Guy Vs Ignacio
Guy Vs Ignacio
Guy Vs Ignacio
*
GERALDINE GAW GUY and GRACE GUY
CHEU, petitioners, vs. ALVIN AGUSTIN T. IGNACIO, respondent.
G.R. No. 168622. July 2, 2010.*
GERALDINE GAW GUY and GRACE GUY
CHEU, petitioners, vs. THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF
THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, HON. MARICEL U.
SALCEDO, MAYNARDO MARINAS, RICARDO CABOCHAN and
ELISEO EXCONDE, respondents.
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* SECOND DIVISION.
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Guy vs. Ignacio
Deportation Proceedings; Citizenship; Administrative Law; Courts;
Before judicial intervention is sought, the claim of citizenship of a respondent
in a deportation proceeding must be so substantial that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that such claim is correct.—In Board of Commissioners
(CID) v. Dela Rosa, 197 SCRA 853 (1991), it is required that before judicial
intervention is sought, the claim of citizenship of a respondent in a
deportation proceeding must be so substantial that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that such claim is correct. In the said case, the proof
adduced by the respondent therein was so substantial and conclusive as to
his citizenship that it warranted a judicial intervention. In the present case,
there is a substantial or conclusive evidence that petitioners are Filipino
citizens. Without necessarily judging the case on its merits, as to whether
petitioners had lost their Filipino citizenship by having a Canadian
passport, the fact still remains, through the evidence adduced and
undisputed by the respondents, that they are naturalized Filipinos, unless
proven otherwise.
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari[1]under Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure seeking, among others, to annul and
set aside the Decisions dated January 6, 2005[2]and April 20,
2005[3] and Resolutions dated March 10, 2005[4] and June 29,
2005[5] rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA), revers-
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[1] Rollo, (G.R. No. 167824), pp. 3-152; Rollo, (G.R. No. 168622), pp. 3-138.
Romeo A. Brawner and Mariano C. Del Castillo (now a member of this Court),
concurring; CA Rollo (CA-G.R. SP No. 86432), pp. 254-261.
[3] Penned by Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo, with Associate Justices
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Guy vs. Ignacio
ing and setting aside the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by
the Regional Trial Court[6](RTC), Branch 37, Manila.
The antecedent facts follow.
The father of petitioners Geraldine Gaw Guy and Grace Guy Cheu
became a naturalized[7]Filipino citizen sometime in 1959. The said
petitioners, being minors at that time, were also recognized[8] as
Filipino citizens.
Respondent Atty. Alvin Agustin T. Ignacio, filed a
Complaint[9] dated March 5, 2004 for blacklisting and deportation
against petitioners Geraldine and Grace before the Bureau of
Immigration (BI) on the basis that the latter two are Canadian
citizens who are illegally working in the Philippines, petitioners
having been issued Canadian passports.
Acting upon the Complaint, respondent Maricel U. Salcedo,
Special Prosecutor, Special Task Force of the BI Commissioner,
directed the petitioners, through the issuance of a subpoenae,[10] to
appear before her and to bring pertinent documents relative to their
current immigration status, to which the petitioners objected by
filing with the Special Task Force of the BI Commissioner a
Comment/Opposition with Motion Ad Cautelam to Quash
Re: Subpoena[11] dated 30 April 2004 (Duces Tecum/Ad
Testificandum), which was eventually denied by respondent Salcedo
in an Order[12] dated May 14, 2004.
Respondent Board of Commissioners (BOC) filed a Charge
Sheet[13] dated June 1, 2004 for Violation of Sections 37 (a) 7, 45
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[6] Records, Vol. II, pp. 373-378.
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682 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Guy vs. Ignacio
(e) and 45-A of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended,
which reads as follows:
“The undersigned Special Prosecutor charges GRACE GUY CHEU and
GERALDINE GAW GUY, both Canadian citizens, for working without
permit, for fraudulently representing themselves as Philippine citizens in
order to evade immigration laws and for failure to comply with the subpoena
duces tecum/ad testificandum, in violation of the Philippine Immigration
Act of 1940, as amended, committed as follows:
That respondents GRACE GUY CHEU and GERALDINE GAW GUY,
knowingly, willfully and unlawfully engage in gainful activities in the
Philippines without appropriate permit by working as the Vice-President
for Finance & Treasurer and General Manager, respectively, of Northern
Islands Company, Inc., with office address at No. 3 Mercury Avenue, Libis,
Quezon City;
That both respondents, knowingly, willfully and fraudulently
misrepresent themselves as Philippine citizens as reflected in the general
Information Sheet of Northern Islands Company, Inc., for 2004, in order to
evade any requirement of the Philippine Immigration Laws;
That both respondents, duly served with subpoenas duces tecum/ad
testificandum, dated April 20, 2004, knowingly, willfully and unlawfully
failed to comply with requirements thereof.
CONTRARY TO LAW.”
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preliminary injunction, issued an Order[16]dated June 28, 2004, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the application for temporary
restraining order is hereby GRANTED. The respondents and all persons
acting in their behalf and those under their instructions are directed to
cease and desist from continuing with the deportation proceedings involving
the petitioners. In the meantime set the case for hearing on preliminary
injunction on July 5 and 6, 2004, both at 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon and
the respondents are directed to show cause why writ of preliminary
injunction should not issue.
SO ORDERED.”
684
[24] Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 86298 and raffled off to the Eighth Division and
[26] Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 86432 and raffled off to the Ninth Division and
entitled, Alvin Agustin T. Ignacio v. Hon. Vicente A. Hidalgo, Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 37, Geraldine Gaw Guy and Grace Gaw Cheu.
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writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court, the
dispositive portion of the Decision[27] reads:
“WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED and the Order of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 37, Manila, dated July 19, 2004, is hereby
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.”
686
686 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Guy vs. Ignacio
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ING THAT THE INSTANT CASE IS AN EXCEPTION TO THE
RULE ON PRIMARY JURISDICTION DOCTRINE AND
WARRANTS PETITIONERS’ IMMEDIATE RESORT TO
JUDICIAL INTERVENTION.
A.
CONSIDERING THAT PROOF OF PETITIONERS’
PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP IS SUBSTANTIAL,
PETITIONERS ARE ALLOWED UNDER THIS HONORABLE
COURT'S RULING IN BID V. DELA ROSA, SUPRA, TO SEEK
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF FROM THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT TO ENJOIN THE DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS
CONDUCTED AGAINST THEM.
B.
LIKEWISE, CONSIDERING THAT PETITIONERS STAND TO
SUFFER GRAVE AND IRREPARABLE INJURIES SHOULD
THE DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THEM BE
ALLOWED TO CONTINUE, PETITIONERS ARE ALLOWED
UNDER THE LAW TO IMMEDIATELY SEEK JUDICIAL
RELIEF DESPITE THE PENDENCY OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS.
II.
FURTHER, IT IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THAT THE
RULING OF THIS HONORABLE COURT IN DWIKARNA V.
DOMINGO, 433 SCRA 748 (2004) DID NOT STRIP THE LOWER
COURT OF ITS AUTHORITY TO ENTERTAIN THE PETITION IN
CIVIL CASE NO. 04-110179 AND TO ISSUE A WRIT OF
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION IN THE AFORESAID CASE.
III.
EVEN IF THE RULING OF THIS HONORABLE COURT
IN DWIKARNA V. DOMINGO, SUPRA, DID STRIP THE LOWER
COURT OF ITS JURISDICTION IN BID V. DELA ROSA, SUPRA,
TO ENJOIN DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS, THE RULING
CAN ONLY HAVE PROSPECTIVE EFFECT.688
688 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Guy vs. Ignacio
Basically, petitioners argue that the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, relied upon by the CA in its decision, does not apply in
the present case because it falls under an exception. Citing Board of
Commissioners (CID) v. Dela Rosa,[43]petitioners assert that
immediate judicial intervention in deportation proceedings is
allowed where the claim of citizenship is so substantial that there
are reasonable grounds to believe that the claim is correct. In
connection therewith, petitioners assail the applicability
of Dwikarna v. Domingo in the present case, which the CA relied
upon in ruling against the same petitioners.
After a careful study of the arguments presented by the parties,
this Court finds the petition meritorious.
Petitioners rely on Board of Commissioners (CID) v. Dela
Rosa,[44] wherein this Court ruled that when the claim of citizenship
is so substantial as to reasonably believe it to be true, a respondent
in a deportation proceeding can seek judicial relief to enjoin
respondent BOC from proceeding with the deportation case. In
particular, petitioners cited the following portions in this Court’s
decision:
“True, it is beyond cavil that the Bureau of Immigration has the exclusive
authority and jurisdiction to try and hear cases against an alleged alien,
and in the process, determine also their citizenship (Lao vs. Court of
Appeals, 180 SCRA 756 [1989]. And a mere claim of citizenship cannot
operate to divest the Board of Commissioners of its jurisdiction in
deportation proceedings (Miranda vs. Deportation Board, 94 Phil. 531
[1951]).
However, the rule enunciated in the above-cases admits of an
exception, at least insofar as deportation proceedings are
concerned. Thus, what if the claim to citizenship of the alleged deportee is
satisfactory? Should the deportation proceedings be allowed to continue or
should the question of citizenship be venti-
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[43] G.R. Nos. 95122-23 and G.R. Nos. 95612-13, May 31, 1991, 197 SCRA 853, 874-875.
689
[46] Marked as Annexes “D” and “E” in the Comment of petitioners Grace and
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or have acquired dual citizenship within the confines of the law.
In this regard, it must be remembered though that this Court’s
ruling in Dwikarna v. Domingo did not abandon the doctrine laid
down in BOC v. Dela Rosa. The exception
remains. Dwikarna merely reiterated the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction when this Court ruled that if the petitioner is
dissatisfied with the decision of the Board of Commissioners
of the Bureau of Immigration, he can move for its
reconsideration and if his motion is denied, then he can
elevate his case by way of a petition for review before the
Court of Appeals, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 43 of the Rules
of Civil Procedure.However, utmost caution must be exercised in
availing of the exception laid down in BOC v. Dela Rosa in order to
avoid trampling on the time-honored doctrine of primary
jurisdiction. The court cannot or will not determine a controversy
involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the
administrative tribunal prior to resolving the same, where the
question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion
requiring special knowledge, experience and services in determining
technical and intricate matters of fact.[48] In cases where the doctrine
of primary jurisdiction is clearly applicable, the court cannot
arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy, the
jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative
body of special competence.[49]
Above all else, this Court still upholds the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction. As enunciated in Republic v. Lacap:[50]
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[48] Omictin v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 148004, January 22, 2007, 512 SCRA 70,
82, citing Pambujan Sur United Mine Workers v. Samar Mining Co., Inc., 94 Phil.
932 (1954).
[49] Machete v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109093, November 20, 1995, 250 SCRA
176, 182.
[50] G.R. No. 158253, March 2, 2007, 517 SCRA 255.
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692 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Guy vs. Ignacio
“The general rule is that before a party may seek the intervention of the
court, he should first avail of all the means afforded him by administrative
processes.[51] The issues which administrative agencies are authorized to
decide should not be summarily taken from them and submitted to a court
without first giving such administrative agency the opportunity to dispose
of the same after due deliberation.[52]
Corollary to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction; that is, courts cannot or will not determine
a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the
administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that question by the
administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound
administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and
services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate
matters of fact.[53]
Nonetheless, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and
the corollary doctrine of primary jurisdiction, which are based on sound
public policy and practical considerations, are not inflexible rules. There are
many accepted exceptions, such as: (a) where there is estoppel on the part
of the party invoking the doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative
act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there is
unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the
complainant; (d) where the amount involved is relatively small so as to
make the rule impractical and oppressive; (e) where the question involved
is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of
justice;[54] (f) where judicial intervention is urgent; (g) when its application
may cause great and irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted acts
violate due process; (i) when the issue of non-
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[51] Associated Communications and Wireless Services (ACWS), Ltd. v. Dumlao, 440 Phil.
787, 801-802; 392 SCRA 269, 281 (2002); Zabat v. Court of Appeals, 393 Phil. 195, 206; 338
SCRA 551, 560 (2000).
[52] ACWS, Ltd. v. Dumlao, supra, at 802; p. 281.
[53] Paloma v. Mora, G.R. No. 157783, September 23, 2005, 470 SCRA 711, 725; Fabia v.
Court of Appeals, 437 Phil. 389, 403; 388 SCRA 574, 579 (2002).
[54] Rocamora v. Regional Trial Court-Cebu (Branch VIII), No. L-65037, November 23,
[56] Castro v. Sec. Gloria, 415 Phil. 645, 651-652; 363 SCRA 417, 422 (2001).