Civil Case No. 5111
finds support in the applicable authorities. There is this relevant excerpt in Barretta v. Lopez, this
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Court speaking through the then Chief Justice Paras: "Alleging that the respondent judge of the
municipal court had acted in excess of her jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in issuing
the writ of execution of December 15, 1947, the petitioner has filed the present petition for certiorari
and prohibition for the purpose of having said writ of execution annulled. Said petition is meritorious.
The agreement filed by the parties in the ejectment case created as between them new rights and
obligations which naturally superseded the judgment of the municipal court." In Santos v. Acuña, it
8 9

was contended that a lower court decision was novated by subsequent agreement of the parties.
Implicit in this Court's ruling is that such a plea would merit approval if indeed that was what the
parties intended. Nonetheless, it was not granted, for as explained by the ponente, Justice J. B. L.
Reyes: "Appellants understood and expressly agreed to be bound by this condition, when they
stipulated that "they will voluntarily deliver and surrender possession of the premises to the plaintiff
in such event" ... Hence, it is plain that in no case were the subsequent arrangements entered into
with any unqualified intention to discard or replace the judgment in favor of the plaintiff-appellee; and
without such intent or animus novandi, no substitution of obligations could possibly take
place." Can there be any doubt that if it could be shown, as it was in this case, that there was such
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clear manifestation of will by the parties, the original decision had lost force and effect? To ask the
question is to answer it. The presence of the animus novandi is undeniable. Nor is there anything
novel in such an approach. So it was noted by then Chief Justice Concepcion in De los Santos v.
Rodriguez: "As early as Molina v. De la Riva the principle has been laid down that, when, after
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judgment has become final, facts and circumstances transpire which render its execution impossible
or unjust, the interested party may ask the court to modify or alter the judgment to harmonize the
same with justice and the facts" Molina v. de la Riva was a 1907 decision. Again, the present
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case is far stronger, for there is a later decision expressly superseding the earlier one relied upon on
which the writ of execution thereafter set aside was based.

2. Nor can it be denied that as the later decision in Civil Case No. 6553 was the result of a
compromise, it had the effect of res judicata. This was made clear in Salazar v. Jarabe. There are
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later decisions to the same effect. The parties were, therefore, bound by it. There was thus an
15

element of bad faith when petitioners did try to evade its terms. At first, they were quite successful.
Respondent Judge, however, upon being duly informed, set matters right. He set aside the writ of
execution. That was to act in accordance with law. He is to be commended, not condemned.

3. There is no merit likewise to the point raised by petitioners that they were not informed by
respondent Judge of the petition by private respondent to set aside the writ of execution. The order
granting such petition was the subject of a motion for reconsideration. The motion for
16

reconsideration was thereafter denied. Under the circumstances, the failure to give notice to
17

petitioners had been cured. That is a well-settled doctrine. Their complaint was that they were not
18

heard. They were given the opportunity to file a motion for reconsideration. So they did. That was to
free the order from the alleged infirmity. Petitioners then cannot be heard to claim that they were
denied procedural due process.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed. Costs against petitioners.