Demythologizing - The Problem of Myth in The New Testament

CHAPTER XV
DEMYTHOLOGIZING - THE PROBLEM OF MYTH

IN THE NEW TESTAMENT*
James D. G. Dunn
The subject of myth is a vast and complex one. To do it justice one would
require an all-embracing competence in such diverse fields as early Greek
literature and drama, the comparative study of religion, anthropology, psy-
choanalysis and the philosophy of history. It is important, however, that the
problem of myth in the NT- that is whether there is myth in the NT, and if
so what the NT exegete does with it - should not be tackled on too narrow a
front, but rather should be set in the wider context of the investigation and
treatment of myth in other disciplines. We shall first therefore briefly ex-
amine the concept of myth in general (I); we should then hopefully be in a
better position to evaluate the various claims made over the past 150 years
or so that mythological thinking and particular myths have decisively in-
fluenced the NT writers in their presentation of the salvation event of Jesus
Christ- particularly the key contributions of D. F. Strauss (11), the History
of Religions school (Ill) and R. Bultmann (IV).
I. The Problem of Definition

The basic problem of myth is the problem of definition. There are two
questions here: (1) What is myth? Is the word "myth" a hold-all for a wide
diversity of meanings, or should its use be restricted as a narrowly defined
technical term - clearly marked off, for example, from legend and saga, folk
tale and fairy tale, symbol and analogy? (2) What is the function of myth;
what does myth do? Or, as I prefer to put the question, What is the truth of
myth? Does one remain at the level of explicit statement and story? Or is
the truth of myth implicit - a subconscious and unintended disclosure of the
nature of man and his world?
(1) What is myth? "There is no one definition of myth, no Platonic form
of a myth against which all actual instances can be measured." 1 The prob-
lem of definition extends back to the original usage of the word pv801;. In
terms of etymology it means simply "word" or "story". And in early Greek
literature its meaning can range from a "true story", "an account of facts",
and so "fact" itself, to an invented story, a legend, fairy story, fable or poetic
creation. 2 But in later Greek thought mythos came to stand in antithesis
both to logos (rational thought) and historia, and so came to denote "what
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NEW TESTAMENT INTERPRETATION
cannot really exist". In a western Europe conscious of its Graeco-Roman

heritage it was inevitable that this sense of "myth" should be determinative,
so that in the 19th century "myth" usually meant anything that was op-
posed to reality. For the same reason it was probably inevitable that the
term should become attached primarily to the ancient stories of the Greeks
- the stories of Prometheus, Perseus, Heracles, etc. - so that the "classical"
(and still popular) meaning of myth is a fabulous, untrue story about gods
(or demi-gods) set at the dawn of time or in a timeless past.
In the 19th and 20th centuries however the concept of myth has been
thrown back into the melting pot, and its meaning and the precise demarca-
tion of its meaning are the subject of a vigorous and ongoing debate. In his
recent essay on the subject W. Pannenberg distinguishes three main com-
peting views. 3 (a) "Myth" as used by anthropologists and comparative
religionists - that is, myth as a story whose subject is the primal age and
whose function is to provide a basis for the present world and social order in
that primordial time - what M. Eliade calls "archetypal history". "Myth
narrates a sacred history; it relates an event that took place in primordial
time, the fabled time of the 'beginnings'." 4 (b) Myth as defined originally by
C. G. Heyne - myth, that is, as a primitive conceptual form, the "mode of
conception and expression" in the childhood of the human race, exposing
the structure of primitive consciousness as yet untouched by modern
science; such mythical thought has been rendered obsolete by modern
science. As we shall see, it is this concept of myth which has dominated the
debate about demythologizing within NT hermeneutics. 5 (c) Myth as
poetry, myth as belonging to a sphere where it is judged by standards other
than that of its understanding of the world, myth as symbol and drama able
to awake feeling, "invite thought" and evoke response. 6
When we turn to the problem of myth in the NT we must bear in mind
this diversity of meaning of the word "myth" and not permit any one defini-
tion to determine and answer the problem from the outset.
(2) What is the truth of myth? The paradox of a word which could mean
both "fact" and "invented story" did not escape the Greeks, and the
problem of the truth content of myth was one which tested the finest minds
of the ancient world as it does today. Above all we should mention Plato.
Plato was openly critical of traditional myth, though he allowed that the best
of them, even if false (tpeti8o~) had a value in teaching children~ More impor-
tant, he recognized that mythical thought was an indispensable complement
to rational thought (logos). "Myth carries the lines of logos organically
beyond the frontiers of conceptual knowledge . . . It arises when there is
need to express something which can be expressed in no other way." 8
In the modern discussion about the truth of myth many answers have
been proposed. The following are probably the most important. (a) The
dominant view among anthropologists at the turn of the century (E. B.
Tylor, J. G. Frazer, etc.) was that myth only tells us something about
primitive man, how he speculated about the heavens and the annual cycle of
nature and fertility, how he handled his fears of the unknown (particularly
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DEMYTHOLOGIZING - THE PROBLEM OF MYTH IN THE NEW TESTAMENT
death and beyond), how he conceptualized the mysterious in his present ex-
perience (gods, demons, spirits), how he sought to control and manipulate
these powers by ritual magic, and so on. (b) Closely associated with the first
was the view that myth fulfilled a legitimation function: that myth originated
from ritual and its truth lay in legitimizing the cult (W. Robertson-Smith), or
the broader idea of "charter myth" - a story used to assert and justify a
tribe's rights, loyalties and beliefs and lacking any deeper meaning (B.
Malinowski). 9 (c) More recently the recognition of the importance of
dreams in psychoanalysis has led to the understanding of myth as the ex-
pression of the subconscious, the archetypal images rising from the depths
of man often drawing on the psychic heritage of centuries and so telling us
something about man as he is. "Myth is the natural and indispensable in-
termediate stage between unconscious and conscious cognition." "Myths
are original revelations of the preconscious psyche, involuntary statements
about unconscious psychic happenings." 10 (d) Somewhat analogous is the
structuralist definition of the French anthropologist C. Levi-Strauss who
holds that the true "message" of myth is nothing to do with content as such;
myth is rather a piece of algebra about the workings of the human mind in
the abstract. Levi-Strauss believes that the structure of all myths is identical
with that of the human mind: human thought is a process of binary analysis;
so myth is a model whereby the binary divisions in society, the contradic-
tions in man's view of the world (between village and jungle, male and
female, life and death, earth and sky, etc.) can be resolved and overcome. In
a phrase, myth reveals man striving to create order out of the contradictions
in which he finds himselfinvolved. 11 (e) A fifth understanding of the truth of
myth may be termed the poetic view - myth as the expression of a whole
area of human experience and awareness, of (universal) values and truths,
that can only be presented in symbolic language, what K. Jaspers calls "the
cipher language of myth" 12 - myth as the poet's awareness of a
"moreness" to life than eating, sleeping, working, loving, without wishing or
attempting to define that "moreness" except by means of evocative images
and symbols. 13 (f) A sixth view is that at least some myth is the expression
of distinctively religious experience, that ultimately myth is not merely
man's response to what he thinks of as divine, but is itself somehow
revelatory of the divine. Thus "stories about gods" may not always simply
be the expression of primitive, unscientific conceptualization but may rather
in the first instance be the product of religious consciousness, "the vestibule
at the threshold of the real religious feeling, an earliest stirring of the
numinous consciousness". 14 So too the "which came first?" controversy in
the myth-ritual debate may be wrongly conceived, since the roots of both
myth and ritual may lie in primitive man's attempts to express an irreducibly
religious experience. Or in Jung's words.
"No science will ever replace myth, and a myth cannot be made out of any
science. For it is not that 'God' is a myth, but that myth is the revelation of a
divine life in man. It is not we who invent myth, rather it speaks to us as a Word
ofGod." 15
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The primary problem of myth is therefore the problem of definition. As

we narrow the focus of discussion to the NT, we must constantly ask of
those who postulate the presence of myth in the NT, What kind of myth?
Myth in what sense? Above all we must bear in mind that mythical thinking
can move on different levels: myths as consciously invented stories intended
merely to give pleasure or to serve a legitimation function; myths as
primitive conceptualizations of reality now wholly superseded by the ad-
vance of scientific investigation, though perhaps still retaining a power to
evoke and move particularly by their repetition in the cult; 16 myth as a
veiled window into the reality of man, whether into the structure of his mind
or into the depths of his collective subconscious, or as an expression of his
values and aspirations; 17 myth as man's conscious or unconscious
perception of a "beyondness" in his experience of reality, which comes to
him with the force of inspiration or revelation, which can be expressed only
by means of symbol and image and analogy, and which may neither un-
critically nor unscientifically be taken as prima facie evidence of an on-
tological reality which is "larger" and more complex than our scientific in-
vestigations have so far recognized. 18 If myth or mythological thinking is
present in the NT we must not assume that it moves only on one level and
not another, but must always ask, What is the function, what is the truth of
this myth? in each individual instance.
11. The Problem of Miracle - D. F. Strauss

Is there myth in the NT? Insofar as NT writers take up the question the
answer is a blunt and unequivocal No! The word itself is found only five
times (1 Tim. 1:4; 4:7; 2 Tim. 4:4; Tit. 1:14; 2 Pet. 1:16).and in every case
the writers completely repudiate myth. For these writers myths are invented
and untrue stories, whether Hellenistic speculations about divine emanations
or more Jewish speculative interpretations ofOT stories. Myth is unreal, un-
true, unhistorical, in contrast to the reality, truth and historicity of the
gospel. What is rejected here, however, is only one genre of myth. The ques-
tion of whether other levels of myth and of mythological thinking are pre-
sent in the NT is neither posed nor answered.
Subsequent attempts to wrestle with the problem at this deeper level
reveal something of its complexity. I am referring here to the long and
respected tradition of biblical interpretation by means of allegorizing. For by
turning to allegory the allegorizer expresses his dissatisfaction with the ob-
vious meaning of the biblical text (it is unedifying, outmoded, or whatever)
and seeks for a deeper meaning. That is to say, he treats the biblical
narrative as a type of myth whose literal meaning can be disregarded and
whose truth can be extracted by the methods of allegorical exegesis. This
was certainly the way Philo used the OT. So too the Alexandrians {par-
ticularly Origen), even though they rejected the charges of opponents that
the biblical accounts are in fact myths, nevertheless by using allegorical in-
terpretation treated the Bible in effect as a collection of myths. 19
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DEMYTHOLOGIZING- THE PROBLEM OF MYTH IN THE NEW TESTAMENT
In the 19th century the problem of myth re-emerged with disconcerting

sharpness as the problem of miracle; or to be more precise, with D. F.
Strauss myth was given a central and positive role in the NT as the decisive
answer to the problem of miracle. For much of the 18th and 19th centuries
the question of miracle stood at the storm centre of theological debate. For
many the truth of Christianity stood or fell with the historicity or otherwise
of the biblical miracles 20 - not unnaturally since for centuries Christian
apologetic had presented the miracles of the Bible as sure proof of the super-
natural origin of and divine approval for Christianity. But post-Enlighten-
ment man, with his growing scientific knowledge of the cosmos and his high
regard for the perspicacity and sufficiency of reason, found the very concept
of miracle less and less satisfactory: the laws of nature, the chain reaction of
cause and effect, could not be violated and suspended in the way "miracle"
supposed; God would not work in such an arbitrary and unreasonable
manner. Miracle ceased to be an aid to apologetic and became instead an
embarrassment and a problem.
This is Strauss's starting point for his minute investigation of the events of
Jesus' life. 21 Since miracles are incompatible with natural law (and with
reason) they are incompatible with history; and since miracles are incom-
patible with history, then the Gospels are not historical records. What is the
status of the Gospel narratives then? Strauss's answer is simple: they are
myths. What does Strauss mean by myth? As his negative assessment of the
Gospels shows the influence of post-Enlightenment rationalism, so his
positive assessment shows the influence of German idealism. For Strauss
myth is the expression or embodiment of an idea; it is the form in which the
idea is apprehended. 22 In the case of the Gospels, myth is the expression of
the first Christians' idea of Christ- an idea shaped partly by Jewish expec-
tations concerning the Messiah and partly by the "particular impression
which was left by the personal character, actions and fate of Jesus". It was
this idea of Christ which gave rise to the accounts of miracles in the
Gospels; the miraculous element in any recorded event was created out of
23
or by the idea. Some of these accounts are pure myths - that is, they have
no historical foundation whatsoever: for example, the cures of the blind, the
feeding of the 5,000, and the transfiguration, which all grew out of the dis-
ciples' belief that Jesus was Messiah, the one greater than Moses and Elijah
according to Jewish expectation. 24 Others are historical myths- that is, a
historical fact overgrown with mythical conceptions culled from the idea of
Christ: for example, :'Peter's miraculous draught of fishes [Luke 5.1-11] is
but the expression about the fishers of men [Mark 1.1 7] transmuted into the
history of a miracle"; and underlying the now mythically presented baptism
of Jesus is the historical event itself. 25 In a word, myth is an invented,
symbolical scene.
Strauss's contribution to our subject has been epochal and is still fun-
damental to the modern programme of demythologizing. His painstaking
scrutiny of individual narratives, his careful analysis of what the miracle in-
tended by the evangelist would have involved, and his ruthless exposure of
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the shifts and artifices to which rationalist explanations of Gospel miracles

resorted, is without equal in NT scholarship. 26 It is largely due to Strauss
that more recent debates on the historical Jesus have focused on the
teaching of Jesus rather than on his "works". Perhaps above all, Strauss
showed the importance of starting with the text as it stood, and of respecting
the purpose of its author; against those who played down or explained away
a Gospel miracle he insisted that where the writer intended to narrate a
miracle his intention must be taken seriously. Furthermore, he showed that
there are other considerations to be taken into account than simply those of
historicity: the idea of Jesus cherished by early Christianity, or, as we would
say now, their faith in the risen Jesus, must have influenced their representa-
tion of the historical Jesus; simply to ask after the historicity of this or that
episode or detail may be to miss the author's point. 27
At the same time, Strauss's basic statement of the problem of "miracle"
and his use of "myth" cannot escape criticism. In effect he works with the
equation: miracle = story of unnatural/unhistorical event = myth = idea.
But does the equation hold?
(1) To define miracle as "a transgression of a law of nature ... "
(Hume),28 or even to judge an event "irreconcilable with the known and un-
iversal laws which govern the course of events" (Strauss) begs too many
questions about natural law. Of course the "law" of cause and effect is ax-
iomatic in all scientific investigation - inevitably so - and its operation can
be easily recognized in such a relatively simple case as one billiard ball strik-
ing another. But whenever we are dealing with human relationships or the
relation between the physical world (especially the body) and the psyche
(including such unquantifiables as temperament, will-power, purpose) the
matter is more complex. What is and what causes a decision? What is the
scientific explanation of love and does it begin to do its subject justice? Is
the pleasure and uplift I experience at hearing Beethoven's Eroica
Symphony merely the effect of certain sound waves on my ear drum? And
so on. The "chemistry of human relationship" raises the question of other or
complementary causes which are less determinable than (other) "natural
laws". Such considerations become all the more important when one is dis-
cussing the impact of a charismatic figure such as Jesus. 29 And if this line of
reasoning were pursued it would also become possible to postulate divine
activity in a "miracle" even though the closed weft of history and the con-
tinuum of cause and effect as it presents itself to objective observation is left
undisturbed.30
Consequently, we must question any definition of miracle which sets God
as cause over against the natural world in a dualistic way, so that any effect
attributed to God must be described in terms of "violation" or "interven-
tion". For all the sophistication of our understanding of the universe how far
in fact have we passed beyond the threshold of knowledge of reality in all its
complexity and depth? After all, at the time Strauss was writing his Life of
Jesus, Michael Faraday was only beginning to recognize the nature of elec-
tro-magnetic waves with his talk of "lines of force" and conception of a sort
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of cosmic cobweb of electrical forces - a comparatively recent discovery in

the history of scientific investigation. What other sources of energy and
"lines of force" (particularly in relation to the human personality) have we
yet to discover simply because we have not yet been able to conceptualize
and measure them? I think here, for example, of such parapsychological
phenomena as telepathy and levitation, claims concerning which have been
made for centuries and yet have still been too little investigated. 31 Perhaps
after all reality consists of a sort of intermeshing of physical, psychical and
spiritual forces in a cosmic pattern of which only a few threads at present
are visible, not least in the human being himself, so that, for example, the
concept of "demon-possession" regains in status as the first century's
recognition of the complex forces (not least spiritual) which bear upon the
human personality (to put it no more strongly). Such a conceptualization of
reality can be maintained without lapsing into pantheism or denying the
"otherness" of God. 32
(2) Moving to the other end of Strauss's equation, it is evident that there
are two central characteristics of his concept of myth: myth is the narrative
of an unhistorical event; myth is the embodiment of an idea. These two
characteristics are the two sides of the one coin: where an account is un-
historical (evidenced by historical improbabilities and inconsistencies) there
is a mythical idea; where there is myth (evidenced for instance by poetic
form or messianic ideas) there is no history. Idea (myth) and history are
mutually exclusive.
But this dualism between history and idea (or as we would say today,
between history and faith) is too sharp.
(a) Are all accounts of miracles to be explained as inventions to embody
ideas? What, we might ask, are the ideas which created the stories of
miracles attributed to the other Galilean(?) charismatics, Honi the
Circle-Drawer (Ist century B.C.) and Hanina ben Dosa (Ist century
A.D.)? 33 Perhaps these stories testify to nothing more than the imgination
of the story tellers of the Galilean bazaars and market places. But more
likely they testify to some sort of historical feats on the part of Honi and
Hanina which gave rise to their reputations. So too with Jesus. For the
earliest Christians the most probable source for many of the accounts of
Jesus' miracles would be the recollections of episodes in Jesus' ministry cir-
culating in Galilee and among his first admirers and disciples. 34
(b) Are history and idea (faith) mutually exclusive? No doubt post-Easter
faith is discernible at many points in the miracle stories (see note 27), but
has it created the whole, or is it merely hindsight? Strauss himself recogniz-
ed that Jesus' role as an exorcist cannot be disputed on historical or literary
grounds, 35 but in his view historical improbability tells against the historicity
of other cures attributed to Jesus. 36 Yet he fails to take account of the fact
that Jesus himself appealed to a much wider range of healings, and that it
was Jesus who saw them as evidence of the presence of the blessings of the
end-time (Matt. 11 :5/Luke 7:22). 37 Idea and history are here united by
Jesus himself1 If we took this point in conjunction with the considerations
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marshalled above (p. 290f.) and pursued the argument at greater length than
this paper permits, even the so-called nature miracles would become much
less clear cut in terms of strict historical improbability, 38 and in particular
the possibility would begin to gain in strength that the transformation in
Jesus' mode of existence which we call "resurrection" was not so much an
exception to natural law as a paradigm of the inter-relationship of physical
and spiritual, a partial glimpse of the overall pattern of persons and things.
(c) The logic of Strauss's dualism between history and idea is worked out
to its conclusion when Strauss attempts to reduce christology to the idea of
God-manhood, an idea embodied in Christ but only mythically not
historically, an idea realized only in (an idealized view oO Humanity. 3" Here
Strauss's Hegelian idealism comes to full flower, only to wither before the
blast of man's inhumanity to man, since he has so completely cut it off from
the one historical root that could give it sustenance.
All this does not demonstrate the historicity of any one miracle attributed
to Jesus. But hopefully enough has been said to show that Strauss's flight
from history at this point was premature, and that his posing of the
problems of miracle and myth in the NT was inadequate. "Myth" (in
Strauss's sense) and "miracle" are not synonymous.
Ill. The Influence of Jewish and Hellenistic Myths

At the turn of the century the problem of myth in Christianity was posed
in a new form by the History of Religions school. 40 Already at the time of
Strauss the growing awareness of other religions had brought home the
significance of the fact that in laying claim to various miracle stories
Christianity was not at all unique. Even before Strauss the conclusion had
been drawn that if these other stories are to be judged unhistorical myths,
the same verdict cannot be withheld from the biblical accounts of creation,
virgin birth, etc. But in the latter part of the 19th century and early 20th cen-
tury various influential scholars came to the conclusion that not only did
Christianity have its own myths, but in fact Christianity had been
significantly influenced at its formative stage by particular myths of other
religions; indeed, the plainly mythical thinking of other systems had
decisively shaped Christian faith and worship at key points. The chief
sources of influence were thought to be the myths of Jewish apocalyptic, of
Gnosticism and of Hellenistic mystery religions.
(I) Jewish apocalyptic thought can justifiably be labelled mythical- par-
ticularly its concept of an end-time and new age qualitatively different from
this age (restoration of primeval paradise, Zion's glory, etc.) and its por-
trayal of the end in terms of cosmic catastrophe (slaying the dragon of
chaos, stars falling from heaven, etc.). 41 And it would be hard to deny that
Jesus was influenced by apocalyptic thought or that apocalyptic thought
had a constituent part in the theology of the early church (Mark 13 pars;
and 2 Thess. 2:1-12; Rev. 4-21). 42 But in what sense is Jewish and
Christian apocalyptic mythical? Certainly the language of apocalyptic is not
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to be interpreted literally or pedantically, as is clear from the apocalyptists'

use of symbol and cipher (e.g. the "great beasts" and "seventy weeks" of
oan. 7; 9: "that which restrains" and "the breath of his mouth" of 2 Thess.
2; "the lamb" and the beast with the number 666 of Rev. 5; 13). 43 Yet to
describe apocalyptic hopes merely as invented stories created to comfort
believers in time of crisis would be unjust. Rather are they inspired visions of
the future born of confidence in God alone. Thus, for all the mythical
character of its language (for example, the primeval dragon myth in Rev.
12fT, as in lsa. 27:1; 51:9f),44 the general point can be made with some
force that apocalyptic embodies a dissatisfaction with the present and an in-
sight into or revelation of future reality as God's which is integrally and
irreducibly Christian. How else, after all, can hope which is neither rooted in
nor dependent on the present world express itself? 45
(2) The debate about the influence on NT thought of Gnostic motifs, par-
ticularly the pre-Christian Gnostic redeemer myth 46 is long and complex. 47
It must suffice here to note that already there was speculation concerning
the Primal Man at the time of the earliest NT writings (Paul}, that this
speculation is properly described as mythical (myth in the sense of an ac-
count of "archetypal history"), and that Paul's Adam Christology shows
Paul's awareness of it and indeed may not unjustly be described as part of
that first century speculation - though Paul's contribution is distinctively
Christian (1 Cor. 15:44ff; cf. Phil. 2:6ff). 48 Perhaps also Paul's description
of the body of Christ in cosmic terms (Eph. 1: 10, 23) owes something to
gnostic-type thought. Of course Paul has no intention of reducing Christ to
a symbol expressive of community or to a cosmic idea, though what he con-
ceives to be the ontological reality of Christ underlying this image is not
easy to determine. So too if there is anything that can properly be called a
"divine man" christology, related to Primal Man speculation, which can be
said to have influenced the presentation of Jesus as a miracle worker by the
opponents of Paul in 2 Cor. and the earlier collections of miracle stories
used by Mark and John,49 then the point to note is that all three NT writers
provide a sharp corrective by emphasizing that the character of the gospel is
determined by the suffering and death of Jesus.
(3) A central element in many of the major mystery cults at the time
when Christianity came to birth was the (variously represented) myth of the
god who dies and rises again - the myth deriving ultimately in most cases
from the annual cycle of the earth's fertility. The History of Religions school
claimed that initiation to the cult was conceived as an identification of the
initiate with the god in his dying and rising again, and consequently main-
tained that Hellenistic Christianity was strongly influenced by the mysteries,
particularly in its theology of baptism. 50 This interpretation of the mysteries
and hence of their potential influence on Christian thought has been strongly
and justifiably challenged; 51 however, the fact remains that the more we
interpret Paul's view of the sacraments in terms of a conveying or bestowing
of grace or Spirit, the less easy is it to deny the influence on Paul of the
mythical thought of Gnosis or the mysteries. 52
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The impact of the History of Religions school on the problem of myth in

the NT has been considerable and lasting. Indeed the parallels between the
Jesus depicted by NT faith and the Jewish and Hellenistic myths were
thought by some to be so striking that they concluded that Jesus himself was
a mythical construct, nothing more than an amalgam of Jewish messianic
and apocalyptic hopes with the Hellenistic myth of the dying and rising
god. 53 The artificiality and special pleading of such attempts is their own
condemnation. On the contrary, the parallel between Christian faith and
these Jewish and Hellenistic mythical formulations breaks down precisely at
this point. By applying the same sort of (mythical) language to a historical
individual the NT writers in effect demythologize it. This is true even of the
more history-conscious Jewish apocalyptic: Son of man ceases to be merely
a man-like figure (Dan. 7:13 - in contrast to the beast-like figures, 7:2-12)
and becomes Jesus of Nazareth; similarly Joel's apocalyptic hope (including
the "wonders in heaven" and "moon turned to blood") is taken to be fulfilled
by the events of the first Christian Pentecost (Acts 2:16-21). The contrast is
even sharper with the Hellenistic myths. Sallust said of the Attis myth:
"This never happened, but always is." 54 In direct antithesis, the NT writers
proclaim, "This did happen" (Jesus' life, death and resurrection) and only
thereby can the redemption for which the Jewish and Hellenistic world
longed come to historical realization for man now and hereafter. Thus, even
if the same sort of mythical language has been used to describe the "Christ
event" and Christian experience and hope of salvation in the NT, the point
to be noted is that by its reference to Jesus the Hellenistic, unhistorical myth
has been broken and destroyed as myth in that sense. 55 The parallels
between myth-type language in the NT and the particular myths of
Hellenistic religion and philosophy should not blind us to its particular func-
tion and thus distinctive truth within NT Christianity. It is this function and
truth which it is the task of demythologizing to uncover. 56
IV. The Problem of Objectifying God- R. Bultmann

Despite the sharpness of the challenge posed by Strauss and History of
Religions scholars like J. Weiss, W. Heitmiiller and W. Bousset, the domi-
nant theology at the turn of the century (Liberal Protestantism) had been
largely able to shrug off the problem of myth. In the last analysis myth in
the NT was of little consequence since it did not touch the heart of the
gospel proclaimed by Jesus. The problem of miracle could be ignored since
Jesus himself assigned nothing of critical importance to his miraculous
deeds. The problem of Hellenistic influence on Paul could be ignored by
emphasizing the gap between Jesus and Paul. Even the problem of
apocalyptic influence on Jesus could be set aside since apocalyptic was only
the shell and husk of Jesus' message which could be stripped off to uncover
a kernel of timeless moral truth untouched by myth. 57 Rudolf Bultmann
destroyed this comfortable position by denying that gospel and myth could
be distinguished in this fashion. For Bultmann the kerygma is expressed
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OEMYTHOLOGIZING- THE PROBLEM OF MYTH IN THE NEW TESTAMENT
through myth, not alongside it or inside it. The gospel is not somehow
separate and distinct from myth; rather it is embodied in the mythical
language of the NT. To discard the myth is to discard the gospel. With Bult-
mann therefore the problem of myth seems to threaten the gospel itself, and
posed in these terms it touched many raw nerves, sparking off a debate
which has as yet produced no large scale consensus.
Bultmann's whole work has in effect been addressed to different aspects
of this problem, 58 but it was his 1941 lecture which set the present debate in
motion. 59 Here, although his summary statements of the problem are over-
simplified and confusing, his understanding of myth is fairly clearly that of
C. G. Heyne (see above p. 286): viz. myth is a primitive, pre-scientific con-
ceptualization of reality. There are two key characteristics of myth in this
sense: it is incapable of abstract thought and it lacks understanding of the
true causes of natural and mental processes. 60 Evidently in Bultmann's view
NT thought can be described as mythical because it evinces these
characteristics: for example, it represented the other worldly in material,
spatial terms, the cosmos as a three storied structure (underworld, earth,
heaven); and it attributed mental disorders to demons who were everywhere
on earth and causation of events to spiritual powers who controlled the
lower reaches of heaven. In the 20th century we no longer conceive reality
in such terms; with the development of scientific knowledge we cannot: "it is
no longer possible for anyone seriously to hold the New Testament view of
the world" (p.4). 61
The problem is, however, that the gospel in the NT is expressed in these
terms- Jesus' healings as a victory over demons, his death as a triumphing
over the powers, his "ascension" as a literal going up (from second to third
floor), his "parousia" as a literal coming on clouds from above back down
to earth, and so on. What is to be done? We cannot simply cling to the first
century world view - that "would mean accepting a view of the world in our
faith and religion which we should deny in our every day life" (p. 4). Nor
can we reject the myth while preserving the gospel unscathed (pp. 9f, 12).
The correct solution, argues Bultmann, is to demytho/ogize it - that is, not
to eliminate the myth, but to interpret it.
But to demythologize one must have some insight into the truth of the
myth in question. Such an insight Bultmann claims, though the claim itself is
presented in arbitrary manner and on the basis of the undeclared assump-
tion that mythological thinking (all mythological thinking?) 62 is concerned
with precisely the same questions as Bultmann himself.
"The real purpose of myth is not to present an objective picture of the world as it
is, but to express man's understanding of himself in the world in which he lives.
Myth should be interpreted not cosmologically, but anthropologically, or better
still, existentially ... The importance of the New Testament mythology lies not
in its imagery but in the understanding of existence which it enshrines" (pp. lOf.).
Yet though he fails to justify his starting point he does attempt to justify his
procedure. Demythologizing is not simply a matter of reading Heidegger's
existentialism into the NT. On the contrary, the criterion for determining the
295
truth of NT myth is "the understanding of human existence which the New

Testament itself enshrines" (p. 12). 63 Nevertheless, while he does justify his
claim that demythologizing must involve interpretation in existential terms,
it is the "only in existential terms" implicit in his starting point which leaves
him most vulnerable to criticism.
In the second part of the essay he elaborates the NT "understanding of
existence", principally from Paul. And lest his presentation of "the life of
faith" should appear no different from the existentialist philosopher's tal~ of
"authentic existence", 64 he goes on to insist, again in rather arbitrary
manner, that the possibility of such authentic life becomes actual (as distinct
from remaining theoretical) only through "the event of Jesus Christ" (pp.
22-33). This does not mean however that he has retreated once more into
the language and thought forms of the NT. For when he goes on to talk of
the saving event of cross and resurrection it becomes fairly clear that he is
talking in fact of the proclamation of cross and resurrection as saving event,
about saving event in the here and now of existential encounter with the
kerygma:
"To believe in the cross of Christ does not mean to concern ourselves with a
mythical process wrought outside of us and our world, or with an objective event
turned by God to our advantage, but rather to make the cross of Christ our own,
to undergo crucifixion with him' (p. 36). 'The real Easter faith is faith in the word
of preaching which brings illumination" (p. 42). 65
Similarly, in an essay given over to an investigation of the christological
confession of the World Council of Churches, Bultmann maintains that so
far as the NT is concerned statements about Jesus' divinity "are not meant
to express his nature but his significance." 66
The questions raised by all this are legion, and I have already criticized
Bultmann's setting up of the problem at several points; but here we have
space to take up only three issues.
(1) The real problem for Bultmann is not the problem of mythological
language as such, but the problem of any language which objectifies God
(hence the title to this section). It is the problem of what to do with language
which speaks as though God was an object, as though God's activity con-
sisted in objective acts within the space-time complex which were therefore
open to historical investigation and so to verification or falsification, so that
faith would become dependent on the findings of historical and scientific
research. 67 That this was the real problem of NT mythology for Bultmann
was already evident in the 1941 essay, 68 but it became more explicit in his
subsequent restatements of the problem: "Mythological thought ... objec-
tifies the divine activity and projects it on to the plane of worldly
happenings"; "myths give to the transcendent reality an immanent
this-worldly objectivity"; "mythological thinking naively objectifies the
beyond as though it were something within the world." 69 It is because
mythological language is objectifying language and so threatens faith that
demythologizing is necessary.
For the same reasons demythologizing is possible only in terms of ex-
296
istentialist interpretation; only the language of existential encounter enables

Bultmann to speak of God's activity without objectifying it. God acts now;
faith recognizes God acting in the existential encounter of the word of the
cross which addresses me as a word of God, as a word of grace. It is by
wedding faith firmly to the kerygma alone that Bultmann seeks to deliver
faith from the vagaries of historical criticism and from myth. Hence his
claim at the end of the 1941 essay: "It is precisely its immunity from proof
which secures the Christian proclamation against the charge of being
mythological" (p. 44). So too his claim at the end of his later discussions:
"Demythologizing is the radical application of the doctrine of justication by
faith to the sphere of knowledge and thought. Like the doctrine of justifica-
tion, demythologizing destroys every longing for security." 70
But can we equate the problem of myth in the NT so completely with the
problem of objectifying God? And if existentialist interpretation is really ad-
dressed to the latter problem does it provide such a theologically satisfying
answer to the former problem as Bultmann claims? These two questions
provide the cues for my other two comments.
(2) What is NT myth? In the 1941 essay Bultmann defined mythology as
"the use of imagery to express the other worldly in terms of this world and
the divine in terms of human life, the other side in terms of this side" (p. 10
n. 2). This definition was rightly criticized since its concept of myth is too
all-embracing: 71 in particular the definition confuses myth and analogy and
in effect makes it impossible to speak of God at all. 72 Bultmann recognized
this and subsequently attempted to defend the legitimacy of talk of "God as
Creator" in terms of analogy. 73 But as soon as one recognizes that "use of
imagery to express the other worldly in terms of this worldly" can be
legitimate (that is, without objectifying God) - use of metaphor, symbol,
analogy - the question arises, How much of the "mythological language" of
the NT is in fact metaphor, symbol and analogy? Does the "God-talk" of
the NT always imply such a naive and primitive conceptualization as Bult-
mann assumes? We have already noted how the Acts 2 sermon treats the
cosmic spectacle language of Joel 2 as little more than apocalyptic
sound-effects. So we must ask whether the NT writers' concept of the
cosmos was quite so unsophisticated as Bultmann suggests. For example,
the seer of Revelation quite obviously intended his language to be un-
derstood symbolically (see above p. 292f.). And if P .S. Minear is right, "the
prophet was aware of the danger of absolutizing the relative and of
diminishing the inexpressible transcendence of God to the dimensions of his
own creation." 74 Paul certainly thought in the current terms of more than
one heaven, but how he conceptualized them and whether he considered any
language adequate to describe them is another question ("whether in the
body or out of the body I do not know, God knows", "unutterable
utterances" - 2 Cor. 12:2fl); and though he talked of spiritual powers as
real beings in the heavens (e.g. Rom. 8:38; 1 Cor. 2:6, 8; Eph. 6:12), it is
clear that for Paul the "powers" which pose the greatest threat to man are
the personifications, sin, death and law. 75 To take only one or two other
297
examples: was the talk of Jesus' death as sacrifice, of atonement through his
blood, intended as any more than a vigorous metaphor giving a meaningful
way of understanding Jesus' death to hearers long familiar with the practice
of sacrifice, a metaphor, that is, drawn from the life of the times like the cor-
relative metaphors of cleansing, justification, redemption, adoption, etc? It
would certainly be quite justified to argue that the kerygma of the letter to
the Hebrews in effect "demythologizes" the sacrificial ritual and the temple
by emphasizing the reality of forgiveness and of immediate personal
relationship with God in the writer's "here and now". 76
The issue is of course more complex, but at least the point begins to
emerge that much of the "mythological" language of the NT was in fact
analogical and metaphorical language - and consciously so - only the
analogies and metaphors were the ones appropriate to the age and inevitably
took up the language and concepts of the age. But if the beyondness of God
was often conceived in terms of "somewhere beyond the frontiers of scien-
tific knowledge", then the fact that first century frontiers of scientific
knowledge were not very far advanced does not really touch the
metaphorical and analogical value of first century attempts to speak of that
beyondness. In short, Bultmann's posing of the problem of myth in the NT
is inadequate because the questions, What kind of myth? Myth in what
sense? have not been subjected to a sufficiently thorough examination.
(3) What is the truth of NT myth? If demythologizing in existentialist
terms is addressed to the problem of objectifying God does it really answer
the problem of myth? Does Bultmann's reduction of the "God-talk",
Christ-event talk to the kerygmatic encounter of the here and now really un-
cover the truth of such mythological language as is used in the NT?
Paradoxically, while his concept of myth in the NT is too broad (2), his un-
derstanding of the truth of myth is too narrow. 77 Bultmann has been
attacked here from two sides. He has been attacked by his more radical dis-
ciples for the illogicality of his stopping place. If the gospel can be translated
so completely into existentialist categories without remainder, why does
Bultmann insist on retaining a reference to Christ, and defend so vigorously
his right to continue speaking of "God acting in Christ"? If "the self un-
derstanding of the man of faith is really the constant in the New
Testament", 78 then where does christology properly speaking come in at
all? Does Bultmann's flight from history into the kerygma answer the
problem of myth since the kerygma is itself mythological; does Bultmann's
programme of demythologizing not logically involve "dekerygmatizing" as
well? ~ If faith is merely man's possibility of authentic existence, then the
7
realisation of that possibility cannot be tied exclusively to Christ. 80 Why

indeed retain the idea of God at all? Does the first century concept of a
cosmologically transcendent God not demythologize existentially into the
concept of self-transcendence? 81
These attacks bring out a point which should not be ignored- that Bult-
mann has always seen his task at this point in terms of Christian evangelism
and apologetic (as well as being required by the NT itselO. He wishes to
298
affirm the gospel and to "defend" faith by setting it free from the objectifica-
tion and meaninglessness of first century conceptualizations. "The task of
demythologizing has no other purpose but to make clear the call of the
Word of God." 82 Hence his initial setting up of the problem in terms of a
distinction between kerygma and myth 83 -the heritage of German idealism
allowing him to affirm almost as an a priori that the kerygma is the truth
within the myth, a truth which challenges me today without conflicting with
the 20th century scientific world view. Yet it is difficult to see how Bult-
mann's position can hold before the criticisms of such as Ogden without the
arbitrary appeal to faith born of the kerygma to which Bultmann is in fact
reduced. 84 But his resort to fideism has obviously proved unsatisfactory to
those cited above - and by the very canons to which Bultmann himself
appealed when he proposed his programme of demythologizing. Conse-
quently the apologetic stand must be made further to the right.
The criticism of Bultmann from the right has often been expressed in
terms of reducing theology to anthropology, which is not altogether un-
justified, but forgets that Bultmann added "or better still, existentially" (see
above p. 295 and n. 62). The same criticism is better expressed in terms of
reducing christology to soteriology, 85 or as the criticism that he has
telescoped what faith might wish to affirm regarding the past and the future
into the present. On the contrary, Christian faith must make affirmations
about Jesus as Jesus, and about past and future including the past
and future of Jesus Christ (as well as about God) if it is to retain any
meaningful continuity with original Christianity. 86 In particular, it must
be said that if the phrase "the resurrection of Jesus" is not attempting
to talk about something which happened to Jesus, if it merely describes
the rise of Easter faith, 87 then it is of no more value than the mystery
religions' myth of the dying and rising god, for all that it has been attached
to a (once) historical (now dead) figure. 88 In which case, the focus of
Christianity must shift from the Christ of faith to the historical Jesus, or
Christianity itself reduces to a mystery cult; that is, Christianity becomes a
form of imitatio Christi moralism (Jesus the first Christian) 89 or a modern
vegetation cult (Christ the principle of life, the image of annual rebirth), and
whatever grace is experienced through it cannot either legitimately or
meaningfully be described as "the grace of God in Christ". Moreover, if
"the resurrection of Jesus" is not saying something by way of promise about
the present and future of Jesus as well as about the present and future of
believers, then we must also point out that Christianity loses the purpose
and hope which originally was one of its crucial and distinctive elements. w
To be sure, the Fourth Gospel's shift in emphasis from future to past and
present ("realized eschatology") can be dubbed a sort of "demy-
thologizing" ,91 but only if one recognizes that its realized eschatology
does not involve a total abandonment of future eschatology (5:28f.; 6:39f.,
44, 54; 11:25; 12:48; 14:2f.; 17:24); 92 even for John the truth of the
"eschatological myth" includes a still future hope which does not dissolve
away in the acids of the demythologizing process. Bultmann fails to realize
299
how much NT myth cannot be demythologized because it is saying

something fundamental to the Christian gospel and saying what cannot be
expressed in other than mythological terms. 93
In short, it would appear that because it is addressed primarily to the
problem of objectifying God rather than to the wider problem of myth in the
NT, Bultmann's programme of demythologizing fails to do justice to the
truth of NT mythological language by abandoning the very historical and
ontological aflirmations about Jesus which that language is able to convey
by its very nature as myth. Space forbids the fuller discussion which the sub-
ject deserves.
V. Conclusion
What is the problem of myth in the NT? It is not reducible to the problem
of miracle; the activity of the divine within the world need not be conceived
in terms of intervention and suspension of natural laws. It is not reducible to
the problem of dependency on other mythological formulations which con-
ceptualize the hoped for deliverance from the frustrations and contradic-
tions of the human condition; when such borrowing does take place the
character of the mythological language is transformed by its reference to the
historical man Jesus. It is not reducible to the problem of objectifying God;
the two problems overlap only in part, and to equate them is to ignore much
of the truth of NT myth.
The problem of myth in the NT is that the NT presents events critical to
Christian faith in language and concepts which are often outmoded and
meaningless to 20th century man. More precisely, the problem of myth in
the NT is (1) the problem of how to speak of God at all, the problem of
analogy, compounded by the fact that many of the NT metaphors and
analogies are archaic and distasteful to modern sensibilities (e.g. blood
sacrifice); (2) it is the problem of how to speak of God acting in history,
compounded by the fact that in the first century world the activity of divine
beings is often evoked as the explanation for what we now recognize as
natural and mental processes, that is, where the natural cause and effect se-
quence is not recognized and causation is attributed solely to the divine in-
stead (e.g. epilepsy as demon possession); (3) it is the problem of how to
conceptualize the margin between the observable domain of scientific
history and "beyond" and how to speak of "passage" from one to the other
- compounded by the fact that out of date conceptualizations determine cer-
tain traditionally important expressions of NT faith about Christ at this
point - in particular, the problem that "ascension" (Acts 1: 11) and parousia
"in clouds" "from heaven" (Mark 13:26; 1 Thess. 4:16) were not merely
metaphors or analogies but were intended as literal descriptions, but descrip-
tions which derive from and depend on a first century cosmology which is
impossible to us.
The problem is that the faith and hope of the first Christians is not readily
distinguishable from this first century language and conceptualization. On
300
the contrary, their faith and hope is expressed through that language; it does
not have an existence apart from that language. The question then to which
demythologizing addresses itself is whether the gospel is forever imprisoned
within these first century thought forms, whether it can be re-expressed in
20th century terms. Are we justified in saying that there is a faith and hope
which can be expressed in other language and thought forms but which
remains the same faith and hope? If such first century theologizing as Adam
christology, talk of spiritual powers in the heavens and ascension can no
longer have the same meaning for us as it had for the first Christians, what
meaning should. it have?
The problem of myth in the NT is thus a complex one and an adequate
answer would require careful exegesis of many different passages. Perhaps I
have said enough in the earlier discussions to indicate the broader
theological considerations which would guide my own answers, and the
following chapter continues the discussion on a somewhat different tack.
The point is that each must tackle the problem for himself and no one else
can tackle it for him; for in the end of the day it is the problem of how I ex-
press my faith as a Christian. The more one regards the Christ-event and the
faith of the first Christians as normative, the more tightly one is bound to
the expressions of the faith and hope of these first Christians as the starting
point for the elucidation and interpretation of one's own self-understanding
and experience of grace. By this I do not mean of course that one must cling
to the words themselves as though they were a sort of magic talisman.
Rather one must always seek to rediscover afresh the reality of the love and
faith and hope which these words expressed, and then seek to re-express that
reality in language meaningful to one's own experience and to one's
neighbour. The process of demythologizing is therefore a dialectic between
me in all my 20th century conditionedness and the faith of the first
Christians in all its first century conditionedness. Such a dialectic is not a
once-for-all question and answer from one to other, but a continuing
dialogue of question and answer where each repeatedly puts the other in
question and where one wrestles existentially with the text and with oneself
till an answer begins to emerge - an answer which poses a further question
in reply. Nor is it a dialogue which involves only my voice and the voice of
the past, since it is only part of the wider human search for reality and truth
and other voices break in posing other questions and offering other answers.
Nor is it a dialogue which can ever reach finality of form or expression since
each man's question is peculiarly his own and since 19th century gives way
to 20th and 20th begins to give way to 21st and each new generation has its
own agenda; rather is it a dialogue which must be taken up ever afresh by
each believer and by each believing community. In short, the dialectic of
demythologizing is the language of living faith.
301
NOTES
*I wish to express my thanks to A. C. Thiselton and I. H. Marshal! for comments on an

earlier draft; also to my colleague R. W. A. McKinney for continual stimulus in many dis-
cussions on this and related subjects.
I. G. S. Kirk, Myth: Its Meaning and Functions in Ancient and Other Cultures (Cam-
bridge 1970), p. 7.
2. G. Stahlin, pvfJor;, TDNT IV, pp. 766-9; cf. also C. K. Barrett, "Myth and the New
Testament", Exp.T 68 (1956-57), p. 345.
3. W. Pannenberg, "The Later Dimensions of Myth in Biblical and Christian Tradition",
Basic Questions in Theology Ill (E.T. London 1973), pp. 1-22.
4. M. Eliade, Myth and Reality, (London 1964) p. 5; Encyclopaedia Britannica, Art.
"Myth", Vol. 15, p. 1133. Eliade is criticised- by I. Strenski, "Mircea Eliade: Some
Theoretical Problems", in A. Cunningham, ed., The Theory of Myth (London 1973), pp.
40-78. See also I. G. Barbour, Myths, Models and Paradigms (London 1976), pp. 19ff.
5. See also W. G. Kiimmel, The New Testament: The History of the Investigation of its
Problems (E.T. London 1973), pp. 101ff, 121; and see below p. 295. R. A. Johnson,-The
Origins of Demythologizing (Leiden 1974) points out that the work of B. Fontenelle, De
l'origine des fables (1 724) considerably predates that of Heyne (pp. 131-4).
6. Cf. particularly P. Ricoeur, The Symbolism ofEvil (E.T. New York 1967), discussed by
J. Rogerson, Myth in O.T. Interpretation (Berlin 1974), chap. 9.
7. Plato, The Republic 376-7.
8. Stiihlin, TDNT IV pp. 774ff. See also R. M. Grant, The Earliest Lives ofJesus (London
1961), pp. 121f. J. Creed, "Uses of Classical Mythology", in Cunningham, pp. 7-15.
9. See Kirk, Myth, pp. 12-29; also Pannenberg, "Myth", pp. SIT; further references to the
myth-ritual debate in B. S. Childs, Myth and Reality in the Old Testament (London 1960), p.
19 n. 2 and discussion in Rogerson, chap. 6.
10. C. G. Jung, Memories, Dreams and Reflection (E.T. London 1963), p. 343; Kirk, Myth,
p. 279. See also C. G. Jung and C. Ken!nyi, Introduction to a Science of Mythology (E.T.
London 195 1).
11. Kirk, Myth, pp. 42-83; Rogerson, p. 105. See further e.g. C. Li~vi-Strauss, Structural
Anthropoiogy (E.T. New York 1963), chap. XI; E. Leach, Levi-Strauss (Glasgow, revised
1974), chap. 4.
12. K. Jaspers, "Myth and Religion", Kerygma and Myih 11 (ed. H. W. Bartsch, E.T. Lon-
don I 962), p. 145.
13. M. Grant, Myths of the Greeks and Romans (London 1962), p. xvii, cites the following
appropriate lines:
The intelligible forms of ancient poets,
the fair humanities of old religion, ...
They live no longer in the faith of reason!
But still the heart doth need a language, still
Doth the old instinct bring back the old names ...
14. R. Otto, The Idea of the Holy (E.T. Oxford 1923), p. 126. Cf. M. Eliade: "For all
primitive mankind, it is religious experience which lays the foundation of the World" (Myths,
Dreams and Mysteries (E.T. London 1960), p. 19).
I 5. Jung, Memories, p. 373; Kirk quotes Jung to similar effect: "The primitive mentality
does not invent myths, it experiences them" (Myth, p. 279). See also N. Berdyaev, Freedom
and Spirit (E.T. London 1935), p. 70.
16. Cf. N. Smart, The Phenomenon of Religion (London 1973), eh. 3.
I 7. Thus, for example, the Gnostic myth reveals man's consciousness of his divided nature
(both mind and matter) and its frustrations, and Nietzsche's "myth" of "superman" ex-
presses a certain kind of aspiration, a "will to power".
18. Cf. Pannenberg: "To attribute all phenomena, and especially particularly striking and
extraordinary events, to the intervention of gods, neither presupposes ignorance, in every
302
case, of the true relationship between cause and effect, nor is it comprehensible as the conse-
quence of such ignorance. Rather, such a way of looking at things expresses the basic
religious experience which apprehends the individual phenomenon not only in its association
with other finite events and circumstances, but with reference to the 'powers' which determine
reality as a whole. Without this specifically religious element even an ignorance of true causes
would not explain why any event was attributed to a divine power" ("Myth", p. 14 n.32).
19. Stahlin, TDNT IV, pp. 790f. See also R. M. Grant, A Short History of the Interpretation
of the Bible (London revised 1965), pp. 62-8.
20. Cf. L. Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity (1841, E.T. 1854, reprinted, New York
1957): "The specific object of faith is miracle; faith is the belief in miracle; faith and miracle
are absolutely inseparable" (p. 126).
21. The Life of Jesus Critically Examined (E.T. 1846, I vol. 1892, reprinted, London 1973),
pp. 39f. The influence of David Hume's still fundamental contribution to the debate is most
clearly seen in Strauss's more constructive New Life of Jesus (E.T. London 1865): "it is ab-
solutely impossible to conceive of a case in which the investigator of history will not find it
more probable, beyond all comparison, that he has to deal with an untrue account, rather
than with a miraculous fact" (Vol. I, p. 200).
22. Perhaps his most perceptive definition of myth is to be found in New Life, I p. 206: "The
myth, in its original form, is not the conscious and intentional invention of an individual but a
production of the common consciousness of a people or religious circle, which an individual
does indeed first enunciate, but which meets with belief for the very reason that such in-
dividual is but the organ of this universal conviction. it is not a covering in which a clever
man clothes an idea which arises in him for the use and benefit of the ignorant multitude, but
it is only simultaneously with the narrative, nay, in the very form of the narrative which he
tells, that he becomes conscious of the idea which he is not yet able to apprehend purely as
such". See also the earlier formulation in Life, pp. 80ff. For a closer analysis of his concept of
myth see P. C. Hodgson's Introduction to the 1973 reprint, pp. xxiii, xxvi, xxxivff.
23. Life, pp. 86f.
24. Life, ~§ 95, 102, 107.
25. Life, §§ 71, 51.
26. See also the striking tribute to Strauss by A. Schweitzer, The Quest of the Historical
Jesus (E.T. London 1910), p. 84.
27. This consideration is particularly relevant in studying the Fourth Gospel; but even in the
Synoptics we must note the significance of such red actions as Matt. 13:58 of Mark 6:5f. and
Matt. 14:32f. of Mark 6:51f., and of the manner in which Matthew and Luke make different
points in narrating the same incident (Matt. 8:5-13/Luke 7:1-10).
28. Much more satisfactory is the definition of R. Swinburne, The Concept of Miracle (Lon-
don 1970): "Miracle is an event of an extraordinary kind, brought about by a god, and of
religious significance" (p. 1). His essay is chiefly a critique of Hume's definition on
philosophical grounds.
29. See J. D. G. Dunn, Jesus and the Spirit (London 1975), eh. 4.
30. Cf. R. Bultmann, Kerygma and Myth (ed. H.-W. Bartsch, E.T. London 1953), p. 197.
31. Examples, including several well attested instances of these and other parapsychological
phenomena may be found in H. Thurston, The Physical Phenomena of Mysticism (London
1952), and C. Wilson, The Occult (London 1971).
32. Recent attempts to speak of God while taking full cognisance of modern science in its
various disciplines and to do so in an integrated way, include J. V. Taylor, The Go-Between
God (London 1972), Part One; J. W. Bowker, The Sense of God (Oxford 1973); M. Kelsey,
Encounter with God (London 1974); Barbour, Myths. Many have found Karl Heim, Chris-
tian Faith and Natural Science (E.T. London 1953) helpful; also Teilhard de Chardin, Le
Milieu Divin (E.T. London 1960).
33. See G. Vermes, Jesus the Jew (London 1973), pp. 69-78.
34. E. Trocme, Jesus and his Contemporaries (E.T. London 1973), chapter 7.
35. Strauss, Life, §§92-93. See also H. van der Loos, The Miracles ofJesus (Leiden 1965),
pp. 156-175.
36. Though he wavered on this point in the third edition of Life; see Hodgson, pp.xliif.
303
37. The authenticity of this logion as a word of the historical Jesus has been widely
recognized; see e.g. R. Bultmann, The History of the Synoptic Tradition (E. T. Oxford, 1963),
pp. 23f; R. H. Fuller, The Foundations of New Testament Christology (London 1965), pp.
128f. Strauss's own interpretation in New Life, I p. 364 is wholly unconvincing: the miracles
to which Jesus appeals "are to be understood in a spiritual sense of the moral effects of his
doctrine".
38. See e.g. the suggestion of R. Otto, The Kingdom of God and the Son of Man (E.T. Lon-
don 1938), pp. 368-74.
39. Strauss, Life, §§148-151. Instead of an individual at the centre of christology Strauss
placed an idea- H. ·Harris, David Friedrich Strauss and his Theology (Cambridge 1973), p.
55.
40. See Kiimmel, New Testament, pp. 245fT.
41. See P. Vielhauer in E. Hennecke and W. Schneemelcher, New Testament Apocrypha
(E.T. ed. R. M. Wilson, London 1965) Vol. 11, pp. 587-90; D. S. Russell, The Method and
Message of Jewish Apocalyptic (London 1964), 122-7.
42. See particularly K. Koch, The Rediscovery of Apocalyptic (E.T. London 1972), chapter
6.
43. J. F. Walvoord, The Revelation of Jesus Christ (London 1966), falls into the error of
attempting to interpret Revelation literally.
44. Kiimmel, New Testament, pp. 250fT. See also I Pet. 3:19f., Jude 6, 14f.
45. Cf. W. G. Kiimmel, "Mythische Rede und Heilsgeschehen im Neuen Testament",
Heilsgeschehen und Geschichte (Marburg 1965), pp. 161fT.
46. See particularly R. Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament Vol. I (E.T. London
1952), pp. 164-83; Primitive Christianity in its Contemporary Setting (E.T. London 1956),
pp. 162-71, 189-208.
47. See particularly C. Colpe, Die religionsgeschichtliche Schule Gottingen 1961); E.
Yamauchi, Pre-Christian Gnosticism (London 1973); cf. J. W. Drane (p. 123 above).
48. See J. D. G. Dunn, "I Corinthians 15.45- Last Adam, Life-giving Spirit", Christ and
the Spirit in the New Testament: Studies in Honour of C. F. D. Moule (ed. B. Lindars and S.
S. Smalley; Cambridge 1973), pp. 129f, 135f; also Jesus and the Spirit, eh. 10.
49. See e.g. R. Bultmann, The History of the Synoptic Tradition (E.T. Oxford 1963), pp.
241, 371; H. Koester, "One Jesus and Four Primitive Gospels", in J. M. Robinson and H.
Koester, Trajectories through Early Christianity (Philadelphia 1971), pp. 187-93; R. P.
Martin, Mark: Evangelist and Theologian (Exeter 1972), chap. VI; E. Trocme,Jesus and his
Contemporaries (E.T. London 1973), chap. 7.
50. See e.g. Bultmann, Theology I, pp. 140fT, 148fT.
51. For description and critique see particularly G. Wagner, P.auline Baptism and the Pagan
Mysteries (E.T. Edinburgh 1967).
52. See e.g. E. Kasemann, "The Pauline Doctrine of the Lord's Supper," Essays on New
Testament Themes (E.T. London 1964), pp. 108fT. But see also Dunn, Baptism in the Holy
Spirit (London 1970), Part Ill.
53. See e.g. A. Drews, Die Christusmythe (Jena 1910); P. L. Couchoud, The Enigma of
Jesus (E.T. London 1924); G. A. Wells, The Jesus of the Early Christians (London 1971).
But see also M. Goguel, Jesus the Nazarene- Myth or History? (E.T. London 1926); H. G.
Wood, Did Christ Really Live? (London 1938).
54. Cited by H. Schlier, "The New Testament and Myth", The Relevance of the New Testa-
ment (E.T. London 1967), p. 84.
55. Schlier, p. 92. Cf. A. Harnack: ·:In Christ the principal figure of all myths has become
history", cited by G. Miegge, Gospel and Myth in the Thought of Rudolf Bultmann (E.T.
London 1960), p. 106. To be sure, the concepts of Christ's pre-existence and virginal concep-
tion can justifiably be described as "mythical" (cf. Kiimmel, Heilsgeschehen, p. 155, 1650;
but even here we should note that "the idea of the incarnation ... is contrary to the nature of
myth itself' (Pannenberg, "Myth", pp. 710.
56. 0. Cullmann, Salvation in History (E.T. London 1967), pp. 139fT.
57. Each of these observations can be illustrated from the classic expression of Liberal
Protestantism, A. Harnack's What is Christianity? (E.T. London 1901, reprinted 1958); see
304
particularly Lectures 2, 3 and 10. It is noticeable that Weiss, Heitmiiller and Bousset remain-
ed firmly entrenched within Liberal Protestantism at this central point; see J. Weiss, Jesus'
Proclamation of the Kingdom of God (E.T. London 1971), p. 135 (also Introduction pp.
16-24); Kiimmel, New Testament, pp. 230fT, 255fT, 259fT; Koch, Apocalyptic, p. 59.
58. Kiimmel, New Testament, n. 466; see also Miegge, Gospel, pp. 119fT; J. M. Robinson,
"The Pre-History of Demythologization", Interpretation 20 (1966), pp. 68f; W. Schmithals,
An Introduction to the Theology of Rudolf Bultmann (E.T. London 1968), p. 250; Johnson,
pp. 103-14.
59. "New Testament and Mythology", E.T. in Kerygma and Myth, pp. 1-44; subsequent
page references in the text are to this essay.
60. Pannenberg, "Myth", p. 9. See also Johnson, pp. 141-151.
61. See also Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology (London 1960), p. 37.
62. But see Part I above. K. Barth comments, "What kind of myth is it that recognizes the
existence only of the human subject, and so requires an exclusively existentialist and
anthropological interpretation?" (Kerygma and Myth II, p. 116); see also I. Henderson, Myth
in the New Testament (London 1952), pp. 30fT- "the non-homogeneous character of the
mythical" (p. 52). Bultmann would presumably justify the claim on the grounds that the sub-
ject-object distinction and so the possibility of consciously standing apart from the world is a
modern development beginning with Descartes (cf. Schmithals, Bultmann, pp. 29fT.). Existen-
tialism overcomes this subject-object pattern and so enables post-Cartesian scientific man to
get inside pre-Cartesian and particularly NT (mythical) thought. See also F. Gogarten,
Demythologizing and History (E.T. London 1955), pp. 48-68- particularly valuable for his
warning against an unjustified attack on Bultmann's theology as "subjectivist".
63. See also J. Macquarrie, An Existentialist Theology (London 1955), pp. 14-21.
64. "This is what is meant by 'faith': to open ourselves freely to the future" (Kerygma and
Myth, p. 19).
65. Cf. Bultmann, Theology I, pp. 305f. See also Schmithals, Bultmann, chapters 6 and 8:
"The Christian Easter faith is not interested in the historical question because it is interested
in the resurrection of Jesus as saving event, that is as an existential experience" (p. 138). "It is
the Word that makes the Jesus-event the saving event"; "apart from this proclamation the
Jesus-event is just an ordinary earthly event" (pp. 174, 193).
66. "The Christological Confession of the World Council of Churches", Essays
Philosophical and Theological (E.T. London 1955), pp. 280f.
67. Here Bultmann acknowledges his debt to his teacher W. Herrmann (Kerygma and Myth,
pp. 2001); but inftue·,1tial statements on the same theme had been made by Kierkegaard, M.
Kahler and of course Barth.
68. See particularly his comments on I Cor. 15:3-8 (Kerygma and Myth p. 39); and below.
Cf. his earlier essay, "What does it mean to speak of God?" (1925), Faith and Understan-
ding (E.T. London 1969), pp. 53-65.
69. Kerygma and Myth, p. 197; Jesus Christ and Mythology, p. 19; "On the Problem of
Demythologizing", New Testament Issues (ed. R. Batey; London 1970), p. 41; also his reply
to H. P. Owen in The Theology of Rudolf Bultmann (ed. C. W. Kegley, London 1966) p.
261. See also H. P. Owen, Revelation and Existence: a Study in the Theology of Rudolph
Bultmann (Cardiff 1957): "Demythologizing would be more accurately called deobjec-
tifying" (p. 15); Schmithals, Bultmann, chapter 2; "The basic error of all theology, even of
faith itself ... - God's action is objectified" (p. 141); and particularly Johnson, Origins, pp.
14f and passim, who notes the important influence of H. Jonas on Bultmann's understanding
of myth and of "objectivation" (pp. 114-26, 207-31).
70. Jesus Christ and Mythology, p. 84; see also Kerygma and Myth, pp. 210f.
71. Miegge, Gospel, p. 93.
72. R. W. Hepburn, "Demythologizing and the Problem of Validity", New Essays in
Philosophical Theology (ed. A. Flew and A. Macintyre; London 1955), pp. 229f; see also e.g.
Kiimmel, "Mythos im Neuen Testament", Heilsgeschehen, p. 221; J. Macquarrie, The Scope
of Demythologizing (London 1960), pp. 198fT; but see also S. M. Ogden's more sympathetic
comments in Kegley, Bultmann, pp. 111-6.
73. Kerygma and Myth, pp. 196f; Jesus Christ and Mythology, pp. 68f; New Testament
305
Issues, p. 42. But see Macquarrie's comment, Demythologizing, p. 205 n. 1.

74. P. S. Minear, "The Cosmology of the Apocalypse", Current Issues in New Testament
Interpretation (ed. W. Klassen and G. F. Snyder; London 1962), pp. 32f; "Certainly we can-
not accuse him of holding a naive three-storied idea of the physical world. There is nothing
naive about his wrestling with the dilemmas of human existence" (p. 34).
75. Cf. Bultmann, Theology I, §§21fT. G. Bornkamm characterizes the heresy which Paul at-
tacks in Colossians as an attempt "to gain access to the gospel by way of myth" - "Myth
and Gospel: A Discussion of the Problem of Demythologizing the New Testament
Message", Kerygma and History(ed. C. E. Braaten and R. A. Harrisville, Nashville 1962), p.
181.
76. Cf. F. F. Bruce, "The Kerygma of Hebrews", Interpretation 23 (1969), pp. 9fT.
77. Cf. Barth, Kerygma and Myth 11, pp. 115f.
78. H. Braun, "The Meaning of New Testament Christology", J. Th.Ch. 5 (New York,
1968), pp. 117f.
79. F. Buri, Kerygma und Mythos 11 (ed. H. W.-Bartsch, Hamburg 1952), pp. 85fT: "The
kerygma is a last vestige of mythology to which we still illogically cling" (p. 96). See also
Macquarrie, Demythologizing, chapter 5.
80. S. M. Ogden, Christ without Myth (New York 1961), pp. 76-94, 111-16; Van A.
Harvey, The Historian and the Believer (London 1967), pp. 139--46; see also Jaspers,
Kerygma and Myth 11 pp. 173f.
81. A. Kee, The Way of Transcendence (Harmondsworth, 1971), pp. xvi-xxii.
82. Jesus Christ and Mythology, p. 43. On Bultmann's concern to remove the false skan-
dalon of first century mythology from the gospel, see Schmithals, Bultmann, pp. 255f.
83. "Does the New Testament embody a truth which is quite independent of its mythical set-
ting? If it does, theology must undertake the task of stripping the Kerygma from its mythical
framework, of 'demythologizing' it" (Kerygma and Myth, p. 3). Note also the a priori distinc-
tion between "the other worldly" and "this world", etc. in the definition on p. 10 n. 2 (cited
above p. 297).
84. "The word of preaching confronts us as the word of God. It is not for us to question its
credentials" (Kerygma and Myth, p. 41); see also his reply to Jaspers, (Kerygma and Myth II,
p. 190), and Schmithals, lJultmann, pp. 193f.
85. See e.g. Barth and R. Schnackenburg in Kerygma and Myth 11, pp. 91-102, 340--9.
86. This is not to deny that Bultmann wishes to say something about "the historical event of
Jesus Christ"; but to describe it only as "the eschatological event ... only present as ad-
dress" (Bultmann's reply to Ogden in Kegley, Bultmann, pp. 272f) neither meets Ogden's
criticism nor says enough about Jesus.
87. "If the event of Easter Day is in any sense an historical event additional to the event of
the cross, it is nothing else than the rise of faith in the risen Lord, since it was this faith which
led to the apostolic preaching" (Kerygma and Myth, p. 42). Barth comments: "The real life of
Jesus Christ is confined to the kerygma and to faith" (Kerygma and Myth 11, p. 101). Similar-
ly Bornkamm: "Jesus Christ has become a mere saving fact and ceases to be a person"
(Kerygma and History, p. 186).
88. Cf. Kiimmel, Heilsgeschehen, pp. 157-65, 228f; see also Cullmann, Christ and Time
(E.T. London 1951, revised 1962), pp. 94-106; Salvation in History pp. 136-50; H. Ott,
"Rudolf Bultmann's Philosophy of History" in Kegley, Bultmann, p. 58 (note Bultmann's
response, p. 264).
89. Macquarrie's position in effect in Demythologizing, pp. 93, 98f, 224, and in his concept
of "Christhood" in Principles of Christian Theology (London 1966).
90. Note particularly that 1 Cor. 15:12ff seems to be specifically directed against such a
reduction of resurrection hope to the "now" of present religious experience (cf. I Cor. 4:8);
see Dunn, "I Corinthians 15:45", pp. 127f. Cf. W. Pannenberg, Jesus God and Man (E.T.
London 1968), pp. 106fT; J. Moltmann, The Theology of Hope (E.T. London 1967), chapter
3. Similar criticism would have to be levelled against Bultmann's reduction of the future im-
minent expectation of Jesus' own message to the crisis of the eschatological "now" of deci-
sion (Jesus and the Word (E.T. London 1934, reprinted 1958), pp. 44-7).
91. Jesus Christ and Mythology, pp. 33f, 80f.
306
DEMYTHOLOGIZING- lHE PROBLEM OF MYTH IN THE NEW TESTAMENT
92. Against Bultmann's arbitrary attempts to attribute such passages to the anonymous
"ecclesiastical redactor"- The Gospel of John (E.T. Oxford 1971).
93. Kiimmel, Heilsgeschehen, pp. 156f, 160, 164, 225fT. Cf. Plato's distinction between
mythos and logos above (p. 286); and J. Knox, The Death of Christ (London 1959, reprinted
1967), pp. 146fT; also Myth and Truth (London 1966), chapters 2 and 3.
307
CHAPTER XIV
EXEGESIS IN PRACTICE: TWO EXAMPLES

For essential principles and methods:
0. KAISER and W. G. KtJMMEL, Exegetical Method: a Student's Handbook
(New York: Seabury 1967), pp. 35-48.
For the "tools" required for NT exegesis:
F. W. DANKER, Multi-purpose Tools for Bible Study (St Louis: Concordia
197<f ). Includes essays on how to use the major tools of biblical exegesis.
R. T. FRANCE (ed.), A Bibliographical Guide to New Testament Research
(Cam bridge: Tyndale Fellowship, 19 74 2 ).
W. G. KuMMEL, Introduction to the New Testament (London: SCM Press
2
1975 ), pp. 23-28: "The Most Important Tools for the Study of the New
Testament".
D. M. ScHOLER, A Basic Bibliographical Guide for New Testament
Exegesis (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans 1973 2 ).
CHAPTER XV
DEMYTHOLOGIZING - THE PROBLEM OF MYTH

IN THE NT
I. G. HARBOUR, Myths, Models and Paradigms (London: SCM Press 1974).

On the diverse functions of language.
H.-W. BARTSCH (ed.), Kerygma and Myth (translated and edited by R. H.
Fuller; Vol. I, London: SPCK 1953; Vol. II, 1962; both volumes com-
bined, 1972). Contains Bultmann's famous essay "The New Testament
and Mythology" together with other contributions to the debate it spark-
ed off.
C. E. BRAATEN and R. A. HARRISVILLE (eds), Kerygma and History
(Nashville: Abingdon 1962). Includes several essays on myth in the NT.
R. BuLTMANN, Jesus Christ and Mythology (London: SCM Press 1960).
Popular lectures delivered in English in USA.
A. CuNNINGHAM (ed.), The Theory of Myth: Six Studies (London 1973).
University of Lancaster Colloquium - includes papers on Eliade,
Levi-Strauss and Mary Douglas.
I. HENDERSON, Myth in the New Testament (London: SCM Press 1952). A
still useful critique of Bultmann.
R. W. HEPBURN, "Demythologizing and the Problem of Validity", in New
382
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Essays in Philosophical Theology, ed. A. Flew and A. Macintyre (Lon-

don: SCM Press 1955).
R. A. J OHNSON, The Origins of Demythologizing: Philosophy and
Historiography in the Theology of Rudolf Bultmann (Leiden: Brill 1974).
The most penetrating analysis of the origin and development of Bult-
mann's thought.
G. S. KIRK, Myth: Its Meaning and Function in Ancient and Other
Cultures, (Cambridge University Press 1970). A classical scholar tackles
the wider questions of myth, particularly the anthropological theories of
C. Levi-Strauss.
W. G. Ki:JMMEL, "Mythische Rede und Heilsgeschehen im Neuen
Testament", and "Mythos im Neuen Testament", in Heilsgeschehen und
Geschichte (Marburg: N. G. Elert 1965). Approaches the problem from a
"salvation-history" standpoint.
J. MACQUARRIE, The Scope of Demythologizing (London: SCM Press
1960). A valuable assessment of the debate to date of writing; perhaps
Macquarrie's best work.
G. MIEGGE, Gospel and Myth in the Thought of Rudolf Bultmann (London:
Lutterworth Press 1960). An Italian Waldensian's contribution.
S. M. OooEN, Christ without Myth (New York: Harper and Row 1961).
Perhaps the single most penetrating critique of Bultmann.
W. PANNENBERG, "The Later Dimensions of Myth in Biblical and Christian
Tradition", in Basic Questions in Theology, vol. 3 (London: SCM Press
1973). A review of approaches to the problem, particularly in biblical
scholarship.
J. W. RooERSON, Myth in Old Testament Interpretation (Berlin: de Gruyter
1974). Describes how the concept of myth has been used in OT inter-
pretation since the end of late 18th century, including chapters on
Levi-Strauss and Paul Ricoeur.
G. STAHLIN, art, mythos, in TDNT 4, pp. 762-795.
o. F. STRAuss, The Life of Jesus Critically Examined (London: SCM Press
1973; originally pub. 1835-36).
CHAPTER XVI
THE NEW HERMENEUTIC
P. J. AcHTEMEIER, An Introduction to the New Hermeneutic (Philadephia:

Westminster Press 1969).
E. BETTI, Die Hermeneutik als allgemeine Methodik der
Geisteswissenschaften (Tiibingen; J. C. B. Mohr 1972 2 ).
383

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CHAPTER XV

DEMYTHOLOGIZING - THE PROBLEM OF MYTH

I. The Problem of Definition

cannot really exist". In a western Europe conscious of its Graeco-Roman

The primary problem of myth is therefore the problem of definition. As

11. The Problem of Miracle - D. F. Strauss

In the 19th century the problem of myth re-emerged with disconcerting

the shifts and artifices to which rationalist explanations of Gospel miracles

of cosmic cobweb of electrical forces - a comparatively recent discovery in

Ill. The Influence of Jewish and Hellenistic Myths

to be interpreted literally or pedantically, as is clear from the apocalyptists'

The impact of the History of Religions school on the problem of myth in

IV. The Problem of Objectifying God- R. Bultmann

truth of NT myth is "the understanding of human existence which the New

istentialist interpretation; only the language of existential encounter enables

realisation of that possibility cannot be tied exclusively to Christ. 80 Why

how much NT myth cannot be demythologized because it is saying

*I wish to express my thanks to A. C. Thiselton and I. H. Marshal! for comments on an

Issues, p. 42. But see Macquarrie's comment, Demythologizing, p. 205 n. 1.

EXEGESIS IN PRACTICE: TWO EXAMPLES

DEMYTHOLOGIZING - THE PROBLEM OF MYTH

I. G. HARBOUR, Myths, Models and Paradigms (London: SCM Press 1974).

Essays in Philosophical Theology, ed. A. Flew and A. Macintyre (Lon-

THE NEW HERMENEUTIC

P. J. AcHTEMEIER, An Introduction to the New Hermeneutic (Philadephia:

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