Dasgupta - A History of Indian Philosophy PDF
Dasgupta - A History of Indian Philosophy PDF
Dasgupta - A History of Indian Philosophy PDF
OF
INDIAN PHILOSOPHY
BY
SURENDRANATH DASGUPTA, M.A., Ph.D.,
PROFESSOR OF SANSKRIT, GOVERNMENT COLLEGE, CHITTAGONG, BENGAL,
LECTURER IN BENGALI IN THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE
VOLUME I
CAMBRIDGE
AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS
1922
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'S'"Cl~rJ~frrlf~T ~T~ot il 7l~~iCJT II
1 May the noble-minded scholars instead of cherishing ill feeling kindly correct
whatever errors have been here committed through the dullness of my intellect in the
way of wrong interpretations and misstatements.
S.D.
TRINITY COLLEGE,
CAMBRIDGE.
February, I 922.
CONTENTS
CHAPTER I PAGE
INTRODUCTORY . I
CHAPTER II
THE VEDAS, BRAHMA~AS AND THEIR PHILOSOPHY
I The Vedas and their antiquity . . . 10
2 The place of the Vedas in the Hindu mind 10
3 Classification of the Vedic literature I I
4 The Samhitas . I2
5 The Br~hmanas 13
6 The Aral)yakas . 14
7 The :B.g-Veda, its civilization 14
8 The Vedic gods . . I6
9 Polytheism, Henotheism, and Monotheism . . . I7
Io Growth of a Monotheistic tendency ; Prajapati, Visvakarma 19
11 Brahma . . . . . 20
I2 Sacrifice; the First Rudiments of the Law of Karma 2I
I3 Cosmogony-Mythological and_Philosophical.
I4 Eschatology; the Doctrine of Atman
I 5 Conclusion
CHAPTER III
THE EARLIER UPANI$ADS (700 B.C.-6oo n.c.)
I The place of the Upani!iiads in Vedic literature . . 28
2 The names of the Upani!?ads; Non-Brahmanic influence 30
3 Brahmal)aS and the Early U pani!iiads 31
4 The meaning of the word U pani!iiad . . 38
5 The composition and growth of diverse Upani!jads 38
6 Revival of U pani!iiad studies in modern times . 39
7 The Upani!?ads and their interpretations . . . 4I
8 The quest after Brahman: the struggle and the failures . 42
9 Unki!_owability of Brahman and the Negative Method 44
10 The Atman doctrine . . 45
I I Place of Brahman in the U pani!jads . 48
12 The World 51
13 The World-Soul . . 52
14 The Theory of Causation . 52
I 5 Doctrine of Transmigration 53
16 Emancipation 58
CHAPTER IV
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE SYSTEMS
OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY
I In what sense is a History of Indian Philosophy possible? 62
2 Growth of the Philosophic Literature 65
3 The Indian systems of Philosophy . 67
4 Some fundamental points of agreement 71
I The Karma theory . 71
2 The Doctri1ze of flfukti . 74
3 The Doctrine of Soul . . . . . . • 75
5 The Pessimistic Attitude towards the World and the Optimistic
F~thintheend 75
6 Unity in Indian Sadhana (philosophical, religious and ethical
endeavours) 77
XIV Contents
CHAPTER V
BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY
PAGE
I The State of Philosophy in India before Buddha 78
2 Buddha : his Life 81
3 Early Buddhist Literature . . . . . 82
4 The Doctrine of Causal Connection of early Buddhism 84
5 The Khandhas . 93
6 Avijja and Asava 99
7 Sila and Samadhi 100
8 Kamma 1o6
9 Upani~ads and Buddhism 109
10 The Schools of Theravada Buddhism 112
II Mahayanism . . . 125
12 The Tathata Philosophy qf Asvagho~a (8oA.D.) 129
13 The Madhyamika or the Sunyavada school-Nihilism . . 138
14 Uncompromising Idealism or the School of Vijnana vada Buddhism I45
15 Sautrantika theory of Perception 151
I6 Sautrantika theory of Inference I 55
I7 The Doctrine of Momentariness 158
18 The Doctrine of Momentariness and the Doctrine of Causal
Efficiency (Arthakriyakaritva) . I63
19 Some Ontological Problems on which the Different Indian Systems
diverged 164
20 Brief Survey of the Evolution of Buddhist Thought 166
CHAPTER VI
THE JAINA PHILOSOPHY
I The Origin of J ainism I69
2 Two Sects of Jainism . . . . . 170
3 The Canonical and other Literature of the J a ins 171
4 Some General Characteristics of the J ains . 172
5 Life of Mahavira . . . . . . 173
6 The Fundamental Ideas of Jaina Ontology . . 173
7 The Doctrine of Relative Pluralism (Anekantavada) 175
8 The Doctrine of Nayas . 176
9 The Doctrine of Syadvada 179
10 Knowledge, its value for us 181
I I Theory of Perception 183
I2 Non-Perceptual knowledge 185
13 Knowledge as Revelation . 186
14 The Jivas 188
IS Karma ~heory . I90
I6 Karma, Asrava and Nirjara 192
17 Pudgala . . . . I95
18 Dharma, Adharma, Akasa 197
I<) Kala and Samaya . 198
20 J a ina Cosmography . 199
21 Jaina Yoga . . 199
22 J a ina Atheism 203
23 Mok~a (emancipation) 207
Contents XV
CHAPTER VII
THE KAPILA AND THE PATANJALA SA~fKHYA (YOGA)
PAGE
I A Review . . . . . . 208
2 The Germs of Saipkhya in the U pani~ads 2I I
3 Sarpkhya and Yoga Literature. 2I2
4 An Early School of Sarpkhya . . . . . 2I3
5 Saipkhya karika, Sarpkhya siitra, Vacaspati Misra and Vijfiana
Bhiksu . . 222
6 Yoga and Patafijali . . . . . . ·. . 226
7 The Saipkhya and the Yoga doctrine of Soul or Puru~a . 238
8 Thought and .:\latter. 24I
9 Feelings, the Ultimate Substances 242
10 The Gunas . 243
I I Prakrti and its evolution . . . . . . . 24 5
I2 Pralaya and the disturbance of the Prakrti Equilibrium . 247
I3 Mahat and Ahamkara 248
q. The Tanmatras and the ParamaQ.US . . 2; I
I5 Principle of Causation and Conservation of Energy 2 54
I6 Change as the formation of new collocations . . 255
I 7 Causation as Satkaryavada (the theory that the effect potentially
exists before it is generated by the movement of the cause) 257
I8 Saipkhya Atheism and Yoga Theism 258
I9 Buddhi and Purusa . . . . 259
20 The Cognitive Pr~cess and some characteristics of Citta 26I
2I Sorrow and its Dissolution 264
22 Citta . . . . . . 268
23 Yoga Purificatory Practices (Parikarma) . 270
24 The Yoga Meditation 271
CHAPTER VIII
THE NYAYA-VAISE~IKA PHILOSOPHY
I Criticism of Buddhism and Sarpkhya from the Nyaya standpoint 274
2 Nyaya and Vaise~ika siitras . . . . . 276
3 Does Vaise~ika represent an old school of Mimarpsa? 280
4 Philosophy in the Vaise~ika siitras . 285
5 Philosophy in the N yaya siitras . . . 294
6 Philosophy of Nyaya siitras and Vaise~ika siitras 301
7 The Vaise~ika and Nyaya Literature . . . 305
8 The main doctrine of the Nyaya-Vaise~ika Philosophy . . . 310
9 The six Padarthas: Dravya, GuQa, Karma, Samanya, Vise~a, Sama- 3I3
vaya . 3I3
10 The Theory of Causation . . . . 3I9
I I Dissolution (Pralaya) and _Creation (Sr~ti) • 323
I2 Proof of the Existence of ISvara . . 325
I3 The Nyaya-Vaise~ika Physics . . 326
q The Origin of Knowledge (PramaQa) 330
I 5 The fou~ PramaiJas of N yaya 332
I6 PerceptiOn (Pratyak~a) . 333
I 7 Inference . 343
I8 U pamana and Sabda . 354
I9 Negation in Nyaya-Vaise~ika • . . . . . • . 355
20 The necessity of the Acquirement of debating devices for the seeker
of Salvation . . . . . . . . . . .
2I The Doctrine of Soul
22 ISvara and Salvation
XVl Contents
CHAPTER IX
MlMA.l~1SA PHILOSOPHY
I A Comparative Review .
2 The Mlmamsa Literature . . . . . . . . .
3 The Paratab-pramaQya doctrine of Nyaya and the Svatal)-pramaQya
doctrine of Mlmamsa . . . . 372
4 The place of Sense-organs!n Perceptior:. . 375
5 Indeterminate and Determmate Perception . 378
6 Some Ontological Problems connected with the Doctrine of Per-
ception . . . . 379
7 The Nature of Knowledge 382
8 The Psychology of Illusion 384
9 Inference . . . 387
IO U pamfma, Arthapatti 39I
I1 Sabda-pramaQa . . 394
12 The PramaQ.a of Non-perception (anupalabdhi) 397
I3 Self, Salvation, and God . . . . 399
14 Mlmarpsa as Philosophy and Mlmarpsa as Ritualism 403
CHAPTER X
THE SANKARA SCHOOL OF VEDANTA
INDEX . 495
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTORY
Nyayakosa has been prepared by l\1. M. Bhimacarya Jhalkikar, Bombay, Govt. Press.
Introductory 3
am afraid the translation may not be found very intelligible.
Gul)aratna'scommentaryisexcellentso far as Jainism is concerned,
and it sometimes gives interesting information about other
systems, and also supplies us with some short bibliographical
notices, but it seldom goes on to explain the epistemological or
ontological doctrines or discussions which are so necessary for the
right understanding of any of the advanced systems of Indian
thought. Thus in the absence of a book which could give us in
brief the main epistemological, ontological, and psychological
positions of the Indian thinkers, it is difficult even for a good
Sanskrit scholar to follow the advanced philosophical literature,
even though he may be acquainted with many of the technical
philosophical terms. I have spoken enough about the difficulties
of studying Indian philosophy, but if once a person can get him-
self used to the technical terms and the general positions of the
different Indian thinkers and their modes of expression, he can
master the whole by patient toil. The technical terms, which are
a source of difficulty at the beginning, are of inestimable value in
helping us to understand the precise and definite meaning of the
writers who used them, and the chances of misinterpreting or
misunderstanding them are reduced to a minimum. It is I think
well-known that avoidance of technical terms has often rendered
philosophical works unduly verbose, and liable to misinterpre-
tation. The art of clear writing is indeed a rare virtue and every
philosopher cannot expect to have it. But when technical ex-
pressions are properly formed, even a bad writer can make himself
understood. In the early days of Buddhist philosophy in the
Pali literature, this difficulty is greatly felt. There are some
technical terms here which are still very elastic and their repeti-
tion in different places in more or less different senses heighten
the difficulty of understanding the real meaning intended to be
conveyed.
But is it necessary that a history of Indian philosophy should
be written? There are some people who think that the Indians
never rose beyond the stage of simple faith and that therefore they
cannot have any philosophy at all in the proper sense of the term.
Thus Professor Frank Thilly of the Cornell University says in
his History ofPhilosophy\" A universal history of philosophy would
include the philosophies of all peoples. Not all peoples, however
1
New York, 1914, p. 3·
4 Introductory [cH.
have produced real systems of thought, and the speculations of
only a few can be said to have had a history. Many do not rise
beyond the mythological stage. Even the theories of Oriental
peoples, the Hindus, Egyptians, Chinese, consist, in the main, of
mythological and ethical doctrines, and are not thoroughgoing
systems of thought: they are shot through with poetry and faith.
We shall, therefore, limit ourselves to the study of the Western
countries, and begin with the philosophy of the ancient Greeks,
on whose culture our own civilization in part, rests." There are
doubtless many other people who hold such uninformed and
untrue beliefs, which only show their ignorance of Indian matters.
It is not necessary to say anything in order to refute these views,
for what follows will I hope show the falsity of their beliefs. If
they are not satisfied, and want to know more definitely and
elaborately about the contents of the different systems, I am afraid
they will have to go to the originals referred to in the biblio-
graphical notices of the chapters.
There is another opinion, that the time has not yet come for
an attempt to write a history of Indian philosophy. Two
different reasons are given from two different points of view. It
is said that the field of Indian philosophy is so vast, and such a
vast literature exists on each of the systems, that it is not possible
for anyone to collect his materials directly from the original
sources, before separate accounts are prepared by specialists
working in each of the particular systems. There is some truth
in this objection, but although in some of the important systems
the literature that exists is exceedingly vast, yet many of them
are more or less repetitions of the same subjects, and a judicious
selection of twenty or thirty important works on each of the
systems could certainly be made, which would give a fairly correct
exposition. In my own undertaking in this direction I have
always drawn directly from the original texts, and have always
tried to collect my materials from those sources in which they
appear at their best. My space has been very limited and I have
chosen the features which appeared to me to be the most
important. I had to leave out many discussions of difficult
problems and diverse important bearings of each of the systems
to many interesting aspects of philosophy. This I hope may be
excused in a history of philosophy which does not aim at com-
pleteness. There are indeed many defects and shortcomings, and
Introductory 5
these would have been much less in the case of a writer abler
than the present one. At any rate it may be hoped that the
imperfections of the present attempt will be a stimulus to those
whose better and more competent efforts will supersede it. No
attempt ought to be called impossible on account of its imper-
fections.
In the second place it is said that the Indians had no proper
and accurate historical records and biographies and it is therefore
impossible to write a history of Indian philosophy. This objection
is also partially valid. But this defect does not affect us so much
as one would at first sight suppose; for, though the dates of the
earlier beginnings are very obscure, yet, in later times, we are in
a position to affirm some dates and to point out priority and
posteriority in the case of other thinkers. As most of the systems
developed side by side through many centuries their mutual
relations also developed, and these could be well observed. The
special nature of this development has been touched on in the
fourth chapter. Most of the systems had very early beginnings
and a continuous course of development through the succeeding
centuries, and it is not possible to take the state of the philosophy
of a particular system at a particular time and contrast it with
the state of that system at a later time; for the later state did not
supersede the previous state, but only showed a more coherent
form of it, which was generally true to the original system but
was more determinate. Evolution through history has in Western
countries often brought forth the development of more coherent
types of philosophic thought, but in India, though the types
remained the same, their development through history made them
more and more coherent and determinate. Most of the parts
were probably existent in the earlier stages, but they were in an
undifferentiated state; through the criticism and conflict of the
different schools existing side by side the parts of each of the
systems of thought became more and more differentiated, deter-
minate, and coherent. In some cases this development has been
almost imperceptible, and in many cases the earlier forms have
been lost, or so inadequately expressed that nothing definite
could be made out of them. Wherever such a differentiation
could be made in the interests of philosophy, I have tried to do
it. But I have never considered it desirable that the philosophical
interest should be subordinated to the chronological. It is no
6 Introductory [cH.
doubt true that more definite chronological information would be
a very desirable thing, yet I am of opinion that the little
chronological data we have give us a fair amount of help in form-
ing a general notion about the growth and development of the
different systems by mutual association and conflict. If the con-
dition of the development of philosophy in India had been the
same as in Europe, definite chronological knowledge would be
considered much more indispensable. For, when one system
supersedes another, it is indispensably necessary that we should
know which preceded and which succeeded. But when the systems
are developing side by side, and when we are getting them in
their richer and better forms, the interest with regard to the
conditions, nature and environment of their early origin has rather
a historical than a philosophical interest. I have tried as best
I could to form certain general notions as regards the earlier
stages of some of the systems, but though the various features of
these systems at these stages in detail may not be ascertainable,
yet this, I think, could never be considered as invalidating the
whole programme. Moreover, even if we knew definitely the
correct dates of the thinkers of the same system we could not
treat them separately, as is done in European philosophy, without
unnecessarily repeating the same thing twenty times over; for
they all dealt with the same system, and tried to bring out the
same type of thought in more and more determinate forms.
The earliest literature of India is the Vedas. These consist
mostly of hymns in praise of nature gods, such as fire, wind, etc.
Excepting in some of the hymns of the later parts of the work
(probably about 1000 B.C.), there is not much philosophy in them
in our sense of the term. It is here that we first find intensely
interesting philosophical questions of a more or less cosmological
character expressed in terms of poetry and imagination. In the
later Vedic works called the Brahmat:tas and theArat:J.yakaswritten
mostly in prose, which followed the Vedic hymns, there are two
tendencies, viz. one that sought to establish the magical forms of
ritualistic worship, and the other which indulged in speculative
thinking through crude generalizations. This latter tendency was
indeed much feebler than the former, and it might appear that
the ritualistic tendency had actually swallowed up what little of
philosophy the later parts of the Vedic hymns were trying to
express, but there are unmistakable marks that this tendency
Introductory 7
existed and worked. Next to this come certain treatises written
in prose and verse called the U pani~ads, which contain various
sorts of philosophical thoughts mostly monistic or singularistic
but also some pluralistic and dualistic ones. These are not
reasoned statements, but utterances of truths intuitively perceived
or felt as unquestionably real and indubitable, and carrying great
force, vigour, and persuasiveness with them. It is very probable
that many of the earliest parts of this literature are as old as
500 B.C. to 700 B.C. Buddhist philosophy began with the Buddha
from some time about 500 B.C. There is reason to believe that
Buddhist philosophy continued to develop in India in one or
other of its vigorous forms till some time about the tenth or
eleventh century A.D. The earliest beginnings of the other Indian
systems of thought are also to be sought chiefly between the age
of the Buddha to about 200 B.C. J aina philosophy was probably
prior to the Buddha. But except in its earlier days, when it came
in conflict with the doctrines of the Buddha, it does not seem to
me that the Jaina thought came much in contact with other
systems of Hindu thought. Excepting in some forms of Vai~I).ava
thought in later times, J aina thought is seldom alluded to by
the Hindu writers or later Buddhists, though some Jains like
Haribhadra and Gul).aratna tried to refute the Hindu and Buddhist
systems. The non-aggressive nature of their religion and ideal
may to a certain extent explain it, but there may be other
reasons too which it is difficult for us to guess. It is interesting
to note that, though there have been some dissensions amongst
the Jains about dogmas and creeds, Jaina philosophy has not
split into many schools of thought more or less differing from one
another as Buddhist thought did.
The first volume of this work will contain Buddhist and Jaina
philosophy and the six systems of Hindu thought. These six sys-
tems of orthodox Hindu thought are the Sarpkbya, the Yoga, the
N yaya, the Vais~ika, the Mimarpsa (generally known as Purva
Mimarpsa), and the Vedanta (known also as Uttara Mimarpsa).
Of these what is differently known as Sa£!1khya and Xoga are but
different schools of one system. The Vaise~ika and the N yay a in
later times became so mixed up that, though in early times the
similarity of the former with Mimarpsa was greater than that with
N yaya, they came to be regarded as fundamentally almost the
same systems. N yay a and V aise~ika have therefore been treated
8 Introductory [cH.
together. In addition to these systems some theistic systems began
to grow prominent from the ninth century A.D. They also probably
had their early beginnings at the time of the Upani~ads. But at
that time their interest was probably concentrated on problems
of morality and religion. It is not improbable that these were
associated with certain metaphysical theories also, but no works
treating them in a systematic way are now available. One of
their most important early works is the Bkagavadgitii. This book
is rightly regarded as one of the greatest masterpieces of Hindu
thought. It is written in verse, and deals with moral, religious,
and metaphysical problems, in a loose form. It is its lack of
system and method which gives it its peculiar charm more akin
to the poetry of the U pani~ads than to the dialectical and syste-
matic Hindu thought. From the ninth century onwards attempts
were made to supplement these loose theistic ideas which were
floating about and forming integral parts of religious creeds, by
metaphysical theories. Theism is often dualistic and pluralistic,
and so are all these systems, which are known as different schools
of Vai~l).ava philosophy. Most of the Vai!?l).ava thinkers wished
to show that their systems were taught in the U pani~ads, and thus
wrote commentaries thereon to prove their interpretations, and
also wrote commentaries on the Brahmasiitra, the classical ex-
position of the philosophy of the U pani~ads. In addition to the
works of these Vai!?l).ava thinkers there sprang up another class
of theistic works which were of a more eclectic nature. These
also had their beginnings in periods as old as the U pani~ads.
They are known as the Saiva and Tantra thought, and are dealt
with in the second volume of this work.
\Ve thus see that the earliest beginnings of most systems of
Hindu thought can be traced to some time between 6oo B.C. to
100 or 200 B.C. It is extremely difficult to say anything about
the relative priority of the systems with any degree of certainty.
Some conjectural attempts have been made in this work with
regard to some of the systems, but how far they are correct, it
will be for our readers to judge. Moreover during the earliest
manifestation of a system some crude outlines only are traceable.
As time went on the systems of thought began to develop side
by side. Most of them were taught from the time in which they
were first conceived to about the seventeenth century A.D. in an
unbroken chain of teachers and pupils. Even now each system
of Hindu thought has its own adherents, though few people now
Introductory 9
care to write any new works upon them. In the history of the
growth of any system of Hindu thought we find that as time went
on, and as new problems were suggested, each system tried to
answer them consistently with its own doctrines. The order in
which we have taken the philosophical systems could not be
strictly a chronological one. Thus though it is possible that the
earliest speculations of some form of Sarpkhya, Yoga, and
Mlmarpsa were prior to Buddhism yet they have been treated
after Buddhism and Jainism, because the elaborate works of these
systems which we now possess are later than Buddhism. In my
opinion the Vaise~ika system is also probably pre-Buddhistic,
but it has been treated later, partly on account of its association
with Nyaya, and partly on account of the fact that all its com-
mentaries are of a much later date. It seems to me almost certain
that enormous quantities of old philosophical literature have been
lost, which if found could have been of use to us in showing the
stages of the early growth of the systems and their mutual
relations. But as they are not available we have to be satisfied
with what remains. The original sources from which I have drawn
my materials have all been indicated in the brief accounts of the
literature of each system which I have put in before beginning
the study of any particular system of thought.
In my interpretations I have always tried to follow the original
sources as accurately as I could. This has sometimes led to old
and unfamiliar modes of expression, but this course seemed to me
to be preferable to the adoption of European modes of thought
for the expression of Indian ideas. But even in spite of this
striking similarities to many of the modern philosophical doctrines
and ideas will doubtless be noticed. This only proves that the
human mind follows more or less the same modes of rational
thought. I have never tried to compare any phase of Indian
thought with European, for this is beyond the scope of my present
attempt, but if I may be allowed to express my own conviction,
I might say that many of the philosophical doctrines of European
philosophy are essentially the same as those found in Indian
philosophy. The main difference is often the difference of the
point of view from which the same problems appeared in such a
variety of forms in the two countries. My own view with regard
to the net value of Indian philosophical development will be ex-
pressed in the concluding chapter of the second volume of the
present work.
CHAPTER II
THE VEDAS, BRAHMA~AS AND THEIR PHILOSOPHY
Vedic ritual. The prayers that a Brahmin now says three times
a day are the same selections of Vedic verses as were used as
prayer verses two or three thousand years ago. A little insight
into the life of an ordinary Hindu of the present day will show
that the system of image-worship is one that has been grafted
upon his life, the regular obligatory duties of which are ordered
according to the old Vedic rites. Thus an orthodox Brahmin
can dispense with image-worship if he likes, but not so with his
daily Vedic prayers or other obligatory ceremonies. Even at
this day there are persons who bestow immense sums of money
for the performance and teaching of Vedic sacrifices and rituals.
Most of the Sanskrit literatures that flourished after the Vedas
base upon them their own validity, and appeal to them as
authority. Systems of Hindu philosophy not only own their alle-
giance to the Vedas, but the adherents of each one of them would
often quarrel with others and maintain its superiority by trying
to prove that it and it alone was the faithful follower of the
Vedas and represented correctly their views. The laws which
regulate the social, legal, domestic and religious customs and
rites of the Hindus even to the present day are said to be but
mere systematized memories of old Vedic teachings, and are
held to be obligatory on their authority. Even under British
administration, in the inheritance of property, adoption, and in
such other legal transactions, Hindu Law is followed, and this
claims to draw its authority from the Vedas. To enter into
details is unnecessary. But suffice it to say that the Vedas, far
from being regarded as a dead literature of the past, are still
looked upon as the origin and source of almost all literatures
except purely secular poetry and drama. Thus in short we may
say that in spite of the many changes that time has wrought,
the orthodox Hindu life may still be regarded in the main as an
adumbration of the Vedic life, which had never ceased to shed
its light all through the past.
The Sa1phitas.
There are four collections or Sarphitas, namely Rg-Veda,
Sarna-Veda, Yajur-Veda and Atharva-Veda. Of these the Rg-
Veda is probably the earliest. The Sarna-Veda has practically
no independent value, for it consists of stanzas taken (excepting
only 75) entirely from the Rg-Veda, which were meant to be
sung to certain fixed melodies, and may thus be called the book
of chants. The Yajur-Veda however contains in addition to the
verses taken from the Rg-Veda many original prose formulas.
The arrangement of the verses of the Sarna-Veda is solely with
reference to their place and use in the Soma sacrifice; the con-
tents of the Yajur- Veda are arranged in the order in which the
verses were actually employed in the various religious sacrifices.
It is therefore called the Veda ofYajus-sacrificial prayers. These
may be contrasted with the arrangement in the Rg-Veda in this,
that there the verses are generally arranged in accordance with
the gods who are adored in them. Thus, for example, first we get
all the poems addressed to Agni or the Fire-god, then all those
to the god Indra and so on. The fourth collection, the Atharva-
Veda, probably attained its present form considerably later than
the I~g- Veda. In spirit, however, as Professor Macdonell says,
"it is not only entirely different from the Rigveda but represents a
much more primitive stage of thought. \;yhile the Rigveda deals
almost exclusively with the higher gods as conceived by a com-
1 Pal)ini, m. iii. 94·
u] The Brahma11as 13
The Ara9yakas.
As a further development of the Brahmat:J.as however we get
the Arat)yakas or forest treatises. These works were probably
composed for old men who had retired into the forest and were
thus unable to perform elaborate sacrifices requiring a multitude
of accessories and articles which could not be procured in forests.
In these, meditations on certain symbols were supposed to be of
great merit, and they gradually began to supplant the sacrifices
as being of a superior order. It is here that we find that amongst
a certain section of intelligent people the ritualistic ideas began
to give way, and philosophic speculations about the nature of
truth became gradually substituted in their place. To take an
illustration from the beginning of the Brhadara9yaka we find
that instead of the actual performance of the horse sacrifice
(asvamedha) there are directions for meditating upon the dawn
( U,fas) as the head of the horse, the sun as the eye of the horse,
the air as its life, and so on. This is indeed a distinct advance-
ment of the claims of speculation or meditation over the actual
performance of the complicated ceremonials of sacrifice. The
growth of the subjective speculation, as being capable of bringing
the highest good, gradually resulted in the supersession of Vedic
ritualism and the establishment of the claims of philosophic
meditation and self-knowledge as the highest goal of life. Thus
we find that the Arat)yaka age was a period during which free
thinking tried gradually to shake off the shackles of ritualism
which had fettered it for a long time. It was thus that the
Aral)yakas could pave the way for the Upani~ads, revive the
germs of philosophic speculation in the Vedas, and develop them
in a manner which made the U pani~ads the source of all philo-
sophy that arose in the world of Hindu thought.
growing belief in the unity of the gods (cf. the refrain of 3, 35)
each of whom might be regarded as a type of the divine 1." But
whether we call it Henotheism or the mere temporary exaggera-
tion of the powers of the deity in question, it is evident that this
stage can neither be properly called polytheistic nor monotheistic,
but one which had a tendency towards them both, although it
was not sufficiently developed to be identified with either of them.
The tendency towards extreme exaggeration could be called a
monotheistic bias in germ, whereas the correlation of different
deities as independent of one another and yet existing side by side
was a tendency towards polytheism.
Growth of a Monotheistic tendency; Prajapati, Visvakarma.
This tendency towards extolling a god as the greatest and
highest gradually brought forth the conception of a supreme
Lord of all beings {Prajapati), not by a process of conscious
generalization but as a necessary stage of development of the mind,
able to imagine a deity as the repository of the highest moral and
physical power, though its direct manifestation cannot be per-
ceived. Thus the epithet Prajapati or the Lord of beings, which
was originally an epithet for other deities, came to be recognized
as a separate deity, the highest and the greatest. Thus it is said
in R. V. x. 121 2 :
In the beginning rose Hiral)yagarbha,
Born as the only lord of all existence.
This earth he settled firm and heaven established :
What god shall we adore with our oblations ?
Who gives us breath, who gives us strength, whose bidding
All creatures must obey, the bright gods even;
Whose shade is death, whose shadow life immortal :
What god shall we adore with our oblations?
Who by his might alone became the monarch
Of all that breathes, of all that wakes or slumbers,
Of all, both man and beast, the lord eternal :
What god shall we adore with our oblations?
Whose might and majesty these snowy mountains,
The ocean and the distant stream exhibit ;
Whose arms extended are these spreading regions :
What god shall we adore with our oblations ?
Who made the heavens bright, the earth enduring,
Who fixed the firmament, the heaven of heavens;
Who measured out the air's extended spaces:
What god shall we adore with our oblations?
1
Macdgnell's Vedz"c Mythology, p. 17. 2 The Rigveda, by Kaegi, pp. 88, 89.
20 The Vedas, Brahma1faS and their Philosophy [ CH.
Similar attributes are also ascribed to the deity Visvakarma
(All-creator )I. He is said to be father and procreator of all beings,
though himself uncreated. He generated the primitive waters.
It is to him that the sage says,
Who is our father, our creator, maker,
Who every place doth know and every creature,
By whom alone to gods their names were given,
To him all other creatures go to ask him 2• R. V. x. 82. 3·
Brahma.
The conception of Brahman which has been the highest glory
for the Vedanta philosophy of later days had hardly emerged in
the ~g- Veda from the associations of the sacrificial mind. The
meanings that Sayat)a the celebrated commentator of the Vedas
gives of the word as collected by Haug are: (a) food, food offering,
(b) the chant of the sama-singer, (c) magical formula or text,
(d) duly completed ceremonies, (e) the chant and sacrificial gift
together, (f) the r<?citation of the hotr priest, (g) great. Roth
says that it also means "the devotion which manifests itself as
longing and satisfaction of the soul and reaches forth to the
gods." But it is only in the Satapatha Brahmal)a that the con-
ception of Brahman has acquired a great significance as the
supreme principle which is the moving force behind the gods.
Thus the Satapatha says," Verily in the beginning this (universe)
was the Brahman (neut.). It created the gods; and, having
created the gods, it made them ascend these worlds: Agni this
(terrestrial) world, Vayu the air, and Siirya the sky.... Then the
Brahman itself went up to the sphere beyond. Having gone up
to the sphere beyond, it considered, 'How can I descend again
into these worlds?' It then descended again by means of these
two, Form and N arne. Whatever has a name, that is name; and
that again which has no name and which one knows by its form,
' this is (of a certain) form,' that is form : as far as there are Form
and Name so far, indeed, extends this (universe). These indeed
are the two great forces of Brahman; and, verily, he who knows
these two great forces of Brahman becomes himself a great force 8•
In another place Brahman is said to be the ultimate thing in the
Universe and is identified with Prajapati, Puru!?a and Pral)a
1 See The Ri'gveda, by Kacgi, p. 89, and also Muir'sSa11skrit Texts, vol. IV. pp. 5-11.
2 Kaegi's translation.
8 See Eggeling's translation of Satapatha Brahmal)a S.B.E. vol. xuv. pp. 27, z8.
n] Sacrifice; the First Rudiments ofthe Law of Karma 21
Sagara" Press, Bombay, I9I7· These are I isa, 2 Kena, 3 Ka!ha, 4 Prasna, 5 Mul)-
9aka, 6 Mal)9iikya, 7 Taittir'iya, 8 Aitareya, 9 Chandogya, 10 Brhadaral)yaka,
1 I Svetasvatara, I 2 Kau~Haki, I 3 Maitreyi, I 4 Kaivalya, I 5 Jabala, 16 Brahma-
bindu, I7 Ha~psa, I8 Arul)ika, J9 Garbha, 20 Narayal)a, 2I Naraya!Ja, 22 Para-
maha~psa, 23 Brahma, 24 Amrtanada, 25 Atharvasiras, 26 Atharvasikha, 27 Mai-
trayal)'i, 28 Brhajjabala, 29 Nrsirphapiirvatapin'i, 30 Nrsi~phottaratapini, 31 Kalag-
nirudra, 32 Subala, 33 K~urika, 34 Yantrika, 35 Sarvasara, 36 Niralamba, 37 Su-
karahasya, 38 Vajrasiicika, 39 Tejobindu, 40 Nadabindu, 4I Dhyanabindu, 42 Brah-
mavidya, 43 Yogatattva, 44 Atmabodha, 45 Naradaparivrajaka, 46 Trisikhibrahmal)a,
47 Sita, 48 Vogacii9ama!li, 49 Nirval)a, so Mal)dalabrahma!Ja, 51 Dak~il)amurtti,
52 Sarabha, 53 Skanda, 54 Tripadvibhiitimahanarayal)a, 55 Advayataraka, s6 Rama-
rahasya, 57 IUmapiirvatapini, :;8 Ramottaratapini, 59 Vasudeva, 6o Mudgala,
6I Sal)9ilya, 62 Paitigala, 63 Bhik~uka, 64 Maha, 65 Sariraka, 66 Yoga.Sikha,
67 Turiyatita, 68 Sa~pnyasa, 69 Paramaha~psaparivrajaka, 70 Ak~amala, 71 Avyakta,
72 Ekak~ara, 73 Annapftrna, 74 Siirya, 75 Ak~i, 76 Adhyatma, 77 Ku~J9ika, 78 Sa-
vitri, 79 Atman, 8o Pasupatabrahma, 8I Parabrahma, 82 Avadhiita, 83 Tripuratapini,
84 Devi, 85 Tripura, 86 Ka!harudra, 87 Bhavana, 88 Rudrahrdaya, 89 Yogakul)9ali,
90 Bhasmajabala, 91 Rudrak~ajabala, 92 Gal)apati, 93 Jabaladar5ana, 94 Tarasara,
95 Mahavakya, 96 Paficabrahma, 97 Pral)agnihotra, 98 Gopalapiirvatapini, 99 Gopa-
Iottaratapini, 100 Kr~l)a, 1oi Yajfiavalkya, 102 Varaha, 103 Sa!hyayaniya, 104 Ha-
yagr'iva, 105 Dattatreya, Io6 Garu9a, 107 Kalisantaral)a, 108 Jabali, 109 Sau-
bhagyalak~mi, I 10 Sarasvatirahasya, 1 I I Bahvrca, I I2 Muktika.
The collection of U pani~ads translated by Dara shiko, Aurangzeb's brother, contained
50 Upani~ads. The r.Iuktika Upani~arl gives a list of I08 Upani~ads. With the exception
of the first 13 Upani~ads most of them are of more or less later date. The Upani~ds
dealt with in this chapter are the earlier ones. Amongst the later ones there are some
which repeat the purport of these, there are others which deal with the Saiva, Sakta,
the Yoga and the Vai~l)ava doctrines. These will be referred to in connection with the
cansideration of those systems in Volume II. The later Upani~ads which only repeat the
purport of those dealt with in this chapter do not require further mention. Some of
the later V pani~ads were composed even as late as the fourteenth or the.fifteenth century·
CH. In] The place of the Upani~ads in Vedic lzterature 29
process of development and they were probably regarded as parts
of one literature, in spite of the differences in their subject-matter.
Deussen supposes that the principle of this division was to be
found in this, that the BrahmaJ].as were intended for the house-
holders, the AraJ].yakas for those who in their old age withdrew
into the solitude of the forests and the U pani~ads for those who
renounced the world to attain ultimate salvation by meditation.
Whatever might be said about these literary classifications the
ancient philosophers of India looked upon the Upani!?ads as being
of an entirely different type from the rest of the Vedic literature
as dictating the path of kno\vledge (Jiliiua-miirga) as opposed
to the path of works (karma-miirga) which forms the content
of the latter. It is not out of place here to mention that the
orthodox Hindu view holds that whatever may be written in the
Veda is to be interpreted as commandments to perform certain
actions (vidhi) or prohibitions against committing certain others
(nifedha). Even the stories or episodes are to be so interpreted
that the real objects of thei1 insertion might appear as only to
praise the performa11ce of the commandments and to blame the
commission of the prohibitions. No person has any right to argue
why any particular Vedic commandment is to be followed, for no
reason can ever discover that, and it is only because reason fails
to find out why a certain Vedic act leads to a certain effect that
the Vedas have been revealed as commandments and prohibitions
to show the true path of happiness. The Vedic teaching belongs
therefore to that of the Karma-marga or the performance of Vedic
duties of sacrifice, etc. The U pani!?ads however do not require
the performance of any action, but only reveal the ultimate truth
and reality, a knowledge of which at once emancipates a man.
Readers of Hindu philosophy are aware that there is a very strong
controversy on this point between the adherents of the Vedanta
( Upani~ads) and those of the Veda. For the latter seek in analogy
to the other parts of the Vedic literature to establish the principle
that the U pani~ads should not be regarded as an exception, but
that they should also be so interpreted that they might also be
held out as commending the performance of duties; but the
former dissociate the Upani~ads from the rest of the Vedic litera-
ture and assert that they do not make the slightest reference to
any Vedic duties, but only delineate the ultimate reality which
reveals the highest knowledge in the minds of the deserving.
30 The E artier Upanz~ads [cH.
Sankara the most eminent exponent of the U pani~ads holds that
they are meant for such superior men who are already above
worldly or heavenly prosperities, and for whom the Vedic duties
have ceased to have any attraction. Wheresoever there may be
such a deserving person, be he a student, a householder or an
ascetic, for him the Upani~ads have been revealed for his ultimate
emancipation and the ~r~ .-knt>Wledge. Those who perform the
Vedic dut~~):>elor\g to··a_ stage inferior to those who no longer
care for the fruits of the Vedic duties but are eager for final
emancipation, and it is the latter who alone are fit to hear the
Upani~ads 1 •
the sacrifices are not fit to hear the Upani~ads and those who are fit to hear the Upa-
ni~ds have no longer any necessity to perform the sacrificial duties.
2 When the SalJlhita texts had become substantially fixed, they were committed
to memory in different parts of the country and transmitted from teacher to pupil
along with directions for the practical performance of sacrificial duties. The latter
formed the matter of prose. compositions, the Brahmal_las. These however were
gradually liable to diverse kinds of modifications according to the special tendencies
and needs of the people among which they were recited. Thus after a time there
occurred a great divergence in the readings of the texts of the Brahmal)aS even of the
same Veda among different people. These different schools were known by the name
of particular Sakhas (e.g. Aitareya, Kau~itaki) with which the Brahmal)as were asso-
ciated or named. According to the divergence of the Brahmar:~as of the different
Sakhas there occurred the divergences of content and the length of the Upani~ads
associated with them.
III] Brahma~as and the Early Upanz~ads 31
form the Taittirlya and Mahanarayal).a, of the Ka!ha school
the Kathaka, of the Maitrayal).l school the 1\Iaitrayal)l. The
Brhadaral).yaka U pani~ad forms part of the Satapatha Brahmar:ta
of the Vajasaneyi schools. The Isa Upani~ad also belongs to the
latter school. But the school to which the Svetasvatara belongs
cannot be traced, and has probably been lost. The presump-
tion with regard to these U pani~ads is that they represent the
enlightened views of the particular schools among which they
flourished, and under whose names they passed. A large number
of U pani~ads of a comparatively later age were attached to the
Atharva-Veda, most of which were named not according to the
Vedic schools but according to the subject-matter with which
they dealP.
It may not be out of place here to mention that from the
frequent episodes in the Upani~ads in which the Brahmins are
described as having gone to the K~attriyas for the highest know-
ledge of philosophy, as well as from the disparateness of the
U pani~ad teachings from that of the general doctrines of the
Brahmar:tas and from the allusions to the existence of philo-
sophical speculations amongst the people in Pali works, it may be
inferred that among the K~attriyas in general there existed earnest
philosophic enquiries which must be regarded as having exerted
an important influence in the formation of the U pani~ad doctrines.
There is thus some probability in the supposition that though the
U pani~ads are found directly incorporated with the Brahmar:tas
it was not the production of the growth of Brahmanic dogmas
alone, but that non-Brahmanic thought as well must have either
set the U pani~ad doctrines afoot, or have rendered fruitful assist-
ance to their formulation and cultivation, though they achieved
their culmination in the hands of the Brahmins.
Schroeder think that MaitriiyaQI also belongs to the earliest group, whereas Deussen
counts it as a comparatively later production. Winternitz divides the U pani~ads into
four periods. In the first period he includes Brhadaral)yaka, Chandogya, Taittiriya,
Aitareya, Kau~itaki and Kena. In the second he includes Kii!haka, isa, Svetasvatara,
MuQ<;iaka, Mahanariiyal)a, and in the third period he includes Prasna, MaitriiyaQi and
Mal)9iikya. The rest of the U pani~ds he includes in the fourth period.
The Earlier Upani~ads [cu.
writes in the preface to his Welt als Wille und Vorstellung 1 ,
"And if, indeed, in addition to this he is a partaker of the benefit
conferred by the Vedas, the access to which, opened to us through
the Upanishads, is in my eyes the greatest advantage which this
still young century en joys over previous ones, because I believe
that the influence of the Sanskrit literature will penetrate not less
deeply than did the revival of Greek literature in the fifteenth
century: if, I say, the reader has also already received and
assimilated the sacred, primitive Indian wisdom, then is he best
of all prepared to hear what I have to say to him .... I might ex-
press the opinion that each one of the individual and disconnected
aphorisms which make up the Upanishads may be deduced as
a consequence from the thought I am going to impart, though
the converse, that my thought is to be found in the Upanishads
is by no means the case." Again, "How does every line display
its firm,definite,and throughout harmonious meaning! From every
sentence deep, original, and sublime thoughts arise, and the whole
is pervaded by a high and holy and earnest spirit .... In the whole
world there is no study, except that of the originals, so beneficial
and so elevating as that of the Oupanikhat. It has been the solace
of my life, it will be the solace of my death! 2 " Through Schopen-
hauer the study of the U pani~ads attracted much attention in
Germany and with the growth of a general interest in the study
of Sanskrit, they found their way into other parts of Europe as
well.
The study of the U pani!?ads has however gained a great
impetus by the earnest attempts of our Ram Mohan Roy who
not only translated them into Bengali, Hindi and English and
published them at his own expense, but founded the Brahma
Samaj in Bengal, the main religious doctrines of which were
derived directly from the U pani~ads.
The World.
We have already seen that the universe has come out of
Brahman, has its essence in Brahman, and will also return back
to it. But in spite of its existence as Brahman its character as
represented to experience could not be denied. Sarikara held
that the U pani~ads referred to the external world and accorded
a reality to it consciously with the purpose of treating it as merely
relatively real, which will eventually appear as unreal as soon
as the ultimate truth, the Brahman, is known. This however
remains to be modified to this extent that the sages had not
probably any conscious purpose of according a relative reality to
the phenomenal world, but in spite of regarding Brahman as the
highest reality they could not ignore the claims of the exterior
world, and had to accord a reality to it. The inconsistency of this
reality of the phenomenal world with the ultimate and only
reality of Brahman was attempted to be reconciled by holding
that this world is not beside him but it has come out of him, it
is maintained in him and it will return back to him.
The world is sometimes spoken of in its twofold aspect, the
organic and the inorganic. All organic things, whether plants,
animals or men, have souls 1• Brahman desiring to be many created
fire (teJas), water (ap) and earth (kfiti). Then the self-existent
Brahman entered into these three, and it is by their combination
that all other bodies are formed 2• So all other things are produced
as a result of an alloying or compounding of the parts of these three
together. In this theory of the threefold division of the primitive
elements lies the earliest germ of the later distinction (especially
in the Sarpkhya school) of pure infinitesimal substances(tanmatra)
and gross elements, and the theory that each gross substance is
composed of the atoms of the primary elements. And in Prasna
IV. 8 we find the gross elements distinguished from their subtler
natures, e.g. earth (Prtlzivi), and the subtler state of earth
(prtlzivlmatra). In the Taittiriya, II. 1, however, ether (tikasa)
is also described as proceeding from Brahman, and the other
elements, air, fire, water, and earth, are described as each pro-
ceeding directly from the one which directly preceded it.
Doctrine of Transmigration.
When the Vedic people witnessed the burning of a dead body
they supposed that the eye of the man went to the sun, his breath
to the wind, his speech to the fire, his limbs to the different parts
of the universe. They also believed as we have already seen in
the recompense of good and bad actions in worlds other than our
own, and though we hear of such things as the passage of the
human soul into trees, etc., the tendency towards transmigration
had but little developed at the time.
In the U pani!?ads however we find a clear development in
the direction of transmigration in two distinct stages. In the one
the Vedic idea of a recompense in the other world is combined with
1 Cha. vr. z-4•
54 The E a1'lz"er Upan~ads [cH.
the doctrine of transmigration, whereas in the other the doctrine
of transmigration comes to the forefront in supersession of the
idea of a recompense in the other world. Thus it is said that
those who performed charitable deeds or such public works as the
digging of wells, etc., follow after death the way of the fathers
(pitryiina), in which the soul after death enters first into smoke,
then into night, the dark half of the month, etc., and at last reaches
the moon; after a residence there as long as the remnant of his
good deeds remains he descends again through ether, wind, smoke,
mist, cloud, rain, herbage, food and seed, and through the assimi-
lation of food by man he enters the womb of the mother and is
born again. Here we see that the soul had not only a recompense
in the world of the moon, but was re-born again in this world 1 •
The other way is the way of gods (devayiina), meant for those
who cultivate faith and asceticism (tapas). These souls at death
enter successively into flame, day, bright half of the month, bright
half of the year, sun, moon, lightning, and then finally into
Brahman never to return. Deussen says that "the meaning of
the whole is that the soul on the way of the gods reaches regions
of ever-increasing light, in which is concentrated all that is bright
and radiant as stations on the way to Brahman the 'light of
lights'" (jyoti~'ii1!l jyoti[z) 2•
The other line of thought is a direct reference to the doctrine
of transmigration unmixed with the idea of reaping the fruits of
his deeds (karma) by passing through the other worlds and with-
out reference to the doctrine of the ways of the fathers and gods,
the Yanas. Thus Yajnavalkya says, "when the soul becomes
weak (apparent weakness owing to the weakness of the body with
which it is associated) and falls into a swoon as it were, these senses
go towards it. It (Soul) takes these light particles within itself and
centres itself only in the heart. Thus when the person in the eye
turns back, then the soul cannot know colour; (the senses) become
one( with him); (people about him)say he does not see; (the senses)
become one (with him), he does not smell, (the senses) become
one (with him), he does not taste, (the senses) become one (with
him), he does not speak, (the senses) become one (with him), he
does not hear, (the senses) become one (with him), he does not
think, (the senses) become one with him, he does not touch, (the
senses) become one with him, he does not know, they say. The
1 Chii. v. ro. 2
Deussen's Philosophy of the Upanishads, p. 335·
III] Transmi'gration 55
tip of his heart shines and by that shining this soul goes out.
When he goes out either through the eye, the head, or by any
other part of the body, the vital function (prii~za) follows and all
the senses follow the vital function (prii~za) in coming out. He
is then with determinate consciousness and as such he comes
out. Knowledge, the deeds as well as previous experience (Pra.Jiia)
accompany him. Just as a caterpillar going to the end of a blade
of grass, by undertaking a separate movement collects itself, so
this self after destroying this body, removing ignorance, by a
separate movement collects itself. Just as a goldsmith taking a
small bit of ·gold, gives to it a newer and fairer form, so the soul
after destroying this body and removing ignorance fashions a
newer and fairer form as of the Pitrs, the Gandharvas, the gods,
of Prajapati or Brahma or of any other being.... As he acts and
behaves so he becomes, good by good deeds, bad by bad deeds,
virtuous by virtuous deeds and vicious by vice. The man .is full
of desires. As he desires so he wills, as he wills so he works, as
the work is done so it happens. There is also a verse, being
attached to that he wants to gain by karma that to which he
was attached. Having reaped the full fruit (lit. gone to the
end) of the karma that he does here, he returns back to this
world for doing karma 1 • So it is the case with those who have
desires. He who has no desires, who had no desires, who has
freed himself from all desires, is satisfied in his desires and in
himself, his senses do not go out. He being Brahma attains
Brahmahood. Thus the verse says, when all the desires that are
in his heart are got rid of, the mortal becomes immortal and
attains Brahma here" (Brh. IV. iv. 1-7).
A close consideration of the above passage shows that the
self itself destroyed the body and built up a newer and fairer
frame by its own activity when it reached the end of the present
life. At the time of death, the self collected within itself all
senses and faculties and after death all its previous knowledge,
work and experience accompanied him. The falling off of the
body at the time of death is only for the building of a newer
body either in this world or in the other worlds. The self which
thus takes rebirth is regarded as an aggregation of diverse cate-
gories. Thus it is said that "he is of the essence of understanding,
1 It is possible that there is a vague and obscure reference here to the doctrine that
of man; others say it does not exist. This I should like to know
instructed by thee. This is my third boon." Varna said, " It was
inquired of old, even by the gods ; for it is not easy to under-
stand it. Subtle is its nature, choose another boon. Do not
compel me to this." Naciketas said," Even by the gods was it
inquired before, and even thou 0 Death sayest that it is not easy
to understand it, but there is no other speaker to be found like
thee. There is no other boon like this." V am a said," Choose sons
and grandsons who may live a hundred years, choose herds of
cattle ; choose elephants and gold and horses ; choose the wide
expanded earth, and live thyself as many years as thou wishest.
Or if thou knowest a boon like this choose it together with wealth
and far-extending life. Be a king on the wide earth. I will make
thee the enjoyer of all desires. All those desires that are difficult
to gain in the world of mortals, all those ask thou at thy pleasure;
those fair nymphs with their chariots, with their musical instru-
ments; the like of them are not to be gained by men. I will give
them to thee, but do not ask the question regarding death."
Naciketas replied, u All those enjoyments are of to-morrow and
they only weaken the senses. All life is short, with thee the
dance and song. Man cannot be satisfied with wealth, we could
obtain wealth, as long as we did not reach you we live only as
l<;mg as thou pleasest. The boon which I choose I have said."
Varna said, " One thing is good, another is pleasant. Blessed is
he who takes the good, but he who chooses the pleasant loses
the object of man. But thou considering the objects of desire,
hast abandoned them. These two, ignorance (whose object is
6o The Earlier Upani~ads [en.
what is pleasant) and knowledge (whose object is what is good),
are known to be far asunder, and to lead to different goals.
Believing that this world exists and not the other, the careless
youth is subject to my sway. That knowledge which thou hast
asked is not to be obtained by argument. I know worldly hap-
piness is transient for that firm one is not to be obtained by what
is not firm. The wise by concentrating on the soul, knowing him
whom it is hard to behold, leaves both grief and joy. Thee
0 N aciketas, I believe to be like a house whose door is open to
Brahman. Brahman is deathless, whoever knows him obtains
whatever he wishes. The wise man is not born; he does not die;
he is not produced from anywhere. Unborn, eternal, the soul is
not slain, though the body is slain; subtler than what is subtle,
greater than what is great, sitting it goes far, lying it goes every-
where. Thinking the soul as unbodily among bodies, firm among
fleeting things, the wise man casts off all grief. The soul cannot
be gained by eloquence, by understanding, or by learning. It
can be obtained by him alone whom it chooses. To him it reveals
its own nature 1.'' So long as the Self identifies itself with its desires,
he wills and acts according to them and reaps the fruits in the
present and in future lives. But when he comes to know the
highest truth about himself, that he is the highest essence and prin-
ciple of the universe, the immortal and the infinite, he ceases to have
desires, and receding from all desires realizes the ultimate truth
of himself in his own infinitude. Man is as it were the epitome
of the universe and he holds within himself the fine constituents
of the gross body (annamaya ko~a), the vital functions (prlitJa-
maya kofa) of life, the will and desire (manomaya) and the
thoughts and ideas ( vifiiiinamaya), and so long as he keeps him-
self in these spheres and passes through a series of experiences
in the present life and in other lives to come, these experiences
are willed by him and in that sense created by him. He suffers
pleasures and pains, disease and death. But if he retires from
these into his true unchangeable being, he is in a state where he
· is one with his experience and there is no change and no move-
ment. What this state is cannot be explained by the use of
concepts. One could only indicate it by pointing out that it is
not any of those concepts found in ordinary knowledge; it is not
1 Ka~ha 11. The translation is not continuous. There are some parts in the extract
whatever one knows as this and this (neti neti). In this infinite
and true self there is no difference, no diversity, no meum and
tzmm. It is like an ocean in which all our phenomenal existence
will dissolve like salt in water. "Just as a lump of salt when put
in water will disappear in it and it cannot be taken out separately
but in whatever portion of water we taste we find the salt, so,
Maitreyi, does this great reality infinite and limitless consisting
only of pure intelligence manifesting itself in all these (phenomenal
existences) vanish in them and there is then no phenomenal know-
ledge" (Brh. II. 4· I 2 ). The true self manifests itself in all the
processes of our phenomenal existences, but ultimately when it
retires back to itself, it can no longer be found in them. It is a
state of absolute infinitude of pure intelligence, pure being, and
pure blessedness.
CHAPTER IV
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE SYSTEMS
OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY
phases of the system, but this principle cannot be carried all through, for the supple-
mentary information and arguments given by the later commentators often appear as
harmonious elaborations of the earlier writings and are very seldom in conflict with them.
Growth of the Philosophic Literature
use in the Vaiie#ka sutras of KaQada (IX. ii. I 3) which I consider as pre-Buddhistic.
The Buddhist pi!akas (.4-oo B.c.) called the heretical opinions "di{!hi" (Sanskrit-drl?!i
from the same root drs from which darsana is formed). Haribhadra (fifth century A.D.)
uses the word Darsana in the sense of systems of philosophy (sarvadarsanaviicyo'
rthalj-.$a(fdarsanasamuccaya 1.). Ratnakirtti (end of the tenth century A.D.) uses the
word also in the same sense (" Yadi niima darsane darsane niiniiprakiiram sattvalak-
~a~zam uktamasti." K~a!zabhaizgasiddhiin Six Buddldst N;•iiya tracts, p. 20). Madhava
(I 331 A. D.) calls his Compendium of all systems of philosophy, Sarvadarsanasar?tgraha.
The word "mata" (opinion or view) was also freely used in quoting the views of other
systems. llut there is no word to denote 'philosophers' in the technical sense. The
Buddhists used to call those who held heretical views "tairthika." The words" siddha,"
"jiliinin," etc. do not denote philosophers in the modern sense, they are used rather in
the sense of" seers" or "perfects."
IV] Purva Mzmanzsa
The Vedic texts were used as mantras (incantations) for sacrifices,
and people often disputed as to the relation of words in a
sentence or their mutual relative importance with reference to the
general drift of the sentence. There were also differences of view
with regard to the meaning of a sentence, the use to which it may
be applied as a mantra, its relative importance or the exact
nature of its connection with other similar sentences in a complex
Vedic context. The Mlmarpsa formulated some principles accord-
ing to which one could arrive at rational and uniform solutions
for all these difficulties. Preliminary to these its main objects, it
indulges in speculations with regard to the external world, soul,
perception, inference, the validity of the Vedas, or the like, for in
order that a man might perform sacrifices with mantras, a definite
order of the universe and its relation to man or the position and
nature of the mantras of the Veda must be demonstrated and
established. Though its interest in such abstract speculations is
but secondary yet it briefly discusses these in order to prepare a
rational ground for its doctrine of the mantras and their practical
utility for man. It is only so far as there are these preliminary
discussions in the Mlmarpsa that it may be called a system of
philosophy. Its principles and maxims for the interpretation of
the import of words and sentences have a legal value even to this
day. The siitras of Mlmarpsa are attributed to Jaimini, and Sahara
wrote a bha~ya upon it. The two great names in the history of
Mlmarpsa literature after Jaimini and Sahara are Kumarila Bhana
and his pupil Prabhakara, who criticized the opinions of his master
so much, that the master used to call him guru (master) in sarcasm,
and to this day his opinions pass as guru-mata, whereas the views
of Kumarila BhaHa pass as bhaf!a-mata 1• It may not be out of
place to mention here that Hindu Law (smrti) accepts without
any reservation the maxims and principles settled and formulated
by the Mlmarpsa.
1 There is a story that Kumarila could not understand the meaning of a Sanskrit
MANY scholars are of opinion that the Sarpkhya and the Yoga
represent the earliest systematic speculations of India. It is also
suggested that Buddhism drew much of its inspiration from them.
It may be that there is some truth in such a view, but the
systematic Sarpkhya and Yoga treatises as we have them had
decidedly been written after Buddhism. Moreover it is well-known
to every student of Hindu philosophy that a conflict with the
Buddhists has largely stimulated philosophic enquiry in most of
the systems of Hindu thought. A knowledge of Buddhism is
therefore indispensable for a right understanding of the different
systems in their mutual relation and opposition to Buddhism. It
seems desirable therefore that I should begin with Buddhism
first.
The State of Philosophy in India before the Buddha.
It is indeed difficult to give a short sketch of the different
philosophical speculations that were prevalent in India before
Buddhism. The doctrines of the U pani~ads are well known, and
these have already been briefly described. But these were not the
only ones. Even in the U pani~ads we find references to diverse
atheistical creeds 1• We find there that the origin of the world
and its processes were sometimes discussed, and some thought
that "time" was the ultimate cause of all, others that all these
had sprung forth by their own nature (svabhava), others that
everything had come forth in accordance with an inexorable
destiny or a fortuitous concourse of accidental happenings, or
through matter combinations in general. References to diverse
kinds of heresies are found in Buddhist literature also, but no
detailed accounts of these views are known. Of the U pani!?ad
type of materialists the two schools of Carvakas (Dhurtta and
Susik~ita) are referred to in later literature, though the time in
which these flourished cannot rightly be discovered 2• But it seems
1 Sveta§vatara, I. '2, kala!; svabhczbo m"yatiryadrcchii bhiitciniyotzil; puru~a iti cintyam.
2 Lokiiyata (literally, that which is found among people in general) seems to have
been the name by which all carvaka doctrines were generally known. See Gul)aratna
on the Lokayatas.
CH. v] Ciirviikas 79
probable however that the allusion to the materialists contained
in the U pani~ads refers to these or to similar schools. The
Carvakas did not believe in the authority of the Vedas or any
other holy scripture. According to them there was no soul. Life
and consciousness were the products of the combination of matter,
just as red colour was the result of mixing up white with
yellow or as the power of intoxication was generated in molasses
(madasakti). There is no after-life, and no reward of actions, as
there is neither virtue nor vice. Life is only for enjoyment. So
long as it lasts it is needless to think of anything else, as every-
thing will end with death, for when at death the body is burnt
to ashes there cannot be any rebirth. They do not believe in
the validity of inference. Nothing is trustworthy but what can
be directly perceived, for it is impossible to determine that the
distribution of the middle term (hetu) has not depended upon
some extraneous condition, the absence of which might destroy
the validity of any particular piece of inference. If in any case
any inference comes to be true, it is only an accidental fact and
there is no certitude about it. They were called Carvaka because
they would only eat but would not accept any other religious or
moral responsibility. The word comes from carv to eat. The
Dhurtta Carvakas held that there was nothing but the four
elements of earth, water, air and fire, and that the body was but the
result of atomic combination. There was no self or soul, no
virtue or vice. The Susik~ita Carvakas held that there was
a soul apart from the body but that it also was destroyed with
the destruction of the body. The original work of the Carvakas
was written in sutras probably by Brhaspati. J ayanta and Gul).ar-
atna quote two sutras from it. Short accounts of this school may be
found in J ayanta's Nyiiyamailjari, Madhava's Sarvadarsanasmtz-
graha and Gul).aratna's Tarkarahasyadipikii. Mahiibhiirata gives
an account of a man called Carvaka meeting Yudhi~thira.
Side by side with the doctrine of the Carvaka materialists we
are reminded of the Ajlvakas of which Makkhali Gosala, probably
a renegade disciple of the Jain saint lVIahavlra and a contemporary
of Buddha and Mahavlra, was the leader. This was a thorough-
going determinism denying the free will of man and his moral
responsibility for any so-called good or evil. The essence of
Makkhali's system is this, that "there is no cause, either proximate
or remote, for the depravity of beings or for their purity. They
8o Buddhist Philosophy [cH.
become so without any cause. Nothing depends either on one's
own efforts or on the efforts of others, in short nothing depends
on any human effort, for there is no such thing as power or energy,
or human exertion. The varying conditions at any time are due
to fate, to their environment and their own nature 1."
Another sophistical school led by Ajita Kesakambali taught
that there was no fruit or result of good or evil deeds; there is no
other world, nor was this one real; nor had parents nor any
former lives any efficacy with respect to this life. Nothing that
we can do prevents any of us alike from being wholly brought to
an end at death 2•
There were thus at least three currents of thought: firstly the
sacrificial Karma by the force of the magical rites of which any
person could attain anything he desired; secondly the Upani~ad
teaching that the Brahman, the self, is the ultimate reality and
being, and all else but name and form which pass away but do
not abide. That which permanently abides without change is the
real and true, and this is sel( Thirdly the nihilistic conceptions
that there is no law, no abiding reality, that everything comes
into being by a fortuitous concourse of circumstances or by some
unknown fate. In each of these schools, philosophy had probably
come to a deadlock. There were the Yoga practices prevalent in
the country and these were accepted partly on the strength of
traditional custom among certain sections, and partly by virtue
of the great spiritual, intellectual and physical power which they
gave to those who performed them. But these had no rational
basis behind them on which they could lean for support. These
were probably then just tending towards being affiliated to the
nebulous Sarpkhya doctrines which had grown up among certain
sections. It was at this juncture that we find Buddha erecting
a new superstructure of thought on altogether original lines which
thenceforth opened up a new avenue of philosophy for all posterity
to come. If the Being of the U pani~ads, the superlatively motion-
less, was the only real, how could it offer scope for further new
speculations, as it had already discarded all other matters of
interest? If everything was due to a reasonless fortuitous con-
course of circumstances, reason could not proceed further in the
direction to create any philosophy of the unreason. The magical
1 Siimaiiiiaphala-sutta, Dfgha, 11. '20. Iloernlc?s article on the Ajivakas, E. R. E.
2 Slimmiiiaphala-sutta, n. 23.
v] Buddha's Life
force of the hocus-pocus of sorcery or sacrifice had but little that
was inviting for philosophy to proceed on. If we thus take into
account the state of Indian philosophic culture before Buddha,
we shall be better able to understand the value of the Buddhistic
contribution to philosophy.
of the twelve links of causes as we find it in the Sai!IYU!ta Nikiiya as the earliest
Buddhist view, as Satpyutta does not represent the oldest part of the suttas. But as
this doctrine of the twelve causes became regarded as a fundamental Buddhist doctrine
and as it gives us a start in philosophy I have not thought it fit to enter into conjec-
tural discussions as to the earliest form. Dr E. J. Thomas drew my attention to this tact.
2 AttJzasiilini, p. 38. There are also other senses in which the word is used, as
dham nza -desa11ii where it means religious teaching. The Lmikiivatiira described Dharmma
as gu~wdravyapzervakii dharmm,"i, i.e. Dharmmas are those which are associated as attri-
lmtes and substances.
Doctrine of Causal Connection 85
on birth. What being there, is there birth, on what does birth
depend ? Then it occurred to him that birth could only be if
there were previous existence (bhava) 1• But on what does this
existence depend, or what being there is there bhava. Then it
occurred to him that there could not be existence unless there
were holding fast (upiidana) 2• But on what did upadana depend?
It occurred to him that it was desire (tm:.zha) on which upadana
depended. There can be upadana if there is desire (ta?zhii)'. But
what being there, can there be desire? To this question it
occurred to him that there must be feeling (vedanii) in order that
there may be desire. But on what does vedana depend, or rather
what must be there, that there may be feeling (vedanii)? To this
it occurred to him that there must be a sense-contact (plzassa)
in order that there may be feeling 4• If there should be no sense-
contact there would be no feeling. But on what does sense-
contact depend? It occurred to him that as there are six sense-
contacts, there are the six fields of contact (ayata1la) 5• But on
what do the six ayatanas depend? It occurred to him that
there must be the mind and body (1liimariipa) in order that there
may be the six fields of contacP; but on what does namariipa
depend? It occurred to him that without consciousness ( viiziiiina)
there could be no namariipa 6• But what being there would there
1 This word bhava is interpreted by Candrakirtti in his Madhyamika vrtti, p. 565
(La Vallee Poussin's edition) as the deed which brought about rebirth (putzarbhava-
j'anaka~n karma samutthiipayati kiiyma viicii matzasa ca).
2 Atthasiilitzi, p. 385, upadanantida}hagahai)atp. Candrakirtti in explaining upadana
says that whatever thing a man desires he holds fast to the materials necessary for
attaining it (yatra vastutzi satn~zastasya vastutzo 'rymzaya vi¢hapatziiya upiidiinamupii-
datte tatra tatra priirthayate) . .Miidhyamika vrtti, p. 565.
3 Candrakirtti describes tr~I)a as iisviidatziibhinatzda?ziidhyavasii?zasthiitziidiitmapri-
Compendium, p. '27 1. This seems to me toLe fairly correct. The four skandhas are called
nama in each birth. These together with riipa (matter) give us namariipa (mind
and body) which being developed render the activities through the six sense-gates
possiblesothat there may be knowledge. Cf.M. V. 564. Govindananda, the commentator
86 Buddhist Philosophy [cH.
be vififiana. Here it occurred to him that in order that there
might be vififiana there must be the conformations (sankluira) 1•
But what being there are there the sankharas? Here it occurred
to him that the sankharas can only be if there is ignorance
(avyja). If avijja could be stopped then the sankharas will be
stopped, and if the sankharas could be stopped vififiana could be
stopped and so on :1.
It is indeed difficult to be definite as to what the Buddha
actually wished to mean by this cycle of dependence of existence
sometimes called Bhavacakra (wheel of existence). Decay and
death (jariimara?ta) could not have happened if there was no
birth 3• This seems to be clear. But at this point the difficulty
begins. We must remember that the t!leory of rebirth was
on Sankara's bha!,?ya on the Brahma-siitras (II- ii. 19), gives a different interpretation of
Namariipa which may probably refer to the Vijfianavada view though we have no means
at hand to verify it. He says-To think the momentary as the permanent is Avidya;
from there come the sarpskaras of attachment, antipathy or anger, and infatuation; from
there the first vijfiana or thought ofthe foetus is produced; from that alayavijfiana, and
the four elements (which are objects of name and are hence called nama) are produced,
and from those are produced the white and black, semen and blood called riipa.
Both Vacaspati and Amalananda agree with Govindananda in holding that nama
signifies the semen and the ovum while riipa means the visible physical body built out
of them. Vijfiafia entered the womb and on account of it namariipa were produced
through the association of previous karma. See Vedi'intakaljJataru, pp. 274, 275· On
the doctrine of the entrance of vijfiafia into the womb compare D. N. II. 63.
1 It is difficult to say what is the exact sense of the word here. The Buddha was
one of the first few earliest thinkers to introduce proper philosophical terms and phraseo-
logy with a distinct philosophical method and he had often to use the same word in
more or less different senses. Some of the philosophical terms at least are therefore
rather elastic when compared with the terms of precise and definite meaning which we find
in later Sanskrit thought. Thus inS. N. III. p. 87, "Smikhatattz abhisaizkharonti,"
sai1khara means that which synthesises the complexes. In the Compendium it is trans-
lated as will, action. Mr Aung thinks that it means the same as karma; it is here used
in a different sense from what we find in the word sankhara khandha (viz. mental
states). 'We get a list of 51 mental states forming sankhara khandh:1 in Dhamma
Sailga1_1i, p. 18, and another different set of 4-0 mental states in Dharmasm!lgraha, p. 6.
In addition to these forty cittasamprayuktasa1flSkiira, it also counts thirteen cittavi-
prayuktasalftskiira. Candrakirtti interprets it as meaning attachment, antipathy and
infatuation, p. 563. Govindananda, the commentator on Sankara's Brahma-sutra (II. ii.
19), also interprets the word in connection with the doctrine of Pratityasamutpada as
attachment, antipathy and infatuation.
2 Sm!zyutta Nikiiya, II. 7-8.
3 Jara and maral).a bring in soka (grief), paridevana (lamentation), dul:Jkha (suffer-
1
The word ayatana is found in many places in the earlier Upani~ads in the sense
of" field or place," Cha. I. s. Brh. III. 9· 10, but ~a<;Iayatana does not occur.
2
Candrakirtti interprets nama as Vedaniidayo'nlpi~zafcatviiraf.z skmzdhiistatra tatra
bhave niimaymztiti niima. saha rupaskandhena ca 11iima rzlpam ceti niimarz"tpamucyate.
The four skandhas in each specific birth act as name. These together with rii.pa make
namartlpa. llf. v. s64.
3 Warren's Buddhism in Translations, p. I84.
dihi aiiiie honti ten' eva yasmin samaye suriyo udeti tasmin samaye tassa te}ii·saiz.
khiitam ropa'!l piti eva1_n vuccamiine pi na ropiidihi aiiiio sur£yo 1tiima atthi. Tatlui
cittam phassiidayo dhamme upiidiiya paiiiiapiyati. A tthato pan' ettha tehi aiiiiam eva.
Tena yasmin samaye cittam uppanna'!l hoti eka1ftsuz eva tasmi1z samaye phassiidihi
atthato aiiiiad eva hoti ti.
4 "Jiitirdehajanma paiicaskandhasanmdiiya!z," Govindananda's Ratnaprablzii on
as that from which anything becomes, as merit and demerit (dharmiidi). See also
Vibhanga, p. 137 and \;Varren's Buddhism in Translations, p. 201. Mr Aung says in
Abhidhammatthasangaha, p. 189, that bhavo includes kammabhavo (the active side of
an existence) and upapattibhavo (the passive side). And the commentators say that
bhava is a contraction of" kammabhava '' or Karma-becoming i.e. karmic activity.
2 Prof. De Ia Vallee Poussin in his Thtorie des Douze Causes, p. 26, says that
vijtiana ne rlescendait pas dans le sein maternel Ia namarupa s'y constituerait-il? "
Govinrlananda on Sankara's commentary on the Brahma-szetras (11. ii. 19) says that the
first consciousness (vijfiana) of the foetus is produced by the sarp.skaras of the previous
birth, and from that the four elements (which he calls nama) and from that the white
and red, semen and ovum, and the first stage of the foetus (kalala-budbudiivastha) is
produced.
92 Buddhist Philosophy [cH.
rupa, ~ac;layatana, sparsa, vedana, tr~l)a, upadana and the bhava
(leading to another life) of the present actual life. This bhava
produces the jati and jaramarar:ta of the next life 1•
It is interesting to note that these twelve links in the chain
extending in three sections over three lives are all but the
manifestations of sorrow to the bringing in of which they natur-
ally determine one another. Thus Abhidhammattlzasangaha
says "each of these twelve terms is a factor. For the composite
term 'sorrow,' etc. is only meant to show incidental consequences
of birth. Again when ' ignorance ' and 'the actions of the
mind' have been taken into account, craving Ur~?zii), grasping
(upiidiina) and (karma) becoming (bhava) are implicitly ac-
counted for also. In the same manner when craving, grasping
and (karma) becoming have been taken into account, ignorance
and the actions of the mind are (implicitly) accounted for, also;
and when birth, decay, and death are taken into account, even
the fivefold fruit, to wit (rebirth}, consciousness, and the rest are
accounted for. And thus :
Five causes in the Past and Now a fivefold ' fruit.'
Five causes Now and yet to come a fivefold 'fruit' make up
the Twenty Modes, the Three Connections (1. sankhara and
viflflana, 2. vedana and tal)ha, 3· bhava and jati) and the four
groups (one causal group in the Past, one resultant group in the
Present, one causal group in the Present and one resultant
group in the Future, each group consisting of five modes) 2."
These twelve interdependent links (dviidasaizga) represent
the paticcasam u ppada (pratityasamutpiida) doctrines (dependent
origination ) 3 which are themselves but sorrow and lead to cycles
of sorrow. The term paticcasamuppada or pratityasamutpada
has been differently interpreted in later Buddhist literature'.
1 This explanation probably cannot be found in the early Pali texts; but Buddha-
gho~a mentions it in Sumaizga!aviliisini on l¥Iahiinidiina suttanta. We find it also in
Abhidhammatthasmigaha, VIII. 3· Ignorance and the actions of the mind belong to
the past; "birth," "decay and death" to the future; the intermediate eight to the
present. It is styled as trikar:tc).aka (having three branches) in Abhidhamzako!a, III.
'lo-'24· Two in the past branch, two in the future and eight in the middle "sa
pratitynsamutpiido dviida!iiizgastrikii~zrfakaf.z pi'irviipariintayordve dve madhye~tau."
2
Aung and Mrs Rhys Davids' translation of Abhidhammatthasaizgaha, pp. 189-190.
s The twelve links are not always constant. Thus in the list given in the Dialogues
of the Buddha, II. '23 f., avijja and sankhara have been omitted and the start has been
made with consciousness, and it has been said that "Cognition turns back from name
and form; it goes not beyond."
'M. V. P· sf.
v] Avi;j"a in Patzccasamuppada 93
Samutpada means appearance or arising (priidurbkiiva) and pra-
tltya means after getting (prati+i+ya); combining the two we
find, arising after getting (something). The elements, depending
on which there is some kind of arising, are called hetu (cause) and
paccaya (ground). These two words however are often used in
the same sense and are interchangeable. But paccaya is also
used in a specific sense. Thus when it is said that avijja is the
paccaya of sankhara it is meant that avijja is the ground (!hiti)
of the origin of the sankharas, is the ground of their movement,
of the instrument through which they stand (ninzitta!!hiti), of
their ayuhana (conglomeration), of their interconnection, of their
intelligibility, of their conjoint arising, of their function as cause
and of their function as the ground with reference to those which
are determined by them. Avijja in all these nine ways is
the ground of sankhara both in the past and also in the future,
though avijja itself is determined in its turn by other grounds 1•
When we take the hetu aspect of the causal chain, we cannot
think of anything else but succession, but when we take the
paccaya aspect we can have a better vision into the nature of the
cause as ground. Thus when avijja is said to be the ground
of the sankharas in the nine ways mentioned above, it seems
reasonable to think that the sankharas were in some sense
regarded as special manifestations of avijja 2 • But as this point
was not further developed in the early Buddhist texts it would
be unwise to proceed further with it.
The Khandhas.
The word khandha (Skr. skandha) means the trunk of a tree
and is generally used to mean group or aggregate 3• \Ve have
seen that Buddha said that there was no atman (soul). He said
that when people held that they found the much spoken of soul,
they really only found the five khandhas together or any one of
them. The khandhas are aggregates of bodily and psychical
states which are immediate with us and are divided into five
1 See Pa!isambhidtzmagga, vol. I. p. so; see also lllajjhima Nikiiya, 1. 67, saiz-
khiirii ... avijjt1nidt"ilu1 avi]jiisamudayii avi]'jtl}iitikii avi]jtipablzavii.
2 In the Yoga derivation of asmita (egoism), raga (attachment), dve~a (antipathy)
and abbinivda (self love) from avidya we find also that all the five are regarded as the
five special stages of the growth of avidya (paiicaparvii avid;tii).
3 The word skandha is used in Chandogya, II. 23 {trayo dlzarnzaska11dluil_z yaj1ial_z
adhyayanam dtznam) in the sense of branches and in almost the same sense in ::\Iaitri,
VII. I I.
94 Buddhist Philosophy [cH.
classes: (1) riipa (four elements, the body, the senses), sense
data, etc., (2) vedana (feeling-pleasurable, painful and in-
different), (3) safifla (conceptual knowledge), (4) sarikhara (syn-
thetic mental states and the synthetic functioning of compound
sense-affections, compound feelings and compound concepts),
(5) viflfiana (consciousness) 1 •
All these states rise depending one upon the other (pa!z"cca-
samuppmzna) and when a man says that he perceives the self he
only deludes himself, for he only perceives one or more of these.
The word riipa in riipakhandha stands for matter and material
qualities, the senses, and the sense data 2• But "riipa" is also
used in the sense of pure organic affections or states of mind
as we find in the Khmzdha Yamaka, 1. p. 16, and also in Sm!l-
yutta NikiiJ'a, III. 86. Rupaskandha according to Dlzarma-
-smtzgraha means the aggregate of five senses, the five sensations,
and the implicatory communications associated in sense per-
ceptions (viji'iapti).
The elaborate discussion of Dlzammasaizga?Zi begins by defin-
ing rupa as "cattaro ca ma/uiblziitii catunnanca mahiibhittanam
upiidiiJ'a riipam" (the four mahabhiitas or elements and that
proceeding from the grasping of that is called riipa) 3• Buddha-
gho!?a explains it by saying that riipa means the four maha-
bhutas and those which arise depending (nissiiya) on them as
a modification of them. In the riipa the six senses including
their affections are also included. In explaining why the four
elements are called mahabhutas, Buddhagho!?a says : "Just as a
magician (mii.:viikiira) makes the water which is not hard appear
as hard, makes the stone which is not gold appear as gold;
just as he himself though not a ghost nor a bird makes himself
appear as a ghost or a bird, so these elements though not them-
selves blue make themselves appear as blue (nilam upiidii nipam),
not yellow, red, or white make themselves appear as yellow, red
or white (odatam upiidiiriipam), so on account of their similarity
to the appearances created by the magician they are called
mahabhuta '."
In the Smtzyutta NikiiJ1a we find that the Buddha says, "0
Bhikkhus it is called rupam because it manifests (riipyati); how
1 Sm!zyulla .'\"ikciya, 111. 86, etc.
2 Abhidhammatthasmigaha, J.P. T. S. 1884, p. 27 ff.
3
Dhammasmiga~zi, pp. 124-179· 4
Atthaslili1li, p. 299·
v] Theory of Matter 95
does it manifest? It manifests as cold, and as heat, as hunger and
as thirst, it manifests as the touch of gnats, mosquitos, wind, the
sun and the snake; it manifests, therefore it is called riipa •."
If we take the somewhat conflicting passages referred to above
for our consideration and try to combine them so as to understand
what is meant by riipa, I think we find that that which mani-
fested itself to the senses and organs was called riipa. No dis-
tinction seems to have been made between the sense-data as
colours, smells, etc., as existing in the physical world and their
appearance as sensations. They were only numerically different
and the appearance of the sensations was dependent upon the
sense-data and the senses but the sense-data and the sensations
were " riipa." Under certain conditions the sense-data were fol-
lowed by the sensations. Buddhism did not probably start with
the same kind of division of matter and mind as we now do.
And it may not be out of place to mention that such an opposi-
tion and duality were found neither in the U pani~ads nor in the
Sarpkhya system which is regarded by some as pre-Buddhistic.
The four elements manifested themselves in certain forms and
were therefore called riipa; the forms of affection that appeared
were also called riipa; many other mental states or features
which appeared with them were also called riipa 2• The ayatanas
or the senses were also called riipa 3• The mahabhiitas or four
elements were themselves but changing manifestations, and they
together with all that appeared in association with them were
called riipa and formed the riipa khandha (the classes of sense-
materials, sense-data, senses and sensations).
In Sm?zyutta Nikiiya (III. 101) it is said that "the four
mahabhiitas were the hetu and the paccaya for the communica-
tion of the riipakkhandha (rupakklzandlzassa parzfziipaniiya). Con-
tact (sense-contact, phassa) is the cause of the communication of
feelings (vedanii); sense-contact was also the hetu and paccaya
for the communication of the safifiakkhandha; sense-contact is
also the hetu and paccaya for the communication of the sankhara-
kkhandha. But namariipa is the hetu and the paccaya for the
communication of the vififianakkhandha.'' Thus not only feelings
arise on account of the sense-contact but safifia and satl.khara
also arise therefrom. Safifia is that where specific knowing or
1 Sm!zyutta Niktzya, 111. 86. 2 Khandlzayamaka.
3 Dhammasmiga1.zi, p. 1 24 ff.
g6 Buddhist Philosophy [cH.
conceiving takes place. This is the stage where the specific dis-
tinctive knowledge as the yellow or the red takes place.
Mrs Rhys Davids writing on safifia says: "In editing the
second book of the Abhidhamma pitaka I found a classification
distinguishing between saflfia as cognitive assimilation on occasion
of sense, and safifia as cognitive assimilation of ideas by way of
naming. The former is called perception of resistance, or opposi-
tion (patigha-saiiitii). This, writes Buddhagho~a, is perception on
occasion of sight, hearing, etc., when consciousness is aware of the
impact of impressions; of external things as different, we might
say. The latter is called perception of the equivalent word or
name (ad/tivachtinii-safifzii) and is exercised by the sensus com-
11lUnis (mano), when e.g. 'one is seated ... and asks another who
is thoughtful: "What are you thinking of?" one perceives through
his speech.' Thus there are two stages of safifia-consciousness,
1. contemplating sense-impressions, 2. ability to know what they
are by naming 1.''
About sailkhara we read in Sa1!ZY1ttta Nikiiya (III. 87) that it
is called sailkhara because it synthesises (abhisankharonti), it ·is
that which conglomerated rupa as rupa, conglomerated safifia
as safifia, sankhara as sailkhara and consciousness ( viruziina)
as consciousness. It is called sarikhara because it synthesises
the conglomerated (sa1ikhatam abhisankharonti). It is thus a
synthetic function which synthesises the passive rupa, safifia,
sailkhara and vinfiana elements. The fact that we hear of 52
satikhara states and also that the sankhara exercises its syn-
thetic activity on the conglomerated elements in it, goes to show
that probably the word satikhara is used in two senses, as mental
states and as synthetic activity.
Viflnana or consciousness meant according to Buddhagho!?a,
as we have already seen in the previous section, both the stage
at which the intellectual process started and also the final
resulting consciousness.
Buddhagho~a in explainingthe processofBuddhist psychology
says that "consciousness(citta)first comes into touch (phassa) with
its object (liramma~za) and thereafter feeling, conception (smllili)
and volition (cetmu"i) come in. This contact is like the pillars of
a palace, and the rest are but the superstructure built upon it
(dabbasambhiirasadisii). But it should not be thought that contact
1 Buddhist Psydzology, pp. 49, 50.
v] Theory of Sense-contact 97
is the beginning of the psychological processes, for in one whole
consciousness (ekacittasmi1!l) it cannot be said that this comes
first and that comes after, so we can take contact in association
with feeling (vedanii), conceiving (saiziia) or volition (cetanii);
it is itself an immaterial state but yet since it comprehends
objects it is called contact." "There is no impinging on one side
of the object (as in physical contact), nevertheless contact causes
consciousness and object to be in collision, as visible object and
visual organs, sound and hearing; thus impact is itsfunction; or
it has impact as its essential property in the sense of attainment,
owing to the impact of the physical basis with the mental object.
For it is said in the Commentary :-((contact in the four planes of
existence is never without the characteristic of touch with the
object; but the function of impact takes place in the five doors.
For to sense, or five-door contact, is given the name 'having the
characteristic of touch' as well as 'having the function of impact.'
But to contact in the mind-door there is only the characteristic
of touch, but not the function of impact. And then this Sutta is
quoted 'As if, sire, two rams were to fight, one ram to represent
the eye, the second the visible object, and their collision contact.
And as if, sire, two cymbals were to strike against each other, or
two hands were to clap against each other; one hand would
represent the eye, the second the visible object and their collision
contact. Thus contact has the characteristic of touch and the
function of impact~'. Contact is the manifestation of the union
of the three (the object, the consciousness and the sense) and its
effect is feeling (vedanii); though it is generated by the objects
it is felt in the consciousness and its chief feature is experiencing
(anublzava) the taste of the object. As regards enjoying the
taste of an object, the remaining associated states enjoy it only
partially. Of contact there is (the function of) the mere touching,
of perception the mere noting or perceiving, of volition the mere
coordinating, of consciousness the mere cognizing. But feeling
alone, through governance, proficiency, mastery, enjoys the taste
of an object. For feeling is like the king, the remaining states
are like the cook. As the cook, when he has prepared food of
diverse .tastes, puts it in a basket, seals it, takes it to the king,
breaks the seal, opens the basket, takes the best of all the soup
and curries, puts them in a dish, swallows (a portion) to find out
1 Atthasc'ili1li, p. 108; translation, pp. I.lj-q~.
Buddhist Philosophy [cH.
whether they are faulty or not and afterwards offers the food of
various excellent tastes to the king, and the king, being lord,
expert, and master, eats whatever he likes, even so the mere tasting
of the food by the cook is like the partial enjoyment of the object
by the remaining states, and as the cook tastes a portion of the
food, so the remaining states enjoy a portion of the object, and
as the king, being lord, expert and master, eats the meal according
to his pleasure so feeling being lord expert, and master, enjoys
the taste of the object and therefore it is said that enjoyment or
experience is its function I."
The special feature of sai1fia is said to be the recognizing
(paccablzifziza) by means of a sign (abhiiiiianena). According to
another ex planation, a recognition takes place by the inclusion
of the totality (of aspects)-sabbasaizgahikavasella. The work of
volition (cetmzii) is said to be coordination or binding together
(ablzismzdahana). "Volition is exceedingly energetic and makes
a double effort, a double exertion. Hence the Ancients said
'Volition is like the nature of a landowner, a cultivator who taking
fifty-five strong men, went down to the fields to reap. He was
exceedingly energetic and exceedingly strenuous; he doubled his
strength and said "Take your sickles" and so forth, pointed out
the portion to be reaped, offered them drink, food, scent, flowers,
etc., and took an equal share of the work.' The simile should be
thus applied: volition is like the cultivator, the fifty-five moral
states which arise as factors of consciousness are like the fifty-five
strong men; like the time of doubling strength, doubling effort
by the cultivator is the doubled strength, doubled effort of
volition as regards activity in moral and immoral acts 2." It
seems that probably the active side operating in sailkhara was
separately designated as cetana (volition).
"\Vhen one says 'I,' what he does is that he refers either to
all the khandhas combined or any one of them and deludes him-
self that that was 'I.' Just as one could not say that the
fragrance of the lotus belonged to the petals, the colour or the
pollen, so one could not say that the rupa was 'I' or that the
vedana was 'I' or any of the other khandhas was '1.' There is
nowhere to be found in the khandhas ' I am 3 '."
with eyes open and sometimes with eyes shut. When he finds
that even in shutting his eyes he can visualize the object in his
mind, he may leave off the object and retire to another place to
concentrate upon the image of the earth ball in his mind.
In the first stages of the first meditation (patlzamam jlu'inam)
the mind is concentrated on the object in the way of understanding
it with its form and name and of comprehending it with its diverse
relations. This state of concentration is called vitakka (discursive
meditation). The next stage of the first meditation is that in
which the mind does not move in the object in relational terms
but becomes fixed and settled in it and penetrates into it without
any quivering. This state is called vicara (steadily moving). The
first stage vitakka has been compared in Buddhagho~a's Vi'sud-
dlzimagga to the flying of a kite with its wings flapping, whereas
the second stage is compared to its flying in a sweep without the
least quiver of its wings. These two stages are associated with
a buoyant exaltation (pitt) and a steady inward bliss called sukha 1
instilling the mind. The formation of this first jhana roots out
five ties of avijja, kamacchando (dallying with desires), vyapado
(hatred), thinamiddham (sloth and torpor), uddhaccakukkuccam
(pride and restlessness), and vicikiccha (doubt). The five elements
of which this jhana is constituted are vitakka, vicara, piti, sukham
and ekaggata (one pointedness).
When the sage masters the first jhana he finds it defective
and wants to enter into the second meditation (dutiyam jluinam),
where there is neither any vitakka nor vicara of the first jhana,
but the mind is in one unruffled state (ekodibhiivam). It is a
much steadier state and does not possess the movement which
characterized the vitakka and the vicara stages of the first jhana
and is therefore a very placid state (vitakka-viciirakkhoblza-
z•iralte1}a ativiya aca/atii suppasmmatii ca). It is however associ-
ated with pl:ti, sukha and ekaggata as the first jhana was.
When the second jhana is mastered the sage becomes disin-
clined towards the enjoyment of the plti of that stage and becomes
indifferent to them (upekklzako). A sage in this stage sees the
objects but is neither pleased nor displeased. At this stage all
the asavas of the sage become loosened (klti?ziisava). The
enjoyment of sukha however still remains in the stage and the
1 'Where there is piti there is sukha, but where there is sukha there may not
experienced the thought (of the moment) as it were the self or ex-
perienced himself as being endowed with thought, or the thought
in the self or the self in the thought. It is these kinds of experi-
ences that he considered as the perception of the selfl.
The U pani~ads did not try to establish any school of discipline
or systematic thought. They revealed throughout the dawn of an
experience of an immutable Reality as the self of man, as the only
abiding truth behind all changes. But Buddhism holds that this
immutable self of man is a delusion and a false knowledge.
The first postulate of the system is that impermanence is sorrow.
Ignorance about sorrow, ignorance about the way it originates,
ignorance about the nature of the extinction of sorrow, and ignor-
ance about the means of bringing about this extinction represent
the fourfold ignorance (avijj"iip. The avidya, which is equivalent
to the Pali word avijja, occurs in the U pani~ads also, but there
it means ignorance about the atman doctrine, and it is sometimes
contrasted with vidya or true knowledge about the self (iitmanY..
With the U pani~ads the highest truth was the permanent self,
the bliss, but with the Buddha there was nothing permanent; and
all was change; and all change and impermanence was sorrow"'.
This is, then, the cardinal truth of Buddhism, and ignorance con-
cerning it in the above fourfold ways represented the fourfold
ignorance which stood in the way of the right comprehension of
the fourfold cardinal truths (iiri'ya .sacca)-sorrow, cause of the
origination of sorrow, extinction of sorrow, and the means thereto.
There is no Brahman or supreme permanent reality and no
self, and this ignorance does not belong to any ego or self as we
may ordinarily be led to suppose.
Thus it is said in the risuddhimagga "inasmuch however
as ignorance is empty of stability from being subject to a coming
into existence and a disappearing from existence ... and is empty
of a self-determining Ego from being subject to dependence,-
... or in other words inasmuch as ignorance is not an Ego, and
similarly with reference to Karma and the rest-therefore is it
to be understood of the wheel of existence that it is empty with
a twelvefold emptiness 5."
Sa!!lYUlta Niktiya, III. 46.
1 2 11/ajjhima Niktiya, I. p. 54·
:t Cha.
1. 1. 10. Brh. IV. 3· 20. There are some passages where vidya and avidya
have been used in a different and rather obscure sense, isa 9-r1.
4 A1ig. Nikt?J'a, III. 85.
5 Warren's Budtillism ill Translations ( Visuddhimagga, chap. XVII.), p. 17 5·
112 Buddhist Philosophy [ Cll~
not develop into the Mahasanghikas, but it was the Mahasanghikas who first seceded
while the Vajjiputtakas seceded independently of them. The .Mahiibodhivm!zsa, which
according to Professor Geiger was composed 975 A.D.-IoooA.D., follows the Maha·
varpsa in holding the Mahasanghikas to be the first seceders and Vajjiputtakas to have
seceded independently.
Vasumitra confuses the council of Vesali with the third council of Pii!aliputra. See
introduction to translation of Kathiivatthu by Mrs Rhys Davids.
l! For other accounts of the schism see 1\lr Aung and .Mrs Rhys Davids's translation
of Kathiivatthu, pp. xxxvi-xlv.
v] Schools of Buddhisnz 113
The atoms of colour, taste, smell and touch, and cognition are
being destroyed every moment. The meanings of words always
imply the negations of all other things, excepting that which is
intended to be signified by that word (anyiipoka!z sabdiirtha!z).
Salvation (mok.fa) comes as the result of the destruction of the
process of knowledge through continual medjtation that there
is no soul 1•
One of the main differences between the Vibhajjavadins, Sau-
trantikas and the Vaibha~ikas or the Sarvastivadins appears to
refer to the notion of time which is a subject of great interest
with Buddhist philosophy. Thus A bhid/zarmakosa (v. 24 ... )
describes the Sarvastivadins as those who maintain the universal
existence of everything past, present and future. The Vibhajja-
vadins are those "who maintain that the present elements and
those among the past that have not yet produced their fruition,
are existent, but they deny the existence of the future ones and
of those among the past that have already produced fruition."
There were four branches of this school represented by Dhar-
matrata, Gho~a, Vasumitra and Buddhadeva. Dharmatrata main-
tained that when an element enters different times, its existence
changes but not its essence, just as when milk is changed into curd
or a golden vessel is broken, the form of the existence changes
though the essence remains the same. Gho~a held that " when
an element appears at different times, the past one retains its
past aspects without being severed from its future and present
aspects, the present likewise retains its present aspect without
completely losing its past and future aspects," just as a man in
passionate love with a woman does not lose his capacity to love
other women though he is not actually in love with them. V asu-
mitra held that an entity is called present, past and future accord-
ing as it produces its efficiency, ceases to produce after having
once produced it or has not yet begun to produce it. Buddha-
deva maintained the view that just as the same woman may
be called mother, daughter, wife, so the same entity may be
called present, past or future in accordance with its relation to the
preceding or the succeeding moment.
All-these schools are in some sense Sarvastivadins, for they
maintain universal existence. But the Vaibha~ika finds them all
defective excepting the view of Vasumitra. For Dharmatrata's
1
Gur;aratna's Tarkarahasyadipikti, pp. 46-47.
I 16 Buddhist Philosophy [cH.
view is only a veiled Sarpkhya doctrine; that of Gho!?a is a
confusion of the notion of time, since it presupposes the co-
existence of all the aspects of an entity at the same time, and
that of Buddhadeva is also an impossible situation, since it would
suppose that all the three times were found together and included
in one of them. The Vaibha!?ika finds himself in agreement
with Vasumitra's view and holds that the difference in time
depends upon the difference of the function of an entity ; at the
time when an entity does not actually produce its function it is
future; when it produces it, it becomes present; when after having
produced it, it stops, it becomes past; there is a real existence
of the past and the future as much as of the present. He thinks
that if the past did not exist and assert some efficiency it could
not have been the object of my knowledge, and deeds done in
past times could not have produced its effects in the present
time. The Sautrantika however thought that the Vaibha!?ika's
doctrine would imply the heretical doctrine of eternal existence,
for according to them the stuff remained the same and the time-
difference appeared in it. The true view according to him was,
that there was no difference between the efficiency of an entity,
the entity and the time of its appearance. Entities appeared
from non-existence, existed for a moment and again ceased to
exist. He objected to the Vaibha!?ika view that the past is to
be regarded as existent because it exerts efficiency in bringing
about the present on the ground that in that case there should
be no difference between the past and the present, since both
exerted efficiency. If a distinction is made between past, present
and future efficiency by a second grade of efficiencies, then we
should have to continue it and thus have a vicious infinite. \Ve
can know non-existent entities as much as we can know existent
ones, and hence our knowledge of the past does not imply
that the past is exerting any efficiency. If a distinction is
made between an efficiency and an entity, then the reason why
efficiency started at any particular time and ceased at another
would be inexplicable. Once you admit that there is no dif-
ference between efficiency and the entity, you at once find that
there is no time at all and the efficiency, the entity and the
moment are all one and the same. When we remember a thing
of the past we do not know it as existing in the past, but in the
same way in which we knew it when it was present. \Ne are
v] Vasubandhu and the Vats:zputtr'iyas 117
a compilation from other Vibha!?as which existed before the Chinese translations and
Vibha!?a texts dated 383 A.D.
4 See Takakusu's article J. R. A. S. 1905.
11 The Sautrantikas did not regard the Abhidharmas of the Vaibha~ikas as authentic
Mahayanism.
It is difficult to say precisely at what time Mahayanism took
its rise. But there is reason to think that as the Mahasari.ghikas
separated themselves from the Theravadins probably some time in
400 B.C. and split themselves up into eight different schools, those
elements of thoughts and ideas which in later days came to be
labelled as Mahayana were gradually on the way to taking their
first inception. \Ve hear in about 100 A.D. of a number of works
which are regarded as various :Mahayana siitras, some of which
are probably as old as at least 100 B.C. (if not earlier) and others
as late as 300 or 400 A.D. 1• These Mahayanasiitras, also called
the Vaipulyasiitras, are generally all in the form of instructions
given by the Buddha. Nothing is known about their authors or
compilers, but they are all written in some form of Sanskrit and
were probably written by those who seceded from the Theravada
school.
The word Hinayana refers to the schools of Theravada, and
as such it is contrasted with Mahayana. The words are generally
translated as small vehicle (hina= small,yana=vehicle) and great
vehicle (malui =great, yiina =vehicle). But this translation by
no means expresses what is meant by Mahayana and Hina-
yana11. Asari.ga (480 A.D.) in his Mahiiyiinaszttriilmtzkara gives
propounded the same sort of doctrines as those preached by Nagarjuna. None of his
works are available in Sanskrit and I have never come across any allusion to his name
by Sanskrit writers.
1 Quotations and references to many of these siitras are found in Candrakirtti's com-
mentary on the Miidhyamika kiirikiis of Nagarjuna; some of these are the following:
Af{asiihaS1·ikiiprajiiiipiiramitii (translated into Chinese 164 A.D.-167 A.D.), Satasiihas-
rikiiprajiiiipiiramitii, Gaganagaiija, Samiidhisutra, Tathiigatagultyasi'Ura, Drtfhiidhyii-
fayasaiicodaniisutra, Dhyiiyitamu~{isutra, PitiiputrasamiigamasiUra, Jl.lahiiyiinasutra,
Miiradamanasutra, Ratnaku{asutra, Ratnaciitjtzpariprcchiisutra, Ratnameghasutra,
Ratnariifisutra, Ratniikarasutra, Rii~{rapiilaparzfr.cchiisiUra, Lmikiivatiirasutra,
Lalitavistarasutra, Vajracchedikiisutra, Vimalakirttinirdefasutra, SiilistambhasiUra,
Samiidhirajasutra, Sukhiivativyuha, Suvan:zaprabhiisasutra, Saddharmapu~ujarika
(translated into Chinese A.D. 255), Amitiiyurdhyiinasutra, Hastikiikhyas1~tra, etc.
2 The word Yana is generally translated as vehicle, but a consideration of numerous
contexts in which the word occurs seems to suggest that it means career or course or
way, rather than vehicle (La/itavistara, pp. 25, 38; Prajiiiipiiramitii, pp. 24, 319;
Samiidltirtijasutra, p. 1 ; K aru1JiiPtt1Jdarika, p. 67; Lmikiivatiiramtra, pp. 68, 1 o8, 13 2 ).
The word Yana is as old as the Upani~ds where we read of Devayana and Pitryana.
There is no reason why this word should be taken in a different sense. We hear in
Laitkiivatiira of Sravakayana (career of the Sravakas or the Theravadin Buddhists),
Pratyekabuddhayana (the career of saints before the coming of the Buddha), Buddha
yana (career of the Buddhas), Ekayana (one career), Devayana (career of the gods),
126 Buddhist Philosophy [cH.
us the reason why one school was called Hinayana whereas the
other, which he professed, was called Mahayana. He says that,
considered from the point of view of the ultimate goal of religion,
the instructions, attempts, realization, and time, the Hinayana
occupies a lower and smaller place than the other called Maha
(great) Yana, and hence it is branded as Hina (small, or low).
This brings us to one of the fundamental points of distinction
between Hinayana and Mahayana. The ultimate good of an
adherent of the Hinayana is to attain his own nirva1fa or salva-
tion, whereas the ultimate goal of those who professed the Maha-
yana creed was not to seek their own salvation but to seek the
salvation of all beings. So the Hinayana goal was lower, and in
consequence of that the instructions that its followers received,
the attempts they undertook, and the results they achieved were
narrower than that of the Mahayana adherents. A Hinayana man
had only a short business in attaining his own salvation, and this
could be done in three lives, whereas a Mahayana adherent was
prepared to work for infinite time in helping all beings to attain
salvation. So the Hinayana adherents required only a short period
of work and may from that point of view also be called kina, or
lower.
This point, though important from the point of view of the
difference in the creed of the two schools, is not so from the point
of view of philosophy. But there is another trait of the Maha-
yanists which distinguishes them from the Hinayanists from the
philosophical point of view. The Mahayanists believed that all
things were of a non-essential and indefinable character and
void at bottom, whereas the Hinayanists only believed in the
impermanence of all things, but did not proceed further than
that.
It is sometimes erroneously thought that Nagarjuna first
preached the doctrine of Sunyavada (essencelessness or voidness
of all appearance), but in reality almost all the Mahayana siitras
either definitely preach this doctrine or allude to it. Thus if we
take some of those siitras which were in all probability earlier than
N agarjuna, we find that the doctrine which N agarjuna expounded
with all the rigour of his powerful dialectic was quietly accepted
as an indisputable truth. Thus we find Subhuti saying to
the Buddha that vedana (feeling), sarpjfta (concepts) and the
sarpskaras (conformations) are all maya (illusion) 1• All the
skandhas, dhatus (elements) and ayatanas are void and absolute
cessation. The highest knowledge of everything as pure void
is not different from the skandhas, dhatus and ayatanas, and this
absolute cessation of dharmas is regarded as the highest know-
ledge (pra;i!iipiiramitii) 2• Everything being void there is in reality
no process and no cessation. The truth is neither eternal (Siisvata)
nor non-eternal (astisvata) but pure void. It should be the object
of a saint's endeavour to put himself in the" thatness" ( tathatii) and
consider all things as void. The saint (bodhisattva) has to estab-
lish himself in all the virtues (ptiramita), benevolence (diilla-
piiramitti), the virtue of character (Silapiiramitti), the virtue of
forbearance (kfiilltipiiramitii), the virtue of tenacity and strength
( vlryyapiiramitti) and the virtue of meditation (dltyiinaptira-
mitti). The saint (bodlzisattva) is firmly determined that he will
help an infinite number of souls to attain nirval)a. In reality,
however, there are no beings, there is no bondage, no salva-
tion ; and the saint knows it but too well, yet he is not afraid
of this high truth, but proceeds on his career of attaining for
all illusory beings illusory emancipation from illusory bondage.
The saint is actuated with that feeling and proceeds in his
work on the strength of his paramitas, though in reality there
is no one who is to attain salvation in reality and no one who
is to help him to attain its. The true prajflaparamita is the
absolute cessation of all appearance (ya(t amtpalambha(t sarva-
dharmtil}iim sa praj1iiiptiramitii ityucyate)·J.
The Mahayana doctrine has developed on two lines, viz. that
of Sunyavada or the Madhyamika doctrine and Vijflanavada.
The difference between Sunyavada and Vijfianavada (the theory
that there is only the appearance of phenomena of consciousness)
is not fundamental, but is rather one of method. Both of them
agree in holding that there is no truth in anything, everything
is only passing appearance akin to dream or magic. But
while the Sunyavadins were more busy in showing this indefin-
ableness of all phenomena, the Vijflanavadins, tacitly accepting
1 Af{asiihasrikiiprajlit'ipiiramiltz, p. 16. 2
Ibid. p. 177.
3 Ibid. p. 21. 4
Ibid. p. 177.
128 Buddhist Philosophy [cH.
the truth preached by the Siinyavadins, interested themselves in
explaining the phenomena of consciousness by their theory of
beginningless illusory root-ideas or instincts of the mind ( vasa11a).
Asvagho~a (100 A.D.) seems to have been the greatest teacher
of a new type of idealism (vijliiinaviida) known as the Tathata
philosophy. Trusting in Suzuki's identification of a quotation in
Asvagho~a's Sraddhotpiidasiistra as being made from Laizkiiva-
tiirasiitra, we should think of the Laizkiivatiirasftlra as being one
of the early works of the Vijflanavadinsi. The greatest later writer
of the Vijflanavada school was Asanga (400 A.D.), to whom are
attributed the Saptadasablzfmti sittra, M aluiyiina sftlra, Upadesa,
M alziiyiinasamparigralza siistra, Yogiiciirabhitmi siistra and
111ahiiyii~tasfttriilm!tkiira. None of these works excepting the
last one is available to readers who have no access to the
Chinese and Tibetan manuscripts, as the Sanskrit originals are
in all probability lost. The Vijflanavada school is known to
Hindu writers by another name also, viz. Y ogacara, and it does
not seem an improbable supposition that Asanga's Yogiiciira-
bhiimi siistra was responsible for the new name. Vasubandhu,
a younger brother of Asanga, was, as Paramartha (499-569) tells
us, at first a liberal Sarvastivadin, but was converted to Vijfla-
navada, late in his life, by Asa1iga. Thus Vasubandhu, who
wrote in his early life the great standard work of the Sarvasti-
vadins, Ablzidharmakosa, devoted himself in his later life to Vijna-
navada2. He is said to have commented upon a number of
Mahayana siitras, such asAvatmtzsaka, Nirvii?za, Saddharmapu?t-
tfarika, Prajiiiipiiramitii, Vimalakirtti and Srimiiliisi1?zltamida, and
compiled some Mahayana siitras, such as Vijiziinamiitrasiddlzi,
Ratnatraya, etc. The school of Vijflanavada continued for at
least a century or two after V asu bandhu, but we are not in
possession of any work of great fame of this school after him.
We have already noticed that the Siinyavada formed the fun-
damental principle of all schools of Mahayana. The most powerful
exponent of this doctrine was Nagarjuna (100 A.D.), a brief account
of whose system will be given in its proper place. Nagarjuna's
karikas (verses) were commented upon by Aryyadeva, a disciple
of his, Kumarajiva (383 A.D.), Buddhapalita and Candrakirtti
(550 A.D.). Aryyadeva in addition to this commentary wrote at
1 I >r S. C. VidyaLhiishana thinks that La/zkiivatiira belongs to about 300 A. D.
2 Takakusu's "A study of the Paramartha's life of Vasubandhu, "J. R. A. S. 1905.
Aryyadeva's Philosophy 129
Geschichte des Buddhisnms, German translation by Schiefner, pp. 84-85. See Suzuki's
Awakening of Faith, pp. 24-32. Asvagho~ wrote the Buddhacaritaktivya, of great
poetical excellence, and the .Jlfahii!al!lkiiraliistra. He \'lias also a musician and had
IJO Buddhist Philosophy [cH.
He held that in the soul two aspects may be distinguished
-the aspect as thatness ( bhzttatathatii) and the aspect as the cycle
of birth and death (sm!zsiira). The soul as bhiitatathata means
the oneness of the totality of all things (dharmadhtitu). Its essen-
tial nature is uncreate and external. All things simply on account
of the beginningless traces of the incipient and unconscious
memory of our past experiences of many previous lives (smrti)
appear under the forms of individuation I. If we could overcome
this smrti "the signs of individuation would disappear and there
would be no trace of a world of objects." "All things in their
fundamental nature are not nameable or explicable. They can-
not be adequately expressed in any form of language. They
possess absolute sameness (samatii). They are subject neither to
transformation nor to destruction. They are nothing but one soul"
-thatness (bhittatathatii). This "thatness" has no attribute and
it can only be somehow pointed out in speech as "thatness."
As soon as you understand that when the totality of existence is
spQken of or thought of, there is neither that which speaks nor
that which is spoken of, there is neither that which thinks nor
that which is thought of, "this is the stage of thatness." This
bhiitatathata is neither that which is existence, nor that which is
non-existence, nor that which is at once existence and non-
existence, nor that which is not at once existence and non-exist-
ence; it is neither that which is plurality, nor that \vhich is
at once unity and plurality, nor that which is not at once unity
and plurality. It is a negative concept in the sense that it is
beyond all that is conditional and yet it is a positive concept
in the sense that it holds all within it. It cannot be compre-
hended by any kind of particularization or distinction. It is
only by transcending the range of our intellectual categories of
the comprehension of the limited range of finite phenomena that
we can get a glimpse of it. It cannot be comprehended by the
particularizing consciousness of all beings, and we thus may call
it negation, .. siinyata," in this sense. The truth is that which
invented a musical instrument called Wistavara that he might by that means convert the
people of the city. "Its melody was classical, mournful, and melodious, inducing the
audience to ponder on the misery, emptiness, and non-atmanness oflife." Suzuki, p. 35·
I I have ventured to translate "smrti" in the sense of \'asanii in preference to
Suzuki's "confused subjectivity" becaus~ smrti in the sense of viisanii is not unfamiliar
to the readers of such Buddhist works as La~ikiivatiira. The word "subjectivity"
seems to be too European a term to be used as a word to represent the Buddhist sense.
v] A fvagho~a' s A bsolutisnz 131
ILmikiiz,atiirasutra, p. 85.
2Lmikiivatiirasiltra, p. 87, compare the term "vyavaharika" as used of the pheno-
menal and the conventional world in almost the same sense by Sankara.
v] Void1less of all phenonzena 149
relation, but none of these characters may be said to be true;
the real truth (paramiirtlta) can never be referred to by such
speech -construction.
The nothingness (Sfmyata) of things may be viewed from
seven aspects-( 1) that they are always interdependent, and hence
have no special characteristics by themselves, and as they cannot
be determined in themselves they cannot be determined in terms
of others, for, their own nature being undetermined, a reference
to an "other'' is also undetermined, and hence they are all in-
definable (lak~a~ta.Siinyatii); (2) that they have no positive essence
( bhiivasvabhiivasfmyatii), since they spring up from a natural non-
existence (svabhiiviibhiivotpatti); (3) that they are of an unknown
type of non-existence (apracaritasii1Zyatii), since all the skandhas
vanish in the nirvat:ta; (4) that they appear phenomenally as con-
nected though non-existent (pracaritasfmyata), for their skandhas
have no reality in themselves nor are they related to others, but
yet they appear to be somehow causally connected; (5) that none
of the things can be described as having any definite nature,
they are all undemonstrable by language ( 1Zirabltilapya.Srmyatii) ;
(6) that there cannot be any knowledge about them except that
which is brought about by the long-standing defects of desires
which pollute all our vision; (7) that things are also non-existent
in the sense that we affirm them to be in a particular place and
time in which they are not (itaretarasiinyatii).
There is thus only non-existence, which again is neither eternal
nor destructible, and the world is but a dream and a maya ; the
two kinds of negation (nirodha) are akasa (space) and nirvat:ta;
things which are neither existent nor non-existent are only
imagined to be existent by fools.
This view apparently comes into conflict with the doctrine of
this school, that the reality is called the tathagatagarbha (the
womb of all that is merged in thatness) and all the phenomenal
appearances of the clusters (ska1Zdhas), elements (dltiitus), and
fields of sense operation (iiyatanas) only serve to veil it with
impurities, and this would bring it nearer to the assumption of a
universal soul as the reality. But the Lmikii·vatiira attempts to
explain away this conflict by suggesting that the reference to
the tathagatagarbha as the reality is only a sort of false bait to
attract those who are afraid of listening to the nairatmya (non-
soul) doctrine 1•
1 Lmiktivatarasutra, p. So.
Buddhist Philosophy [cH.
The Bodhisattvas may attain their highest by the fourfold
knowledge of (I) s'lJacittadrsyablziivanii, ( 2) utpiidastlzitibhanga-
vivaryj"anatti, ( 3) btihyablttivabltii:vopalak~a?jatti and (4) s·vapra-
tyaryyajfiii-;ziidhigamiibhinnalak~a?jatii. The first means that all
things are but creations of the imagination of one's mind. The
second means that as things have no essence there is no origina-
tion, existence or destruction. The third means that one should
know the distinctive sense in which all external things are said
either to be existent or non-existent, for their existence is merely
like the mirage which is produced by the beginningless desire
( viisanii) of creating and perceiving the manifold. This brings us
to the fourth one, which means the right comprehension of the
nature of all things.
The four dhyanas spoken of in the Lankiivatiira seem to be
different from those which have been described in connection with
the Theravada Buddhism. These dhyanas are called (I) biilo-
paciirika, (2) artlzapravicaya, (3) tathatiilambana and (4) tathii-
gata. The first one is said to be that practised by the sravakas
and the pratyekabuddhas. It consists in concentrating upon the
doctrine that there is no soul (pudgalanairiitmya), and that every-
thing is transitory, miserable and impure. \Vhen considering all
things in this way from beginning to end the sage advances on
till all conceptual knowing ceases (iism!z}fiiinirodhiit); we have
what is called the valopacarika dhyana (the meditation for be-
ginners).
The second is the advanced state where not only there is
full consciousness that there is no self, but there is also the com-
prehension that neither these nor the doctrines of other heretics
may be said to exist, and that there is none of the dharmas that
appears. This is called the arthapravicayadltyii1la, for the sage
concentrates here on the subject of thoroughly seeking out (pra-
vicaya) the nature of all things (artlta).
The third dhyana, that in which the mind realizes that the
thought that there is no self nor that there are the appearances,
is itself the result of imagination and thus lapses into the thatness
(tathatii). This dhyana is called tathatiilambmta, because it has for
its object tathata or thatness.
The last or the fourth dhyana is that in which the lapse of
the mind into the state of thatness is such that the nothingness
and incomprehensibility of all phenomena is perfectly realized;
v] Ultimate goal
and nirval)a is that in which all root desires ( viisami) manifesting
themselves in knowledge are destroyed and the mind with know-
ledge and perceptions, making false creations, ceases to work. This
cannot be called death, for it will not have any rebirth and it can-
not be called destruction, for only compounded things (smtzsk_rta)
suffer destruction, so that it is different from either death or
destruction. This nirval)a is different from that of the sravakas
and the pratyekabuddhas for they are satisfied to call that state
nirval)a, in which by the knowledge of the general characteristics
of all things (transitoriness and misery) they are not attached to
things and cease to make erroneous judgments 1•
Thus we see that there is no cause (in the sense of ground)
of all these phenomena as other heretics maintain. When it is
said that the world is maya or illusion, what is meant to be
emphasized is this, that there is no cause, no ground. The pheno-
mena that seem to originate, stay, and be destroyed are mere
constructions of tainted imagination, and the tathata or thatness
is nothing but the turning away of this constructive activity or
nature of the imagination (vikalpa) tainted with the associations
of beginningless root desires (vasanii) 2• The tathata has no
separate reality from illusion, but it is illusion itself when the
course of the construction of illusion has ceased. It is therefore
also spoken of as that which is cut off or detached from the mind
(cittavimukta), for here there is no construction of imagination
(sarvakalpmziiviralzitam ) 3•
siddhi, a treatise on solipsism, but his Jllyiiyabindu seems rightly to have been considered
by the author of Nyiiyabindu!ikii!ippani (p. 19) as being written from the Sautrantika
point of view.
Buddhist Philosophy [cH.
desires to have (samyagjFuinaprervika sarvapuru~arthasiddht")l.
When on proceeding, in accordance with the presentation of any
knowledge, we get a thing as presented by it we call it right
knowledge. Right knowledge is thus the knowledge by which one
can practically acquire the thing he wants to acquire (arthiidhi-
gati). The process of knowledge, therefore, starts with the per-
ceptual presentation and ends with the attainment of the thing
represented by it and the fulfilment of the practical need by it
(arthiidhigamat samiipta(t pramii!tavyiiptira(t). Thus there are
three moments in the perceptual acquirement of knowledge:
(1) the presentation, (2) our prompting in accordance with it,
and (3) the final realization of the object in accordance with
our endeavour following the direction of knowledge. Inference
is also to be called right knowledge, as it also serves our practical
need by representing the presence of objects in certain connec-
tions and helping us to realize them. In perception this presen-
tation is direct, while in inference this is brought about indirectly
through the li1l.ga (reason). Knowledge is sought by men for the
realization of their ends, and the subject of knowledge is dis-
cussed in philosophical works only because knowledge is sought
by men. Any knowledge, therefore, which will not lead us to
the realization of the object represented by it could not be called
right knowledge. All illusory perceptions, therefore, such as the
perception of a white conch-shell as yellow or dream perceptions,
are not right knowledge, since they do not lead to the realization
of such objects as are presented by them. It is true no doubt
that since all objects are momentary, the object which was per-
ceived at the moment of perception was not the same as that
which was realized at a later moment. But the series of existents
which started with the first perception of a blue object finds itself
realized by the realization of other existents of the same series
(uiladau ya eva satttiina(t paricchimto 1tilajiiiinena sa eva tena
pnipita(t toltl uila;iiiinam pramii~zam) 2•
When it is said that right knowledge is an invariable ante-
cedent of the realization of any desirable thing or the retarding
of any undesirable thing, it must be noted that it is not meant
1
Brief extracts from the opinions of two other commentators of Nyii;,abi~tdu,
Vinitadeva and Santabhadra (seventh century), are found in Nyiiyabi1ldu{il.:ii{ippani,
a commentary of Nyii),abi1ldu{ikii of Dharmmottara, hut their texts are not available
lu us.
2 Nyiiyabi1llltt{ikti{ippa~ti, p. 11.
v] Theory of Perception 1 53
that right knowledge is directly the cause of it; for, with the rise
of any right perception, t]lere is _a memory of Qast experienc_~.
desire is aroused, through desire an endeavour in accordance with
it is launched, and as a result of that there is realization of the
object of desire. Thus, looked at from this point of view, right
knowledge is not directly the cause of the realization of the object.
Right knowledge of course directly indicates the presentation, the
object of desire, but so far as the object is a mere presentation it
is not a subject of enquiry. It becomes a subject of enquiry only in
connection with our achieving the object presented by perception.
Perception (pratyak~a) has been defined by Dharmakirtti as
a presentation, which is generated by the objects alone, unasso-
ciated by any names or relations (kalpanii) and which is not
erroneous (kalpaniipocfhamablzriintam)I. This definition does not
indeed represent the actual nature (svanipa) of perception, but only
shows the condition which must be fulfilled in order that anything
may be valid perception. What is meant by saying that a per-
ception is not erroneous is simply this, that it will be such that
if one engages himself in an endeavour in accordance with it,
he will not be baffled in the object which was presented to him
by his perception (tasmiidgriihye arthe vastztnlpe yadaviparyastam
tadabhriintamiha veditavyam ). It is said that a right perception
could not be associated with names (kalpami or abhiliipa). This
qualification is added only with a view of leaving out all that is not
directly generated by the object. A name is given to a thing
only when it is associated in the mind, through memory, as being
the same as perceived before. This cannot, therefore, be regarded
as being produced by the object of perception. The senses present
the objects by coming in contact with them, and the objects also
must of necessity allow themselves to be presented as they are
when they are in contact with the proper senses. But the work
of recognition or giving names is not what is directly produced
by the objects themselves, for this involves the unification of
previous experiences, and this is certainly not what is presented
1 The definition first given in the Pramii!Jasamuccaya (not available in Sanskrit) of
one of the earliest works in which we hear of the doctrine of arthakriyiikiin'tva (practical
fulfilment of our desire as a criterion of right knowledge). Later on it was regarded
as a criterion of existence, as Ratnakirtti's works and the profuse references by Hindu
writers to the Buddhistic doctrines prove. The word arthakriyii is found in Candra-
kirtti's commentary on Nagarjuna and also in such early works as Lalitavistara (pointed
out to_me by Dr E. J. Thomas of the Cambridge University Library) but the word
has no philosophical significance there.
1
As the Pramii!Jasamuccaya of Diimaga is not available in Sanskrit, we can hardly
know anything of developed Buddhist logic except what can be got from the Nyiiya-
bindu{ikii of Dhannmottara.
2
tasmlit niyama7Jatoreviinvayavyatirekayol; prayogal; karttavyal; yena pratibatzdho
gamyeta siidha11yasa siidhyena. Nyiiyabindu{ikii, p. 'l-J.
Buddhz"st P hz"losophy [cu.
of cases. The first is that where the nature of the reason is con-
tained in the thing to be inferred as a part of its nature, i.e. where
the reason stands for a species of which the thing to be inferred
is a genus; thus a stupid person living in a place full of tall pines
may come to think that pines are called trees because they are
tall and it may be useful to point out to him that even a small
pine plant is a tree because it is pine; the quality of pineness
forms a part of the essence of treeness, for the former being
a species is contained in the latter as a genus; the nature of the
species being identical with the nature of the genus, one could
infer the latter from the former but not vice versa; this is called
the unfailing natural connection of identity of nature (tiidiitmya).
The second is that where the cause is inferred from the effect
which stands as the reason of the former. Thus from the smoke
the fire which has produced it may be inferred. The ground of
these inferences is that reason is naturally indissolubly connected
with the thing to be inferred, and unless this is the case, no
inference is warrantable.
This natural indissoluble connection (svabhiivapratibandha),
be it of the nature of identity of essence of the species in the
genus or inseparable connection of the effect with the cause, is
the ground of all inference 1 • The svabhavapratibandha deter-
mines the inseparability of connection (avi1llibhavaniyama) and
the inference is made not through a series of premisses but
directly by the linga (reason) which has the inseparable con-
nection2.
The second type of inference known as pararthanumana
agrees with svarthanumana in all essential characteristics; the
main difference between the two is this, that in the case of
pararthanumana, the inferential process has to be put verbally in
premisses.
Pandit Ratnakarasanti, probably of the ninth or the tenth cen-
tury A.D., wrote a paper named Antarvyiiptisamarthalla in which
1
na hi yo yatra svabhiive11a na pratibaddhafz sa tam apratibaddhavi~ayamavaJya
meva na vyabhicaratiti nasti tayoravyabhicarani'yamah. Nyiiyabi11du{ikii, p. 29.
2
The inseparable connection determining inference is only possible when the
linga satisfies the three following conditions, viz. ( 1) pak~asattva (existence of the
linga in the palq;a-the thing about which something is inferred); (z) sapak~sattva
(existence of the linga in those cases where the siidhya or probandum existed), and
(3) vipak!?iisattva (its non-existence in all those places where the sadhya did not exist).
The Buddhists admitted three propositions in a syllogism, e.g. The hill has fire, because
it has smoke, like a kitchen but unlike a lake.
v] Inference 157
he tried to show that the concomitance is not between those
cases which possess the liilga or reason with the cases which
possess the sadhya (probandum) but between that which has the
characteristics of the liilga with that which has the characteristics
of the sadhya (probandum); or in other words the concomitance
is not between the places containing the smoke such as kitchen,
etc., and the places containing fire but between that which has the
characteristic of the liilga, viz. the smoke, and that which has the
characteristic of the sadhya, viz. the fire. This view of the nature
of concomitance is known as inner concomitance (antarvyiipti),
whereas the former, viz. the concomitance between the thing
possessing liilga and that possessing sadhya, is known as outer
concomitance (bahirvyapti) and generally accepted by the Nyaya
school of thought. This antarvyapti doctrine of concomitance is
indeed a later Buddhist doctrine.
It may not be out of place here to remark that evidences of
some form of Buddhist logic probably go back at least as early
as the Kathiivattlm (200 B.C.). Thus Aung on the evidence of
the Yamaka points out that Buddhist logic at the time of Asoka
"was conversant with the distribution of terms" and the process
of conversion. He further points out that the logical premisses
such as the udaharaJ!a ( Yo yo aggimii so so dhiemava-whatever is
fiery is smoky), the upanayana (ayam pabbato dluemavii-this
hill is smoky) and the niggama ( tasmiidayam aggimii-therefore
that is fiery) were also known. (Aung further sums up the
method of the arguments which are found in the Katlziivatthu as
follows:
"Adherent. Is A B? (thiipattii).
Opponent. Yes.
Adherent. Is CD? (piipanii).
Opponent. No.
Adherent. But if A be B then (you should have said) Cis D.
That B can be affirmed of A but D of Cis false.
Hence your first answer is refuted.")
The antecedent of the hypothetical major premiss is termed
thapana, because the opponent's position, A is B, is conditionally
established for the purpose of refutation.
The consequent of the hypothetical major premiss is termed
papana because it is got from the antecedent. And the con-
Buddh£st P h£/osophy [cu.
elusion is termed ropal)a because the regulation is placed on the
opponent. Next:
" If D be derived of C.
Then B should have been derived of A.
But you affirmed B of A.
(therefore) That B can be affirmed of A but not of D or Cis
wrong."
This is the pa!iloma, inverse or indirect method, as contrasted
with the former or direct method, anuloma. In both methods the
consequent is derived. But if we reverse the hypothetical major
in the latter method we get
If A is B C is D.
But A is B.
Therefore C is D.
By this indirect method the opponent's second answer is re-
established 1."
at least as early as the sixth or the seventh century. Jayanta quotes a passage which
differentiates the two clearly (Nyayamaiijari, p. 22):
'' mulak~atikarimii lmrallavasthii1!l hi du~a~zam.
miilasiddhatt tvanuyiipi niinavasthii niviiryate."
The infinite regress that has to be gone through in order to arrive at the root
matter awaiting to be solved destroys the root and is hence vicious, whereas if the
root is saved there is no harm in a regress though one may not be willing to have it.
v] M onzentariness
all things to be momentary, for this is more an attempt to refute
the doctrines of N yay a than an elaboration of the Buddhist
principles.
The doctrine of momentariness ought to be a direct corollary
of the Buddhist metaphysics. But it is curious that though all
dharmas were regarded as changing, the fact that they were all
strictly momentary (k~a?zika-i.e. existing only for one moment)
'".:as not emphasized in early Pali literature. Asvagho~a in his
Sraddhotptidasiistra speaks of all skandhas as k~al)ika (Suzuki's
translation, p. 105). Buddhagho~a also speaks of the meditation
of the khandhas as khal)ika in his Visuddhimagga. But from the
seventh century A.D. till the tenth century this doctrine together
with the doctrine of arthakriyakaritva received great attention at
the hands of the Sautrantikas and the Vaibha~ikas. All the
N yay a and Vedanta literature of this period is full of refutations
and criticisms of these doctrines. The only Buddhist account
available of the doctrine of momentariness is from the pen of
Ratnakirtti. Some of the general features of his argument in
favour of the view have been given above. Elaborate accounts of it
may be found in any of the important N yaya works of this period
such as Nyayamafz_jari, Ttitparyyafikii of Vacaspati Misra, etc.
Buddhism did not at any time believe anything to be per-
manent. \Vith the development of this doctrine they gave great
emphasis to this point. Things came to view at one moment and
the next moment they were destroyed. \Vhatever is existent is
momentary. It is said that our notion of permanence is derived
from the notion of permanence of ourselves, but Buddhism denied
the existence of any such permanent selves. \Vhat appears as
self is but the bundle of ideas, emotions, and active tendencies
manifesting at any particular moment. The next moment these
dissolve, and new bundles determined by the preceding ones
appear and so on. The present thought is thus the only thinker.
Apart from the emotions, ideas, and active tendencies, we cannot
discover any separate self or soul. It is the combined product of
these ideas, emotions, etc., that yield the illusory appearance of
self at ~ny moment. The consciousness of self is the resultant pro-
duct as it were of the combination of ideas, emotions, etc., at any
particular moment. As these ideas, emotions, etc., change every
moment there is no such thing as a permanent sel(
The fact that I remember that I have been existing for
D. II
Buddhist Philosophy [en.
a long time past does not prove that a permanent self has been
existing for such a long period. \Vhen I say this is that book, I
perceive the book with my eye at the present moment, but that
"this book" is the same as "that book" (i.e. the book arising in
memory), cannot be perceived by the senses. It is evident
that the "that book" of memory refers to a book seen in the
past, whereas "this book " refers to the book which is before
my eyes. The feeling of identity which is adduced to prove per-
manence is thus due to a confusion between an object of memory
referring to a past and different object with the object as perceived
at the present moment by the senses 1• This is true not only of
all recognition of identity at~d permanence of external objects but
also of the perception of the identity of self, for the perception of
self-identity results from the confusion of certain ideas or emotions
arising in memory with similar ideas of the present moment. But
since memory points to an object of past perception, and the per-
ception to another object of the present moment, identity cannot
be proved by a confusion of the two. Every moment all objects
of the world are suffering dissolution and destruction, but yet
things appear to persist, and destruction cannot often be noticed.
Our hair and nails grow and are cut, but yet we think that we
have the same hair and nail that we had before, in place of old
hairs new ones similar to them have sprung forth, and they leave
the impression as if the old ones were persisting. So it is that
though things are destroyed every moment, others similar to
these often rise into being and are destroyed the next moment
and so on, and these similar things succeeding in a series produce
the impression that it is one and the same thing which has been
persisting through all the passing moments 2• Just as the flame
of a candle is changing every moment and yet it seems to us as
if we have been perceiving the same flame all the while, so
all our bodies, our ideas, emotions, etc., all external objects
around us are being destroyed every moment, and new ones are
being generated at every succeeding moment, but so long as the
objects of the succeeding moments are similar to those of the
preceding moments, it appears to us that things have remained
the same and no destruction has taken place.
1 See pratyaLhijfiii.nirii.sa of the Buddhists, Jl.'yiiyamaiijari, V.S. Series, pp. 449• etc.
2 See Tad.:arahasyadzpikii of Gul}aratna, p. 30, and also Nyiiyamaiijari, V.S.
edition, p. 450.
v] Causa! Efficiency
Life of Mahavira.
Mahavira, the last prophet of the J ains, was a K~attriya of
the Jnata clan and a native of Vaisali (modern Besarh, 27 miles
north ofPatna). He was the second son of Siddhartha and Trisala.
The Svetambaras maintain that the embryo of the Tirthankara
which first entered the womb of the Brahmin lady Devananda
was then transferred to the worn b of TriSala. This story the
Digambaras do not believe as we have already seen. His parents
were the worshippers of Parsva and gave him the name Varddha-
mana (Vira or Mahavira). He married Yasoda and had a daughter
by her. In his thirtieth year his parents died and with the per-
mission of his brother N andivardhana he became a monk. After
twelve years of self-mortification and meditation he attained
omniscience (keva!a, c( bodhi of the Buddhists). He lived to
preach for forty-two years more, and attained mok!?a (emanci-
pation) some years before Buddha in about 480 B.C. 2•
!anasamuccaya.
The Jai'na Philosophy [cH.
not a composite of water-atoms. Again it is a composite of earth-
atoms only in the sense that gold is a metallic modification of
earth, and not any other modification of earth as clay or stone.
Its being constituted of metal-atoms is again true in the sense
that it is made up of gold-atoms and not of iron-atoms. It
is made up again of gold-atoms in the sense of melted and un-
sullied gold and not as gold in the natural condition. It is again
made up of such unsullied and melted gold as has been hammered
and shaped by the goldsmith Devadatta and not by Yajnadatta.
Its being made up of atoms conditioned as above is again only
true in the sense that the collocation has been shaped as a jug
and not as a pot and so on. Thus proceeding in a similar manner
the Jains say that all affirmations are true of a thing only in a
certain limited sense. All things (vastu) thus possess an infinite
number of qualities (anantadltarmiitmaka1!z vastu), each of which
can only be affirmed in a particular sense. Such an ordinary thing
as a jug will be found to be the object of an infinite number of
affirmations and the possessor of an infinite number of qualities
from infinite points of view, which are all true in certain restricted
senses and not absolutely 1• Thus in the positive relation riches
cannot be affirmed of poverty but in the negative relation such
an affirmation is possible as when we say "the poor man has no
riches." The poor man possesses riches not in a positive but in
a negative way. Thus in some relation or other anything may be
affirmed of any other thing, and again in other relations the very
same thing cannot be affirmed of it. The different standpoints
from which things (though possessed of infinite determinations)
can be spoken of as possessing this or that quality or as ap-
pearing in relation to this or that, are technically called naya 2•
Taltviirthiidhigamasiitra.
2 See Tatlviirlhiidhigamasiitra, and Vift'!tivafyaka bhti~ya, pp. 895-923.
Standpoints ofJudgment 177
the thing. Secondly we may notice the qualities separately and
regard the thing as a mere non-existent fiction ( cf. the Buddhist
view); thus I may speak of the different qualities of the book
separately and hold that the qualities of things are alone percep-
tible and the book apart from these cannot be found. These two
points of view are respectively called dravya1Zayaand paryaya11aya 1•
The dravyanaya again shows itself in three forms, and paryaya-
naya in four forms, of which the first form only is important for
our purposes, the other three being important rather from the
point of view of grammar and language had better be omitted
here. The three nayas under dravyanaya are called naigama-naya,
sarpgraha-naya and vyavahara-naya.
When we speak of a thing from a purely common sense point
of view, we do not make our ideas clear or precise. Thus I may
hold a book in my hand and when asked whether my hands are
empty, I may say, no, I have something in my hand, or I may say,
I have a book in my hand. It is evident that in the first answer
I looked at the book from the widest and most general point of
view as a "thing," whereas in the second I looked at it in its
special existence as a book. Again I may be reading a page of
a book, and I may say I am reading a book, but in reality I was
reading only one of the pages of the book. I may be scribbling
on loose sheets, and may say this is my book on Jaina philosophy,
whereas in reality there were no books but merely some loose
sheets. This looking at things from the loose common sense view,.
in which we do not consider them from the point of view of their
most general characteristic as "being'' or as any of their special
characteristics, but simply as they appear at first sight, is techni-
cally called the naigama standpoint. This empirical view probably
proceeds on the assumption that a thing possesses the most
general as well as the most special qualities, and hence we may
lay stress on any one of these at any time and ignore the other
ones. This is the point of view from which according to the
Jains the Nyaya and Vaise~ika schools interpret experience.
Sarpgraha-naya is the looking at things merely from the
most general point of view. Thus we may speak of all individual
things from their most general and fundamental aspect as "being."
This according to the Jains is the Vedanta way of looking at
things.
1
SJ tidviidamaii.fari, Pl-l· I7I-I73·
1
The J a ina Philosophy [cu.
The vyavahara-naya standpoint holds that the real essence
of things is to be regarded from the point of view of actual prac-
tical experience of the thing, which unifies within it some general
as well as some special traits, which has been existing from past
times and remain in the future, but yet suffer trifling changes
all the while, changes which are serviceable to us in a thousand
ways. Thus a "book" has no doubt some general traits, shared
by all books, but it has some special traits as well. Its atoms are
continually suffering some displacement and rearrangement, but
yet it has been existing as a book for some time past and will
exist for some time in the future as well. All these characteristics,
go to make up the essence of the "book" of our everyday ex-
perience, and none of these can be separated and held up as being
the concept of a "book." This according to the Jains is the
Saf!lkhya way of looking at things.
The first view of paryaya-naya called .1JitSiUra is the Buddhist
view which does not believe in the existence of the thing in the
past or in the future, but holds that a thing is a mere conglomera-
tion of characteristics which may be said to produce effects at
any given moment. At each new moment there are new colloca-
tions of new qualities and it is these which may be regarded as
the true essence of our notion of things 1•
The nayas as we have already said are but points of view, or
aspects of looking at things, and as such are infinite in number.
The above four represent only a broad classification of these. The
Ja ins hold that the N yaya-Vaise!;iika, the Vedanta, the Saf!lkhya,
and the Buddhist,. have each tried to interpret and systematize
experience from one of the above four points of view~ and each re-
gards the interpretation from his point of view as be(.1g absolutely
true to the exclusion of all other points of view. This is their error
(nayabhasa), for each standpoint represents only one of the many
points of view from which a thing can be looked at. The affirma-
, tions from any point of view are thus true in a limited sense and
under limited conditions. Infinite numbers of affirmations may
be made of things from infinite points of view. Affirmations or
judgments according to any naya or standpoint cannot therefore
. be absolute, for even contrary affirmations of the very selfsame
t The other standpoints of paryaya-naya, which represent grammatical and lin-
guistic points of view, are fabcla-1taya, samabhiriitjha-naya, and evambhiUa-naya. See
Viftfiiva1yaka bhiifya, pp. 895-923.
VI] Syadvada 179
things may be held to be true from other points of view. The
truth of each affirmation is thus only conditional, and incon-
ceivable from the absolute point of view. To guarantee correctness
therefore each affirmation should be preceded by the phrase syiit
(may be). This will indicate that the affirmation is only relative, 1
made somehow, from some point of view and under some reser-
vations and not in any sense absolute. There is no judgment
which is absolutely true, and no judgment which is absolutely
false. All judgments are true in some sense and false in another.
This brings us to the famous J aina doctrine of Syadvada I.
Theory of Perception.
The main difference of the Jains from the Buddhists in the
theory of perception lies, as we have already seen, in this, that the
Jains think that perception (pratyak~a) reveals to us the external
objects just as they are with most of their diverse characteristics of
colour, form, etc., and also in this, that knowledge arises in the soul
1 Illusion consists in attributing such spatial, temporal or other kinds of relations
to the objects of our judgment as do not actually exist, but the objects themselves
actually exist in other relations. \Vben I mistake the rope for the snake, the snake
actually exists though its relationing with the " this " as " this is a snake " does not
exist, for the snake is not the rope. This illusion is thus called satkhyiiti or misrelationing
of existents (sat).
2 See Jaina-tarka-viirttika of Siddhasena, ch. I., and vrtti by Santyacarya,
Non-Perceptual Knowledge.
Non-perceptual knowledge (parok~a) differs from pratyak~a
in this, that it does not give us so vivid a picture of objects as the
latter. Since the Ja ins do not admit that the senses had any func-
tion in determining the cognitions of the soul, the only distinction
they could draw behveen perception and other forms of knowledge
was that the knowledge of the former kind (perception) gave us
clearer features and characteristics of objects than the latter.
Parok!?a thus includes inference, recognition, implication, memory,
etc.; and this knowledge is decidedly less vivid than perception.
Regarding inference, the J ains hold that it is unnecessary to
have five propositions, such as: (I) "the hill is fiery," ( 2) ''because
of smoke," (3) "wherever there is smoke there is fire, such as the
kitchen," (4) "this hill is smoky," (5) "therefore it is fiery," called
respectively pratijliii, lzetu, drs!iinta, upa11aya and ni'gamana, ex-
cept for the purpose of explicitness. It is only the first two
propositions which actually enter into the inferential process
(Prameyakamalamiirta?z¢a, pp. 108, 109). When we make an
of separate senses is with reference to admitting them as entities or capacities having
a distinct and separate category of existence from the soul. The sense organs are like
windows for the soul to look out. They cannot thus modify the sense-knowledge
which rises in the soul by inward determination; for it is already existent in it; the
perceptual process only means that the veil which was observing it is removed.
1 Prame;,akamalamiirta~uja, pp. 8-1 1.
186 The Jaina Philosophy [cH.
inference we do not proceed through the five propositions as
above. They who know that the reason is inseparably connected
with the probandum either as coexistence (sahabhava) or as in-
variable antecedence (kramabhiiva) will from the mere statement
of the existence of the reason (e.g. smoke) in the hill jump to the
conclusion that the hill has got fire. A syllogism consisting of
five propositions is rather for explaining the matter to a child
than for representing the actual state of the mind in making an
inference 1•
As regards proof by testimony the Jains do not admit the
authority of the Vedas, but believe that the Jaina scriptures give
us right knowledge, for these are the utterances of persons who
have lived a worldly life but afterwards by right actions and
right knowledge have conquered all passions and removed all
ignorance 2•
Knowledge as Revelation.
The Buddhists had affirmed that the proof of the existence of
anything depended upon the effect that it could produce on us.
That which could produce any effect on us was existent, and that
1 As regards concomitance (vyiiptz) some of the J a ina logicians like the Buddhists
prefer antarvyiipti (between smoke and fire) to bahirvyapti (the place containing smoke
with the place containing fire). They also divide inference into two classes, sviirthii-
numiina for one's own self and pariirthiinumiina for convincing others. It may not
be out of place to note that the earliest J a ina view as maintained by Bhadrabahu in his
Dasavaikalikaniryukti was in favour of ten propositions for making an inference;
( 1) Pratifiiii (e.g. non-injury to life is the greatest virtue), ( 2) Pratijiiiivibhakti (non-in-
jury to life is the greatest virtue according to J a ina scriptures), (3) Hetu (because those
who adhere to non-injury are loved by gods and it is meritorious to do them honour),
(4) Hetu vibhakti (those who do so are the only persons who can live in the highest
places of virtue), (5) Vipakfa (but even by doing injury one may prosper and even by
reviling J a ina scriptures one may attain merit as is the case with Brahmins), (6) Vipak!a
prali!edha (it is not so, it is impossible that those who despise Jaina scriptmes should
be loved by gods or should deserve honour), (7) Drf!iinta (the Arhats take food from
householders as they do not like to cook themselves for fear of killing insects), (8) Ai-
aizkii (hut the sins of the householders should touch the arhats, for they cook for them),
(9) Asankiipralifedha (this cannot be, for the arhats go to certain houses unexpectedly,
so it could not be said that the cooking was undertaken for them), (ro) Naigamana
(non-injury is therefore the greatest virtue) (Vidyabhit~al)a's Indian Logic). These are
persuasive statements which are often actually adopted in a discussion, but from a
formal point of view many of these are irrelevant. When Vatsyayana in his .Nyaya-
sutrablul!ya, I. I. 32, says that Gautama introduced the doctrine of five propositions as
against the doctrine of ten propositions as held by other logicians, he probably had
this J aina view in his mind.
2
SeeJainatarkaviirttika, and Parik~iimukhasutravrtti, and ~acjdarfanasamuccaya
with Gul)aratna on Jainism.
VI] Theory of Be£ng
which could not non-existent. In fact production of effect was
with them the only definition of existence (being). Theoretically
each unit of effect being different from any other unit of effect,
they supposed that there was a succession of different units of
effect or, what is the same thing, acknowledged a succession of
new substances every moment. All things were thus momentary.
The Jains urged that the reason why the production of effect
may be regarded as the only proof of being is that we can assert
only that thing the existence of which is indicated by a corre-
sponding experience. When we have a unit of experience we
suppose the existence of the object as its ground. This being so,
the theoretical analysis of the Buddhists that each unit of effect
produced in us is not exactly the same at each new point of time,
and that therefore all things are momentary, is fallacious; for ex-
perience shows that not all of an object is found to be changing
every moment; some part of it (e.g. gold in a gold ornament) is
found to remain permanent while other parts (e.g. its form as ear-
rings or bangles) are seen to undergo change. How in the face
of such an experience can we assert that the whole thing vanishes
every moment and that new things are being renewed at each
succeeding moment? Hence leaving aside mere abstract and
unfounded speculations, if we look to experience we find that the
conception of being or existence in- olves a notion of permanence
associated with change-paryaya (acquirement of new qualities
and the loss of old ones). The Jains hold that the defects of other
systems lie in this, that they interpret experience only from one
particular standpoint (naya) whereas they alone carefully weigh
experience from all points of view and acquiesce in the truths
indicated by it, not absolutely but under proper reservations and
limitations. The Jains hold' that in formulating the doctrine of
arthakriyiikiiritva the Buddhists at first showed signs of starting
on their enquiry on the evidence of experience, but soon they
became one-sided in their analysis and indulged in unwarrantable
abstract speculations which went directly against experience.
Thus if we go by experience we can neither reject the self nor
the ex_ternal world as some Buddhists did. Knowledge which
reveals to us the clear-cut features of the external world certifies
at the same time that such knowledge is part and parcel of myself
as the subject. Knowledge is thus felt to be an expression of my
own sel( We do not perceive in experience that knowledge
188 The J a ina Philosophy [cH.
in us is generated by the external world, but there is in us the
rise of knowledge and of certain objects made known to us by it.
The rise of knowledge is thus only parallel to certain objective
collocations of things which somehow have the special fitness
that they and they alone are perceived at that particular mometlt.
Looked at from this point of view all our experiences are centred
in ourselves, for determined somehow, our experiences come to us
as modifications of our own self. Knowledge being a character
of the self, it shows itself as manifestations of the self independent
of the senses. No distinction should be made between a conscious
and an unconscious element in knowledge as Sarpkhya does. Nor
should knowledge be regarded as a copy of the objects which it
reveals, as the Sautrantikas think, for then by copying the materi-
ality of the object, knowledge would itself become material.
Knowledge should thus be regarded as a formless quality of the
self revealing all objects by itself. But the Mimarpsa view that the
validity (priimii~rya) of all knowledge is proved by knowledge it-
self (svata!fpriimii~l)'a) is wrong. Both logically and psychologically
the validity of knowledge depends upon outward correspondence
(sm!zvada) with facts. But in those cases where by previous
knowledge of correspondence a right belief has been produced
there may be a psychological ascertainment of validity without
reference to objective facts (priimii?ryamutpattau parata eva
jiiaptau svakarye ca S'lJata{z paratasca abhyasiinabhyasiipek,faya) 1•
The objective world exists as it is certified by experience. But
that it generates knowledge in us is an unwarrantable hypo-
thesis, for knowledge appears as a revelation of our own self. This
brings us to a consideration of J aina metaphysics.
The jivas.
The Jains say that experience shows that all things may be
divided into the living (}iva) and the non-living (ajiva). The
principle of life is entirely distinct from the body, and it is most
erroneous to think that life is either the product or the property
of the body 2• It is on account of this life-principle that the body
appears to be living This principle is the soul. The soul is
directly perceived (by introspection) just as the external things
are. It is not a mere symbolical object indicated by a phrase or
1
Prameyakamalamiirta~uja, pp. 38-4-3·
2
See Jaina Viirttika, p. 6o.
VI] Souls
a description. This is directly against the view of the great
Mimarpsa authority Prabhakara I. The soul in its pure state is
possessed of infinite perception (a1Zanta-darsa11a), infinite know-
ledge (ananta-_j71iina), infinite bliss (a1la1lta-sukha) and infinite
power (ananta-virya) 2• It is all perfect. Ordinarily however, with
the exception of a few released pure souls (mukta-_jiva), all the
other jivas (smtzsiirin) have all their purity and power covered with
a thin veil of karma matter which has been accumulating in them
from beginningless time. These souls are infinite in number. They
are substances and are eternal. They in reality occupy innumer-
able space-points in our mundane world (lokiikiisa), have a limited
size (-madhyama-parimii'!la) and are neither all-pervasive (vibhu)
nor atomic (a~u); it is on account of this that jiva is called
jiviistikaya. The word astikaya means anything that occupies
space or has some pervasiveness; but these souls expand and
contract themselves according to the dimensions of the body
which they occupy at any time (bigger in the elephant and
smaller in the ant life). It is well to remember that according to
the J ains the soul occupies the whole of the body in which it
lives, so that from the tip of the hair to the nail of the foot,
wherever there may be any cause of sensation, it can at once feel
it. The manner in which the soul occupies the body is often ex-
plained as being similar to the manner in which a lamp illumines
the whole room though remaining in one corner of the room. The
Jains divide the jivas according to the number of sense-organs
they possess. The lowest class consists of plants, which possess
only the sense-organ of touch. The next higher class is that
of worms, which possess two sense-organs of touch and taste.
Next come the ants, etc., which possess touch, taste, and smell.
The next higher one that of bees, etc., possessing vision in
addition to touch, taste, and smell. The vertebrates possess all
the five sense-organs. The higher animals among these, namely
men, denizens of hell, and the gods possess in addition to these
an inner. sense-organ namely 1Jza1zas by virtue of which they are
I See Prameyakamaiamiirta~zda, p. 33·
2
The Jains distinguish between darfana andj1ziina. Darsana is the knowledge of
things without their details, e.g. I see a cloth. Jfiana means the knowledge of details,
e.g. I not only see the cloth, but know to whom it belongs, of what quality it is,
where it was prepared, etc. In all cognition we have first darsan:!l and then jfiana.
The pure souls possess infinite general perception of all things as well as infinite
knowledge of all things in all their details.
190 The jaina Phz"losophy [cH.
called rational (sa1tt/lii1l) while the lower animals have no reason
and are called asmtzJilin.
Proceeding towards the lowest animal we find that the Jains
regard all the four elements (earth, water, air, fire) as being ani-
mated by souls. Thus particles of earth, etc., are the bodies of
souls, called earth-lives, etc. These we may call elementary lives;
they live and die and are born again in another elementary body.
These elementary lives are either gross or subtle; in the latter case
they are invisible. The last class of one-organ lives are plants.
Of some plants each is the body of one soul only; but of other
plants, each is an aggregation of embodied souls, which have all
the functions of life such as respiration and nutrition in common.
Plants in which only one soul is embodied are always gross; they
exist in the habitable part of the world only. But those plants
of which each is a colony of plant lives may also be subtle and
invisible, and in that case they are distributed all over the world.
The whole universe is full of minute beings called nigodas; they
are groups of infinite number of souls forming very small clusters,
having respiration and nutrition in common and experiencing ex-
treme pains. The whole space of the world is closely packed with
them like a box filled with powder. The nigodas furnish the supply
of souls in place of those that have reached Mok~a. But an
infinitesimally small fraction of one single nigoda has sufficed to
replace the vacancy caused in the world by the Nirvarya of all the
souls that have been liberated from beginningless past down to
the present. Thus it is evident the sarpsara will never be empty
of living beings. Those of the 1li'godas who long for development
come out and contiune their course of progress through successive
stages 1•
Karma Theory.
It is on account of their merits or demerits that the jfvas are
born as gods, men, animals, or denizens of hell. We have already
noticed in Chapter I I I that the cause of the embodiment of soul
is the presence in it of karma matter. The natural perfections of
the pure soul are sullied by the different kinds of karma matter.
Those which obscure right knowledge of details (_jiialla) are
called _jFuiniivara1Jiya, those which obscure right perception
(dar.Sana) as in sleep are called dar.Smziivarmfiya, those which
1 See Jacobi's article on Jainism, E. R. E., and Lokaprakiifa, VI. pp. 31 ff.
VI] Eftects of Karma
obscure the bliss-nature of the soul and thus produce pleasure and
pain are vedaniya, and those which obscure the right attitude of the
soul towards faith and right conduct mohaniya 1• In addition to
these four kinds of karma there are other four kinds of karma which
determine (r) the length of life in any birth, (2) the peculiar body
with its general and special qualities and faculties, (3) the nation-
ality, caste,family, social standing, etc., (4) the inborn energy of the
soul by the obstruction of which it prevents the doing of a good
action when there is a desire to do it. These are respectively called
(I) iiyu~ka karma, ( 2) nama karma, (3) gotra karma, (4) mztariiya
karma. By our actions of mind, speech and body, we are con-
tinually producing certain subtle karma matter which in the first
instance is called bhava karma, which transforms itself into dravya
karma and pours itself into the soul and sticks there by coming
into contact with the passions (ka~aya) of the soul. These act like
viscous substances in retaining the in pouring karma matter. This
matter acts in eight different ways and it is accordingly divided
into eight classes, as we have already noticed. This karma is the
cause of bondage and sorrow. According as good or bad karma
matter sticks to the soul it gets itself coloured respectively as
golden, lotus-pink, white and black, blue and grey and they are
called the lesyas. The feelings generated by the accumulation of
the karma-matter are called bhava-leiya and the actual coloration
of the soul by it is called dravya-leiya. According as any karma
matter has been generated by good, bad, or indifferent actions, it
gives us pleasure, pain, or feeling of indifference. Even the know-
ledge that we are constantly getting by perception, inference, etc.,
is but the result of the effect of karmas in accordance with which
the particular kind of veil which was obscuring any particular kind
of knowledge is removed at any time and we have a knowledge
of a corresponding nature. By our own karmas the veils over our
knowledge, feeling, etc., are so removed that we have just that
kind of knowledge and feeling that we deserved t~ have. All
knowledge, feeling, etc.:a,re thus- m one sei1se generated from
within, the external objects which are ordinarily said to be
generating them all being but mere coexistent external con-
ditions.
1 The Jains acknowledge five kinds of knowledge: (1) matijiiiina (ordinary cog-
nition), (2) fruti (testimony), (3) avadhi (supernatural cognition), (4-) malla/.zjJaryaya
(thought-reading), (5) kevala-Jiiiina (omniscience).
The Jaina Philosophy [cH.
After the effect of a particular karma matter (karma-varga?zti)
is once produced, it is discharged and purged from off the soul.
This process of purging off the karmas is called nit:)'arii. If no
new karma matter should accumulate then, the gradual purging
off of the karmas might make the soul free of karma matter, but as
it is, while some karma matter is being purged off, other karma
matter is continually pouring in, and thus the purging and
binding processes continuing simultaneously force the soul to
continue its mundane cycle of existence, transmigration, and re-
birth. After the death of each individual his soul, together with
its karmic body (karma~zafarlra), goes in a few moments to the
place of its new birth and there assumes a new body, expanding
or contracting in accordance with the dimensions of the latter.
In the ordinary course karma takes effect and produces its
proper results, and at such a stage the soul is said to be in the
audayika state. By proper efforts karma may however be pre-
vented from taking effect, though it still continues to exist, and
this is said to be the aupafamika state of the soul. When karma
is not only prevented from operating but is annihilated, the soul
is said to be in the k~iiyika state, and it is from this state that
Mok~a is attained. There is, however, a fourth state of ordinary
good men with whom some karma is annihilated, some neutralized,
and some active (k~aJ'opafamika) 1 •
sthiinas which are fourteen in number. The first three stages represent the growth of
faith in Jainism, the next five stages are those in which all the passions are controlled,
in the next four stages the ascetic practises yoga and destroys all his karmas, at the
thirteenth stage he is divested of all karmas hut he still practises yoga and at the
fourteenth st.1.ge he attains liberation (see Dravyasarpgrahavrtti, 13th verse).
Influx of Karma 193
enter through those channels. Thus they distinguish two kinds
of asravas, bhavasrava and karmasrava. Bhavasrava means the
thought activities of the soul through which or on account of
which the karma particles enter the souP. Thus Nemicandra
says that bhavasrava is that kind of change in the soul (which
is the contrary to what can destroy the karmasrava), by which
the karmas enter the soul 2• Karmasrava, however, means the
actual entrance of the karma matter into the soul. These
bhavasravas are in general of five kinds, namely delusion
(mithyatva), want of control (avirati), inadvertence (pramada),
the activities of body, mind and speech (yoga) and the pas-
sions (ka~iiyas). Delusion again is of five kinds, namely ekt"i11ta
(a false belief unknowingly accepted and uncritically followed),
~~iparlta (uncertainty as to the exact nature of truth), viuaya
(retention of a belief knowing it to be false, due to old habit),
saJtt.Saya (doubt as to right or wrong) and aj1tiilla (want of any
belief due to the want of application of reasoning powers).
Avirati is again of five kinds, injury (hil?zsii), falsehood (mzrta),
stealing (cauryya), incontinence (abrahma), and desire to have
things which one does not already possess (parigrahakiiJik~t"i).
Pramada or inadvertence is again of five kinds, namely bad con-
versation (vikatha), passions (ka~aya), bad use of the five senses
(indriya), sleep (11idra), attachment (raga) 3•
Coming to dravyasrava we find that it means that actual in-
flux of karma which affects the soul in eight different manners
in accordance with which these karmas are classed into eight
different kinds, namely jfianavararyiya, darsanavarat)iya, veda-
niya, mohaniya, ayu, nama, gotra and antaraya. These actual
influxes take place only as a result of the bhavasrava or the re-
prehensible thought activities, or changes (pari?tama) of the soul.
The states of thought which condition the coming in of the karmas
is called bhavabandha and the actual bondage of the soul by the
actual impure connections of the karmas is technically called
dravyabandha. It is on account of bhavabandha that the actual
connection between the karmas and the soul can take place 4• The
actual c~nnections of the karmas with the soul are like the sticking-
1 Dravyasa'!zgralza, Sl. 29.
2
Nemicandra's commentary on Dravyasa'!zgraha, Sl. 29, edited by S.C. Ghoshal,
Arrah, 1917.
3 See N emicandra's commentary on Sl. 30.
4 Nemicandra on 31, and Vardhamii1zapurii~za XVI. 4-4• quoted hy Ghoshal.
194 The Ja·ina Philosophy [ CII
Pudgala.
The aj'iva (non-living) is divided into pudgalastikaya, dharma
stiktiya, adharmastikaya, tiktisastikaya, kala, pu1;1ya, papa. The
word pudgala means matter 3, and it is called astikaya itl the
sense that it occupies space. Pudgala is made up of atoms
1Taltviirth,zdhi'gamasutra. 2 Ibid.
3
This is entirely different from the Buddhist sense. With the Buddhists pudgala
means an individual or a person.
The Jaina Philosophy [cH.
which are without size and eternal. Matter may exist in two
states, gross (such as things we see around us), and subtle (such
as the karma matter which sullies the soul). All material things
are ultimately produced by the combination of atoms. The
smallest indivisible particle of matter is called an atom (a?zu).
The atoms are all eternal and they all have touch, taste, smell,
and colour. The formation of different substances is due to the
different geometrical, spherical or cubical modes of the combi-
nation of the atoms, to the diverse modes of their inner arrange-
ment and to the existence of different degrees of inter-atomic
space (gha?Zapratarabhede?Za). Some combinations take place by
simple mutual contact at two points (J'ugmapradesa) whereas
in others the atoms are only held together by the points of at-
tractive force (oja(tpradesa) (Prajlitipa1topiingasiitra, pp. 10-12).
Two atoms form a compound (skmzdha), when the one is viscous
and the other dry or both are of different degrees of viscosity or
dryness. It must be noted that while the Buddhists thought that
there was no actual contact between the atoms the Jains regarded
the contact as essential and as testified by experience. These
compounds combine with other compounds and thus produce
the gross things of the world. They are, however, liable to
constant change (pari~ztima) by which they lose some of their
old qualities (gu~zas) and acquire new ones. There are four
elements, earth, water, air, and fire, and the atoms of all these
are alike in character. The perception of grossness however
is not an error which is imposed upon the perception of the
atoms by our mind (as the Buddhists think) nor is it due to the
perception of atoms scattered spatially lengthwise and breadthwise
(as the Sarpkhya-Yoga supposes), but it is due to the accession of
a similar property of grossness, blueness or hardness in the com-
bined atoms, so that such knowledge is generated in us as is given
in the perception of a gross, blue, or a hard thing. \Vhen a thing
appears as blue, what happens is this, that the atoms there have
all acquired the property of blueness and on the removal of the
darsanavarar)lya and jftanavarar)lya veil, there arises in the soul
the perception and knowledge of that blue thing~ This sameness
(samii1za-rupatti) of the accession of a quality in an aggregate of
atoms by virtue of which it appears as one object (e.g. a cow)
is technically called tiryaksiimii1lya. This samanya or generality
is thus neither an imposition of the mind nor an abstract entity
VI] Dhanna 197
(as maintained by the Naiyayikas) but represents only the ac-
cession of similar qualities by a similar development of qualities
of atoms forming an aggregate. So long as this similarity of
qualities continues we perceive the thing to be the same and
to continue for some length of time. \Vhen we think of a thing
to be permanent, we do so by referring to this sameness in the
developing tendencies of an aggregate of atoms resulting in the
relative permanence of similar qualities in them. According to
the Jains things are not momentary and in spite of the loss of
some old qualities and the accession of other ones, the thing as
a whole may remain more or less the same for some time. This
sameness of qualities in time is technically called iirdhvasiimiinya 1•
If the atoms are looked at from the point of view of the change
and accession of new qualities, they may be regarded as liable to
destruction, but if they are looked at from the point of view of
substance (dravya) they are eternal.
jaina Cosmogr~phy.
jaina Yoga.
Yoga according to Jainism is the cause of mok!';)a (salvation).
This yoga consists of jfiana (knowledge of reality as it is), sraddha
(faith in the teachings of the Jinas), and caritra (cessation from
doing all that is evil). This caritra consists of ahil!lSii (not
taking any life even by mistake or unmindfulness), srmrta
(speaking in such a way as is true, good and pleasing), asteya
(not taking anything which has not been given), brahmacaryya
(abandoning lust for all kinds of objects, in mind, speech and
body), and apari'gralla (abandoning attachment for all things) 1•
These strict rules of conduct only apply to ascetics who are bent
on attaining perfection. The standard proposed for the ordinary
householders is fairly workable. Thus it is said by Hemacandra,
that ordinary householders should earn money honestly, should
follow the customs of good people, should marry a good girl from
a good family, should follow the customs of the country and so
forth. These are just what we should expect from any good and
1 Certain external rules of conduct are also called caritra. These are: lry_vii (to
go by the path already trodden by others and illuminated by the sun's rays, so that
proper precaution may be taken while walking to prevent oneself from treading on
insects, etc., which may be lying on the way), bht1~ii (to speak well and pleasantly
to all beings), ija~za (to beg alms in the proper monastic manner), di'inasamiti (to
inspect carefully the seats avoiding all transgressions when taking or giving anything),
utsargasamiti (to take care that bodily refuse may not be thrown in such a way as to
injure any being), manogupti (to remove all false thoughts, to remain satisfied within
oneself, and hold all people to be the same in mind), viiggupti (absolute silence), and
kiiyagupti (absolute steadiness and fixity of the body). Five other kinds of caritra are
counted in Dravyasm!zp-ahavrtti 35·
200 The J a ina Philosophy [cH.
honest householder of the present day. Great stress is laid upon
the virtues of ahirpsa, sunrta, asteya and brahmacaryya, but the
root of all these is ahirpsa. The virtues of sunrta, asteya and
brahmacaryya are made to follow directly as secondary corrol-
laries of ahirpsa. Ahirpsa may thus be generalized as the funda-
mental ethical virtue of Jainism; judgment on all actions may be
passed in accordance with the standard of ahirrsa ; sunrta, asteya
and brahmacaryya are regarded as virtues as their transgression
leads to hirpsa (injury to beings). A milder form of the practice
of these virtues is expected from ordinary householders and this
is called anubrata (small vows). But those who are struggling
for the attainment of emancipation must practise these virtues
according to the highest and strictest standard, and this is called
mahabrata (great vows). Thus for example brahmacaryya for a
householder according to the anubrata standard would be mere
cessation from adultery, whereas according to mahabrata it would
be absolute abstention from sex-thoughts, sex-words and sex-
acts. Ahirpsa according to a householder, according to anubrata,
would require abstinence from killing any animals, but according
to mahavrata it would entail all the rigour and carefulness to
prevent oneself from being the cause of any kind of injury to
any living being in any way.
Many other minor duties are imposed upon householders, all
of which are based upon the cardinal virtue of ahirpsa. These
are (1) di'gvirati (to carry out activities within a restricted area
and thereby desist from injuring living beings in different places),
(2) bhogopablzoganui1la (to desist from drinking liquors, taking
flesh, butter, honey, figs, certain other kinds of plants, fruits, and
vegetables, to observe certain other kinds of restrictions regarding
time and place of taking meals), (3) auartltada~uja consisting of
(a) apadhyii1Ul (cessation from inflicting any bodily injuries,
killing of one's enemies, etc.), (b) piipopadda (desisting from
advising people to take to agriculture which leads to the killing
of so many insects), (c) hil!Zsopakari'diina (desisting from giving
implements of agriculture to people which will lead to the injury
of insects), (d) pramiidiicara!za (to desist from attending musical
parties, theatres, or reading sex-literature,gambling,etc.), (4) Sikfii-
padabrata consisting of (a) siimayikabrata (to try to treat all
beings equally), (b) desiivakaSikabrata (gradually to practise the
digvirati'brata more and more extensively), (c) pofadhabrata
Rules of Conduct 201
jaina Atheism 2•
The N aiyayikas assert that as the world is of the nature of
an effect, it must have been created by an intelligent agent and
this agent is Isvara (God). To this the Jain replies," What does
the Naiyayika mean when he says that the world is of the nature
of an effect"? Does he mean by "effect," ( 1) that which is made
up of parts (siivayava), or, (2) the coinherence of the causes of a
non-existent thing, or, (3) that which is regarded by anyone as
having been made, or, (4) that which is liable to change (vikiirit-
vam). Again, what is meant by being "made up of parts"? If it
means existence in parts, then the class-concepts (siimiinya)
existing in the parts should also be regarded as effects, and hence
destructible, but these the N aiyayikas regard as being partless and
eternal. If it means "that which has parts," then even "space"
(iikiisa) has to be regarded as "effect," but the Naiyayika regards
it as eternal.
Again "effect" cannot mean "coinherence of the causes of a
thing which were previously non-existent," for in that case one
could not speak of the world as an effect, for the atoms of the
elements of earth, etc., are regarded as eternal.
Again if ''effect" means "that which is regarded by anyone as
1
Yogaliistra, by Hemacandra, edited by Windisch, in Zeitsch1·ift der Deutschm
Alorg. Gesel!schafl, Leipsig, 1874, and DraVJ'aSaf!Zgraha, edited by Ghoshal, I9Ii.
2
See Gu~;mratna's Tarkarahasyadipikt1.
204 The J a ina Philosophy [en.
ha~ing been made," then it would apply even to space, for when
a man digs the ground he thinks that he has made new space in
the hollow which he dug.
If it means "that which is liable to change," then one could
suppose that God was also liable to change and he would require
another creator to create him and he another, and so on ad
iufinitum. Moreover, if God creates he cannot but be liable to
change with reference to his creative activity.
Moreover, we know that those things which happen at some
time and do not happen at other times are regarded as "effects."
But the world as a whole exists always. If it is argued that things
contained within it such as trees, plants, etc., are "effects," then
that would apply even to this hypothetical God, for, his will and
thought must be diversely operating at diverse times and these
are contained in him. He also becomes a created being by virtue
of that. And even atoms would be "effects," for they also undergo
changes of colour by heat.
Let us grant for the sake of argument that the world as a
whole is an "effect." And every effect has a cause, and so the
world as a whole has a cause. But this does not mean that the
cause is an intelligent one, as God is supposed to be. If it is
argued that he is regarded as intelligent on the analogy of human
causation then he might also be regarded as imperfect as human
beings. If it is held that the world as a whole is not exactly
an effect of the type of effects produced by human beings
but is similar to those, this will lead to no inference. Because
water-vapour is similar to smoke, nobody will be justified in
inferring fire from water-vapour, as he would do from smoke.
If it is said that this is so different an effect that from it the
inference is possible, though nobody has ever been seen to pro-
duce such an effect, well then, one could also infer on seeing
old houses ruined in course of time that these ruins were pro-
duced by intelligent agents. For these are also effects of which
we do not kno\v of any intelligent agent, for both are effects,
and the invisibility of the agent is present in both cases. If it is
said that the world is such that we have a sense that it has been
made by some one, then the question will be, whether you infer
the agency of God from this sense or infer the sense of its having
been made from the fact of its being made by God, and you have
a vicious circle (tlli)'Oilyiisraya).
VI] Anti-theistic A rgunzents
Again, even if we should grant that the world was created by
an agent, then such an agent should have a body, for we have
never seen any intelligent creator without a body. If it is held
that we should consider the general condition of agency only,
namely, that the agent is intelligent, the objection will be that
this is impossible, for agency is always associated with some kind
of body. If you take the instances of other kinds of effects such
as the shoots of corn growing in the fields, it will be found that
these had no intelligent agents behind them to create them. If it
is said that these are also made by God, then you have an
argument in a circle (cakraka), for this was the very matter which
you sought to prove.
Let it be granted for the sake of argument that God exists.
Does his mere abstract existence produce the world? Well, in
that case, the abstract existence of a potter may also create the
world, for the abstract existence is the same in both cases. Does
he produce the world by knowledge and will? \Veil, that is im-
possible, for there cannot be any knowledge and will without a
body. Does he produce the world by physical movement or any
other kind of movement? In any case that is impossible, for there
cannot be any movement without a body. If you suppose that
he is omniscient, you may do so, but that does not prove that
he can be all-creator.
Let us again grant for the sake of argument that a bodiless
God can create the world by his will and activity. Did he take
to creation through a personal whim? In that case there would
be no natural laws and order in the world. Did he take to it
in accordance with the moral and immoral actions of men? Then
he is guided by a moral order and is not independent. Is it
through mercy that he took to creation? Well then, we suppose
there should have been only happiness in the world and nothing
else. If it is said that it is by the past actions of men that they
suffer pains and enjoy pleasure, and if men are led to do vicious
actions by past deeds which work like blind destiny, then such
a blind destiny (ad.r~ta) might take the place of God. If He took
to creation as mere play, then he must be a child who did things
without a purpose. If it was due to his desire of punishing certain
people and favouring others, then he must harbour favouritism
on behalf of some and hatred against others. If the creation took
place simply through his own nature, then, what is the good of
206 The Jaina Phzlosophy [cH.
admitting him at all ? You may rather say that the world came
into being out of its own nature.
It is preposterous to suppose that one God without the help
of any instruments or other accessories of any kind, could create
this world. This is against all experience.
Admitting for the sake of argument that such a God exists,
you could never justify the adjectives with which you wish to
qualify him. Thus you say that he is eternal. But since he has
no body, he must be of the nature of intelligence and will.
But this nature must have changed in diverse forms for the pro-
duction of diverse kinds of worldly things, which are of so varied
a nature. If there were no change in his knowledge and will, then
there could not have been diverse kinds of creation and de-
struction. Destruction and creation cannot be the result of one
unchangeable will and knowledge. Moreover it is the character
of knowledge to change, if the word is used in the sense in which
knowledge is applied to human beings, and surely we are not
aware of any other kind of knowledge. You say that God is
omniscient, but it is difficult to suppose how he can have any
knowledge at all, for as he has no organs he cannot have any
perception, and since he cannot have any perception he cannot
have any inference either. If it is said that without the supposi-
tion of a God the variety of the world would be inexplicable, this
also is not true, for this implication would only be justified if
there were no other hypothesis left. But there are other supposi-
tions also. Even without an omniscient God you could explain
all things merely by the doctrine of moral order or the law of
karma. If there were one God, there could be a society of Gods
too. You say that if there were many Gods, then there would be
quarrels and differences of opinion. This is like the story of
a miser who for fear of incurring expenses left all his sons and
wife and retired into the forest. When even ants and bees can
co-operate together and act harmoniously, the supposition that if
there were many Gods they would have fallen out, would indicate
that in spite of all the virtues that you ascribe to God you think
his nature to be quite unreliable, if not vicious. Thus in which-
ever way one tries to justify the existence of God he finds that it
is absolutely a hopeless task. The best way then is to dispense
with the supposition altogether 1•
1 See ._r.;arft!arsanasamuccaya, Gu1.1aratna on Jainism, pp. 115-124-.
VI] E mancipati01z 207
Mok~a (emancipation).
The motive which leads a man to strive for release (mok~a) is
the avoidance of pain and the attainment of happiness, for the
state of mukti is the state of the soul in pure happiness. It is
also a state of pure and infinite knowledge (alla1ltajiiiina) and infi-
nite perception (mumtadarsana). In the sarpsara state on account
of the karma veils this purity is sullied, and the veils are only worn
out imperfectly and thus reveal this and that object at this and
that time as ordinary knowledge (mati), testimony (sruta), super-
natural cognition, as in trance or hypnotism (avadlzi), and direct
knowledge of the thoughts of others or thought reading (mmza!z-
paryiiya). In the state of release however there is omniscience
(kevala-jiiaJZa) and all things are simultaneously known to the
perfect (kevalin) as they are. In the sarpsara stage the soul always
acquires new qualities, and thus suffers a continual change though
remaining the same in substance. But in the emancipated stage
the changes that a soul suffers are all exactly the same, and thus
it is that at this stage the soul appears to be the same in substance
as well as in its qualities of infinite knowledge, etc., the change
meaning in this state only the repetition of the same qualities.
It may not be out of place to mention here that though the
karmas of man are constantly determining him in various ways
yet there is in him infinite capacity or power for right action
(anantavirya), so that karma can never subdue this freedom and
infinite capacity, though this may be suppressed from time to time
by the influence of karma. It is thus that by an exercise of this
power man can overcome all karma and become finally liberated.
If man had not this anantavirya in him he might have been eter-
nally under the sway of the accumulated karma which secured
his bondage (balldlta). But since man is the repository of this
indomitable power the karmas can only throw obstacles and
produce sufferings, but can never prevent him from attaining his
highest good.
CHAPTER VII
THE KAPILA AND THE PATANJALA SAI\1KHYA (YOGA)!.
A Review.
THE examination of the two ancient Nastika schools of
Buddhism and 1ainism of two different types ought to convince
us that serious philosophical speculations were indulged in, in
circles other than those of the U pani~ad sages. That certain
practices known as Yoga were generally prevalent amongst the
wise seems very probable, for these are not only alluded to in some
of the U pani~ads but were accepted by the two nastika schools
of Buddhism and 1ainism. Whether we look at them from the
point of view of ethics or metaphysics, the two N astika schools
appear to have arisen out of a reaction against the sacrificial
disciplines of the Brahma:r:tas. Both these systems originated with
the K!?attriyas and were marked by a strong aversion against the
taking of animal life, and against the doctrine of offering animals
at the sacrifices.
The doctrine of the sacrifices supposed that a suitable com-
bination of rites, rituals, and articles of sacrifice had the magical
power of producing the desired effect-a shower of rain, the
birth of a son, the routing of a huge army, etc. The sacrifices
were enjoined generally not so much for any moral elevation, as
for the achievement of objects of practical welfare. The Vedas
were the eternal revelations which were competent so to dictate
a detailed procedure, that we could by following it proceed on a
certain course of action and refrain from other injurious courses
in such a manner that we might obtain the objects we desired
by the accurate performance of any sacrifice. If we are to define
truth in accordance with the philosophy of such a ritualistic
culture we might say that, that alone is true, in accordance with
which we may realize our objects in the world about us; the truth
of Vedic injunctions is shown by the practical attainment of our
1 This chapter is based on my Study 4 Patanjali, published by the Calcutta
Prabhakara holds the opposite view. Truth according to them is determined a priori
while error is determined by experience.
2 Historically the doctrine of momentariness is probably prior to the doctrine of
a1·thakriyiikaritva. But the later Buddhists sought to prove that momentariness was
the logical result of the doctrine of arthakriyiikiirilz'a.
210 The Kapila and the Pata'izjala Sa1?zkhya [en.
would answer, "yes, this is true from this point of view, but
untrue from that point of view, while that is also true from such
a point of view and untrue from another." Rut such an answer
cannot satisfy the mind which seeks to reach a definite pro-
nouncement, an absolute judgment.
The main departure of the systems of 1ainism and Buddhism
from the sacrificial creed consisted in this, that they tried to formu-
, late a theory of the universe, the reality and the position of sentient
beings and more particularly of man. The sacrificial creed was
busy with individual rituals and sacrifices, and cared for principles
or maxims only so far as they were of use for the actual perform-
ances of sacrifices. Again action with the new systems did not mean
sacrifice but any general action that we always perform. Actions
were here considered bad or good according as they brought
about our moral elevation or not. The followers of the sacrificial
creed refrained from untruth not so much from a sense of personal
degradation, but because the Vedas had dictated that untruth
should not be spoken, and the Vedas must be obeyed. The
sacrificial creed wanted more and more happiness here or in the
other world. The systems of Buddhist and 1ain philosophy turned
their backs upon ordinary happiness and wanted an ultimate and
unchangeable state where all pains and sorrows were for ever
dissolved (Buddhism) or where infinite happiness, ever unshaken,
was realized. A course of right conduct to be followed merely for
the moral elevation of the person had no place in the sacrificial
creed, for with i~ a course of right conduct could be followed
only if it was so dictated in the Vedas. Karma and the fruit of
karma (karmaphala) only meant the karma of sacrifice and its
fruits-temporary happiness, such as was produced as the fruit
of sacrifices; knowledge with them meant only the knowledge of
sacrifice and of the dictates of the Vedas. In the systems how-
ever, karma, karmaphala, happiness, knowledge, all these were
taken in their widest and most universal sense. Happiness or
absolute extinction of sorrow was still the goal, but this was no
narrow sacrificial happiness but infinite and unchangeable happi-
ness or destruction of sorrow; karma was still the way, but not
sacrificial karma, for it meant all moral and immoral actions
performed by us; knowledge here meant the knowledge of truth
or reality and not the knowledge of sacrifice.
Such an advance had however already begun in the Upa-
vn] Sii'J'!Zkhya £n the Upan£~ads 211
casikha's doctrine as a genuine Satpkhya doctrine. This may probably be due to the
fact that the Sarpkhya doctrines sketched in Caraka did not attract their notice.
vn] Sii1fzkhya of Paiicafikha and Caraka 217
for the existence of the self are also the same. Like Caraka again
Pancasikha also says that all consciousness is due to the conditions
of the conglomeration of our physical body mind,-and the
element of "cetas." They are mutually independent, and by such
independence carry on the process of life and work. None of the
phenomena produced by such a conglomeration are self. All our
suffering comes in because we think these to be the self. Mok~a
is realized when we can practise absolute renunciation of these
phenomena. The guryas described by Paficasikha are the different
kinds of good and bad qualities of the mind as Caraka has it.
The state of the conglomeration is spoken of as the k~etra, as
Caraka says, and there is no annihilation or eternality; and the
last state is described as being like that when all rivers lose
themselves in the ocean and it is called alinga (without any
characteristic)-a term reserved for prakrti in later Sarpkhya.
This state is attainable by the doctrine of ultimate renuncia-
tion which is also called the doctrine of complete destruction
( sanzyagbadha ).
Guryaratna (fourteenth century A.D.), a commentator of $a¢-
darsmzasamuccaya, mentions two schools of Sarpkhya, the
Maulikya (original) and the Uttara or (later) 1• Of these the
doctrine of the Maulikya Sarpkhya is said to be that which
believed that there was a separate pradhana for each atman
(maulikyasii1[lkhyti lzytitmtinamiitmiinam prati prtlzak pradlztinam
vadanti). This seems to be a reference to the Sarpkhya doctrine
I have just sketched. I am therefore disposed to think that this
represents the earliest systematic doctrine of Sarpkhya.
In Jtiahtibhtirata XII. 3 1 8 three schools of Sarpkhya are
mentioned, viz. those who admitted twenty-four categories (the
school I have sketched above), those who admitted twenty-
five (the well-known orthodox Sarpkhya system) and those who
admitted twenty-six categories. This last school admitted a
supreme being in addition to puru~a and this was the twenty-sixth
principle. This agrees with the orthodox Yoga system and the
form of Sarpkhya advocated in the M alzablzarata. The schools of
Sarpkhya of twenty-four and twenty-five categories are here
denounced as unsatisfactory. Doctrines similar to the school of
Sarpkhya we have sketched above are referred to in some of the
3· 1; Taitt. Brah. II. '2. 3· .~; R.V. x. 129; Satap. Brah. XI. 5· 8. I.
6 Kapm III. 4, indriyii~ti hayliniihuf:z vi~ay,ue~ugocariin. The senses are the horses
and whatever they grasp are their objects. Maitr. 2. 6. fi..arme?Zdriyti?tyasya hayii!:z
the conative senses are its horses.
6 Vz~:;-yal.z is used from the root of yz~jir yoge and not from yuja samiidhau. A con-
different kinds of asceticism and rigour which passed by the name of brahmacarya
were prevalent in the country at the time (Pa1.1ini as Goldstticker has proved is pre-
buddhistic), but associated with these had grown up a definite system of mental
discipline which passed by the name of Yoga.
228 The Kapila and the Patanjala Sa1!zkhya [cH.
in some quarters to explain the validity of the Yoga processes,
and it seems therefore that the association and grafting of the
Sarpkhya metaphysics on the Yoga system as its basis, was the
work of the followers of this school of ideas which was subsequently
systematized by Patafijali. Thus Sakyayana says: ''Here some
say it is the gut:J.a which through the differences of nature goes
into bondage to the will, and that deliverance takes place when
the fault of the will has been removed, because he sees by the
mind; and all that we call desire, imagination, doubt, belief, un-
belief, certainty, uncertainty, shame, thought, fear, all that is but
mind. Carried along by the waves of the qualities darkened in
his imagination, unstable, fickle, crippled, full of desires, vacil-
lating he enters into belief, believing I am he, this is mine, and
he binds his self by his self as a bird with a net. Therefore, a
man being possessed of will, imagination and belief is a slave,
but he who is the opposite is free. For this reason let a man
stand free from will, imagination and belief-this is the sign of
liberty, this is the path that leads to Brahman, this is the opening
of the door, and through it he will go to the other shore of dark-
ness. All desires are there fulfilled. And for this, they quote a
verse: 'When the five instruments of knowledge stand still together
with the mind, and when the intellect does not move, that is called
the highest state 1. ' "
An examination of such Yoga U pani~ads as Sal)9ilya, Yoga-
tattva, Dhyanabindu, Harpsa, Amrtanada, Varaha, Mat:J.9ala
Brahmat:J.a, N adabindu, and Yogakut:J.9ali, shows that the Yoga
practices had undergone diverse changes. in diverse schools, but
none of these show any predilection for the Sarpkhya. Thus the
Yoga practices grew in accordance with the doctrines of the
1 Vatsyayana, however, in his bha~ya on .Njii;'a siltra, I. i. 29, distinguishes
Siirpkhya from Yoga in the following way: The Sarpkhya holds that nothing can
come into being nor be destroyed, there cannot be any change in the pure intelligence
(1ziratisayiil_z cetaniil:z). All changes are due to changes in the body, the senses, the
manas and the objects. Yoga holds that all creation is due to the karma of the puru~a.
Do~ (passions) and the pravrtti (action) are the cause of karma. The intelligences
or souls (cetanaJ are associated with qualities. Non-being can come into being and
what is produced may be destroyed. The last view is indeed quite different from
the Yoga of Vyiisabhiif)'a. It is closer to Nyaya in its doctrines. If Viitsyayana's
statement is correct, it would appear that the doctrine of there being a moral purpose
in creation was borrowed by Siirpkhya from Yoga. Udyotakara's remarks on the same
siitra clo not indicate a difference but an agreement between SiiT)lkhya and Yoga on the
doctrine of the indriyas being "ahhautilm." Curiously enough Vatsyayana quotes a
passage from Vyiisahhii!ya, I II. 1.~. in his hhii~ya, 1. ii. 6, and criticizes it as self-con-
tradictory (vintddha).
vn] Patai'ij'ali, a Compiler 229
in the fashion of Tantra than that given by Pataiijali. He mentions different places
in the body (e.g. heart, throat, tip of the nose, palate, forehead, centre of the brain)
which are centres of memory where concentration is to be made. See Vacaspati's
Tiitparyafikii or Vatsyayana's bha~ya on Nyiiya siitra, 111. ii. 43·
230 The Kapila and the Patalijala Sa"?zkhya [en.
criticized; the putting of an "iti" (the word to denote the conclu-
sion of any work) at the end of the third chapter is evidently to
denote the conclusion of his Yoga compilation. There is of course
another " £ti" at the end of the fourth chapter to denote the
conclusion of the whole work. The most legitimate hypothesis
seems to be that the last chapter is a subsequent addition by a
hand other than that of Patafijali who was anxious to supply
some new links of argument which were felt to be necessary for
the strengthening of the Yoga position from an internal point of
view, as well as for securing the strength of the Yoga from the
supposed attacks of Buddhist metaphysics. There is also a
marked change (due either to its supplementary character or
to the manipulation of a foreign hand) in the style of the last
chapter as compared with the style of the other three.
The siitras, 30-34, of the last chapter seem to repeat what
has already been said in the second chapter and some of the
topics introduced are ·such that they could well have been
dealt with in a more relevant manner in connection with similar
discussions in the preceding chapters. The extent of this chapter
is also disproportionately small, as it contains only 34 siitras,
whereas the average number of siitras in other chapters is between
51t055·
We have now to meet the vexed question of the probable date
of this famous Yoga author Patafijali. Weber had tried to con-
nect him with Kapya Patarpchala of Satapatha BrahmaJ!a 1 ; in
Katyayana's Viirttika we get the name Patafijali which is ex-
plained by later commentators as patmzta[t aiijalaya(l yasmai (for
whom the hands are folded as a mark of reverence), but it is indeed
difficult to come to any conclusion merely from the similarity of
names. There is however another theory which identifies the
writer of the great commentary on Pat)ini called the JIIahii-
bhii~ya with the Patafijali of the Yoga siitra. This theory has been
accepted by many western scholars probably on the strength of
some Indian ·commentators who identified the two Patafijalis.
Of these one is the writer of the Pataiija/icarita (Ramabhadra
Dlk~ita) who could not have flourished earlier than the eighteenth
century. The other is that cited in Sivarama's commentary on
Viisa'i.Jadattil which Aufrccht assigns to the eighteenth century.
The other two are king Bhoja of Dhar and CakrapaJ!idatta,
1
WcLer's IIistorJ' of India11 Literature, p. 223 n.
vn] I de1ltity of Pataiijali 231
.cittatmztram vastu tadapramti1Jakam tada kim syiit (Iv. 16) was probably a line of the
Vyiisabhii!ya, as Bhoja, who had consulted many commentaries as he says in the
preface, does not count it as a sf1tra.
234 The Kapila and the Pataiijala Sa1?zkhya [cH.
far as can be judged from the copious extracts supplied by
Alberuni) shows that these ideas had undergone some change
from what we find in the Yoga sutra. Following the idea of God
in Alberuni we find that he retains his character as a timeless
emancipated being, but he speaks, hands over the Vedas and
shows the way to Yoga and inspires men in such a way that they
could obtain by cogitation what he bestowed on them. The name
of God proves his existence, for there cannot exist anything of
which the name existed, but not the thing. The soul perceives
him and thought comprehends his qualities. Meditation is iden-
tical with worshipping him exclusively, and by practising it
uninterruptedly the individual comes into supreme absorption
with him and beatitude is obtained 1•
The idea of soul is the same as we find in the Yoga szttra.
The idea of metempsychosis is also the same. He speaks of the
eight siddhis (miraculous powers) at the first stage of meditation
on the unity of God. Then follow the other four stages of medi-
tation corresponding to the four stages we have as in the Yoga
siUra. He gives four kinds of ways for the achievement of salvation,
of which the first is the abltyasa (habit) of Patafijali, and the
object of this abhyasa is unity with God 2• The second stands
for vairagya: the third is the worship of God with a view to seek
his favour in the attainment of salvation (cf. Yoga sittra, I. 23 and
I. 29). The fourth is a new introduction, namely that of rasa-
yana or alchemy. As regards liberation the view is almost the
same as in the Yoga siitra, II. 25 and IV. 34, but the liberated
state is spoken of in one place as absorption in God or being
one with him. The Brahman is conceived as an iirddkvamula
aviiksiikha asvattka (a tree with roots upwards and branches
below), after the Upani!?ad fashion, the upper root is pure
Brahman, the trunk is Veda, the branches are the different
doctrines and schools, its leaves are the different modes of inter-
pretation. Its nourishment comes from the three forces ; the
1 cr. Yoga siitra I. '23-'29 and II. I, 45· The Ytlga siilras speak of fsvara (God)
as an eternally emancipated puru~a, omniscient, and the teacher of all past teachers.
By meditating on him many of the obstacles such as illness, etc., which stand in the
way of Voga practice are removed. I Ie is regarded as one of the alternative objects
of concentration. The commentator Vyasa notes that he is the best object, for being
drawn towards the Yogin hy his concentration He so wills that he can easily attain
concentration and through it salvation. No argumt:nt is given in the Yoga siitras of
the existence of God.
2 Cf. Yoga JI. 1.
vn] Pataiijal£ of Kitiib Piitanjal 235
object of the worshipper is to leave the tree and go back to the
roots.
The difference of this system from that of the Yoga siUra is :
( 1) the conception of God has risen here to such an importance
that he has become the only object of meditation, and absorption
in him is the goal; (2) the importance of the yama 1 and the
niyama has been reduced to the minimum; (3) the value of the
Yoga discipline as a separate means of salvation apart from any
connection with God as we find in the Yoga siitra has been lost
sight of; (4) liberation and Yoga are defined as absorption in
God; (5) the introduction of Brahman ; (6) the very significance
of Yoga as control of mental states (cittavrttinirodlta) is lost
sight of, and (7) rasayana (alchemy) is introduced as one of the
means of salvation.
From this we can fairly assume that this was a new modi-
fication of the Yoga doctrine on the basis of Patafijali's Yoga
siitra in the direction of Vedanta and Tantra, and as such it
probably stands as the transition link through which the Yoga
doctrine of the siitras entered into a new channel in such a way
that it could be easily assimilated from there by later develop-
ments of Vedanta, Tantra and Saiva doctrines 2 • As the author
mentions rasayana as a means of salvation, it is very probable
that he flourished after Nagarjuna and was probably the same
person who wrote Piitaii.fala ta1ttra, who has been quoted by
Sivadasa in connection with alchemical matters and spoken of
by Nagesa as "Carake PatanjaliJ:l." \Ve can also assume with some
degree of probability that it is with reference to this man that
Cakraparyi and Bhoja made the confusion of identifying him with
the writer of the Mahiibhii,fya. It is also very probable that Cakra-
paryi by his line "piitaii.falamahiiblzii~yacarakapratism!zskrtai(t"
refers to this work which was called "Pataiijala." The commen-
tator of this work gives some description of the lokas, dvipas and
the sagaras, which runs counter to the descriptions given in the
Vyiisabhii~ya, III. 26, and from this we can infer that it was pro-
bably written at a time when the Vjllisabltii,fya was not written
or had not attained any great sanctity or authority. Alberuni
which practically is the same as yama and niyama, but it is said that through them
one cannot attain salvation.
2 Cf. the account of PaJupatadarialla in Sarvadar.fanasa'!1graha.
2J6 The Kapila and the Piitanjala Sil:l?zkhya [cH.
also described the book as being very famous at the time, and
Bhoja and Cakrapal)i also probably confused him with Pataftjali
the grammarian ; from this we can fairly assume that this book
of Patafijali was probably written by some other Pataftjali within
the first 300 or 400 years of the Christian era; and it may not
be improbable that \vhen Vyiisablul.~ya quotes in III. 44 as "it£
Pataftjali}:l,'' he refers to this Pataftjali.
The conception of Yoga as we meet it in the Maitrayal)a
U pani~ad consisted of six angas or accessories, namely pral)a-
yama, pratyahara, dhyana, dharal)a, tarka and samadhi 1• Com-
paring this list with that of the list in the Yoga szltras we find
that two new elements have been added, and tarka has been
replaced by asana. Now from the account of the sixty-two
heresies given in the Brahmaja/a sutta we know that there were
people who either from meditation of three degrees or through
logic and reasoning had come to believe that both the external
world as a \vhole and individual souls were eternal. From the
association of this last mentioned logical school with the Samadhi
or Dhyana school as belonging to one class of thinkers called
sasvatavada, and from the inclusion of tarka as an ati.ga in
samadhi, we can fairly assume that the last of the angas given in
Maitrayat~I U pani~ad represents the oldest list of the Yoga doc-
trine, when the Sarpkhya and the Yoga were in a process of being
grafted on each other, and when the Sarpkhya method of dis-
cussion did not stand as a method independent of the Yoga. The
substitution of asana for tarka in the list of Pataftjali shows that
the Yoga had developed a method separate from the Sarpkhya.
The introduction of ahirpsa (non-injury), satya (truthfulness),
asteya (want of stealing), brahmacaryya (sex-control), aparigraha
(want of greed) as yama and sauca (purity), santo~a (content-
ment) as niyama, as a system of morality without which Yoga is
deemed impossible (for the first time in the sutras), probably
marks the period when the disputes between the Hindus and the
Buddhists had not become so keen. The introduction of maitr1,
karur~a. mudita, upek~a is also equally significant, as we do not
find them mentioned in such a prominent form in any other
literature of the Hindus dealing with the subject of emancipa-
tion. Beginning from the .Aciirii1igasittra, Uttariidhyaymzasiitra,
1 prii~uiyiimalf pratyiihiiral.z dhyiinam dhiira1Jti tarkal.z samiidlzi(z !a(la1iga ityttcyate
1 It is important to note that Satpkhya has two terms to denote the two aspects
involved in knowledge, viz. the relating element of awareness as such (tit), and the
content (buddhi) which is the form of the mind-stuff representing the sense-data and
the image. Cognition takes place by the reflection of the former in the latter.
vn] The Stuff of Thought and Matter
knowledge in connection with a person, so as to make them a
system of experience. This principle of intelligence is called
puru~a. There is a separate puru~a in Saf!lkhya for each indi-
vidual, and it is of the nature of pure intelligence. The Vedanta
atman however is different from the Sarpkhya puru~a in this that
it is one and is of the nature of pure intelligence, pure being,
and pure bliss. It alone is the reality and by illusory maya it
appears as many.
Thought and Matter.
A question naturally arises, that if the knowledge forms are
made up of some sort of stuff as the objective forms of matter
are, why then should the puru~a illuminate it and not external
material objects. The answer that Sarpkhya gives is that the
knowledge-complexes are certainly different from external ob-
jects in this, that they are far subtler and have a preponderance
of a special quality of plasticity and translucence (sattva), which
resembles the light of puru~a, and is thus fit for reflecting and
absorbing the light of the puru~a. The two principal character-
istics of external gross matter are mass and energy. But it
has also the other characteristic of allowing itself to be photo-
graphed by our mind; this thought-photograph of matter has
again the special privilege of being so translucent as to be able
to catch the reflection of the cit-the super-translucent transcen-
dent principle of intelligence. The fundamental characteristic
of external gross matter is its mass; energy is common to
both gross matter and the subtle thought-stuff. But mass is
at its lowest minimum in thought-stuff, whereas the capacity
of translucence, or what may be otherwise designated as the
intelligence-stuff, is at its highest in thought-stuff. But if the
gross matter had none of the characteristics of translucence that
thought possesses, it could not have made itself an object of
thought; for thought transforms itself into the shape, colour,
and other characteristics of the thing which has been made its
object. Thought could not have copied the matter, if the matter
did not possess some of the essential substances of which the
copy was made up. But this plastic entity (sattva) which is
so predominant in thought is at its lowest limit of subordination
in matter. Similarly mass is not noticed in thought, but some
such notions as are associated with mass may be discernible in
The Kapila and the Pataizfala Siif!zkhya [cH.
thought; thus the images of thought are limited, separate, have
movement, and have more or less clear cut forms. The images
do not extend in space, but they can represent space. The trans-
lucent and plastic element of thought (sativa) in association with
movement (rajas) would have resulted in a simultaneous revelation
of all objects; it is on account of mass or tendency of obstruction
(tamas) that knowledge proceeds from image to image and dis-
closes things in a successive manner. The buddhi (thought-stuff)
holds within it all knowledge immersed as it were in utter dark-
ness, and actual knowledge comes before our view as though
by the removal of the darkness or veil, by the reflection of the
light of the puru~a. This characteristic of knowledge, that all its
stores are hidden as if lost at any moment, and only one picture
or idea comes at a time to the arena of revelation, demonstrates
that in knowledge there is a factor of obstruction which manifests
itself in its full actuality in gross matter as mass. Thus both
thought and gross matter are made up of three elements, a
plasticity of intelligence-stuff (sattva), energy-stuff (rajas), and
mass-stuff (ta·mas), or the factor of obstruction. Of these the last
two are predominant in gross matter and the first two in thought.
The Gul}aS 1 •
These three types of ultimate subtle entities are technically
called gu~za in Sarpkhya philosophy. Gurya in Sanskrit has three
meanings, namely (1) quality, (2) rope, (3) not primary. These
entities, however, are substances and not mere qualities. But it
may be mentioned in this connection that in Sarpkhya philosophy
there is no separate existence of qualities; it holds that each
and every unit of quality is but a unit of substance. What
we call quality is but a particular manifestation or appearance
of a subtle entity. Things do not possess quality, but quality
1 Yogaviirttika, II. 18; Bhavagal)da's Tattvayiithiirthyadipa1za, PP· 1-3; Vijiiii-
niimrtabhii~ya, p. Ioo; Tatlvakaumudi, 13; also Gau<;fapii.da and NarayaQatirtha, 13.
244 The Kapila and the Pataiifala Sii1f-zkhya [cH.
signifies merely the manner in which a substance reacts ; any
object we see seems to possess many qualities, but the Sarpkhya
holds that corresponding to each and every new unit of quality,
however fine and subtle it may be, there is a corresponding
subtle entity, the reaction of which is interpreted by us as a
quality. This is true not only of qualities of external objects
but also of mental qualities as well. These ultimate entities
were thus called guryas probably to suggest that they are the
entities which by their various modifications manifest them-
selves as guryas or qualities. These subtle entities may also be
called guryas in the sense of ropes because they are like ropes
by which the soul is chained down as if it were to thought and
matter. These may also be called guryas as things of secondary
importance, because though permanent and indestructible, they
continually suffer modifications and changes by their mutual
groupings and re-groupings, and thus not primarily and unalter-
ably constant like the souls (purztfa). Moreover the object of the
world process being the enjoyment and salvation of the puru.!?as,
the matter-principle could not naturally be regarded as being of
primary importance. But in whatever senses we may be inclined
to justify the name gul)a as applied to these subtle entities, it
should be borne in mind that they are substantive entities or
subtle substances and not abstract qualities. These gui)aS are
infinite in number, but in accordance with their three main char-
acteristics as described above they have been arranged in three
classes or types called sativa (intelligence-stuff), rajas (energy-
stuff) and lamas (mass-stuff). An infinite number of subtle sub-
stances which agree in certain characteristics of self-shining or
plasticity are called the sattva-gu~zas and those which behave as
units of activity are called the rajo-gu1JaS and those which behave
as factors of obstruction, mass or materiality are called tamo-gu~zas.
These subtle gul)a substances are united in different proportions
(e.g. a larger number of sattva substances with a lesser number of
rajas or tamas, or a larger number of tamas substances with a
smaller number of rajas and sattva substances and so on in
varying proportions), and as a result of this, different substances
with different qualities come into being. Though attached to one
another when united in different proportions, they mutually act
and react upon one another, and thus by their combined resultant
produce new characters, qualities and substances. There is how-
vn] Prakrti as E quilibriu1n of Gu1Jas 245
ever one and only one stage in which the gul}as are not com-
pounded in varying proportions. In this state each of the gul}a
substances is opposed by each of the other gul}a substances, and
thus by their equal mutual opposition create an equilibrium, in
which none of the characters of the gul)as manifest themselves.
This is a state which is so absolutely devoid of all characteristics
that it is absolutely incoherent, indeterminate, and indefinite. It
is a qualitiless simple homogeneity. It is a state of being which
is as it were non-being. This state of the mutual equilibrium
of the gul)as is called prakrtP. This is a state which cannot be
said either to exist or to non-exist for it serves no purpose, but
it is hypothetically the mother of all things. This is however the
earliest stage, by the breaking of which, later on, all modifications
take place.
Prakrti and its Evolution.
Sarpkhya believes that before this world came into being there
was such a state of dissolution-a state in which the gul}a com-
pounds had disintegrated into a state of disunion and had by their
mutual opposition produced an equilibrium the prakrti. Then
later on disturbance arose in the prakrti, and as a result of that a
process of unequal aggregation of the gul}as in varying proportions
took place, which brought forth the creation of the manifold.
Prakrti, the state of perfect homogeneity and incoherence of the
gm~as, thus gradually evolved and became more and more deter-
minate, differentiated, heterogeneous, and coherent. The gul}as are
always uniting, separating, and uniting again 2• Varying qualities
of essence, energy, and mass in varied groupings act on one another
and through their mutual interaction and interdependence evolve
from the indefinite or qualitatively indeterminate the definite or
qualitatively determinate. And though co-operating to produce
the world of effects, these diverse moments with diverse tendencies
never coalesce. Thus in the phenomenal product whatever energy
there is is due to the element of rajas and rajas alone; all matter,
resistance, stability, is due to tamas,and all conscious manifestation
to sattva. The particular gul}a which happens to be predominant
in any phenomenon becomes manifest in that phenomenon and
others become latent, though their presence is inferred by their
1
Yogavczrttika, 11. 19, and Pravacanabhii{ya, I. 61.
:: Kaumudi, 13-16; Tattvavaifczradi, II. zo, IV. 13, q.; also Yogaviirttika, IV. 13, 14.
The Kapi!a and the Pataiija/a Sii1'[tkhya [cH.
effect. Thus, for example, in a body at rest mass is patent, energy
latent and potentiality of conscious manifestation sublatent. In a
moving body, the rajas is predominant (kinetic) and the mass is
partially overcome. All these transformations of the groupings of
the gut)as in different proportions presuppose the state of prakrti
as the starting point. It is at this stage that the tendencies to
conscious manifestation, as well as the powers of doing work, are
exactly counterbalanced by the resistance of inertia or mass,
and the process of cosmic evolution is at rest. When this equi-
librium is once destroyed, it is supposed that out of a natural
affinity of all the sattva reals for themselves, of rajas reals for other
reals of their type, of tamas reals for others of their type, there
arises an unequal aggregation of sattva, rajas, or tamas at differ-
ent moments. When one gut)a is preponderant in any particular
collocation, the others are co-operant. This evolutionary series
beginning from the first disturbance of the prakrti to the final
transformation as the world-order, is subject to "a definite law
which it cannot overstep." In the words of Dr B. N. Seal 1 , "the pro-
cess of evolution consists in the development of the differentiated
( vai~amya) within the undifferentiated (siimytivasthii) of the deter-
minate (vise~a) within the indeterminate (avise~a) of the coherent
(yutasiddha) within the incoherent (ayutasiddha). The order of
succession is neither from parts to whole nor from whole to the
parts, but ever from a relatively less differentiated, less deter-
minate, less coherent whole to a relatively more differentiated,
more determinate, more coherent whole." The meaning of such
an evolution is this, that all the changes and modifications in
the shape of the evolving collocations of gut)a reals take place
within the body of the prakrti. Prakrti consisting of the in-
finite reals is infinite, and that it has been disturbed does not
mean that the whole of it has been disturbed and upset, or
that the totality of the gut)as in the prakrti has been unhinged
from a state of equilibrium. It means rather that a very vast
number of gut)aS constituting the worlds of thought and matter
has been upset. These gm;as once thrown out of balance begin to
group themselves together first in one form, then in another, then
in another, and so on. But such a change in the formation of
aggregates should not be thought to take place in such a way
that the later aggregates appear in supersession of the former ones,
so that when the former comes into being the latter ceases to exist.
1
Dr B. N. Seal's Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus, 1915, p. 7·
vn] Prakrti and its Evolution 247
For the truth is that one stage is produced after another; this
second stage is the result of a new aggregation of some of the
reals of the first stage. This deficiency of the reals of the first
stage which had gone forth to form the new aggregate as the
second stage is made good by a refilling from the prakrti. So also,
as the third stage of aggregation takes place from out of the reals
of the second stage, the deficiency of the reals of the second stage
is made good by a refilling from the first stage and that of the
first stage from the prakrti. Thus by a succession of refillings the
process of evolution proceeds, till we come to its last limit, where
there is no real evolution of new substance, but mere chemical
and physical changes of qualities in things which had already
evolved. Evolution (tattviintarapari?ziima) in Sarp.khya means the
development of categories of existence and not mere changes of
qualities of substances (physical, chemical, biological or mental).
Thus each of the stages of evolution remains as a permanent
category of being, and offers scope to the more and more differ-
entiated and coherent groupings of the succeeding stages. Thus
it is said that the evolutionary process is regarded as a differen-
tiation of new stages as integrated in previous stages (smttsrs!a-
viveka).
equilibrium of the prakrti for new creation takes place by the will of Jsvara (God).
vn] Evolution of fi-1ahat 249
within it the minds (buddhz) of all puru~as which were lost in the
prakrti during the pralaya. The very first work of the evolution
of prakrti to serve the puru~as is thus manifested by the separating
out of the old buddhis or minds (of the puru~as) which hold within
themselves the old specific ignorance (a·vidyti) inherent in them
with reference to each puru~a with which any particular buddhi
is associated from beginningless time before the pralaya. This
state of evolution consisting of all the collected minds (buddhi)
of all the puru~as is therefore called buddhitattva. It is a state
which holds or comprehends within it the buddhis of all indi-
viduals. The individual buddhis of individual puru~as are on one
hand integrated with the buddhitattva and on the other associated
with their specific puru~as. When some buddhis once begin to
be separated from the prakrti, other buddhi evolutions take
place. In other words, we are to understand that once the trans-
formation of buddhis is effected for the service of the puru~as,
all the other direct transformations that take place from the
prakrti take the same line, i.e. a preponderance of sattva being
once created by the bringing out of some buddhis, other trans-
formations of prakrti that follow them have also the sattva pre-
ponderance, which thus have exactly the same composition as the
first buddhis. Thus the first transformation from prakrti becomes
buddhi-transformation. This stage of buddhis may thus be re-
garded as the most universal stage, which comprehends within it
all the buddhis of individuals and potentially all the matter of
which the gross world is formed. Looked at from this point of
view it has the widest and most universal existence comprising
all creation, and is thus called malta! (the great one). It is called
liliga (sign), as the other later existences or evolutes give us the
ground of inferring its existence, and as such must be distin-
guished from the prakrti which is called alinga, i.e. of which no
linga or characteristic may be affirmed.
This mahat-tattva being once produced, further modifications
begin to take place in three lines by three different kinds of
undulations representing the sattva preponderance, rajas pre-
ponderance and tamas preponderance. This state when the mahat
is disturbed by the three parallel tendencies of a preponderance of
tamas, rajas and sattva is called ahmtzkiira, and the above three
tendencies are respectively called ttimasika alza1ltkiira or blziitiidi,
riij'asika or taij'asa aha1!lkiira, and vaiktirika ahm?tktira. The raja-
sika aharp.kara cannot mark a new preponderance by itself; it only
The Kap£la and the Pata1z_jala Sii??zkhya [cH.
helps (sahakiin") the transformations of the sattva preponderance
and the tamas preponderance. The development of the former
preponderance, as is easy to see, is only the assumption of a more
and more determinate character of the buddhi, for we remember
that buddhi itself has been the resulting transformation of a sattva
preponderance. Further development with the help of rajas on
the line of sattva development could only take place when the
buddhi as mind determined itself in specific ways. The first
development of the buddhi on this line is called stittvika or vaz-
ktirika ahmtzkiira. This aharp.kara represents the development
in buddhi to produce a consciousness-stuff as I or rather "mine,"
and must thus be distinguished from the first stage as buddhi, the
function of which is a mere understanding and general datum as
thisness.
The ego or aharp.kara (abhimiilla-dravya) is the specific expres-
sion of the general consciousness which takes experience as mine.
The function of the ego is therefore called abhimtina (self-asser-
tion). From this again come the five cognitive senses of vision,
touch, smell, taste, and hearing, the five conative senses of speech,
handling, foot-movement, the ejective sense and the generative
sense; the prti~zas (bio-motor force) which help both conation and
cognition are but aspects of buddhi-movement as life. The indi-
vidual aharp.karas and senses are related to the individual buddhis
by the developing sattva determinations from which they had come
into being. Each buddhi with its own group of aharp.kara (ego)
and sense-evolutes thus forms a microcosm separate from similar
other buddhis with their associated groups. So far therefore as
knowledge is subject to sense-influence and the ego, it is different
for each individual, but so far as a general mind (kiira?ta buddhi)
apart from sense knowledge is concerned, there is a community of
all buddhis in the buddhitattva. Even there however each buddhi
is separated from other buddhis by its own peculiarly associated
ignorance (avidyii). The buddhi and its sattva evolutes of aharp.-
kara and the senses are so related that though they are different
from buddhi in their functions, they are all comprehended in the
buddhi, and mark only its gradual differentiations and modes. We
must again remember in this connection the doctrine of refilling,
for as buddhi exhausts its part in giving rise to aharp.kara, the de-
ficiency of budd hi is made good by prakrti; again as aharp.kara
partially exhausts itself in generating sense-faculties, the defi-
vn] Evolution of I n.fra-atoms
ciency is made good by a refilling from the buddhi. Thus the
change and wastage of each of the stadia are always made good
and kept constant by a constant refilling from each higher state
and finally from prakrti.
terms and expressions of Dr Seal and am largely indebted to him for his illuminating
exposition of this subject as given in Ray's Hindu Chemistry. The credit of explaining
Sarpkhya physics in the light of the text belongs entirely to him.
2 Dr Seal's Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus.
The Kapila and the Pataiijala Sii"!lkhya [cu.
of the peculiar forms which these "potentials" assume in particles
of gross matter like the atoms and their aggregates. In other
words, the potentials lodged in subtle matter must undergo peculiar
transformations by new groupings or collocations before they can
act as sensory stimuli as gross matter, though in the minutest
particles thereof the sensory stimuli may be infra-sensible (atin-
dri'ya but not anudbhiUa) 1•
Of the tanmatras the sabda or tiktisa tanmatra (the sound-
potential) is first generated directly from the bhutadi. Next
comes the sparsa or the vayu tmzmiitra (touch-potential) which is
generated by the union of a unit of tamas from bhutadi with the
akasa tanmatra. The nlpa tammitra (colour-potential) is generated
similarly by the accretion of a unit of tamas from bhutadi; the
rasa tanmatra (taste-potential) or the ap tamniitra is also similarly
formed. This ap tanmatra again by its union with a unit of tamas
from bhutadi produces the ga11dlza tanmiitra (smell-potential) or
the k#ti' ta11miitra 2• The difference of tanmatras or infra-atomic
units and atoms (parama~zu) is this, that the tanmatras have only
the potential power of affecting our senses, which must be grouped
and regrouped in a particular form to constitute a new existence
as atoms before they can have the power of affecting our senses.
It is important in this connection to point out that the classifica-
tion of all gross objects as k!?iti, ap, tejas, marut and vyoman is
not based upon a chemical analysis, but from the points of view
of the five senses through which knowledge of them could be
brought home to us. Each of our senses can only apprehend a
particular quality and thus five different ultimate substances are
said to exist corresponding to the five qualities which may be
grasped by the five senses. In accordance with the existence of
these five elements, the existence of the five potential states or
tanmatras was also conceived to exist as the ground of the five
gross forms.
The five classes of atoms are generated from the tanmatras as
follows: the sound-potential, with accretion of rudiment matter
from blultadi' generates the akasa-atom. The touch-potentials com-
bine with the vibratory particles (sound-potential) to generate the
1
Dr Seal's Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus.
2
There were various ways in which the genesis of tanmiitras and atoms were ex-
plained in literatures other than Sat}lkhya; for some account of it see Dr Seal's Positive
Sci'mces of the Ancient Ili11dus.
vn] Evolution of Atoms 2 53
1 As the contact of the buddhi with the external objects takes place through the
senses, the sense-data of colours, etc., are modified by the senses if they are defective.
The spatial qualities of things are however perceived by the senses directly, but the
time-order is a scheme of the citta or the buddhi. Generally speaking Yoga holds
that the external objects are faithfully copied by the budd hi in which they are reflected,
like trees in a lake :
'' tasmi1!1fca darpa~te spl.iire samastii vastudrHaya!.z
im{istiil.z pratibimbanti sarasiva ta!adnmtiil.z." Yog.zviirttil.-a, 1. 4·
The huddhi assumes the form of the object which is reflected on it hy the senses,
or rather the mind flows out through· the senses to the external objects and assumes
their forms: "indri'yii~IJ'eva pra~uili'kii cittasal1cara~ta1{tiirga!.z tai'f.z sal!l)'tifJ'a tadgola-
kadz,iirii biihyavaslu#iparaktasya ci'ttas;tendriyastihityc1taiviirthiikiiral_t. pari~ziimo
bhaz•ati." Yogaviirttika, 1. vi. i· Contrast Tattvakaumudi, 27 and 30.
vn] Instinct a1td Desire
Apart from the perceptions and the life-functions, buddhi, or
rather citta as Yoga describes it, contains within it the root im-
pressions (sm!zskiiras) and the tastes and instincts or tendencies
of all past lives (viisanii) 1• These sarp.skaras are revived under suit-
able associations. Every man had had infinite numbers of births in
their past lives as man and as some animal. In all these lives the
same citta was always following him. The citta has thus collected
within itself the instincts and tendencies of all those different
animal lives. It is knotted with these vasanas like a net. If a man
passes into a dog life by rebirth, the vasanas of a dog life, which
the man must have had in some of his previous infinite number of
births, are revived, and the man's tendencies become like those of
a dog. He forgets the experiences of his previous life and becomes
attached to enjoyment in the manner of a dog. It is by the revival
of the vasana suitable to each particular birth that there cannot be
any collision such as might have occurred if the instincts and
tendencies of a previous dog-life were active when any one was
born as man.
The sarp.skaras represent the root impressions by which any
habit of life that man has lived through, or any pleasure in
which he took delight for some time, or any passions which were
I The word sarpskara is used by PaQini who probably preceded Budrlha in three
different senses: {I) improving a thing as distinguished from generating a new quality
(Sata utkarfiidhiilla'fl sa'!zskiira!z, Kasika on PaQini, VI. ii. 16), (2) conglomeration
or aggregation, and (3) adornment (PaQini, VI. i. I3i• 1 38). In the Pi!akas the word
sa1ikhara is used in various senses such as constructing, preparing, perfecting, embel-
lishing, aggregation, matter, karma, the skandhas (collected by Childers). In fact
sankhara stands for almost anything of which impt:rmanence could be predicated.
But in spite of so many diversities of meaning I venture to suggest that the meaning
of aggregation (samaviiya of PaQini} is prominent. The word sat!Zskaroti is used in
Kau~itaki, II. 6, Chandogya, IV. xvi. 2, 3, 4, viii. 8, 5, and BrhadaraQyaka, VI. iii. 1,
in the sense of improving. I have not yet come across any literary use of the second
meaning in Sanskrit. The meaning of sal}'lskara in Hindu philosophy is altogether
different. It means the impressions (which exist sub-consciously in the mind) of the
objects experienced. All our experiences whether cognitive, emotional or conative
exist in sub-conscious states and may under suitable conditions be reproduced as
memory (smrti}. The word vasana (Yoga sutra, IV. '2-J) seems to be a later word. The
earlier U pani~ads do not mention it and so far as I know it is not mentioned in the Pali
pi!akas. Abhidhiinappadipikii of ~loggallana mentions .it, and it occurs in the l\luktika
U pani~ad. It comes from rhe root .. vas" to stay. It is often loosely used in the sense
of sai!lSkara, and in Vyiisabhiifya they are identified in IV. 9· But vasana generally
refers to the tendencies of past lives most of which lie dormant in the mind. Only those
appear which can find scope in this life. But sarpskaras are the sub-conscious states
which are being constantly generated by experience. Vasanas are innate sal}'lskaras not
acquired in this life. See Vyiisabhiifya, Tattviivaiiiiradi and Yoga'llt'irttika, II. I 3·
The Kapila and the Piitanjala Sii1?zkhya [cH.
engrossing to him, tend to be revived, for though these might
not now be experienced, yet the fact that they were experienced
before has so moulded and given shape to the citta that the
citta will try to reproduce them by its own nature even without
any such effort on our part. To safeguard against the revival of
any undesirable idea or tendency it is therefore necessary that its
roots as already left in the citta in the form of sarpskaras should
be eradicated completely by the formation of the habit of a con-
trary tendency, which if made sufficiently strong will by its own
sarpskara naturally stop the revival of the previous undesirable
sarpskaras.
Apart from these the citta possesses volitional activity (ce~{a)
by which the conative senses are brought into relation to their
objects. There is also the reserved potent power (Saktz) of citta,
by which it can restrain itself and change its courses or continue
to persist in any one direction. These characteristics are involved
in the very essence of citta, and form the groundwork of the Yoga
method of practice, which consists in steadying a particular state
of mind to the exclusion of others.
Merit or demerit (pu?fya, papa) also is imbedded in the citta
as its tendencies, regulating the mode of its movements, and
giving pleasures and pains in accordance with it.
sub-conscious states. Saipkhya generally uses the word buddhi. Both the words mean
the same substance, the mind, but they emphasize its two different functions. Buddhi
means intellection.
266 The Kapila and the Patanjala Sii1?zkhya [cH.
puru~a from prakrti. This final purpose being attained the
prakrti can never again bind the puru~a with reference to whom
this right knowledge was generated ; for other puru~as however
the bondage remains as before, and they continue their experi-
ences from one birth to another in an endless cycle.
Yoga, however, thinks that mere philosophy is not sufficient.
In order to bring about liberation it is not enough that a true
knowledge differentiating puru~a and buddhi should arise, but it
is necessary that all the old habits of experience of buddhi, all
its sarpskaras should be once for all destroyed never to be revived
again. At this stage the budd hi is transformed into its purest
state, reflecting steadily the true nature of the puru~a. This is
the kevala (oneness) state of existence after which (all sarpskaras,
all avidya being altogether uprooted) the citta is impotent any
longer to hold on to the puru!:'a, and like a stone hurled from a
mountain top, gravitates back into the prakrti 1 • To destroy the
old sarpskaras, knowledge alone not being sufficient, a graduated
course of practice is necessary. This graduated practice should
be so arranged that by generating the practice of living higher
and better modes of life, and steadying the mind on its subtler
states, the habits of ordinary life may be removed. As the yogin
advances he has to give up what he had adopted as good and
try for that which is still better. Continuing thus he reaches the
state when the budd hi is in its ultimate perfection and purity.
At this stage the buddhi assumes the form of the puru~a, and
final liberation takes place.
Karmas in Yoga are divided into four classes: ( 1) sukla or
white (pu1!ya, those that produce happiness), (2) krp!a or black
(piipa, those that produce sorrow), (3) sukla-k.r~?ta (pu~zya-piipa,
most of our ordinary actions are partly virtuous and partly vicious
as they involve, if not anything else, at least the death of many
insects), (4) asukliikr~?ta (those inner acts of self-abnegation, and
meditation which are devoid of any fruits as pleasures or pains).
All external actions involve some sins, for it is difficult to work
in the world and avoid taking the lives of insects:?. All karmas
1
Both SaiJlkhya and Yoga speak of this emancipated state as r..-ai'l•alya (alone-ness),
the former because all sorrows have been absolute!y uprooted, never to grow up again
and the latter because at this state puru~a remains for ever alone without any associa-
tion with buddhi, see SiiJ!zklzya kiirikii, 68 and Yoga s1Uras, IV. 34·
2 Vyiisabhii!ya and Tattvavai.<iiradi, 1 v. 7.
vn] Modes of fg1loraJtce
proceed from the five-fold afflictions (klefas), namely avidyii,
asmitii, riiga, dve~a and abhi11ivefa.
vVe have already noticed what was meant by avidya. It con-
sists generally in ascribing intelligence to buddhi, in thinking it
as permanent and leading to happiness. This false knowledge
while remaining in this form further manifests itself in the other
four forms of asmita, etc. Asmita means the thinking of worldly
objects and our experiences as really belonging to us-the
sense of "mine" or "I'' to things that really are the qualities or
transformations of the guryas. Raga means the consequent attach-
ment to pleasures and things. Dve~a means aversion or antipathy
to unpleasant things. Abhinivesa is the desire for life or love of
life-the will to be. \Ve proceed to work because we think our
experiences to be our own, our body to be our own, our family
to be our own, our possessions to be our own; because we are
attached to these ; because we feel great antipathy against any
mischief that might befall them, and also because we love our
life and always try to preserve it against any mischief. These all
proceed, as is easy to see, from their root avidya, "·hich consists
in the false identification of buddhi with puru~a. These five,
avidya, asmita, raga, dve~a and abhinivesa, permeate our buddhi,
and lead us to perform karma and to suffer. These together
with the performed karmas which lie inherent in the buddhi as
a particular mode of it transmigrate with the buddhi from birth
to birth, and it is hard to get rid of them 1• The karma in the
aspect in which it lies in the buddhi as a mode or modification of
it is called karmiifaya (the bed of karma for the puru~a to lie in).
\Ve perform a karma actuated by the vicious tendencies (klcsa) of
the buddhi. The karma when thus performed leaves its stain or
modification on the buddhi, and it is so ordained according to the
teleology of the prakrti and the removal of obstacles in the course
of its evolution in accordance with it by the permanent will of
Isvara that each vicious action brings sufferance and a virtuous
one pleasure.
The karmas performed in the present life will generally ac-
cumulate, and when the time for giving their fruits comes, such
a life is ordained for the person, such a body is made ready for
him according to the evolution of prakrti as shall make it possible
for him to suffer or enjoy the fruits thereo( The karma of the
1 Vyiisablziifya and Tattvavaifiiradi, 11. 3-9.
268 The Kapila and the Pataiz.fala Sii1!zkhya [cH.
present life thus determines the particular kind of future birth
(as this or that animal or man), the period of life (tiyu~) and the
painful or pleasurable experiences (bhoga) destined for that life.
Exceedingly good actions and extremely bad actions often pro-
duce their effects in this life. It may also happen that a man has
done certain bad actions, for the realization of the fruits of which
he requires a dog-life and good actions for the fruits of which
he requires a man-life. In such cases the good action may remain
in abeyance and the man may suffer the pains of a dog-life first
and then be born again as a man to en joy the fruits of his good
actions. But if we can remove ignorance and the other afflictions,
all his previous unfulfilled karmas are for ever lost and cannot
again be revived. He has of course to suffer the fruits of those
karmas which have already ripened. This is thejivanmukti stage,
when the sage has attained true knowledge and is yet suffering
mundane life in order to experience the karmas that have already
ripened ( ti~{hati smtzskaravastit cakrablzramivaddh.rtasarirafz ).
Citta.
The word Yoga which was formerly used in Vedic literature
in the sense of the restraint of the senses is used by Patafijali in
his Yoga sutra in the sense of the partial or full restraint or
steadying of the states of citta. Some sort of concentration may
be brought about by violent passions, as when fighting against
a mortal enemy, or even by an ignorant attachment or instinct.
The citta which has the concentration of the former type is called
k#'pta (wild) and of the latter type pramziqha (ignorant). There
is another kind of citta, as with all ordinary people, in which
concentration is only possible for a time, the mind remaining
steady on one thing for a short time leaves that off and clings to
another thing and so on. This is called the vik~ipta (unsteady)
stage of mind (cittablzztmi). As distinguished from these there is
an advanced stage of citta in which it can concentrate steadily on
an object for a long time. This is the ekagra (one-pointed) stage.
There is a still further advanced stage in which the citta processes
are absolutely stopped. This happens immediately before mukti,
and is called the nirodha (cessation) state of citta. The purpose of
Yoga is to achieve the conditions of the last two stages of citta.
The cittas have five processes ( v.rtti), ( 1) pramii~za 1 (valid
1 Satpkhya holds that both validity anti invalidity of any cognition depend upon
the cognitive state itself and not on correspondence with external facts or objects
(svata~ priimii~zyal!l svata~ apriimti~TYa'!z). The contribution of SaTJtkhya to the doc-
vn] Tendencies of Good and Evil
cognitive states such as are generated by perception, inference
and scriptural testimony), (2) viparyaya (false knowledge, illusion,
etc.), (3) vikalpa (abstraction, construction and different kinds of
imagination), (4) nidrii (sleep, is a vacant state of mind, in which
tamas tends to predominate), (5) smrti (memory).
These states of mind (v_rtti) comprise our inner experience.
When they lead us towards sarpsara into the course of passions
and their satisfactions, they are said to be kli~ta (afflicted or
leading to affliction); when they lead us towards liberation, they
are called akli~ta (unafflicted). To whichever side we go, towards
sarpsara or towards mukti, we have to make use of our states of
mind; the states which are bad often alternate with good states,
and whichever state should tend towards our final good (libera-
tion) must be regarded as good.
This draws attention to that important characteristic of citta,
that it sometimes tends towards good (i.e. liberation) and some-
times towards bad (sarpsara). It is like a river, as the Vyiisa-
bhii~ya says, which flows both ways, towards sin and towards the
good. The teleology of prakrti requires that it should produce
in man the sarpsara as well as the liberation tendency.
Thus in accordance with it in the midst of many bad thoughts
and bad habits there come good moral will and good thoughts,
and in the midst of good thoughts and habits come also bad
thoughts and vicious tendencies. The will to be good is therefore
never lost in man, as it is an innate tendency in him which is
as strong as his desire to enjoy pleasures. This point is rather
remarkable, for it gives us the key of Yoga ethics and shows that
our desire of liberation is not actuated by any hedonistic attraction
for happiness or even removal of pain, but by an innate tendency
of the mind to follow the path of liberation I. Removal of pains
trine of inference is not definitely known. What little Vacaspati says on the subject has
been borrowed from Vatsyayana such as the putvavat, !ejavat and siimiinyatodrf!a types
of inference, and these may better be consulted in our chapter on Nyaya or in the Tiitpar-
ya!ikii of Vacaspati. Sarpkhya inference was probably from particular to particular on
the ground of seven kinds of relations according to which they had seven kinds of in-
ference '' miitriinimittasa'!zyogivirodhisahaciiribhil;. Svasvtimibadhyaghiittidyail; siit?Z-
khytinii'!z saptadhiinumii" ( Tiitpatya!ikii, p. 109). Sarpkhya definition of inference as
given by Udyotakara {I. I. v) is "sambandhiidekasmtit pratyakjiicche~asiddhira1Zumii
natn."
I Sarpkhya however makes the absolute and complete destruction of three kinds
of sorrows, iidhyiitmika (generated internally by the illness of the body or the unsatis-
fied passions of the mind), tidhibhautika (generated externally by the injuries inflicted
by other men, beasts, etc.) and adhidaivika (generated by the injuries inflicted by demons
and ghosts) the object of all our endeavours (purutiirlha).
270 The Kapila and the Pi'ita1'ljala Si'i1?tkhya [cH.
is of course the concomitant effect of following such a course, but
still the motive to follow this path is a natural and irresistible
tendency of the mind. Man has power (Sakti) stored up in his
citta, and he has to use it in such a way that this tendency may
gradually grow stronger and stronger and ultimately uproot the
other. He must succeed in this, since prakrti wants liberation for
her final realization 1•
1 It should be noted that the word samiidhi cannot properly be translated either
Extreme remoteness (e.g. a lark high up in the sky), extreme proximity (e.g. collyrium
inside the eye), loss of sense-organ (e.g. a blind man), want of attention, extreme
smallness of the object (e.g. atoms), obstruction by other intervening objects (e.g. by
walls), presence of superior lights (the star cannot be seen in daylight), being mixed
up with other things of its own kind (e.g. water thrown into a lake).
2
Though all things are but the modifications of gut;as yet the real nature of the
gm;as is never revealed by the sense-knowledge. \Vhat appears to the senses are but
illusory characteristics like those of magic (maya) :
" ;.,·u~u1niil!l parama'!z rzipam 1la dr~{ipathamruhati
Yattu dts!z"patham prliptam tmzmiiyeva sutucchakam."
Vyiisabhii~ya, IY. r 3·
The real nature of the gm;as is thus revealed only hy prajiiii.
CHAPTER VIII
THE NYAYA-VAISE$IKA PHILOSOPHY
edition ofVaise~ika that the Vaise~ika siUras were earlier than the
N yaya. It seems to me to be perfectly certain that the Vaise~ika
siUras were written before Caraka (8o A.D.); for he not only quotes
one of the Vaz~!e~ika siUras, but the whole foundation of his medical
physics is based on the Vaise~ika physics 1• The Lmikiivatiira
siUra (which as it was quoted. by Asvagho~a is earlier than
8o A.D.) also makes allusions to the atomic doctrine. There are
other weightier grounds, as we shall see later on, for supposing
that the Vaz~!e#ka siitras are probably pre-Buddhistic 2•
It is certain that even the logical part of the present Nyiiya
siUras was preceded by previous speculations on the subject by
thinkers of other schools. Thus in commenting on I. i. 32 in which
the sli.tra states that a syllogism consists of five premisses(avayava)
Vatsyayana says that this sutra was written to refute the views
of those who held that there should be ten premisses 3• The
Vazse#ka sfttras also give us some of the earliest types of inference,
which do not show any acquaintance with the technic of the Nyaya
doctrine of inference".
that which separates. V. S. 11. ii. 7· Samanya and vise~a depend upon our mode of
thinking (as united or as separate).
3 Vaife~ika siitra (11. ii. 9 and v. ii. 26).
The Nyaya-Vaife~ika Philosophy [cH.
systems that we have can we trace any upholding of this ancient
view 1• These considerations as well as the general style of the
work and the methods of discussion lead me to think that these
siitras are probably the oldest that we have and in all probability
are pre-Buddhistic.
The Va£se~ika szltra begins with the statement that its object
is to explain virtue, "dharma." This is we know the manifest duty
of Mimarpsa and we know that unlike any other system Jaimini
begins his lVlimiil!ZSii szttras by defining "dharma." This at first
seems irrelevant to the main purpose of Vaise~ika, viz., the de-
scription of the nature of padartha 2• He then defines dharma as
that which gives prosperity and ultimate good (ni(.z.Sreyasa) and
says that the Veda must be regarded as valid, since it can dictate
this. He ends his book with the remarks that those injunctions
(of Vedic deeds) which are performed for ordinary human motives
bestow prosperity even though their efficacy is not known to us
through our ordinary experience, and in this matter the Veda must
be regarded as the authority which dictates those acts 3 • The fact
that the Vaise~ika begins with a promise to describe dharma and
after describing the nature of substances, qualities and actions
and also the adN!a (unknown virtue) due to dharma (merit
accruing from the performance of Vedic deeds) by which many
of our unexplained experiences may be explained, ends his book
by saying that those Vedic works which are not seen to produce
any direct effect, will produce prosperity through adr!?ta, shows
that Kat) ada's method of explaining dharma has been by showing
that physical phenomena involving substances, qualities, and
actions can only be explained up to a certain extent while a
good number cannot be explained at all except on the as-
sumption of adr~ta (unseen virtue) produced by dharma. The
I Svetasvatara 1. i. '2.
2 I remember a verse quoted in an old commentary of the Kaliipa vyiikara~za, in
which it is said that the description of the six categories by Kal)ada in his Vaifqika
sutras, after having proposed to describe the nature of dharma, is as irrelevant as to
proceed towards the sea while intending to go to the mountain Ilimavat (Himalaya).
"Dhanllat!l vyiikhyt"itukiimasya !a{padt"i1·thopavar~za1lll1!1 Himavadgmztukiimasya siiga·
ragamanopamam."
:l The siitra " Tadvaca11iid ii11uulyas_va priimtl'l.tyam (1. i. 3 and x. ii. 9) has been
explained by Upaskiira as meaning "The Veda being the word of lsvara (God) must
he regarded as valid," but since there is no mention of" Isvara" anywhere in the text
this is simply reading the later Nyaya ideas into the Vaise~ika. Sfttra x. ii. 8 is only
a repetition of VI. ii. 1.
VIIIj Antiquity o.f Vaife~ika
ness (smha), elasticity (sal!zskiira), merit (dharma), and demerit (adharma) ha\·e been
altogether omitted. These are all counted in later Vaise~ika commentaries and com-
286 The Nyaya- Vaise~ika Philosophy [cH.
ment,downward movement, contraction, expansion and horizontal
movement. The three common qualities of dravya,gut)a and karma
are that they are existent, non-eternal, substantive, effect, cause,
and possess generality and particularity. Dravya produces other
dravyas and the gm~as other guJ!aS. But karma is not necessarily
produced by karma. Dravya does not destroy either its cause or
its effect, but the guJ!aS are destroyed both by the cause and by
the effect. Karma is destroyed by karma. Dravya possesses
karma and gul!a and is regarded as the material (samaviiyi) cause.
GuJ!aS inhere in dravya, cannot possess further guJ!as, and are
not by themselves the cause of contact or disjoining. K~rma is
devoid of guJ!a, cannot remain at one time in more than one
object, inheres in dravya alone, and is an independent cause of
contact or disjoining. Dravya is the material cause (samavayi)
of (derivative) dravyas, guJ!a, and karma; gul!a is also the non-
material cause (asamavtiyi) of dravya, guJ!a and karma. Karma
is the general cause of contact, disjoining, and inertia in motion
(vega). Karma is not the cause of dravya. For dravya may be
produced even without karma 1• Dravya is the general effect of
dravya. Karma is dissimilar to guJ!a in this that it does not pro-
duce karma. The numbers two, three, etc., separateness, contact
and disjoining are effected by more than one dravya. Each karma
not being connected with more than one thing is not produced
by more than one thing 2• A dravya is the result of many con-
tacts (of the atoms). One colour may be the result of many
colours. Upward movement is the result of heaviness, effort and
contact. Contact and disjoining are also the result of karma. In
denying the causality of karma it is meant that karma is not the
cause of dravya and karma 3•
In the second chapter of the first book Kat:~ada first says that
if there is no cause, there is no effect, but there may be the cause
even though there may not be the effect. He next says that
genus (siinuinya) and species (vise~a) are relative to the under-
pencliums. It must be noted that "gu~a" in \'aise~ika means qualities and not subtle
reals or substances as in Sarpkhya-Yoga. Gul)a in Vaise~ika would be akin to what
Yoga would call dharma.
1 It is only when the karya ceases that dravya is produced. See Upaskiira 1. i. 22.
2 If karma is related to more than one thing, then with the movement of one we
should have felt that two or more things were moving.
3 It must he noted that "karma" in this sense is quite different from the more
extensive use uf karma as meritorious or vicious action which is the cause of rebirth.
VIII] Philosophy in the Vaise~ika siltras
standing; being (bhiiva) indicates continuity only and is hence
only a genus. The universals of substance, quality and action
may be both genus and species, but vise~a as constituting the ulti-
mate differences (of atoms) exists (independent of any percipient).
In connection with this he says that the ultimate genus is being
(sattii) in virtue of which things appear as existent; all other
genera may only relatively be regarded as relative genera or
species. Being must be regarded as a separate category, since it
is different from dravya, gul)a and karma, and yet exists in them,
and has no genus or species. It gives us the notion that some-
thing is and must be regarded as a category existing as one
identical entity in all dravya, gul).a, and karma, for in its uni-
versal nature as being it has no special characteristics in the
different objects in which it inheres. The specific universals of
thingness (dravya!'va), qualitiness (gu~zatva) or actionness (kar-
matva) are also categories which are separate from universal being
(bhiiva or sattii) for they also have no separate genus or species
and yet may be distinguished from one another, but bhava or
being was the same in all.
In the first chapter of the second book Kal)ada deals with
substances. Earth possesses colour, tast~, smell, and touch; water,
colour, taste, touch, liquidity, and smoothness (slli'gdha); fire,
colour and touch; air, touch; but none of these qualities can be
found in ether (iikiisa). Liquidity is a special quality of water
because butter, lac, wax, lead, iron, silver, gold, become liquids
only when they are heated, while water is naturally liquid itselfl.
Though air cannot be seen, yet its existence can be inferred by
touch, just as the existence of the genus of cows may be inferred
from the characteristics of horns, tails, etc. Since this thing in-
ferred from touch possesses motion and quality, and does not
itself inhere in any other substance, it is a substance ( dravya)
and is eternaJ2. The inference of air is of the type of inference
of imperceptible things from certain known characteristics
called siimiinyato dr~!a. The name of air "viiyu" is derived
from the scriptures. The existence of others different from us
has (asmadvi'si'#iiniiltl) to be admitted for accounting for the
I It should be noted that mercury is not mentioned. This is important for mercury
was known at a time later than Caraka.
2 Substance is that which possesses quality and action. It should be noted that
the word "adrml)'alve11a" in II. i. 13 has been interpreted by me as "adrav;,avatlvetza."
288 The Nyaya- Vaile~ika Philosophy [cu.
gtvmg of names to things (sm!t}iiiikarma). Because we find
that the giving of names is already in usage (and not invented
by us) 1• On account of the fact that movements rest only in
one thing, the phenomenon that a thing can enter into any un-
occupied space, would not lead us to infer the existence of akasa
(ether). Akasa has to be admitted as the hypothetical substance
in which the quality of sound inheres, because, since sound (a
quality) is not the characteristic of things which can be touched,
there must be some substance of which it is a quality. And this
substance is akasa. It is a substance and eternal like air. As
being is one so akasa is one 2•
In the second chapter of the second book Kal)ada tries to
prove that smell is a special characteristic of earth, heat of fire,
and coldness of water. Time is defined as that which gives the
notion of youth in the young, simultaneity, and quickness. It is
one like being. Time is the cause of all non-eternal things, be-
cause the notion of time is absent in eternal things. Space
supplies the notion that this is so far away from this or so much
nearer to this. Like being it is one. One space appears to have
diverse inter-space relations in connection with the motion of the
sun. As a preliminary to discussing the problem whether sound
is eternal or not, he discusses the notion of doubt, which arises
when a thing is seen in a general way, but the particular features
coming under it are not seen, either when these are only remem-
bered, or when some such attribute is seen which resembles some
other attribute seen before, or when a thing is seen in one way
but appears in another, or when what is seen is not definitely
grasped, whether rightly seen or not. He then discusses the ques-
tion whether sound is eternal or non-eternal and gives his reasons
to show that it is non-eternal, but concludes the discussion with
a number of other reasons proving that it is eternal.
The first chapter of the third book is entirely devoted to the
inference of the existence of soul from the fact that there must
be some substance in \vhich knowledge produced by the contact
of the senses and their object in heres.
The knowledge of sense-objects (i1ldri'yiirtlta) is the reason by
1 I have differed from Upasl.:iira in interpreting "sm!l}iitzkarma" in II. i. 18, 19 as
a genitive compound while Upaskiira makes it a dvamlva compound. Upaskara's
interpretation seems to be far-fetched. He wants to twist it into an argument for the
existence of ( ;Oll.
2 This interpretation is according to Sai1kara l\lisra's Upasl.:iira.
VIII] Ph£/osophy £n the Vaife~£ka siltras
which we can infer the existence of something different from the
senses and the objects which appear in connection with them. The
types of inferences referred to are ( 1) inference of non-existence of
some things from the existence of some things, ( 2) of the existence
of some things from the non-existence of some things, (3) of the
existence of some things from the existence _of others. In all
these cases inference is possible only when the two are known to
be connected with each other (prasiddhipiirvakatvat apadeiasya) 1 ~
When such a connection does not exist or is doubtful, we have
anapadesa (fallacious middle) and sandigdha (doubtful middle)~
thus, it is a horse because it has a horn, or it is a cow because it
has a horn are examples of fallacious reason. The inference of
soul from the cognition produced by the contact of soul, senses
and objects is not fallacious in the above way. The inference of
the existence of the soul in others may be made in a similar way
in which the existence of one's own soul is inferred 2, i.e. by virtue
of the existence of movement and cessation of movement. In the
second chapter it is said that the fact that there is cognition only
when there is contact between the self, the senses and the objects
proves that there is manas (mind), and this manas is a substance
and eternal, and this can be proved because there is no simul-
taneity of production of efforts and various kinds of cognition; it
may also be inferred that this manas is one (with each person).
The soul may be inferred from inhalation, exhalation, twinkling
of the eye, life, the movement of the mind, the sense-affections
pleasure, pain, will, antipathy, and effort. That it is a substance
and eternal can be proved after the manner of vayu. An objector
is supposed to say that since when I see a man I do not see his
soul, the inference of the soul is of the type of siimiinyatodr~!a
inference, i.e., from the perceived signs of pleasure, pain, cog-
nition to infer an unknown entity to which they belong, but
that this was the self could not be affirmed. So the existence of
soul has to be admitted on the strength of the scriptures. But
the Vaise~ika reply is that since there is nothing else but self to
which the expression "I" may be applied, there is no need of
falling back on the scriptures for the existence of the soul. But
1 In connection with this there is a short reference to the methods of fallacy in
which Gautama's terminology does not appear. There is no generalised statement, but
specific types of inference are only pointed out as the basis.
2 The forms of inference used show that Kal)ada was probably not aware of
Gautama's terminology.
The Nyaya- Vaife~ika Philosophy [cH.
then it is said that if the self is directly perceived in such ex-
periences as" I am Yajfiadatta" or" I am Devadatta," what is the
good of turning to inference? The reply to this is that inference
lending its aid to the same existence only strengthens the con-
viction. \Vhen we say that Devadatta goes or Yajnadatta goes,
there comes the doubt whether by Devadatta or Yajnadatta the
body alone is meant; but the doubt is removed when we think
that the notion of" I'' refers to the self and not to anything else.
As there is no difference regarding the production of pleasure,
pain, and cognition, the soul is one in all. But yet it is many
by special limitations as individuals and this is also proved on
the strength of the scriptures 1 •
In the first chapter of the fourth book it is said that that
which is existent, but yet has no cause, should be considered
eternal (11itya). It can be inferred by its effect, for the effect can
only take place because of the cause. vVhen we speak of any-
thing as non-eternal, it is only a negation of the eternal, so that
also proves that there is something eternal. The non-eternal
is ignorance (avidyii)2. Colour is visible in a thing which is great
(malzat) and compounded. Air ('lliiyu) is not perceived to have
colour, though it is great and made up of parts, because it has not
the actuality of colour (riipasmtzskiira-i.e. in air there is only
coiour in its unmanifested form) in it Colour is thus visible only
when there is colour with special qualifications and conditions 3 • In
this way the cognition of taste, smell, and touch is also explained.
Number,measure,separateness,contact, and disjoining, the quality
of belonging to a higher or lower class, action, all these as they
abide in things possessing colour are visible to the eye. The
number etc. of those which have no colour are not perceived by the
eye. But the notion of being and also of genus of quality (gul)atva)
1 I have differed here from the meaning given in Upasktira. I think the three
siitras "Sukhadu!zkhaj11dnamjpatt;•avifefiidekiitmyam," "vyaz•asthato niimi," and" :.!as-
trasiimarthytlt ca" originally meant that the self was one, though for the sake of many
limitations, and also because of the need of the performance of acts enjoined by the
scriptures, they are regarded as many.
2 l have differed here also in my meaning from the Upaskara, which regards this
siitra "am"dyii" to mean that we do not know of any reasons which lead to the non-
cterr.ality of the atoms.
3 This is what is meant in the later distinctions of udbhutarupavattva and amtd-
bhutariipavattva. The word Slli?Hkiim in Vai~el?ika has many senses. It means inertia,
elasticity, collection (samaviiya), production (udbhava) and not being overcome (aJZ,zb-
hibhava). For the last three senses see Upaskiira IY. i. 'i·
VIII] P h£losophy £n the Va£fe~ika sutras
are perceived by all the senses (just as colour, taste, smell, touch,
and sound are perceived by one sense, cognition, pleasure, pain,
etc. by the manas and number etc. by the visual and the tactile
sense) 1•
In the second chapter of the fourth book it is said that the
earth, etc. exist in three forms, body, sense, and objects. There
cannot be any compounding of the five elements or even of the
three, but the atoms of different elements may combine when one
of them acts as the central radicle (upa#ambltaka). Bodies are of
two kinds, those produced from ovaries and those which are other-
wise produced by the combination of the atoms in accordance
with special kinds of dharma. All combinations of atoms are due
to special kinds of dharmas. Such super-mundane bodies are to
be admitted for explaining the fact that things must have been
given names by beings having such super-mundane bodies, and
also on account of the authority of the Vedas.
In the first chapter of the fifth book action (karma) is dis-
cussed. Taking the example of threshing the corn, it is said
that the movement of the hand is due to its contact with the
soul in a state of effort, and the movement of the flail is due
to its contact with the hand. But in the case of the uprising of
the flail in the threshing pot due to impact the movement is
not due to contact with the hands, and so the uplifting of the
hand in touch with the flail is not due to its contact with the
soul; for it is due to the impact of the flail. On account of
heaviness (gztrutva) the flail will fall when not held by the hand.
Things may have an upward or side motion by specially directed
motions (nodanavise.ra) which are generated by special kinds of
efforts. Even without effort the body may move during sleep.
The movement of needles towards magnets is due to an unknown
cause (atf.r#akara?taka). The arrow first acquires motion by
specially directed movement, and then on account of its inertia
(vegasanzskilra) keeps on moving and when that ceases it falls
down through heaviness.
The second chapter abounds with extremely crude explana-
1 This portion has been taken from the Upaskiira of Sm1kara Mi~ra on the Vaife-
jika sutras of KaQada. It must be noted here that the notion of number according to
Vai~e~ika is due to mental relativity or oscillation (apek!t'ibuddhijanya). But this mental
relativity can only start when the thing having number is either seen or touched; and it
is in this sense that notion of number is said to depend on the visual or the tactual
sense.
The Nyaya- Vaise~zka Philosophy [cH.
tions of certain physical phenomena which have no philosophical
importance. All the special phenomena of nature are explained
as being due to unknown cause (adn!akiiritam) and no ex-
planation is given as to the nature of this unknown (adr~!a).
It is however said that with the absence of adr~!a there is no con-
tact of body with soul, and thus there is no rebirth, and therefore
mok~a (salvation); pleasure and pain are due to contact of the
self, manas, senses and objects. Yoga is that in which the mind
is in contact with the self alone, by which the former becomes
steady and there is no pain in the body. Time, space, akasa are
regarded as inactive.
The whole of the sixth book is devoted to showing that gifts
are made to proper persons not through sympathy but on account
of the injunction of the scriptures, the enumeration of certain
Vedic performances, which brings in adr~ta, purification and im-
purities of things, how passions are often generated by adr~!a,
how dharma and adharma lead to birth and death and how mok-?a
takes place as a result of the work of the soul.
In the seventh book it is said that the qualities in eternal
things are eternal and in non-eternal things non-eternal. The
change of qualities produced by heat in earth has its beginning
in the cause (the atoms). Atomic size is invisible while great size
is visible. Visibility is due to a thing's being made up of many
causes 1, but the atom is therefore different from those that have
great size. The same thing may be called great and small rela-
tively at the same time. In accordance with at)utva (atomic) and
mahattva (great) there are also the notions of small and big. The
eternal size of parimaJJtfala (round) belongs to the atoms. Akasa
and atman are called mahi'i1Z or paramamahan (the supremely
great or all-pervasive); since manas is not of the great measure
it is of atomic size. Space and time are also considered as being
of the measure "supremely great" (paramamahat). Atomic size
(parimat:1<;lala) belonging to the atoms and the mind (manas) and
the supremely great size belonging to space, time, soul and ether
( akasa) are regarded as eternal.
In the second chapter of the seventh book it is said that unity
and separateness are to be admitted as entities distinct from
other qualities. There is no number in movement and quality;
the appearance of number in them is false. Cause and effect are
1 I have differed from the l'paskiira in the interpretation of this si"1tra.
VIII] Philosophy in the Vaife~ika siUras 293
neither one, nor have they distinctive separateness (ekaprthaktva).
The notion of unity is the cause of the notion of duality, etc.
Contact may be due to the action of one or two things, or the
effect of another contact and so is disjoining. There is neither
contact nor disjoining in cause and effect since they do not exist
independently (yutasiddhyabluivat). In the eighth book it is said
that soul and manas are not perceptible, and that in the ap-
prehension of qualities, action, generality, and particularity
perception is due to their contact with the thing. Earth is the
cause of perception of smell, and water, fire, and air are the
cause of taste, colour and touch t. In the ninth book negation is
described; non-existence (asat) is defined as that to which
neither action nor quality can be attributed. Even existent things
may become non-existent and that which is existent in one
way may be non-existent in another; but there is another kind
of non-existence which is different from the above kinds of
existence and non-existence 2• All negation can be directly per-
ceived through the help of the memory which keeps before the
mind the thing to which the negation applies. Allusion is also
made in this connection to the special perceptual powers of the
yogins (sages attaining mystical powers through Yoga practices).
In the second chapter the nature of hetu (reason) or the
middle term is described. It is said that anything connected
with any other thing, as effect, cause, as in contact, or as con-
trary or as inseparably connected, will serve as liti.ga (reason).
The main point is the notion ''this is associated with this," or
''these two are related as cause and effect," and since this may
also be produced through premisses, there may be a formal syllo-
gism from propositions fulfilling the above condition. Verbal
cognition comes without inference. False knowledge (avidyii) is
due to the defect of the senses or non-observation and mal-
observation due to wrong expectant impressions. The opposite
of this is true knowledge (vidya). In the tenth it is said that
pleasure and pain are not cognitions, since they are not related to
doubt and certainty.
I Upaskiira here explains that it is intended that the senses are produced by those
specific elements, but this cannot be found in the siitras.
II In the previous three kinds of non·existence, pragabhtiva (negation before pro-
duction), dhva'!lsii/Jhiiva {negation after destruction), and anyonyabluiva {mutual
negation of each other in each other), have been described. The fourth one is siimiin-
yabhiiva (general negation).
294 The Nyaya- Vaise~ika Philosophy [cH.
A dravya may be caused by the inhering of the effect in it, for
because of its contact with another thing the effect is produced.
Karma (motion) is also a cause since it inheres in the cause. Con-
tact is also a cause since it inheres in the cause. A contact which
inheres in the cause of the cause and thereby helps the production
of the effect is also a cause. The special quality of the heat of
fire is also a cause.
Works according to the injunctions of the scriptures since they
have no visible effect are the cause of prosperity, and because the
Vedas direct them, they have validity.
not against the Nyaya doctrine of perception, but against the wording of the definition
of perception as given in the Nyiiya siUm, II. i. 4·
2
This is a refutation of the doctrines of the Buddhists, who rejected the e1:istence
of wholes (avayavi). On this subject a later Buddhist monograph by PaQ~ita Asoka
(9th century A.D.), Avayavini1iikara~za in Six Buddhist Nyaya Tracts, may be re-
ferred to.
3 Pte1"Vodakavifi#am khalu varfodakan fighrataram srotasd bahutaraphenapha!a-
tary). He himself makes no such claim and calls his work a compendium of the
properties of the categories (Padiir/hadharmasat!zgraha). He takes the categories of
dravya, gu~za, karma, siimiinya, 7Jifefa and samaviiya in order and without raising any
discussions plainly narrates what he has got to say on them. Some of the doctrines
which are important in later Nyaya-Vaise!?ika discussions, such as the doctrine of
creation and dissolution, doctrine of number, the theory that the number of atoms
contributes to the atomic measure of the molecules, the doctrine of pilupaka in con-
nection with the transformation of colours by heat occur in his narration for the tirst
time as the Vaifefika siilras are silent on these points. It is difficult to ascertain his
date definitely; he is the earliest writer on Vaise!?ika available to us after KaQada
and it is not improbable that he lived in the sth or 6th century A.D.
VIII] Nyaya L ite·rature
been definitely settled, but there is reason to believe that he lived
some time in the beginning of the fourth century A.D. Jacobi
places him in 300 A.D. Udyotakara (about 635 A.D.) wrote a
Vtirttika on Vatsyayana's bha~ya to establish the Nyaya views
and to refute the criticisms of the Buddhist logician Diimaga
(about 500 A.D.) in his Pramii?tasamuccaya. Vacaspatimisra
(840 A.D.) wrote a sub-commentary on the Nytiyavarttika of
Udyotakara called Nyayavtirttikatiitparya{ika in order to make
clear the right meanings ofUdyotakara's Viirttika which was sink-
ing in the mud as it were through numerous other bad writings
(dustarakunibandhapankamagniiuam). Udayana (984 A.D.) wrote
a sub-commentary on the Tatparya!ika called Tiitparya{ikii-
parisuddhi. Varddhamana (1225 A.D.) wrote a sub-commentary
on that called the Nyiiyanibandhaprakiisa. Padmanabha wrote
a sub-commentary on that called Varddhamanendu and Sankara
Misra (1425 A.D.) wrote a sub-commentary on that called the
Nyayatiitparyama?z¢ana. In the seventeenth century Visvanatha
wrote an independent short commentary known as Vz~~vanatha-
7.J_rtti, on the Nyaya szttra, and Radhamohana wrote a separate
commentary on the Nyiiya sietras known as Nyiiyasutravivarwza.
In addition to these works on the Nyaya sfttras many other
independent works of great philosophical value have been written
on the N yay a system. The most important of these in medieval
times is the Nytiyamaiijari of Jayanta (880 A.D.), who flourished
shortly after Vacaspatimisra. J ayanta chooses some of the Nyaya
siUras for interpretation, but he discusses the Nyaya views quite
independently, and criticizes the views of other systems of Indian
thought of his time. It is far more comprehensive than Vacaspati's
Tatparya!ikii, and its style is most delightfully lucid. Another
important work is Udayana's Kusumaiijali in which he tries to
prove the existence of Isvara (God). This work ought to be read
with its commentary Prakiisa by Varddhamana ( 1225 A.D.) and its
sub-commentary M akarmzda by Rucidatta ( 127 5 A.D.). U dayana's
A tmatattvaviveka is a polemical work against the Buddhists, in
which he tries to establish the N yaya doctrine of soul. In addition
to these we have a number of useful works on Nyaya in later
times. Of these the following deserve special mention in connec-
tion with the present work. Bhii~iipariccheda by Visvanatha with
its commentaries Muktiivall, Dinakari and Riimarudri, Tarka-
samgralza with J'{yiiymzir?wya, Tarkablzii~ii of Kesava Misra with
The NJ'iiya- Vaife~ika Philosophy [en.
the commentary Nyayapradipa, Saptapadiirtlzi of Sivaditya,
Tiirk£karak~li of Varadaraja with the commentary Nz~ka?z!aka of
Mallinatha, Nyiiyasara of Madhava Deva of the city of Dhara
and iVyayas£ddluintama1/jari of J anaklnatha Bhattacarya with
the Nyayamanjarisara by Yadavacarya, and Nyayasiddhautadipa
of Sasadhara with Prabha by Se!?anantacarya.
The new school of Nyaya philosophy known as Navya-Nyaya
began with Gangesa U padhyaya of Mithila, about 1200 A.D.
Gangesa wrote only on the four pramat:las admitted by theN yaya,
viz.pratyak!;'a,anumana,upamana,and sabda,and not on any of the
topics of N yaya metaphysics. But it so happened that his dis-
cussionsonanumana(inference)attracted unusuallygreatattention
in Navadvlpa (Bengal), and large numbers of commentaries and
commentaries of commentaries were written on the anumana
portion of his work T attvac£utama1j£, and many independent
treatises on sabda and anumana were also written by the scholars
of Bengal, which became thenceforth for some centuries the home
of N yaya studies. The commentaries of Raghunatha Siromat:li
(1500 A.D.), Mathura Bhanacarya (158oA.D.), Gadadhara Bhana-
carya (1650A.D.) and JagadiSa Bhattacarya (1 590 A.D.), commen-
taries on Siromat:li's commentary on Tattvac£utiimani, had been
very widely read in Bengal. The new school of N yaya became the
most important study in Navadvlpa and there appeared a series
of thinkers who produced an extensive literature on the subject I.
The contribution was not in the direction of metaphysics, theology,
ethics, or religion, but consisted mainly in developing a system
of linguistic notations to specify accurately and precisely any
concept or its relation with other concepts 2•
Thus for example when they wished to define precisely the
nature of the concomitance of one concept with another (e.g. smoke
and fire), they would so specify the relation that the exact nature
of the concomitance should be clearly expressed, and that there
should be no confusion or ambiguity. Close subtle analytic
thinking and the development of a system of highly technical
1 From the latter half of the twelfth century to the third quarter of the sixteenth
century the new school of Nyaya was started in Mithila (Behar); but from the fifteenth
to the seventeenth century Bengal became pre-eminently the home of Nyaya studies.
See Mr Cakravartti's paper,J. A. S.B. 1915. I am indebted to it for some of the
dates mentioned in this section.
2 lfvart1numii1za of Raghunatha as well as his Padiirlhatattvaniriipa~za are, how-
the writing of this chapter. Those who want to be acquainted with a fuller bibliography
of the new school of logic should refer to the paper called "The History of Navya
Nyaya in Bengal," by Mr Cakravartti inJ. A. S. B. 1915.
2 I have treated Nyaya and Vai~e~ika as the same system. Whatever may have been
their original differences, they are regarded since about 6oo A.D. as being in complete
agreement except in some minor points. The views of one system are often supple-
mented hy those of the other. The original character of the two systems has already
been treated.
~ See Nyiiyaka1ltlali, PP· 59-64.
VIII] Metaphysz"cal Categorz"es 311
sutra_;. Later Nyaya writers such as Udayana include abhiiva as a separate category,
but Sridhara a contemporary of Udayana rightly remarks that abhava was not counted
hy Prasastapada as it was dependent on bhava-''abhiivasya Prthaganupadefaf:t
bhiivapiiratantryiil na tvabhiiviit." N;'tlyakandali, p. 6, and Lakfa1Jiivali, p. 2.
2
" Tattvato }1iiilefu biihyiidhyiitmikefu vifayqu dofadar.faniit viraktasya samihii.
'' paramaQus" and non-eternal as in the dvya,_mka. The parimal)~lala parima~m is thus
a variety of aQuparimal)a. The al)uparimal)a and the hrasvaparimal)a represent the
two dimensions of the measure of dvyal)ukas as mahat and dirgha are with reference
to tryar:mkas. See Nyayakamb.zli, p. I.H·
VIII] The Quality of Measure
(hrasva) of the dyad is the cause of the measure "great" (mahat)
of the tryat:J.uka. But when we come to the region of these gross
tryat:J.ukas we find that the "great" measure of the tryat:lukas is
the cause of the measure of other grosser bodies com posed by
them. For as many tryat:lukas constitute a gross body, so much
bigger does the thing become. Thus the cumulation of the trya-
t:J.Ukas of mahat parimat:la makes things of still more mahat pari-
mat:J.a. The measure of tryar)ukas is not only regarded as mahat
but also as dirgha (long) and this dirgha parimar)a has to be ad-
mitted as coexisting with mahat parimat:la but not identical, for
things not only appear as great but also as long (dirgha). Here
we find that the accumulation of tryat:J.ukas means the accumula-
tion of "great" (mahat) and "long" (dirglza) parimat:J.a, and hence
the thing generated happens to possess a measure which is greater
and longer than the individual atoms which composed them.
Now the hrasva parimat:la of the dyads is not regarded as having
a lower degree of greatness or length but as a separate and distinct
type of measure which is called small (hrasva). As accumulation
of grossness, greatness or length, generates still more greatness,
grossness and length in its effect, so an accumulation of the
hrasva (small) parimat:la ought to generate still more hrasva
parimat:\a, and we should expect that if the hrasva measure of
the dyads was the cause of the measure of the tryaryukas, the
tryat:lukas should be even smaller than the dyat:lukas. So also if
the atomic and circular (par£ma~z¢ala) size of the atoms is re-
garded as generating by their measure the measure of the dya-
t:\Ukas, then the measure of the dyat:lukas ought to be more atomic
than the atoms. The atomic, small, and great measures should
not be regarded as representing successively bigger measures pro-
duced by the mere cumulation of measures, but each should be
regarded as a measure absolutely distinct, different from or foreign
to the other measure. It is therefore held that if grossness in the
cause generates still more greatness in the effect, the smallness
and the parimat:l9ala measure of the dyads and atoms ought to
generate still more smallness and subtleness in their effect.
But since the dyads and the tryat:luka molecules are seen to
be constituted of atoms and dyads respectively, and yet are
not found to share the measure of their causes, it is to be argued
that the measures of the atoms and dyads do not generate the
measure of their effects, but it is their mmzber which is the cause
316 The Nyaya- Va£fe~ika Philosophy [cH.
of the measure of the latter. This explains at~uparimarya, hras\-a
parimarya, mahat parimarya, and dlrg!1a parimarya. The parimarya
of akasa, kala, dik and atman which are regarded as all-pervasive,
is said to be paramamahat (absolutely large). The parimaryas
of the atoms, akasa, kala, dik, manas, and atman are regarded
as eternal (nz"tya). All other kinds of parimat~as as belonging to
non-eternal things are regarded as non-eternal.
The eighth is Prthaktva (mutual difference or separateness of
things), that entity or quality in things by virtue of which things
appear as different (e.g. this is different from that). Difference is
perceived by us as a positive notion and not as a mere negation
sue~} as this jug is not this pot.
The ninth is sm!zyoga (connection), that entity of gurya by
virtue of which things appear to us as connected.
The tenth is vibhtiga (separation), that entity of gurya which
destroys the connection or contact of things.
The eleventh and twelfth guryas, paratva and aparatva, give
rise in us to the perceptions of long time and short time, remote
and near.
The other guryas such as buddhi (knowledge ),sukha (happiness),
du(tklta (sorrow), z"cchti (will), d~'e.fa (antipathy or hatred) and
yaflza (effort) can occur only with reference to soul.
The characteristic of guru tva (heaviness) is that by virtue of
which things fall to the ground. The gllrya of sneha (oiliness)
belongs to water. The gurya of sm?zskara is of three kinds, ( 1) vega
(velocity) which keeps a thing moving in different directions,
( 2) sthiti-sthtipaka (elasticity) on account of which a gross thing
tries to get back its old state even though disturbed, (3) bhti-
vmzti is that quality of atman by which things are constantly
practised or by which things experienced are remembered and
recognized 1• Dharma is the quality the presence of which enables
the soul to enjoy happiness or to attain salvation2• Adhanna is
1 Pra~astapada says that bhavana is a special characteristic of the soul, contrary to
intoxication, sorrow and knowledge, by which things seen, heard and felt are remem-
bered and recognized. Through unexpectedness (as the sight of a camel for a man of
South India), repetition (as in studies, art etc.) and intensity of interest, the sa~pskara
hecomes particularly strong. See Nyiiyakandali, p. 267. Kal)ada however is silent
on these points. I Ie only says that by a special kind of contact of the mind with soul
and also by the sa~pskara, memory (smrti) is produced (IX. 2. 6).
2
Pra~astapiida speaks of dharma (merit) as being a quality of the soul. Thereupon
Sriclhara points out that this view does not admit that dharma is a power of karma (na
karmasiimarth;•am). Sacrifice etc. cannot be dharma for these actions being momentary
VIII] Category of Universality
the opposite quality, the presence of which in the soul leads a
man to suffer. Adr~!c or destiny is that unknown quality of
things and of the soul which brings about the cosmic order, and
arranges it for the experience of the souls in accordance with
their merits or demerits.
Karma means movement ; it is the third thing which must
be held to be as irreducible a reality as dravya or gm_.a. There
are five kinds of movement, (1) upward, (2) downward, (3) con-
traction, (4) expansion, (5} movement in general. All kinds of
karmas rest on substances just as the guryas do, and cause the
things to which they belong to move.
Siimiinya is the fourth category. It means the genus, or aspect
of generality or sameness that we notice in things. Thus in spite
of the difference of colour between one cow and another, both of
them are found to have such a sameness that we call them cows.
In spite of all diversity in all objects around us, they are all
perceived as sat or existing. This sat or existence is thus a same-
ness, which is found to exist in all the three things, dravya, gm~a,
and karma. This sameness is called siimiinya or j(iti, and it is
regarded as a separate thing which rests on dravya, gurya, or
karma. This highest genus salta (being) is called parajiiti (highest
universal), the other intermediate jatis are called aparajtiti (lower
universals), such as the genus of dravya, of karma, or of gurya, or
still more intermediate jatis such as gotvajiiti (the genus cow),
nilatvajiiti (the genus blue). The intermediate jatis or genera
sometimes appear to have a special aspect as a species, such as
pasutva (animal jati) and go tva (the cow jati); here however
gotva appears as a species, yet it is in reality nothing but a jati.
The aspect as species has no separate existence. It is jati which
from one aspect appears as genus and from another as species.
they cannot generate the effects which are only to be reaped at a future time. If the
action is destroyed its power (siimarthya) cannot last. So dharma is to be admitted
as a quality generated in the self by certain courses of conduct which produce happi-
ness for him when helped by certain other conditions of time, place, etc. Faith
(fraddhii), non-injury, doing good to all beings, truthfulness, non-stealing, sex-control,
sincerity, control of anger, ablutions, taking of pure food, devotion to particular gods,
fasting, strict adherence to scriptural duties, and the performance of duties assigned
to each caste and stage of life, are enumerated by Prasastapada as producing dharma.
The person who strictly adheres to these duties and the yamas and niyamas (cf.
Patafijali's Yoga) and attains Yoga by a meditation on the six padarthas attains a
dharma which brings liberation (mok,m). Sridhara refers to the Sa!Jlkhya-Yoga
account of the method of attaining salvation (Nyii;'akandali, pp. 272-28o). See also
Vallabha's N,yliyaliliivati, pp. 74-75. (Bombay, 1915.)
318 The Nyaya- Vaife~zka Philosophy [cH.
This jati or siimiinya thus must be regarded as having a separate
independent reality though it is existent in dravya, gurya and
karma. The Buddhists denied the existence of any indepen-
dent reality of samanya, but said that the sameness as cow
was really but the negation of all non-cows (apoha). The per-
ception of cow realizes the negation of all non-cows and this
is represented in consciousness as the sameness as cow. He who
should regard this sameness to be a separate and independent
reality perceived in experience might also discover two horns
on his own head 1 • The Nyaya-Vaise~ika said that negation
of non-cows is a negative perception, whereas the sameness per-
ceived as cow is a positive perception, which cannot be explained
by the aforesaid pegation theory~o_f the _Buddhists. Samanya has
thus to be admitted to have a separate reality. All perception as
sameness of a thing is due to the presence of this thing in that
object 1• This jati is eternal or non-destructible; for even with
the destruction of individuals comprehended within the jati, the
latter is not destroyed 2•
Through vise~a things are perceived as diverse. No single
sensation that we receive from the external world probably agrees
with any other sensation, and this difference must be due to the
existence of some specific differences amongst the atoms them-
selves. The specific difference existing in the atoms, emancipated
souls and minds must be regarded as eternally existing, and it
1 The Buddhist PaQditasoka says that there is no single thing running through
different individuals (e.g. cooks) by virtue of which the samanya could be established.
For if it did exist then we could have known it simply by seeing any cook without
any reference to his action of cooking by virtue of which the notion of generality is
fom1ed. If there is a similarity between the action of cooks that cannot establish
jati in the cooks, for the similarity applies to other things, viz. the action of the
cooks. If the specific individualities of a cow should require one common factor to
hold them together, then these should require another and that another, and we have
a regressus ad infinitum. Whatever being perceptible is not perceived is non-existent
(yadyadupalabdhilak~a~zapraptam sannopalabhyate tattadasat). Samanya is such,
therefore samanya is non-existent. No samanya can be admitted to exist as an
entity. But it is only as a result of the impressions of past experiences of existence
and non-existence that this notion is formed and transferred erroneously to external
objects. Apart from this no samanya can be pointed out as being externally per-
ceptihle-.Sii:mauyadii~a~adikprasiiritii-in Six Buddhist Nyiiya Tracts. The Vedanta
also does not think that either by perception or by inference we can know jati as a
separate substance. So it di);cards jati. See Vediintaparibhii~ii, .Sikhiima~i and Afa1Ji-
prahhii, pp. 69-i L See also Srihaq;a's Khm;rjanakha~ufakhiidya, pp. 1079-1086.
2 Similarity (.<adrlya) is not regarded as a separate category, for it is defined as
sisting between two different entities (e.g. substance and qualities). Thus Sar1kara
says (Brahma-sutrabhiiV'a II. ii. 13) that if a samavaya relation is to be admitted to
connect two different things, then another samavaya would be necessary to connect
it with either of the two entities that it intended to connect, and that another,
and so there will be a vicious infinite (anavasthii). Nyaya, however, would not re-
gard it as vicious at all. It is well to rememLer that the Indian systems acknow-
ledge two kinds of anavastha-priimii~ziki (valid infinite, as in case of the question of
tht; seed and the tree, or of the avidya and the passions), and another apriimii~ziki
anavasthii (vicious infinite) as when the admission of anything involves an infinite chain
before it can be completed.
J20 The Nyiiya- Vaife!ika Philosophy [cH.
they admitted dravya, gurya, karma and samanya. Vise~a they
had to admit as the ultimate peculiarities of atoms, for they did
not admit that things were continually changing their qualities,
and that everything could be produced out of everything by a
change of the collocation or arrangement of the constituting atoms.
In the production of the effect too they did not admit that the
effect was potentially pre-existent in the cause. They held that
the material cause (e.g. clay) had some power within it, and the
accessory and other instrumental causes (such as the stick, the
wheel etc.) had other powers; the collocation of these two de-
stroyed the cause, and produced the effect which was not existent
before but was newly produced. This is what is called the
doctrine of asatktiryaviida. This is just the opposite of the
Sarpkhya axiom, that what is existent cannot be destroyed (nti-
bhtivo vidyate sata!t} and that the non-existent could never be
produced (niisato vidyate bhiiva!t). The objection to this view is
that if what is non-existent is produced, then even such im-
possible things as the hare's horn could also be produced. The
Nyaya-Vaise~ika answer is that the view is not that anything
that is non-existent can be produced, but that which is produced
was non-existent!.
It is held by Mimarpsa that an unseen power resides in the
cause which produces the effect. To this Nyaya objects that this
is neither a matter of observation nor of legitimate hypothesis, for
there is no reason to suppose that there is any transcendental
operation in causal movement as this can be satisfactorily ex-
plained by molecular movement (parispanda). There is nothing
except the invariable time relation ( antecedence and sequence)
between the cause and the effect, but the mere invariableness of
an antecedent does not suffice f-o make it the cause of what
succeeds; it must be an unconditional antecedent as well (anya-
tlzasiddhisftnyasya ni'yattipiirvavarttitti). Unconditionality and in-
variability are indispensable for kiiryakiirm:za-bhtiva or cause and
effect relation. For example, the non-essential or adventitious
accompaniments of an invariable antecedent may also be invari-
able antecedents; but they are not unconditional, only collateral
or indirect. In other words their antecedence is conditional
upon something else {1la sviitautrye~za). The potter's stick is an
unconditional invariable antecedent of the jar; but the colour
1
1\yiiyamaiijari, p. 49f·
VIII] Doctrine of Causation 321
but the siitras of both the systt:ms seem to be silent on the matter.
The Nyaya- Vaise~ika Ph£/osophy [cH.
atoms do not conglomerate. It is not an act of cruelty on the
part of Isvara that he brings about dissolution, for he does it to
give some rest to the sufferings of the living beings.
At the time of creation, Isvara wishes to create and this desire
of Isvara works in all the souls as adr~ta. This one eternal
desire of Isvara under certain conditions of time (e.g. of pralaya)
as accessory causes (salzakiiri) helps the disintegration of atoms
and at other times (e.g. that of creation) the constructive process
of integration and unification of atoms for the world-creation.
When it acts in a specific capacity in the diverse souls it is called
adr~ta. At the time of dissolution the creative function of this
adg;ta is suspended and at the time of creation it finds full play.
At the time of creation action first begins in the vayu atoms by
the kinetic function of this adr~ta, by the contact of the souls
with the atoms. By such action the air atoms come in contact
with one another and the dvyaryukas are formed and then in a
similar way the tryaryukas are formed, and thus vayu originates.
After vayu, the ap is formed by the conglomeration of water
atoms, and then the tejas atoms conglomerate and then the earth
atoms. When the four elements are thus conglomerated in the
gross form, the god Brahma and all the worlds are created by
Isvara and Brahma is directed by Isvara to do the rest of the
work. Brahma thus arranges for the enjoyment and suffering of
the fruits of diverse kinds of karma, good or bad. Isvara brings
about this creation not for any selfish purpose but for the good
of all beings. Even here sorrows have their place that they
may lead men to turn from worldly attachment and try for
the attainment of the highest good, mukti. Moreover Isvara
arranges for the enjoyment of pleasures and the suffering of
pains according to the merits and demerits of men, just as in
our ordinary experience we find that a master awards prizes
or punishments according to good or bad deeds 1 • Many Nyaya
books do not speak of the appointment of a Brahma as de-
puty for supervision of the due disposal of the fruits of karma
according to merit or demerit. It is also held that pralaya and
creation were brought about in accordance with the karma of
men, or that it may be due to a mere play (lila) of Isvara.
Isvara is one, for if there were many Isvaras they might quarrel.
The will of Isvara not only brings about dissolution and creation,
1 See Nyt'iyakandali, pp. 48-54·
VIII] Proof of the Existence of God
but also acts always among us in a general way, for without it
our karmas could not ripen, and the consequent disposal of
pleasures and sorrows to us and a corresponding change in the
exterior world in the form of order or harmony could not happen.
The exterior world is in perfect harmony with men's actions.
Their merits and demerits and all its changes and modifications
take place in accordance with merits and demerits. This desire
(iccha) of Isvara may thus be compared with the iccha of Isvara
as we find it in the Yoga system.
subject and the object, they also are to be regarded as causes in some sense. "Pramiilt-
prameyayof.z pramii~ze caritiirtltatvallta,·aritiirthatz'at!l pramii~tas;•a tasmiit ladeva pha-
lahetuf.z. Pranuurprameye tu phaloddefma pmvrtte iti taddhetu katlzaiicit." Ibid.p.16.
332 The Nyaya- Vaife~ika Philosophy [cH.
express or manifest its object. If knowledge and the object are
both but corresponding points in a parallel series, whence comes
this correspondence? Why should knowledge illuminate the
object. The doctrine of the Vijnana vadins, that it is knowledge
alone that shows itself both as knowledge and as its object, is also
irrational, for how can knowledge divide itself as subject and ob-
ject in such a manner that knowledge as object should require
the knowledge as subject to illuminate it? If this be the case we
might again expect that knowledge as knowledge should also
require another knowledge to manifest it and this another, and so
on ad i11ji11itum. Again if pramal}a be defined as priipa?za (capacity
of being realized) then also it would not hold, for all things being
momentary according to the Buddhists, the thing known cannot
be realized, so there would be nothing which could be called
pramana. These views moreover do not explain the origin of
knowledge. Knowledge is thus to be regarded as an effect like
any other effect, and its origin or production occurs in the same
way as any other effect, namely by the joint collocation of causes
intellectual and physical•. There is no transcendent element
involved in the production of knowledge, but it is a production
on the same plane as that in which many physical phenome,na
are produced 2•
The four Pramal}as of N yaya.
We know that the Carvakas admitted perception (pratyak~a)
alone as the valid source of knowledge. The Buddhists and the
Vaise~ika admitted two sources, pratyak~a and inference (anu-
miina)3. Sarpkhya added sabda (testimony) as the third source;
1 See Nyiiyamaiijari, pp. 12-26.
2
Discussing the question of the validity of knowledge Gaflge5a, a later naiyayika
of great fame, says that it is derived as a result of our inference from the correspondence
of the perception of a thing with the activity which prompted us to realize it. That
which leads us to successful activity is valid and the opposite invalid. When I am sure
that if I work in accordance with the perception of an object I shall be successful, I
call it valid knowledge. Tattvacintt1ma~zi, K. TarkavagiSa's edition, Priimii?tyaviida.
3
The Vaife!ika sz/tras tacitly admit the Vedas as a pramal)a. The view that
Vaise~ika only admitted two pramal)as, perception and inference, is traditionally ac-
cepted, "pratJ'ak!ameka'!JCiirviikiif.l ka~u'idasugatau punaf.l anumanafica tacciipi, etc."
l'rasastapada divides all cognition (buddhi) as vidyii (right knowledge) and avidyii
(ignorance). Under avidyii he counts sa'!daJ'a (doubt or uncertainty), viparyaya
(illusion or error), mzadhyavasiiya (want of definite knowledge, thus when a man who
had never seen a mango, sees it for the first time, he wonders what it may be) and svapna
(drt:am). Right knowledge (vidyti) is of four kinds, perception, inference, memory and
the supernatural knowledge of the sages (ar!a). Interpreting the Vaife!ika siitras 1. i. 3•
VIII] Percept-ion 333
Nyaya adds a fourth, upamil?Za (analogy). The principle on which
the four-fold division of pramaryas depends is that the causal
collocation which generates the knowledge as well as the nature
or characteristic kind of knowledge in each of the four cases is
different. The same thing which appears to us as the object of
our perception, may become the object of inference or sabda
(testimony), but the manner or mode of manifestation of know-
ledge being different in each case, and the manner or conditions
producing knowledge being different in each case, it is to be
admitted that inference and sabda are different pramaryas, though
they point to the same object indicated by the perception. Nyaya
thus objects to the incorporation of sabda (testimony) or upamana
within inference, on the ground that since the mode of produc-
tion of knowledge is different, these are to be held as different
pramary as 1 •
Perception (Pratyak~a).
sion the sense is in real contact with the right object, but it is
only on account of the presence of certain other conditions that
it is associated with wrong characteristics or misapprehended as
a different object. Thus when the sun's rays are perceived in a
desert and misapprehended as a stream, at the first indeterminate
stage the visual sense is in real contact with the rays and thus
far there is no illusion so far as the contact with a real object is
concerned, but at the second determinate stage it is owing to the
similarity of certain of its characteristics with those of a stream
that it is misapprehended as a stream 2 • Jayanta observes that on
account of the presence of the defect of the organs or the rousing
of the memory of similar objects, the object with which the sense
is in contact hides its own characteristics and appears with the
characteristics of other objects and this is what is meant by
illusion 3• In the case of mental delusions however there is no
sense-contact with any object and the rousing of irrelevant
memories is sufficient to produce illusory notions 4• This doctrine
of illusion is known as viparitakhyiiti or a1lyathiikhyiiti. What
existed in the mind appeared as the object before us (hrdaye
parisplzurato'rthasya balziravabhiisanam ) 5 • Later V aise!?ika as
interpreted by Prasastapada and Sridhara is in full agreement
with Nyaya in this doctrine of illusion (bhranza or as Vaise~ika
calls it viparyaya) that the object of illusion is always the right
thing with which the sense is in contact and that the illusion
consists in the imposition of wrong characteristics 6•
I have pointed out above that N yay a divided perception into
two classes as nirvikalpa (indeterminate) and savikalpa (deter-
minate) according as it is an earlier or a later stage. Vacaspati
says, that at the first stage perception reveals an object as a
particular; the perception of an orange at this avikalpika or 1lir-
vikalpika stage gives us indeed all its colour, form, and also the
universal of orangeness associated with it, but it does not reveal
1
See Udyotakara's N.yiiyaz•iirttika, p. 37, and Gai1gda's Tattz·acilltiima'l}i, p. 401,
Bibliotheca I1Zdica.
2 "bzdr~1'e~zalocya maricin ucciiz,acamucm/ato uirvikalpetta g:hitllii pafcattatro-
paghiitado!iil z•iparyyeti, savikalpako'sya pratyayo bhriinto jiiyate tasmiidvij1iiinasya
vvabhiciiro tziirthasya, V iicaspati's Tiitparyatikii," p. 87.
3 Nyiiyanzatijari, p. 88. 4
Ibid. pp. 89 and 184. 5 Ibid. p. 184.
6 Nyayakatzdali, pp. 1 77-181, "Suktisal!lYuktmmdriye?Ja do!asahakiiri?Jii rajata-
naiva tziimadheyamarthapratyayaf}."
3 Nyiiyakandali, p. 189 ff., "alai} savikalpakamicchatii nil-vikalpakamapye!ilavyam,
1
Tt.uparya{ikii, pp. 88-95·
342 The Nyaya- Vaife~ika Philosophy [cH.
possible is called ji'ianalak~aJ!a. But the knowledge acquired by
these two contacts is not counted as perception 1•
Pleasures and pains (suklza and du(tklta) are held by Nyaya
to be different from knowledge (ji'iana). For knowledge interprets,
conceives or illumines things, but sukha etc. are never found to
appear as behaving in that character. On the other hand we feel
that we grasp them after having some knowledge. They cannot
be self-revealing, for even knowledge is not so; if it were so, then
that experience which generates sukha in one should have gene-
rated the same kind of feeling in others, or in other words it should
have manifested its nature as sukha to all; and this does not
happen, for the same thing which generates sukha in one might
not do so in others. Moreover even admitting for argument's
sake that it is knowledge itself that appears as pleasure and pain,
it is evident that there must be some differences between the
pleasurable and painful experiences that make them so different,
and this difference is due to the fact that knowledge in one case
was associated with sukha and in another case with du}:lkha.
This shows that sukha and du}:lkha are not themselves knowledge.
Such is the course of things that sukha and du}:lkha are generated
by the collocation of certain conditions,and are manifested through
or in association with other objects either in direct perception or
in memory. They are thus the qualities which are generated in
the self as a result of causal operation. It should however be
remembered that merit and demerit act as concomitant causes
in their production.
The yogins are believed to have the pratyak~a of the most
distant things beyond our senses; they can acquire this power
by gradually increasing their powers of concentration and per-
ceive the subtlest and most distant objects directly by their
mind. Even we ourselves may at some time have the notions
of future events which come to be true, e.g. sometimes I may
have the intuition that "To-morrow my brother will come,"
1 Siddhiintamuktiivali on Kii1·ikii 6.~ and 6~. \Ve must remember that Gangesa
discarded the definition of perception as given in the Nyii)'G siitra which we have dis-
cussed above, and held that perception should be defined as that cognition which has
the special class-character of direct apprehension. He thinks that the old definition
of perception as the cognition generated by sense-contact involves a vicious circle
( TattvacintiimaiJi, pp. 538-546). Sense-contact is still regarded by him as the cause of
perception, but it should not Le included in the definition. He agrees to the six kinds
of contact described first by Udyotakara as mentioned above.
VIII] Inference 343
and this may happen to be true. This is called pratibhana-
jfiana, which is also to be regarded as a pratyak~a directly
by the mind. This is of course different from the other form
of perception called manasa-pratyak~a, by which memories of
past perceptions by other senses are associated with a percept
visualized at the present moment; thus we see a rose and per-
ceive that it is fragrant ; the fragrance is not perceived by the
eye, but the manas perceives it directly and associates the visual
percept with it. According to Vedanta this acquired perception
is only a case of inference. The pratibha-pratyak~a however is
that which is with reference to the happening of a future event.
\Vhen a cognition is produced, it is produced only as an objective
cognition, e.g. This is a pot, but after this it is again related to
the self by the mind as " I know this pot." This is effected by
the mind again coming in contact for reperception of the cogni-
tion which had already been generated in the soul. This second
reperception is called anuvyavasaya, and all practical work can
proceed as a result of this anuvyavasaya 1•
Inference.
Inference (ammuina) is the second means of proof (pramat:la)
and the most valuable contribution that Nyaya has made has
been on this subject. It consists in making an assertion about a
thing on the strength of the mark or linga which is associated
with it, as when finding smoke rising from a hill we remember
that since smoke cannot be without fire, there must also be fire
in yonder hill. In an example like this smoke is technically
called linga, or hetu. That about which the assertion has been
made (the hill in this example) is called pak!?a, and the term
"fire" is called sadhya. To make a correct inference it is
necessary that the hetu or linga must be present in the pak~a,
I This later N yaya doctrine that the cognition of self in association with cognition is
a mere familiar case which was cited to help the understanding of the listener, e.g. The
hill is fiery; because it has smoke; like a kitchen (example). Asanga made the ex-
ample more serviceable to reasoning, but Dignaga converted it into a universal
proposition, that is a proposition expressive of the universal or inseparable connection
between the middle term and the major term, e.g. The hill is fiery ; because it has
smoke; all that has smoke is fiery as a kitchen" (bzdimz Lo._r:ric, pp. 95, 96). It is of
course true that Vatsyayana had an imperfect example as "like a kitchen" (fabdaf:z
utptzttidharmakatviidmzityalf sthii/yiidivat, 1. i. 36), but Prasastapada has it in the
proper form. Whether Prasastapada borrowed it from Diimaga or Diimaga from
l'ra5astapada cannot be easily settled.
VIII] Doctrine of Conconzitance 351
(1zidarsaniibhiisa). Prasastapada's contribution thus seems to con-
sist of the enumeration of the five premisses and the fallacy of
the nidarsana, but the names of the last two premisses are so
different from what are current in other systems that it is reason-
able to suppose that he collected them from some other traditional
Vaise!?ika work which is now lost to us. It however definitely
indicates that the study of the problem of inference was being
pursued in Vaise!?ika circles independently of N yaya. There is
no reason however to suppose that Prasastapada borrowed any-
thing from Diimaga as Professor Stcherbatsky or Keith supposes,
for, as I have shown above, most of Prasastapada's apparent in-
novations are all definitely alluded to by Kar:tada himself, and
Professor Keith has not discussed this alternative. On the
question of the fallacies of nidarsana, unless it is definitely proved
that Diimaga preceded Prasastapada, there is no reason whatever
to suppose that the latter borrowed it from the former 1•
The nature and ascertainment of concomitance is the most
important part of inference. Vatsyayana says that an inference
can be made by the sight of the liti.ga (reason or middle) through
the memory of the connection between the middle and the major
previously perceived. Udyotakara raises the question whether it
is the present perception of the middle or the memory of the
connection of the middle with the major that should be regarded
as leading to inference. His answer is that both these lead to
inference, but that which immediately leads to inference is /i,iga-
pariimarsa, i.e. the present perception of the middle in the minor
associated with the memory of its connection with the major, for
inference does not immediately follow the memory of the con-
nection, but the present perception of the middle associated with
the memory of the connection (sm_rtya1lugrhito lziigapariimarso).
But he is silent with regard to the nature of concomitance.
U dyotakara's criticisms of Dirinaga as shown by Vacaspati have
no reference to this point. The doctrine of tiidiitmya and tadut-
patti was therefore in all probability a new contribution to
Buddhist logic by Dharmakirtti. Dharmakirtti's contention was
that the root principle of the connection between the middle and
the major was that the former was either identical in essence
with the latter or its effect and that unless this was grasped a
mere collection of positive or negative instances will not give us
1 Prasastapada's bha~ya with Nyayakandali, pp. 2oo-255.
352 The Nyaya- Va£se~£ka Ph£/osophy [cH.
the desired connection 1• Vacaspati in his refutation of this view
says that the cause-effect relation cannot be determined as a
separate relation. If causality means invariable immediate ante-
cedence such that there being fire there is smoke and there being
no fire there is no smoke, then it cannot be ascertained with
perfect satisfaction, for there is no proof that in each case the
smoke was caused by fire and not by an invisible demon. Unless
it can be ascertained that there was no invisible element as-
sociated, it cannot be said that the smoke was immediately
preceded by fire and fire alone. Again accepting for the sake of
argument that causality can be determined, then also cause is
known to precede the effect and therefore the perception of smoke
can only lead us to infer the presence of fire at a preceding time
and not contemporaneously with it. Moreover there are many
cases where inference is possible, but there is no relation of cause
and effect or of identity of essence (e.g. the sunrise of this
morning by the sunrise of yesterday morning). In the case of
identity of essence (tiidiitmya as in the case of the pine and the
tree) also there cannot be any inference, for one thing has to be
inferred by another, but if they are identical there cannot be any
inference. The nature of concomitance therefore cannot be de-
scribed in either of these ways. Some things (e.g. smoke) are
naturally connected with some other things (e.g. fire) and when
such is the case, though we may not know any further about the
nature of this connection, we may infer the latter from the former
and not vice versa, for fire is connected with smoke only under
certain conditions (e.g. green wood). It may be argued that there
may always be certain unknown conditions which may vitiate
the validity of inference. To this Vacaspati's answer is that if
even after observing a large number of cases and careful search
such conditions (upiidhi) cannot be discovered, we have to take
it for granted that they do not exist and that there is a natural
connection between the middle and the major. The later
Buddhists introduced the method of Paiicakiira?ti in order to
determine effectively the causal relation. These five conditions
determining the causal relation are (I) neither the cause nor the
effect is perceived, (2) the cause is perceived, (3) in immediate
succession the effect is perceived, (4) the cause disappears, (5) in
1 A.aryyakiira~znbhiiviidv,i svabh,iviidz•a niyiinzakiit aviniibhtivamj,amo' darfmziimta
given by the forester by virtue of which the association of the name "wild ox" to the
strange animal was possible was itself "upamana." \Vhen Prasastapada held that upa~
mana should be treated as a case of testimony (iiptavacana), he had probably this inter-
pretation in view. But Udyotakara and Vacaspati hold that it was not by the instruction
alone of the forester that the association of the name " wild ox" was made, but there
was the perception of similarity, and the memory of the instruction of the forester too.
So it is the perception of similarity with the other two factors as accessories that lead
us to this association called upamana. \Vhat VatsyayaQ.a meant is not very clear, but
Diimaga supposes that according to him the result of upamana was the knowledge of
similarity or the knowledge of a thing having similarity. Vacaspati of course holds that
he has correctly interpreted VatsyayaQ.a's intention. It is however definite that upamana
means the associating of a name to a new object (samiikhyiisambandhapratipattirupamii-
1ziirthal;, Vatsyayar.m). Jayanta points out that it is the preception of similarity which
directly leads to the association of the name and hence the instruction of the forester
cannot be regarded as the direct cause and consequently it cannot be classed under
testimony (fabda). See Prasastapada and Nyiiyakandalf, pp. 220-22, VatsyayaQ.a,
Udyotakara, Vacaspati and Jayanta on Upamiina.
2 See Kumarila's treatment of abhava in the Slokaviirttika, pp. 4i3-491.
The Nyaya- Vaise~ika Philosophy [cH.
and his followers, whose philosophy we shall deal with in the
next chapter, hold that negation (abhiiva) appears as an intuition
(miinam) with reference to the object negated where there are no
means of ordinary cognition(pramii~za) leading to prove the exist-
ence (satpar£cchedakam) of that thing. They held that the notion
"it is not existent" cannot be due to perception, for there is no
contact here with sense and object. It is true indeed that when
we turn our eyes (e.g. in the case of the perception of the non-
existence of a jug) to the ground, we see both the ground and
the non-existence of a jug, and when we shut them we can see
neither the jug nor the ground, and therefore it could be urged
that if we called the ground visually perceptible, we could say
the same with regard to the non-existence of the jug. But even
then since in the case of the perception of the jug there is sense-
contact, which is absent in the other case, we could never say
that both are grasped by perception. \Ve see the ground and
remember the jug (which is absent) and thus in the mind rises
the notion of non-existence which has no reference at all to visual
perception. A man may be sitting in a place where there were
no tigers, but he might not then be aware of their non-existence
at the time, since he did not think of them, but when later on he
is asked in the evening if there were any tigers at the place where
he was sitting in the morning, he then thinks and becomes aware
of the non-existence of tigers there in the morning, even
without perceiving the place and without any operation of the
memory of the non-existence of tigers. There is no question of
there being any inference in the rise of our notion of non-existence,
for it is not preceded by any notion of concomitance of any kind,
and neither the ground nor the non-perception of the jug could
be regarded as a reason (linga), for the non-perception of the jug
is related to the jug and not to the negation of the jug, and no
concomitance is known between the non-perception of the jug and
its non-existence, and when the question of the concomitance of
non-perception with non-existence is brought in, the same diffi-
cultyabout the notion of non-existence (abhiiva) which was sought
to be explained will recur again. Negation is therefore to be
admitted as cognized by a separate and independent process
of knowledge. Nyaya however says that the perception of
non-existence (e.g. there is no jug here) is a unitary perception
of one whole, just as any perception of positive existence (e.g.
VIII] fi[i1niil?ZSii vi'ew of Negati'on 357
there is a jug on the ground) is. Both the knowledge of the
ground as well as the knowledge of the non-existence of the jug
arise there by the same kind of action of the visual organ, and
there is therefore no reason why the knowledge of the ground
should be said to be due to perception, whereas the knowledge of
the negation of the jug on the ground should be said to be due
to a separate process of knowledge. The non-existence of the jug
is taken in the same act as the ground is perceived. The principle
that in order to perceive a thing one should have sense-contact
with it, applies only to positive existents and not to negation or
non-existence. Negation or non-existence can be cognized even
without any sense-contact. Non-existence is not a positive sub-
stance, and hence there cannot be any question here of sense-
contact. It may be urged that if no sense-contact is required
in apprehending negation, one could as well apprehend negation
or non-existence of other places which are far away from him.
To this the reply is that to apprehend negation it is necessary
that the place where it exists must be perceived. We know a
thing and its quality to be different, and yet the quality can only
be taken in association with the thing and it is so in this case as
well. We can apprehend non-existence only through the appre-
hension of its locus. In the case when non-existence is said to
be apprehended later on it is really no later apprehension of non-
existence but a memory of non-existence (e.g. of jug) perceived
before along with the perception of the locus of non-existence
(e.g. ground). Negation or non-existence (abhii·va) can thus, ac-
cording to N yaya, generate its cognition just as any positive
existence can do. Negation is not mere negativity or mere
vacuous absence, but is what generates the cognition "is not,"
as position (bhii'va) is what generates the cognition "it is."
The Buddhists deny the existence of negation. They hold
that when a negation is apprehended, it is apprehended with
specific time and space conditions (e.g. this is not here now);
but in spite of such an apprehension, we could never think
that negation could thus be associated with the~1 in any
relation. There is also no relation between the negation and its
pratiyogi (thing negated-e.g. jug in the negation of jug), for
when there is the pratiyogi there is no negation, and when there
is the negation there is no pratiyogi. There is not even the
relation of opposition ( virodha), for we could have admitted it, if
The Nyaya- Vaz"se~ika Philosophy [cH.
the negation of the jug existed before and opposed the jug,
for how can the negation of the jug oppose the jug, without
effecting anything at all? Again, it may be asked whether nega-
tion is to be regarded as a positive being or becoming or of the
nature of not becoming or non-being. In the first alternative it
will be like any other positive existents, and in the second case it
will be permanent and eternal, and it cannot be related to this or
that particular negation. There are however many kinds of non-
perception, e.g. (I) svabhavanupalabdhi (natural non-perception-
there is no jug because none is perceived); (2) karat)anupalabdhi
(non-perception of cause-there is no smoke here, since there is
no fire); (3) vyapakanupalabdhi (non-perception of the species-
there is no pine here, since there is no tree); (4) karyanupalabdhi
(non-perception of effects-there are not the causes of smoke here,
since there is no smoke); (5) svabhavaviruddhopalabdhi (percep-
tion of contradictory natures-there is no cold touch here because
of fire); (6) viruddhakaryopalabdhi (perception of contradictory
effects-there is no cold touch here because of smoke); (7) virud-
dhavyaptopalabdhi (opposite concomitance-past is not of neces-
sity destructible, since it depends on other causes); ( 8) karyya vi-
ruddhopalabdhi (opposition of effects-there is not here the causes
which can give cold since there is fire); (9) vyapakaviruddhopa-
labdhi (opposite concomitants-there is no touch of snow here,
because of fire); (I o) kararya viruddhopalabdhi (opposite causes-
there is no shivering through cold here, since he is near the fire);
(I I) kararyaviruddhakaryyopalabdhi (effects of opposite causes-
this place is not occupied by men of shivering sensations for it
is full of smoke 1 ).
There is no doubt that in the above ways we speak of nega-
tion, but that does not prove that there is any reason for the
cognition of negation (heturniibhiivasamvida!t). All that we can
say is this that there are certain situations which justify the use
(yogyatti) of negative appellations. But this situation or yogyata
is positive in character. What we all speak of in ordinary usage
as non-perception is of the nature of perception of some sort.
Perception of negation thus does not prove the existence of
negation, but only shows that there are certain positive percep-
tions which are only interpreted in that way. It is the positive
perception of the ground where the visible jug is absent that
1
See Nytlpzbindu, p. I I, and NJ't'iyamaiijari, pp. 53-7.
VIII] Nyaya 'l'iew of .}legation 359
leads us to speak of having perceived the negation of the jug
(anupalambha[t abhtivmtz vyavaharayati) 1 •
The Nyaya reply against this is that the perception of positive
existents is as much a fact as the perception of negation, and we
have no right to say that the former alone is valid. It is said
that the non-perception of jug on the ground is but the percep-
tion of the ground without the jug. But is this being without
the jug identical with the ground or different? If identical then
it is the same as the ground, and we shall expect to have it even
when the jug is there. If different then the quarrel is only over
the name, for whatever you may call it, it is admitted to be a
distinct category. If some difference is noted between the ground
with the jug, and the ground without it, then call it "ground,
without the jugness" or "the negation of jug," it does not matter
much, for a distinct category has anyhow been admitted. N ega-
tion is apprehended by perception as much as any positive
existent is; the nature of the objects of perception only are dif-
ferent; just as even in the perception of positive sense-objects
there are such diversities as colour, taste, etc. The relation of
negation with space and time with which it appears associated is
the relation that subsists between the qualified and the quality
(11ise~ya vz"se~m:.za). The relation between the negation and its
pratiyogi is one of opposition, in the sense that where the one is
the other is not. The Vaise#ka siUra (IX. i. 6) seems to take abhava
in a similar way as Kumarila the Mlmarpsist does, though the
commentators have tried to explain it away 2• In Vaise~ika the
four kinds of negation are enumerated as (1) priigabhava (the
negation preceding the production of an object-e.g. of the jug
before it is made by the potter); (2) dhvm!zsabhtiva (the negation
following the destruction of an object-as of the jug after it is
destroyed by the stroke of a stick); (3) anyml)'iibhiiva (mutual
negation-e.g. in the cow there is the negation of the horse and
1 See 1Vyiiyabindu{ikii, pp. 34- ff., and also Nycryamaiifari, pp. 48--63.
2
Prasastapada says that as the pro·luction of an effect is the sign of the existence
of the cause, so the non-production of it is the sign of its non-existence. Sridhara in
commenting upon it says that the non-preception of a sensible object is the sign (liliga)
of its non-existence. But evidently he is not satisfied with the view for he says that
non-existence is also directly perceived by the senses (bhtivavad abhiivo'pilldriyagra-
ha~zayogya~) and that there is an actual sense-contact with non-existence which is the
collocating cause of the preception of non-existence (abhiivmdriyasamzikar1o'Pi abhii-
vagraha~asiimagri), Nj'cryakandali, pp. 225-30.
The Nyaya- Vaise~ika Phz"losophy [cH.
in the horse that of the cow); (4) atyantiibltiiva (a negation which
always exists-e.g. even when there is a jug here, its negation in
other places is not destroyed) 1 •
problems, have many diverse aspects, and it is impossible to do them justice in a small
section like this.
VIII] Fallacies
where the reason repeats the thesis to be proved in another form
(e.g. sound is non-eternal because it has not the quality of
eternality); sadhyasama is that where the reason itself requires
to be proved (e.g. shadow is a substance because it has motion,
but it remains to be proved whether shadows have motion or not);
kalatlta is a false analogy where the reason fails because it does not
tally with the example in point of time. Thus one may argue that
sound is eternal because it is the result of contact (stick and the
drum) like colour which is also a result of contact of light and
the object and is eternal. Here the fallacy lies in this, that colour
is simultaneous with the contact of light which shows what was
already there and only manifested by the light, whereas in the
case of sound it is produced immediately after the contact of the
stick and drum and is hence a product and hence non-eternal.
The later Nyaya works divide savyabhicara into three classes,
(I) sadhararya or common (e.g. the mountain is fiery because it is
an object of knowledge, but even a lake which is opposed to fire
is also an object of knowledge), (2) asadhararya or too restricted
(e.g. sound is eternal because it has the nature of sound ; this
cannot be a reason for the nature of sound exists only in the
sound and nowhere else), and (3) anupasarpharin or unsubsuming
(e.g. everything is non -eternal, because they are all objects of
knowledge ; here the fallacy lies in this, that no instance can be
found which is not an object of knowledge and an opposite con-
clusion may also be drawn). The fallacy satpratipak~a is that in
which there is a contrary reason which may prove the opposite
conclusion (e.g. sound is eternal because it is audible, sound is
non-eternal because it is an effect). The fallacy asiddha (unreal)
is of three kinds (I) asrayiisiddha (the lotus of the sky is fragrant
because it is like other lotuses; now there cannot be any lotus in
the sky), (2) s-z,ariipiisiddha (sound is a quality because it is
visible; but sound has no visibility), (3) -zryapyatviisiddha is that
where the concomitance between the middle and the consequence
is not invariable and inevitable; there is smoke in the hill because
there is fire; but there may be fire without the smoke as in a red
hot iron ball, it is only green-wood fire that is invariably associated
with smoke. The fallacy biidhita is that which pretends to prove
a thesis which is against direct experience, e.g. fire is not hot
because it is a substance. \Ve have already enumerated the
fallacies counted by Vaise~ika. Contrary to N yaya practice
The Nyaya- Vaise~ika Philosophy [cH.
Prasastapada counts the fallacies of the example. Diimaga also
counted fallacies of example (e.g. sound is eternal, because it is
incorporeal, that which is incorporeal is eternal as the atoms ;
but atoms are not incorporeal) and Dharmaklrtti counted also the
fallacies of the pak!:'a (minor); but Nyaya rightly considers that
the fallacies of the middle if avoided will completely safeguard
inference and that these are mere repetitions. Chala means the
intentional misinterpretation of the opponent's arguments for the
purpose of defeating him. Jati consists in the drawing of contra-
dictory conclusions, the rais;ing of false issues or the like with
the deliberate intention of defeating an opponent. Nigrahasthana
means the exposure of the opponent's argument as involving
self-contradiction, inconsistency or the like, by which his defeat is
conclusively proved before the people to the glory of the victorious
opponent. As to the utility of the description of so many debating
tricks by which an opponent might be defeated in a metaphysical
work, the aim of which ought to be to direct the ways that lead to
emancipation, it is said by J ayanta in his .lVyiiyamaiijari that these
had to be resorted to as a protective measure against arrogant
disputants who often tried to humiliate a teacher before his pupils.
If the teacher could not silence the opponent, the faith of the
pupils in him would be shaken and great disorder would follow,
and it was therefore deemed necessary that he who was plodding
onward for the attainment of mok!?a should acquire these devices
for the protection of his own faith and that of his pupils. A know-
ledge of these has therefore been enjoined in the Nya;'a siitra as
being necessary for the attainment of salvation I.
A Comparative Review.
THE Nyaya-Vaise~ika philosophy looked at experience from
a purely common sense point of view and did not work with any
such monistic tendency that the ultimate conceptions of our
common sense experience should be considered as coming out of
an original universal (e.g. prakrti of the Sarpkhya). Space, time,
the four elements, soul, etc. convey the impression that they are sub-
stantive entities or substances. vVhat is perceived of the material
things as qualities such as colour, taste, etc. is regarded as so many
entities which have distinct and separate existence but which
manifest themselves in connection with the substances. So also
karma or action is supposed to be a separate entity, and even
the class notions are perceived as separate entities inhering in
substances. Knowledge (jiiiina) which illuminates all things is
regarded only as a quality belonging to soul, just as there are
other qualities of material objects. Causation is viewed merely
as the collocation of conditions. The genesis of knowledge is
also viewed as similar in nature to the production of any other
physical eyent. Thus just as by the collocation of certain physical
circumstances a jug and its qualities are produced, so by the
combination and respective contacts of the soul, mind, sense, and
the objects of sense, knowledge (jiiii11a) is produced. Soul with
Nyaya is an inert unconscious entity in which knowledge, etc.
inhere. The relation between a substance and its quality, action,
class notion, etc. has also to be admitted as a separate entity, as
without it the different entities being without any principle of
relation would naturally fail to give us a philosophic construction.
Sarpkhya had conceived of a principle which consisted of an
infinite number of reals of three different types, which by their
combination were conceived to be able to produce all substances,
qualities, actions, etc. No difference was acknowledged to exist
between substances, qualities and actions, and it was conceived
1 On the meaning of the word Mimarpsa see Chapter IV.
MlnziilfZSii Philosophy [cH.
that these were but so many aspects of a combination of the three
types of reals in different proportions. The reals contained within
them the rudiments of all developments of matter, knowledge,
willing, feelings, etc. As combinations of reals changed incessantly
and new phenomena of matter and mind were manifested, collo-
cations did not bring about any new thing but brought about a
phenomenon which was already there in its causes in another
form. What we call knowledge or thought ordinarily, is with them
merely a form of subtle illuminating matter-stuff. Sarpkhya holds
however that there is a transcendent entity as pure conscious-
ness and that by some kind of transcendent reflection or contact
this pure consciousness transforms the bare translucent thought-
matter into conscious thought or experience of a person.
But this hypothesis of a pure self, as essentially distinct and
separate from knowledge as ordinarily understood, can hardly
be demonstrated in our common sense experience; and this has
been pointed out by the Nyaya school in a very strong and
emphatic manner. Even Sarpkhya did not try to prove that the
existence of its transcendent puru~a could be demonstrated in
experience, and it had to attempt to support its hypothesis of the
existence of a transcendent self on the ground of the need of
a permanent entity as a fixed object, to which the passing states
of knowledge could cling, and on grounds of moral struggle
towards virtue and emancipation. Sarpkhya had first supposed
knowledge to be merely a combination of changing reals, and
then had as a matter of necessity to admit a fixed principle as
puru~a (pure transcendent consciousness). The self is thus here
in some sense an object of inference to fill up the gap left by
the inadequate analysis of consciousness (buddlzi) as being non-
intelligent and incessantly changing.
Nyaya fared no better, for it also had to demonstrate self
on the ground that since knowledge existed it was a quality,
and therefore must inhere in some substance. This hypothesis
is again based upon another uncritical assumption that substances
and attributes were entirely separate, and that it was the nature
of the latter to inhere in the former, and also that knowledge was
a quality requiring (similarly with other attributes) a substance
in which to inhere. None of them could take their stand upon
the self-conscious nature of our ordinary thought and draw their
conclusions on the strength of the direct evidence of this self-
IX] Nyaya and Mzmii1fZSii
conscious thought. Of course it is true that Sarpkhya had ap-
proached nearer to this view than N yaya, but it had separated
the content of knowledge and its essence so irrevocably that it
threatened to break the integrity of thought in a manner quite
unwarranted by common sense experience, which does not seem
to reveal this dual element in thought. Anyhow the unification
of the content of thought and its essence had to be made, and this
could not be done except by what may be regarded as a make-
shift-a transcendent illusion running on from beginningless
time. These difficulties occurred because Sarpkhya soared to a
region which was not directly illuminated by the light of common
sense experience. The Nyaya position is of course much worse
as a metaphysical solution, for it did not indeed try to solve any-
thing, but only gave us a schedule of inferential results which could
not be tested by experience, and which were based ultimately on
a one-sided and uncritical assumption. It is an uncritical common
sense experience that substances are different from qualities and
actions, and that the latter inhere in the former. To base the
whole of metaphysics on such a tender and fragile experience is,
to say the least, building on a weak foundation. It was necessary
that the importance of the self-revealing thought must be brought
to the forefront, its evidence should be collected and trusted, and
an account of experience should be given according to its verdict.
No construction of metaphysics can ever satisfy us which ignores
the direct immediate convictions of self-conscious thought. It is
a relief to find that a movement of philosophy in this direction
is ushered in by the Mimarpsa system. The Jliimii1ttsii sfttras
were written by Jaimini and the commentary (bhii~ya) on it was
written by Sahara. But the systematic elaboration of it was made
by Kumarila, who preceded the great Sailkaracarya, and a disciple
of Kumarila, Prabhakara.
pupil, to his views, attempted a trick and pretended that he was dead. His disciples
then asked Prabhakara whether his burial rites should be performed according to
Kumarila's views or Prabhakara's. Prabhakara said that his own views were erroneous,
but these were held by him only to rouse up Kumarila's pointed attacks, whereas
Kumarila's views were the right ones. Kumarila then rose up and said that Prabhakara
was defeated, hut the latter said he was not defeated so long as he was alive. But
this has of course no historic value.
IX J Object£ons aga£nst the Seif-val£d£ty of K1zowledge 37 3
it has conditioned. Moreover, knowledge is a mental affair and
how can it certify the objective truth of its representation? In
other words, how can my perception "a blue thing" guarantee
that what is subjectively perceived as blue is really so objectively
as well? After my perception of anything as blue we do not
have any such perception that what I have perceived as blue
is really so. So this so-called self-validity of knowledge cannot
be testified or justified by any perception. We can only be cer-
tain that knowledge has been produced by the perceptual act, but
there is nothing in this knowledge or its revelation of its object
from which we can infer that the perception is also objectively
valid or true. If the production of any knowledge should certify
its validity then there would be no invalidity, no illusory know-
ledge, and following our perception of even a mirage we should
never come to grief. But we are disappointed often in our per-
ceptions, and this proves that when we practically follow the
directions of our perception we are undecided as to its validity,
which can only be ascertained by the correspondence of the per-
ception with what we find later on in practical experience. Again,
every piece· of knowledge is the result of certain causal colloca-
tions, and as such depends upon them for its production, and
hence cannot be said to rise without depending on anything else.
It is meaningless to speak of the validity of knowledge, for
validity always refers to objective realization of our desires and
attempts proceeding in accordance with our knowledge. People
only declare their knowledge invalid when proceeding practically
in accordance with it they are disappointed. The perception of
a mirage is called invalid when proceeding in accordance with
our perception we do not find anything that can serve the pur-
poses of water (e.g. drinking, bathing). The validity or truth of
knowledge is thus the attainment by practical experience of the
object and the fulfilment of all our purposes from it (arthakriyti-
jiztina or phalajfuina) just as perception or knowledge repre-
sented them to the perceiver. There is thus no self-validity of
knowledge (svata!z-prtimii?t.Ya), but validity is ascertained by
sa1!lvtida or agreement with the objective facts of experience•.
It is easy to see that this N yay a objection is based on the
supposition that knowledge is generated by certain objective
collocations of conditions, and that knowledge so produced can
1 See Nyiiyamaiijari, pp. 16o-173·
374 Mznzii1?ZSii Philosophy [cH.
only be tested by its agreement with objective facts. But this
theory of knowledge is merely an hypothesis; for it can never be
experienced that knowledge is the product of any collocations;
we have a perception and immediately we become aware of cer-
tain objective things; knowledge reveals to us the facts of the
objective world and this is experienced by us always. But that
the objective world generates knowledge in us is only an hypothesis
which can hardly be demonstrated by experience. It is the supreme
prerogative of knowledge that it reveals all other things. It is not a
phenomenon like any other phenomenon of the world. When we
say that knowledge has been produced in us by the external
collocations, we just take a perverse point ofview which is un-
warranted by experience; knowledge only photographs the
objective phenomena for us; but there is nothing to show that
knowledge has been generated by these phenomena. This is
only a theory which applies the ordinary conceptions of causation
to knowledge and this is evidently unwarrantable. Knowledge is
not like any other phenomena for it stands above them and
interprets or illumines them all. There can be no validity in
things, for truth applies to knowledge and knowledge alone. What
we call agreement with facts by practical experience is but the
agreement of previous knowledge with later knowledge; for ob-
jective facts never come to us directly, they are always taken
on the evidence of knowledge, and they have no other certainty
than what is bestowed on them by knowledge. There arise in-
deed different kinds of knowledge revealing different things, but
these latter do not on that account generate the former, for this
is never experienced; we are never aware of any objective fact
before it is revealed by knowledge. Why knowledge makes
different kinds of revelations is indeed more than we can say, for
experience only shows that knowledge reveals objective facts and
not why it does so. The rise of knowledge is never perceived by
us to be dependent on any objective fact, for all objective facts
are dependent on it for its revelation or illumination. This is
what is said to be the self-validity (svata[t-priimii?l.J!a) of know-
ledge in its production (utpatti). As soon as knowledge is pro-
duced, objects are revealed to us; there is no intermediate link
between the rise of knowledge and the revelation of objects on
which knowledge depends for producing its action of revealing
or illuminating them. Thus knowledge is not only independent
IX] Self-validity of Know ledge 375
of anything else in its own rise but in its own action as well
(svakiiryakara?te svata!z priimii?l)'al!t jiia1zasya). Whenever there
is any knowledge it carries with it the impression that it is
certain and valid, and we are naturally thus prompted to work
(prav_rtti) according to its direction. There is no indecision in
our mind at the time of the rise of knowledge as to the correct-
ness of knowledge ; but just as knowledge rises, it carries with
it the certainty of its revelation, presence, or action. But in cases
of illusory perception other perceptions or cognitions dawn which
carry with them the notion that our original knowledge was not
valid. Thus though the invalidity of any knowledge may appear
to us by later experience, and in accordance with which we
reject our former knowledge, yet when the knowledge first revealed
itself to us it carried with it the conviction of certainty which
goaded us on to work according to its indication. Whenever a man
works according to his knowledge, he does so with the conviction
that his knowledge is valid, and not in a passive or uncertain temper
of mind. This is what Mimarpsa means when it says that the
validity of knowledge appears immediately with its rise, though
its invalidity may be derived from later experience or some other
data (;izii11asya pnimii?tyam S'ZJata!z apnimii?tya1!l parata!z). Know-
ledge attained is proved invalid when later on a contradictory
experience (biidhaka;iliina) comes in or when our organs etc. are
known to be faulty and defective (kara?zado~aj1ziina). It is from
these that knowledge appearing as valid is invalidated; when
we take all necessary care to look for these and yet find them
not, we must think that they do not exist. Thus the validity of
knowledge certified at the moment of its production need not
be doubted unnecessarily when even after enquiry we do not find
any defect in sense or any contradiction in later experience. All
knowledge except memory is thus regarded as valid independently
by itself as a general rule, unless it is invalidated later on. Memory
is excluded because the phenomenon of memory depends upon
a previous experience, and its existing latent impressions, and
cannot thus be regarded as arising independently by itself.
Inference.
Sahara says that when a certain fixed or permanent relation
has been known to exist between two things, we can have the
idea of one thing when the other one is perceived, and this kind
of knowledge is called inference. Kumarila on the basis of this
tries to show that inference is only possible when we notice
that in a large number of cases two things (e.g. smoke and fire)
subsist together in a third thing (e.g. kitchen, etc.) in some inde-
pendent relation, i.e. when their coexistence does not depend
upon any other eliminable condition or factor. It is also neces-
sary that the two things (smoke and fire) coexisting in a third
thing should be so experienced that all cases of the existence of
one thing should also be cases involving the existence of the
other, but the cases of the existence of one thing (e.g. fire),
though including all the cases of the existence of the other
(smoke), may have yet a more extensive sphere where the latter
(smoke) may not exist. \Vhen once a permanent relation, whether
it be a case of coexistence (as in the case of the contiguity of
the constellation of Krttika with Rohit:J.I, where, by the rise of the
former the early rise of the latter may be inferred), or a case of
identity (as in the relation between a genus and its species), or
a case of cause and effect or otherwise between two things and
a third thing which had been apprehended in a large number of
cases, is perceived, they fuse together in the mind as forming
lriinzii:l!ZSii Philosophy [cH.
one whole, and as a result of that when the existence of the
one (e.g. smoke) in a thing (hill) is noticed, we can infer the
existence of the thing (hill) with its counterpart (fire). In all
such cases the thing (e.g. fire) which has a sphere extending
beyond that in which the other (e.g. smoke) can exist is called
gamya or vyiipaka and the other (e.g. smoke) VJ'iipya or gamaka
and it is only by the presence of gamaka in a thing (e.g. hill,
the pak!?a) that the other counterpart the gamya (fire) may be
inferred. The general proposition, universal coexistence of the
gamaka with the gamya (e.g. wherever there is smoke there is
fire) cannot be the cause of inference, for it is itself a case
of inference. Inference involves the memory of a permanent
relation subsisting between two things (e.g. smoke and fire) in a
third thing (e.g. kitchen); but the third thing is remembered only
in a general way that the coexisting things must have a place
where they are found associated. It is by virtue of such a memory
that the direct perception of a basis (e.g. hill) with the gamaka
thing (e.g. smoke) in it would naturally bring to my mind that
the same basis (hill) must contain the gamya (i.e. fire) also.
Every case of inference thus proceeds directly from a perception
and not from any universal general proposition. Kumarila holds
that the inference gives us the minor as associated with the major
and not of the major alone, i.e. of the fiery mountain and not of
fire. Thus inference gives us a new knowledge, for though it was
known in a general way that the possessor of smoke is the pos-
sessor of fire, yet the case of the mountain was not anticipated
and the inference of the fiery mountain is thus a distinctly new
knowledge (desakiiliidhikyiidyuktamagrlzitagriihitvam anumiina-
sya, Nyayaratnakara, p. 363) 1• It should also be noted that in
forming the notion of the permanent relation between two things,
a third thing in which these two subsist is always remembered
and for the conception of this permanent relation it is enough
that in the large number of cases whc;re the concomitance was
noted there was no knowledge of any case where the concomit-
ance failed, and it is not indispensable that the negative instances
in which the absence of the gamya or vyapaka was marked by an
1 It is important to note that it is not unlikely that Kumarila was indebted to
Diimaga for this; for Diimaga's main contention is that ''it is not fire, nor the con-
nection between it and the hill, but it is the fiery hill that is inferred" for otherwise
inference would give us no new knowledge (see Vidyal>hii~al)a's India11. Logic, p. 8;
and Tiilparya{ikii, p. 120.
IX] Inference
absence of the gamaka or vyapya, should also be noted, for a
knowledge of such a negative relation is not indispensable for
the forming of the notion of the permanent relation 1• The ex-
perience of a large number of particular cases in which any two
things were found to coexist together in another thing in some
relation associated with the non-perception of any case of failure
creates an expectancy in us of inferring the presence of the
gamya in that thing in which the gamaka is perceived to exist
in exactly the same relation 2• In those cases where the circle of
the existence of the gamya coincides with the circle of the exist-
ence of the gamaka, each of them becomes a gamaka for the other.
It is clear that this form of inference not only includes all cases
of cause and effect, of genus and species but also all cases of
coexistence as well.
The question arises that if no inference is possible without
a memory of the permanent relation, is not the self-validity
of inference destroyed on that account, for memory is not re-
garded as self-valid. To this Kumarila's answer is that memory
is not invalid, but it has not the status of pramal)a, as it does
not bring to us a new knowledge. But inference involves the
acquirement of a new knowledge in this, that though the coex-
istence of two things in another was known in a number of cases,
yet in the present case a new case of the existence of the gamya
in a thing is known from the perception of the existence of the
gamaka and this knowledge is gained by a means which is not
perception, for it is only the gamaka that is seen and not the
gamya. If the gamya is also seen it is no inference at all.
As regards the number of propositions necessary for the ex-
plicit statement of the process of inference for convincing others
(piiriirtluinumiina) both Kumarila and Prabhakara hold that three
premisses are quite sufficient for inference. Thus the first three
premisses pratijfia, hetu and dr!?tanta may quite serve the purpose
of an anumana.
There are two kinds of anumana according to Kumarila
viz. pratyak!?atodr~tasambandha and samanyatodr!?tasambandha.
The former is that kind of inference where the permanent
1 Kumarila strongly opposes a Buddhist view that concomitance (vyapti) is ascer-
tained only by the negative instances and not by the positive ones.
2 " tasmiidanavagate'pi sarvatriinvaye sarvatafca zyatireke bahufalf siihityiivagama-
tacandrikii on anumiina.
2 On the subject of the means of assuring oneself that there is no condition (upiidhi)
which may vitiate the inference, Prabhakara has nothing new to tell us. He says that
where even after careful enquiry in a large number of cases the condition cannot he
discovered we must say that it does not exist (praya!lulzanviiyamii~u aupiidhikatva-
llavagamiit, see Frakara~zapaiicikli, p. 71 ).
IX] Upanzii1za and A rthapatti 391
Sabda pramai)a.
Sabda or word is regarded as a separate means of proof by
most of the recognized Indian systems of thought excepting the
Jaina, Buddhist, Carvaka and Vaise~ika. A discussion on this
topic however has but little philosophical value and I have there-
fore omitted to give any attention to it in connection with the
Nyaya, and the Sarpkhya-Yoga systems. The validity and au-
thority of the Vedas were acknowledged by all Hindu writers and
they had wordy battles over it with the Buddhists who denied
it. Some sought to establish this authority on the supposition
that they were the word of God, while others, particularly the
Mimarpsists strove to prove that they were not written by any-
one, and had no beginning in time nor end and were eternal.
Their authority was not derived from the authority of any
trustworthy person or God. Their words are valid in themselves.
Evidently a discussion on these matters has but little value with
us, though it was a very favourite theme of debate in the old
days of India. It was in fact the most important subject for
Mimarpsa, for the Mimli1?tsa sittras were written for the purpose
of laying down canons for a right interpretation of the Vedas.
The slight extent to which it has dealt with its own epistemo-
logical doctrines has been due solely to their laying the foun-
dation of its structure of interpretative maxims, and not to
writing philosophy for its own sake. It does not dwell so much
upon salvation as other systems do, but seeks to serve as a
rational compendium of maxims with the help of which the
Vedas may be rightly understood and the sacrifices rightly per-
formed. But a brief examination of the doctrine of word (Sabda)
as a means of proof cannot be dispensed with in connection with
Mlmarpsa as it is its very soul.
Sabda (word) as a pramal)a means the knowledge that we
get about things (not within the purview of our perception) from
relevant sentences by understanding the meaning of the words of
which they are made up. These sentences may be of two kinds,
viz. those uttered by men and those which belong to the Vedas.
The first becomes a valid means of knowledge when it is not
IX] Sabda Pra11zii1Ja 395
uttered by untrustworthy persons and the second is valid in
itself. The meanings of words are of course known to us
before, and cannot therefore be counted as a means of proof;
but the meanings of sentences involving a knowledge of the
relations of words cannot be known by any other acknowledged
means of proof, and it is for this that we have to accept sabda
as a separate means of proof. Even if it is admitted that the
validity of any sentence may be inferred on the ground of its
being uttered by a trustworthy person, yet that would not
explain how we understand the meanings of sentences, for when
even the name or person of a writer or speaker is not known,
we have no difficulty in understanding the meaning of any
sentence.
Prabhakara thinks that all sounds are in the form of letters,
or are understandable as combinations of letters. The constituent
letters of a word however cannot yield any meaning, and are
thus to be regarded as elements of auditory perception which
serve as a means for understanding the meaning of a word. The
reason of our apprehension of the meaning of any word is to be
found in a separate potency existing in the letters by which the
denotation of the word may be comprehended. The percep-
tion of each letter-sound vanishes the moment it is uttered, but
leaves behind an impression which combines with the impressions
of the successively dying perceptions of letters, and this brings
about the whole word which contains the potency of bringing
about the comprehension of a certain meaning. If even on hearing
a word the meaning cannot be comprehended, it has to be ad-
mitted that the hearer lacks certain auxiliaries necessary for the
purpose. As the potency of the word originates from the separate
potencies of the letters, it has to be admitted that the latter is
the direct cause of verbal cognition. Both Prabhakara and
Kumarila agree on this point.
Another peculiar doctrine expounded here is that all words
have natural denotative powers by which they themselves out of
their own nature refer to certain objects irrespective of their corn-
prehension or non-comprehension by the hearer. The hearer will
not understand the meaning unless it is known to him that the
word in question is expressive of such and such a meaning,
but the word was all along competent to denote that meaning
and it is the hearer's knowledge of that fact that helps him to
Mznza1?zsa Philosophy [cH.
understand the meaning of a word. Mlmarpsa does not think
that the association of a particular meaning with a word is due
to conventions among people who introduce and give meanings
to the words•. \Vords are thus acknowledged to be denotative
of themselves. It is only about proper names that convention
is admitted to be the cause of denotation. It is easy to see
the bearing of this doctrine on the self-validity of the Vedic
commandments, by the performance of which such results would
arise as could not have been predicted by any other person.
Again all words are believed to be eternally existent; but though
they are ever present some manifestive agency is required by
which they are manifested to us. This manifestive agency con-
sists of the effort put forth by the man who pronounces the
word. N yaya thinks that this effort of pronouncing is the cause
that produces the word while Mlmarpsa thinks that it only mani-
fests to the hearer the ever-existing word.
The process by which according to Prabhakara the meanings
of words are acquired may be exemplified thus: a senior com-
mands a junior to bring a cow and to bind a horse, and the
child on noticing the action of the junior in obedience to the
senior's commands comes to understand the meaning of "cow"
and " horse." Thus according to him the meanings of words can
only be known from words occuring in injunctive sentences; he
deduces from this the conclusion that words must denote things
only as related to the other factors of the injunction (anvitiibhid-
hiina viida), and no word can be comprehended as having any
denotation when taken apart from such a sentence. This doctrine
holds that each word yields its meaning only as being generally
related to other factors or only as a part of an injunctive sentence,
thus the word giim. accusative case of go (cow) means that it is
intended that something is to be done with the cow or the bovine
genus, and it appears only as connected with a specific kind of
action, viz. bringing in the sentence giim iiuaya-bring the cow.
Kumarila however thinks that words independently express
separate meanings which are subsequently combined into a sen-
tence expressing one connected idea (abhihitiillvayaviida). Thus
in giim iinaya, according to Kumarila, gam means the bovine
class in the accusative character and iinaya independently means
1 According to Nyaya God created all words and associated them with their
meanings.
IX] Non..perception 397
bring; these two are then combined into the meaning" bring the
cow." But on the former theory the word gam means that it is
connected with some kind of action, and the particular sentence
only shows what the special kind of action is, as in the above
sentence it appears as associated with bringing, but it cannot
have any meaning separately by itself. This theory of Kumarila
which is also the N yaya theory is called abhihitanvayavada 1•
Lastly according to Prabhakara it is only the Veda that can
be called sabda-pramarya, and only those sentences of it which
contain injunctions (such as, perform this sacrifice in this way
with these things). In all other cases the validity of words is
only inferred on the ground of the trustworthy character of the
speaker. But Kumarila considers the words of all trustworthy
persons as sabda-pramarya.
Patanj'ali, appendix. It may be noted in this connection that Mimal}1sa did not favour
the Spho!a doctrine of sound which consists in the belief that apart from the momentary
sounds of letters composing a word, there was a complete word form which was mani-
fested (spho!a) but not created by the passing sounds of the syllables. The work of
the syllable sounds is only to project this word-manifestation. See Vacaspati's Tattva-
bindu, Slokaviirttika and Prakaral_tapaiicikii. For the doctrine of anvitabhidhana see
Salikanatha's Vakyiirthamatrkavrtti.
JJ[inzii'l?ZSii P hz"losophy [cH.
that they come within the purview of the senses, while in the
latter case the perception of the negative existence can only be
had by a separate mode of the movement of the mind which we
designate as a separate pramal).a as anupalabdhi. Prabhakara
holds that non-perception of a visible object in a place is only the
perception of the empty place, and that therefore there is no need
of admitting a separate pramal).a as anupalabdhi. For what is
meant by empty space? If it is necessary that for the perception
of the non-existence of jug there should be absolutely empty
space before us, then if the place be occupied by a stone we ought
not to perceive the non-existence of the jug, inasmuch as the
place is not absolutely empty. If empty space is defined as that
which is not associated with the jug, then the category of negation
is practically admitted as a separate entity. If the perception of
empty space is defined as the perception of space at the moment
which we associated with a want of knowledge about the jug, then
also want of knowledge as a separate entity has to be accepted,
which amounts to the same thing as the admission of the want or
negation of the jug. Whatever attempt may be made to explain
the notion of negation by any positive conception, it will at best
be an attempt to shift negation from the objective field to know-
ledge, or in other words to substitute for the place of the external
absence of a thing an associated want of knowledge about the
thing (in spite of its being a visible object) and this naturally ends
in failure, for negation as a separate category has to be admitted
either in the field of knowledge or in the external world. N ega-
tion or abhava as a separate category has anyhow to be admitted.
It is said that at the first moment only the ground is seen without
any knowledge of the jug or its negation, and then at the next
moment comes the comprehension of the non-existence of the jug
But this also means that the moment of the perception of the
ground is associated with the want of knowledge of the jug or
its negation. But this comes to the same thing as the admission
of negation as a separate category, for what other meaning can
there be in the perception of" only the ground" if it is not meant
that it (the perception of the ground) is associated with or quali-
fied by the want of knowledge of the jug? For the perception of
the ground cannot generate the notion of the non-existence of
the jug, since even where there is a jug the ground is perceived.
The qualifying phrase that "only the ground is perceived" be-
IX] Self 399
comes meaningless, if things whose presence is excluded are not
specified as negative conditions qualifying the perception of the
ground. And this would require that we had already the notion
of negation in us, which appeared to us of itself in a special
manner unaccountable by other means of proof. It should also
be noted that non-perception of a sensible object generates the
notion of negation immediately and not through other negations,
and this is true not only of things of the present moment but also
of the memory of past perceptions of non-existence, as when we
remember that there was no jug here. Anupalabdhi is thus a
separate pramar:ta by which the absence or want of a sensible
object-the negation of a thing-can be comprehended.
consider all activity as being only ofthe nature of molecular vibration (parispanda). It
admitted the existence of energy (.fakti) as a separate category which manifested itself
in actual movements. The self being considered as a sakti can move the body and
yet remain unmoved itself. Manifestation of action only means the relationing of the
energy with a thing. Nyaya strongly opposes this doctrine of a non-sensible (atindriya)
energy and seeks to explain all action by actual molecular motion.
IX] Mzmii'J?ZSii and Nyaya- Va£se~£ka
no one can have any knowledge of them. Moreover there cannot
be any contact (sm?tyoga) or inherence (samavaya) of dharma
and adharma with God that he might supervise them; he cannot
have any tools or body wherewith to fashion the world like
the carpenter. Moreover he could have no motive to create the
wo,rld either as a merciful or as a cruel act. For when in the
beginning there were no beings towards whom should he be
actuated with a feeling of mercy? Moreover he would himself
require a creator to create him. So there is no God, no creator,
no creation, no dissolution or pralaya. The world has ever been
running the same, without any new creation or dissolution, Sf!?!i
or pralaya.
vistara.
CHAPTER X
THE SANKARA SCHOOL OF VEDANTA
consciousness, which, when it became clear at the next moment, was called savikalpa.
x] Episte11zology of Kunzarila
was sometimes the result. Jflana was a movement and not the
result of causal operation as N yaya supposed. N yay a would
not also admit any movement on the part of the self, but it
would hold that when the self is possessed of certain qualities,
such as desire, etc., it becomes an instrument for the accom-
plishment of a physical movement. Kumarila accords the same
self-validity to knowledge that Prabhakara gives. Later know-
ledge by experience is not endowed with any special quality
which should decide as to the validity of the knowledge of the
previous movement. For what is called saipvadi or later testimony
of experience is but later knowledge and nothing more 1• The
self is not revealed in the knowledge of external objects, but we
can know it by a mental perception of self-consciousness. It is
the movement of this self in presence of certain collocating cir-
cumstances leading to cognition of things that is called jflana 2•
Here Kumarila distinguishes knowledge as movement from know-
ledge as objective consciousness. Knowledge as movement was
beyond sense perception and could only be inferred.
Th_e i~ealistic tend~ncy _o~ Vijflanavada Bud~hi:m, Sa1pk~ya,
andMtmaipsawas mamfest m ttsattemptatestabhshmgtheumque
1
character of knowledge as being that with which alone we are in.
touch. But Vijnanavada denied the external world, and thereby
did violence to the testimony of knowledge. Sa1pkhya admitted
the external world but created a gulf between the content of know-
ledge and pure intelligence; Prabhakara ignored this difference, 1
and was satisfied with the introspective assertion that knowledge
was such a unique thing that it revealed with itself, the knower and J
Bha{{aci1ltiimm;i on Pratyak~a.
The Saizkara School of Vedanta [cH.
uncontradicted experience. But no enquiry was made whether
any absolute judgments about the ultimate truth of knowledge
and matter could be made at all. That which appeared was re-
garded as the real. But the question was not asked, whether
there was anything which could be regarded as absolute truth,
the basis of all appearance, and the unchangeable reality. This
philosophical enquiry had the most wonderful charm for the
Hindu mind.
Vedanta Literature.
It is difficult to ascertain the time when the Brahma-siUras
were written, but since they contain a refutation of almost all the
other Indian systems, even of the Siinyavada Buddhism (of course
according to Sankara's interpretation), they cannot have been
written very early. I think it may not be far from the truth in
supposing that they were written some time in the second century
B.C. About the period 780 A.D. Gau~apada revived the monistic
teaching of the U pani~ads by his commentary on the Mal)<;liikya
Upani~ad in verse called 111ii~t¢ftkyakiirikii. His disciple Govinda
was the teacher of Saii.kara (788-820 A.D.). Sankara's com-
mentary on the Bralzma-sittras is the root from which sprang
forth a host of commentaries and studies on V edantism of great
originality, vigour, and philosophic insight. Thus Anandagiri, a
disciple of Sankara, wrote a commentary called Nyiiyanz"r~zaya,
and Govindananda wrote another commentary named Rat1la-
prabhii. Vacaspati Misra, who flourished about 841 A.D., wrote
another commentary on it called the Bhiimati. Amalananda
(1247-1260A.D.) wrote his Kalpataru on it, and Apyayadlk~ita
( 15 so A.D.) son of Railgarajadhvarlndra of Kaficl wrote his Kalpa-
taruparimala on the Kalpataru. Another disciple of Satikara,
Padmapada, also called Sanandana, wrote a commentary on it
known as Pailcapiidz"kii. From the manner in which the book is
begun one would expect that it was to be a running commentary
on the whole of Sari.kara's bha~ya, but it ends abruptly at the
end of the fourth siitra. Madhava (1350), in his Said:aravija;'a,
recites an interesting story about it. He says that Suresvara re-
ceived Sai1kara's permission to write a viirttika on the bha~ya.
But other pupils objected to Sar'lkara that since Suresvara was
formerly a great Mimarpsist(Mai)(Jana Misra was called Suresvara
after his conversion to Vedantism) he was not competent to write
x] Vedanta Literature
a good viirttika on the bha~ya. Suresvara, disappointed, wrote
a treatise called Nai~karmyasiddhi. Padmapada wrote a pka
but this was burnt in his uncle's house. Satikara, who had once
seen it, recited it from memory and Padmapada wrote it down.
Prakasatman (1200) wrote a commentary on Padmapada's Pai"i-
capiidikii known as Paiicapiidikiivivara?za. Akhary<;lananda wrote
his Tattvadipana, and the famous Nrsiiphasrama Muni (1500)
wrote his Vivara?zabhiivaprakiisikii on it. Amalananda and
Vidyasagara also wrote commentaries on Paiicapiidikii, named
Pafzcapiidikiidarpa?ta and Paiicapiidikii!ikii respectively, but
the Paiicapiidikiivivara?za had by far the greatest reputation.
Vidyaral).ya who is generally identified by some with Mad-
ha va ( I 3 50) wrote his famous work Vi·vara~zaprameyasm!zgraha 1,
elaborating the ideas of Pai/capiidikiivivara?za; Vidyaral).ya
wrote also another excellent work named fivamnuktiviveka on
the Vedanta doctrine of emancipation. Suresvara's (800 A.D.)
excellent work Naz~karmyasiddhi is probably the earliest inde-
pendent treatise on Satl.kara's philosophy as expressed in his
bha~ya. It has been commented upon by Jftanottama Misra.
Vidyararyya also wrote another work of great merit known as
PaiicadaSi, which is a very popular and illuminating treatise in
verse on Vedanta. Another important work written in verse on
the main teachings of Sai\kara's bha!?ya is Sm!zk~epasiiriraka,
written by Sarvajftatma Muni (900 A.D.). This has also been
commented upon by Ramatlrtha. Srlhar~a (1 190 A.D.) wrote
his Kha?ttfanakha?ufakhiidya, the most celebrated work on the
Vedanta dialectic. Citsukha, who probably flourished shortly
after Srlhar~a, wrote a commentary on it, and also wrote an
independent work on Vedanta dialectic known as Tattvadipikii
which has also a commentary called Naya11aprasiidi1zi written
by Pratyagrupa. Satikara Misra and Raghunatha also wrote
commentaries on K ha?ttfauakha?ztfakltiid;1a. A work on V e-
danta epistemology and the principal topics of Vedanta of
great originality and merit known as Vcdii11tapariblui~ii was
written by Dharmarajadhvarindra (about 1550 A.D.). His son
Ramakr!?nadhvarin wrote his Sikhii1Jta?zi on it and Amaradasa his
Ma?ziprablui. The Veda?Ztapan"bhii~ii with these two commen-
taries forms an excellent exposition of some of the fundamental
principles of Vedanta. Another work of supreme importance
1 See Narasit11hacarya's article in the Indian A1ztiquary, 1916.
The Saizkara School of Vedanta [cH.
(though probably the last great work on Vedanta) is the
Advaitasiddhi of Madhusiidana Sarasvati who followed Dharma-
rajadhvarindra. This has three commentaries known as Gautja-
brahmii1zmzdi, Vi!!halesopadhyii)'i and S iddhivyiikhyii. Sadananda
Vyasa wrote also a summary of it known as Advaitasiddhi'sid-
dha1ltasiira. Sadananda wrote also an excellent elementary work
named Vedantasara which has also two commentaries Subodhini
and Vidvallmanoraiijiui. TheA dvaitabrahmasiddhi of Sadananda
Yati though much inferior to Advaitasiddh£ is important, as it
touches on many points of Vedanta interest which are not dealt
with in other Vedanta works. The Nyayamakaranda of Ananda-
bodha Bhattarakacaryya treats of the doctrines of illusion very
well, as also some other important points of Vedanta interest.
Vedii1ltasiddhiintamuktavali of Prakasananda discusses many of
the subtle points regarding the nature of ajfiana and its relations
to cit, the doctrine of d_r~!isr~!ivada, etc., with great clearness.
Siddhii11talesa by Apyayadlk~ita is very important as a summary
of the divergent views of different writers on many points of
interest. Vcdiintatattvadipikii and Siddhiintatattva are also good
as well as deep in their general summary of the Vedanta system.
Bhedadhikkiira of N rsiiphasrama Muni also is to be regarded as
an important work on the Vedanta dialectic.
The above is only a list of some of the most important Ve-
danta works on which the present chapter has been based.
Vedanta in Gau<;Iapada.
It is useless I think to attempt to bring out the meaning of
the Vedanta thought as contained in the Bralzma-siUras without
making any reference to the commentary of Sari.kara or any
other commentator. There is reason to believe that the Brahma-
s'iUras were first commented upon by some Vai!?l)ava writers who
held some form of modified dualism 1• There have been more
than a half dozen Vai!?l)ava commentators of the Brahma-sittras
who not only differed from Sari.kara's interpretation, but also
differed largely amongst themselves in accordance with the
different degrees of stress they laid on the different aspects of
their dualistic creeds. Every one of them claimed that his inter-
pretation was the only one that was faithful to the siitras and to
1 This point will be dealt with in the 2nd volume, when I shall deal with the
for he has I think tried his level best to explain away even the most obvious references
to Buddha and Buddhism in GaU<_lapii.da's karikii.. I have, therefore, drawn my meaning
directly as Gauc_lapii.da's kii.rikii.s seemed to indicate. I have followed the same principle
in giving the short exposition of Gau~lapada's philosophy below.
x] Gazufapada's Phz"losophy
GaU<;lapada does not indicate his preference one way or the
other, but describes the fourth state of the self as unseen (adr~ta),
unrelationable (avyavakiiryam), ungraspable (agnihyam.), inde-
finable (alak~a?za), unthinkable (acint_)'am), unspeakable (av;'a-
padesya), the essence as oneness with the self (ekiitmapratya-
yasiira), as the extinction of the appearance (prapaiicopasama),
the quiescent (Siintam), the good (Sivam), the one (advaita) 1• The
world-appearance (prapai/ca) would have ceased if it had existed,
but all this duality is mere maya (magic or illusion), the one
is the ultimately real (paramarthata!z). In the second chapter
Gau<;lapada says that what is meant by calling the world a
dream is that all existence is unreal. That which neither exists
in the beginning nor in the end cannot be said to exist in the
present. Being like unreal it appears as real. The appearance
has a beginning and an end and is therefore false. In dreams
things are imagined internally, and in the experience that we
have when we are awake things are imagined as if existing out-
side, but both of them are but illusory creations of the sel£
What is perceived in the mind is perceived as existing at the
moment of perception only; external objects are supposed to
have two moments of existence (namely before they are per-
ceived, and when they begin to be perceived), but this is all mere
imagination. That which is unmanifested in the mind and that
which appears as distinct and manifest outside are all imaginary
productions in association with the sense faculties. There is first
the imagination of a perceiver or soul (ji·lla) and then along with
it the imaginary creations of diverse inner states and the external
world. Just as in darkness the rope is imagined to be a snake,
so the self is also imagined by its own illusion in diverse forms.
There is neither any production nor any destruction (na nirodho,
1za cotpattif.z), there is no one who is enchained, no one who is
striving, no one who wants to be released:!. Imagination finds
itself realized in the non-existent existents and also in the sense
1 Compare in ~agarjuna's first karika the idea of prapaiicopafamam fivam.
A 1zirodhanzametpiidamanucchedamafiifvatam a1tekiirthamand1ziirthamaniiganzama11i1·-
gamam ya!J pratityasamutpiidanz prapaiicopafamam fi'l•am defaJ•iimii.ra sambuddhastam
vande vadatiimvaram. Compare also Nagarjuna's Chapter on Nirva~zaparik[d, Pilrvo-
palambhopafamal.z prapaiicopafamal} fiva!z na kvacit kasyacit kafcit dharmmo bud-
dhmadt!fitaf.z. So far as I know the Buddhists Wt:re the first to use the words prapaJi·
copataman fivam.
2 Compare Nagarjuna's karika, "anirodhamanutpadam" in 11-Iadh;•amikac.•rtti,
B. T. S., p. 3·
The Sankara School of Vediinta · [cH
of unity; all imagination either as the many or the one (ad-l'aya)
is false ; it is only the oneness (ad-vayatii) that is good. There
is no many, nor are things different or non-different (11a niinedam
.. .1la p_rtltag niip_rtltak) 1• The sages who have transcended attach-
ment, fear, and anger and have gone beyond the depths of the
Vedas have perceived it as the imaginationless cessation of all
appearance (nz"rvikalpa~t prapai'icopasama!t), the one 2•
In the third chapter Gau<;lapada says that truth is like the
void (iikiisa) which is falsely conceived as taking part in birth
and death, coming and going and as existing in all bodies ; but
howsoever it be conceived, it is all the while not different from
akasa. All things that appear as compounded are but dreams
(svap11a) and maya (magic). Duality is a distinction imposed
upon the one (advaita) by maya. The truth is immortal, it cannot
therefore by its own nature suffer change. It has no birth. All
birth and death, all this manifold is but the result of an imposi-
tion of maya upon it 3• One mind appears as many in the dream,
so also in the waking state one appears as many, but when the
mind activity of the Togins (sages) is stopped arises this fearless
state, the extinction of all sorrow, final cessation. Thinking every-
thing to be misery (duftkham sarvam mwsm_rtya) one should stop
all desires and enjoyments, and thinking that nothing has any
birth he should not see any production at all. He should awaken
the mind (citta) into its final dissolution (laya) and pacify it
when distracted; he should not move it towards diverse objects
when it stops. He should not taste any pleasure (sukltam) and by
wisdom remain unattached, by strong effort making it motionless
and still. When he neither passes into dissolution nor into dis-
traction; when there is no sign, no appearance that is the perfect
Brahman. \Vhen there is no object of knowledge to come into
being, the unproduced is then called the omniscent (sar'ZJaji'ia).
In the fourth chapter, called the Alatasanti,Gau<)apada further
1 Compare illiidhyamikal..·,lrikii, B. T. S., p. 3• anekiirtham mzii1ziirtham, etc.
2 Compare LaJikiivati'irasftlra, p. 7R, Advayiisamsiiraparinirva~zavatsarvadhar
mii!.z tasmfU tarhi mahiimate SzmyatiiJmtpiidiiffvayanil;svabhiivalak~a~ze yoga!.z kara-
~nyaf.z ; also 8, 46, Yaduta svacittavi~ayavikalpadr~tJ'i'inavabodhaniit vzjiianii1ziim
svadttadr.(yamiilriinavaliire~la mahiimale viila/Jtlhagjmziif.z bhiiviib/z,1vasvabhiivapara-
miirthadNtidvavm'tldino hhaz•anti.
3 Compare. Nagarjuna's karil<a, B. T. S., p. 196, Akiifam safm't'igaiica ba11-
karal)a, according to its diverse functions, is called manas, buddhi, aharpkara, and
citta. In its functions as doubt it is called manas, as originating definite cognitions it
is called Luddhi. As presenting the notion of an ego in consciousness aharpkiira, and
as producing memory citta. These four represent the different modifications or states
(vrtti) of the same entity (which in itself is but a special kind of modification of
ajfiana as antaJ:lkaraJ}a).
x] Inference 473
etc. and veiled these forms. Perception leads to the tern porary
and the partial breaking of the veil over specific ajr1ana forms
so that there is a temporary union of the cit as underlying the
subject and the object through the broken veil. Perception on
the subjective side is thus defined as the union or undifferentia-
tion (abheda) of the subjective consciousness with the objective
consciousness comprehending the sensible objects through the
sped fie mental states ( tattadindri'yayogyavi~aytivacchi1lnacaitanyti
bhimzatvam tattadiiktiravi~aytivacchiunajfzti1lasya tattadamse pra-
tyak~atvam). This union in perception means that the objective
has at that moment no separate existence from the subjective
consciousness of the perceiver. The consciousness manifesting
through the anta}:lkarat)a is called jivasak~i.
Inference (anumtina), according to Vedanta, is made by our
notion of concomitance ( vytiptijiitina) between two things, acting
through specific past impressions (sm!tsktira). Thus when I see
smoke on a hill, my previous notion of the concomitance of smoke
with fire becomes roused as a subconscious impression, and I
infer that there is fire on the hill. My knowledge of the hill and
the smoke is by direct perception. The notion of concomitance
revived in the subconscious only establishes the connection be-
tween the smoke and the fire. The notion of concomitance is
generated by the perception of two things together, when no
case of the failure of concomitance is known ( vyablziciirtijlitina)
regarding the subject. The notion of concomitance being alto-
gether subjective, the Vedantist does not emphasize the necessity
of perceiving the concomitance in a large number of cases (bhii.-
yodarsanam sakrddarsmzam veti vise~o 1ztidara?1iya(z). Vedanta is
not anxious to establish any material validity for the inference,
but only subjective and formal validity. A single perception of
concomitance may in certain cases generate the notion of the
concomitance of one thing with another when no contradictory
instance is known. It is immaterial with the Vedanta whether this
concomitance is experienced in one case or in hundreds of cases.
The method of agreement in presence is the only form of con-
comitance (anvayavytipti) that the Vedanta allows. So the
Vedanta discards all the other kinds of inference that N yaya
supported, viz. anvaya'uyatircki (by joining agreement in pre-
sence with agreement in absence), kevalti1zva;'i (by universal agree-
ment where no test could be applied of agreement in absence) and
474 The Sa1ikara School of Vedanta [cH.
kevalavyat£reki (by universal agreement in absence). Vedanta
advocates three premisses, viz. (1) pratijila (the hill is fiery);
(2) lzetu (because it has smoke) and (3) d_rstiinta (as in the
kitchen) instead of the five propositions that N ya ya maintained 1•
Since one case of concomitance is regarded by Vedanta as
being sufficient for making an inference it holds that seeing the
one case of appearance (silver in the conch-shell) to be false,
we can in fer that all things (except Brahman) are false ( Brah-
mabh£mtam sarvam m£thyii Brahmabhin1latviit yedevam tadevam
yatlzii suktirfipyam). First premiss (pratij1zii) all else excepting
Brahman is false; second premiss (hetu) since all is different from
Brahman; third premiss (dr~!iinta) whatever is so is so as the
silver in the conch 2•
being similar to the mimaf!lSa view, do not require to be treated here separately.
x] A tma1l and jzva 475
pearance of all our world experience. This goes directly against
the jftatata theory of Kumarila that consciousness was not im-
mediate but was only inferable from the manifesting quality
(jiiiitatii) of objects when they are known in consciousness.
Now Vedanta says that this self-luminous pure consciousness
is the same as the sel( For it is only self which is not the object
of any knowledge and is yet immediate and ever present in
consciousness. No one doubts about his own self, because it
is of itself manifested along with all states of knowledge. The
self itself is the revealer of all objects of knowledge, but is
never itself the object of knowledge, for what appears as the
perceiving of self as object of knowledge is but association
comprehended under the term ahaf!1kara (ego). The real self is
identical with the pure manifesting unity of all consciousness.
This real self called the atman is not the same as the j1va or
individual soul, which passes through the diverse experiences
of worldly life. Isvara also must be distinguished from this
highest atman or Brahman. We have already seen that many
Vedantists draw a distinction between maya and avidya. Maya
is that aspect of ajftana by which only the best attributes
are projected, whereas avidya is that aspect by which impure
qualities are projected. In the former aspect the functions are
more of a creative, generative (vikfepa) type, whereas in the latter
veiling (iivara?za) characteristics are most prominent. The rela-
tion of the cit or pure intelligence, the highest self, with maya and
avidya (also called ajftana)was believed respectively to explain the
phenomenal Isvara and the phenomenal j1va or individual. This
relation is conceived in two ways, namely as upadhi or pratibim ba,
and avaccheda. The conception of pratibimba or reflection is
like the reflection of the sun in the water where the image,
though it has the same brilliance as the sun, yet undergoes
the effect of the impurity and movements of the water. The
sun remains ever the same in its purity untouched by the
impurities from which the image sun suffers. The sun may
be the same but it may be reflected in different kinds of
water and yield different kinds of images possessing different
characteristics and changes which though unreal yet phenome-
nally have all the appearance of reality. The other conception
of the relation is that when we speak of akasa (space) in the jug
or of akasa in the room. The akasa in reality does not suffer
The Saitka1~a School of Vedanta [cH.
any modification in being within the jug or within the room. In
reality it is all-pervasive and is neither limited (avachinna)
within the jug or the room, but is yet conceived as being limited
by the jug or by the room. So long as the jug remains, the
akasa limited within it will remain as separate from the akasa
limited within the room.
Of the Vedantists who accept the reflection analogy the fol-
lowers of N rsirphasrama think that when the pure cit is reflected
in the maya, ISvara is phenomenally produced, and when in the
avidya the individual or jiva. Sarvajfiatma however does not
distinguish between the maya and the avidya, and thinks that
when the cit is reflected in the avidya in its total aspect as cause,
we get Isvara, and when reflected in the antaJ:tkarat:Ja-a product
of the avidya-we have jiva or individual soul.
}Iva or individual means the self in association with the ego
and other personal experiences, i.e. phenomenal self, which feels,
suffers and is affected by world-experiences. In jiva also three
stages are distinguished; thus when during deep sleep the antal).-
kara1fa is submerged, the self perceives merely the ajfiana and the
jiva in this state is called prajfia or anandamaya. In the dream-
state the self is in association with a subtle body and is called
taijasa. In the awakened state the self as associated with a
subtle and gross body is called visva. So also the self in its pure
state is called Brahman, when associated with maya it is called
Isvara, when associated with the fine subtle element of matter as
controlling them, it is called hirat:Jyagarbha; when with the gross
elements as the ruler or controller of them it is called vira~
puru!?a.
The jiva in itself as limited by its avidya is often spoken of
as paramarthika (real), when manifested through the sense and
the ego in the waking states as vyavaharika (phenomenal), and
when in the dream states as dream-self, pratibha-?ika (illusory).
Prakasatma and his followers think that since ajfiana is one
there cannot be two separate reflections such as jiva and Isvara;
but it is better to admit that jiva is the image of Isvara in the
ajfUina. The totality of Brahma-cit in association with maya is
Isvara, and this when again reflected through the ajfiana gives
us the jiva. The manifestation of the jiva is in the anta}:lkaral!a
as states of knowledge. The jiva thus in reality is Isvara and
apart from jfva and Isvara there is no other separate existence of
x] E kajiva Doctrine 477
Brahma-caitanya. }Iva being the image of Isvara is thus de-
pendent on him, but when the limitations of jiva are removed
by right knowledge, the jiva is the same Brahman it always was.
Those who prefer to conceive the relation as being of the
avaccheda type hold that reflection (pratibim ba) is only possible
of things which have colour, and therefore jiva is cit limited (avac-
chinna) by the antal)karat:ta (mind). Isvara is that which is be-
yond it; the diversity of antal)karat:tas accounts for the diYersity
of the jivas. It is easy however to see that these discussions are
not of much fruit from the point of view of philosophy in deter-
mining or comprehending the relation of Isvara and jiva. In the
Vedanta system I~vara has but little importance, for he is but a
phenomenal being; he may be better, purer, and much more
powerful than we, but yet he is as much phenomenal as any of
us. The highest truth is the self, the reality, the Brahman, and
both jiva and Isvara are but illusory impositions on it. Some
Vedantists hold that there is but one jiva and one body, and
that all the world as well as all the jivas in it are merely his
imagmmgs. These dream jivas and the dream world will
continue so long as that super-jiva continues to undergo his
experiences ; the world-appearance and all of us imaginary
individuals, run our course and salvation is as much imaginary
salvation as our world-experience is an imaginary experience of
the imaginary jivas. The cosmic jiva is alone the awakened jiva
and all the rest are but his imaginings. This is known as the
d~~trine of ekajiva (one-soul).
The opposite of this doctrine is the theory held by some
Vedantists that there are many individuals and the world-appear-
ance has no permanent illusion for all people, but each person
creates for himself his own illusion, and there is no objective
datum which forms the common ground for the illusory percep-
tion of all people; just as when ten persons see in the darkness a
rope and having the illusion of a snake there, run away, and
agree in their individual perceptions that they have all seen
the same snake, though each really had his own illusion and
there was no snake at all. According to this view the illusory
perception of each happens for him subjectively and has no
corresponding objective phenomena as its ground. This must
be distinguished from the normal Vedanta view which holds
that objectively phenomena are also happening, but that these
The Sa1ika1"'a School of Vedanta [cH.
are illusory only in the sense that they will not last permanently
and have thus only a temporary and relative existence in com-
parison with the truth or reality which is ever the same constant
and unchangeable entity in all our perceptions and in all world-
appearance. According to the other view phenomena are not
objectively existent but are only subjectively imagined; so that
the jug I see had no existence before I happened to have the
perception that there was the jug; as soon as the jug illusion
occurred to me I said that there was the jug, but it did not exist
before. As soon as I had the perception there was the illusion,
and there was no other reality apart from the illusion. It is there-
fore called the theory of dr!?~isr~~ivada, i.e. the theory that the
subjective perception is the creating of the objects and that there
are no other objective phenomena apart from subjective per-
ceptions. In the normal Vedanta view however the objects of
the world are existent as phenomena by the sense-contact with
which the subjective perceptions are created. The objective
phenomena in themselves are of course but modifications of ajfiana,
but still these phenomena of the ajfiana are there as the common
ground for the experience of all. This therefore has an objec-
tive epistemology whereas the dr~~isr~tivada has no proper
epistemology, for the experiences of each person are determined
by his own subjective avidya and previous impressions as modi-
fications of the avidya. The dr~~ispHivada theory approaches
nearest to the Vijfianavada Buddhism, only with this difference
that while Buddhism does not admit of any permanent being
Vedanta admits the Brahman, the permanent unchangeable
reality as the only truth, whereas the illusory and momentary
perceptions are but impositions on it.
The mental and physical phenomena are alike in this, that
both are modifications of ajfiana. It is indeed difficult to
comprehend the nature of ajfiana, though its pr~sence in con-
sciousness can be perceived, and though by dialectic criticism
all our most well-founded notions seem to vanish away and
become self-contradictory and indefinable. Vedanta explains
the reason of this difficulty as due to the fact that all these
indefinable forms and names can only be experienced as modes
of the real, the self-luminous. Our innate error which we con-
tinue from beginningless time consists in this, that the real in
its full complete light is ever hidden from us, and the glimpse
x] Indefinable Nature of Aj1ziina 479
that we get of it is always through manifestations of forms
and names; these phenomenal forms and names are undefinable,
incomprehensible, and unknowable in themselves, but under
certain conditions they are manifested by the self-luminous real,
and at the time they are so manifested they seem to have a
positive being which is undeniable. This positive being is only
the highest being, the real which appears as the being of those forms
and names. A lump of clay may be moulded into a plate or a
cup, but the plate-form or the cup-form has no existence or being
apart from the being of the clay; it is the being of the clay that
is imposed on the diverse forms which also then seem to have
being in themselves. Our illusion thus consists in mutually mis-
attributing the characteristics of the unreal forms-the modes of
ajfiana and the real being. As this illusion is the mode of all our
experience and its very essence, it is indeed difficult for us to
conceive of the Brahman as apart from the modes of ajfiana.
Moreov~r such is the nature of ajfianas that they are knowable
only by a false identification of them with the self-luminous
Brahman or atman. Being as such is the highest truth, the
Brahman. The ajfiana states are not non-being in the sense of
nothing of pure negation (abhiiva), but in the sense that they are
not being. Being that is the self-luminous illuminates non-being,
the ajfiana, and this illumination means nothing more than a
false identification of being with non-being. The forms of ajfiana
if they are to be known must be associated with pure conscious-
ness, and this association means an illusion, superimposition, and
mutual misattribution. But apart from pure consciousness these
cannot be manifested or known, for it is pure consciousness alone
that is self-luminous. Thus when we try to know the ajfiana
states in themselves as apart from the atman we fall in a dilemma,
for knowledge means illusory superimposition or illusion, and
when it is not knowledge they evidently cannot be known. Thus
apart from its being a factor in our illusory experience no other
kind of its existence is known to us. If ajfiana had been a non-
entity altogether it could never come at all, if it were a positive
entity then it would never cease to be; the ajfiana thus is a
mysterious category midway between being and non-being and
indefinable in every way; and it is on account of this that it is
called tattvii1lyatvtibhyiim anirviicya or undefinable and undeter-
minable either as real or unreal. It is real in the sense that it is
The Saizka1~a School of Vedanta [cH.
a necessary postulate of our phenomenal experience and unreal
in its own nature, for apart from its connection with consciousness
it is incomprehensible and undefinable. Its forms even while they
are manifested in consciousness are self-contradictory and ·in-
comprehensible as to their real nature or mutual relation, and
comprehensible only so far as they are manifested in conscious-
ness, but apart from these no rational conception of them can be
formed. Thus it is impossible to say anything about the ajfiana
(for no knowledge of it is possible) save so far as manifested in
consciousness and depending on this the Dr~tisr!?tivadins asserted
that our experience was inexplicably produced under the influence
of avidya and that beyond that no objective common ground
could be admitted. But though this has the general. assent of
Vedanta and is irrefutable in itself, still for the sake of explain-
ing our common sense view (pratikarmavyavasathii) we may
think that we have an objective world before us as the common
field of experience. We can also imagine a scheme of things and
operations by which the phenomenon of our experience may be
interpreted in the light of the Vedanta metaphysics.
The subject can be conceived in three forms: firstly as the
atman, the one highest reality, secondly as jlva or the atman as
limited by its psychosis, when the psychosis is not differentiated
from the atman, but atman is regarded as identical with the psy-
chosis thus appearing as a living and knowing being,asjivasak;Si or
perceiving consciousness, or the aspect in which the jlva compre-
hends, knows, or experiences; thirdly the an ta}:lkarat:Ja psychosis or
mind which is an inner centre or bundle of avidya manifesta-
tions, just as the outer world objects are exterior centres ·of
avidya phenomena or objective entities. The antal)karat:Ja is not
only the avidya capable of supplying all forms to our present ex-
periences, but it also contains all the tendencies and modes of
past impressions of experience in this life or in past lives. The
anta}:lkarat:Ja is always turning the various avidya modes of it into
the jlvasak~i (jlva in its aspect as illuminating mental states), and
these are also immediately manifested, made known, and trans-
formed into experience. These avidya states of the antal)karat:Ja
are called its vrttis or states. The specific peculiarity of the vrtti-
ajnanas is this that only in these forms can they be superimposed
upon pure consciousness, and thus be interpreted as states of con-
sciousness and have their indefiniteness or cover removed. The
x] Perception a1ld Objective Existence
forms of ajfiana remain as indefinite and hidden or veiled only
so long as they do not come into relation to these vrttis of anta}:l-
karai)a, for the ajfiana can be destroyed by the cit only in the
form of a vrtti, while in all other forms the ajfiana veils the cit
from manifestation. The removal of ajfiana-vrttis of the antal:t-
karal)a or the manifestation of vrtti-jfi.ana is nothing but this, that
the antal:tkarai)a states of avidya are the only states of ajfiana
which can be superimposed upon the self-luminous atman
(adh;,iisa, false attribution). The objective world consists of the
avidya phenomena with the self as its background. Its objectivity
consists in this that avidya in this form cannot be superimposed
on the self-luminous cit but exists only as veiling the cit. These
avidya phenomena may be regarded as many and diverse, but in
all these forms they serve only to veil the cit and are beyond con-
sciousness. It is only when they come in contact with the avidya
phenomena as anta}:lkarai)a states that they coalesce with the
avidya states and render themselves objects of consciousness or
have their veil of avararya removed. It is thus assumed that in
ordinary perceptions of objects such as jug, etc. the anta}:lkararya
goes out of the man's body (.fariramadhyat) and coming in
touch with the jug becomes transformed into the same form,
and as soon as this transformation takes place the cit which
is always steadily shining illuminates the jug-form or the jug.
The jug phenomena in the objective world could not be mani-
fested (though these were taking place on the background of
the same self-luminous Brahman or at man as forms of the highest
truth of my subjective consciousness) because the ajfiana pheno-
mena in these forms serve to veil their illuminator, the self-lumin-
ous. It was only by coming into contact with these phenomena
that the anta}:lkarai)a could be transformed into corresponding
states and that the illumination dawned which at once revealed
the anta}:lkarai)a states and the objects with which these states or
vrttis had coalesced. The consciousness manifested through the
vrttis alone has the power of removing the ajfiana veiling the
cit. Of course there are no actual distinctions of inner or outer,
or the cit within me and the cit without me. These are only of
appearance and due to avidya. And it is only from the point of
view of appearance that we suppose that knowledge of objects
·can only dawn when the inner cit and the outer cit unite together
through the antal)karai)avrtti, which makes the external objects
The Sa1ikara School of Vedanta [cH.
translucent as it were by its own translucence, removes the ajfiana
which was veiling the external self-luminous cit and reveals the
object phenomena by the very union of the cit as ·reflected
through it and the cit as underlying the object phenomena. The
pratyak!?a-prama or right knowledge by perception is the cit, the
pure consciousness, reflected through the vrtti and identical with
the cit as the background of the object phenomena revealed by
it. From the relative point of view we may thus distinguish three
consciousnesses: (I) consciousness as the background of objec-
tive phe1.:10mena, (2) consciousness as the background of the j"iva
or pramata, the individual, (3) consciousness reflected in the vrtti
of the antal).karat:Ja; when these three unite perception is effected.
Prama or right knowledge means in Vedanta the acquire-
ment of such new knowledge as has not been contradicted by
experience (abiid/Lita). There is thus no absolute definition of
truth. A knowledge acquired can be said to be true only so long
as it is not contradicted. Thus the world appearance though it
is very true now, may be rendered false, when this is contradicted
by right knowledge of Brahman as the one reality. Thus the.
knowledge of the world appearance is true now, but not true
absolutely. The only absolute truth is the pure consciousness
which is never contradicted in any experience at any time. The
truth of our world-knowledge is thus to be tested by finding out
whether it will be contradicted at any stage of world experience
or not. That which is not contradicted by later experience is to
be regarded as true, for all world knowledge as a whole will be
contradicted when Brahma-knowledge is realized.
The inner experiences of pleasure and pain also are gene-
rated by a false identification of antal)karat:ta transformations as
pleasure or pain with the self, by virtue of which are gene-
rated the perceptions, "I am happy," or "I am sorry." In con-
tinuous perception of anything for a certain time as an object
or as pleasure, etc. the mental state or vrtti is said to last in the
same way all the while so long as any other new form is not
taken up by the antal).karat_Ia for the acquirement of any new
knowledge. In such cases \vhen I infer that there is fire on the
hill that I see, the hill is an object of perception, for the antal)-
karat_Ia vrtti is one with it, but that there is fire in it is a matter
of inference, for the antal_1karat_1a vrtti cannot be in touch with the
fire; so in the same experience there may be two modes of
x] Perception
'
mental modification, as perception in seeing the hill, and as
inference in inferring the fire in the hill. In cases of acquired
perception, as when on seeing sandal wood I think that it is
odoriferous sandal wood, it is pure perception so far as the sandal
wood is concerned, it is inference or memory so far as I assert it
to be odoriferous. Vedanta does not admit the existence of the
relation called samaviiya (inherence) or jatz" (class notion); and
so does not distinguish perception as a class as distinct from the
other class called inference, and holds that both perception and
inference are but different modes of the transformations of the
antaJ:tkaral)a reflecting the cit in the corresponding vrttis. The
perception is thus nothing but the cit manifestation in the antal:t-
karal)a vrtti transformed into the form of an object with which it is
in contact. Perception in its objective aspect is the identity of
the cit underlying the object with the subject, and perception in
the subjective aspect is regarded as the identity of the subjective
cit with the objective cit. This identity of course means that
through the vrtti the same reality subsisting in the object and
the subject is realized, whereas in inference the thing to be in-
ferred, being away from contact with antal:tkaral)a, has apparently
a different reality from that manifested in the states of conscious-
ness. Thus perception is regarded as the mental state represent-
ing the same identical reality in the object and the subject by
antal:tkaral)a contact, and it is held that the knowledge produced
by words (e.g. this is the same Devadatta) referring identically
to the same thing which is seen (e.g. when I see Devadatta
before me another man says this is Devadatta, and the know-
ledge produced by "this is Devadatta" though a verbal (Siibda)
knowledge is to be regarded as perception, for the antal:tkaral)a
vrtti is the same) is to be regarded as perception or pratyak.~a.
The content of these words (this is Devadatta) being the same
as the perception,and there being no new relationing knowledge as
represented in the proposition "this is Devadatta" involving the
unity of two terms "this" and "Devadatta" with a copula, but
only the indication of one whole as Devadatta under visual per-
ception already experienced, the knowledge proceeding from
''this is Devadatta" is regarded as an example of nirvikalpa
knowledge. So on the occasion of the rise of Brahma-conscious-
ness when the preceptor instructs "thou art Brahman '' the
knowledge proceeding from the sentence is not savikalpa, for
The Saizka1'a School of Vedanta [cH.
though grammatically there are two ideas and a copula, yet
from the point of view of intrinsic significance (tiitparya) one
identical reality only is indicated. Vedanta does not distinguish
nirvikalpa and savikalpa in visual perception, but only in sabda
perception as in cases referred to above. In all such cases the
condition for nirvikalpa is that the notion conveyed by the
sentence should be one whole or one identical reality, whereas
in savikalpa perception we have a combination of different
ideas as in the sentence, "the king's man is coming" (riij'apuru~a
agacchati). Here no identical reality is signified, but what is
signified is the combination of two or three different concepts 1 •
It is not out of place to mention in this connection that
Vedanta admits all the six pramal)aS of Kumarila and con-
siders like Mimarpsa that all knowledge is self-valid (svata!z-
pramii1:ta). But prama has not the same meaning in Vedanta
as in Mimarpsa. There as we remember prama meant the
knowledge which goaded one to practical action and as such
all knowledge was prama, until practical experience showed the
course of action in accordance with which it was found to be
contradicted. In Vedanta however there is no reference to action,
but prama means only uncontradicted cognition. To the definition
of self-validity as given by Mimarpsa Vedanta adds another
objective qualification, that such knowledge can have svatal)-
pramal)ya as is not vitiated by the presence of any do~a (cause
of error, such as defect of senses or the like). Vedanta of course
does not think like Nyaya that positive conditions (e.g. cor-
respondence, etc.) are necessary for the validity of knowledge,
nor does it divest knowledge of all qualifications like the
Mimarpsists, for whom all knowledge is self-valid as such. It
adopts a middle course and holds that absence of do~a is a neces-
sary condition for the self-validity of knowledge. It is clear that
this is a compromise, for whenever an external condition has to
be admitted, the knowledge cannot be regarded as self-valid,
but Vedanta says that as it requires only a negative condition
for the absence of do~a, the objection does not apply to it, and it
holds that if it depended on the presence of any positive con-
dition for proving the validity of knowledge like the Nyaya,
then only its theory of self-validity would have been damaged.
But since it wants only a negative condition, no blame can be
I See ~ edii1llaparibhii~ii and Sikhiima1Ji.
x] Theory of Illusion
attributed to its theory of self-validity. Vedanta was bound to
follow this slippery middle course, for it could not say that the
pure cit reflected in consciousness could require anything else
for establishing its validity, nor could it say that all phenomenal
forms of knowledge were also all valid, for then the world-
appearance would come to be valid ; so it held that know-
ledge could be regarded as valid only when there was no do~a
present; thus from the absolute point of view all world-know-
ledge was false and had no validity, because there was the
avidya-do~a, and in the ordinary sphere also that knowledge was
valid in which there was no do~a. Validity (pramat:tya) with
Mlmarpsa meant the capacity that knowledge has to goad us to
practical action in accordance \vith it, but with Vedanta it meant
correctness to facts and want of contradiction. The absence of
do~a being guaranteed there is nothing which can vitiate the
correctness of knowledge 1•
mal)ya.
The Saizkara School of Vedanta [en.
conviction or perception that can lead a man to actual practical
movement. If again it is said that it is the general and imperfect
perception of a thing (which has not been properly differentiated
and comprehended) before me, which by the memory of silver
appears to be like true silver before me and this generates the
movement for picking it up, then this also is objectionable. For
the appearance of the similarity with real silver cannot lead us
to behave with the thing before me as if it were real silver. Thus
I may perceive that gavaya (wild ox) is similar to cow, but despite
this similarity I am not tempted to behave with the gavaya as
if it were a cow. Thus in whatever way the Mimarpsa position
may be defined it fails 1• Vedanta thinks that the illusion is
not merely subjective, but that there is actually a phenomenon
of illusion as there are phenomena of actual external objects;
the difference in the two cases consists in this, that the illusion
is generated by the do~a or defect of the senses etc., whereas the
phenomena of external objects are not due to such specific do~as.
The process of illusory perception in Vedanta may be described
thus. First by the contact of the senses vitiated by do~as a
mental state as "thisness" with reference to the thing before me
is generated; then in the thing as "this" and in the mental state
of the form of that "this" the cit is reflected. Then the avidya
(nescience) associated with the cit is disturbed by the presence
of the do~a, and this disturbance along with the impression of
silver remembered through similarity is transformed into the
appearance of silver. There is thus an objective illusory silver
appearance, as well as a similar transformation of the mental state
generated by its contact with the illusory silver. These two trans-
formations, the silver state of the mind and external phenomenal
illusory silver state, are manifested by the perceiving consciousness
(siik#caitanya). There are thus here two phenomenal transforma-
tions, one in the avidya states forming the illusory objective silver
phenomenon, and another in the antal)karat~a-vrtti or mind state.
But in spite of there being two distinct and separate phenomena,
their object being the same as the "this" in perception, we have
one knowledge of illusion. The special feature of this theory of
illusion is that an indefinable (a11in,acaniya-khyiiti) illusory silver
is created in every case where an illusory perception of silver
occurs. There arc three orders of reality in Vedanta, namely the
I See Vivara~a-prameya·Sat?tgraha anu Nyiiyamakaranda on akhyati refutation.
x] Nature of Illusion
piiranuirthika or absolute, 'l'Yavahiirika or practical ordinary
experience, and priitibhiisika, illusory. The first one represents
the absolute truth; the other two are false impressions due
to do~a. The difference between vyavaharika and pratibhasika
is that the do!?a of the vyavaharika perception is neither dis-
covered nor removed until salvation, whereas the do!?a of the
pratibhasika reality which occurs in many extraneous forms (such
as defect of the senses, sleep, etc.) is perceived in the world of
our ordinary experience, and thus the pratibhasika experience
lasts for a much shorter period than the vyavaharika. But just
as the vyavaharika world is regarded as phenomenal modifica-
tions of the ajfiana, as apart from our subjective experience and
even before it, so the illusion (e.g. of silver in the conch-shell) is
also regarded as a modification of avidya, an undefinable creation
of the object of illusion, by the agency of the do!?a. Thus in the
case of the illusion of silver in the conch-shell, indefinable silver
is created by the do!?a in association with the senses, which is
called the creation of an indefinable (anirvacaniya) silver of illu-
sion. Here the cit underlying the conch-shell remains the same
but the avidya of antalfkaral).a suffers modifications (pari?ziima)
on account of do~a, and thus gives rise to the illusory creation.
The illusory silver is thus vi·zrartta (appearance) from the point
of view of the cit and parit:~ama from the point of view of
avidya, for the difference between vivartta and parit:~ama is, that
in the former the transformations have a different reality from
the cause (cit is different from the appearance imposed on it),
while in the latter case the transformations have the same reality
as the transforming entity (appearance of silver has the same
stuff as the avidya whose transformations it is). But now a
difficulty arises that if the illusory perception of silver is due to
a coalescing of the cit underlying the antalfkaral).a-vrtti as modi-
fied by do~a and the object-cit as underlying the "this" before
me (in the illusion of "this is silver"), then I ought to have the
experience that "I am silver" like "I am happy" and not that
"this is silver"; the answer is, that as the coalescing takes place
in connection with my previous notion as "this," the form of
the knowledge also is "this is sih·er," whereas in the notion
"I am happy," the notion of happiness takes place in connec-
tion with a previous vrtti of "1." Thus though the coalescing
of the two "cits" is the same in both cases, yet in one ca~e the
The Sa1ikara School of Vedanta [cH.
knowledge takes the form of "I am," and in another as "this is"
according as the previous impression is "I" or "this." In dreams
also the dream perceptions are the same as the illusory percep-
tion of silver in the conch-shell. There the illusory creations are
generated through the defects of sleep, and these creations are
imposed upon the cit. The dream experiences cannot be regarded
merely as memory-products, for the perception in dream is in the
form that "I see that I ride in the air on chariots, etc." and not
that" I remember the chariots." In the dream state all the senses
are inactive, and therefore there is no separate objective cit there,
but the whole dream experience with all characteristics of space,
time, objects, etc. is imposed upon the cit. The objection that
since the imposition is on the pure cit the imposition ought to
last even in waking stages, and that the dream experiences ought
to continue even in waking life, does not hold; for in the waking
stages the anta}:lkarat:ta is being constantly transformed into dif-
ferent states on the expiry of the defects of sleep, etc., which were
causing the dream cognitions. This is called 1z.ivrtti (negation)
as distinguished from biidha (cessation). The illusory creation of
dream experiences may still be there on the pure cit, but these
cannot be experienced any longer, for there being no do!?a of
sleep the antal)karat:ta is active and suffering modifications in
accordance with the objects presented before us. This is what is
called nivrtti, for though the illusion is there I cannot experience
it, whereas badha or cessation occurs when the illusory creation
ceases, as when on finding out the real nature of the conch-shell
the illusion of silver ceases, and we feel that this is not silver, this
was not and will not be silver. \Vhen the conch-shell is perceived
as silver, the silver is felt as a reality, but this feeling of reality
was not an illusory creation, though the silver was an objective
illusory creation; for the reality in the sukti (conch-shell) is trans-
ferred and felt as belonging to the illusion of silver imposed upon
it. Here we see that the illusion of silver has two different kinds
of illusion comprehended in it. One is the creation of an inde-
finable silver (a1Zirvacani)'a-rafatotpattz) and the other is the attri-
bution of the reality belonging to the conch-shell to the illusory
silver imposed upon it, by which we feel at the time of the illu-
sion that it is a reality. This is no doubt the mzyathiikhyiiti
form of illusion as advocated by Nyaya. Vedanta admits that
when two things (e.g. red flower and crystal) are both present
x] Vedanta Ethics
before my senses, and I attribute the quality of one to the other
by illusion (e.g._the illusion that the crystal is red), then the illusion
is of the form of anyathakhyati; but if one of the things is not
present before my senses and the other is, then the illusion is not
of the anyathakhyati type, but of the anirvacaniyakhyati type.
Vedanta could not avoid the former type of illusion, for it be-
lieved that all appearance of reality in the world-appearance
was really derived from the reality of Brahman, which was self-
luminous in all our experiences. The world appearance is an
illusory creation, but the sense of reality that it carries with it
·is a misattribution (anyathakhyati) of the characteristic of the
Brahman to it, for Brahman alone is the true and the real, which
manifests itself as the reality of all our illusory world-experience,
just as it is the reality of sukti that gives to the appearance of
silver its reality.
INDIAN PHILOSOPHY
BY
SURENDRANATH DASGUPTA, M.A., Ph.D.
PRINCIPAL, SANSKRIT COLLEGE, CALCUTTA
VOLUME II
CAMBRIDGE
AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS
PUBLISHED BY
TilE SYNDICS OF THE CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
London Office: Bentley House, N.W. I
American Branch: New York
.-\gents for Canada, India, and Pakistan: Macmillan
he has drawn his materials mostly from them, it has seldom been
possible to refer to the efforts of his fellow-workers in the field.
Occasionally, however, he has had to discuss and sometimes to bor-
row the views of other writers in the assessment of chronological
facts, and he also expresses his indebtedness to such other writers
who have worked upon some of the special problems of Indian
thought. It has been suggested to him that it would have been better
if the views of other writers had been fully criticized, but however
that may be, such criticism has been considered as beyond the
scope of this work, which, as at present planned, will cover some
JOOO pages when completed.
The chronological views regarding the antiquity of the Gita may
appear heretical, but it is hoped that they may be deemed ex-
cusable, for this is an age of toleration, and they are not more
heretical than the views of many distinguished writers on Indian
chronology. In the chapter on the Gita, some repetition of the
same views in different contexts was inevitable on account of the
looseness of the structure of the Gita, which is an ethico-religious
treatise and not a system of philosophy. This, however, has been
studiously avoided in the other chapters. Neither the Yoga-viisiftha
nor the Gitii are systematic works on philosophy, and yet no
treatment of Indian philosophy can legitimately ignore their
claims. For in a country where philosophy and religion have
been inseparably associated, the value of such writings as breathe
the spirit of philosophy cannot be over-estimated, and no history
of Indian philosophy worth the name can do without them.
I have no words sufficient to express my gratitude to my
esteemed friend, Dr F. W. Thomas, Boden Professor of Sanskrit,
Oxford, who went through the proofs in two of their stages
and thus co-operated with me in the trouble of correcting
them. I fear that in spite of our joint efforts many errors have
escaped our eyes, but had it not been for his kind help the
imperfections of the book would have been greater. I must similarly
thank my friend, Mr Douglas Ainstie, for help with the proofs.
l\tly thanks are also due to my pupils, Dr M. Eleade (Bucharest),
Mr Janakiballabh Bhattacharyya, 1\I.A., and my other friends,
Messrs Satkari 1\tlookerjee, NI.A., Durgacharan Chatterjee, JVI.A.,
Srish Chandra Das Gupta, lVI.A., and my daughter, Miss Maitreyi
Devi, for the assistance they rendered me in getting the manuscript
Vlll Preface
ready for the press, inserting diacritical marks, comparing the
references and the like, and also in arranging the index cards. But
as none of them had the whole charge of any of these tasks, and
as their help was only of an occasional nature, the responsibility
for imperfections belongs to the author and not to them.
SURENDRANATH DASGUPTA
Calcutta, 1931
CONTENTS
CHAPTER XI
THE SANKARA SCHOOL OF VEDANTA (continued)
PAGE
I The World-Appearance I
2 Thought and its Object in Buddhism and in Vedanta IJ
3 Sailkara's Defence of Vedanta; Philosophy of Badarayat;ta and
Bhartrprapaiica 36
4 Teachers and Pupils in Vedanta 46
s Vedanta Doctrine of Soul and the Buddhist Doctrine of Soullessness 58
6 Vedantic Cosmology 73
7 Sailkara and his School 77
8 Mat;t<;lana, Suresvara and VisvarUpa 82
9 Mal).<;lana (A.D. 8oo) . 87
IO Suresvara (A.D. 8oo) 98
II Padmapada (A.D. 82o) I02
I2 Vacaspati Misra (A.D. 84o) Io6
I3 Sarvajiiatma Muni (A.D. 900) III
I4 Anandabodha Yati (eleventh or twelfth century A.D.) u6
IS jV/ahii-vidyii and the Development of Logical Formalism • u8
I6 Vedanta Dialectic of Srihar~a (A.D. I ISO) . I2S
I7 Application of the Dialectic to the Different Categories and Concepts I33
I8 Citsukha's Interpretations of the Concepts of Sailkara Vedanta (A.D.
I220) I47
I9 The Dialectic of Nagarjuna and the Vedanta Dialectic I63
20 Dialectical Criticisms of Santarak~ita and Kamalasila (A.D. 76o) as
forerunners of Vedanta Dialectics I7I
(a) Criticisms of Sarpkhya Pari1)iima Doctrine I7 I
(b) Criticism of Isvara I76
(c) Refutation of the Soul Theory I78
(d) Refutation of the Mimarpsa Theory of the Self I79
(e) Refutation of the Sarpkhya View of the Self I8I
(f) Refutation of the Upani~ad View of the Self I8I
(g) Refutation of the Theory of the Persistence of Existing Entities . I 82
(h) Refutation of Criticisms of the Non-permanency of Entities I8S
(i) Refutation of the Nyaya Vaise~ika Categories I87
2I Dialectic of Sailkara and Anandajiiana I89
22 Philosophy of the Prakatiirtha-vivara1)a (A.D. I200) I96
23 Vimuktatman (A.D. I2oo) • I98
24 Ramadvaya (A.D. I3oo) 204
2S Vidyarat;tya (A.D. I3SO) 2I4
26 Nrsirphasrama Muni (A.D. ISOO) 2I6
27 Appaya Dik~ita (A.D. ISSO) 2I8
28 Prakasananda (A.D. ISSO-I6oo) . 220
29 Madhusiidana Sarasvati (A.D. Isoo) 22S
X Contents
CHAPTER XII
CHAPTER XIII
CHAPTER XIV
THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE BHAGAVAD-GiTA
PAGE
I The Gftii Literature • 437
2 Gitii and Yoga . • 443
3 Sarpkhya and Yoga in the Gitii- • 455
4 Sarpkhya Philosophy in the Gitii • 461
5 A vyakta and Brahman • 470
6 Conception of Sacrificial Duties in the Gltii • 479
7 Sense-control in the Gitii . 488
8 The Ethics of the Gitii and the Buddhist Ethics • 493
9 Analysis of Action • SIS
IO Eschatology SI7
II God and Man • • 523
I2 Vi~~u, Vasudeva and Kn~a • 535
I3 Bhagavata and the Bhagavad-gltii • 545
INDEX • 553
CHAPTER XI
THE SANKARA SCHOOL OF VEDANTA (continued)
The World-Appearance.
The U pani~ads, called also the Vedanta, contain passages which
indicate very different lines of thought, theistic, pantheistic, of
self as the only ultimate reality, creationism, etc. The works of
those commentators who wrote commentaries on the Upani~ads
before Sankara and tried to interpret them on the supposition that
there was one uniform, systematic, dogmatic philosophy in them
are now practically all lost, and all that we can know of them is
contained in the meagre references that are found in Sankara's
commentario.!s or the works of other, later, commentators. As an
example I may refer to Bhartrprapafica, who tried to give a realistic
interpretation of the Brhad-iira7Jyaka Upan#ad by treating the
world and souls as real emanations from God or Brahman 1 •
1
Fragments of Bhartrprapaiica from the writings of Sankara and his com-
mentator Anandajiiana and from Suresvara's Viirttika have been collected by
Prof. Hiriyanna, Mysore, in a short paper read at the Third Oriental Conference
in Madras in 1924, published in Madras in 1925.
2 The Sa1ikara School of Vedanta [cH.
Sankara inherited from his predecessors the opinion that the
Upani!?ads teach us one consistent systematic philosophy, but,
being under the influence of Gau9apada, differed from them
on the nature of this philosophy, which he propounded so elabo-
rately in all his commentaries on the Upani~:;ads and the Brahma-
siitras.
The main thesis of Sankara, as has already been pointed out
in the preceding chapter, consists of the view that Brahman alone
is the ultimate reality, while everything else is false. He was
interested in proving that this philosophy was preached in the
Upani~ads; but in the Upani!?ads there are many passages which
are clearly of a theistic and dualistic purport, and no amount of
linguistic trickery could convincingly show that these could yield
a meaning which would support Sankara's thesis. Sankara there-
fore introduces the distinction of a common-sense view (vyiiva-
hiirika) and a philosophic view (piiramiirthika), and explains the
Upani!?ads on the supposition that, while there are some passages
in them which describe things from a purely philosophic point of
view, there are many others which speak of thing~ only from a
common-sense dualistic view of a real world, real souls and a real
God as creator. Sankara has applied this method of interpretation
not only in his commentary on the Upani~ads, but also in his
commentary on the Brahma-stitra. Judging by the siltras alone,
it does not seem to me that the Brahma-siltra supports the
philosophical doctrine of Sankara, and there are some siltras which
Sankara himself interpreted in a dualistic manner. He was never
afraid of indulging in realistic interpretations; for he could easily get
out of the difficulty by asserting that all the realistic conceptions
found in the sutras or in the U pani~ad passages were merely an
estimate of things from the common-sense point of view. Though
on the basis of Sailkara's own statements, as well as those of his
later commentators and other adherents of his school, there is
hardly any room for doubt regarding the meaning and force of
Sankara's philosophy, yet at least one Indian scholar has sought
to prove that Sankara's philosophy was realistic 1 . That there was
some amount of realism in Sankara is proved by his own con-
fession, when he criticizes the uncompromising Buddhistic idealists
(vzjiiiina-viidins) or the so-called Buddhistic nihilists (silnya-viidins).
1
Advaita Philosophy by K. Vidyaratna, published by the Calcutta Univer-
sity Press, 1924.
XI] Jrhe Tflorld-i1ppearance 3
I have already discussed in a general way in what sense according
to the Vedanta, from the point of view of the Sankara school of
Vedanta as interpreted by his later adherents, the world is an
illusion. But in the present section I propose to discuss Sankara's
own statements, as well as the statements of some of his important
followers, on the subject of the nature of world-illusion. This is
one of the most important points of the Sankara school of
philosophy and needs a discussion in some detail.
But before I take it up, I am naturally reminded of the views
of Buddhist idealism and the so-called Buddhistic nihilism, and it
seems desirable that Sankara's doctrine of illusion should be treated
in connection with the doctrines of illusion in those systems of
Buddhistic thought which preceded Sankara. Taking the Sunya-
viida theory of Nagarjuna and Candrakirti, we see that they also
introduced the distinction between limited truth and absolute
truth. Thus Nagarjuna says in his Madhyamika-sutras that the
Buddhas preach their philosophy on the basis of two kinds of truth,
truth as veiled by ignorance and depending on common-sense pre-
suppositions and judgments (sa1{lvrti-satya) and truth as unqualified
and ultimate (paramiirtha-satya )1. The word sal!lvrti literally means
"closed." Candrakirti explains smpvrti as meaning "closing on
all sides" and says that it is ignorance (ajiiiina) which is denoted
by the term sal!lvrti here, because it covers the truth of all things 2 •
In this sense the whole of the world of our experience of causes
and effects, which we perceive and of which we speak, presents an
appearance which is hidden by ignorance. This world is not con-
tradicted in our world-experience; but, as each and every entity
of this world is produced by other things or entities, and they
again by others, and as we cannot specify the nature of each one
of them without referring to others which produced them or from
which they originated, and tracing those again to other causes and
1
.lvliidhyamika-sutra, xxm. 8.
2
Iha catviiro viparyiisii ucyante: tadyathii pratik~atJa-vinliiini skandha-
paiicake yo nityam iti griihal; sa viparyiisal; . .. dul.zkhiitmake skandha-paiicake yab
sukham iti f.,iparzto griihal; so 'paro viparyiisal.z, ... iariram aiuci-svabhii'l.:attz tatra
yo iucitvena griihal; sa viparyiisal;, ... paiica-skandhattz niriitmakattz tasmin ya
iitma-griihab aniitmani iitmiibhzniveial; sa viparyiisal;. Candrakirti's commentary
on ibid. XXIII. 13. Compare it with the Yoga-sutra, II. 5, Anandasrama Series.
3
Candrakirti's commentary on the Miidhyamika-sutra, XXIII. 13.
6 The Saizkara School of Vedanta [cH.
experienced before, resembling a memory image. It is explained by
some as being the false affirmation of the characteristics of one thing
in regard to another; others explain it as an error due to the non-
apprehension of the difference between that which is wrongly
apprehended and the misapprehended object which the former is
wrongly supposed to be; others think that, when one thing is
misapprehended as another, the illusion consists in the fancying of
the former entity as being endowed with strange characteristics
(viparita-dharmatva); but in all these different ways of analysis
illusion fundamentally is nothing but the false appearance of
one thing with the characteristics of another. So also it may be
that a conch-shell appears as silver or that one moon appears as
two moons 1 • Sankara then suggests that, since the universal self
(pratyag-iitman) is felt through our feeling of "I" and since it is
immediate in all experience (aparok~a), it is not absolutely un-
related and unindicated (avi~aya) in experience, and consequently
it is quite possible that the non-self (aniitman) and its character-
istics may be illusorily imposed upon the universal self. This
illusory imposition of the non-self and its characteristics on the
universal self is called nescience (avidyii).
In his commentary on Gau9apada's Karikii, 1. 17, Sankara says
that, when a piece of rope falsely appears as a snake, this is merely
false imposition or appearance, not existence. The illusory appear-
ance of the snake did not really bring into existence a snake,
which later on became non-existent when right knowledge super-
vened. It was a mere illusion, and the rope-snake had no existence
at alJ2. Sankara in commenting on Gau9apada's Kiirikii explains
with approval Gau9apada's view that the world of common ex-
perience is as illusory as a dream. Dreams are false; for in a dream
a man may have the experience of going to distant places, and yet,
when he wakes up, he finds that he has been asleep for a few
seconds only, and has not moved a foot from his bed. The dream
experiences are therefore false, because they are contradicted by
the waking experiences. But the waking experiences, being similar
to dream experiences, are equally false. For both sets of ex-
periences involve the duality of subject and object, and are therefore
1
Sankara's Adhyiisa-bhii~ya on the Brahma-<ifitra, Nirl)aya-Sagara Press,
Bombay, 1904.
2
Ra_jjviirrz sarpa iva kalpitatviit na tu sa T-·idyate . .. na hi rajjviirrz bhriinti-
buddhyii kalpita!z sarpo vid_vamiina!z san vivekato niv•rtta!z; tathedarrz prapmi-
ciikhya'!l miiyii-miitram. Gau<;lapada's Kiirikii, 1. 17, Anandasrama Series.
XI) The World-Appearance 7
fundamentally more or less the same: so that, if one of them is
false, the other also is false. The world-experience is like other
well-known instances of illusion-the mirage, for example. Since
it had no existence in the beginning, and will not have any existence
in the end, neither can it have existence in the intervening period
of appearance. The objection that our waking experiences fulfil
practical purposes and have thus associated with them the prag-
matic test of truth, which is absent in the case of dream experiences,
is invalid; for the pragmatic tests of the waking experiences may
well be contradicted by dream experiences ; a man who goes
to sleep after a sumptuous feast may well dream that he has been
starving for days together. Both our inner world of mind and its
experiences and the outer objective world are thus false creations 1 •
But GauQapada and Sankara differ from the Siinyavadin Buddhists
in this-that they think that even false creations must have some
basis in truth. If a rope appears as a snake, the false creation of
the snake has some basis in the truth of the rope: there could
not be false creations and false appearances without any firm basis
of truth (iispada) underlying them 2 • Nagarjuna, it will be re-
membered, tried to prove the falsity of all appearances on the
ground of their being interdependent and not having anything
which could be pointed out as their own nature. The dialectic
being applicable to all appearances, there was nothing left which
was not relative and interdependent, nothing which was self-
evident by nature and which was intelligible by itself without
reference to anything else. It is this interdependence and relativity
of all appearances that was called "nothingness, or sunyatii by
Nagarjuna. There was nothing which could be affirmed of anything
independently by itself without reference to something else; nothing
therefore could be conceived as having any essence by itself.
All appearances were therefore only interdependent phantom crea-
tions; and it was precisely this interdependence that proved the
essencelessness of their natures. There was no basis of truth any-
where. There was nothing which had any essence. But neither
Sankara nor GauQapada appears to have tried to show why the
inner world of thoughts, ideas, emotions, volitions and the outer
world of objects should be considered as being illusory appearances.
1
Sankara's commentary on Gaw;lapih.la's Kiirikii, 11. 1-12.
2
Na hi niriispadii raJju-sarpa-mrgatn7Jikiidaya!z kvacit upalabhya11te. Ibid.
I. 6.
8 The Sankara School of Vedanta [cH.
Their main point seems to consist in a dogmatic statement that
all appearances or experiences are false just as dream experi-
ences are false. The imperfect analogy of waking experiences
is made into an argument, and the entire manifold of appearances
is declared to be false. But it is urged at the same time that these
false creations must have some basis of truth; the changing ap-
pearances must have some unchanging basis on which they are
imposed-and this basis is the self (iitman), or Brahman, which is
the only thing that is permanent, unchanging and real. This self
is the being of pure intelligence, which is one identical unit,
negating all differences and duality (visuddha-vijiiapti-miitra-sattii-
dvaya-rupe1Ja )1. Just as the false creation of " snake " appears in the
case of the" rope," so all such judgments as" I am happy,"" I am
unhappy," "I am ignorant," "I am born," "I am old," "I am
with a body," "I perceive," etc., are all merely false predications
associated with the self; they are all false, changing and illusory
predications, and it is only the self which remains permanent
through all such judgments. The self is entirely different from all
such predications; it is self-luminous and self-manifesting, shining
independently by itself.
By applying the dialectic of mutual interdependence, pratitya-
samutpiida, Nagarjuna tried to prove that there was nothing which
could be pointed out as the essence of anything as it is; but he
did not explain how the appearances which were nothing more
than phantom creations came to be what they were. How did
the world-appearance of essenceless interdependent phenomena
show itself? Sankara did not try to prove with a keen logical
dialectic that the world-appearance was false: he simply took it
for granted, since the Upani!?ads proclaimed Brahman as the
ultimate reality. But how did the world-appearance manifest itself?
Sankara does not seem to go deeply into this question and simply
passes it over in asserting that this world-appearance is all due
to ignorance (avidyii); it could not be spoken of as either existing
or non-existing; it was merely illusory, like the conch-shell silver.
But Padmapada, who wrote the commentary known as Paiica-piidikii
on the first four sutras of Sankara's commentary on the Brahma-
sutras, says that the precise meaning of the term "false conception "
(mithyii-jFiiina) in Sankara's introduction to his commentary on the
Brahma-sutras is that there is a force or power or potency (saktz) of
1 Gaudapada's Kiirikii, II. 17.
XI] The World-Appearance 9
nescience which constitutes materiality (jatjiitmikii avidyii-saktil;),
and that it is this potency which transforms itself into the stuff
(upiidiina) of the world-appearance 1 • It is well to remember in
this connection that, according to Sankara's philosophy, it is not
only the objective world that constitutes the world of appearance,
but also the subjective world of all experiences and predicates that
may be associated with the self. Thus, when one says "1," this
ego-hood is analysed as involving two parts-the one, pure in-
telligence or pure consciousness; and the other, the concept of
subjectivity, which is illuminated, expressed or manifested by the
underlying pure intelligence with which it is falsely associated.
The concept of subjectivity stands here as materiality, or objec-
tivity, which is made to float up by the power of pure intelligence,
thus causing the judgment "I am" or "I am a man 2 ." This
avidyii-sakti, or power of avidyii, subsists in the pure self and, on
the one hand, arrests the revelation of its true nature as Brahman,
and, on the other hand, transforms itself into the various
concepts associated with the psychological self of our ordinary
experience 3 • The illusion consists in the association of the psycho-
logical qualities of thinking, feeling, willing, etc. with the trans-
cendent or universal self (pratyak-citi). These psychological deter-
minations are all mutually connected with one another. Thus, to
be able to enjoy pleasures, one must first act; one can only act
when one has attachments, antipathies and desires, and one can
have attachments and desires only when one has experienced joys
and sorrows-so these psychological determinations in a beginning-
less cycle are always naturally associated with the transcendent
self-luminous self4 •
It should be clear from the foregoing discussion that, as
Padmapada or Prakasatman explains, ajiiiina or nescience is
some kind of indefinable stuff out of the transformations of which
subjective psychological experiences and the world of objects have
come into being. This ajiiiina is not the ajiiiina of the Buddhists,
i.e. a wrong notion or misconception, and this adhyiisa, or illusion,
1
Paiica-piidikii, p. 4, the Vizianagram Sanskrit Series, 1891.
2
asmat-pratyaye yo 'nidam-a1Jlsas cid-eka-rasal;. tasmi7J1S tad-bala-nirbhiisita-
tayii lak~a~zato yu~mad-arthasya manu~yiiblzimiinasya sambhedaiviivabhiisal;. sa
eva adhyiisal;.. Ibid. p. 3·
3
atal;. sii pratyak-citi brahma-svarupiivabhiismJl pratibadhniiti aha7J1kiiriid-
y-atad-rupa-pratibhiisa-nimitta7J1 ca bhavati. Ibid. p. 5.
4
Prakasatman's Paiica-piidikii-vi·varm;a, p. ro, the Vizianagram Sanskrit
Series, 1 892.
10 The Sankara School of Vedanta [cH.
is not the v£paryaya of Nagarjuna; for here it is a positive power
or stuff. Thus Prakasatman argues that all effects have at their
back some cause, which forms their stuff or material; the world-
appearance, being also an effect, must have some stuff out of which
it has evolved or was made up; and ajiiiina, lying in the trans-
cendent self as a separate power, is such a material cause 1 • This
av£dya-potency in the transcendent self is positive in its nature.
This positive ajiiiina is directly perceived in such immediate per-
ceptions as "I do not know myself or others," and can also be
inferred or comprehended by implication 2 • The fact that ajfliina
or av£dyii is spoken of as a power inherent in the transcendent self
shows that it is dependent thereon ; avidyii is not, however, a power,
but a substance or entity which has certain powers by which it
transforms itself into the cosmic appearances, subjective and ob-
jective; yet it is called a power, or sakti' because of its dependence
(para-tantratii} on the transcendent self, and it is in consideration
of the entire dependence of avidyii and its transformations on the
self that the self is regarded as the material cause of all effects-
the cosmic appearances of the world and the mind 3 • The self thus
not only holds the ajfiiina within it as a dependent function,
but in spite of its self-luminosity it can be reacted upon by the
ajfliina with its manifold powers in such a way that it can be
veiled by this ajfliina and made the underlying basis of all world-
appearances of ajiiiina-transformations 4 •
Appaya Dik~ita, referring in his Siddhiinta-le$a to the view of
the writer of the Padiirtha-tattva, summarizes the matter thus:
Brahman and Maya form together the material cause ( ubhayam
upiidiinam), and hence it is that in the world-appearance there are
two distinct characteristics, "being" (salta} from Brahman and
materiality (jaljya) from 1\rlaya. Brahman is the cause, as the
unchanging basis of the Iviaya, which is the cause as being the
1
sarva1Jl ca l?aryam sopiidiina1Jl bhiiva-kiiryatviit ghatiidivad ity anumiiniit
... tasman mithyiirtha-taj-jnaniitmaka1Jl mithyii-bhi"itam adhyasam upiidiina-
kiira1}12-siipek~am ... mithyii-jnanam eva adhyiisopiidiinam. Panca-piidikii-vivara1Ja,
pp. I 1-12.
2
Ibid. p. 13.
3
saktir ity iitma-para-tmztratayii iitmana!z sarva-kiiryopiidiinasya nirvor;lh-
rtvam. Ibid. p. 13. Atma-kara7Jatva-nir•vor;lhrt·vad iitma-para-tantratvii ca sakti-
matyam api sakti-sabda upaciirital;. Akhar:H;lananda Muni's Tattva-dipana,
p. 65, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Book Depot, Benares, 1902.
4
atalz svaprakiise 'pi iitmani vicitra-sakti-bhiiva-riipiividyii-prayuktam iiva-
ra1Ja'f!Z durapah1}avam. Ramananda Sarasvati's Vivara1Jopanyiisa, p. 16, Chow-
khamba Sanskrit Book Depot, Benares, 1901.
XI] The fVorld-Appearance II
tejnb-a·vanaya!z. ibid. p. 1.
~ Sa'f!lk~epa-iiiriraka, 1. 333, 334, Bhaii Sastri's edition.
5
Siddhiinta-le§a, p. 13, V.S. Series, 1890.
12 The Sankara School of Vedanta [cH.
avidyii (formed by compounding the negative particle a and
vidyii "knowledge") may mean either absence of knowledge ( vidyii-
bhiival;) or false knowledge (mithya-jiiiinam); and in neither of these
meanings can it be supposed to behave as the material cause or
substance-stuff of anything; for a false knowledge cannot be a
substance out of which other things are made 1 • The answer given
by Anandabodha Bhattaraka to such an objection is that this avidyii
is not a psychological ignorance, but a special technical category,
which is beginningless and indefinable (aniidy-anirviicyiividyii.Sra-
ya~ziit). The acceptance of such a category is a hypothesis which
one is justified in holding as valid, since it explains the facts.
Effects must have some cause behind them, and a mere instru-
mental cause cannot explain the origination of the substratum of
the effect; again, effects which are not true cannot have for their
material cause (upadiina-kiira1Ja) that which is true, nor can they
have for their material cause that which is absolutely non-existent.
So, since the material cause of the world can neither be true nor
be anything which is absolutely non-existent, the hypothesis is
naturally forced upon the Vedantists that the material cause of
this false world-appearance is an entity which is neither existent
nor non-existent 2 • Anandabodha in his Pramii1}a-miilii quotes ap-
provingly from the Brahma-tattva-samlk~ii ofVacaspati to show that
avidyii is called avidyii or nescience because it is a hypothetic
category which is neither "is" nor "is not," and is therefore
unintelligible; avidyii signifies particularly the unintelligibility of
this category 3 • Anandabodha points out that the acceptance of
avidyii is merely the logical consequence of indicating some
possible cause of the world-appearance-considering the nature
of the world-appearance as it is, its cause can only be something
which neither is nor is not; but what we understand by such
a category, we cannot say; it is plainly unintelligible; the logical
requirements of such a category merely indicate that that which is
the material cause of this false world-appearance cannot be re-
garded either as existing or as non-existing; but this does not
1
avidyii hi vidyabhavo mithya-jiiiiiWl!l vii na cobhaya1Jl lwsya cit samavayi-
kiirm.zam adravyatviit. Anandabodha's ~Vyiiya-makaranda, p. 122, Chowkhamba
Sanskrit Book Depot, Benares, 1901.
2
Ibid. pp. 122-124.
3 sad-asad-ublzayiinubhayiidi-prakiirai?z anirvacanfyatvam eva hy avidyiiniim
The Vedanta takes a twofold view of things; the first view refers
to ultimate reality and the second to appearance. This ultimate
reality is pure intelligence, as identical with pure bliss and pure
being. This is called ultimately real in the sense that it is regarded
as changeless. By pure intelligence the Vedanta does not mean the
ordinary cognitional states; for these have a subjective and an
objective content which are extraneous to them. This pure in-
telligence is pure immediacy, identical with the fact of revelation
found in all our conscious states. Our apprehensions of objects
are in some sense events involving both a subjective and an ob-
jective content ; but their special feature in every case is a revelatory
inwardness or immediacy which is non-temporal and changeless.
The fact that we see, hear, feel, touch, think, remember is equi-
valent to saying that there are various kinds of cognizings. But
what is the nature of this cognizing? Is it an act or a fact? When
I see a blue colour, there is a blue object, there is a peculiar
revelation of an appearance as blue and a revelation of the "I"
as perceiver. The revelation is such that it is both a revelation of
a certain character as blue and of a certain thing called the blue
object. When a revelation occurs in perception, it is one and
it reveals both the object and its appearance in a certain
character as blue. The revelation is not the product of a certain
relation which happens to subsist at any time between the
character-appearance and the object; for both the character-
appearance as blue and the object are given in revelation. The
revelation is self-evident and stands unique by itself. Whether I see,
or hear, or feel, or change, the fact remains that there is some sort
of an awareness which does not change. Awareness is ever present
by itself and does not undergo the changes that its contents undergo.
I may remember that I had seen a blue object five minutes pre-
viously; but, when I do this, what I perceive is the image of a blue
object, with certain temporal and spatial relations, which arises or
1
V ailak~m:zya-viico-yuktir hi pratiyogi-nirupm;iid yauktikatva-prakatana-
phalii na tv evarrz-rilpatiiyiil; siimaiijasya-sampiidaniiya ity avociima. Pramii1}a-
miilii, p. 10.
The Sankara School of Vedanta [cH.
becomes revealed; but the revelation itself cannot be revealed
again. I may be conscious, but I cannot be conscious of con-
sciousness. For consciousness as such, though ever present in its
immediacy, cannot become an object of any other consciousness.
There cannot be any such thing as the awareness of an awareness
or the awareness of the awareness of an awareness, though we may
multiply such phrases in language at our pleasure. When I re-
member that I have been to Trinity College this morning, that
only means that I have an image of the way across the commons,
through Church Street and Trinity Street; my movements through
them are temporally pushed backward, but all this is a revelation
as image at the present moment and not a revelation of a past
revelation. I cannot say that this present image in any way reveals
that particular image as the object of the present revelation. But
the former revelation could not be held to be distinct from the
present one; for distinction is always based on content and not on
revelation. Revelation as such is identical and, since this is so, one
revelation cannot be the object of another. It is incorrect to say
that "A is A" means that one A becomes itself over again. It is
owing to the limitations of grammatical terminology that identity
is thus described. Identity thus understood is different from what
we understand by identity as a relation. Identity understood as a
relation presupposes some difference or otherness and thus is not
self-contained. And it is because it is not self-contained that it
can be called a relation. When it is said that A is identical with A,
it means that on all the various occasions or contents in which
A appeared it always signified the same thing, or that it had the
same shape or that it was the same first letter of the English
alphabet. Identity in this sense is a function of thought not
existing by itself, but in relation to a sense of opponency or other-
ness. But revelation has no otherness in it; it is absolutely ubi-
quitous and homogeneous. But the identity of revelation of which
we are speaking does not mean that the revelation signifies the
same thing amidst a diversity of contents: it is simply the one
essence identical in itself and devoid of any numerical or other
kinds of difference. It is absolutely free from" now" and" then,"
"here" and "there," "such " or" not such" and "this" or" that."
Consciousness of the self-shining self taken in this way cannot be
regarded as the relation of an appearance to an object, but it is
the fact of the revelation or the entity of the self. If we conceive
xi] Thought and its Object in Buddhism and Vedanta 15
of revelation in this way, it is an error to make any distinction in
revelation as the revelation of the past or the revelation of the
present moment. For moments are revealed as objects are re-
vealed; they do not constitute revelation or form any part of it.
This revelation is identical with the self-shining self to which
everything else has to be related in order to be known.
"Is cognizing an act or a fact?" Before this can be answered
the point to be made clear is what is meant by cognizing. If we
ignore the aspect of revelation and speak of mental states which
can be looked at from the point of view of temporal or qualitative
change of character, we must speak of them as acts or events. If
we look at any mental state as possessing certain characters and
relations to its objects, we have to speak of these aspects. But, if
we look at cognizing from the point of view of its ultimate truth
and reality as revelation, we cannot call it either an act or a fact;
for, as revelation, it is unique and unchangeable in itself. All
relations and characters are revealed in it, it is self-evident and
is at once in and beyond them all. Whether we dream or w?ke,
whether we experience an. illusion or a truth, revelation is always
there. When we look at our mental states, we find that they are
always changing, but this is so only with reference to the contents.
Apart from this there is a continuity in our conscious life. By
this continuity the Vedanta apprehends not any sort of coherence
in our ideas, but the fact of the permanence of revelation. It
may be asked what remains of revelation, if the mental states are
taken away. This question is not admissible; for the mental states
do not form part of revelation; they are rendered conscious by
coming into relation with revelation. This category is the ultimate
reality. It is not self or subject in the sense in which self or ego
is ordinarily understood. For what is ordinarily understood as the
ego or the '' I" is as much a content of the perception of the
moment as any other objective content. It is not impossible that
any particular objective content may be revealed at any time
without the corresponding "I perceive" being explicitly revealed
at the same time. The notion of ego or " I " does not refer to an
everlasting abiding independent self or person; for this notion is
as changing as any other objective content. The " I" has no definite
real content as referring to an existing entity, but is only
a particular mode of mind which is often associated, as a
relatively abiding content, with other changing contents of the
The Sankara School of Vedanta [cH.
mind. As such, it is as changeable as is any other object. "I know
this" only means that there is a revelation which at one sweep
reveals both the " this" and the " I." So far as the revelation
appears as revealing the "this" and the "1," it is manifested in
a subjective mental state having a particular conscious centre
different from other similar centres. But, since revelation cannot
in reality be individuated, all that we may say about "I" or
"mine,"" thou" or" thine," falls outside it. They are all contents,
having some indefinite existence of their own and revealed by this
principle of revelation under certain conditions. This principle of
revelation thus has a reality in quite a different sense from that
which is used to designate the existence of any other object. All
other objects are dependent upon this principle of revelation for
their manifestation, and their nature or essence, out of connection
with it, cannot be defined or described. They are not self-evident,
but are only expressed by coming into some sort of relation
with this principle. We have already seen that this principle
cannot be either subjective or objective. For all considera-
tions of subject or object fall outside it and do not in any
way qualify it, but are only revealed by it. There are thus two
principles, the principle of revelation and all that which is re-
vealed by it. The principle of revelation is one; for there is nothing
else like it; it alone is real in the highest and truest sense. It is
absolute in the sense that there is no growth, decay, evolution or
change in it, and it is perfectly complete in itself. It is infinite in
the sense that no finitude can form part of it, though through it all
finitude is being constantly revealed. It is all-pervading in the
sense that no spatial or temporal limits can be said to affect it in
any way, though all these are being constantly revealed by it. It is
neither in my head nor in my body nor in the space before me;
but yet there is nowhere that it is not. It has sometimes been
designated as the" Self" or iitman, but only in the sense of denoting
its nature as the supreme essence and transcendent reality of all-
the Brahman.
Apart from this principle of revelation, all else is constituted
of a substanceless indefinable stuff called maya. In some schools
of Sati.kara Vedanta it is said that all is pure and simple illusion,
that things exist only when they are perceived and dissolve into
nothingness as soon as we cease to perceive them ; this school has
been designated the Drfti-snti school, a doctrine which has been
x1] Thought and its Object in Buddhism and Vedanta 17
briefly explained in the tenth chapter of the present work 1 • One of
the most important texts of this school is the Siddhiinta-muktiivalz by
Prakasananda 2 • Prakasananda seems to have taken his inspiration
from the Yoga-vasi~tha, and he denied the existence of things when
they are not perceived (ajfiiita-sattviinabhyupagama). He tried to
show that there were no grounds for holding that external objects
existed even when they were not perceived or that external objects
had a reality independent of their perceptions. Examining the
capacity of perception as a proof to establish this difference be-
tween perception and its object, he argued that, since the difference
between the awareness and its object was a quality of the awareness,
the awareness itself was not competent to grasp this quality in the
object, as it was one of the constituents of the complex quality
involving a difference of the awareness and its object; to assert
the contrary would be ·a fallacy of self-dependence (iitmiisrayatva).
If the apprehended difference is a complex, such as "difference-
between-awareness-and-its-object," and if this complex is a quality
which is apprehended as existing in the object, it has to be assumed
that, in order that the nature of awareness may be realized, vindi-
cated or established, it must depend upon itself involved as a con-
stituent in the complex "difference-between-awareness-and-its-
object" directly and immediately-which comes to the same thing
as saying that awareness becomes aware of itself by being aware
of itself; this is impossible and is called the logical fallacy of self-
1
A History of Indian Philosophy, vel. 1. pp. 477-478, by S. N. Dasgupta,
published by the Cambridge University Press, 1922.
2
Prakasananda refers to the arguments of Prakasatman's (A.D. 1200) Paiica-
piidikii-vivarm;aand Sarvajfiatma Muni's (A.D. 900) Sa'f!lk~epa-siirlraka and refers
approvingly to Sure8vara, the author of the Nai~karmya-siddhi. Appaya Dik!?ita
(A.D.162o) refers to PrakasanandainhisSiddhiinta-leia (pp. 13, 72). Nana Dik~ita,
a follower of the school ofPrakasananda and author of the Siddhiinta-mpikii, in a
commentary on the Siddhiinta-muktiivall, gives a list of Vedanta teachers. In this
list he mentions the names of Prakasanuhhavananda, Nrsirpha and Raghavendra
Yati. Venis thinks (see The Pandit, 1890, pp.487-490) that Prakasanubhavais the
same as Prakasatman and Nrsirpha the same as Nrsirphasrama Muni, who is
said to have converted Appaya Dik!?ita to Sankara Vedanta, and thinks that
Prakasananda lived in the last quarter of the sixteenth century, being wedged
in between Nrsirpha and Appaya. Though it would be difficult to settle his
time so precisely and definitely, yet it would not be wrong to suppose that he
lived sometime towards the latter half of the sixteenth centurv. Prakasananda's
doctrine of DH!i-sn# is apparently unknown to the earlier V~dantic works and
even the Vediinta-pan"bhii~ii, a work of the early sixteenth century, ~oes not
seem to be aware of him, and it appears that the earliest mention of his name can
be traced only to Appaya, who lived in the sixteenth and the seventeenth
centuries. Prakasananda mav thus be believed to have lived in the latter half of
the sixteenth century. ·
DII 2
The Sankara School of Vedanta [cH.
dependence 1 • If it is held that the complex quality ("difference-
of-awareness-from-the-object") is directly perceived in the ob-
ject through the senses, then it has to be assumed that the
said complex quality existed in the object even before the pro-
duction of the awareness, and this would involve the impossible
supposition that the complex quality of which the awareness was
a constituent was already present even before such an awareness
had already come into being. If perception or direct awareness
cannot be said to prove the difference between the awareness and
its object, there can be no inference which may be supposed to
do it. For such an inference has to take form thus-" the object is
different from its own awareness, because it is associated with
entirely different kinds of qualities or characteristics 2 . , But ho,v
could it be known that the object has qualities of an entirely
different character from its awareness, since a difference between
an awareness and its object was contested and could not be proved
by perception or any other means? Prakasananda further says that
the argument by implication (arthiipatti), that awareness involves
the acceptance of something different from the awareness of
which the awareness is affirmed, because there cannot be any know-
ledge without a corresponding object, is invalid. In proving the
invalidity of the supposition that knowledge necessarily implies an
object, Prakasananda raises the question whether such an impli-
cation of an object as conditioning knowledge refers to the pro-
duction (utpatti) of know ledge, its persistence (sthiti) or its secondary
cognition. As regards the first alternative Prakasananda says that
according to the Vedanta consciousness is ever-existent and is
never a product; and, even if it is regarded as a product, the
process of cognition can itself be regarded as a sufficient cause
for its production. It can by no means be urged that the
presence of an external object is in all cases necessary for the
production of knowledge; for, though it is arguable that in
perception an object is necessary, no one will suggest that an
external object is to be considered necessary in the production of
inferential knowledge-a fact which shows that the presence of
an external object is not indispensable for the production of know-
ledge as such. As regards the persistence of knowledge it is said
1
Siddhiinta-muktiivall, as printed in the Pandit, 1889, pp. 247-249.
2
vimato vi~ayalz sva-vi~aya-jiiiiniid bhidyate tad-viruddha-dharmiiirayatviit.
Ibid. p. 252.
xi] Thought and its Object in Buddhism and Vedanta 19
that awareness has not the object that it knows for its locus or sub-
stance (iiSraya), in such a way that the absence of the object, as apart
from the awareness, would make it impossible for the awareness to
persist; and, if knowledge is supposed to be persisting in anything,
that something would not be a cognized object, but the cognizer
itself-as in the Nyaya view, where knowledge is regarded as an
attribute of the self and the self is then regarded as the substance
or locus (iiSraya) of knowledge. Since again cognition and its
object do not exist in the same space or in the same time (this is
proved by the possibility of our knowing a past or a future object),
there cannot be any such concomitance between the two that it
would be right for any one to infer the external presence of an
object because of there being a subjective cognition or awareness.
So he argues that there is no proof that cognition and cognized
objects are different.
In the above account of Prakasananda's views it is clear that
he does not attempt to give any positive proof in support of his
thesis that the world-appearance and all objects contained in it
have no existence while they are not perceived or that the being
of all objects cognized is their percipi. He only tries to show that
it cannot be logically established that awareness of blue and blue
are two different objects; or, in other words, that it cannot be
proved that the cognized object is different from its cognition.
It could not legitimately be held that awareness (p1·atitz) was
different from its object (pratyetavya). The whole universe, as we
perceive it, is nothing but cognition without there being any object
corresponding to it. As dreams are nothing but mere awareness,
without there being any real objects behind them which manifest
themselves in different ways of awareness and their objects, so
also is the world of awaking consciousness 1 • The world has thus
no independent substratum, but is mere cognition or mere aware-
ness (vijfiiina-miitra or bhiiva-miitra).
This scheme of Vedanta philosophy is surprisingly similar
to the idealism of Vasubandhu (A.D. z8o-36o), as taught in his
Vi1Jlsatikii with a short commentary of his own and in his Tri1Jlsikii
with a commentary by Sthiramati 2 • According to this idealism
pratyetavya-pratltyoi ca bhedal;. priimiivikal;. kutab
pratzti-miitram evaitad blziiti viiva1Jl cariicaram
jiiiina-jiieya-prabhedena yathii sviipna1Jl pratfyate
vijiiiina-miitram evaitat tatlzii jiigrac cariicaram.
Siddhiinta-muktiivali, p.258.
2
Vijiiapti-miitratii-siddlzi, containing two treatises, Vi1Jlsatikii and Tri1Jliikii,
2-2
20 The Sankara School of Vedanta [cH.
entity which is neither painful nor pleasurable, which is feeling per se (vedana
anubhava-svablzavii sa punar vi$ayasya ahladaka-paritiipaka-tadubhaya-kara-
vivil~ta-s·variipa-siik$iitkarm:za-bhedtit). This feeling per se must be distinguished
again from the non-pleasurable-painful feeling existing along with the two other
varieties, the painful and the pleasurable. Here the vipiika transformations are
regarded as evolving the basic entity of feeling, and it is therefore undifferentiated
in it as pleasure or pain and is hence called "feeling as indifference (upek$ii)"
and undifferentiated (avyiikrta). The differentiation of feeling as pleasurable or
as painful takes place only as a further determination of the basic entity of feeling
evolved in the v:ipiika transformations of good and bad deeds (Subhiisubha-
karma-vipaka). Good and bad (Subhasubha) are to be distinguished from moral
and immoral as potential and actual determinations of virtuous and vicious
actions.
The Sankara School of Vedanta [en.
actualized emotional states of attachment, antipathy or the like,
which are associated with the actual pleasurable or painful feelings.
The vi'piika transformations thus give us the basic concept of mind
and its principal functions with all the potentialities of determinate
subject-object consciousness and its processes. There are here the
constructive tendencies of selves as perceivers, the objective con-
structive tendencies of colours, sounds, etc., the sense-faculties,
etc., attention, feeling, discrimination, volition and sense-func-
tioning. But none of these have any determinate and actualized
forms. The second grade of transformations, called manana,
represents the actual evolution of mora1 and immoral emotions;
it is here that the mind is set in motion by the ignorant references
to the mental elements as the self, and from this ignorance about
the self is engendered self-love (iitma-sneha) and egoism (iitma-
miina). These references are again associated with the fivefold
universal categories of sense-functioning, feeling, attention, voli-
tion and discrimination. Then comes the third grade of trans-
formations, which is associated with the fiv~fold universal cate-
gories together with the special manifestations of concrete sense-
perceptions and the various kinds of intellectual states and moral
and immoral mental states, such as desire (chandal.z) for different
kinds of sense-experiences, decisions (adhimok~a) in conclusions
firmly established by perceptions, reasoning, etc., memory, attentive
reflection (samiidhz), wisdom (prajiiii), faith and firm will for the
good (sraddhii}, shamefulness (hri) for the bad, etc. The term
iilaya-vi.fiiiina is given to all these three types of transformations,
hut there is underneath it, as the permanent passive ground, the
eternal and unchangeable pure thought ('1.-'ijiiapti-miitratii).
It may be pointed out here that in this system of philosophy
the eternal and unchangeable thought-substance undergoes by
virtue of its inner dynamic three different orders of superficial
changes, which are compared to constantly changing streams and
waves. The first of these represents the basic change which later
determines all subjective and objective possibilities; the second
starts the process of the psychosis by the original ignorance and
false attribution of self-hood to non-self elements, self-love and
egoism; and in the third grade we have all the concrete mental
and extra-mental facts. The fundamental categories which make
the possibility of mind, mental processes and the extra-mental
relations, are evolved in the first stage of transformations; and these
x1] Thought and its Object in Buddhism and Vedanta 25
abide through the other two stages of transformations and become
more and more complex and concrete in course of their association
with the categories of the other transformations. In analysing the
knowledge situation Vasubandhu does not hold that our awareness
of blue is only a modification of the "awareness," but he thinks
that an awareness has always two relations, a relation with the
subject or the knower (griihaka-graha) and a relation with the object
which is known (griihya-graha). Blue as an object is essential for
making an awareness of blue possible; for the awareness is not
blue, but we have an awareness of the blue. But Vasubandhu
argues that this psychological necessity is due to a projection of
objectivity as a necessary function of determinate thought, and it
does not at all follow that this implies that there are real external
objects existing outside of it and generating the aw;1reness as
external agent. Psychological objectivity does not imply onto-
logical objectivity. It is argued that, if the agency of objective
entities in the production of sense-knowledge be admitted, there
could not be any case where sense-knowledge could be admitted to
be produced without the operation of the objective entities; but,
since in dreams and illusions such sense-knowledge is universally
regarded as being produced without the causal operation of such
objective entities, no causal operation can be conceded to the
objective entities for the production of sense-knowledge.
Sankara, in attempting to refute the Buddhist idealism in his
commentary on the Brahma-siltra, 11. ii. 28, seems to refer to a
school of idealism which is the same as that described by
Santarak~ita in his Tattva-sa1{lgraha (commented upon by Kama-
la8ila), but largely different from that described in Vasubandhu's
Tri1{lsikii. The positive arguments against the impossibility of an
external world constituted by partless atoms are the same 1 • But
1 Vacaspati, however, in his Bhamati commentary, 11. ii. 28, introduces some
a pupil of Devesvara.
3 vivarta-viidasya hi pilrva-bhumir
vediinta-viide pari~ziima-viidaft
vyavasthite 'smin pari1Jiima-viide
svaya1{l samiiyiiti vh·arta-viidaft.
Sa1{lk~epa-siirlraka, n. 61.
upiiyam iitisthati pi"irvam uccair
upeyam iiPIU1fl janatii yathaiva
irutir munindroi ca vivarta-siddhyai
vikiira-viida1{l vadatas tathaiva. Ibid. II. 62.
vikiira-viida1{l Kapiliidi-pak~am
upetya viidena tu siitra-kiiraft
irutis ca sa1{ljalpati piirvabhumau
stlzitvii vivarta-pratipiidaniiya. Ibid. 11. 64.
The Sankara School of J..7 edanta [cH.
such as to support the view that the pari1Jlima view was intro-
duced only to prepare the reader's mind for the vivarta view,
which was ultimately definitely approved as the true view; but it
has been shown that the content of almost all the siltras of n. i.
consistently support the pari1Jiima view, and that even the siltra
n. i. 14 cannot be explained as holding the vivarta view of
causation as the right one, since the other siltras of the same
section have been explained by Sailkara himself on the pari1Jiima
view; and, if the content be taken into consideration, this sutra also
has to be explained on the pari1_liima view of bhediibheda type.
pagato blzavati blzinna-/ak~a7JOf!& lzi rfipaf!& sabdiid ityiidi k~lriidivat samudii.yas cet
prajfiaptita/:l. Abhidharma-kosa-vyiikh:va, Visvabharati MS. p. 337.
XI) Soul in T7 ediinta and Buddhism 59
milk appears to have a separate existence from the proper com-
bination of its constituent elements, yet it is in reality nothing
more than a definite kind of combination of its constituent
elements, so the self is nothing more than a certain conglomeration
of the psychological elements (skandha), though it may appear to
have a separate and independent existence. The Vatsiputriyas,
however, think that the individual is something different from the
skandhas or psychological entities, as its nature is different from
the nature of them. The Vatsiputriyas deny the existence of a
permanent soul, but believe in momentary individuals (pudgala)
as a category separate and distinct from the skandhas. Just as fire
is something different from the fuel that conditioned it, so the
name "individual" (pudgala) is given to something conditioned
by the skandhas at a given moment in a personallife 1 • Vasuban-
dhu, however, argues against the acceptance of such an individual
and says that there is no meaning in accepting such an individual.
Rain and sun have no effects on rriere vacuous space, they are of
use only to the skin; if the individual is, like the skin, a deter-
miner of the value of experiences, then it must be accepted as
external; if it is like vacuous space, then no purpose is fulfilled
by accepting it 2 • The Vatsiputriyas, however, thought that, just as
the fuel conditioned the fire, so the personal elements conditioned
the individual. By this conditioning the Vatsiputriyas meant that
the personal elements were some sort of a coexisting support 3 •
'Vhat is meant by saying that the pudgala is conditioned by the
personal elements is that, when the skandhas or psychological
elements are present, the pudgala is also present there 4 • But
Vasubandhu urges that a mere conditioning of this kind is not
sufficient to establish the cognitional existence of an individual;
for even colour is conditioned by the visual sense, light and
attention in such a way that, these being present, there is the
perception of light; but can anybody on that ground consider the
1 Stcherbatsky's translation of the Pudgala-uiniicaya, Bulletin de l'Academie
pp. 938-939·
XI) Soul in Vedanta and Buddhism
any collocation of conditions. Consciousness thus, not being a
product of anything and not being further analysable into any
constituents, cannot also be regarded as a momentary flashing.
Uncaused and unproduced, it is eternal, infinite and unlimited.
The main point in which consciousness differs from everything
else is the fact of its self-revelation. There is no complexity in
consciousness. It is extremely simple, and its only essence or
characteristic is pure self-revelation. The so-called momentary
flashing of consciousness is not due to the fact that it is
momentary, that it rises into being and is then destroyed the
next moment, but to the fact that the objects that are revealed
by it are reflected through it from time to time. But the conscious-
ness is always steady and unchangeable in itself. The immediacy
(aparok~atva) of this consciousness is proved by the fact that, though
everything else is manifested by coming in touch with it, it itself
is never expressed, indicated or manifested by inference or by
any other process, but is always self-manifested and self-revealed.
All objects become directly revealed to us as soon as they come in
touch with it. Consciousness (sa'l(lvid) is one. It is neither identical
with its objects nor on the same plane with them as a constituent
element in a collocation of them and consciousness. The objects
of consciousness or all that is manifested in consciousness come
in touch with consciousness and themselves appear as conscious-
ness. This appearance is such that, when they come in touch
with consciousness, they themselves flash forth as consciousness,
though that operation is nothing but a false appearance of the non-
conscious objects and mental states in the light of consciousness,
as being identical with it. But the intrinsic difference between
consciousness and its objects is that the former is universal (pratyak)
and constant (anuvrtta), while the latter are particular (ap1·atyak)
and alternating (vyiivrtta). The awarenesses of a book, a table, etc.
appear to be different not because these are different flashings of
knowledge, but because of the changing association of conscious-
ness with these objects. The objects do not come into being with
the flashings of their awareness, but they have their separate
existence and spheres of operation 1 • Consciousness is one and
unchanging; it is only when the objects get associated with it that
1 tattva-daril tu nityam advitzyarrz v~iiiiinarrz vi~ayiis ca tatriidhyastiib Prthag-
Vedantic Cosmology.
From what has been said above it is evident that maya
(also called avidyii or ajiiiina) is in itself an indefinable
mysterious stuff, which has not merely a psychological existence,
but also an ontological existence as well. It is this ajfiiina which
on the one hand forms on the subjective plane the mind and the
senses (the self alone being Brahman and ultimately real), and on
the other hand, on the objective plane, the whole of the objective
universe. This ajiiiina has two powers, the power of veiling or
covering (iivara~a) and the power of creation (vik§epa). The power
of veiling, though small, like a little cloud veiling the sun with a
diameter of millions of miles, may, in spite of its limited nature,
cover up the infinite, unchangeable self byveilingitsself-luminosity
as cognizer. The veiling of the self means veiling the shining
unchangeable self-perception of the self, as infinite, eternal and
limitless, pure consciousness, which as an effect of such veiling
appears as limited, bound to sense-cognitions and sense-enjoy-
ments and functioning as individual selves 1 . It is through this
covering power of ajiiiina that the self appears as an agent and an
enjoyer of pleasures and pains and subject to ignorant fears of
rebirth, like the illusory perception of a piece of rope in darkness as
a snake. Just as through the creative power of ignorance a piece of
1
vastuto 'jiiiinasyiitmiichiidakatviibhiive 'pi pramiitr-buddhimiitriichiidakatvena
ajiiiinasyiitmiichiidakatvam upaciiriid ucyate. Subodhinl on Vediinta-siira, p. 13,
Nirl)aya-Sagara Press, Bombay, 1916.
74 The Sankara School of Vedanta [cH.
rope, the real nature of which is hidden from view, appears as a
snake, so does ignorance by its creative power create on the hidden
self the manifold world-appearance. As the ajtiiina is supposed to
veil by its veiling power (iivara~za-saktz) only the self-cognizing
and self-revealing aspect of the self, the other aspect of the self as
pure being is left open as the basis on which the entire world-
appearance is created by the creative power thereof. The pure
consciousness, veiled as it is by ajiiiina with its two powers, can
be regarded as an important causal agent (nimitta), when its nature
as pure consciousness forming the basis of the creation of the world-
appearance is emphasized; it can be regarded as the material cause,
when the emphasis is put on its covering part, the afiiiina. It is
like a spider, which, so far as it weaves its web, can be regarded as
a causal agent, and, so far as it supplies from its own body the
materials of the web, can be regarded as the material cause of the
web, when its body aspect is emphasized. The creative powers
(vik~epa-saklz) of ajfiiina are characterized as being threefold, after
the manner of Sarp.khya prakrli, as sattva, rajas and lamas. With
the pure consciousness as the basis and with the associated creative
power of ajfiiina predominating in lamas, space (iikiiSa) is first
produced; from iikiisa comes air, from air fire, from fire water, from
water earth. It is these elements in their fine and uncompounded
state that in the Sarp.khya and the Pural}as are called lan-miilras.
It is out of these that the grosser materials are evolved as also the
subtle bodies 1 • The subtle bodies are made up of seventeen parts,
1
As to how the suhtle elements are combined for the production of grosser
elements there are two different theories, viz. the tnvrt-lwra~za and the paiicl-
kara1Ja. The trivrt-karm;a means that fire, water and earth (as subtle elements)
are each divided into two halves, thus producing two equal parts of each; then
the three half parts of the three subtle elements are again each divided into two
hah-es, thus producing two quarter parts of each. Then the original first half of
each element is combined with the two quarters of other two elements. Thus
each element has half of itself with two quarter parts of other two elements.
Vacaspati and Amalananda prefer tri·crt-karu1Ja to paiici-lwral}Q; for they think
that there is no point in admitting that air and iikiisa have also parts of other
clements integrated in them, and the Vedic texts speak of tri'l·rt-kara1)a and not of
paiic1-kara1Ja. The paiki-kara1Ja theory holds that the five subtle elements are
divided firstly into two halves, and then one of the two halves of these five
elements is divided again into four parts, and then the first half of each subtle
element is combined with the one-f<,urth of each half of all the other elements
excepting the element of which there is the full half as a constituent. Thus each
element is made up of one-half of itself, and the other half of it is constituted of
the one-fourth of each of the other elements (i.e. one-eighth of each of the
other four elements), and thus each element has at least some part of other
elements integrated into it. This view is supported by the Vediinta-paribhiifii
and its Sillhiima1)i commentary, p. 363.
XI] Vediintic Cosmology 75
excluding the subtle elements, and are called suk~ma-sartra or
liftga-sarira. This subtle body is composed of the five cognitive
senses, the five conative senses, the five viiyus or biomotor activities,
buddhi (intellect) and manas, together with the five subtle elements
in tanmatric forms. The five cognitive senses, the auditory, tactile,
visual, gustatory and olfactory senses, are derived from the sativa
parts of the five elements, iikiisa, viiyu, agni, ap and prthivt
respectively. Buddhi, or intellect, means the mental state of
determination or affirmation (niJcayiitmikii antal:zkarm:za-vrttz).
ll.fanas means the two mental functions of vikalpa and saftkalpa
or of saftkalpa alone resulting in doubt 1 • The function of mind
(citta) and the function of egoism (ahattzkiira) are included in
buddhi and manas 2 • They are all produced from the sattva
parts of the five elements and are therefore elemental. Though
they are elemental, yet, since they are produced from the
compounded sattva parts of all the elements, they have the re-
vealing function displayed in their cognitive operations. Buddhi
with the cognitive senses is called the sheath of knowledge
(vijfiiinamaya-ko~a). Manas with the cognitive senses is called the
sheath of manas (manomaya-ko~a). It is the self as associated with
the vijfiiinamaya-ko~a that feels itself as the agent, enjoyer, happy
or unhappy, the individual self (jtva) that passes through worldly
experience and rebirth. The conative senses are produced from
the rajas parts of the five elements. The five viiyus or biomotor
activities are called Prii7Ja or the breathing activity, Udiina or the
upward activity and Samiina or the digestive activity. There are
some who add another five viiyus such as the Naga, the vomiting
Apiina troyiines activity, Kiirma, the reflex activity of opening the
eyelids, Krkala, the activity of coughing, Devadatta, the activity of
yawning, and Dhanaiijaya, the nourishing activity. These prii1Jas
1 The Vediinta-silra speaks of sankalpa and vikalpa, and this is explained
by the Subodhinl as meaning doubt. See Vediinta-siira and Subodhinl, p. 17. The
Vediinta-paribhii~ii and its commentators speak of safzlwlpa as being the only
unction of manas, but it means "doubt." See pp. 88-89 and 358.
2
smara1)iikiira-vrttimad untal;kara1)a1Jz cittam (Vediinta-paribhii~ii-1\Ia~zi
prabhii, p. 89). anayor eva cittiihat!lkiirayor antarbhiivalz (Vediinta-siira, p. 17).
But the Vediinta-paribhii~ii says that manas, buddhi, aha1flkiira and citta, all four,
constitute the inner organ {anta{lkara1)a). See Vediinta-paribhii,~ii, p. 88. The
Vediinta-siira however does not count four functions buddhi, manas, citta,
aha'f!lkiira; citta and aha1Jzkiira are regarded as the same as buddhi and manas.
Thus according to the Vediinta-siira there are only two categories. But since
the Vediinta-paribhii~ii only mentions buddhi and manas as constituents of the
subtle body, one need not think that there is ultimately any difference between
it and the Vediinta-siira.
The Sankara School of Vedanta [cH.
together with the cognitive senses form the active sheath of prii1_Za
(prii1_Zamaya-ko~a). Of these three sheaths, the vijiiiinamaya, mano-
maya and prii1_Zamaya, the v~fiiiinamaya sheath plays the part of the
active agent (kartr-rupal;); the manomaya is the source of all desires
and volition, and is therefore regarded as having an instrum~ntal
function; the prii1_Zamaya sheath represents the motor functions.
These three sheaths make up together the subtle body or the
su~ma-sarira. HiraQ.yagarbha (also called Sutriitmii or prii1Ja) is
the god who presides over the combined subtle bodies of all living
beings. Individually each subtle body is supposed to belong to
every being. These three sheaths, involving as they do all the sub-
conscious impressions from which our conscious experience is de-
rived, are therefore called a dream (jitgrad-viisaniimayatviit svapna).
The process of the formation of the gross elements from the
subtle parts of the elements is technically called paiiclkara1_la. It
consists in a compounding of the elements in which one half of
each rudimentary element is mixed with the eighth part of each
other rudimentary element. It is through such a process of com-
pounding that each element possesses some of the properties of
the other elements. The entire universe consists of seven upper
worlds (Bhul;, Bhuval:z, Svar, Alahar, Janal;, Tapa~z and Satyam ),
seven lower worlds (Atala, Vitala, Sutala, Rasiitala, Taliitala,
Mahiitala and Piitiila) and all the gross bodies of all living beings.
There is a cosmic deity who presides over the combined
physical bodies of all beings, and this deity is called Virat. There
is also the person, the individual who presides over each one of
the bodies, and, in this aspect, the individual is called Visva.
The ajniina as constituting antal;kara1_la or mind, involving the
operative functions of buddhi and manas, is always associated
with the self; it is by the difference of these anta~zkara1_las that one
self appears as many individual selves, and it is through the states
of these antal;kara1_las that the veil over the self and the objects
are removed, and as a result of this there is the cognition of objects.
The anta!:zkara1_la is situated within the body, which it thoroughly
pervades. It is made up of the saft:va parts of the five rudimentary
elements, and, being extremely transparent, comes into touch with
the sense objects through the specific senses and assumes their
forms. It being a material stuff, there is one part inside the body,
another part in touch with the sense-objects, and a third part
between the two and connected with them both as one whole.
XI] Sankara and his School 77
The interior part of the antal:zkara1Ja is the ego or the agent. The
intervening part has the action of knowledge, called also vrtti-jiiiina.
The third part, which at the time of cognition is transformed into
the form of the sense-objects, has the function of making them
manifested in knowledge as its objects. The antal:zkara1}a of three
parts being transparent, pure consciousness can well be manifested
in it. Though pure consciousness is one, yet it manifests the three
different parts of the anta!:zkarar.za in three different ways, as the
cognizer (pramiitr), cognitive operation (pramiir.za) and the cogni-
tion, or the percept (pramitt). In each of the three cases the
reality is the part of the pure consciousness, as it expresses itself
through the three different modifications of the antal:zkarar.za. The
sense-objects in themselves are but the veiled pure consciousness,
brahman, as forming their substance. The difference between the
individual consciousness (jzva-caitanya) and the brahman-con-
sciousness (brahma-caitanya) is that the former represents pure
consciousness, as conditioned by or as reflected through the antal:z-
kara1Ja, while the latter is the unentangled infinite consciousness, on
the basis of which all the cosmic creations of miiyii are made. The
covering of avidyii, for the breaking of which the operation of the
antal:zkara1Ja is deemed necessary, is of two kinds, viz. subjective
ignorance and objective ignorance. When I say that I do not know
a book, that implies subjective ignorance as signified by" I do not
know," and objective ignorance as referring to the book. The
removal of the first is a precondition of all kinds of knowledge,
perceptual or inferential, while the second is removed only in
perceptual knowledge. It is diverse in kind according to the form
and content of the sense-objects; and each perceptual cognition
removes only one specific ignorance, through which the particular
cognition arise31.
proper teacher. The experience of the ego and all its associated
experiences of attachment, antipathy, etc., vanish with the dawn
of true self-knowledge of unity. The notion of ego is a changeful
and extraneous element, and hence outside the element of pure
consciousness. All manifestations of duality are due to the dis-
tracting effects of the antal;karm:za. When true knowledge dawns,
the self together with all that is objectivity in knowledge vanishes.
All the illusory appearances are due to the imposition of ajiiiina on
the pure self, which, however, cannot thereby disturb the unper-
turbed unity of this pure self. It is the antal;karm:za, or the intellect,
that suffers all modifications in the cognitive operations; the
underlying pure consciousness remains undisturbed all the same.
Yet this non-self which appears as mind, intellect, and its objects
is not a substantive entity like the prakrti of the Sarpkhya; for its
appearance is due merely to ignorance and delusion. This world-
appearance is only a product of nescience (ajiiiina) or false and
indescribable illusion on the self, and is no real product of any real
substance as the Sarpkhya holds. Thus it is that the whole of the
world-appearance vanishes like the illusory silver in the conch-shell
as soon as truth is realized.
In the third chapter Suresvara discusses the nature of ajiiiina, its
relation with the self, and the manner of its dissolution. There are
two entities, the self and the non-self; now the non-self, being itself
a product of ajiiiina (nescience or ignorance), cannot be regarded
as its support or object; so the ajiiiina has for its support and object
the pure self or Brahman; the ignorance of the self is also in regard
to itself, since there is no other object regarding which ignorance is
possible-the entire field of objective appearance being regarded
as the product of ignorance itself. It is the ignorance of the real
nature of the self that transforms itself into all that is subjective
and objective, the intellect and its objects. It is thus clear that
according to Suresvara, unlike Vacaspati Misra and lVfal)<;iana, the
avidyii is based not upon individual persons(jtva), but upon the pure
intelligence itself. It is this ignorance which, being connected and
based upon the pure self, produces the appearances of individual
persons and their subjective and objective experiences. This ajiiiina,
as mere ignorance, is experienced in deep dreamless sleep, when all
its modifications and appearances shrink within it and it is ex-
perienced in itself as pure ignorance, which again in the waking
state manifests itself in the whole series of experiences. It is easy to
102 The Saizkara School of Vedanta [cH.
see that this view of the relation of ajiiiina to pure intelligence is
different from the idealism preached by lV1aQ<;lana, as noticed in the
previous section. An objection is raised that, if the ego were as much
an extraneous product of ajiiiina as the so-called external objects,
then the ego should have appeared not as a subject, but as an object
like other external or internal objects (e.g. pleasure, pain, etc.). To
this Suresvara replies that, when the antal;kara1Ja or mind is trans-
formed into the form of the external objects, then, in order to give
subjectivity to it, the category of the ego (aharrzkiira) is produced
to associate objective experiences with particular subjective centres,
and then through the reflection of the pure intelligence by way of
this category of the ego the objective experience, as associated with
this category of the ego, appears as subjective experience. The
category of the ego, being immediately and intimatsly related to
the pure intelligence, itself appears as the knower, and the objec-
tivity of the ego is not apparent, just as in burning wood the fire
and that which it burns cannot be separated. It is only when the
pure intelligence is reflected through the ajiiiina product of the
category of the ego that the notion of subjectivity applies to it,
and all that is associated 'vith it is experienced as the "this," the
object, though in reality the ego is itself as much an object as the
objects themselves. All this false experience, however, is destroyed
in the realization of Brahman, when Vedantic texts of unity are
realized. In the third chapter of the Nai~karmya-siddhi the central
ideas of the other three chapters are recapitulated. In the Viirttika
Suresvara discusses the very same problems in a much more
elaborate manner, but it is not useful for our present purposes to
enter into these details.
it seems that AnandapGrl)a lived after Sankara Misra (A.D. 1529), as is seen
from his criticism of his reading of a passage of the Kha1Jtf.ana-kha1)t/.a-khiidya,
p. s86 {Chowkhamba).
The Saizkara School of Vedanta [cH.
therefore be placed in the early part of the seventeenth century.
Govindananda himself also in his Ratna-prabhii commentary
followed the Vivara7Ja line of interpretation, and he refers to
Prakasatman with great respect as PrakiiSiitma-fri-cara7Jaib (Ratna-
prabhii, p. 3).
Padmapada's method of treatment, as interpreted by Prakas-
atman, has been taken in the first and the second volumes of the
present work as the guide to the exposition of the Vedanta. It is not
therefore necessary that much should be said in separate sections re-
garding the Vedantic doctrines of these two great teachers. But still
a few words on Padmapada's philosophy may with advantage be
read separately. Padrnapada says that miiyii, avyiikrta, prakrti,
agraha7Ja, avyakta, tamab, kiira7Ja, laya, sakti, mahiisupti, nidrii,
kfara and iikiisa are the terms which are used in older literature as
synonymous with avidyii. It is this entity that obstructs the
pure and independently self-revealing nature of Brahman, and
thus, standing as the painted canvas (citra-bhitti) of ignorance
(avidyii), deeds (karma) and past impressions of knowledge (piirva-
prajiiii-Sa1Jlskiira) produce the individual persons (jivatviipiidika).
Undergoing its peculiar transformations with God as its support,
it manifests itself as the two powers of knowledge and activity
(vijiiiina-kri'yii-sakti-dvaylifraya) and functions as the doer of all
actions and the enjoyer of all experiences (kartrtva-bhoktrtvaikii-
dhiirai.J). In association with the pure unchangeable light of Brah-
man it is the complex of these transformations which appears
as the immediate ego (aha'f!lkiira). It is through the association
with this ego that the pure self is falsely regarded as the enjoyer
of experiences. This transformation is called antai.Jkara7Ja, manas,
buddhi and the ego or the ego-feeler (aha1Jl-pratyayin) on the side
of its cognitive activity, while on the vibratory side of its activity
(spanda-saktyii), it is called prii1Ja or biomotor functions. The asso-
ciation of the ego with the pure litman, like the association of the
redness of a japii flower with a crystal, is a complex (granthi) which
manifests the dual characteristics of activity of the avidyii stuff
and the consciousness of the pure self (sa1Jlbhinnobhaya-riipatviit).
On the question as to whether avidyii has for both support
(lisraya) and object (vi~aya) Brahman Padmapada's own attitude
does not seem to be very clear. He only says that avidyii mani-
fests itself in the individual person (jiva) by obstructing the
real nature of the Brahman as pure self-luminosity and that the
XI] Padmapiida 105
sophy. But, when once they started perfecting the purely logical
appliances and began to employ them successfully in debates, it
became essential for all Vedantists also to master the ways of this
new formalism for the defence of their old views, with utter
neglect of new creations in philosophy. Thus in the growth of
the history of the dialectic of logical formalism in the Vedanta
system of thought it is found that during the eighth, ninth,
tenth and eleventh centuries the element of formalism was
at its lowest and the controversies of the Vedanta with the
Buddhists, l\limarpsists and Naiyayikas were based largely on the
analysis of experience from the Vedantic standpoint and its general
approach to philosophy. But in the twelfth and the thirteenth
centuries the controversy was largely v;ith the Nyaya and Vaise!}ika
and dominated by considerations of logical formalism above every-
thing else. Criticisms became for the most part nothing more than
criticisms of Nyaya and Vaise~ika definitions. Parallel to this a
new force was gradually growing during these centuries in the
writings of Ramanuja and his followers, and in the succeeding
centuries the followers of l\ladhva, the great Vai~J)ava writer, began
to criticize the V edantists (of the Sankara school) very strongly.
It is found therefore that from the thirteenth or fourteenth century
the Vedantic attack was largely directed against the followers of
Ramanuja and 1\lladhva. A history of this controversy will be given
in the third and fourth volumes of the present work. But the
method of logical formalism had attained such an importance by
this time that, though the Vai!?J)avas brought in many new con-
siderations and points of view in philosophy, the method of logical
formalism never lost its high place in dialectic discussions.
tremely knotty here and there, so that no one could understand its difficulties
easily except when explained by the teacher. Thus he says:
grantha-granthir iha kvacit kvacid api nyiisi prayatniin maya
priijiiammanya-manii hatlzena pafhitlmiismin khala!z khelatu,
sraddhiiriiddha-gurul;z slathzkrta-drl}ha-granthil;z samiisiidayat
tv etat-tarkarasormmi-majjana sukhe~v iisaiijana'!l sajjanal;z.
Klzm;ufana-khm;rtja-klziidya, p. 1341. Chowkhamba Sanskrit Book Depot,
Benares, 1914.
Several commentaries have been written on this celebrated work by various
people, e.g. Khm;tjana-mm;rfjana by Paramananda, Khm;rfjana-ma1Jljana by
Bhavanatha, Dzdlziti by Raghunatha SiromaQi, Prakiisa by Vardhamana, Vidyii-
bhara1Jl by VidyabharaQa, Vidyii-siigarl by Vidyasagara, Kha1Jfjana-flkii by
Padmanabha PaQ<;iita, Jinanda-vardhana by Sankara Misra, Srt-darpa1Ja by
Subhankara, Kha1J4ana-mahii-tarka by Caritrasirpha, Kha1Jf/ana-kha1Jljana by
Pragalbha Misra, Si~ya-lzitai#1Jf by Padmanabha, Kha1Jtfana-kufhiira by Goku-
lanatha Upadhyaya. At least one refutation of it was attempted by the Naiya-
yikas, as is evidenced by the work of a later Vacaspati (A.D. 1350) from Bengal,
called Klza1Jljanoddlziira.
XI) Vedanta Dialectic of Srlhar~a 127
be right, yet the way in which one happened to come by this idea
may be wrong. There may be a fire on a hill; but yet, if one infers
the existence of such a fire from fog appearing as smoke, then such
an inference is false, even though the idea of the fire may itself
be right. Leaving aside the discussion of the propriety of such
demands on the part of the opponents, the Vedantist says that
the Upani~adic texts demonstrate the truth of the ultimate oneness
of reality.
The ultimate oneness of all things, taught in the Upani~ad texts,
cannot be said to be negatived by our perceptual experience of
"many." For our perception deals with individual-things of the
moment and therefore cannot apply to all things of the past,
present, and future and establish the fact of their all being different
from one another. Perception applies to the experience of the
immediate present and is therefore not competent to contradict the
universal proposition of the oneness of all things, as taught by the
Upani~ads. Again, as Snhar~a says, in our perception of the things
of experience we do not realize the differences of the perceptual
objects from ourselves, but the differences among the objects
themselves. The self-revelation of knowledge also fails to show its
difference from all objects of the world. The difference, again, of the
perceived objects from all other things is not revealed in the nature
of the perceived objects themselves as svarupa-bheda, or difference
as being of the nature of the objects which are differenced-if that
were the case, then the false and erroneous perception of silver
would also at once manifest its difference from the object (the
conch-shell) on which the false silver is imposed. In this way
Srihar~a tried to prove that the purport of non-duality, as asserted
in the Vedic texts, is not contradicted by any other, stronger,
proof. Most of these arguments, being of a verbal nature, may
better here be dropped. The main stress seems to rest on the
idea that the immediate differences between the things perceived
do not in the least suggest or imply that they, in their essence
or in their totality, could not ultimately, as a result of our pro-
gressive and better knowledge of things, be considered as one
identical reality (as is asserted in the Upani~ads). If perception
cannot prove anything, inferences by themselves cannot stand
alone or contradict the non-duality taught in the Upani~ads. In
our world of phenomenal experience our minds are always im-
pressed with the concept of difference; but Srihar~a says that the
DII 9
130 The Sankara School of Vedanta [cH.
mere existence of an idea does not prove its reality. Words
can give rise to ideas relating even to absolutely non-existing
things.
Again, the concept of" difference" can hardly be defined. If it
lies involved within the essential nature of all things that differ,
then difference would be identical with the nature of the things
that differ. If difference were different from the things that differ,
then it would be necessary to find out some way of establishing a
relation between "difference" and the things that differ, and this
might require another connection, and that another, and so we
should have a vicious endless series. He says that "difference"
may be looked upon from a number of possible points of view.
Firstly, "difference" is supposed to be of the nature of things.
But a "difference" which is of the nature of the things which
differ must involve them all in one; for there cannot be any
difference without referring to the things from which there is
difference. If by" book" we mean its difference from table, then
the table has to enter into the nature of the book, and that would
mean the identity of the table and the book. There is no meaning
in speaking of" difference" as being the thing, when such differ-
ences can only be determined by a reference to other things. If
"difference" be the nature of a thing, such a nature cannot be in
need of being determined by other things. One thing, say a book,
is realized as being different from a table-the nature of the
difference may here be described as being "the quality of being
distinguished from a table"; but "the quality of being distin-
guished" would have no meaning or locus standi, unless "the table"
were also taken with it. If anyone says that a book is identical with
"the quality of being distinguished from," then this will in-
variably include "the table" also within the essence of the book,
as "the table " is a constituent of the complex quality "to be dis-
tinguished from," which necessarily means " to be distinguished
from a table." So on this view also" the table" and all other things
which could be distinguished from the book are involved in the
very essence of all things-a conclusion which contradicts the very
concept of difference. It may also be pointed out that the concept
of difference is entirely extraneous to the concept of things as they
are understood or perceived. The notion of "difference" is itself
different from the notion of the book and the table, whether jointly
or separately. The joint notion of the book and the table is different
XI] Vedanta Dialectic of Srlhar$a 131
from the notion that" the book differs from the table." For under-
standing the nature of a book it is not necessary that one should
understand previously its difference from a table. l\Ioreover, even
though the notion of difference may in some sense be said to lead
to our apprehension of individual things, the apprehension of such
individual things does not carry with it the idea that it is on account
of such difference that the individual things are perceived. It is
through similarity or resemblance between two things-say be-
tween a wild cow (gavaya) and the domestic cow (go)-that a man
can recognize an animal as a wild cow; but yet, when he so con-
siders an animal as a wild cow, he does not invariably because
of such a resemblance to a cow think the animal to be a wild
cow. The mental decision regarding an animal as a cow or a wild
cow takes place immediately without any direct participation of
the cause which produced it. So, even though the notion of differ-
ence may be admitted to be responsible for our apprehension of
the different individual things, an apprehension of an individual
thing does not involve as a constituent any notion of difference.
It is therefore wrong to think that things are of the nature of
difference.
In another view, wherein difference is interpreted as "mental
negation" or "otherness" (anyonyiibhiiva), this "otherness" (say
of the book from the table) is explained as being the negation of
the identity of one with the other. When one says that the book is
other than the table, what is meant is that identity of the book with
the table is denied. Srihar~a here raises the objection that, if the
identity of the book with the table was absolutely chimerical, like the
hare's horn, such a denial of identity would be absolutely meaning-
less. It cannot, again, be suggested that this mental negation, or
negation as otherness, means the denial of one class-concept in
respect of another (e.g. that of book on the table); for there is in
these class-concepts no such special characteristic (dharma) by
virtue of which one could be denied of the other or they could be
distinguished from each other, since the Naiyayika, against whom
Srihar~a's arguments are directed, does not admit that class-con-
cepts possess any distinguishing qualities. In the absence of such
distinguishing qualities they may be regarded as identical: but in
that case the denial of one class-concept (say of the table) would
involve the denial of the class-concept of the thing itself (e.g. the
book), since the class-concepts of the book and the table, not having
IJ2 The Saizkara School of Vedanta [cH.
any distinguishing qualities, are identical; and, further, through
mental denial both the book and the table would be devoid of the
class-concepts of book and table, and so there would be no way of
distinguishing one thing from another, book from table. It is easy
to see therefore that there is no way of making a special case re-
garding negation as otherness (anyonyiibhiiva). Again, if difference
is regarded as the possession of opposite characters (vaidharmya),
then also it may be asked whether the opposite characters have
further opposite characters to distinguish them from one another,
and these again others, and so there is a vicious infinite; if these
are supposed to stop anywhere, then the final characters at that
stage, not having any further opposite characters to distinguish
them, would be identical, and hence all opposite characters in the
backward series would be meaningless and all things would be
identical. If on the contrary it is admitted at the very first stage
that opposite or differing characters have no differing characters to
distinguish them from one another, then the characters will be
identical. Again, it may be asked whether these distinguishing
characters are themselves different fron1 the objects which possess
them or not. If they are different, one may again ask concerning
the opposing characters which lead to this difference and then again
about other opposing characters of these, and so on. If these
infinite differences were to hold good, they could not arrive in less
than infinite time, whereas the object is finite and limited in time.
If, again, they came all at once, there would be such a disorderly
medley of these infinite differences that there would be no way of
determining their respective substrates and their orderly successive
dependence on one another. And, since in the series the earlier
terms of difference can only be established by the establishment
of the later terms of difference, the forward movement in search
of the later terms of difference, in support of the earlier terms
of difference, makes these earlier terms of difference un-
necessary1.
It cannot, therefore, be said that our perception of differences
has any such intrinsic validity that it can contradict the ultimate
unity taught in the Upani~ad texts. Sriha~a does not deny that
we perceive seeming differences in all things, but he denies their
1 prathama-bhediisvlkiira-prayojanasya bheda-vyavahiiriider dvitfya-bhediid
the effect is produced at the third moment. In this view the effect is produced
by the destroyed cause.
1
idam eva hi kiiryasya kiirm:ziipek~ii yat tad-anantara-blziivitvam. Tattva-
sa1pgraha, p. 177.
3
na hi vayam iinantarya-miitra1Jl kiirya-kiira1JO.-bhiiviidhigati-nibandhana1Jl
.• . yasyaiviinantara1Jl yad bhavati tat tasya kiirm:zam i~ate. Ibid. p. 180.
c Santarak!?ita and Kamalasila are Buddhists who style themselves niriikiira-
vijfiiina-vadin.
XI] Dialectical criticisms of Siintarak#ta and Kamalaslla 187
(viisanii) means nothing more than the production of a new mental
state of a modified nature. There is again no permanent perceiver
who remembers and recognizes; it is only when in a particular series
of conscious states, on account of the strength of a particular
perception, such particularly modified mental states are generated
as may be said to contain seeds of memory, that memory is possible.
The Buddhists also do not consider that there is one person
who suffers bondage and is liberated; they think that bondage
means nothing more than the production of painful states due to
ignorance (avidyii) and other mental causes, and that liberation
also means nothing more than purity of the mental states due
to cessation of ignorance through right knowledge.
1
prapaficasya vastutviibhiiviin niidvaita-honib avastutviibhiiviic ca pratyak$iidy-
apriimii1)yam· apy-ukta-do$iihhiiviit. MS. p. 64.
2
yatha citrasya bhittib siik.iiit nopiidiinam niipi saha.ill'f!l citTaT[l tasyiih niipy-
avasthiintara'!l mrda iva gha!iidib niipi gu't)iintariigama/:l iimrasyeva raktatiidi/:l na
ciisyiih janmiidis citriit priig ardhll'f!l ca bhiiviit, yady api bhitti'!l vinii citra'!' na
bhati tathiipi na sii citra'!' vina bhiiti ity evam-iidy-anubhUtir bhitti-jagac-citrayor
yojyam. Ibid. p. 73.
The Sankara School of Vedanta [cH.
as there is the vrtti-object contact, the veil is removed and the object is illu-
minated; the next moment there is again an ajiziina-veil covering the object, and
again there is the vrtti-object contact, and again illumination of the object, and
thus there is very quick succession of veils and their removals, as the perception
of the object continues in time. On account of the rapidity of this succession
it is not possible to notice it (vrtti-vijfiiinasya siivayavatviic ca hriisa-da$iiyii1J1-
dlpa-jviiliiyii iva tamo 'ntara1J1- mohiintaram iivaritum vi~aya,_ pravartate tato
'pi kramamii1Ja1J1- k~a1Jiintare siimagry-anusiire7Ja vijfiiiniintara1J1- vi~ay ivara7Ja-
bhangenaiva sva-kiirya1J1- karoti, tathii sarvii1Jy api atisaighryiit tu jfiiina-bhedavad
iivara1Jiintara1J1- na la~yate. Vediinta-kaumudl, MS. copy, p. 46). This view of
the Vediinta-kaumudl is different from the view of the V ediinta-paribhii~ii, which
holds that in the case of continuous perception of the same object there are not
different successive awarenesses, but there is one unchanged continuous vrtti
and not different vrttis removing different ajiiiinas (kin ca siddhiinte dhiirii-
viihika-buddhi-sthale na jfiiinii-bhedab kintu yiiviid ghata-sphura7Jam tiivad
ghatiikiiriintal;kara7Ja-vrttir ekaiva na tu niinii vrtteb sva-virodhi-vrtty-utpatti-
parya1)tG'f!l sthiiyitviibhyupagamiit. Vediinta-parib~ii, pp. 26, 27, Bombay, 191 1).
2
atal; siivayava-sattviitmakam antal;kara7Jam eva anudbhuta-rilpa-sparsam
adrsyam aspr$ya1J1- ca vi~ayiikiire7Ja pari1Jamate. V ediinta-kaumudt, MS. copy, p. 42.
14-2
212 The Sankara School of Vedanta [cH.
dispelling an intellectual darkness enfolding the object before its
illumination, there is no separate perception of time as an entity
standing apart from the objects ; perception of time is but
the perception of the succession of cognitive acts, and what is
regarded as the present time is that in which the successive time-
moments have been fused together into one concrete duration: it
is this concrete duration, which is in reality but a fusion of mo-
mentary cognitive acts and awarenesses, that is designated as the
present time 1 • According to Ramadvaya the definition of per-
ception would not therefore include the present time as a separate
element over and above the object as a separate datum of per-
ception; for his view denies time as an objective entity and regards
it only as a mode of cognitive process.
Ramadvaya's definition of right knowledge is also different
from that of Dharmaraja Adhvarindra. Ramadvaya defines right
knowledge (pramii) as experience which does not wrongly represent
its object (yathiirthiinubhavab pramii), and he defines the instru-
Inent of right knowledge as that which leads to it 2 • Verbally this
definitionisentirelydifferent from that of Dharmaraja Adhvarindra,
with whom the two conditions of pramii or right knowledge are
that it should not be acquaintance with what was already known
(anadhigata) and that it should be uncontradicted 3 • The latter
condition, however, seems to point only to a verbal difference from
Ramadvaya's definition; but it may really mean very much more
than a verbal difference. For, though want of contradiction
(Dharmaraja Adhvarindra's condition) and want of wrong repre-
sentation (Ramadvaya's condition) may mean the same thing, yet
in the former case the definition of truth becomes more subjective
than in the latter case; for want of wrong representation refers to
an objective correspondence and objective certainty. An awareness
may wrongly represent an object, but yet may not be found
contradicted in the personal history of one or even many observers.
Such a definition of truth becomes very relative, since its limits are
not fixed by correspondence with its object. Considering the fact
1
na kiilafz pratya~a-gocarafz ... stambhiidir eva priig-abhiiva-nivrtti-pradhva,_-
siinutpatti-rupo vartamiinal; tad-avacchinalz kiilo 'pi vartamiinafz sa ca tathii-
vidho 'neka-jiiiina-siidhiira~ eva, na caitiivatii jiiiina-yaugapadyiipattil; suksma-
kiiliipe~ayii kra.,a-sambhaviit, na ca sukjma-kiilopiidluniim apratltil} kiirya-
kramettaiva unnlyamiinatviit. Vediinta-kaumudi, MS. copy, pp. 2o-22.
2
Ibid. p. 16.
3
tatra smrti-vyiivrttam pramiitvam anadhigatiibiidhitiirtha-fl#aya-jiiiinatvam.
Vediinta-parib/zi4ii, p. 20.
XI] Ramiidvaya 213
Origination.
The world as such never existed in the past, nor exists now,
nor will exist hereafter; so it has no production or destruction in
any real sense 1 • But yet there is the appearance, and its genesis
has somehow to be accounted for. The ultimate entity is, of course,
of the nature of pure cessation (santa), as described above. The
order of moments leading to the manifestation of the world-
appearance can be described in this way: At first there is some-
thing like a self-reflecting thought in the ultimate entity, producing
some indescribable objectivity which gives rise to an egohood.
Thus, on a further movement, which is akin to thought, is produced
a state which can be described as a self-thinking entity, which
is clear pure intelligence, in which everything may be reflected.
It is only this entity that can be called conscious intelligence
(cit). As the thought-activity becomes more and more concrete
(ghana-sa1{lvedana), other conditions of soul (jiva) arise out of it.
At this stage it forgets, as it were, its subject-objectless ultimate
state, and desires to flow out of itself as a pure essence of creative
movement (bhavana-matra-sara). The first objectivity is aka/a,
manifested as pure vacuity. At this moment arise the ego (aha1{lta)
and time (kala). This creation is, however, in no sense real. and is
nothing but the seeming appearances of the self-conscious move-
ment (sva-Sa1{lvedana-matrakam) of the ultimate being. All the
network of being is non-existent, and has only an appearance of
existing. Thought (sa1{lvit), which at this moment is like the aka/a
and the ego and which is the seed (bija) of all the conceivings
of thought (bhavana), formulates by its movement air 2 • Again,
bandhyii-putra-vyoma-bane yathii na stafz kadiicana
jagad-iidy akhila1Jl drsya1Jl tathii niisti kadiicana
na cotpanna1Jl na ca dhva'lJlSi yat kiliidau na vidyate
utpatti/:l krdrsl tasya nasa-sabdasya ka kathii. m. 11. 4, S·
mana[z sa'tflpadyate lola1Jl kalanii-kalanonmukham;
kalayantl manaT:z saktir iidau bhiivayati kfat)iit.
iikiisa-bhiivaniimacchiim iabda-bija-rasonmukhlm;
tatas lii1Jl ghanalii'tfl jiiia1Jl ghana-spanda -kramiin manafz.
IV. 44· 16, 17.
A comparison of numerous passages like these shows that each mental
creation is the result of a creative thought-movement called bhii'lJanii, and each
successive movement in the chain of a succession of developing creative move-
ments is said to be ghana, or concrete_ Ghana ha<> been paraphrased in the Tatparya-
prakiisa as accretion (upacaya). Bhiiviina is the same as spanda; as the result of
each thought-movement, there was thought-accretion (ghana), and corresponding
to each ghana there was a semi-statical creation, and foJlowing each ghana there
was a spanda (ghana-spanda-kramlit) _
The Philosophy of the Yoga-viisi~tha [cH.
following the iikiisa moment and from it as a more concrete state
(ghanzbhuya), comes forth the sound-potential (kha-tan-miitra). This
sound-potential is the root of the production of all the Vedas, with
their words, sentences and valid means of proof. Gradually the
conceivings of the other tan-miitras of sparsa, tejas, rasa and gandha
follow, and from them the entire objective world, which has no
other reality than the fact that they are conceptions of the
self-conscious thought 1 • The stages then are, that in the state of
equilibrium (sama) of the ultimate indescribable entity called the
Brahman, which, though pure consciousness in essence, is in an un-
manifested state, there first arises an objectivity (cetyatva) through
its self-directed self-consciousness of the objectivity inherent
in it (satas cetylif!Zsa-cetaniit); next arises the soul, where there
is objective consciousness only through the touch or connection
of objectivity (cetya-sar!',yoga-cetaniit) instead of the self-directed
consciousness of objectivity inherent in itself. Then comes the
illusory notion of subjectivity, through \vhich the soul thinks that it
is only the conscious subject and as such is different from the object
(cetyailw-paratii-vaJiit). This moment naturally leads to the state of
the subjective ego, which conceives actively (buddhitviikalana1J1),
and it is this conceiving activity which leads to the objective con-
ceptions of the different tan-miitras and the world-appearance.
These are alJ, however, ideal creations, and as such have no reality
apart from their being as mere appearance. Since their nature is
purely conceptual (vikalpa), they cannot be real at any time. All
that appears as existent does so only as a result of the conceptual
activity of thought. Through its desire, "I shall see," there comes
the appearance of the two hollows of the eye, and similarly in the
case of touch, smell, hearing and taste. There is no single soul,
far less an infinite number of them. It is by the all-powerful
conceptual activity of Brahman that there arises the appearance of
so many centres of subjective thought, as the souls (jzvas). In
reality, however, the jzvas have no other existence than the con-
ceptualizing activity which produces their appearance. There is
no materiality or form: these are nothing but the self-flashings
of thought (citta-camatkiira).
Manas, according to this theory, is nothing but that function
of pure consciousness through which it posits out of itself an object
of itself. Here the pure conscious part may be called the spiritual
1 III. 12.
xn] Karma, Manas and the Categories 237
part and its objectivity aspect the material part 1 • In its objectivity
also the cit perceives nothing but itself, though it appears to per-
ceive something other than itself (svam evanyatayli drstva), and
this objectivity takes its first start with the rise of egohood
(ahaf!llli).
But to the most important question, namely, how the original
equilibrium is disturbed and how the present development of the
conceptual creation has come about, the answer given in the
Yoga-vlis~tha is that it is by pure accident (klikataliya-yogena)
that such a course of events took place. It is indeed disappointing
that such a wonderful creation of world-appearance should have
ultimately to depend on accident for its origin 2 • It is considered
irrelevant to enquire into the possibility of some other cause of
the ultimate cause, the Brahman 3 •
The World-Appearance.
The Yoga-'lJiis#tha is never tired of repeating that this world is
like a hare's horn, a forest in the sky, or a lotus in the sky. The state
of Brahman is higher than the state of manas. It is by becoming
manas that Brahman transforms itself into thought-activity and
thus produces the seeming changeful appearances. But Brahman in
itself cannot have anything else (brahma-tattve 'nyatii niistz). But,
though there is this change into manas, and through it the production
of the world-appearance, yet such a change is not real, but illusory;
for during all the time when this change makes its appearance
and seems to stay, Brahman remains shut up within itself, change-
less and unchangeable. All objective appearance is thus nothing
but identically the same as the Brahman, and all that appears
has simply no existence. The seer never transforms himself into
objectivity, but remains simply identical with himself in all ap-
pearances of objectivity. But the question arises, how, if the world-
appearance is nothing but the illusory creative conception of manas,
can the order of the world-appearance be explained? The natural
answer to such a question in this system is that the seeming
correspondence and agreement depend upon the similarity of the
imaginary products in certain spheres, and also upon accident. It
is by accident that certain dream series correspond with certain
other dream series 1 • But in reality they are all empty dream con-
structions of one manas. It is by the dream desires that physical
objects gradually come to be considered as persistent objects
existing outside of us. But, though during the continuance of the
dreams they appear to be real, they are all the while nothing but
mere dream conceptions. The self-alienation by which the pure
consciousness constructs the dream conception is such that, though
it always remains identical with itself, yet it seems to posit itself as
its other, and as diversified by space, time, action and substance
( de$a-kiila-kriyii-dravyai!z).
The d;fference between the ordinary waking state and the
dream state consists in this, that the former is considered by us as
associated with permanent convictions (sthira-pratyaya), whereas
the latter is generally thought to have no permanent basis.
Any experience which persists, whether it be dream or not,
1 melanam api svakiya-parakfya-svapniinii1Jl daiviit kvacit sa1]'lviidavat sviintafz-
called viisanii. Those who have not the proper wisdom always
believe in the representations of the ideations of viisanii without
any hesitation and consider them to be true; and, since both the
viisanii and the prii1Ja-spanda are the ground and cause of the
manifestations of citta, the cessation of one promptly leads to the
cessation of the other. The two are connected with each other in
the relation of seed and shoot (bljiinkuravat); from prli1Ja-spanda
there is viisanii, and from viisanii there is prii1Ja-spanda. The object
of knowledge is inherent in the knowledge itself, and so with the
cessation of knowledge the object of knowledge also ceases 1 •
As a description of prii1Ja we find in the Y oga-viisiftha that it is
said to be vibratory activity (spanda-saktt) situated in the upper part
of the body, while apiina is the vibratory activity in the lower part
of the body. There is a natural prii1Jliyiima going on in the body
in waking states as well as in sleep. The mental outgoing tendency
of the prli1Jas from the cavity of the heart is called recaka, and the
drawing in of the prli1Jas (dviidasiingult) by the apiina activity is
called puraka. The interval between the cessation of one effort of
apiina and the rise of the effort of prii1Ja is the stage of kumbhaka.
Bhusm._19a, the venerable old crow who was enjoying an excep-
tionally long life, is supposed to instruct Vasi~tha in VI. 24 on the
subject of prii1Ja. He compares the body to a house with the ego
(aha'f!lklira) as the householder. It is supposed to be supported
by pillars of three kinds 2 , provided with nine doors (seven aper-
tures in the head and two below), tightly fitted with the tendons
(sniiyu) as fastening materials and cemented with blood, flesh and
fat. On the two sides of it there are the two niit}is, £tja and p£ngalii,
lying passive and unmanifested (nimil£te). There is also a machine
(yantra) of bone and flesh (asthi-mliJ!lsa-maya) in the shape of three
double lotuses (padma-yugma-traya) having pipes attached to them
running both upwards and downwards and with their petals closing
upon oneanother(anyonya-m£lat-komala-saddala). When it is slowly
samula1[l naryata}.z k#pra1[l mula-cchediid iva druma}.z.
sa1Jlvida1[l viddhi sa1Jlvedya1Jl bija1Jl dhiratayii vinii
na sa1Jlbhavati sa1[lVedya1[l taila-hinas tilo yathii
na bahir niintare ki1Jlcil sa1JlVedya1[l vidyate Prthak.
Yoga-viisiftha, v. 91. 66 and 67.
2
tri-prakiira-mahii-sthil7Jam, VI. 24. 14. The commentator explains the three
kinds of pillars as referring to the three primal entities of Indian medicine--
vii.yu (air),pitta (bile) and kapha (phlegm)-viita-pitta-kapha-lak~a7Ja-tri-prakiirii
mahiinta}.z sthu'l}ii vi~tambha-kiif.thiini yasya. I am myself inclined to take the
three kinds of pillars as referring to the bony structure of three parts of the body-
the skull, the trunk, and the legs.
DII 17
The Philosophy of the Yoga-viisi~tha [cH.
filled with air, the petals move, and by the movement of the petals
the air increases. Thus increased, the air, passing upwards and
downwards through different places, is differently named as prii:l}a,
apiina, samiina, etc. It is in the threefold machinery of the lotus
of the heart (hrt-padma-yantra-tritaye) that all the prii'l}a forces
operate and spread forth upwards and downwards like the rays
from the moon's disc. They go out, return, repulse and draw
and circulate. Located in the heart, the air is called prii'l}a: it is
through its power that there is the movement of the eyes, the opera-
tion of the tactual sense, breathing through the nose, digesting of
food and the power of speech 1 • The prii'l}a current of air stands
for exhalation (recaka) and the apiina for inhalation (puraka), and
the moment of respite between the two operations is called kum-
bhaka; consequently, if the prli1:za and apiina can be made to cease
there is an unbroken continuity of kumblzaka. But all the functions
of the prii!W, as well as the upholding of the body, are ultimately
due to the movement of citta 2 • Though in its movement in the
body the prii'l}a is associated with air currents, still it is in reality
nothing but the vibratory activity proceeding out of the thought-
activity, and these two act and react upon each other, so that, if
the vibratory activity of the body be made to cease, the thought-
activity will automatically cease, and vice-versa. Thus through
spanda-nirodha we have prii1_1a-nirodha and through prii'l}a-nirodlza
we havespanda-nirodha. In the Yoga-viisi#ha, III. 13. 31, viiyu is
said to be nothing but a vibratory entity (spandateyat sa tad viiyul;).
In Y. 78 it is said that citta and movement are in reality one
and the same, and are therefore altogether inseparable, like the
snow and its whiteness, and consequently with the destruction of
one the other is also destroyed. There are two ways of destroying
the citta, one by Yoga, consisting of the cessation of mental states,
and the other by right knowledge. As water enters through the
crevices of the earth, so air (viita) tnoves in the body through the
niitjzs and is called prii1Ja. It is this priil}a air which, on account of
its diverse functions and works, is differently named as apiina, etc.
1 Yoga-viisi~tha, VI. 24. It is curious to note in this connection that in the
whole literature ~f the Ayur-Yeda there is probably no passage where there is such
a clear description of the respiratory process. Pupphusa, or lungs, are mentioned
only by name in Susruta-sa1[lhitii, but none of their functions and modes of
operation are at all mentioned. It is probable that the discovery of the
respiratory functions of the lungs was made by a school of thought different
from that of the medical school.
2
Ibid. VI. zs. 61-74·
xn] Prii1Ja and its Control 259
But it is identical with citta. From the movement of prll1Ja there
is the movement of citta, and from that there is knowledge (samvid).
As regards the control of the movement of prii1Ja, the Yoga-vasinha
advises several alternatives. Thus it holds that through concen-
trating one's mind on one subject, or through fixed habits of long
inhalation associated with meditation, or through exhaustive ex-
halation, or the practice of not taking breath and maintaining
kumbhaka, or through stopping the inner respiratory passage by
attaching the tip of the tongue to the uvula 1 , or, again, through
concentration of the mind or thoughts on the point between the
two brows, there dawns all of a sudden the right knowledge and
the consequent cessation of prii1Ja activities 2 •
Professor 1\Iacdonell, writing on prii'l}a in the Ved£c Index,
vol. n, says," prii'l}a, properly denoting' breath,' is a term of wide
and vague significance in Vedic literature." In the narrow sense
prii'l}a denotes one of the vital airs, of which five are usually
enumerated, viz. prii1Ja, apiina, vyiina, udiina and samiina. The
exact sense of each of these breaths, when all are mentioned, cannot
be determined. The word prli1Ja has sometimes merely the general
sense of breath, even when opposed to apiina. But its proper sense
is beyond question "breathing forth,'' "expiration." But, though
in a few cases the word may have been used for "breath" in its
remote sense, the general meaning of the word in the Upani!?ads
is not air current, but some sort of biomotor force, energy or
vitality often causing these air currents 3 • It would be tedious to
refer to the large number of relevant Upani~ad texts and to try
to ascertain after suitable discussion their exact significance in each
tiilu-mala-gatii:rrz yatniij jihvayiikramya ghanfikiim
firdhva-randhra-gate prii7Je priit)a-spando nirudhyate.
Yoga-viis#tha, v. 78. 25.
2
It is important to notice in this connection that most of the forms of prii7Ja-
yiima as herein described, except the hatha-yoga process of arresting the inner
air passage by the tongue, otherwise known as khecarl-mfidrii, are the same as
described in the sfitras of Patail.jali and the bhii~ya of Vyasa; and this fact has
also been pointed out by the commentator Anandabodhendra Bhik!?u in his
commentary on the above.
3
Difference between prii7Ja and viiyu, Aitareya, II. 4; the niisikya prii7Ja, I. 4·
Relation of prii7Ja to other functions, Kautitaki, 11. 5; prii7Ja as life, II. 8;
prii7Ja connected with vayu, II. 12; prii7Ja as the most important function of
life, II. 14; prii7Ja as consciousness, 111. 2. Distinction of niisikya and mukhya
prii7Ja, Chiindogya, II. 1-9; the function of the five viiyus, III. 3-5; prii7Ja as the
result of food, I. 8. 4; of water, VI. 5· 2, VI. 6. 5, VI. 7· 6; priiiJa connected with
iitman, as everything else connected with prii7Ja, like spokes of a wheel, Brhad-
iira7Jyaka, II. s. 15; prii~za as strength, ibid. v. 14. 4; prii7Ja as force running
through the su~um7Jii nerve, ]}faitrl, VI. 21 ; etc.
17·2
260 The Philosophy of the Yoga-vdsiftha [cH.
case. The best way to proceed therefore is to refer to the earliest
traditional meaning of the word, as accepted by the highest Hindu
authorities. I refer to the Vediinta-sutra of Badarayal)a, which may
be supposed to be the earliest research into the doctrines discussed
in the Upani~ads. Thus the Vediinta-sutra, II. 4· 9 (na viiyu-kriye
J>rthag upadesiit), speaking of what may be the nature of priir:za, says
that it is neither air current (viiyu) nor action (kriya), since priir:za
has been considered as different from air and action (in the
Upani~ads). Sailkara, commenting on this, says that from such
passages as yalz priir:zab sa e~a viiyulz paiica 'vidhalz priir:zo piino vyiina
udiinalz samanalz (what is priil}a is ~iiyu and it is fivefold, priir:za,
apiina, vyiina, udiina,samiina), it may be supposed that vayu (air)
is priir:za, but it is not so, since in Chiindogya, 111. 18. 4, it is stated
that they are different. Again, it is not the action of the senses,
as the Sarpkhya supposes; for it is regarded as different from the
senses in Mu1J¢aka, II. 1. 3· The passage which identifies viiyu with
priil}a is intended to prove that it is the nature of viiyu that has
transformed itself into the entity known as priil}a (just as the
human body itself may be regarded as a modification or trans-
formation of k#ti, earth). It is not viiyu, but, as Vacaspati says,
"viiyu-bheda," which Amalananda explains in his Vediinta-kalpa-
taru as viiyolz paril}iima-rupa-karya-vise~alz, i.e. it is a particular
evolutionary product of the category of viiyu. Sankara's own state-
ment is equally explicit on the point. He says, "viiyur eviiyam
adhyiitmam iipannalz paiica-vyuho vise~iitmaniivat#thamiinalz priir:zo
nama bhar:zyate na tattviintara'f!l niipi viiyu-miitram," i.e. it is viiyu
which, having transformed itself into the body, differentiates
itself into a group of five that is called viiyu; priil}a is not alto-
gether a different category, nor simply air. In explaining the
nature of priitza in 11. 4· 10-12, Sankara says that priir:za is not as in-
dependent as jzva (soul), but performs everything on its behalf, like
a prime minister (riija-mantrivaj jzvasya sarviirtha-karal}atvena
upakaral}a-bhuto na svatantralz). Priil}a is not an instrument like
the senses, which operate only in relation to particular objects; for,
as is said in Chiindogya, v. 1. 6, 7, Brhad-iirar:zyaka, IV. 3· 12 and
Brhad-iiral}yaka, 1. 3· 19, when all the senses leave the body the
priil}a continues to operate. It is that by the functioning of which
the existence of the soul in the body, or life (jzva-sthitz), and the
passage of the jzva out of the body, or death (jivotkriintz), are
possible. The five viiyus are the five functionings of this vital
XII] Prt17Ja and its Control
principle, just as the fivefold mental states of right knowledge,
illusion, imagination (vikalpa), sleep and memory are the different
states of the mind. Vacaspati, in commenting on Vediinta-siltra,
II. 4· 11, says that it is the cause which upholds the body and the
senses (dehendriya-vidhiira7Ja-kiira7Ja1Jl prii1JaJ.z), though it must be
remembered that it has still other functions over and above the
upholding of the body and the senses (na kevala1JZ sarlrendriya-
dhiira1Jam asya kiiryam, Vacaspati, ibid.). In Vediinta-siltra, II.
4· 13, it is described as being atomic (a1Ju), which is explained
by Sailkara as" subtle" (suk~ma), on account of its pervading the
whole body by its fivefold functionings. Vacaspati in explaining it
says that it is called "atomic" only in a derivative figurative sense
(upacaryate) and only on account of its inaccessible or indefinable
character (duradhigamatii), though pervading the whole body.
Govindananda, in commenting upon Vediinta-siltra, II. 4· 9, says
that priil}a is a vibratory activity which upholds the process of life
and it has no other direct operation than that (parispanda-rupa-
prii7Janiinukillatviid aviintara-vyiipiiriibhiiviit). This seems to be
something like biomotor or life force. With reference to the
relation of prii7Ja to the motor organs or faculties of speech, etc.,
Sankara says that their vibratory activity is derived from prii1Ja
( viig-iidi~u parispanda-liibhasya prii1Jiiyattatvam, II. 4· 19). There are
some passages in the Vediinta-sutra which may lead us to think
that the five viiyus may mean air currents, but that it is not so is
evident from the fact that the substance of the prii1Ja is not air (etat
prii7Jiidi-paizcakam iikiisiidi-gata-rajo-'1JlSebhyo militebhya utpadyate),
and the rajas element is said to be produced from the five bhutas,
and the prii1Jas are called kriyiitmaka, or consisting of activity.
Rama Tirtha, commenting on the above passage of the Vediinta-
siira, says that it is an evolutionary product of the essence of viiyu
and the other bhutas, but it is not in any sense the external air
which performs certain physiological functions in the body ( tathii
mukhya-prii1JO 'pi viiyor biihyasya siltriitmakasya vikiiro na siirfra-
madhye nabhovad vrtti-liibha~miitreya avasthito biihya-viiyur eva) 1 •
Having proved that in Vedanta prii1Ja or any of the five viiyus means
biomotor force and not air current, I propose now to turn to the
Sarpkhya-Yoga.
The Sarpkhya-Yoga differs from the Vedanta in rejecting the
view that the prii7Ja is in any sense an evolutionary product of the
1 Vidvan-mano-ra1ijanl, p. 105, Jacob's edition, Bombay, 1916.
The Philosophy of the Yoga-vdsi~tha [cH.
nature of vayu. Thus VijfH1nabhik~u in his Vijiianamrta-bhii!ya
on Vedanta-sutra, II. 4· 10, says that pratza is called viiyu because
it is self-active like the latter (svatafz kriyavattvena ubhayoi.J, priitta-
viiyvofz sajatyiit). Again, in II. 4· 9, he says that priitta is neither air
nor the upward or downward air current (mukhya-pra1JO na vayu!J
napi siir:Zrasya urdhv-adho-vgamana-la~a1Jii vayu-kriya).
What is pra7Ja, then, according to Sarp.khya-Yoga? It is
mahat-tattva, which is evolved from prakrti, which is called buddhi
with reference to its intellective power and priitta with reference
to its power as activity. The so-called five viiyus are the different
functionings of the mahat-tattva (siimanya-kiirya-sadhiiratza'!l yat
kiiratza'!l mahat-tattva'!l tasyaiva vrtti-bhediifz pratziipaniidayafz; see
Vijiianiimrta-bhii~ya, II. 4· I I). Again, referring to Sii'!lkhya-kiirikii,
29, we find that the five vayus are spoken of as the common func-
tioning of buddhi, aha'!lkiira and manas, and Vacaspati says that
the five viiyus are their life. This means that the three, buddhi,
aha'!lkiira and manas, are each energizing, in their own way, and
it is the joint operation of these energies that is called the fivefold
priitta which upholds the body. Thus in this view also pratta is
biomotor force and no air current. The special feature of this
view is that this biomotor force is in essence a mental energy
consisting of the specific functionings of buddhi, aha'!lkiira and
manas 1 • It is due to the evolutionary activity of antafzkara7Ja.
In support of this view the Sa'!lkhya-pravacana-bhaVJa, II. 3 I,
Vyiisa-bhiiVJa, 111. 39, Vacaspati's Tattva-vaisiiradt, Bhik!?u's Yoga-
varttika, and Nagesa's Chiiya-vyiikhyii thereon may be referred
to. It is true, no doubt, that sometimes inspiration and expiration
of external air are also called priitta; but that is because in inspira-
tion and expiration the function of priitta is active or it vibrates. It
is thus the entity which moves and not mere motion that is called
priitta 2 • Ramanuja agrees with Sailkara in holding that pratta is
not air (vayu), but a transformation of the nature of air. But it
should be noted that this modification of air is such a modification
as can only be known by Yoga methods 3 •
The Vaise~ika, however, holds that it is the external air which
1
Gau<;lapada's bhiifya on the SaT[lkhya-kiirikii, 29 compares the action of
prii7Ja to the movement of birds enclosed in a cage which moves the cage:
compare Sailkara's reference to Vediinta-sutra, II. 4· 9·
2
Riimiinuja-bhiifya on Vediinta-sutra, II. 4· 8.
8
See the Tattva-muktii-kaliipa, 53-55, and also Riimiinuja-bhiiDJa and Sruta-
prakiilikii, II. 4· z-zs.
XII] PrtilJa and its Control
according to its place in the body performs various physiological
functions 1 • The medical authorities also support the view that
viiyu is a sort of driving and upholding power. Thus the Bhiiva-
prakiisa describes 'viiyu as follows: It takes quickly the do~as,
dhiitus and the malas from one place to another, is subtle, com-
posed of rajo-gu1}a; is dry, cold, light and moving. By its move-
ment it produces all energy, reg1 ~ates inspiration and expiration
and generates all movement and action, and by upholding the
keenness of the senses and the dhiitus holds together the heat,
senses and the mind 2 • Vahata in his A#ii1iga-Sa1Jlgraha also regards
viiyu as the one cause of all body movements, and there is nothing
to suggest that he meant air currents 3 • The long description of
Caraka (r. 12), as will be noticed in the next chapter, seems to
suggest that he considered the viiyu as the constructive and
destructive force of the universe, and as fulfilling the same kinds of
functions inside the body as well. It is not only a physical force
regulating the physiological functions of the body, but is also the
mover and controller of the mind in all its operations, as knowing,
feeling and willing. Susruta holds that it is in itself avyakta
(unmanifested or unknowable), and that only its actions as
operating in the body are manifested (avyakto vyakta-karmii ca).
In the Yoga-viisi#ha, as we have already seen above, prii1}a or
viiyu is defined as that entity which vibrates (spandate yat sa tad
viiyu/:t, III. 1 3) and it has no other reality than vibration. Prii1Ja itself
is, again, nothing but the movement of the intellect as ahaf!lkiira 4 •
Prii1}a is essentially of the nature of vibration (spanda), and
mind is but a form of prii1}a energy, and so by the control of the
mind the five viiyus are controlled 5 • The Saiva authorities also
agree with the view that prii1}a is identical with cognitive activity,
which passes through the nii{lls (nerves) and maintains all the body
movement and the movement of the senses. Thus K~emaraja says
that it is the cognitive force which passes in the form of prii1Ja
through the nii¢ls, and he refers to Bhana Kallata as also holding
the same view, and prii1Ja is definitely spoken of by him as force
(kutila-viihini prii1}a-sakti/:t) 6 • Sivopadhyaya in his Vivrti on the
1
Nyiiya-kandall of Sridhara, p. 48.
2
Bhiiva-prakiisa, Sen's edition, Calcutta, p. 47·
3
Vahata's A~!iiilga-sa1Jlgraha and the commentary by Indu, Trichur, 1914,
pp. 1]8, 212.
4
Yoga-viisi~tha, III. 14. 5
Ibid. v. 13, 78.
6
Siva-sutra-vim.ariinl, III. 43, 44·
The Philosophy of the Yoga-vasi~tha [cH.
Vijfiana-bhairava also describes priir;za as force (sakti), and the
Vijfiiina-bhat"rava itself does the same 1 • Bhatta Ananda in his
Vz}fiiina-kaumudi describes priir;za as a functioning of the mind
(citta-vrtti).
Stages of Progress.
It has been already said that the study of philosophy and
association with saintly characters are the principal means with
which a beginner has to set out on his toil for the attainment of
salvation. In the first stage (prathamii bhumikii) the enquirer has to
increase his wisdom by study and association with saintly persons.
The second stage is the stage of critical thinking ( vicara~;zii); the
third is that of the mental practice of dissociation from all passions,
etc. (asaflga-bhiivanii); the fourth stage (vilapani) is that in which
through a right understanding of the nature of truth the world-ap-
pearance shows itself to be false; the fifth stage is that in which the
saint is in a state of pure knowledge and bliss (suddha-sa1Jlvit-mayii-
nanda-rupa). This stage is that of the jtvan-mukta, in which the
saint may be said to be half-asleep and half-awake (ardha-supta-
prabuddha). The sixth stage is that in which the saint is in a state
of pure bliss; it is a state which is more like that of deep dreamless
sleep (su~upta-sadrsa-sthitz). The seventh stage is the last transcen-
dental state (turyiitzta), which cannot be experienced by any saint
while he is living. Of these the first three stages are called the
waking state (jagrat), the fourth stage is called the dream state
(svapna), the fifth stage is called the dreamless (su~upta) state, the
sixth stage is an unconscious state called the turya, and the seventh
stage is called the turyiitita 3 •
Desire (icchii) is at the root of all our troubles. It is like a mad
elephant rushing through our system and trying to destroy it.
The senses are like its young, and the instinctive root inclinations
(viisanii) are like its flow of ichor. It can only be conquered by
the close application of patience (dhairya). Desire means the
imaginations of the mind, such as "let this happen to me," and
this is also called saflkalpa. The proper way to stop this sort of
imagining is to cease by sheer force of will from hoping or desiring
in this manner, and for this one has to forget his memory; for
1
Vijiiiina-bhairava and Vivrti, verse 67.
2
See the N_viiya-kandalf of Sridhara, p. 48, and also Dinakari and RiimarUdrf
on the Siddhiinta-muktiivalf on Bhiilii-parichcheda, p. 44·
3 Yoga-viis#tha, VI. 120.
xn] Stages of Progress
so long as memory continues such hopes and desires cannot be
stopped. The last stage, when all movement has ceased (aspanda)
and all thoughts and imaginations have ceased, is a state of un-
consciousness (avedanam) 1 • Yoga is also defined as the ultimate
state of unconsciousness (avedana), the eternal state when every-
thing else has ceased 2 • In this state citta is destroyed, and one is
reduced to the ultimate entity of consciousness; and thus, being
free of all relations and differentiations of subject and object,
one has no knowledge in this state, though it is characterized as
bodhiitmaka (identical with consciousness). This last state is indeed
absolutely indescribable (avyapadesya), though it is variously de-
scribed as the state of Brahman, Siva, or the realization of the
distinction of prakrti and puru~a 3 • The Yoga-viisiftha, however,
describes this state not as being.essentially one of bliss, but as a state
of unconsciousness unthinkable and indescribable. It is only the
fifth state that manifests itself as being of the nature of iinanda;
the sixth state is one of unconsciousness, which, it seems, can
somehow be grasped; but the seventh is absolutely transcendental
and indescribable.
The division of the progressive process into seven stages
naturally reminds one of the seven stages of prajfiii (wisdom) in
Pataiijali's Yoga-sutra and Vyiisa-bhii§ya. The seven stages of
prajiiii are there divided into two parts, the first containing four
and the second three. Of these the four are psychological and the
three are ontological, showing the stages of the disintegration of
dtta before its final destruction or citta-vimukti4 • Here also the
first four stages, ending with viliipanl, are psychological, whereas
the last three stages represent the advance of the evolution of dtta
towards its final disruption. But, apart from this, it does not seem
that there is any one to one correspondence of the prajfiii states
of the Yoga-v~tha with those of Pataiijali. The Yoga-viisiftha
occasionally mentions the name Yoga as denoting the highest state
and defines it as the ultimate state of unconsciousness (avedana1Jl
v-idur yogam) or as the cessation of the poisonous effects of desire 5 .
In the first half of the sixth book, chapter 125, the ultimate state
is described as the state of universal negation (sarviipahnava).
Existence of citta is pain, and its destruction bliss; the destruction
1 Yoga-viisqfha, VI. 126. 3
z Ibid. VI. 126. 99· Ibid. VI. 126. 71-'72.
' See my A History of Indian Philosophy, vol. I, Cambridge, 1922, p. 273.
5
Icchti-vqa-viktirasya viyoga1Jl yoga-ntimakam. Yoga-vtisq{ha, VI. 37· I; also
ibid. VI. 126. 99·
The Philosophy of the Yoga-vas#tha [cH.
of citta by cessation of knowledge-a state of neither pain nor
pleasure nor any intermediate state-a state as feelingless as that
of the stone (Pi:i!iitzavat-samam), is the ultimate state aimed at 1 •
Karma, according to the Yoga-vii.si$tha, is nothing but thought-
activity manifesting itself as subject-object knowledge. Abandon-
ment of karma therefore means nothing short of abandonment of
thought-activity or the process of knowledge 2 • Cessation of karma
thus means the annihilation of knowledge. The stirring of karma
or activity of thought is without any cause; but it is due to this
activity that the ego and all other objects of thought come into
being·; the goal of all our endeavours should be the destruction of
all knowledge, the unconscious, stone-like knowledgeless state 3 •
As there are seven progressive stages, so there are also seven
kinds of beings according to the weakness or strength of their
viisaniis. There are svapna-jiigara, saizkalpa-jiigara, kevala-
jiigrat-sthita, ciriij-jiigrat-sthita, ghana-jiigrat-sthita, jiigrat-svapna
and /qitza-jagaraka. Svapna-jiigara (dream -awake) persons are those
who in some past state of existence realized in dream experience all
our present states of being and worked as dream persons (~vapna
nara). The commentator in trying to explain this says that it is not
impossible; for everything is present everywhere in the spirit, so it is
possible that we, as dream persons of their dream experience,should
be present in their minds in their viisanii forms ( tad-antal;-karatze
viisaniitmanii sthitii/;) 4 • As both past and present have no existence
except in thought, time is in thought reversible, so that our exist-
ence at a time future to theirs does not necessarily prevent their
having an experience of us in dreams. For the limitations of time
and space do not hold for thought, and as elements in thought
everything exists everywhere (sarva1Jl sarvatra vidyate) 5 • By dreams
these persons may experience changes of life and even attain to
final emancipation. The second class, the saizkalpa-jiigaras, are those
who without sleeping can by mere imagination continue to con-
ceive all sorts of activities and existences, and may ultimately
attain emancipation. The third class, the kevala-jiigaras, are those
who are born in this life for the first time. When such beings pass
1 This turlyiitlta stage should not be confused with the sixth stage of su~pti,
Bhiimatr, u. 1 I. 28.
The Philosophy of the Y oga-viis#tha [CH.
perceiving of an object is not the object itself; it is always felt that
the perception of the blue is different from the blue which is
perceived; the blue stands forth as the object of perception and
the two can never be identical. This is universally felt and acknow-
ledged, and the Buddhist idealist, even while trying to refute it,
admits it in a way, since he says that what is inner perception appears
as if it exists outside of us, externally. If externality as such never
existed, how could there be an appearance of it in consciousness?
When all experiences testify to this difference between knowledge
and its object, the inner mental world of thoughts and ideas and
the external world of objects, how can such a difference be denied?
You may see a jug or remember it: the mental operation in these
two cases varies, but the object remains the same 1 •
The above argument of Sankara against Buddhist idealism
conclusively proves that he admitted the independent existence of
objects, which did not owe their existence to anybody's knowing
them. External objects had an existence different from and inde-
pendent of the existence of the diversity of our ideas or percepts.
But the idealism of the Yoga-vasi~tha is more like the doctrine of
the Buddhist idealists than the idealism of Sankara. For according
to the Yoga-vasi#ha it is only ideas that have some sort of existence.
Apart from ideas or percepts there is no physical or external world
having a separate or independent existence. Esse est percipi is the
doctrine of the Yoga-vasi#ha, while Sankara most emphatically
refutes such a doctrine. A. later exposition of Vedanta by Prakas-
ananda, known as Veda. ·l-siddhanta-muktavalz, seems to derive
its inspiration from the Yoga-vasz~tha in its exposition of Vedanta
on lines similar to the idealism of the Yoga-vasiftha, by denying the
existence of objects not perceived (ajiiata-sattvanabhyupagama) 2 •
Prakasananda disputes the ordinarily accepted view that cognition
of objects arises out of the contact of senses with objects; for
objects for him exist only so long as they are perceived, i.e. there
is no independent external existence of objects apart from their
perception. All objects have only perceptual existence (pratUzka-
sattva). Both Prakasananda and the Yoga-vasi#ha deny the
existence of objects when they are not perceived, while Sankara
not only admits their existence, but also holds that they exist in
the same form in which they are known ; and this amounts vir-
tually to the admission that our knowing an object does not add
1
Sankara's bhiiDJa on the Brahma-sutra, 11. 2. 28.
11 Siddhiinta-muktiivall. See The Pandit, new series, vol. XI, pp. 129-139.
xu] Buddhist and Vedanta Idealism
anything to it or modify it to any extent, except that it becomes
known to us through knowledge. Things are what they are, even
though they may not be perceived. This is in a way realism. The
idealism of Sankara's Vedanta consists in this, that he held that
the Brahman is the immanent self within us, which transcends all
changeful experience and is also ultimate reality underlying all
objects perceived outside of us in the external world. \Vhatever
forms and characters there are in our experience, internal as well
as external, have an indescribable and indefinite nature which
passes by the name of miiyii 1 • Sankara Vedanta takes it for granted
that that alone is real which is unchangeable; what is changeful,
though it is positive, is therefore unreal. The world is only unreal
in that special sense; miiyii belongs to a category different from
affirmation and negation, namely the category of the indefinite.
The relation of the real, the Brahman, to this miiyii in
Sailkara Vedanta is therefore as indefinite as the miiyii; the real
is the unchangeable, but how the changeful forms and characters
become associated with it or what is their origin or what is their
essence, Sankara is not in a position to tell us. The Yoga-viisiftha
however holds that formless and characterless entity is the ultimate
truth; it is said to be the Brahman, cit, or void (sunya); but,
whatever it may be, it is this characterless entity which is the
ultimate truth. This ultimate entity is associated with an energy
of movement, by virtue of which it can reveal all the diverse forms
of appearances. The relation between the appearances and the
reality is not external, indefinite and indescribable, as it is to
Sankara, but the appearances, which are but the unreal and
illusory manifestations of the reality, are produced by the opera-
tion of this inner activity of the characterless spirit, which is in
itself nothing but a subject-objectless pure consciousness. But this
inner and immanent movement does not seem to have any dia-
lectic of its own, and no definite formula of the method of its
operation for its productions can be given; the imaginary shapes
of ideas and objects, which have nothing but a mere perceptual
existence, are due not to a definite order, but to accident or chance
(kiikatiiltya). Such a conception is indeed very barren, and it is
here that the system of the Y oga-viisi~tha is particularly defective.
Another important defect of the system is that it does not either
criticize knowledge or admit its validity, and the characterless
entity which forms its absolute is never revealed in experience.
1 See my A History of l11dian Philosophy, vol. I, ch. x.
The Philosophy of the Yoga-viisi~tha (CH. XII
With Sankara the case is different; for he holds that this absolute
Brahman is also the self which is present in every experience and is
immediate and self-revealed. But the absolute of the Yoga-viis#tha
is characterless and beyond experience. The state of final emancipa-
tion, the seventh stage, is not a stage of bliss, like the Brahmahood
of the Vedanta, but a state of characterlessness and vacuity almost.
In several places in the work it is said that this ultimate state is
differently described by various systems as Brahman, distinction
of pra/qti and puru~a, pure vijiiana and void (sunya), while in truth
it is nothing but a characterless entity. Its state of mukti (emanci-
pation) is therefore described, as we have already seen above, as
pii~ii1Javat or like a stone, which strongly reminds us of the
Vaise~ika view of mukti. On the practical side it lays great stress
on pauru~a, or exertion of free-will and energy, it emphatically
denies daiva as having the power of weakening pauru~a or even
exerting a superior dominating force, and it gives us a new view
of karma as meaning only thought-activity. As against Sankara, it
holds that knowledge (jiiana) and karma may be combined together,
and that they are not for two different classes of people, but are
both indispensable for each and every right-minded enquirer. The
principal practical means for the achievement of the highest end of
the Yoga-viis#tha are the study of philosophical scripture, asso-
ciation with good men and self-criticism. It denounces external
religious observances without the right spiritual exertions as being
worse than useless. Its doctrine of esse est percipi and that no
experiences have any objective validity outside of themselves, that
there are no external objects to which they correspond and that
all are but forms of knowledge, reminds us very strongly of
what this system owes to VijfHinavada Buddhism. But, while an
important Vijfianavada work like the Lankavatiira-siltra tries to
explain through its various categories the origin of the various
appearances in knowledge, no such attempt is made in the Yoga-
vasi~tha, where it is left to chance. It is curious that in the Sanskrit
account of Vijfianavada by Hindu writers, such as Vacaspati and
others, these important contributions of the system are never re-
ferred to either for the descriptive interpretation of the system or
for its refutation. While there are thus unmistakable influences of
Vijfianavada and Gau<;lapada on the Yoga-viisiftha, it seems to have
developed in close association with the Saiva, as its doctrine of spanda,
or immanent activity, so clearly shows. This point will, however,
be more fully discussed in my treatment of Saiva philosophy.
CHAPTER XIII
SPECULATIONS IN THE MEDICAL SCHOOLS
already been described in the first volume of the present work, pp. 2IJ-2I7.
DII IB
Speculations in the Medical Schools (cH.
for it supposes that diseases also existed always, while Caraka, 1. 1. 6 supposes
that diseases broke out at a certain point of time. Is it an addition by the reviser
Drdhabala?
··a Caraka, I. 1. 42 and Jfyur-tJeda-dipikii of CakrapaQ.i on it.
3 A~tiinga-saTMJTaha, 1. 1. 8. Gopatha-Briihma1)a, 1. 10, however, mentions
occurs in the Worter.buch in connection with the word iiyur-veda, could not
XIII] Ayur-veda and the Atharva-Veda 275
We thus find that Ayur-veda was regarded by some as a Veda
superior to the other Vedas and respected by their followers as a
fifth Veda, as an upaveda of the Atharva-Veda, as an independent
upaveda, as an upiiizga of the Atharva- Veda and lastly as a vediiizga.
All that can be understood from these conflicting references is
that it was traditionally believed that there was a Veda known as
Ayur-veda which was almost co-existent with the other Vedas, was
entitled to great respect, and was associated with the Atharva- Veda
in a special way. It seems, however, that the nature of this asso-
ciation consisted in the fact that both of them dealt with the curing
of diseases and the attainment of long life; the one principally by
incantations and charms, and the other by medicines. What Susruta
understands by calling Ayur-veda an upiiizga of the Atharva- Veda
is probably nothing more than this. Both the Atharva- Veda and
Ayur-veda dealt with the curing of diseases, and this generally
linked them together in the popular mind, and, the former being
the holier of the two, on account of its religious value, the latter
was associated with it as its literary accessory·. Darila Bhatta, in
commenting upon Kausika-siltra, 25. 2, gives us a hint as to what
may have been the points of contact and of difference between
Ayur-veda and the Atharva- Veda. Thus he says that there are two
kinds of diseases; those that are produced by unwholesome diet,
and those produced by sins and transgressions. The Ayur-veda
was made for curing the former, and the Atharvan practices for the
latter 1 • Caraka himself counts penance (priiyas-citta) as a name of
medicine (bhe~aja) and CakrapaQ.i, in commenting on this, says that
as priiyas-citta removes the diseases produced by sins, so medicines
(bhe~aja) also remove diseases, and thus priiyas-citta is synonymous
with bhe~aja2.
But what is this Ayur-veda? We now possess only the
treatises of Caraka and Susruta, as modified and supplemented by
later revisers. But Susruta tells us that Brahma had originally
produced the Ayur-veda, which contained Ioo,ooo verses spread
over one thousand chapters, and then, finding the people weak
in intelligence and short-lived, later on divided it into eight subjects,
be verified owing to some omission in the reference. It should be noted that
vedi.iilga is generally used to mean the six aizgas, viz. Si~i.i, Kalpa, Vyiikara~a,
Chandas, Jyoti~ and Nirukta.
1
dvi-praki.iri.i vyi.idhaya/:t i.ihi.ira-nimittii a$ubhanimittiiJ ceti; tatra i.ihi.ira-
samutthi.ini.i1Jl. va#amya i.iyurveda1J1. cakiira adharma-samutthi.ini.i1Jl. tu si.istramidam
ucyate. Darila's comment on Kausika-siltra, 25. 2.
2 Caraka, VI. I. 3 and Ayur-veda-dipiki.i, ibid.
18-2
Speculations in the Medical Schools [cH.
viz. surgery (salya), treatment of diseases of the head (siiliikya),
treatment of ordinary diseases (kiiya-cikitsii), the processes of
counteracting the influences of evil spirits (bhuta-vidyii), treatment
of child diseases (kaumiira-bhrtya), antidotes to poisons (agada-
tantra), the science of rejuvenating the body (rasiiyana) and the
science of acquiring sex-strength (viijtkarm:za) 1 • The statement of
Susruta that Ayur-veda was originally a great work in which the
later subdivisions of its eight different kinds of studies were not
differentiated seems to be fairly trustworthy. The fact that Ayur-
veda is called an upiiizga, an upaveda, or a vediiizga also points to its
existence in some state during the period when the Vedic literature
was being composed. We hear of compendiums of medicine as early
as the Priitisiikhyas 2 • It is curious, however, that nowhere in the
U pani!?ads or the Vedas does the name" Ayur-veda" occur, though
different branches of study are mentioned in the former 3 • The
A!?tanga Ayur-veda is, however, mentioned in the Mahii-bhiirata,
and the three constituents (dhiitu), viiyu (wind), pitta (bile) and
Slepnan (mucus), are also mentioned; there is reference to a theory
that by these three the body is sustained and that by their decay the
body decays (etail:z /eyz'l}ais ca k~zyate), and Kr!?I)atreya is alluded to as
being the founder of medical science (cikitsitam) 4 • One of the earliest
systematic mentions of medicines unmixed with incantations and
charms is to be found in the Mahii-vagga of the Vinaya-Pitaka,
where the Buddha is prescribing medicines for his disciples 5 •
These medicines are of a simple nature, but they bear undeniable
marks of methodical arrangement. We are also told there of a
surgeon, named Akasagotto, who made surgical operations (sattha-
kamma) on fistula (bhagandara). In Rockhill's Life of the Buddha
we hear of Jivaka as having studied medicine in the Taxila U niver-
1
Susruta-sa1Jzhitii, I. I. s-<J.
2 R.V. Priitisiildzya, I6. 54 (55), mentioned by Bloomfield in The Atharva-
Veda and Gopatha-Briihmm;a, p. 10. The name of the medical work mentioned
is Subhe$aja.
3 IJ.g-veda'IJl bhagavo 'dhyemi Yajur-veda'f!l siima-vedam iitharvm.za$ caturtham
of India was there any time when people did not take to charms
and incantations for curing diseases or repelling calamities and
injuring enemies. The IJ.g- Veda itself may be regarded in a large
measure as a special development of such magic rites. The hold
of the Atharval)ic charms on the mind of the people was prob-
ably very strong, since they had occasion to use them in all
their daily concerns. Even now, when the J3.g-Vedic sacrifices
have become extremely rare, the use of Atharval)ic charms and of
their descendants, the Tantric charms of comparatively later times,
is very common amongst all classes of Hindus. A very large part
of the income of the priestly class is derived from the performance
of auspicious rites (svastyayana), purificatory penances (priiyas-
citta), and oblations (homa) for curing chronic and serious illnesses,
winning a law-suit, alleviating sufferings, securing a male issue
to the family, cursing an enemy, and the like. Amulets are used
almost as freely as they were three or four thousand years ago, and
snake-charms and charms for dog-bite and others are still things
which the medical people find it difficult to combat. Faith in the
mysterious powers of occult rites and charms forms an essential
feature of the popular Hindu mind and it oftentimes takes the
place of religion in the ordinary Hindu household. It may there-
fore be presumed that a good number of Atharval)ic hymns
were current when most of the J3.g-Vedic hymns were not yet
composed. By the time, however, that the Atharva- Veda was
compiled in its present form some new hymns were incorporated
with it, the philosophic character of which does not tally with the
outlook of the majority of the hymns. The Atharva- Veda, as
Sayal)a points out in the introduction to his commentary, was
indispensable to kings for warding off their enemies and securing
many other advantages, and the royal priests had to be versed in
the Atharval)ic practices. These practices were mostly for the
alleviation of the troubles of an ordinary householder, and ac-
cordingly the Grhya-sutras draw largely from them. The oldest
name of the Atharva- Veda is Atharviingirasal;, and this generally
suggested a twofold division of it into hymns attributed to Atharvan
and others attributed to Angiras; the former dealt with the holy
(santa), promoting of welfare (pau~tika) and the curatives ( bhe~ajiini),
and the latter with offensive rites for molesting an enemy {iibhi-
ciirika), also called terrible (ghora). The purposes which the Athar-
val)ic charms were supposed to fulfil were numerous. These may
Speculations in the Medical Schools (CH.
be briefly summed up in accordance with the KauSika-sutra as
follows: quickening of intelligence, accomplishment of the virtues
of a Brahmacarin (religious student); acquisition of villages,
cities, fortresses and kingdoms, of cattle, riches, food grains,
children, wives, elephants, horses, chariots, etc.; production of
unanimity (aikamatya) and contentment among the people;
frightening the elephants of enemies, winning a battle, warding
off all kinds of weapons, stupefying, frightening and ruining the
enemy army, encouraging and protecting one's own army, knowing
the future result of a battle, winning the minds of generals and chief
persons, throwing a charmed snare, sword, or string into the fields
where the enemy army may be moving, ascending a chariot for
winning a battle, charming all instruments of war music, killing
enemies, winning back a lost city demolished by the enemy;
performing the coronation ceremony, expiating sins, cursing,
strengthening cows, procuring prosperity; amulets for promoting
welfare, agriculture, the conditions of bulls, bringing about various
household properties, making a new-built house auspicious, letting
loose a bull (as a part of the general rites-Jriiddha), performing
the rites of the harvesting month of Agrahayal).a (the middle of
November to the middle of December); securing curatives for
various otherwise incurable diseases produced by the sins of past
life; curing all diseases generally, Fever, Cholera, and Diabetes;
stopping the flow of blood from wounds caused by injuries from
weapons, preventing epileptic fits and possession by the different
species of evil spirits, such as the bhuta, pisiica, Brahma-riik~asa,
etc.; curing viita, pitta and Sle~man, heart diseases, Jaundice,
white leprosy, different kinds of Fever, Pthisis, Dropsy; curing
worms in cows and horses, providing antidotes against all kinds
of poisons, supplying curatives for the diseases of the head, eyes,
nose, ears, tongue, neck and inflammation of the neck; warding
off the evil effects of a Brahmin's curse; arranging women's
rites for securing sons, securing easy delivery and the welfare of
the foetus; securing prosperity, appeasing a king's anger, know-
ledge of future success or failure; stopping too much rain
and thunder, winning in debates and stopping brawls, making
rivers flow according to one's wish, securing rain, winning in
gambling, securing the welfare of cattle and horses, securing large
gains in trade, stopping inauspicious marks in women, performing
auspicious rites for a new house, removing the sins of prohibited
XIII] Ayur-veda and the Atharva-Jl.eda
acceptance of gifts and prohibited priestly services; preventing bad
dreams, removing the evil effects of unlucky stars under whose
influence an infant may have been born, paying off debts, removing
the evils of bad omens, molesting an enemy; counteracting the
molesting influence of the charms of an enemy, performing aus-
picious rites, securing long life, performing the ceremonies at birth,
naming, tonsure, the wearing of holy thread, marriage, etc.; per-
forming funeral rites, warding off calamities due to the disturbance
of nature, such as rain of dust, blood, etc., the appearance
of yak~as, riik~asas, etc., earthquakes, the appearance of comets,
and eclipses of the sun and moon.
The above long list of advantages which can be secured by the
performance of Atharval).ic rites gives us a picture of the time when
these AtharvaQ.ic charms were used. Whether all these functions
were discovered when first the Atharval).ic verses were composed
is more than can be definitely ascertained. At present the evidence
we possess is limited to that supplied by the KauSika-siitra. Ac-
cording to the Indian tradition accepted by Sayal).a the compila-
tion of the Atharva- Veda was current in nine different collections,
the readings of which differed more or less from one another. These
different recensions, or siikhiis, were Paippalada, TaQ.<Ja, MaQ.<Ja,
Saunakiya, Jajala, Jalada, Brahmavada, Devadacia, and Caral).a-
vaidya. Of these only the Paippalada and Saunakiya recensions
are available. The Paippalada recension exists only in a single un-
published Tiibingen n1anuscript first discovered by Roth 1 • It
has been edited in facsimile and partly also in print. The Sauna-
kiya recension is what is now available in print. The Saunakiya
school has the Gopatha-briihmat.:za as its Brahmal).a and five
sutra works, viz. Kaui-ika, Va'itiina, Nak~atra-kalpa, Ang-irasa-
kalpa and Sant£-kalpa 2 ; these are also known as the five kalpas
(paiica-kalpa). Of these the Kaui-ika-siitra is probably the earliest
and most important, since all the other four depend upon it3 •
The Na~atra-kalpa and Santi-kalpa are more or less of an astro-
logical character. No manuscript of the Angirasa-kalpa seems to
be available; but from the brief notice of Sayal).a it appears to
1 Der Atharvaveda in Kashmir by Roth.
2 The Kauiika-siltra is also known as Sa,hitii-vidhi and Sa1flhitii-kalpa. The
three kalpas, Nak~atra, Angirasa and Santi, are actually Pariiinas.
3 'tatra Sakalyena sa1flhitii-mantriit;ii1!' Siintika-pa~fikiid#u karmasu viniyoga~
knew of only two bones as forming the kurca, and there is no passage in Susruta
to show that he knew of more. The os calcis would be the piirp:~i, the astragalus,
the kurca-siras, the two malleoli bones and the two gulpha bones.
1
Both Caraka and Susruta count sixty of these phalanges {pa1Ji-padiiizguli),
whereas their actual number is fifty-six only.
3 Caraka counts these metacarpal and metatarsal bones (pii1Ji-piida-saliika) as
twenty, the actual number. Susruta collects them under tala, a special term used
by him. His combined tala-kilrca-gulpha includes all the bones of the hand and
foot excluding the anguli bones (phalanges).
3
Caraka uses the term pii1Ji-pada-saliikiidhi~!hiina, Yajfiavalkya, sthiina, and
Susruta, kurca. Caraka seems to count it as one bone. Kurca means a network
of (1) flesh (mii1llSa), (2) sirii, (3) sniiyu, (4) bones (miimsa-Sirii-sniiyv-asthi-jiiliini).
All these four kinds of network exist in the two joints of the hands and feet.
4
Hoernle remarks that in the Atharva- Veda a~thlvat and janu are synony-
mous; but the text, x. 2. 2, seems clearly to enumerate them separately. The
~!hivat is probably the patella bone. Caraka uses the terms jiinu and kapiilikii,
probably for the knee-cap (patella) and the elbow pan (kapiilikii). Kapiilikii
means a small shal1ow basin, and this analogy suits the construction of the elbow
pan. Susruta uses the term kr7.rpara (elbow pan), not in the ordinary list of
bones in Sarlra, v. 19, but at the time of counting the manna in ibid. VI. 25.
5
This seems to be different from a~thzvat (patella).
6
The tibia and the fibula in the leg. Caraka, Bhela, Susruta and Vagbhata I
describe this organ rightly as consisting of two bones. The Atharva-Vedajustly
describes the figure made bv them as being a fourfold frame having its ends
closely connected together (catu~fayatfl yuj'yate sa'I'Jlhitiintam). The corresponding
two bones of the fore-arm (aratni)-radius and ulna-are correctly counted by
Caraka. Curiously enough, Susruta does not refer to them in the bone-list. The
biihu is not enumerated in this connection.
7 Caraka speaks of two bones in the pelvic cavity, viz. the os innominatum on
cartilages as new bones (taru~a asthi). There are altogether ten costal cartilages
on either side of the sternum. But the eighth, ninth and tenth cartilages are
attached to the seventh. So, if the seventh, eighth, ninth and tenth cartilages
are considered as a single bone, there are altogether seven bones on either side
of the sternum. This gives us the total number of fourteen which Caraka counts.
The sternum was not counted by Caraka separately. With him this was the
result of the continuation of the costal cartilages attached to one another without
a break. Su8ruta and Vagbhata I curiously count eight bones in the breast, and
this can hardly be accounted for. Hoernle's fancied restoration of the ten of
Susruta does not appear to be proved. Yajiiavalkya, however, counts seventeen,
i.e. adds the sternum and the eighth costal cartilage on either side to Caraka's
fourteen bones, which included these three. Hoemle supposes that Yajiia-
valkya's number was the real reading in Susruta; but his argument is hardly
convincing.
2
The windpipe is composed of four parts, viz. larynx, trachea, and two
bronchi. It is again not a bone, but a cartilage; but it is yet counted as a bone
by the Indian anatomists, e.g. Caraka calls it "jatru" and Susruta "kat.ztha-
natfr,." Hoernle has successfully shown that the wordjatru was used in medical
books as synonymous with windpipe or neck generally. Hoernle says that
originally the word denoted cartilaginous portions of the neck and breast (the
windpipe and the costal cartilages), as we read in the Satapatha-briihmat,za:
"tasmiid imii ubhayatra pariavo baddhii/:l kikasiisu ca jatrUiU" (the ribs are
fastened at either end, exteriorly to the thoracic vertebrae and interiorly to the
costal cartilages-jatru). In medical works it means the cartilaginous portion
of the neck, i.e. the windpipe (Caraka), and hence is applied either to the neck
generally or to the sterno-clavicular articulation at the base of the neck (Susruta).
It is only as late as the sixth or seventh century A.D. that, owing to a misinter-
pretation of the anatomical terms sandhi and a1f1Sa, it was made to mean clavicle.
See Hoernle's Studies in the Medicine of Ancient India, p. r68.
3 "Parivayos catur-vi7[liati/:l piirsvayos tiivanti caiva sthalakiini tiivanti caiva
sthiilakiirbudiini," i.e. there are twenty-four bones in the piiriva (ribs), twenty-
four sthiilakas (sockets), and twenty-four sthiilakiirbudas (tubercles). Susruta
speaks of there being thirty-six ribs on either side. A rib consists of a shaft
and a head;" at the point of junction of these two parts there is a tubercle which
articulates with the transverse process of corresponding vertebrae, and probably
this tubercle is arbuda. '' There are, no doubt, twenty-four ribs. The sthalakas and
arbudas cannot properly be counted as separate bones; but, even if they are
counted, the total number ought to be 68 bones, as Hoernle points out, and not
72, since the two lowest have no tubercles.
' Kaphotja probably means scapula or shoulder-blade. Caraka uses the
word a1f1Sa-phalaka. Caraka uses two other terms, a~aka (collar-bone) and a1f1Sa.
This word a7Jlsa seems to be a wrong reading, as Hoernle points out; for in
reality there are only two bones, the scapula and the collar-bone. But could it
not mean the acromion process of the scapula? Though Susruta omits the
shoulder-blade in the counting of bones in Siirfra, v. (for this term is ak~aka
saT[ljiie), yet he distinctly names a1f1Sa-phalaka in Sarfra, VI. 27, and describes
it as triangular (trika-sa7Jlbaddhe); and this term has been erroneously interpreted
as grfvaya a1f1Sa-dvayasya ca yal;l saT[lyogas sa trika/:l by (>alhaJ).a. The junction
of the collar-bone with the neck cannot be called trika.
6 Caraka counts fifteen bones in the neck. According to modern anatomists
there are, however, only seven. He probably counted the transverse processes
XIII] Bones in the Atharva-Veda and Ayur-veda
in the plural) 1 ; 17. the collar-bones (a1J1SaU in the dual) 2 ; 18. the
brow (laliita); 19. the central facial bone (kakii/ikii) 3 ; 20. the pile
of the jaw (hanu-citya) 4 ; 21. the cranium with ten1ples (kapiilam) 5 •
and got the number fourteen, to which he added the vertebrae as constituting
one single bone.
Susruta counts nine bones. The seventh bone contains spinous and transverse
processes and was probably therefore counted by him as three bones, which,
together with the other six, made the total number nine.
1
Caraka counts forty-three bones in the vertebral column <Pr~tha-gatiistlzi),
while the actual number is only twenty-six. Each bone consists of four parts,
viz. the body, the spinous process, and the two transverse processes, and Caraka
counts them all as four bones. Susruta considers the body and the spinous
process as one and the two transverse processes as two; thus for the four bones
of Caraka, Susruta has three. In Caraka the body and the spinous process of
the twelve thoracic vertebrae make the number twenty-four; the five lumbar
vertebrae (body+ spine+ two transverses) make twenty. He adds to this the
sacrum and the coccyx as one pelvic bone, thus making the number forty-five;
with Susruta we have twelve thoracic vertebrae, six lumbar vertebrae, twelve
transverses, i.e. thirty bones. The word klkasa (A.V. II. 33· 2) means the whole of
the spinal column, anukya (A.V. II. 33· 2) means the thoracic portion of the
spine, and udara the abdominal portion.
2
Both Caraka and Susruta call this ak~aka and count it correctly as two
bones. Cakrapal)..i describes it as" ak1a-vivak1akau jatru-sandhel:z kflakau" (they
are called ak~aka because they are like two beams-the fastening-pegs of the
junction of the neck-bones).
Susruta further speaks of a7JlSa-Pltha (the glenoid cavity into which the head
of the humerus is inserted) as a samudga (casket) bone. The joint of each of the
anal bones, the pubic bone and the hip bone (nitamba) is also described by him
as a samudga. This is the "acetabulum, or cotyloid cavity, in which the head
of the femur, is lodged" (Suiruta, Siirira, v. 27, a7JlSa-Pltha-guda-bhaga-nitambe1U
samudgiifz).
3
Laliita is probably the two superciliary ridges at the eye-brow and kaluJpkii
the lower portion, comprising the body of the superior maxillary together with
the molar and nasal bones. Caraka counts the two molar {gat;fja-kilfa), the two
nasal, and the two superciliary ridges at the eye-brows as forming one continuous
bone (ekiisthi niisikii-gat;fja-kuta-laliitam).
4
According to Caraka, the lower jaw only is counted as a separate bone
(eka7fL hanv-asthi), and the two attachments are counted as two bones (dve
hanu-mula-bandhane). Susruta, however, counts the upper and the lower jaws as
two bones (hanvor dve). Though actually each of these bones consists of two
bones, they are so fused together that they may be considered as one, as was
done by Susruta. Caraka did not count the upper jaw, so he counted the sockets
of the teeth (dantolilkhala) and the hard palate (tiil~Jiaka). Susruta's counting of
the upper hanu did not include the palatine process; so he also counts the tiilu
(eka7fL tiiluni).
6 Sankha is the term denoting the temples, of which both Caraka and
Susruta count two. Caraka counts four cranial bones (catviiri siralz-kapiiliini) and
Susruta six (Sirasi 1at). The brain-case consists of eight bones. Of these two are
inside and hence not open to view from outside. So there are only six bones
which are externally visible. Of these the temporal bones have already been
counted as sankha, thus leaving a remainder of four bones. Susruta divides the
frontal, parietal and occipital bones into two halves and considers them as
separate bones, and he thus gets the number six. Both the frontal and occipital
are really each composed of two bones, which become fused in later life.
Though the author has often differed from Dr Hoemle, yet he is highly in-
debted to his scholarly explanations and criticisms in writing out this particular
section of this chapter.
z88 Speculations in the Medical Schools [cH.
pupphusa. In another place (Cikitsii, xvn. 34) he speaks of kloma as one of the
organs connected with hiccough (hrdaya'I'Jl kloma kat.ztha'I'Jl ca tiiluka'I'Jl ca samiisritii
mrdvz sa ~udra-hikveti nrva'I'Jl siidhyii prakzrtitii}. Cakrapa~ describes it as
pipiisii-sthiina (seat of thirst). But, whatever that may be, since Caraka considers
its importance in connection with hiccough, and, since he does not mention
pupphusa (lungs-Mahci-vyutpatti, 100), kloma must mean with him the one
organ of the two lungs. Susruta speaks of pupphusa as being on the left side
and kloma as being on the right. Since the two lungs vary in size, it is quite
possible that Susruta called the left lung pupphusa and the right one kloma.
Vagbhata I follows Susruta. The Atharva- Veda, Caraka, Susruta, Vagbhata
and other authorities use the word in the singular, but in Brhad-iiravyaka, 1. the
word kloma is used in the plural number; and Sankara, in commenting on this,
says that, though it is one organ, it is always used in the plural (nitya-bahu-va-
caniinta). This, however, is evidently erroneous, as all the authorities use the
word in the singular. His description of it as being located on the left of the
heart (yakrc ca klomiinai ca hrdayasyiidhastiid dak#t.zottarau mii'I'JlSa-khat.zf.jau, Br.
1. 1, commentary of Salikara) is against the verdict of Susruta, who places it on
the same side of the heart as the liver. The Bhiiva-prakiisa describe& it as the root
of the veins, where water is borne or secreted. That kloma was an organ which
formed a member of the system of respiratory organs IS further proved by its
being often associated with the other organs of the neighbourhood, such as the
throat (kavtha) and the root of the palate (tiilu-mula). Thus Caraka says," udaka-
vahiinii'I'Jl srotasii'I'Jl tiilu-mula'I'Jl kloma ca .. • . Jihvii-tiilv-o~tha-kavtha-kloma-io~am
•• . dr~tvii" (Vimiina, v. 10). Sarrigadhara, I. v. 45, however, describes it as a gland
of watery secretions near the liver (jala-viihi-iira-mula'I'Jl trp:tii-l:chiidanaka'I'Jl
tilam).
2 This word does not occur in the medical literature. SayaQa describes it as
of the excreta with many holes). These holes are probably the orifices of the
glands inside the colon (mala-p(/.tra). The Satapatlza-briihma'l}a, XII. 9· 1. 3
enumerates all these organs as being sacred to certain gods and sacrificial
instruments-hrdayam eviisyaindrab pur(}(f<isal;, yakrt sii'Litral;, klomii t•iiru'f.la!z,
matme e'L'iisyiis·vatthmrz ca piitram audumbarm.n ca pittm_n naiyagrodlzam antrii~zi
stlzii/yalz f!Uda upiisayani syena-piitre pfllzlisandi niiblzi}.z kumblzo 'L'atli~!lzulz pfiisi!z
scl.tatnnul. tad yat sii bahudlzii vitnz~lll bhavati tasmiit plaiir bahudlul. u'krtta!r.
Vasti, or bladder, is regarded as the place where the urine collects (A.V. I. J. 6).
2 Sayat.la says that snii<t'a means here the smaller Siras and dhamanr the thicker
l\Iost of the organs of a cow are mentioned. Along with the organs of human
beings mentioned ahoYe two other organs are mentioned, viz. the pericardium
(puritat) and the bronchial tubes (saha-ka~tfhilui). A.V. x. 9· 15.
4 Enryclopaedia of Rcli;Jiun and Ethirs, "Diseases and m~dicine: Vedic.".
5 Sayal)a paraphrases hira as sirii and describes it as a canal (mi~/t) for carrymg
refers to dhamanis as performing the same function. Sayat].a also freely para-
phrases dhamani as sirii (mahl mahatl sthulatarii dhamanil;z sirii t#thiid it ti$thaty
eva, anena prayoge1Ja nivrtta-rudhira-sriivii avat#thatiim).
2
Here both the dhamani and the hirii are enumerated. Sayat].a here says
that dhamanis are the important niifjls in the heart (hrdaya-gatiiniim pradhiina-
niifj'iniim), and hiriis or siras are branch niif)fs (Sirii~iitp sakhii-nii¢iniim). The
number of dhamanis, as here given, is a hundred and thus almost agrees with
the number of niifjis in the heart given in the Katha Upani~ad, VI. 16 (Satatp
caikii ca hrdayasya niifjyal;z).
The Praina Upani!ad, III. 6 also speaks of a hundred naf)fs, of which there
are thousands of branches.
3
antrebhyo vinirgatasya miltrasya miltriisaya-priipti-siidhane piiriva-dvaya-
sthe niifjyau gavlnyau ity ucyete. SayaJ).a's Bhiil)la. In 1. 11. 5 two niifjis called
gavlnikii are referred to and are described by SayaJ).a as being the two
niif)fs on the two sides of the vagina controlling delivery (gavlnike yonel;z
piiriva-vartinyau nirgamana-pratibandhike nii{iyau-SayaJ).a). In one passage
(A.V. 11. 12. 7) eight dhamanis called manya are mentioned, and SayaJ).a says
that they are near the neck. A niif)f called sikatiivat'f, on which strangury
depends, is mentioned in A.V. I. 17. 4·
4
Another goddess of delivery, Sii!?iiJ).i, is also invoked.
XIII] Organs in the Atharva-Veda and Ayur-veda
The term jariiyu is used in the sense of placenta, which is said to
have no intimate connection with the flesh and marrow, so that
when it falls down it is eaten by the dogs and the body is in no
way hurt. A reference is found to a first aid to delivery in ex-
panding the sides of the vagina and pressing the two gavinil~ii
niil}is 1 • The sniivas (tendons) are also mentioned along with dha-
manis, and Sayal).a explains them as finer siras (Suksmiilz siriih
sniiva-sabdena ucyante). The division of dhamanis, Siriis and sniivas
thus seems to have been based on their relative fineness: the
thicker channels (niil}is) were called dhammzis, the finer ones were
called siriis and the still finer ones sniivas. Their general functions
were considered more or less the same, though these probably
differed according to the place in the body where they were
situated and the organs with which they were associated. It
seems to have been recognized that there was a general flow of
the liquid ele1nents of the body. This probably corresponds to the
notion of srotas, as we get it in the Caraka-Sa'f!lhitii, and which will
be dealt with later on. Thus A.V. x. 2. I I says, "who stored in him
floods turned in all directions moving diverse and formed to flow
in rivers, quick (tivrii), rosy (aru~ii), red (lohini), and copper dark
(tiimra-dhilmrii), running all ways in a man upward and down-
ward? " This clearly refers to the diverse currents of various liquid
elements in the body. The semen, again, is conceived as the thread
of life which is being spun out2 • The intimate relation between the
heart and the brain seems to have been dimly apprehended. Thus
it is said, "together with his needle hath Atharvan sewn his head
and heart3 ." The theory of the viiyus, which we find in all later
literature, is alluded to, and the prii~a, apiina, vyiina and samiina
are mentioned 4 • It is however difficult to guess what these prii~a,
apiina, etc. exactly meant. In another passage of the Atharva-
Veda we hear of nine prii~as (nava prii~iin navabhil; sa'f!lmimite),
and in another seven prii~as are mentioned 5 • In another passage
1 vi te bhinadmi vi yoni1JZ vi gavlnike. A.V. 1. 11. 5.
2
Ko asmin reto nyadadhiit tantur iitayatiim iti (Who put the semen in him,
saying, Let the thread of life be spun out? A.V. x. 2. 17).
3
1Vfurdhiinam asya sa'!Zs'fvyiitharvii hrdaya1Jl ca yat (A.V. x. 2. 26). See
also Griffith's translations.
' Ko asmin prii1Jam avayat ko apiinarrz vyiinam u samiinam asmin ko deve 'dhi
sisriiya puru~e (\Vho has woven prii1Ja, apiina, vyiina and samiina into him and
which deity is controlling him? A.V. x. 2. 13).
6
Sapta prii1Jiin a~tau manyas (or majjfias) tii1]'ls te vrlciimi brahma1Jii (A.V. 11.
12. 7). The Taittinya-briihma1Ja, I. 2. 3· 3 refers to seven prii1Jas, sapta vai
xg-2
292 Speculations in the Medical Schools [cH.
we hear of a lotus with nine gates (nava-dviirarp.) and covered
with the three gu~as 1 • This is a very familiar word in later
Sanskrit literature, as referring to the nine doors of the senses,
and the comparison of the heart with a lotus is also very common.
But one of the most interesting points about the passage is that
it seems to be a direct reference to the gu~a theory, which re-
ceived its elaborate exposition at the hands of the later Saf[lkhya
writers: it is probably the earliest reference to that theory. As
we have stated above, the real functions of the prii~a, etc. were
not properly understood; prii~a was considered as vital power or
life and it was believed to be beyond injury and fear. It was as
immortal as the earth and the sky, the day and the night, the sun
and the moon, the Brahmai)as and the K~attriyas, truth and false-
hood, the past and the future 2 • A prayer is made to prii~a and
apiina for protection from death (p1·ii~iipiinau mrtyor mli piilll1Jt
S'Diihii) 3 • In A. V. III. 6. 8 manas and citta are separately mentioned
and SayaJ).a explains manas as meaning antal;kara~a, or inner
organ, and citta as a particular state of the manas (mano-vrtti-
vise~e~a), as thought 4 • H~re also the heart is the seat of conscious-
ness. Thus in a prayer in III. 26. 6 it is said," 0 i\1itra and VaruJ).a,
take away the thinking povver (citta) from the heart (hrt) of this
woman and, making her incapable of judg1nent, bring her under
my controP." The ojas with which we are familiar in later medical
works of Caraka and others is mentioned in A.V. II. 18, where
izrsa~yiih prii~iih. Again a rf'ference to the seven senses is found in A.V. x. 2. 6:
ka!z sapta khiini vitatarda ilr$a~zi. In A.V. xv. IS. 16. 17 seven kinds of pt·ii~a.
apiina and vydna are described. These seem to serve cosmic functions. The
seven prd~zas are agni, liditya, candramatz, pavamana, dpa~t, paiava!z and prajtilz.
The seven apiinas are paur~umuzsr, ll${akii, amiiviisyti, iraddhii, dik$ii, yajiia and
dak~i~zii. The seven kinds of vyiina are blulmi, autarih$llf!l, dyau!z, nak$alrii~i,
rtu'L·a~z, (Jrtaviilz and Sll1Jl1.latsariib.
1
prupf.arzlw1JZ tzava-dt.'iirmtz tribhir gu~zebhir ii'i:rtalJz
tasmin yad ya~lsam (ltmwrvat tad 'l.'ai Br.lhma-'l!ido vidufz.
(Those who know Brahman know that being to be the self which resides in the
lotus rlowcr of nine gates cmrercd by the three gm..zas. A.V. X. 8. 43.) The niit/.is
uja, piitgalii and SU$Wtt~za, which figure so much in the later Tantric works, do
not appear in the Atharva- Veda. No reference to priil;.ztiyiima appears in the
Athar'l.'a-Veda.
~ A.V. 11. IS.
3
Ibid. 11. 16. 1. Prii~za and apiina are asked in another passage to enter a
man as bulls enter a cow-shed. Sayar;Ja calls pra~1a, apiiua "sariras-dharaka"
(A.V. III. II. s). They are also asked not to leave the body, but to bear the limbs
till old age (m. 11. 6).
1
A1anas and citta are also separately counted in A.V. III. 6. 8.
:; The word dttinafz is sometimes used to mean men of the same ways of
thinking (cittilla~z samilna-citta-yuhlll~l-Siiyar;Ja. A.V. m. IJ. s).
XIII) Practice of Medicine in the Atharva- Veda 2 93
and of cattle. There were also the diseases due to sorcery, which
played a very important part as an offensive measure in Vedic
India. l\'Iany of the diseases were also known to be hereditary
(k~etriya). From the names of the diseases mentioned above it
will be found that most of the diseases noted by Caraka existed
in the Vedic age.
The view-point from which the Vedic people looked at diseases
seems to have always distinguished the different diseases from their
symptoms. Thus the fever was that which produced shivering,
cold, burning sensation, and the like, i.e. the diagnosis was mainly
symptomatic. In addition to the charms and amulets, and the
herbs which were to be internally taken, water was considered to
possess great medica.l and life-giving properties. There are many
hymns which prai"e these qualities of water 1 • The medicinal pro-
perties of herbs were often regarded as being due to water, which
formed their essence. Charms for snake poisons and herbs which
were considered to be their antidotes were in use. Scanty
references to diseases and their cures are found sparsely scattered
in other ~g- Vedic texts and Brahmal)as. But nothing in these
appears to indicate any advance on the Athar-Da- Veda 2 in medical
kno\vledge. Apart from these curatives there were also the already
mentioned charms, amulets and medicines for securing long
life and increasing virility, corresponding to the Rasiiyana and
the Viiji-kara1_la chapters of Caraka and other medical works. We
cannot leave this section without pointing to the fact that, though
most diseases and many remedies were known, nothing in the way
of nidiina, or causes of diseases, is specified. The fact that there
existed a threefold classification of diseases, viz. abhraja, viitaja and
su~ma, should not be interpreted to mean that the Vedic people
had any knowledge of the disturbance of these clements operating
as nidiinas as they were understood in later medical literature. The
three important causes of diseases were evil deeds, the sorcery of
enemies, and possession by evil spirits or the anger of certain gods.
1
apsu antar amrtam apsu bhqajam (There is immortality and medicine in
\Vater-I. 4- 4). See also I. 5· 6, 33, II. 3, III. 7· 5, IV. 33, VI. 24. 92, VI. 24-. 2, etc.
2
For a brief survey of these J3..g- V edtc and other texts see Bolling's article
"Disease and :-.. Iedicine (Vedic)" in Encyclopaedia of Reli'gion and Ethics.
302 Speculations in the Medical Schools [cH.
1
garbhas tu khalu antarik§a viiyv-agni-toya-bhii.mi-vikiiras cetaniidhi~thiina
blzutal;z. Caraka, IV. 4· 6.
2
viiyv-agni-bhumy-ab-gu1)a-piidavat tat ~atjbhyo rasebhyal:z prabhiivaJ ca tasya.
Caraka, IV. 2. 4· iikiisa7'{l tu yady-api sukre piiiica-bhautike 'sti tathiipi na puru~a
sarlriin nirgatya garbhasaya7'{l gacchati, kintu bhuta-catu~fayam eva kriyiivad yiiti
iikiisa7'{l tu vyapakam eva tatriigatena sukre1)a Sa1flbaddha7'{l bhavati. Cakrapai:ll's
Ayur-veda-dlpikii, IV. 2.4. Susruta however considers $ukra (semen) as possessing
the qualities of soma, and iirtava (blood) as possessing the qualities of fire. He says,
however, that particles of the other bhutas (earth, air and ether, as l)alhal)a
enumerates them) are separately associated with them (saumya'!l sukram iirtavam
iigneyam itare~iim apy atra bhii.tiinii7'{l siinnidhya7'{l asty a1)Unii vise~eya parasparo-
pakiiriit pariinugrahiit paraspariinupravesac ca-Susruta, Ill. J. 1), and they
mutually co-operate together for the production of the foetus.
3
yiini tv iitmani suk~mii1)i bhatiini iitivahika-rupii1)i tiini sarva-siidhiira1)atvena
avise~a-siidriya-kiira1)iinlti neha boddhavyani. Cakrapai:ll's Ayur-veda-dlpikii,
IV. 2. 23-27.
XIII) The Foetus and the Subtle Body 3°3
will be pure and vigorous, whereas, if it was that of an animal,
it will be impure and dulP. When a man dies, his soul, together
with his subtle body, composed of the four elements, air, fire,
water and earth, in a subtle state and manas, passes invisibly into
a particular womb on account of its karma, and then, when it
comes into connection with the combined semen and blood of the
father and mother, the foetus begins to develop 2 • The semen and
blood can, however, operate as causes of the production of the
body only when they come into connection ·with the subtle body
transferred from the previous body of a dying being 3 • Susruta
(III. 1. 16) says that the very subtle eternal conscious principles
are manifested (abhivyajyate) when the blood and semen are in
union (parama-silk~miis cetaniivantal; siisvatii lohita-retasal.z sanni-
piite~v abhivya:fyante). But later on (III. 3. 4) this statement is
modified in such a way as to agree with Caraka's account; for
there it is said that the soul comes into contact with the combined
semen and blood along with its subtle elemental body (bhiUiitmanii).
In another passage a somewhat different statement is found
(Susruta, III. 4· 3). Here it is said that the materials of the de-
veloping foetus are agni, soma, sattva, rajas, tamas, the five senses,
and the hhutiitmii-all these contribute to the life of the foetus
and are also called the prii1JaS (life ) 4 • :Qalhal).a, in explaining this,
says that the agni (fire) spoken of here is the heat-power which
manifests itself in the fivefold functionings of digestion (piicaka),
viz. brightening of the skin (bhriijaka), the faculty of vision
Te~ii7'fl vlse~iid balavanti yiini
bhavanti miitii-pitr-karma-jiini
tiini vyavasyet sadrsatva-liizga1JZ
satva'f!l yathiinii.kam api vyavasyet.
Caraka, IV. 2. 27.
Anuka7'{l priiktaniivyavahitii deha-jiitis tena yathiinukatJZ
iti yo deva-sanriid avyavadhiineniigatya bhavati sa
det.'a-satvo bhiivati, etc. CakrapaQ.i, IV. 2. 23-27.
bhu.tais caturbhil; sahital;z su-su~air
mano-javo deham upaiti dehiit
karmiit-makatviin na tu tasya drsyii1fl
divya7'{l vinii rjarsanam asti rii.Pa1'fl. Caraka, IV. 2. 3·
3
yady api sukra-rajasl kiira7Je, tathiipi yadaiviitiviihikatJZ su~ma-bhuta-rii.pa
sarira7'{l priipnutal;z, tadaiva te sarlra'f!l janayata{z, niinyadii. Cakrapa:Q.i, IV.
2. J6.
4
This bhuiiitmii, i.e. the subtle body together with the soul presiding over
it, is called by Susruta karma-puru~a. Medical treatment is of this karma-pur~a
and his body (sa e~a karma-puru~al; cikitsiidhikrtai;-Susruta, III. 1. 16). Susruta
(I. 1. 21) again says," paiica-mahiibhuta-sariri-samaviiya?z purUfa ity ucyate; tasmin
knyii so 'dhi~!hiinam." (In this science, the term puru~a is applied to the unity
of five elements and the self (sarlrl), and this is the object of medical treatment.)
Speculations in the Medical Schools [CH.
(iilocaka), coloration of the blood, the intellectual operations and
the heat operations involved in the formation and work of the
different constituent elements (dhiitu), such as chyle, blood, etc.;
the soma is the root-power of all watery elements, such as mucu8,
chyle, semen, etc., and of the sense of taste; viiyu represents that
which operates as the fivefold life-functionings of prli!UJ, apiina,
samiina, udiina, and vyiina. I)alhal).a says further that sativa, rajas
and tamas refer to manas, the mind-organ, which is a product of
their combined evolution. The five senses contribute to life by
their cognitive functionings. The first passage seemed to indicate
that life was manifested as a result of the union of semen and
blood ; the second passage considered the connection of the soul
with its subtle body (bhutiitmii) necessary for evolving the semen-
blood into life. The third passage introduces, in addition to these,
the five senses, sativa, rajas, and tamas, and the place of semen-
blood is taken up by the three root-powers of agni, and viiyu.
These three powers are more or less of a hypothetical nature,
absorbing within them a number of functionings and body-consti-
tuents. The reason for these three views in the three successive
chapters cannot be satisfactorily explained, except on the supposi-
tion that Susruta's work underwent three different revisions at
three different times. Vagbhata the elder says that the moment
the semen and the blood are united, the life principle (jiva), being
moved by manas (mano-javena), tainted, as the latter is, with the
afflictions (klesa) of attachn1ent, etc., comes in touch with it 1 •
The doctrine of a subtle body, as referred to in the medical works,
may suitably be compared with the Sa1p.khya view. Cakrapal)i him-
self, in explaining Caraka-smphitii, IV. 2. 36, says that this doctrine
of a subtle body (iitiviihika sarira) is described in the iigama, and by
iigama the Sa1p.khya agama is to be understood (tena iigamiid eva
siirrtkhya-dariana-rupiid iitiviihika-saririit). The Siirrtkhya-kiirikii 39
speaks of a subtle body (suk~ma deha) and the body inherited from
1 gate puriil:ze rajasi nave '-casthite suddhe garbhasyiisaye miirge ca bzfiitmanii
III. 296. 17, aizgu~tha-miitrampuru~a'T{l n;·scakar~a yamo baliit. Vacaspati says that
puru~a is not a physical thing and hence it cannot be drawn out of the body.
It must therefore be interpreted in a remote sense as referring to the cessation
of manifestation of citta in the dying body (na ciisya ni~kar~alz sambhavati,
ity aupaciiriko vyiikhyeyas tathii ca cites cittasya ca tatra tatra vrtty-abhii'l:a eva
ni~ kar~iirthalz).
The Sii'T{lkhya-pravacana-bhii~ya, v. 103, says that the thumb-like puru~a
referred to in Mahii-bhiirata, III. 296. 17, which Yama drew from the body of
.Satyavan, has the size of the subtle body (liizga-deha).
:! Nyiiya-kandali, Vizianagram Sanskrit series, 1895, p. 33·
XIII] The Foetus and the Subtle Body 307
of the size of a thumb, has, according to Nyaya, to be explained
away 1 • In rebirth it is only the all-pervading soul which becomes
connected with a particular body (ya eva dehiintara-Saf!Zgamo 'sya,
tam eva taj-jfiiil;-para-lokam iihulz) 2 •
Candrakirti gives us an account of the Buddhist view from the
Sali-stamba-siltra 3 • The foetus is produced by the combination
of the six constituents (~a7pJii1JZ dhiitunii1Jl samaviiyiit). That which
consolidates (sa1JZSle~a) the body is called earth (prthi·vi-dhiitu);
that which digests the food and drink of the body is called fire
( tejo-dhiitu); that which produces inhalation and exhalation is called
air (viiyu-dhiitu); that which produces the pores of the body
(antal;-sa~iryam) is called ether (iikiiSa-dhiitu); that by which
knowledge is produced is called the vijiiiina-dhiitu. It is by the
combination of them all that a body is produced (sarve~ii1JZ sama-
viiyiit kiiyasyotpattir bhavatt). The seed of vijfiiina produces the
germ of name and form (niima-1·upiinkura) by combination with
many other diverse causes. The foetus is thus produced of itself,
not by another, nor by both itself and another, nor by god, nor
by time, nor by nature, nor by one cause, nor by no cause, but
by the combination of the mother's and the father's parts at the
proper season 4 • The combination of father's and mother's parts
gives us the five dhiitus, which operate together when they are in
combination with the sixth dhiitu, the vijfiiina.
The view that the foetus is the result of the joint effect of the
six dhiitus reminds us of a similar expression in Caraka, IV. 3· Caraka
gives there a summary of the discussions amongst various sages
on the subject of the causes of the formation and develop1nent of the
foetus: where there is a union between a man with effective semen
and a woman with no defect of organ, ovary and blood, if at the
time of the union of the semen and blood the soul comes in touch
with it through the mind, then the foetus begins to develop 5 • When
it is taken care of by proper nourishment, etc., then at the right time
1
ta.~miin na lzrt-pur.u}arike yiivad-avasthiinam iitmanalz ata eva aizgu~tha
miitra1Jl puru~a1Jl n£scakar~a baliid yama iti Vyiisa-vacanam evam-param
avagantavyam (Jayanta's Nyiiya-mafijari, p. 469).
2
Ibid. p. 473·
8 1W.adhyamika-vrtti (Bibliotheca Buddhica), pp. s6o-61.
4
Ibid. p. s67.
6
In the Vaise~ika also the all-pervading iitman comes into touch with the
foetus through the manas; but the difference is this, that here the manas is an
operative factor causing the development of the foetus, whereas there the manas
goes to the foetus when through the influence of body-heat it has already de-
veloped into a body.
20-2
J08 Speculations in the Medical Schools [cu.
the child is born, and the whole development is due to the com-
bined effect of all the elements mentioned above (samudayiid e1iirrz
blziiviiniim). The foetus is born of elements from the mother
and the father, the self, the proper hygienic care of the parents'
bodies (siitmya) and the food-juice; and there is also operant
with these the sattva or manas, which is an intermediate vehicle
serving to connect the soul with a former body when it leaves
one (aupapiiduka) 1 • Bharadvaja said that none of these causes can
be considered as valid; for, in spite of the union of the parents,
it often happens that they remain childless ; the self cannot pro-
duce the self; for, if it did, did it produce itself after being born
or without being born? In both cases it is ,impossible for it to
produce itself. Moreover, if the self had the power of producing
itself, it would not have cared to take birth in undesirable
places and with defective powers, as sometimes happens. Again,
proper hygienic habits cannot be regarded as the cause; for
there are many who have these, but have no children, and
there are many who have not these, but have children. If it
was due to food-juice, then all people would have got children.
Again, it is not true that the sattva issuing forth from one body
connects itself with another; for, if it were so, we should all have
remembered the events of our past life. So none of the above
causes can be regarded as valid. To this Atreya replied that it is
by the combined effect of all the above elements that a child is
produced, and not by any one of them scparately 2 • This idea is
again repeated in IV. 3· 20, where it is said that just as a medical
room (kutiigiirartt vartuliikiirarrz grhartt jaintiika-sveda-pratipaditam
-CakrapaQ.i) is made up of various kinds of things, or just as a
chariot is made up of a collection of its various parts, so is the
foetus made up of the combination of various entities which con-
tribute to the fprmation of the embryo and its development (niinii-
vidhiiniirrz garbha-kiirii1Jiit[l blziiviiniirrz samudayiid abhinirvartate) 3 •
The idea of such a combined effect of causes as leading to the
production of a perfect whole seems to have a peculiar Buddhistic
ring about it.
Bharadvaja, in opposing the above statement of Atreya, asks
what, if the foetus is the product of a number of combined causes,
1
Caraka-satp.hitii!.. IV. 3. 3.
2 neti bhagaviin Atreyafz. sarvebhya ebhyo bhiivebhyafz samuditebhyo garbho
'bhinirvartate. Ibid. IV. 3. II.
3
Ibid. IV. 3· 20.
XIII] The Foetus and the Subtle Body
is the definite order in which they co-operate together to produce
the various parts (katham aya1Jl sandhiyate)? Again, how is it
that a child born of a woman is a human child and not that of
any other animal? If, again, man is born out of man, why is not
the son of a stupid person stupid, of a blind man blind, and of
a madman mad? Moreover, if it is argued that the self perceives
by the eye colours, by the ear sounds, by the smell odours, by
the organ of taste the different tastes, and feels by the skin the
different sensations of touch, and for that reason the child does not
inherit the qualities of the father, then it has to be admitted that
the soul can have knowledge only when there are senses and is
devoid of it when there are no senses; in that case the soul is not un-
changeable, but is liable to change (yatra caitad ubhaya1Jl sambhavati
jiiatvam ajiiatva1Jl ca sa-vikiiras ciitmii)l. If .the soul perceives the
objects of sense through the activity of the senses, such as per-
ceiving and the like, then it cannot know anything when it has
no senses, and, when it is unconscious, it cannot be the cause of the
body-movements or of any of its other activities and consequently
cannot be called the soul, iitman. It is therefore simple nonsense
to say that the soul perceives colours, etc. by its senses.
To this Atreya replies that there are four kinds of beings,
viz. those born from ovaries, eggs, sweat and vegetables. Beings
in each class exist in an innumerable diversity of forms 2 • The
forms that the foetus-producing elements (garbha-karii bhiivii/:z)
assume depend upon the form of the body where they assemble.
Just as gold, silver, copper, lead, etc. assume the form of any
mould in which they are poured, so, when the foetus-producing
elements assemble in a particular body, the foetus takes that par-
ticular form. But a man is not infected with the defect or disease
of his father, unless it be so bad or chronic as to have affected his
semen. Each of our limbs and organs had their germs in the
semen of the father, and, when the disease or defect of the father
is so deep-rooted as to have affected (upatiipa) the germ part of
any particular organ in the seed, then the child produced out of
the semen is born defective in that limb; but, if the defect or
disease of the father is so superficial that his semen remains
unaffected, then the disease or defect is not inherited by the son.
The child does not owe sense-organs to his parents; he alone is
responsible for the goodness or badness of his sense-organs ; for
1 2
Caraka-stlT{lhitii, IV. 3· 21. Ibid. IV. 3· 22, 23.
JIO Speculations in the Medical Schools [cH.
these are born from his own self (litma-jiinindriyli1Jz). The presence
or absence of the sense-organs is due to his own destiny or the fruits
of karma (dai•aa). So there is no definite law that the sons of
idiots or men with defective senses should necessarily be born
idiots or be otherwise defective 1 • The self (iitman) is conscious only
when the sense-organs exist. The self is never without the sattva
or the mind-organ, and through it there is always some kind of
consciousness in the self2 • The self, as the agent, cannot without
the sense-organs have any knowledge of the external world leading
to practical work; no practical action for which several accessories
are required can be performed unless these are present; a potter
who knows how to make a jug cannot succeed in making it
unless he has the organs with which to make it3 • The fact that
the self has consciousness even when the senses do not operate
is well illustrated by our dream-knowledge when the senses lie
inoperative 4 • Atreya further says that, when the senses are com-
pletely restrained and the manas, or mind-organ, is also re-
strained and concentrated in the self, one can have knowledge
of all things even without the activity of the senses 5 • The self is
thus of itself the knower and the agent.
This view of Caraka, as interpreted by Cakrapal).i, seems to be
somewhat new. For the self is neither pure intelligence, like the
pU1·u~a of the Sarpkhya-yoga, nor the unity of being, intelligence and
bliss, like that of the Vedanta. Here the soul is the knower by
virtue of its constant association with manas. In this, however, we
are nearer to the Nyaya- Vaise~ika view. But in the Nyaya-Vaise!?ika
view the soul is not always in contact with manas and is not always
conscious. The manas in that view is atomic. The view that the
1 Caraka-smphitii, IV. 3. 25.
2
Ibid. IV. 3· 26, na hy-asattva"tz kadiicid iitmii sattva-viSe~iic copalabhyate
jfiiina-vise~a"tz. Cakrapani, in commenting on this, says that our knowledge of the
external world is due to the operation of the sense-organs in association with
the mind-organ. If these sense-organs do not exist, we cannot have any know-
ledge of the external world, but the internal organ of mind is always associated
with the self: so the knowledge which is due to this mind-organ is ever present
in the self (yat tu kevala-mano-janyam iitma-jiiii.narrz, tad bhavaty eva sarvadii). It
seems that both sattva and manas are used to denote the mind-organ.
3
The word kiirya-jfianam in Caraka-sarrzhitii, IV. 3· 27, has been explained by
Cakrapal).i as kiirya-pravrtti-janaka-biihya-v#aya-jiiiinam. The knowledge that
the self has when it has no sense-organs operating in association with the mind
has no object (nirvi~aya); in other words, this knowledge which the self always
has is formless.
4
Ibid. IV. 3· 31.
6
viniipindriyaib samiidhi-baliid eva yasmiit sarvajno bhavati; tasmii.j jna-sva-
bhiiva eva nirindriyo 'py iitmii (Cakrapal)i's Caraka-tiitparya-pkii, IV. 3· 28-29).
XIII] The Foetus and the· Subtle Body JII
tion of foetal development. Its main points of interest may thus be summarized:
the hard parts of the body are earth, the liquid parts are water, that which is
hot (u~1}a) is heat-light (tejalz), that which moves about is viiyu, that which is
vacuous is iikiisa. The body is further said to depend on six tastes (la4-iiiraya),
sweet (madhura), acid (am/a), salt (lava1}a), bitter (tikta), hot (katu) and pungent
(k~iiya), and it is made up of seven dhiitus of chyle (rasa), blood (sol}ita) and
flesh (mil'f!l.sa). From the six kinds of rasa comes the so1}ita, from s01)ita comes
miirrzsa, from mii'f!l.sa comes fat (medas), from it the tendons (sniiyu), from the
sniiyu bones (asthi), from the bones the marrow (majjii), from the marrow the
semen (sukra). By the second night after the union of semen and blood the
foetus is of the form of a round lump called kala/a, at the eighth night it is of
the form of a vesicle called budbuda, after a fortnight it assumes the form of a
spheroid, pi1)tja; in two months the head appears, in three months the feet,
in four months the abdomen, heels and the pelvic portions appear, in the fifth
month the spine appears, in the sixth month the mouth, nose, eyes and ears
develop; in the seventh month the foetus becomes endowed with life Ulvena
sarrzyukto bhavatt), in the eighth month it becomes fully developed. By an excess
of semen over blood a male child is produced, by the excess of blood a female
child is produced, when the two are equal a hermaphrodite is produced. When
air somehow enters and divides the semen into two, twins are produced. If the
minds of the parents are disturbed (vyiikulita-miinasa/:z), the issue becomes either
blind or lame or dwarf. In the ninth month, when the foetus is well developed
XIII] Foetal Development 31 3
not to exist as to exist. Susruta remarks that the two main con-
stituents of the body, semen and blood, are respectively made up
of the watery element of the moon (saumya) and the fiery element
(iigneya); the other elements in atomic particles are also associated
with them, and all these mutually help one another and co-operate
together for the formation of the body 1 • Susruta further goes on
to say that at the union of female and male the heat (tejal;z)
generated rouses the viiyu, and through the coming together of
heat and air the semen is discharged 2 • Caraka,however, thinks that
the cause of discharge of semen is joy (har~a) 3 • The semen is not
produced from the body, but remains in all parts of the body,and
it is the joy which causes the discharge and the entrance of the
semen into the uterus 4 • Thus he says that, being ejected by the
self as joy (har~a-bhuteniitmanodiritas ciidh~thitas ca), the semen
constituent or the seed, having come out of the man's body, be-
comes combined with the menstrual product (iirtava) in the uterus
(garbhiiSaya) after it has entrance thereinto through the proper
channel (udtena pathii). According to Susruta the ejected semen
enters into the female organ (yonim abhiprapadyate) and comes into
association there with the menstrual product 5 • At that very moment,
the soul with its subtl~ body comes into association with it and
thus becomes associated with the material characteristics of sattva,
with all its organs, it remembers its previous birth and knows its good and
bad deeds and repents that, on account of its previous karma, it is suffering the
pains of the life of a foetus, and resolves that, if it can once come out, it will
follow the Sa~pkhya-yoga discipline. But as soon as the child is born it comes
into connection with V aiP.Zava viiyu and forgets all its previous births and
resolutions. A body is called sarzra, because three fires reside in it (frayante),
viz. the ko#hiigni, darsaniigni and jfiiiniigni. The ko~fhiigni digests all kinds of
food and drink, by the darsaniigni forms and colours are perceived, by the
jiiiiniigni one performs good and bad deeds. This Upanil?ad counts the cranial
bones as being fourt the vital spots (marman) as being 107, the joints as 18o, the
tissues (sniiyu) as 109, the siriis, or veins, as 700, the marrow places as soo, and
the bones as 300.
1
Suiruta-sa1{lhitii, III. 3· 3·
2
Ibid. 111. 3· 4, Nin;taya-Sagara edition, 1915. l)alhaQa, commenting on this,
says, "sukha-la~a1Ja-vyiiyiimajo~ma-viuna1JI. vidrutam aniliic cyutam."
8
Caraka-sa1{lhitii, IV. 4· 7·
" CakrapaQi, commenting on Caraka-sa1{lhitii, IV. 4· 7, says that "niifzgebhyab
Su.kram utpadyate kintu sukra-rupatayaiva vyajyate," i.e. the semen is not pro-
duced from the different parts of the body, but it exists as it is and is only mani-
fested in a visible form after a particular operation (Su5ruta, 111. 3· 4).
6
As l)alhaQa interprets this, the female organ here means the uterus; thus
l)alhaQa says, "yones tritlyiivartiivasthita-garbhaiayyiim pratipadyate," i.e. the
semen enters into the third chamber of the female organ, the place of the
foetus. The uterus is probably considered here as the third chamber, the preceding
two being probably the vulva and the vagina.
Speculations in the Medical Schools [cH.
rajas and tamas, and godly (deva), demonic (asura), and other
characteristics. Caraka, referring to the question of the association
of the soul with the material elements, says that this is due to
the operation of the soul acting through the mind-organ (sattva-
kara~za)1. Cakrapai).i, in commenting on the above passage, says
that the self (iitman) is inactive; activity is however attributed to
the soul on account of the operative mind-organ which is asso-
ciated with it. This, however, seems to be a compromise on the
part of CakrapaQ.i with the views of the traditional Sa111khya
philosophy, which holds the soul to be absolutely inactive; but the
text of the Caraka-sa'!lhita does not here say anything on the
inactivity of the soul; for Caraka describes the soul as active
(pravartate) as agent (kartr) and as universal performer (visva-
karman), and the sativa is described here only as an organ of the
soul (sattva-kara1Ja).
In the first month, the foetus has a jel1y-like form ·(kalala} 2 ;
in the second month, the material constituents of the body having
undergone a chemical change (abhi'prapacyamana) due to the action
of cold, heat and air (sito~miinilai/:z), the foetus becomes hard
(ghana). If it is the foetus of a male child, it is spherical (pi1_1tja);
if it is of a female child, it is elliptical (pesi); if it is of a herma-
phrodite, it is like the half of a solid sphere (arbuda) 3 • In the
third month five special eminences are seen, as also the slight
differentiation of limbs. In the fourth month the differentiation
of the limbs is much more definite and well n1anifested; and owing
to the manifestation of the heart of the foetus the entity of con-
sciousne~s becomes also manifested, since the heart is the special
seat of consciousness; so from the fourth month the foetus mani-
fests a desire for the object:;; of the senses. In the fifth month the
consciousness becomes more awakened ; in the sixth intelligence
begins to develop; in the seventh the division and differentiation of
1
Sattva-kara~w gu~a-J(ra/un,:riiya pravartate-Camka-sarp}zitii, IV. 4· 8.
Cakra.pal).i rightly points out that gu~a here means material elements which
possess qualities--gu!Javmzti bhiltiini. The word gu~a is used in all these passages
in the sense of material entity or blzfita. Though gu!Ja means a quality and
f(tt~zin a substance, yet the \·icw adopted here ignores the difference between
qualities and substances, and gu~za, the ordinary word for quality, stands here
for substance (gw,:ra-gu7Ji1lor abhedopaciiriit-Cakrapar)i, ibid.).
2 J)alhal).a explains kala/a as sinf(hiina-prakhyam.
3
On the meanings of the words jJesz and arbuda there is a difference of
opinion between l)alhal).a and Gayi. Thus Gayi says that pest means quadrangular
(catur-asra) and arbuda means the form of the bud of a silk cotton tree (sii/mali-
muku/iikiiram).
XIII] Foetal Development
limbs become complete; in the eighth, the vital element (ojas) still
remains unsettled, and so, if a child is born at this time, it becomes
short -lived 1 •
Caraka, in ·describing the part played by different material
elements in the fonnation of the body, says that from the element
iikiisa are formed sound, the organ of hearing, lightness (liighava),
subtleness of structure (sauk~mya) and porosity (vireka); from 'Dliyu
(air) are formed the sensation of touch, the organ of touch, rough-
ness, power of movement, the disposition of the constituent elements
(dhiitu-vyuhana), and bodily efforts; from fire, vision, the organ of
vision,digestion,heat,etc.; from water, the sensation of taste and the
taste-organ, cold, softness, smoothness and watery characteristics;
from earth, smell, organ of smell, heaviness, steadiness and hard-
ness. The parts of the body which are thus formed fron1 different
material elements grow and develop with the accession of those
eleP.lents from which they have grown 2 • As the whole world is
made up of five elements (bhuta), so the human body is also made
up of five elements 3 • Caraka maintains that the senses and all
other litnbs of the body which grow before birth make their
appearance simultaneously in the third month~. \Vhen, in the third
month, the sense-organs grow, there grow in the heart feelings and
desires. In the fourth month the foetus becomes hard, in the fifth
it gets more flesh and blood, in the sixth there is greater develop-
ment of strength and colour, in the seventh it becomes complete
with all its limbs, and in the eighth month there is a constant
exchange (,f vital power (ojas) between the mother and the foetus.
The foetus being not yet perfectly developed, the vital fluid passes
from the mother to the foetus; but, since the latter cannot retain
it, it returns to the mother 5 • Cakrapal)i, commenting on this,
says that such an exchange is only possible because the foetus
1 Susruta-sa,zhitii, III. 3· 30.
2
Caraka-sarp.hitii, IV. 4· 12.
a evam ayarp. loka-sammita]J puru~al:z-yiivanto hi loke bhiiva-viSeliis tiivantab
puru~e, yiivantab puru~e tiivanto loke (Caraka-sa,hitii, IV. 4· 13). In ibid. IV. 3,
it is said that the foetus gets its skin, blood, flesh, fat, navel, heart, kloma, spleen,
liver, kidneys, bladder, colon, stomach, the larger intestines, and the upper and the
lower rectum from the mother, and its hair, beard, nails, teeth, bones, veins
and semen from the father; but, however this may be, it is certain that the
development of all these organs is really due to the assimilation of the five
elements of matter. So the development ofthe humal) foetus is, like the develop-
ment of all other things in the world, due to the accretion of material elements.
" Ibid. IV. 4· 14.
6 miitur ojo garbha'!l gacchaati yad ucyate, tad-garbhauja eva miitr-sambaddha'!l
larger ones is called majjii, or marrow, and the fat of pure flesh only is called
vapa, or fat.
JI8 Speculations in the Medical Schools [cH.
blood, pupphusa (lungs) from the froth of blood, and utztfuka (a
gland in the colon?) from the dirt of blood (sor.Jita-kitta-prabhava).
The best parts (prasiida) of blood and lymph are acted upon by
bile, and viiyu works in association therewith; by this process the
entrails, rectum and bladder are produced; and, when the heating
process goes on in the abdomen, the tongue is produced, as the
essence of lymph, blood and flesh. The air, being associated with
heat, enters the flesh and changes the currents, the muscles (pesl}
are differentiated, and by the oily part of fat the viiyu produces
the veins (sira) and tissues (sniiyu). From the essential part of
blood and fat the kidneys (vrkka) are produced, from the essential
part of flesh, blood, lymph and fat the testicles, and from the
essence of blood and lymph the heart, which is the centre of the
dhamanis through which flows the current of life (priir}a-vahii).
Underneath the heart on the left side there are the spleen and the
pupphusa, and on the right side the liver and the kloma (right
lung?), and this is particularly the place of consciousness. At the
time of sleep, when it is covered with Sle~man having a super-
abundance of tamas, the heart remains contracted.
The foetus grows through the chyle of the mother and also
through the inflation of the body of the foetus by air 1 • The navel
of the body is the heating centre (jyotil;.-sthiina), and the air, starting
from here, continues to inflate the body.
It must be borne in mind that a foetus is the product of several
causes operating jointly. A defect of any particular limb at birth
is due to some defect in that part of one or more of the operating
causes through the influence of which that particular limb was
produced. The cause of foetal development is not a question
of organs or limbs which were absolutely non-existent: they
already existed, in the potential form, in the causes operating
jointly. The joint causes did not produce something absolutely
new, but their joint operation helped to actualize all that was
already inherent in them. Of all the joint causes the self remains
unchanged in all changes of the body. The changes of pleasure
and pain or such other characteristics as are considered to be due
to the soul are really due either to sattva or manas, or to the body 2 •
Cakrapal)i, commenting on this, says that the fact that a soul may
1
SuJruta-sa?flhita, III. 4· 57.
2
nir-vikaral:z paras tv atmii sarva-bhfitiinii1]l m·rvile~a-sattva-sanrayos tu vise5iid
viSe5opalabdhil:z. Caraka-sarphitii, IV. 4· 34·
XIII] Growth and Disease
take its birth as this or that animal does not imply that the soul is
liable to change (paramiitma-vikiirii na bhavantz) ; for such a change
is due to the excessive preponderance of sattva, rajas or lamas,
which are in reality due to virtue and vice, which in themselves
are but the characteristics of mind (sattva-rajas-tamal;-prabalatii-
rilpa-vikiiraja-manojanya-dharmiidharma-janyiiny eva) 1 •
There are three kinds of morbid elements (do~a) of the body,
viz. viita, pitta and sle~man, and two morbid elements which affect
the mind (sattva), viz. rajas and tamas. By the disorder of the
first three the body becomes diseased, and by that of the second
two the mind becomes affected. These, however, will be dealt with
more fully later on.
on Caraka-sarrzhitii, IV. 6. 4·
320 Speculations in the Medical Schools [cH.
in the body; the trouble or affection of the body has thus to
be defined in terms of dhiitu-vaifamya. The only escape from
this charge is that dhiitu-vaifamya and disease are synonymous,
and the priikrta-miina of dhiitus is the same as health. When the
dhiitus are in their normal measure, there canno,t be any va~amya,
except of a local nature, as when, for example, the pitta existing in
its own proper measure is somehow carried by viiyu to a part
of the body and there is consequently a local excess. Whatever
leads ~o the increase of any particular dhiitu automatically leads
also to the decrease of other dhiitus which are opposed to it. Things
having the same sort of composition as a particular bodily dhiitu
increase it, and things having a different composition decrease it
(siimiinyam ekatva-kararrz vise~as tu Prthaktva-krt) 1 • The normal
health of a man is but another name for his dhiitu-siimya; a man
is said to be unhealthy, or to be in a state of dhiitu-va#amya, when
symptmns of disease (vikiira) are seen. Slight variations of the
due proportion of dhiitu do not entitle us to call them instances of
dhiitu-vai~amya unless there is vikiira or symptoms of it externally
expressed. The daily course of a healthy man ought to be such
that the equilibrium of dhiitus may be properly maintained. The
sole aim of Ayur-veda is to advise diet, medicines, and a course of
behaviour, such that, if they are properly followed, a normally
healthy person may maintain the balance of his dhiitus and a man
who has lost the equilibrium of his dhiitus may regain it. The aim
of Ayur-veda is thus to advise men how to secure dhiitu-siimya
(dhiitu-siimya-kriyii coktii tantrasyiisya prayojanam) 2 •
If a normally healthy man wishes to keep his health at its
normal level, he has to take things of different tastes, so that there
may not be an excess of any particular kind of substance in the
body. Diseases are caused through the excessive, deficient, and
wrongful administration of sense-objects, the climatic charac-
teristics of heat and cold, and the misuse of intelligence 3 • Thus
the sight of objects with powerful light, the hearing of loud sounds
like the roaring of thunder, the sn1elling of very strong odours,
too much eating, the touching of too much cold or heat or too
much bathing or massage are examples Gf atiyoga, or excessive
association with sense-objects. Not to see, hear, smell, taste or
1 2
Caraka-sa1!J}zitii, I. I. 44· Ibid. I. I. 52.
8 kiila-buddhlndriyiirthiinii'J!l yogo mithyii na ciiti ca
dvayiiSrayiitJii'J!l vyiidhlnii'J!l tri-vidho hetu-sa'J!lgrahalz.
Jbid. I. I. 53·
XIII] Growth and Disease 321
from the three malas referred to here as vayu, pitta and kapha. These are (r) the
watery secretions from tongue, eyes and cheeks, (2) the colouring pitta, (3) the
dirt of ears, tongue, teeth, armpits and penis, (4) the nails, (5) the dirt of the
eyes, (6) the glossy appearance of the face, (7) the eruptions which come out in
youth, and beards. Ra«;ihamalla, in commenting on this, refers to Caraka-sa7{lhitii,
VI. 15. 29-30, in support of the above passage of Sanigadhara. Most of the malas
are chidra-malas, or impurities of the openings.
XIII] Vayu, Pitta and Kapha 327
Atreya says in answer to Kapyavaca's remarks in the learned dis-
cussions of the assembly of the sages, "In one sense you have
all spoken correctly; but none of your judgments are absolutely
true. Just as it is necessary that religious duties (dharma), wealth
(artha) and desires (kiima) should all be equally attended to, or
just as the three seasons of winter, summer and rains all go in
a definite order, so all the three, viita, pitta and Sle~man or kapha,
when they are in their natural state of equilibrium, contribute to
the efficiency of all the sense-organs, the strength, colour and
health of the body, and endow a man with long life. But, when
they are disturbed, they produce opposite results and ultimately
break the whole balance of the system and destroy it 1 ." There is
one important point to which the notice of the reader should par-
ticularly be drawn. I have sometimes translated mala as" polluting
agents or impurities" and sometimes as "waste-products," and
naturally this may cause confusion. The term mala has reference
to the production of diseases 2 • Kitta means waste-products or
secretions, and these may be called mala when they are in such
proportions as to cause diseases. vVhen, however, a mala is in such
proportions that it does not produce any disease, it is not a mala
proper but a mala-dhiitu (nirbiidha-kariin maliidzn prasii1{lde smhcak~
mahe)3. In another passage of Caraka (1. z8. 3), which has been
referred to above, it is said that out of the digested food and drink
there are produced rasa and kitta (secretion) called mala ( tatriihiira-
prasiidiikhya-rasa~l kiftal!l ca maliikhyam abhinirvartate), and out of
this kz#q is produced sweat, urine, excreta, viiyu,pitta and Sle~man.
These malas are also dhiitus, inasmuch as they sustain the body as
much as the other dhiitus, rasa or 1·akta, etc. do, so long as they
are in their proper proportions and balance ( te sarva eva dhiitavo
maliikhyii/:l prasiidiikhyiis ca) 4 • Vagbhata, however, takes a different
view of this subject. He separates the do~a, dhiitu and mala and
speaks of them as being the roots of the body. Thus he says that
viiyu sustains the body, contributing energy (utsiiha), exhalation
(ucchviisa), inspiration (ni/:lsviisa), mental and bodily movement
(ce#ii), ejective forces (·vega-pravartana); pitta helps the body by
1 Caraka-sa'l'flhitii, 1. 12. 13.
2
tatra mala-bhfitiis te ye ianrasya biidhakarii/.1 syulz. Caraka-sa'l'flhitii, IV. 6. 17.
3
Cakrapiir:ti on Caraka-sa'l'flhitii. Compare Siirizgadhara, IV. 8: viiyub pitla1Jl
kapho do~ii dhiitavai ca malii matiib, i.e. viiyu, pitta and kapha are known as do~a,
dhiitu and mala.
4
Also eva'l'fl rasa-malau sva-pramii~ziivasthitav iifrayasya sama-dhiitor dhiitu-
siimyam anuvartayatab (Caraka-sa'f!lhitii, 1. 28. 3).
Speculations in the 1V!edical Schools [cH.
digestive function, heat, the function of sight, imagination (medhii),
power of understanding (dhi), courage (saurya), softness of the
body; and Sle~man, by steadiness, smoothness, by serving to unite
the joints, etc. The functions of the seven dhiitus, beginning with
rasa, are said to be the giving of satisfaction through the proper
functioning of the senses (prt;~ana or rasa), the contribution of
vitality (jivana), the production of oiliness (sneha), the supporting
of the burden (dhiira~a) of the bones (astht), the filling up of bone
cavities (pura~a or majjii) and productivity (garbhotpiida of /ukra);
of males it is said that the excreta has the power of holding the
body, while urine ejects the surplus water and sweat holds it back 1 •
The elder Vagbhata distinguishes the dhiitus from viiyu, pitta and
lwpha by calling the latter do~a (polluting agents) and the former
du~ya {the constituents which are polluted). He further definitely
denies that the malas of dhiitus could be the cause of disease. He
thus tries to explain away this view (that of Caraka as referred to
above) as being aupaciirika, i.e. a metaphorical statement 2 • The
body, according to him, is a joint product of do~a, dhiitu and
mala 3 • Indu, the con1mentator on the A~tiiizga-sa1J1graha, however,
emphasizes one important characteristic of the do$aS when he says
that the dynamic which sets the dhiitus in motion (do~ebhya eva
dhiitilnii~n pra·vrtti~z) is derived from the do~ as, and the circulation
chemical activities, oiliness, hardness, etc. of the chyle (rasa) are
derived from them 4 • Owing to the predominance of one or other
of the do~as from the earliest period, when the foetus begins to
develop, the child is said to possess the special features of one
or other of the do~as and is accordingly called viita-prakrti, pitta-
prakrti or sle:"ma-prakrti. Vagbhata further says that disease is not
dhiitu-'l•ai~amya, but do~a-·cai$mnya, and the equilibrium of do$aS or
do~a-siimya is health. A disease, on this view, is the disturbance
of do~as, and, as do$as arc entities independent of the dhiitus,
the disturbance of do~as may not necessarily mean the dis-
turbance of dhiitus 5 • In another passage the elder Vagbhata says
1
A~tiiilga-hrdaya, 1. 11.
1-5.
2
tajjiin ity-upaciiret)a tan iilmr ghrta-diiha•vat
rasiidisthe~u do~e~u ·vyiidhayas sambhavanti ye.
AHiiilga-smrzgraha, 1. I.
3
lndu, the commentator on the A~tii1iga-S01Jl.(!raha, puts it as sarzra1Jl ca do1a-
dhiitu-mala-samudiiyal.z (1. 1).
4
tathii ca dhiitu-po~iiya rasasya valuma-piika-sneha-kiithinyiidi do~a
prasiida-labhyam eva (ibid.).
5
Ayur-veda is closely associated with the Sarp.khya and Nyaya-Vaise~ika,
which alone deal with some sort of phy::.ics in Indian philosophy. It is pointed
XIII] V iiyu, Pitta and Kapha
that, as the manifold universe is nothing but a modification of the
gu'!las, so all diseases are but modifications of the three do~as, or,
as in the ocean waves, billows and foam are seen which are in
reality the same as the ocean, so all the different diseases are
nothing but the three do~as 1 • The elder Vagbhata uses also in
another place the simile of the three gu'!las with reference to the
three do~as. Thus he says," As the three gu'!las co-operate together
for the production of the world in all its diversity, in spite of the
mutual opposition that exists among themselves, so the three do~m~
also co-operate together, in spite of natural opposition, for the pro-
duction of the diverse diseases 2 ." In the treatment of the bone
system the present writer agrees with Dr Hoernle that Vagbhata
always attempted to bring about a reconciliation between Caraka
and Susruta by explaining away the unadjustable views of one or
the other. Here also the same tendency is seen. Thus, on the one
hand, he explained away as being metaphorical (aupaciiriki) the
expressed views of Caraka that the dhiitu-malas are the do~as. On
the other hand, he followed the statements of the Uttara-tantra
that the three do~as, the dhiitus, excreta and urine sustain a man's
body. He further follows the Uttara-tantra in holding that the three
do~as are the three gm;as (bhinnii do~iis trayo gU1Jii/;). I)alhal).a
identifies z·iiyu with rajas, pitta with sativa and kapha with tamas 3 •
In the Siltra-sthiina Susruta mentions blood (sorzita) as having
the same status as viiyu, pitta and kapha and holds that the body
out by Narasirp.ha Kaviraja (a writer from the south) in his Vivarm;za-siddlziinta-
cintiimm:zi (the only manuscript of which is in possession of the present writer)
that acco:-ding to Sarp.khya it is the do~a transforming itself from a state of
equilibrium to a state of unbalanced preponderance of any of them that is
to be called a disease (vai~amya-siimyiivasthii-bhinniivasthii-viSe~avad do~atvarJl
rogat'l.Jam). The Naiyayikas, however, hold that disease is a separate entity or
substance, which is produced by do~a, but which is not itself a do,w (dravyatve
sati do,w-bhinna-do~a-janyatVa1Jl rogatvam). So a disease is different from its
symptoms or effects. Narasirp.ha further holds that, since Caraka speaks of
diseases as being fiery (agneya) and aerial (viiyavya), he tacitly accepts the
diseases as separate substances. That Caraka sometimes describes a disea:;e
as being dhiitu-vai~amya is to be explained as due to the fact that, since
dhiitu-vai~amyas produce diseases, they are themselves also called diseases in a
remote sense (yat tu C arakena dhiitu-vai~amyasya rogatvam uhtatJl tat te~iiTfl tathii-
vidha-dubkha-kartrtviid aupaciirikam. Vivarava-siddhiinta-cintiimm;li, MS. p. 3).
1
A~tiiilga-satJlgraha, I. 22.
2
iirambhakarJl virodhe 'pi mitho yadyadguva-trayam
viivasya dr~tatJlyugapad vyiidher do~a-traya'Jl tathii (ibid. I. 21).
3
rajo-bhuy#tho miirutal.z, rajo hi pravartaka'Jl sarva-bhiiViinii'Jl pittarJl sattvot-
katatJl/aghu-prakiilakatviit, rajo-yukta'!l vii ity eke kaphas tamo-bahulalz, guru-prii-
varm;iitmakatviid ity iihur bhi~ajafz. Yady evam tat katharJl kapha-pralqtike purJlsi
sattva-gw;.opapannatii pathitii, ucyate, guva-dvitayam api kaphejiiiitavya'l!l sattva-
tamo-bahulii iipa (Oalhal)a on Susruta, Uttara-tantra, 66. 9).
330 Speculations in the Medical Schools [cH.
depends on food and drink as well as on the various combinations
of viiyu,pitta, kapha and s01:zita in health and disease. :QalhaQa, in
commenting on this, says that, Susruta's work being principally a
treatise on surgery, its author holds that blood with all its impurities
plays an important part in producing disturbances in all wounds 1 •
Susruta further speaks of viita, pitta and sle§man as the causes of
the formation of the body (deha-sambhava-hetavafz). The viita, pitta
and kapha, situated in the lower, middle and upper parts of the
body, are like three pillars which support the body, and blood also
co-operates with them in the same work. :QalhaiJ.a remarks that
v.:iita, pitta and kapha are concomitant causes, working in co-
operation with semen and blood 2 • Susruta further derives viita
from the root vii, to move, pitta from tap, to heat, and sle~man
from sli~, to connect together. The Sutra-sthiina of Susruta com-
pares kapha, pitta and viiyu with the moon (soma), the sun
(surya) and air (anila) but not with the three gutyas, as is found
in the supplementary book, called the Uttara-tantra. In discussing
the nature of pitta, he says that pitta is the fire in the body and
there is no other fire but pitta in the body. Pitta has all the
qualities of fire, and so, when it diminishes, articles of food with
fiery qualities serve to increase it, and, when it increases, articles
of food with cooling properties serve to diminish it. Pitta, according
to Susruta, is situated between the stomach (iimiisaya) and the
smaller intestines (pakviisaya), and it cooks all food and drink and
separates the chyle on the one hand, and the excreta, urine, etc.
on the other. Being situated in the above place, between the
stomach and the smaller intestines (tatra-stham eva), by its own
power (iitma-saktyii) it works in other pitta centres of the body
and by its heating work (agni-karma) sets up the proper activities
at those places. In its function of cooking it is called piicaka, in
its function in the liver and spleen, as supplying the colouring
matter of blood, it is called "colouring" (raiijaka), in its function
in the heart it serves intellectual purposes (siidhaka), in its function
in the eyes it is called "perceiving," or locaka, in its function of
giving a glossy appearance to the skin it is called bhriijaka. It is
hot, liquid and blue or yellow, possesses bad smell, and after
1 etad dhi salya-tantram, salya-tantre ca vra~w.fz pradhiina-bhiitafz vra~e ca
dt7~ye~umadhye raktasya priidhiinyam iti S01Jitopiidiinam (ibid.). Susruta also uses
the word do~a to mean pus (ptiya) (I. 5· 12).
2
Susruta, I. 21. 3 and 4· J)alhat:ta, commenting on this, writes:" iukriirtaviidi
sahakiiritayii deha-janakii abhipretiiJ.z."
XIII] Vayu, Pitta and Kapha 33 1
passing through unhealthy digestive actions tastes sour. Coming
to Sle~man, Susruta says that the stomach is its natural place;
being watery, it flows down\vards and neutralizes the bile-heat,
which otherwise would have destroyed the whole body by its ex-
cessive heat. Being in iimiisaya, it works in the other centres of
Sle~man, such as the heart, the tongue, the throat, the head
and in all the joints of the body. The place of viiyu is the pelvic
regions and the rectum (srm:zi-guda-Sa1Jlsraya); the main place of the
blood, which is counted as do~a by Susruta, is regarded as being the
liver and the spleen 1 • I have noticed above, that in the /ltharva-
Veda mention is found of three kinds of diseases, the airy (viitaja),
the dry (s~ma) and the wet (abhraja) 2 • In the Caraka-samhitii
1-'iita, pitta and lwpha are regarded as being produced from kitta,
or secretions. They are thus regarded here as being of the nature
of internal waste-products of unassimilated food-juice at the
different stages of its assimilation, as chyle, flesh, etc., which have
important physiologicai functions to perform for the preservation
of the process of the growth of the body, when they are in due
proportions, and they break up the body when they are in undue
proportions. What exactly ki!ta means is difficult to determine. It
may mean merely the part of the food-juice unassimilated as chyle,
or the part of it unassimilated as blood, and so forth; or it may
mean such unassimilated products, together with the secretions
from the respective dhiitus, which absorb the substantial part
of the food-juice and throw off some of its impurities into the
unabsorbed material; this at least is what kitta ought to mean,
if it is interpreted as dhiitu-mala, or impurities of dhiitus. These
secretions and waste-products form the source of most of the con-
structive and destructive forces of the body. The watery character
of kapha and the fiery character of pitta are not ignored; but their
essence or substance is considered to be secretive, or of the nature
of waste-product. Susruta, however, does not seem to refer to
this secretive aspect, but he seems to have grasped the essential
physiological activity of the body as being of the nature of digestive
operation and the distribution of the heat and the products of
digestion; and the analogy of cooking, as requiring fire, water and
air, seems to have been well before his mind. Susruta also seems to
1
Susruta-saf!Zhitii, I. 11. 8-16.
2
Ye abhrajii viitajii yai ca iupno (Atharva- Veda, I. 12. 3); again, agner iviisya
dahata eti SU~mitza/; (ibid. VI. 20. 4).
332 Speculations in the 111edical Schools [cH.
in 111. 4· 8o: "Some say that the constitution (prakrtz) of the human
body is elemental (bhautikz), the three constitutive elements being
air, fire and water 1 ." The advance of the medical schools of thought
over these speculations and over others which consider the body
to be a product of one bhuta or of many bhiltas is to be sought
in this, that, besides allowing the material causes (upadiina) of
the body to be the dhiitus, they emphasized the necessity of ad-
mitting one or more inherent dynamic principles for the develop-
ment and decay of the body. This explains how viita, pitta and
kapha are regarded both as dhatu and as do1a, as prakrti and as
vikrti. Thus Caraka says, as has already been mentioned, that
from the time of the formation of the foetus the viita, pitta and
kapha are working, but in more or less diverse ways and in diverse
systems, with equal viiyu, pitta, mala and kapha (sama-pittanila-
kapha) or different degrees of predominance of them as viitala,
pittala and sle~mala 2 • Men of the Sle~ala type are generally
healthy, whereas viitala and pittala persons are always of indifferent
health. Later on, when there is a disease with the predominance
of that dofa which is predominant in man's constitution from his
birth, the newly collected do1a produces morbidity on the lines on
which the predominating do~a of his constitution is working ; but this
newly collected do~a does not augment the corresponding original
do~a. The original dofa is never increased, and, whatever may be
the predominance of a dofa due to any disease, the constitutional
condition of the do~as remains the same. Thus a vlita-pra.krti
person does not become Slefma-prakrti or pitta-prakrti, and vice-
versa. The dofaS which are constitutional always remain as the
prakrtim iha narti7Jiim bhautikiT!l kecid iihul}
pavana-dahana-toyail} kirtitiis tiis tu tisral;.
Susruta, 111. 4· 8o.
2 Caraka refers to a view that there are none who may be regarded as
sama-viita-pitta-Sle~man (or having equal viita, pitta and sle~man). Since all men
take various kinds of diet (•vi~amiihiiropayogitviit), they must be either viita-
prakrti, pitta-prakrti, or sle~ma-prallrti. Against this Caraka says that sama-viita-
pitta-sle~man is the same thing as health or freedom from disease (aroga). All
medicines are applied for attaining this end, and there cannot be any doubt
that such a state exists. Again, the terms viita-prakrti, pitta-prakrti and sle~ma
prakrti are incorrect; for prakrti means health. What they mean by viita-prakrti is
that viita is quantitatively predominant (iidhikya-bhiiviit sii do~a-prakrtir ucyate),
and quantitative predominance is the same as vikiira; so the proper terms are
vatala, pittala, etc. When a viitala person takes things which increase vlita, his
viita increases at once; but when he takes things which increase pitta or Jlepnan,
these do not increase in him as rapidly as viita does. So in the case of a pittala
person pitta increases rapidly when articles which increase pitta are taken, and
so with regard to Sle~an (Caraka-saTflhitii, III. 6. 14-18).
XIII] V iiyu, Pitta and Kapha 335
constant part engaged in their physiological operations. The later
accretion of the do~as or their deficiency has a separate course of
action in producing diseases, and there is no interchange between
these later collections of do~as or their deficiency and the con-
stitutional constant parts of the do~as known as prakrti1 • The only
sense (as CakrapaQ.i says) in which a do~a is related to a consti-
tutional (prakrti) do~a is that a do~a grows strong in a system in
which a corresponding do~a is constitutionally predominant, and it
grows weaker when the opposite is the case 2 • It is not out of place
in this connection to say that, though the do~as are mutually op-
posed to one another, they do not always neutralize one another,
and it is possible for them to grow simultaneously violent in a
system. In the six seasons of rains (var~ii), autumn (Sarat), late
autumn (hemanta), winter (sita), spring (vasanta) and summer
(gri~ma) there is an alternate collection (cay a), disturbance (prakopa)
and lowering down (prasama) of the three do~as, pitta, sle~man
and viiyu respectively. Thus, for example, in the rains (var~ii)
there is collection of pitta, in the autumn (sarat) there is dis-
turbance of pitta, in the harvesting season (hemanta) there is
lowering of pitta and collection of Sle~man, in the summer
there is collection of viita, and so forth 3 • Contrasting the
functions of the do~as in the normal (prakrtz) and abnormal
(vikrtz) states, Caraka says that in the normal state the heat of
1 Ibid. 1. 7. 38-41. The passage prakrti-sthaTfl yadii pittaTfl miirutal) slepna1Ja~z
k~aye (I. 17. 45) is often referred to in support of the view that the new accretions
of do~as affect the prakrti-do~as. But Cakrapar:ti explains it differently. He says
that a disease may be caused by a do~a which is not in excess of the constant
constitutional quantity (prakrti-miina) by virtue of the fact that it may be carried
from one part of the body to another and thereby may produce a local accretion
or excess, though the total quantity of do~a may not be in excess.
2
samiinii1rz hi prakrtiTfl priipya do~a/:l pravrddha-balo bha.vati, asamiiniiTfl tu
priipya tathii balaviin na syiit (Cakrapar:ti on Caraka-saTflhitii, I. 17. 62).
3
Ibid. 1. 17. 112. See also Cakrapar:ti's comments on these . .l)alhar:ta, in com-
menting on Susruta-saTflhitii, 1. 21. 18, says that saizcaya of do~as means aggre-
gation or accumulation in general (dehe 'tirupii'lJ!ddhis caya~z); prakopa of do~as
means that the accumulated do~as are spread through the system (vilayana-rupii
<t•rddhi/:l prakopal)). The external signs of the caya of viita are fullness of the
stomach and want of motions; of pitta yellowish appearance and reduction of heat
(mando~1Jalii); of kapha heaviness of the limbs and feeling of laziness. In all cases
of caya there is a feeling of aversion to causes which increase the particular do~a
of which there has been caya (caya-kiira1Ja-vidve~as ca). The stage of caya is the
first stage of operation in the growth and prevention of diseases. If the do~as
can be removed or neutralized at this stage, there is no further disease. The
usual indication of the disturbance (prakopa) of viiyu is disorders of the stomach;
of pitta, acidity, thirst and burning; of kapha, aversion to food, palpitation
(hrdayotkleda), etc. The prakopa of blood (so1}ita) is always due to the prakopa
of viita, pitta or kapha. This is the second stage of the progress of diseases. The
Speculations in the Medical Schools [cH.
pitta occasions digestion; slepnan is strength and vitality, and
viiyu is the source of all activities and the life of all living beings;
but in the abnormal state pitta produces ~any diseases; Slepnan
is the dirt of the system and the cause of many troubles, and viita
also produces many diseases and ultimately death. The places
(sthiiniini) at which the affections of viita, pitta and kapha are
mostly found are thus described by Caraka: of viita the bladder,
rectum, waist and the bones of the leg, but the smaller intestine
(pakvii.Saya) is its particular place of affection; of pitta sweat,
blood and the stomach, of which the last is the most important; of
sle~man the chest, head, neck, the joints, stomach and fat, of which
the chest is the most important. There are eighty affections of
'l-'iita, forty of pitta and twenty of Slepnmz 1 • But in each of these
various affections of viita, pitt a and Slepnan the special features
and characteristics of the corresponding dosas are found. Thus
Caraka in 1. 20. 12-23 describes certain symptoms as leading to
a diagnosis of the disease as being due to the disturbance of ~·iita,
pitta or kapha. But a question may arise as to what may con-
sistently with this view be considered to be the nature of viiyu,pitta
and kapha. Are they only hypothetical entities, standing as symbols
of a number of symptoms without any real existence? In such
an interpretation reality would belong to the symptoms, and
the agents of morbidity, or the do~as, would only be convenient
symbols for col1ecting certain groups of these symptoms under
one name. Wherever there is one particular set of symptoms, it is
to be considered that there is disturbance of viiyu; wherever there
is another set of symptoms, there is disturbance of pitta, and so
third stage is called prasiira. At this stage there is something like a fermentation
of the do~as (paryupta-ki'l}'l'odaka-pi~!a-samaviiya iva). This is moved about by
vayu, which though inanimate, is the cause of all motor activities. When a
large quantity of water accumulates at any place, it breaks the embankment and
flows down and joins on its way with other streams and flows on all sides; so
the do~as also flow, sometimes alone, sometimes two conjointly, and sometimes
all together. In the whole body, in the half of it, or in whatever part the fer-
mented do~as spread, there the symptoms of diseases are showered down, as
it were, like water from the clouds (do~o vikiira'f{Z nabhasi meghm1at tatra •var~ati).
When one do~a, e.g. viiyu, spreads itself in the natural place of another do~a,
e.g. pitta, the remedy of the latter will remove the former (viiyo!z pitta-sthii1la-
gatasya pittavat pratlkiiral:t). The difference between prakopa and prasiira is
thus described by .Oalhar:ta: just as when butter is first stirred up, it moves a
little; this slight movement is like prakopa; but, when it is continuously and
violently stirred to flow out, in froths and foams, it may then be called prasiira
(Susruta-sa1Jlhitii, I. 21. 18-32). The fourth stage is when the purva-rupa is
seen, and the fifth stage is the stage of rupa or vyiidhi (disease) (ibid. 38, 39).
1 Caraka-sa1Jlhitii, I. 20. II.
XIII] V ayu, Pitta and Kapha 337
forth. But there are serious objections against such an inter-
pretation. For, as we have shown above, there are many passages
where these do~as are described as secretions and waste-products,
which in their normal proportions sustain and build the body
and in undue proportions produce diseases and may ultimately
break up the system. These passages could not be satisfactorily
explained upon the above interpretation. 1\tloreover, there are
many passages which describe pitta and kapha as entities having
a particular colour and material consistency, and it is also said that
there are particular places in the body where they collect, and
this would be impossible upon the interpretation that they are
not real entities, but hypothetical, having only a methodological
value as being no more than convenient symbols for a collective
grasp of different symptoms 1 •
The attribution of a certain number of specific qualities to the
do~as is due to a belief that the qualities of effects are due to the
qualities of causes. So, from the diverse qualities of our bodies
considered as effects, the causes were also considered as having
those qualities from which those of the effects were derived. Thus,
in connection with the description of the qualities of viita, Caraka
says that on account of the qualities of rauk~ya the bodies of those
having congenital vii.ta tendency are rough, lean and small, and
1 The secretory character of these do~as is amply indicated by such passages
as those which regard viita, pitta and ile~man as requiring some space in the
stomach for digesting the food materials, e.g. ekaT!l punar viita-pitta-sle~m:ziim
(ibid. III. 2. 3); Sle~a hi snigdha-sla~'f}a-mrdu-madhura-siira-siindra-manda
stimita-guru-ftta-vijjaliicchal} (Sle~an is smooth, pleasing, soft, sweet, substantial,
compact, inert, benumbed, heavy, cold, moist and transparent--ibid. 111. 8. 14.
7. 5) ; pittam ~1Ja7fl ttkroaT!l dravaTfl visram amla'Y{t kafukaTfl ca (pitta is hot, sharp
and liquid, and possesses bad odour, and is acid and pungent and bitter--ibid.
111. 8. 14. 7· 6); viitas tu rilk~a-laghu-cala-bahu-ftghra-ftta-par~a-visadal} (viita is
rough, light, moving, manifold, quick; cold, coarse and scattering--ibid. III.
8. 14. 7· 7)·
It must, however, be noted that the translation I have given of some of these
words cannot be regarded as satisfactory; for in the translation I could only give
one sense of a word, which in the original Sanskrit has been used in a variety of
senses which the word has. Thus, for example, I have translated ril~a as" rough."
But it also means" slim,"" lean,"" having insomnia," or (of a voice) "broken,"
and so forth. There is no English synonym which would have so many senses.
Mahamahopadhyaya Kaviraj Gar:tanatha Sen, of Calcutta, tries to divide the
do~as into two classes, invisible (sak~ma) and visible (sthala)-Siddhiinta-nidana,
pp. 9-11. But though such a distinction can doubtless be made, it has not been
so distinguished in the medical literature, as it is of little value from the medical
point of view; it also does not help us to understand the real nature of the do~as.
The nature and the functions of the do~as do not depend in the least on their
visibility or invisibility, nor can the visible do~a be regarded as always the
product of the invisible one.
Dll 22
~peculations in the J.\11edical Schools [cH.
the voices of such people are rough, weak, grating, slow and
broken, and they cannot sleep well (jiigaruka); again, on account
of the quality of lightness of viiyu, the movements of a man with
congenital viita tendency would be light and quick, and so would
be all his efforts, eating, speech, and so forth. It is easy to see
that the resemblance of the qualities of viiyu to the qualities of
the body is remote; yet, si~ce the special features and characteristics
of one's body were considered as being due to one or the other of
the body-building agents, these characteristics of the body were
through remote similarity referred to them.
There is another point to be noted in connection with the
enumeration of the qualities of the do~as. The disturbance of a do~a
does not necessarily mean that all its qualities have been exhibited
in full strength; it is possible that one or more of the qualities of a
do~a may run to excess, leaving others intact. Thus viiyu is said to
possess the qualities of ruk~a, laghu, cala, bahu, stghra, sua, etc.,
and it is possible that in any particular case the sUa quality may
run to excess, leaving others undisturbed, or so may slta and ruk~a,
or sita, ruk~a and laghu, and so forth. Hence it is the business of
the physician not only to discover \Vhich do~a has run to excess,
but also to examine which qualities of which do~a have run to
excess. The qualities of do~as are variable, i.e. it is possible that a
do{•a in its state of disturbance will remain a do~a, and yet have
some of its qualities increased and others decreased. The nature of
the disturbance of a do~a is determined by the nature of the dis-
turbance of the qualities involved (a'f!lSlif!Zsa-vikalpa)l. The natural
inference from such a theory is that, since the entities having
this or that quality are but component parts of a do~w, a do~a
cannot be regarded as a whole homogeneous in all its parts. On
this view a do~a appears to be a particular kind of secretion which
is a mixture of a number of different secretions having different
qualities, but which operate together on the same lines. When a
particular do~a is in a healthy order, its component entities are in
certain definite proportions both with regard to themselves and to
1 Caraka-saT[lhitii, 11. 1. 10. 4· CakrapaQ.i, in commenting on this, says:" tatra
do~ii?Jiim UTflSiimsa-vikalpo yatlzii-viite prakiipite ,pi kadiicid viitasya sUiiT[lio balaviin
bhavati, kadiicillaghv-a7fZsal;l, kadiicid riik~ii'l!lia(l kadiicillaghu-ruk~ii'!lial;l." The
do~a or do~as which become prominently disturbed in a system are called
anubandhya, and the do~a or do~as which at the time of diseases are not primarily
disturbed are called anubandha. V{hcn three of the do~as are jointly disturbed,
it is calledsannipiita, and when two are so disturbed it is called sa7fZSarga (ibid.m.
6. II).
XIII] V ayu, Pitta and Kapha 339
the total do~a. But, when it is disturbed, some of the component
secretions may increase L1 undue proportions, while others may
remain in the normal state; of course, the quantity of the whole
do~a may also increase or decrease. A do~a such as kapha or pitta
should therefore be regarded as a name for a collection of secre-
tions rather than one secretion of a homogeneous character. It
will be easily seen that, on taking into consideration the com-
parative strengths of the different components of a do~a and the
relative strengths of the other components of other do~as and the
relative strengths and proportions of each of the do~as amongst
themselves, the number of combinations is innumerable, and the
diseases proceeding from such combinations are also innumerable.
The whole system of Caraka's treatment depends upon the ascer-
tainment of the nature of these affections; the names of diseases
are intended to be tnere collective appellations of a number of
affections of a particular type 1 .
One further point which ought to be noted with regard to the
constructive and destructive operations of vii.yu, pitta and kaplza
is that they are independent agents which work in unison with a
man's karma and also in unison with a man's mind. The opera-
tions of the mind and the operations of the body, as performed by
. vayu,p£tta and kapha on the materials of the dhii.tus, rasa, rakta,
etc., run parallel to each other; for both follow the order of human
karma, but neither of them is determined by the other, though
they correspond to each other closely. This psycho-physical
parallelism is suggested throughout Caraka's system. Caraka, in
trying to formulate it, says: "siirlram api satvam anuvidhzyate
SafVa1Jl ca Siirlram" (the mind COrresponds to the body and the
body to the mind). It may be remembered in this connection that
the ultimate cause of all dhiitu-'cai~mU_l'a or ahhi'glziita (bodily in-
juries through accidents, a fall and the like) is foolish action (prajfiii.-
pariidha). Again viita, pitta and kapha are found to perform
not only physical operations, but also intellectual operations of
various kinds. But all intellectual operations belong properly to
mind. \Vhat is meant by attributing intellectual functions to viiyu,
p£tta and kapha seems to be a sort of psycho-physical parallelism,
mind corresponding to body, body corresponding to mind, and
both corresponding to karma.
1 yad viitiirabdhatviidi-jfiiinam eva kiirm:zam rogii1Jii7fl cikitsiiyiim upakiiri;
L Caralw-sm.nhita, 1. 30. 5·
2
CakraraDi says that the mention of param ojas here proves that Caraka be-
liewd in another, aparam ojas. The total quantity of aparam ojas in the bodv is half
a handful (ardluinjali-parimii~la), while that of param ojas is only eight drops of
a white-red and slightly yellowish liquid in the heart. The dhaman1s of the
heart contain half a handful of aparam ojas, and in the disease known as prameha
(urinary disease) it is this ojas that is wasted; but even with waste of this ojas
a man may live, whereas with the slightest waste of the param ojas a man cannot
live. Ojas ought not to be regarded as the eighth dhiitu; for it only supports
(dluirayati) the body, but does not nourish it. Ojas, however, is sometimes used
also in the sense of rasa (Caraka-sa~nhitii 1. 30. 6, Cakrapat)i's commentary). See
also ibid. 1. 17. 74 and 75 and Cakrapat)i's comment on the same. Qjas is,
however. regarded in the Atharva-Veda, 11. 17, as the eighth dhiitu.
344 Speculations in the Medical Schools [cH.
manomaya pur'U!a, i.e. the mind-person, resides. In many other
Upani~ads the heart is the centre of many niirfis, or channels 1 •
Sati.kara, in explaining Brh. II. I. 19, says that the na¢is or siras,
called hitii, which are developed out of the food-juice and are
272,000 in number, emanate from the heart and spread over the
whole body (puritat) 2 • The buddhi resides in the heart and from
there controls the external senses. Thus, for example, at the time
of hearing in the awakened state the buddhi passes through these
11iirjis to the ear and from there expands the auditory organ and
superintends it. When the buddhi thus expands, we have the
state of awakening, when it contracts, the state of deep sleep
(su$uptz).
5).
5 In the Atharva- Veda, VI. 138. 4, the niicfts are described as ducts over the
testes, through which the seminal fluid flows: .ve te niiljyau deva-krte yayos ti~thati
vnflYG'f!l tete bhinadmi (I break with a stone upon a stone those two ducts of yours
Speculations in the J\.1edical Schools [cH.
to denote the speech organ (vak). The word dhamani is used
in ~g- Veda, II. 11. 8 and is paraphrased by Saya1:1a as sound
(sabda) and by Macdonell as "reed" or "pipe1 .'' If Sayal).a's
explanations are to be accepted, then in A.V. II. 33· 6 the word
snava means fine siras (suk~ma~z-siral;) and dhaman'i the larger ducts
(dhamani-sabdena sthulal;). In VI. 90. 5 one hundred dhamanls
are said to surround the body of a person suffering from colic or
gout (sula), and Sayal).a paraphrases dhamani here as nO.fjl. In
Chandogya, III. 19. 2, the rivers are said to be dhamanls (ya
dhamanayas ta nafjyal;), and Sankara paraphrases dhamanz as sira.
I have already referred to the use of the word hira in the Atharva-
Veda; the word is also used in the !Jg- Veda 2 •
The above references show that nlifjzs, siriis (or hiras) and
dhamanls were all ducts in the body, but sometimes the nafjzs or
sirlis had also the special sense of finer channels, whereas the
dlwmanis were the larger ducts. I shall now come to Caraka:
it will be found that there was not much advance towards a
proper understanding of the significance of their distinction and
functions.
Caraka plainly regards dhamanls, Siras and srotas (secretory
currents) as ducts and thinks that different names are applied to
them on account of their different functions. He says that the
roots of the ten dhaman'is are in the heart. These carry through-
out the body the ojas, by which all people live and without which
they all die. It is the essence by which the foetus is formed,
and which goes to the heart at a later stage, when the heart is
formed; when it is lost, life also ceases to exist; it is the essence
of the body and the seat of the prlit:zas. These ducts are called
dhamanls, because they are filled with chyle from outside; they
are called srotas, because the chyle, etc. which nourish the body
are secreted (srava!IO.l) out of these; and they are called Sira,
made by God over your two testes, through which your semen flows). In
x. 7· 15 and 16, the hollows of the seas are described as niit/.is (samudro yasya
niigyal.z), and so also the interspace of the quarters of the sky (yasya catasral.z
pradiso niiljya?1).
1 "Dhamanl, 'reed,' appears to denote 'pipe' in a passage of the IJ.g- Veda
(II. I 1. 8) and in a citation appearjng in the Nirulua (vi. 24)." Vedic Index,
vol. 1, p. 390. The word sirii is spelt with a palatal "s" in Caraka and with a
dental in the Vedas, and it has therefore been differently spelt in this chapter
in different contexts.
2 t·va1Jt vrtram iisayiina7!Z siriisu maho vajre1Ja si~vapa(t. R.V. 1. 121. 1 I. The
word dhamanl is spelt with a long "i" in Caralw and with a short "i" in the
Atharva- Veda.
xrn] The Circulatory and the Nervous System 347
because they go (sarm;iit sirii/:z) to the different parts of the body 1 •
The ten dhamanfs spread out in manifold branches throughout
the body. In the Caraka-sa1(lhitii srotas means properly the path
through which the successive evolutionary products of the body-
constituents (dhiitus) or other kinds of secretion run and accumu-
late together with elements of their own types 2 • Cakrapal).i explains
it thus: The transformation into blood takes place in connection
with chyle (rasa). The coming together of rasa with blood at a
different part of the body cannot take place without a path of trans-
mission, called srotas. So the transformation of dhiitus takes place
through the function of this path of transmission. So for each
kind of product there is a separate srotas. Viiyu, pitta and kapha
may be said to go about through all the SJ·otas, though there are,
no doubt, special channels for each of the three 3 • Gangadhara,
however, takes the srotas as being the apertures through which
the dhiitus and other waste-products flow 4 • In whatever way it
may be looked at, the srotas is, according to Caraka, nothing but
the duct of the dhamanis. Caraka opposes the view of those who
think that the body is nothing but a collection of srotas, for the
simple reason that the substances which pass through these srotas
and the parts of the body where they are attached are certainly
different from the srotas themselves. There are separate srotas
for the flow of prii~za, water, food-juice, blood, flesh, fat, bony
materials, marrow, semen, urine, excreta and sweat; viita, pitta
and Sle~man, however, flow through the body and all the channels
(sarva-srotii1(lsi ayana-bhutiim). For the supply of materials for the
suprasensual elements of the body, such as manas, etc., the whole
of the living body serves as a channel 5 • The heart is the root of all
1
dlzmii.nii.d dhamanyal:z sravm;ii.t srolii.1Jtsi sarm:rii.t 4irii./:z. Caraka-saf!Zhitii., 1.
JO. I I. 2 Ibid. III. 5· 3·
3 Do~ii1J.ii.'f!l tu sarva-iarzra-caratvena yathii-sthftla-sroto 'bhidhiine 'pi sarca-
srotii'f!lSY evagamaniirtlwf!Z vak~yante . .. viitiidiniim api pradhii.na bhutiidhamanyafz
santy eva. Cakrapiil).i's comment on ibid.
4 iihiira-pari1Jiima-raso hi srotasii1Jl chidra-rupa1Jl panthiinaf!Z 'l-'inii gantuf!l na
of astringent and sweet and is yet light by nature, though one would expect it
to be heavy on account of its rasas of astringent and sweet. Vikrti is best
exemplified in the case of fried paddy, which is lighter than rice. It is well
known that by composition wholly new properties may be generated in the
product. Medicinal herbs vary in their properties in accordance with the time
of plucking.
xnr] The Theory of Rasas and their Chemistry 359
if different rasas are mixed together, the mixed rasa itself is not
entitled to be counted as a separate rasa; for its qualities are just
as the sum total of the qualities of the different rasas which are
its constituents, and no independent work can be attributed to
this mixed rasa (na sa'!lST#iinii'l!l rasiinii'l!l karmopadiSanti bud-
dhimanta/:z), as in the case of a compound of two or more sub-
stances, as mentioned above (viciira).
Though on account of the predominance of one or the other
of them they are called earthy (piirthiva), watery (iipya), fiery
(iigneya), airy (viiyavya) or ethereal (iikiisiitmaka), yet all substances
are compounded of the five elements. All substances, whether
animate or inanimate, are to be considered as medicines (a~adha),
provided they are applied in the proper way (yukti) and for specific
purposes (artha). A substance can be a medicine only when it is
applied in the proper way and for specific purposes; nothing can
unconditionally be considered a medicine. The medicative in-
fluence is exerted both by virtue of the specific agency of a sub-
stance (dravya-prabhiiva) and by the specific agency of its qualities,
as also by their joint influence 1 . The action of medicines is called
karman, its potency virya, the place where they operate adhi-
karm;a, the time of operation kiila, the mode of operation upiiya,
and the result achieved phala.
As regards the origin of rasas, it is suggested that water
gets mixed with the five elements in the air and also after its fall
on the ground. These rasas nourish the bodies of all plants and
animals. All the five elements are present in all rasas; but in some
rasas some of the elements predominate, and in accordance with
this there are differences among the various rasas. Thus, with
the predominance of soma there is a sweet taste, with the pre-
dominance of earth and fire an acid taste, with water and fire
a saline taste, with air and fire, hot and pungent, with air and
iikiisa, bitter, with air and earth, astringent. The different elements
1 The medicinal effect of substances may be distinguished from the medicinal
riigaib, na khyiiti-labha-rabhasa-prativardhamiina-spardhiinubandha-vidhuriitma-
bhir iirabheta. Nyiiya-maiijarf, p. 594·
XIII] Logical Speculations and Terms 379
No disputes should be undertaken in a hostile assembly; for
even the best arguments might be misinterpreted. In an ignorant,
friendly or neutral assembly it is possible to win a debate by pro-
ceeding tactfully against an opponent who is looked down upon
by famous or otherwise great persons. In beginning conversations
with such persons attempts may be made to puzzle them by
reciting long sutras and to demoralize or stun them, as it were,
by jokes, banter and gestures and by using satirical language.
When a man has to enter into a dispute with his equal, he
should find out the special point in which his opponent is weak
and attack him there and should try to corner him in such positions
as are generally unacceptable to people in general. Caraka then
proceeds to explain a number of technical terms in connection
with such disputes. Like the Nyaya, Caraka divides such hostile
disputes (viida) into two classes,jalpa and vitm:uJii. Pratijfiii is the
enunciation of a thesis which is sought to be proved, e.g. "The
puru~a is eternal." Sthiipanii is the establishing of a thesis by
syllogistic reasonings involving propositions with hetu, dntiinta,
upanaya and nigamana. Thus the above thesis (pratijiiii), "The
punt~a is eternal," is to be supported by a reason (hetu), "because
it is uncreated ";by an example (dntiinta), "The sky is uncreated
and it is eternal"; by a proposition showing the similarity between
the subject of the example and the subject of the thesis (upanaya),
viz. "Just as the iikiisa is uncreated, so the puru~a is also uncreated" ;
and finally by establishing the thesis (nigamana), "Therefore the
puru~a is eternal 1 ."
Pratifthiipanii is the attempt to establish a proposition contrary
to the proposition or the thesis put forth by the opponent. Thus,
when the thesis of the sthapanii is "Pur~a is eternal," the prati-
sthiipanii proposition would be "Puru~a is non-eternal," because
"it is perceivable by the senses," and "The jug which is per-
ceptible to the senses is non-eternal," and" Puru~a is like the jug,"
so "Pur~a is non-eternal."
Caraka defines hetu as "the cause of knowledge" (hetur niima
upalabdhi-kiira7Jam), and the cause of knowledge is the pramal)as of
pratyakJa, anumiina, aitihya and aupamya. The definition of hetu
in the Nyaya-siltra refers only !o the perceived hetu in the
case of inference, through a similarity or dissimilarity to which a
1 It is easy to see that Caraka admitted in a syllogism all the five propositions
possess that character, it must be eternal, since the cause of its non-eternality is
absent. This objection is called anutpatti-sama. The reply is that, unless the sound
is in existence, its eternality or non-eternality cannot be discussed. If it is
non-existent, of what is the eternality to be affirmed by the opponent?
Again, it may be argued that sabda has prayatniintarzyakatva, and therefore
it may be expected to be non-eternal; it is perceived by the senses, and therefore
it may be expected to be eternal, like so many other sensible objects. This doubt
is called sat{liaya-sama. A doubt remains a doubt only so long as the special
features which remove a doubt are not discovered. Though a man may have
many qualities in common with a post, the doubt cannot remain when the
special features of a man (e.g. his having a head and hands and feet) are known.
Prakarat}a-sama is that in which an entity is equally related to hetus, so that
no one conclusion can properly be drawn. Thus, sound has both prayatniinta-
rlyakatva and niravayavatva (partlessness). Though, according to the first, it
may be said to be non-eternal, according to the second it may be said to be
eternal; so it is eternal. The answer is that the second hetu cannot be pressed
as leading to a conclusion, because the first also is admitted to exist.
Ahetu-sama is the objection that there can be no argument from a hetu; for,
if there is no siidhya (probandum), what is it that the hetu produces? and again,
if there is no hetu before the siidhya, how can the siidhya be produced? So,
as hetu is only a concomitant of siidhya, no inference is possible from it.
The answer is that it is quite possible that from the previously existing hetu
the non-existing siidhya should be produced. Arthiipatti-sama is where, for
example, owing to the fact that sound is partless, it appears to be similar to
iikiisa and hence by implication to be eternal. This is against the previous
thesis that it is non-eternal owing to its being prayatniintarfyaka. AviSe~a-sama
is the objection, that if on account of having the same characteristic of pra-
yatniintarfyakatva, sabda and ghafa are said to be equally non-eternal, then,
owing to all things having the same quality of existence (sattii), they are all the
same. The answer to this is that equality in one respect does not mean equality
in all respects.
Upapatti-sama is where a jug may be expected to be non-eternal owing
to its prayatniintarlyakatva and eternal owing to its being partless like iikiiSa.
Upalabdlzi-sama is where it is urged that, when by a terrible storm a tree
is broken, there is sound which is not the result of any human effort (prayatniinta-
nyakat'l.•a), and yet it is non-eternal; again, lightning is not the result of human
effort, still it is non-eternal. The answer is that the concomitance is between
prayatniintanyakatva and non-eternality and not between non-eternality and
prayatniintarlyakatva; so that all that is produced by human effort is non-
eternal, but not vice-versa. It should also be noted that by prayatniintariyakatva
emphasis is laid on the fact that all things that possess this character are pro-
duced. Anitya-sama is an objection where it is urged, for example, that,
if on account of the similarity of sound to a jug, the former is non-eternal,
then, since in some way or other all things in the world must have some simi-
larity to a jug, all things must be non-eternal. The nitya-sama objection runs
as follows: Is non-eternality in sound non-eternal or eternal? If the latter, then
in order that an eternal quality may abide in it, sound itself must be eternal.
If the former, then on some occasions at least sound must be eternal.
The kiirya-sama objection suggests that prayatntintarlyakatva leads to pro-
duction in two ways, either by bringing into existence that which was
non-existent, or by removing the veil from something which was in a veiled
condition; and it remains undecided what sort of prayatniintarlyakatva applies
to sabda.
The above interpretations are all based on Jayanta's Nyiiya-maiijan.
XIII] Logical Speculations and Terms
were known to Caraka, it is unlikely that he should have passed
them over without referring to them.
An example (dr#iinta) is that on which the common folk and
the learned are of the same opinion, since examples involve facts
which are perceived by all and known to all, e.g. the fire is hot,
water is liquid, the earth is firm. A siddhiinta, or conclusion, is
that to which one could arrive after a searching enquiry and
demonstration by proper reasons. This siddhiinta is of four kinds,
viz. (I) sarva-tantra-siddhiinta, or conclusions accepted by all, e.g.
"There are causes of diseases; there are diseases; curable ones
can be cured,; (2) prati-tantra-siddhiinta, or conclusions which are
not accepted by all, but are limited to particular books or persons:
e.g. some say that there are eight rasas, others say that there are
six; some say that there are five senses, others, that there are six;
(3) adhikara7Ja-siddhiinta, or conclusions which being accepted
or proved, other conclusions also become proved or accepted:
e.g. if it is proved that emancipated souls do not reap the fruits
of kanna, as they are without any desire, then the doctrine of the
suffering of the fruits of karma, emancipation, the existence of
soul and existence after death will have to be considered as refuted;
(4) abhyupagama-siddhiinta, or conclusions which are accepted
only for the sake of an argument, and which are neither examined
critically nor considered as proved 1 •
Sabda is a collection of letters which may be of four kinds, viz.
{I) dr~tiirtha-of experienced purport (e.g. "The do~as lose their
equilibrium through three causes"); (2) adrifiirtha--of unper-
ceivable purport (e.g." There is after-life; there is emancipation");
(3) satya, or truth, that which tallies \Vith facts (e.g. "There is
Ayur-veda ; there are means for curing curable diseases '') ; (4) anrta,
the opposite of truth, untruth 2 • Sm,Jaya, or doubt, occurs with
reference to things about which no certainty is attained. Thus
those who are unhealthy and inactive die soon, whereas those who
are healthy and active live a long life. So there is a doubt whether
in this world death happens timely or untimely. Prayojana, or the
object of action, is that for which anything is begun. Thus one
may think that, if there is untimely death, I shall form healthy
habits and leave off unhealthy habits, so that untimely death may
1 All these siddhdntas occur under the same names in the Nyiiya-sutra,
I. I. 28, 29, 30, 31.
2 The first two divisions, dr~tiirtha and adr~tiirtha, occur in the Nyiiya-sutra,
I. x. 8, sa dvividho dHtiidrnarthatvat.
Speculat-ions in the Med£cal Schools [cH.
not touch me 1 • Sa-vyabhiciira means variability, e.g. "This may
or may not be a medicine for this disease 2 ." Jijiiiisii means ex-
perimenting; a medicine is to be advised after proper experiments
(jijiiiisii). Vyavasiiya means decision (niscaya), e.g. "This is a
disease due to predominance of viiyu; this is the medicine for this
disease." Artha-priipti is the same as the well-known arthiipatti, or
implication, when on making a statement, some other thing which
was not said becomes also stated; it is a case of implication, e.g.
the statement, "This disease cannot be cured by allowing the
patient to take his normal food and drink," implies that it can be
cured by fasting, or, if it is said, "He should not eat during the
day," this means that" He should eat during the night 3 ." Smrzbhava
is the source from which anything springs, e.g. the six dhiitus may
be considered as the sa1Jlbhava of the foetus; wrong diet, of disease;
and right course of treatment, of health.
Anuyojya means a faulty answer which omi~s such details as
should have been given in the answer, e.g. "This disease can be
cured by purificatory action"; such an answer is faulty, as it does
not state whether the purification should be made by vomiting
or purging. Ananuyojya is what is different from anuyojya.
Anuyoga is a question put by a learned man in a discussion as an
enquiry about the reason for a thesis put forward by a learned
colleague: e.g. a learned man says," Puru~a is eternal," and another
learned man asks, ''What is the reason?" Such a question is call~d
anuyoga. A counter-question, such as "What is the reason for
your asking such a question?" is called praty-anuyoga.
Viikya-do~a, or faulty statement, is of five kinds, viz. nyuna,
adhika, anarthaka, apiirthaka and viruddha. Nyuna, or the fault
of omission, is that in which any of the five propositions necessary
for a syllogism is omitted. It may also be applied to those cases in
which, when a statement has to be supported by a number of
1 Prayojana, which means pleasure and pain, is referred to in the Nyiiya-
hetu; for the hetu and siidhya exist in two successive moments and are therefore
not concomitant; but in the former case they are concomitant aml simultaneous,
e.g. sound is eternal, becau!ie it is manifested, like colour, owing to a particular
contact, like light, being manifested by the contact of a stick and a drum, just
as colour is manifested by the contact of ljght with a thing. llut the similarity
fails; for, while colour is manifested simultaneously with the contact of light and
the things, sound is heard at a moment different from that at which actual
contact of the stick and the drum takes place.
25-2
Speculations in the 1\-Iedical Schools (cH.
similar to the jati c~lled siidhya-sama and the fallacy siidhya-sama
of Gautama already described in the footnotes to page 386.
AtUa-kiila is that in which that which should be said first is
said later, e.g. the thesis, or pratijiiii, should be stated first and the
conclusion, or nigamana, last; if instead the nigamana is stated first
and the pratijiiii after, then we have the fault of kiiliittta.
Upalambha (criticisn1) is the finding fault with the hetus, also
called a-hetu, as described above, or hetv-iibhiisas. Parihiira (reply)
means the reply given to the objections pointed out by an opponent;
e.g. the self is eternal, since so long as it remains in the body it shows
signs of life, and, when it is away, though the body still remains
the same, yet there is no sign of life; therefore the self is different
from the body and is eternal. Pratijiiii-hiini (to give up one's
thesis) is where, being cornered by the opponent, one is forced to
give up one's original thesis. Thus one may start with the thesis
that purufa is eternal, but, being cornered, one may give it up and
say that purufa is not eternal. Abhyanujiiii (to bring a counter-
charge) is that in which a disputant, instead of refuting the charge
brought against him by his opponent, charges his opponent with
the same defects 1 • Hetv-antara (dodging with a wrong reason) is
where, when tbe cause of some root fact (prakrti) is asked, the
reply refers to the cause of the modifications or manifestations
(1:ikrti) of that root fact 2 • Arthiintara (wrong answer) is where,
when the definition of one thing (e.g. fever) is asked, a definition
of another thing (e.g. diabetes) is given 3 .1\ligraha-sthiina is where,
in a learned assembly, a statement, though thrice repeated, is not
understood by the opponent. Caraka counts among the nigraha-
sthiinas many of the cases which have already been enumerated
and described. Thus he counts pratijilii-hiini, abhyanujfiii, kiiliitita,
a-hetu, nyuna, atirikta, ·vyartha, apiirthaka, punar-ukta, 'l.'iruddha,
hetv-antara, arthiintara 4 •
1 This corresponds to matilnujiiii of the Nyiiya-siltra, v. 1. 42.
2 In Nytiya-sr1trc, v. 2. 6, we hear of a hettJ-antara, but that seems to be
different from this. The significance of hett.1-antara, as it stands there, may be
illustrated as follows. .An adherent of Saq1khya says that all this world of things
is derived from one root cause, because all these are limited and whatever is
limited is derived from one root cause. This may be refuted by pointing out that
there are many limited things which are derived from more than one root cause.
To this the Sarp.khya adherent replies that only those w!uch are associated with
pleasure and pain and ignorance are to be regarded as proceeding from one
root cause; but this .i.s an addition which was not contained in the original thesis.
8 This is also mentioned in the Nyiiya-siltra, v. 2. 7·
fo The nigraha-sthiinos mentioned in the Nyiya-siitra, v. 2. I,arethe following:
pratijiiti-hiini, pratijiiiintara, pratijiia-virodha, pratijiiii-sannyiisa, hetv-antara,
XIII) Logical Speculations and Terms
After this Caraka further describes the ten categories, a know-
ledge of which he thinks is very necessary for a mastery of the
subject-matter of Ayur-veda. These are karm:za (the agent or the
mover}, karm;a (the instrument necessary for an agent to bring
about an effort), karya-yoni (the material c~mse by the modification
of which effects are produced), karya (that for the production of
which the mover makes his effort), kiirya-phala (that for which a
particular effect is intended by the agent), anubandha (the good
or bad result which attaches itself to the doer after the produc-
tion of the effect), desa (place), kala (the seasons, days, etc.),
pravrtti (the effort and the action needed for the production
of the effect) and upaya (the passivity and special aptitude
of the agent, the instrument and the material cause which can
make the effect possible). The physician is the cause (kara!la),
the medicines the instruments (kara!la); the want of equilibrium
of the dhatus the karya-yoni; ~e restoration of the equilibrium
of the dhatus the karya; the happy state of body and 1nind
the kiirya-phala; length of life, anubandha; the place and the
diseased person, desa; the year and the condition of the diseased
person, kala; the efforts of the physician, pravrtti; the qualifi-
cations of the physician, the qualities of the medicine, etc.,
upiiya.
It may be pointed out in this connection that the Uttara-tantra
of Susruta also mentions thirty-two technical terms helpful to
physicians in refuting the statements of hostile critics and in estab-
lishing their own points, which are called tantra-yukti1 • These are
said to be adhikara!la, yoga, padiirtha, hetv-artha, uddesa, nirdesa,
upadda, apadesa, pradesa, a tidesa, apavarja, vakya-se~a, arthiipatti,
viparyaya, prasanga, ekanta, anekanta, purva-pa~a, nin;aya, anu-
mata, vidhiina, anagatiive~a!la, atikriintiivek~a1Ja, saT{lsaya, vyii-
khyana, sva-sa1J1jfia, nirvacana, nidarsana, niyoga, samuccaya, vikalpa
and uhya. But these technical terms are maxims for the interpre-
tation of textual topics, like the maxims of Mimarpsa, and are not
points of dispute or logical categories. It is said that these maxims
are like the sun to a group of lotuses, or like a lamp to a house,
arthiintara, nirarthaka, avijiiiitiirtha, apiirthaka, apriipta-kiila, nyilna, adhika,
punar-ukta, ananubhii$ana, ajniina, apratibhii, vikfepa, matiinujiiii, paryanuyojyo-
pekwt;a, niranuyojyiinuyoga, apa-siddhiinta, hetv-iibhiisa. Many of these, however,
are not mentioned by Caraka.
1 asad-viidi-prayuktiinii'!l viikyiinii'!l prali$edhii1101J'l sva-viikya-siddhir api ca
Ayur-veda Ethics.
The length of the period of a man's lifetime in this iron age (kali-
yuga) of ours is normally fixed at one hundred years. But sinful
actions of great enormity may definitely reduce the normal length
to any extent. Ordinary vicious actions, however, can reduce the
length of life only if the proper physical causes of death, such as
poisoning, diseases and the like, are present. If these physical
causes can be warded off, then a man may continue to live until
the normal length of his life, one hundred years, is reached, when
the body-machine, being worn out by long work, gradually breaks
down . .1\Iedicines may, however, in the case of those who are not
cursed by the commission of sins of great enormity, prolong the
normal length of life. It is here that Caraka and his followers
differ from all other theories of karma that flourished on the soil of
India. The theory is not accepted in any Indian system of thought
except that of Caraka. In spite of the many differences that pre-
vail amongst these theories, ~hey may still be roughly divided into
four classes. Thus there are, first, the paur~a-vadins, such as those
who follow the Yoga-viis#tha school of thought and are idealists of
the extreme type, thinking that all our experiences can be controlled
by a determined effort of the will and that there is no bond of
previous karma, destiny, or fatality which cannot be controlled or
overcome by it. Human will is all-powerful, and by it we can
produce any change of any kind in the development of our future
well-being. There is, again, the view that God alone is responsible
for all our actions;and that He makes those whom He wants to
XIII] Ayur-veda Ethics
raise perform good actions and those whom He wants to take the
downw£lrd path commit sinful deeds. There is also the view that
God rewards or praises us in accordance with our good or bad deeds,
and that we alone are responsible for our actions and free to act
as we choose. There i~ a further view, elaborately dealt with in
Patafijali's Yoga-siltra, that our deeds determine the particular
nature of our birth, the period of our lifetime and the nature of our
enjoyments or sufferings. Ordinarily the fruits of the actions of a
previous birth are reaped in the present birth, and the ripened
fruits of the actions of the present birth determine the nature of the
future birth, period of life and pleasurable or painful experiences,
while the fruits of extremely good or bad actions are reaped in this
life. In none of these theories do we find the sort of common-sense
eclecticism that we find in Caraka. For here it is only the fruits
of extremely bad actions that cannot be arrested by the normal
efforts of good conduct. The fruits of all ordinary actions can be
arrested by normal physical ways of well-balanced conduct, the
administration of proper tnedicines and the like. This implies that
our ordinary non-moral actions in the proper care of health, taking
proper tonics, medicines and the like, can modify or arrest the
ordinary course of the fruition of our karma. Thus, according to
the effects of tny ordinary karma I may have fallen ill; but, if
I take due care, I may avoid such effects and.may still be in good
health. According to other theories the laws of karma are im-
mutable. Only the fruits of unripe karma can be destroyed by
true knowledge. The fruits of ripe karma have to be experienced
in any case, even if tn1e knowledge is attained. The peculiar
features of Caraka's theory consist in this, that he does not intro-
duce this imn1utability of ripe karmas. The effects of all karmas,
excepting those which are extremely strong, can be modified by
an apparently non-moral course of conduct, involving the ob-
servance of the ordinary daily duties of life. Ordinarily the law of
karma .implies the theory of a moral government of the universe
in accordance with the good or bad fruits of one's own karma.
\Ve may be free to act as we choose; but our actions in this life,
excepting those of great enormity, determine the experiences of
our future lives, and so an action in this life cannot ordinarily be
expected to ward off any of the evils of this life which one is
predestined to undergo in accordance with the karma of a previous
birth. Moreover, it is the moral or immoral aspects of an action that
Speculations in the Medical Schools [cH.
determine the actual nature of their good or bad effects, success or
failure. This implies a disbelief in our power of directly controlling
our fortunes by our efforts. The theory of karma thus involves a
belief in the mysterious existence and ripening of the ·sinful and
virtuous elements of our actions, which alone in their course of
maturity produce effects. If the theory that sins bring their punish-
ment, and virtues produce their beneficial effects, of themselves,
is accepted, its logical consequences would lead us to deny the
possibility of mere physical actions modifying the fruition of these
karmas. So the acceptance of the moral properties of actions leads
to the denial of their direct physical consequences. If through my
honest efforts I succeed in attaining a happy state, it is contended
that my success is not due to my present efforts, but it was pre-
destined, as a consequence of the good deeds of my previous birth,
that I should be happy. For, if the fruition was due to my ordinary
efforts, then the theory that all happy or unhappy experiences
are due to the ripening of the karmas of the previous births falls
to the ground. If, on the other hand, all success or failure is due
to our proper or improper efforts, then the capacity of sins or
virtues to produce misery or happiness may naturally be doubted,
and the cases where even our best efforts are attended ·with failure
are not explained. But, if our ordinary efforts cannot effect any-
thing, and if the modes of our experiences, pleasures and sufferings,
and the term of our life are already predestined. then none of our
efforts are of any use in warding off the calamities of this life, and
the purpose of the science of medicine is baffled. In common-sense
ways of belief one refers to "fate" or "destiny" only when the
best efforts fail, and one thinks that, unless there is an absolute
fatality, properly directed efforts are bound to succeed. Caraka's
theory seems to embody such a common-sense view. But the
question arises how, if this is so, can the immutability of the law
of karma be preserved? Caraka thinks that it is only the extremely
good or bad deeds that have this immutable character. All other
effects of ordinary actions can be modified or combated by our
efforts. Virtue and vice are not vague and mysterious principles
in Caraka, and the separation that appears elsewhere between the
moral and the physical sides of an action is not found in his
teaching 1 .
He seems to regard the "good," or the all-round manifold
1 Caraka-samhitii, 111. J. 28-38.
XIII] Ayur-veda Ethics
utility (hita) of an action, as its ultimate test. What a man has to
do before acting is carefully to judge and anticipate the utility of
his action, i.e. to judge whether it will be good for him or not;
if the effects are beneficial for him, he ought to do it, and, if they
are harmful, he ought not to do it 1 • Our ultimate standard of good
actions lies in seeking our own good, and to this end the proper
direction and guidance of our mind and senses are absolutely
necessary. Caraka applies here also his old principle of the golden
mean, and says that the proper means of keeping the mind in
the right path consists in avoiding too much thinking, in not
thinking of revolting subjects, and in keeping the mind active.
Thoughts and ideas are the objects of the mind, and one has to
avoid the atiyoga, mithyii-yoga and a-yoga of a11 thoughts, as just
described. "Self-good," or iitma-hita, which is the end of all our
actions, is described as not only that which gives us pleasure and
supplies the material for our comfort, ease of mind and long life,
but also that which will be beneficial to us in our future life.
Right conduct (sad-vrtta) leads to the health and well-being of
body and mind and secures sense--control (indriya-vijaya).
The three springs of action are our desire for self-preservation
(prii1Jai~a1Jii), our desire for the materials of comfort (dhanai~a1Jii),
and our desire for a happy state of existence in the future life
(paralokai~a1Jii). 'Ve seek our good not only in this life, but also
in the after-life, and these two kinds of self-good are summed
up in our threefold desire-for self-preservation, for the objects
that lead to happiness, and for a blessed after-life. Right con-
duct is not conduct in accordance with the injunctions of the
Vedas, or conduct which leads ultimately to the cessation of all
sorrows through cessation of all desires or through right know-
ledge and the extinction of false knowledge, but is that which
leads to the fulfilment of the three ultimate desires. The cause of
sins is not transgression of the injunctions of the scriptures, but
errors of right judgment or of right thinking (prajniiparadha).
First and foremost is our desire for life, i.e. for health and pro-
longation of life; for life is the precondition of all other good
things. Next to our desire for life is our desire for wealth and
the pursuit of such vocations of life as lead to it. The third is
1 buddhyii samyag ida7Jl mama hitam idam mamiihitam ity m•ek~yiivek~ya kar-
5iit;zi. Caraka, I. I 1. 7.
2 satii1J1 ca riipiit;ziim ati-sannikar5iid ati-viprakar5iid iivarat;ziit karat;za-daurba-
p. soc.
Speculations in the Medical Schools [cH.
psychological importance and counted them as parallel defects
prompting our efforts.
Patafijali divides all our actions into two classes, vicious (kl#ta)
and virtuous (akl#ta). The virtuous actions are prompted by our
natural propensity towards emancipation, while the vicious ones
are prompted by ignorance (avidyii), egoism· (asmitii), attachment
(raga), antipathy (dve~a) and the will to live (abhinivesa). The
latter four, though of the nature of feeling, are yet regarded as
being only manifestations of the growth and development of
ignorance (avidyii). It is a characteristic peculiarity of the Sarp.khya
philosophy that thoughts and feelings are not regarded there as
being intrinsically different; for the gu1Jas form the materials of
both thoughts and feelings. What is thought in one aspect is
feeling in another. It was on this account that false knowledge
could be considere~ to ~ave developed into the feelings of egoism,
attachment and antipathy, and could be regarded as being of the
same stuff as false knowledge. In the Nyaya psychology, thought
and feelings being considered intrinsically different, a difficulty
was felt in reconciling the fact that, while ignorance could be
regarded as being the cause of the feelings of attachment and anti-
pathy, the latter could not be regarded as being identical with
ignorance (moha). Jayanta, therefore, while he traced raga and
dve~a to moha, ontologically considered them as parallel factors
determining our actions psychologically. In the Sarp.khya-Yoga
metaphysics this difficulty could be obviated; for that school did not
consider feelings to be different from thoughts, since the thoughts
are themselves made up of feeling-stuff; hence even false know-
ledge (avidyii) need not be regarded as being wholly an intellectual
element, since it is itself the product of the feeling-stuff-the gu1Jas.
It is needless to refer in detail to the theories of the springs
of action in other systems of Indian thought. From what has
already been said it would appear that most systems of Indian
Philosophy consider false knowledge to be at the root of all our
worldly activities through the mediation of feelings of attachment,
antipathy and self-love. There is an inherent pessimism in most
systems of Indian thought, which consider that normally we are
all under the evil influence of false knowledge and are all gliding
on the downward path of sins and afflictions. They also consider
that all attachments lead to bondage and slavery to passions, and
thereby lead us away from the path of liberation. Actions are
XIII] Springs of action in the Caraka-sarrzhitii
judged as good or bad according as they lead to liberation or
bondage; their efficacy is in securing the transcendental realization
of the highest truth and the cessation of rebirth, or obscuration of
the nature of reality and exposure to the miseries of rebirth.
But Caraka gives us a scheme of life in which he traces the
springs of all our actions to the three fundamental motives or bio-
logical instincts of life-preservation, worldly desire of acquiring
riches for enjoyment, and other worldly aspirations of self-realiza-
tion. According to him these three fundamental desires sum up
all springs of action. On this view will appears to be more funda-
mental than feeling or know ledge. Caraka does not seem to begin
from the old and stereotyped idea that false knowledge is the
starting-point of the world. His is a scheme of a well-balanced
life which is guided by the harmonious play of these three funda-
mental desires and directed by perfect wisdom and unerring judg-
ment. Evil and mischief creep in through errors of judgment, by
which the harmony of these desires is broken. All kinds of mis-
deeds are traced, not to feelings of attachment or antipathy, but
to errors of judgment or foolishness (prajiiiipariidha). This prajiiii-
pariidha may be con1pared to the moha or avidyii of the Nyaya and
Yoga. But, while the Nyaya and Yoga seem to refer to this molza or
avidyii as a fundamental defect inherent in our mental constitution
and determining its activities as a formative element, Caraka's
prajfiiipariidha is not made to occupy any metaphysical status, but
expresses itself only in the individual lapses of judgment.
Caraka, however, did not dare to come into conflict with the
prevailing ethical and philosophical opinions of his time, and we
find that in Siirzra, 1 he largely accepts the traditional views. He
says there that it is the phenomenal self (bhutiitman or sa1!lyoga-
puru~a) that feels pleasure and pain, and in connection with the
duty of a physician to remove all physical sufferings produced by
diseases he says that the ultimate healing of all pain consists in
the permanent nai~thiki (removal) of pain by the removal of
grasping (upadhii)l. He says there that grasping (upadhii) is itself
sorrowful and the cause of all sorrows. All sorrows can be re-
moved by the removal of all grasping tendencies. Just as a silk-
worm draws out its cocoon thread to its own destruction, so does
1
Cakrapat)i interprets upadhii as desire (tn1Jii); hut it seems to me that it
would have been more correct to interpret it as the Buddhist upiidiina, or
grasping. Cakrapat)i on Caraka, IV. I. 93·
Speculations in the Medical Schools [cH.
the miserable man of ignorance draw desires and longings from
the objects of sense. He is wise indeed who considers all objects
as fire and withdraws himself from them. With the cessation of all
actions (aniirambha) and dissociation fron1 sense-objects there is no
more fear of being afflicted with sorrows. Sorrows, again, are said
to proceed from four causes, namely, the wrong notion of non-
eternal things (e.g. sense-objects) as eternal (buddhi-vibhra1_nSa), the
want of the power of controlling the n1ind from undesirable courses
(dhrti-viblzrattzsa), forgetfulness of the nature of right knowledge
(smrti-vibhra1_nsa) and the adoption of unhygienic courses (asiitmya-
arthiigama). Prajt1iipariidha is defined here as a wrong action that
is done through the confusion of intelligence and want of self-
control and right knowledge (dhz-dhrti-smrti-vibhra~ta), and this
is supposed to rouse up all maladies and defects (sarva-do~a
prakopa~za). Some of the offences that may be counted under
prajt1iipariidha are as follows : to set things in motion, to try to
stop moving objects, to let the proper time for doing things pass
by, to begin an action in the wrong manner, not to behave in the
accustomed manner, not to behave modestly and politely, to insult
respected persons, to go about in wrong places or at wrong times,
to take objects which are known to be harmful, not to abide by
the proper course of conduct described in the Caraka-Sa1J1hitii,
1. 1 . 6; the passions of jealousy, vanity, fear, anger, greed, ignorance,
egoism, errors, all actions promp~.ed by these and whatever else
that is prompted by ignorance (moha) and self-ostentation (rajas).
Prajiiiipariidha is further defined as error of judgment (vi~ama
vijiiiina) and as wrong enterprise (vi~ama-pravartanii), proceeding
out of wrong knowledge or erroneous judgment. It will thus appear
that it is wise to take prajt1iipariidha in the wider sense of error of
judgment or misapplied intelligence, regarding it as the cause of
all kinds of moral depravity, unhealthy and unhygienic habits and
accidental injuries of all kinds. As Caraka admitted the existence
of the self and of rebirth and regarded moral merit (dharma) and
demerit (adharma) as the causes of all human enjoyment and
sufferings, and of the productivity or unproductivity of the ground,
and the hygienic or unhygienic conditions of water, air and the
seasons, he had to include within prajiiiipariidha the causes that led
to vices and sins. The causes of all sorrows are, firstly, wrong
consideration of the non-eternal as eternal and of the injurious as
good; secondly, want of self-control ; and, thirdly, the defect of
XIII) Springs of action in the Caraka-sa'f{lhita
memory (smrti-bhra'f(lsa), through which the right knowledge and
right experience of the past cannot be brought into effect. Thus,
though in a sense Caraka compromises with the traditional schools
of philosophy in including philosophical ignorance or miscon-
ception within prajiiiipariidha, and though he thinks that philo-
sophical ignorance produces sins, yet he takes prajiiiipariidha in
the very wide sense of error of judgment, leading to all kinds of
transgression of laws of health and laws of society and custom,
risky adventures, and all other indiscreet and improper actions.
Prajiiiipariidha, therefore, though it includes the philosophical
moha of the traditional school of philosophy, is yet something
very much more, and is to be taken in the wider sense of error of
judgment. Caraka, no doubt, admits jealousy, vanity, anger, greed,
ignorance (moha), etc., as producing improper action, but he admits
many other causes as well. But the one supreme cause of all these
subsidiary causes is prajiiiipariidha, or error of judgment, taken in
its wide sense. It will not, therefore, be wrong to suppose that,
according to Caraka, all proper actions are undertaken through
the prompting of three fundamental desires, the desire for life,
the desire for wealth and enjoyment, and the desire for spiritual
good. And all improper actions are due to improper under-
standing, confusion of thought, and misdirected intelligence
(prajiiiipariidha). The three fundamental desires, ur1associated \Vith
any error of judgment or lack of understanding, may thus be re-
garded as the root cause of all proper actions. There is, therefore,
nothing wrong in giving full play to the functioning of the three
fundamental desires, so long as there is no misdirected under-
standing and confusion to turn them into the wrong path. Caraka
does not seem to agree with other systems of philosophy in holding
the feelings of attachment and antipathy to be the springs of all
actions. Actions are prompted by the normal active tendencies of
the three fundamental desires, and they become sinful when our
energies are wrongly directed through lack of understanding.
Though Caraka had to compromise with the acknowledged view
of the systems of Indian Philosophy that the cessation of all
sorrows can be only through the cessation of all actions, yet it
seems clear that the course of conduct that he approves consists
in the normal exercise of the three fundamental desires, free from
the commission of any errors of judgment (prajiiiipariidha).
Thus Caraka does not preach the ideal of leaving off desires,
DII 27
Speculations in the Medical Schools [cH.
attachments, feelings and actions of all kinds, nor does he
advocate the Gitii ideal of the performance of duties without
attachment. His is the ideal of living one's life in a manner that
is most conducive to health, long life, and proper enjoyment. Our
only care should be that we do not commit any mistake in eating,
drinking and other actions of life which may directly or indirectly
(through the production of sins) produce diseases and sufferings
or jeopardize our life and enjoyment in any way. This unique
character of Caraka's ethical position is very clearly proved by
the code of conduct, virtues and methods of leading a good life
elaborated by Caraka. He no doubt shows a lip-sympathy with
the ideal of giving up all actions (sannyiisa); but his real sympathies
seem to be with the normal scheme of life, involving normal en-
joyments and fruition of desires. A normal life, according to
Caraka, ought also to be a virtuous life, as vices and sins are the
sources of all sorrows, sufferings and diseases in this life and
the next.
one should not tell lies, or take that which belongs to others, should
not commit adultery, or be jealous at other people's wealth, should
not be given to creating enemies, should not commit sins, or do
wrong even to a sinner, or speak about the defects or secrets of
others; should not keep cmnpany with the sinful or with those
who are the king's enemies or with madmen, the mean, wicked, out-
cast, or those who make abortions. One should not climb into bad
vehicles, lie on hard beds, or beds without sheets or pillows,
should not climb steep mountain sides or trees or bathe in fast
flowing rivers with strong currents; one should not go about
places where there are great fires raging, or laugh loudly or yawn
or laugh without covering the face, or pick one's teeth. Again,
one should not break the laws ordained by a large number of
persons, or other laws in general; should not go about at night in
improper places, or make friends with youngsters, old or greedy
people, fools, sinners or eunuchs; one should not be fond of wines,
gambling, prostitutes, divulge secrets, insult others, be proud or
boastful or speak il1 of old people, teachers, kings or assemblages
of persons, or talk too much; one should not turn out relations,
friends or those who know one's secrets. One should attend at the
proper time to every action, should not undertake to do anything
without properly examining it, or be too procrastinating, or be
under the influence of anger and pleasure; one should not be
very down-hearted in afflictions, or too elated in success, or too
disappointed in failures; should practice sex-continence, try to be
wise, make gifts, be friendly and compassionate to all and always
contented. It is needless to continue to enumerate all the qualities,
which would commonly be included within the requisites of a
good life. In this Caraka seems to cut an ahsolutely new way,
and in no other branch of Indian thought can we note such an
assemblage of good qualities of all the different kinds necessary
not only for a virtuous life, but for the healthy and successful
life of a good citizen.
It has already been pointed out that error of judgment or
delusion, in whichever sphere it may be exercised, is the root of
all mischiefs and all troubles. And Caraka demonstrates this by
enumerating in his schedule of good conduct proper behaviour in
all the different concerns and spheres of life. To Caraka the con-
ception of life is not as moral or immoral, but as good (hita) and bad
(ahita). It is true, no doubt, that here and there stray statements are
422 Speculations in the Medical Schools [cH.
found in the Caraka-sa1{lhita which regard the cessation of all
sorrows as the ultimate end of life; but it is obvious that Caraka's
main approach to the subject shows very clearly that, though moral
virtues are always very highly appreciated, yet the non-moral
virtues, such as the proper taking care of the well-being of one's
own body and the observance of social rules and forms of etiquette
or normal prudent behaviour, are regarded as being equally neces-
sary for the maintenance of a good life. Transgressions and
sins are the causes of mental worries, troubles and also of many
mental and physical diseases, and one ought therefore to take
proper care that they may not enter into one's life; and it is said
that the diseases produced by strong sinful acts cannot be cured
by the ordinary means of the application of medicines and the
like, until with the proper period of their sufferings they subside
of themselves. But sins and transgressions are not the only causes
of our desires, accidents and other domestic, social and political
troubles. It is through our imprudent behaviour and conduct,
which are due to error of judgment (prajiiaparadha), as our other
sins and immoral acts are, that all our bodily and mental troubles
happen to us. A good life, which is the ideal of every person, is
a life of peace, contentment and happiness, free from desires and
troubles of all kinds. It is a life of prudence and well-balanced
judgment, where every action is done with due consideration to
its future consequences and where all that may lead to troubles
and difficulties is carefully avoided. It is only such a life that
can claim to be good and can be regarded as ideal. A merely
moral or virtuous life is not our ideal, which must be good in
every respect. Any transgression, be it of the rules of hygiene,
rules of polite society, rules of good citizenship, or any deviation
from the path which prudence or good judgment would recom-
mend to be wise, may disturb the peace of life. A scheme of
good life thus means a wise life, and observance of morality is
but one of the many ways in which wisdom can be shown.
Ayur-veda, or the Science of Life, deals primarily with the ways
in which a life may be good (hita), bad (ahita), happy (sukha) or
unhappy (asukha). A happy life is described as a life undisturbed
by bodily and mental diseases, full of youth and proper strength,
vitality, energy, power of launching new efforts, endowed with
wisdom, knowledge and efficient sense-organs-a life which is full
of all kinds of desirable enjoyments and in which the ventures that
XIII] Ayur-veda Literature
are undertaken are all successful. The opposite of this is what
tnay be called an unhappy life. The happy life thus represents
a life so far as it is happy and enjoyable and so far as it satisfies
us. The good life is the life as it is moulded and developed by our
right conduct. In a way it is the good life that makes a happy life.
They who seek a good life should desist from the sins of taking
other people's possessions and be truthful and self-controlled.
They should perform every action with proper observation, care and
judgment, and should not be hasty or make mistakes by their care-
lessness; they should attend to the attainment of virtue, wealth and
the enjoyments of life without giving undue emphasis to any of
them; they should respect those who are revered, should be learned,
wise and of a peaceful mind and control their tendencies to attach-
ment, anger, jealousy and false pride; they should always make
gifts; they should lead a life of rigour (tapas) and attain wisdom,
self-knowledge or philosophy (adlzyiitma-7-·idal:z), and behave in such
a way that the interests of both the present life on earth and the
life hereafter may be attended to with care and judgment, always
remembering the lessons of past experience 1 • It is now clear that
the ideal of good life in Caraka is not the same as that of the
different systems of philosophy which are technically called the
Science of Liberation (mok~a-siistra). The fundamental idea of a
good life is that a life should be so regulated that the body and
mind may be free from diseases, that it should not run into un-
necessary risks of danger through carelessness, that it should be
virtuous, pure and moral; that it should be a prudent and wise life
which abides by the laws of polite society and of good and loyal
citizens, manifesting keen alertness in thought and execution and
tending constantly to its own good-good for all interests of life,
body, mind and spirit.
Ayur-veda Literature.
The systematic development of Indian· medicine proceeded
primarily on two principal lines, viz. one that of Susruta and the
other that of Caraka. It is said in Susruta 's great work, Susruta-
saJ!lhitii, that Brahma originally composed the Ayur-veda in one hun-
dred verses, divided into one thousand chapters, even before he had
created human beings, and that later on, having regard to the
shortness of human life and the poverty of the human intellect,
1 Caraka-SmJlhitii, I. 30. 22.
Speculations in the Medical Schools [cH.
he divided it into the eight parts, Salya, Siiliikya, etc., alluded to
in a previous section. But this seems to be largely mythical. It is
further said in the same connection in the Susruta-sa1Jlhitii, 1. 1
that the sages Aupadhenava, Vaitaral).a, Aurabhra, Pau~kalavata,
Karavirya, Gopurarak~ita, Susruta and others approached
Dhanvantari or Divodasa, king of Kasi, for medical instruction.
Susruta's work is therefore called a work of the Dhanvantari
school. Though it was revised at a later date by Nagarjuna, yet
Susruta himself is an old writer. A study of the Jatakas shows that
the great physician Atreya, a teacher of Jivaka, lived in Taxila
shortly before Buddha 1 • It has been said in a preceding section
that in the enumeration of bones Susruta shows a knowledge of
Atreya 's system of osteology. Hoernle has further shown in
sections 42, s6, 6o and 61 of his "Osteology," that the Satapatha-
Briihmm;a, which is at least as old as the sixth century B.C., shows
an acquaintance with Susruta's views concerning the counting of
bones. But, since Atreya could not have lived earlier than the sixth
century B.C., and since the Satapatha-Briihmar;a of abou·t the sixth
century B.c. shows an acquaintance with Susruta's views, Hoernle
conjectures that Susruta must have been contemporary with
Atreya's pupil, Agnivesa 2 • But, admitting Hoernle's main conten-
tions to be true, it may be pointed out that by the term veda-
viidinal:z in Susruta-sa11zhitii, III. 5· 18 Susruta may have referred
to authorities earlier than Atreya, from whom Atreya also may
have drawn his materials. On this view, then, the lower limit of
Susruta's death is fixed as the sixth or seventh century B.C., this
being the date of the Satapatha-Briihmar;a, while practically nothing
can be said about the upper limit.
But it is almost certain that the work which now passes by
the name of Susruta-sarrzhitii is not identically the same work that
was composed by this elder Susruta (vrddha Suiruta). J!alhaQa,
who lived probably in the eleventh or the twelfth century, says in
his Nibandha-sa1Jlgraha that Nagarjuna was the reviser of the
Susruta-sarrzhitii 3 ; and the Susruta-sarrzhitii itself contains a supple-
mentary part after the Kalpa-sthiina, called the Uttara-tantra (later
work). In the edition of Susruta by P.lVIuralidhar, of Pharuknagar,
there is a verse at the beginning, which says that that which was
1 Rockhill's Life of Buddha, pp. 65 and 96.
2 Hoernle's Medicine of Ancient India, Part I, "Osteology," pp. 7 and 8.
3 Pratisa'flskartiiplha Niigiirjuna eva. l)alhat:ta's Nibandha-Sa1!llJraha, 1. 1. 1.
XIII] Ayur-veda Literature
so well taught for the good of the people hy the great sage Dhan-
vantari to the good pupil Susruta became famous all over the
world as Susruta-sa~nhitii, and is regarded as the best and the chief
of the threefold~~ yur-veda literature, and that it was strung together
in the form of a hook by no other person than Nagarjuna 1 . Cakra-
pal)i also in his Bhanumatt refers to a reviser (prati'sa7Jzskartr); but
he does not mention his name. Gayadasa's pailjika on Susruta,
Susruta-candrika or l\yaya-candri'ka, has an observation on the
eighth verse of the third chapter of the :.Yidiina-sthiina, in which he
gives a different reading hy Nagarjuna, which is the same as the
present reading of Susruta in the corresponding passage 2 • Again,
Bhatta Narahari in his Ti'ppa~zi on the Astiitiga-hrdaya-sa1Jlhitii,
ca11ed Vagbha ta-kha~uJana-ma~ujana, in discussing murjha-garbha-
nidana, annotates on the reading vasti-d'l·iire ·vipanniiyiih, which
Vagbhata changes in borrowing from Susruta's vastimara-vipamzii-
yiilz (II. R. 14), and says that vasti'-d'0·are is the reading of Nagarjuna 3 •
ThatNagarjuna had the habit of making supplements to his revisions
of works is further testified by the fact that a work called Yoga-
sataka, attributed to Nagarjuna, had also a supplementary chapter,
called Uttara-tantra, in addition to its other chapters, Kiiya-ciki'tsii,
Siiliikya-tantra, Salya-tantra, Vi~a-tantra, Bhutavi'dyii, Kaumilra-
tantra, Rasilyana-tantra and Viljzkarm.za-tantra. This makes it
abundantly clear that what passes as the Susruta-smrzhitii was either
entirely strung together from the traditional teachings of Susruta
or entirely revised and enlarged hy Nagarjuna on the basis of a
nuclear work of Susruta which was available to ~agarjuna. But
was Nagarjuna the only person who revised the Susruta-sa1Jlhitii?
l)alhaJ).a's statement that it was Nagarjuna who was the reviser
of the work (p1·ati'sarrzslwrtapzha Nilgiirjuna eva) is attested hy the
verse of the Muralidhar edition (Niigiirjunenaiva grathi'tii); but
the use of the emphatic word eva in both suggests that there
may have been other editions or revisions of Susruta by other
writers as well. The hopelessly muddled condition of the readings,
Upadi$!ii tu yii sam_,.,~!! Dhanvantari-11wlwr$i1Jtl
Suiruttiya swli$ytlya loklinii'fl hita-vtinchayii
sarvatra bhuvi 'tikhvtitii ntimnti Suiruta-samhitii
Ayur-vedat-raylmadhye sre$fhii miinyii tatl;ottamii
sii ca Niigiirjunenaiva ~:rathitii grantha-rfipata!z.
2
Niigiirjunas tu pathati; iarlwrii sikatii meho bhasmiikh:yo 'smari-'lwnrtam iti.
In the Nin:taya-Sagara edition of IQI5 this is u. 3· 13, whereas in ]ivananda's
edition it is 11. 3· 8_ See also Dr Cordier's Recentes DecouvertesdeMSS. Medicaux
Sanscrits dans 1'/nde, p. IJ.
3
ata eva Niigiirjunair vasti-dviira iti patlzyate.
Speculations in the Medical Schools [cH.
chapter-divisions ~nd textual arrangements in the chapters in
different editions of the Susruta-sa1J1hitii is such that there can be no
doubt that from time to time many hands were in operation on
this great work. Nor it is proper to think that the work of revising
Susruta was limited to a pre-Cakrapal).i period. It is possible to
point out at least one case in which it can be almost definitely
proved that a new addition was made to the Susruta-saJ?lhitii
after Cakrapal).i, or the text of Susruta known to J!alhal')a was
not known to Cakrapal).i. Thus, in dealing with the use of catheters
and the processes of introducing medicine through the anus
(vasti-kriyii) in IV. 38, the texts of the Sufruta-sa'!lhitii commented
on by J!alhal).a reveal many interesting details which are untouched
in the chapter on Vasti in the Caraka-saJ?lhitii ( Uttara-vasti, Siddhi-
stlziina, xn). This chapter of the Caraka-saJ?lhitii was an addition
by Dr9habala, who flourished in Kasmira or the Punjab, prob-
ably in the eighth or the ninth century. When Cakrapal).i wrote
his commentary in the eleventh century, he did not make any
reference to the materials found in the Suhuta-Sa1J1hitii, nor did he
introduce them into his own medical compendium, which passes
by the name of Cakradatta. Cakrapal).i knew his Suiruta-saJ?lhitii
well, as he had commented on it himself, and it is extremely un-
likely that, if he had found any interesting particulars concerning
1-·asti-kriyii in his text, he should not have utilized them in his
commentary or in his own medical work. The inference, there-
fore, is almost irresistible that many interesting particulars re-
garding vasti-kriyii, absent in the texts of the Sus1·uta-sa1J1hitii in
the ninth and eleventh centuries, were introduced into it in the
tv.·elfth century. It is difficult, however, to guess which Nagar-
juna was the reviser or editor of the Suiruta-sa1J1hitii; it is very
unlikely that he was the famous Nagarjuna of the Miidhyamika-
kiirikii, the great teacher of Sunyavada; for the accounts of the
life of this Nagarjuna, as known from Chinese and Tibetan
sources, nowhere suggest that he revised or edited the Suiruta-
sa1J1hitii. Alberuni speaks of a Nagarjuna who was born in Dihaka,
near Somanatha (Gujarat), about one hundred years before
himself, i.e. about the middle of the ninth century, and who
had written an excellent work on alchemy, containing the sub-
stance of the whole literature of the subject, which by Alberuni's
time had become very rare. It is not improbable that this
Nagarjuna was the author of the Kak~aputa-tantra, which is
XIII] Ayur-:veda Literature
avowedly written with materials collected fro~ the alchemical
works of various religious communities and which deals with
the eightfold miraculous acquirements (a~ta-siddhi). But Vrnda
in his Siddlza-yoga refers to a formula by Nagarjuna which was
said to have be('n written on a pillar in Pataliputra 1 • This
formula is reproduced by CakrapaQi Datta, Vangasena and by
Nityanatha Siddha in his Rasa-ratniikara. But since Vrnda,
the earliest of these writers, flourished about the eighth or the
ninth century, and since his formula was taken from an in-
scription, it is not improbable that this Nagarjuna flourished a
few centuries before him.
Of the commentaries on the Susruta-Sa'f!lhitii the most im-
portant now current is I)alhaQa's Nibandha-sa'f!lgraha. I)alhaQa
quotes CakrapaQi, of A.D. 1o6o, and is himself quoted by Hemadri,
of A.D. 1260. He therefore flourished between the eleventh and
the thirteenth centuries. It has been pointed out that sufficient
textual changes in the Susruta-sarrzhitii had occurred between Cakra-
paQi and I)alhaQa's time to have taken at least about one hundred
years. I am therefore inclined to think that I)alhaQa lived late in
the twelfth, or early in the thirteenth, century at the court of King
Sahapala Deva. CakrapaQi had also written a commentary on the
Susruta-sa'f!lhitii, called Bhiinumati, the first book of which has been
published by Kaviraj Gangaprasad Sen. Dr Cordier notes that
there is a complete manuscript of this at Benares. Niscala Kara and
SrikaQtha Datta sometimes quote from CakrapaQi's commentary
on the Susruta-smtzhitii. I)alhaQa's commentary is called Nibandlza-
smtzgraha, which means that the book is collected from a number
of commentaries, and he himself says in a colophon at the end of
the Uttara-tantra that th(' physician I)alhal)a, son of Bharata, had
written the work after consulting many other commentaries 2 •
At the beginning of his !\7ibandha-smtzgraha he refers to Jaiyyata,
Gayadasa, Bhaskara's pailjikii, Srimadhava and Brahmadcva. In
his work he further mentions Caraka, Harita, Jatukarl)a, Kasyapa,
Kn?I)atreya, Bhadrasaunaka, Nagarjuna, the two Vagbhatas,
Videha, Hariscandra, llhoja, Karttika Kul)qa and others. I lari-
scandra was a commentator on the Caralw-samhitii. It is curious,
however, that, though I)alha!).a refers to Bhask~ra and Srlmadhava
1Nagarjunena lihhitii stambhe Piitaliputralu, ": 149.
2 Nibandlul.n ballldo 'lfik$Yll 1.midyab Srihhiiraf(/.tmajab
uttara-sthii11am alwmt suspa$fllf!l l)alhm;n hhi$td?.
Concluding verse of l)alhar:m'scomment~uyon Susruta's Uttara-tantra, chap.66.
Speculations in the Medical Schools [cH.
at the beginning of his commentary, he does not refer to them
in the body of it~ Hoernle, however, is disposed to identify
Bhaskara and Karttika Ku1.1<Ja as one person. Vijayarak~ita and
SrikaQtha Datta, commentators on Madhava's Nidiina, refer to
Karttika Kui)<Ja in connection with their allusions to the Smruta-
sa1J1hitii, but not to Bhaskara. A Patna inscription (E.I.I. 340, 345)
says that King Bhoja had given the title of Vidyapati to Bhaskara
Bhatta. Hoernle thinks that this Bhaskara was the same as Bhaskara
Bhana. Hoernle also suggests that Vrnda Madhava was the same
as Srimadhava referred to by QalhaQa. Madhava in his Siddha-yoga
often modifies Susruta's statements. It may be that these modifi-
cations passed as Madhava's Tippa7Ja. Since Gayadasa and Cakra-
pal).i both refer to Bhoja and do not refer to one another, it may
be that Gayadasa was a contemporary of Cakrapal)i. Hoernle
thinks that the Brahmadeva referred to by QalhaQa was Sribrahma,
the father of Mahesvara, who wrote his Siihasiinka-carita in A.D.
I I I I. Mahesvara refers to Hariscandra as an early ancestor of his.
It is not improbable that this Hariscandra was a commentator on
Caraka. The poet lVIahesvara was himself also a Kaviraja, and
Heramba Sena's Gurjha-bodhaka-sa1{lgraha was largely based on
1\lahesvara's work. Jejjata's commentary passed by the name of
Brhal-laghu-pafijikii; Gayadasa's commentary was called the
Susruta-candrikii or Nyiiya-candrikii and Srimadhava or Madhava-
Kara's Tippa7Ja was called Sloka-viirttika. Gayadasa mentions the
names of Bhoja, Suranandi and Svamidasa. Gayadasa's panjikii has
been discovered only up to the Nidiina-sthiina, containing 3000
grant has. Among other commentators of Susruta we hear the
names of Gomin, A~a<Jhavarman, Jinadasa, Naradanta, ·Gadadhara,
Ba~pacandra, Soma, Govardhana and Prasnanidhana.
It may not be out of place here to mention the fact that the
Sar:pkhya philosophy summed up in the Siirfra-sthiina of Susruta
is decidedly the Sar:pkhya philosophy of Isvarakr~Qa, which, as I
have elsewhere pointed out, is later than the Sar:pkhya philosophy
so elaborately treated in the Caraka-sa1J1hitii 1 • This fact also sug-
g~sts that the revision of Susruta was executed after the composition
of Isvarakr~I)a's work (about A.D. zoo), which agrees with the view
expressed above that the revision of Susruta was the work of Nagar-
juna, who flourished about the fourth or the fifth century A.D.
But it is extremely improbable that the elaborate medical doctrines
1 History of Indian Philosophy, vol. r, pp. 313-322.
XIII] Ayur-veda Literature
of an author who lived at so early a date as the sixth century B.C.
could have remained in a dispersed condition until seven, eight
or nine hundred years later. It is therefore very probable that
the main basis of Susruta's work existed in a codified and well-
arranged form from very early times. The work of the editor or
reviser seems to have consisted in introducing supplements, such
as the Uttara-tantra, and other chapters on relevant occasions. It
does not seem impossible that close critical and comparative
study of a number of published texts of the Susruta-sa1J1hitii
and of unpublished manuscripts may enable a future student to
separate the original from the supplementary parts. The task,
however, is rendered difficult by the fact that additions to the
Susruta-sm!lhitii \Vere probably not limited to one period, as has
already been pointed out above.
It is well known that Atri's medical teachings, as collected by
Agnivda in his Agnivesa-tantra, which existed at least as late as
Cakrapar;i, form the basis of a revised work by Caraka, who is
said to have flourished during the time of Kar;i!?ka, passing by
the name of Caraka-safJ1hitii 1 • It is now also well known that
Caraka did not complete his task, but left it half-finished at a
point in the Cikitsii-sthiina, seventeen chapters of which, together
with the books called Siddhi-sthiina and Kalpa-sthiina, were added
by Kapilabala's son, Dr<;lhabala, of the city ofPaficanada, about the
ninth century A.D. The statement that Dr<;lhabala supplemented the
work in the above way is found in the current texts of the Caraka-
sm.nhitii2. Niscala Kara in his Ratna-prabhii describes him as author
of the Caraka-pariSi~ta, and Cakrapar;i, Vijayarak!?ita and Arur;a-
datta (A.D. 1240), '"·henever they have occasion to quote passages
from his supplementary parts: all refer to Dr<;lhabala as the author.
The city of Paficanada was identified as the Punjab by Dr U. C. Dutt
in his 1llateria A1edica, which identification was accepted by Dr
Cordier and referred to a supposed modem Panjpur ,north of Attock
in the Punjab. There are several Paficanadas in different parts of
India, and one of them is mentioned in the fifty-ninth chapter of
the Kiisi-khm:uJa; Gangadhara in his cominentary identifies this
with Benares, assigning no reason for such identification. Hoernle,
however, thinks that this Paficanada is the modern village of
1 On Caraka's being the court-physician of Km;i~ka see S. LeYi, Notes sur
adjective to tisane would not only be superfluous, but would also leave ekiigram
without an object. The verb yufijyiit, literally meaning "should link up,, is
interpreted by Sridhara as "should practise," apparently without any justifica-
tion (vi. 12).
XIV] Gila and Y'oga 447
lead the middle course of life and avoid extremes. This avoidance
of extren1es is very unlil'e the process of yoga advised by Patafijali.
Patafijali's course of yoga formulates a method by which the yogzn
can gradually habituate himself to a condition of life in which
he can ultimately dispenfe with food and drink altogether and
desist from all movements of body and mind. The object of a yogin
in making his mind one-pointed is ultimately to destroy the mind.
According to Patafijali the advancement of a yogin has but one
object before it, viz. the cessation of all movements of mind
(citta-·vrtti-nirodha). Since this absolute cessation cannot be effected
without stopping all movements of the body, desires and passions
are to be uprooted, not only because they would make the mind fly
to different objects, but also because they would necessitate move-
nlents of the body, which would again disturb the mind. The
yogin therefore has to practise a twofold control of movements of
body and mind. He has to habituate himself to dispensing with
the necessity of food and drink, to make himself used to all kinds
of privations and climatic inconveniences of heat and cold and
ultimately to prepare himself for the stoppage of all kinds of bodily
movements. But, since this cannot be successfully done so long
as one inhales and exhales, he has to practise prii1_liiyiima for abso-
lute breath-control, anrl not for hours or days, but for months
and years. l\Ioral elevation is regarded as indispensable in yoga
only because without absolute and perfect cessation of all desires
and passions the movements of the body and mind could not be
absolutely stopped. The yogin, ho\vever, has not only to cut off
all new causes of disturbance leading to movements of body and
mind, but also to practise one-pointedness of n1ind on subtler
and subtler objects, so that as a result thereof the sub-conscious
forces of the mind can also be destroyed. Thus, on the one hand,
the mind should be made to starve by taking care that no new
sense-data and no new percepts, concepts, thoughts, ideas or
emotions be presented to it, and, on the other hand, steps are to be
taken to make the mind one-pointed, by which all that it had
apprehended before, which formed the great storehouse of the
sub-conscious, is destroyed. The mind, thus pumped out on both
sides, becomes absolutely empty and is destroyed. The ideal of
Patanjali's Yoga is absolute extremism, consisting in absolute
stoppage of all functions of body and mind.
TheGUii,on the other hand,prescribes the golden middle course
The Philosophy of the Bhagavad-gttii [CH.
of moderate food, drink, sleep, movements of the body and activity
in general. The object of the yogin in the Guii is not the absolute
destruction of mind, but to bring the mind or the ordinary self
into communion with the higher self or God. To the yogin who
practises meditation the Gitii advises steadiness of posture; thus
it says that the yogin should hold his body, head and shoulders
straight, and, being unmoved and fixed in his posture, should
avoid looking to either side and fix his eyes on the tip of his nose.
The Gitii is, of course, aware of the proce~- of breath-control
and prii1Jiiyiima; but, curiously enough, it does not speak of it
in its sixth chapter on dhyiina-yoga, where almost the whole
chapter is devoted to yoga practice and the conduct of yogins. In
the fifth chapter, v. 27, it is said that all sense-movements and
control of life-movements (prii1Ja-karmii1Jt) are like oblations to the
fire of self-control. In the two obscure verses of the same chapter,
v. 29 and 30, it is said that there are some who offer an oblation
of prii1Ja to apiina and of apiina to prii1Ja and thus, stopping the
movement of inhalation and exhalation (prii1Jiipiina-gati ruddhvli),
perform the prli1Jiiyiima, while there are others who, taking a low
diet, offer an oblation of prli'l}a to prli1Ja. Such actions on the part
of these people are described as being different kinds of sacrifices,
or yafiia, and the people who perform them are called yajiia-vida/.t
(those who know the science of sacrifice), and not yogin. It is
difficult to understand the exact tneaning of offering an oblation
of prii1Ja to prii1Ja or of prli1Ja to apiiua and of calling this sacrifice.
The interpretations of Sailkara, Sridhara and others give us but
little help in this matter. They do not tell us why it should be
called a yajiia or how an oblation of prii1Ja to prli1Ja can be made,
and they do not even try to give a synonym for juhvati (offer
oblation) used in this connection. It seems to me, however, that
there is probably a reference to the mystical substitution-medita-
tions (pratikopiisanii) which were used as substitutes for sacrifices
and are referred to in the Upani~ads. Thus in the Maitri Upani~ad,
VI. 9, we find that Brahman is to be meditated upon as the
ego, and in this connection, oblations of the five viiyus to fire with
such mantras as prii'l}iiya sviihii, apiiniiya sviihli, etc. are recom-
mended. It is easy to imagine that, in a later process of development,
for the actual offering of oblations to fire was substituted a certain
process of breath-control, which still retained the old phraseology
of the offering of oblations in a sacrifice. If this interpretation is
XIV] GUii and Yoga 449
accepted, it will indicate how processes of breath-control became
in many cases associated with substitution-meditations of the
Vedic type 1 . The development of processes of breath-control
in connection with substitution-meditations does not seem to
be unnatural at all, and, as a matter of fact, the practice of
prii1y1iyiima in connection with such substitution-meditations is
definitely indicated in the 1llaitri Upani~ad, VI. 18. The movement
of inhalation and exhalation was known to be the cause of all
body-heat, including the heat of digestive processes, and Kr~l}a is
supposed to say in the Gztii, xv. 14, "As fire I remain in the body
of living beings and in association with priil}a and apiina I digest
four kinds of food and drink." The author of the Guii, however,
seems to have been well aware that the prii1Ja and apiina breaths
passing through the nose could be properly balanced (samau), or
that the prii1Ja viiyu could be concentrated between the two eye-
brows or in the head (miirdhni) 2 • It is difficult to say what is
exactly meant by taking the prii1Ja in the head or between the
eyebrows. There seems to have been a belief in the Atharva-siras
Upani~ad and also in the Atharva-sikhii Upani~ad that the prii1Ja
could he driven upwards, or that such priil}a, being in the head,
could protect it 3 • Manu also speaks of the prii1JaS of young
men rushing upwards when old men approached them. But,
whatever may be meant, it is certain that neither the balancing
of prii1Ja and apiina nor the concentrating of prii1Ja in the
head or between the eyebrows is a phrase of Patafijali, the Yoga
writer.
In describing the course of a yogin in the sixth chapter the
Gitii advises that the yogin should lead the austere life of a Brahma-
dirin, withdraw his mind from all mundane interests and think
only of God, dedicate all his actions to Him and try to live in
communion with Him (yukta iisita). This gives to his soul peace,
through which he loses his individuality in God and abides in Him
1
See Hindu Mysticism, by S. N. Dasgupta, Chicago, 1927, pp. 18-20.
2
prii'l}apiinau samau hrtvii niisiibhyantara-ciiri'l}au, v. 27. The phrase samau
krtvii is left unexplained here by Sankara. Sridhara explains it as "having sus-
pended the movement of prii'l}a and apana"--prii'l}iipiiniiv iirddhviidho-gati-
nirodlzena samau krtvii kumbhaka'f!l krtvii. It is difficult, however, to say what is
exadly meant by concentrating the prii'l}a •CJiiyu between the two eyebrows,
bhruvor madhye prii'l}am iivesya samyak (VIII. xo). Neither Sankara nor Sridhara
gives us any assistance here. In murdhny cldhiiyiitmanal.z prii'l}am iisthito yoga-
dlzclrn'l}iim (vm. 12) milrdhni is paraphrased by Sridhara as bhruvor madhye, or
"between the eyebrows."
3
Atharva-Siras, 4 and 6 and Atharva-sikhii, 1.
DII 29
The Philosophy of the Bhagavad-gua [cH.
in the bliss of self-effacement 1 • A yogin can be said to be in union
(with God) when he concentrates his mind on his own higher
self and is absolutely unattached to all desires. By his efforts
towards such a union (yoga-sevayii) he restrains his mind from
all other objects and, perceiving his self in himself, remains in
peace and contentment. At this higher state the yogin enjoys
absolute bliss (sukham iityantikam), transcending all sense-pleasures
by his pure reason, and, being thus fixed in God, he is never
shaken away from Him. Such a yog£n forsakes all his desires and
controls all his senses by his mind, and, whenever the mind itself
seeks to fly away to different objects, he tries to control it and fix
it on his own self. Patiently holding his mind fixed in his self,
he tries to desist from all kinds of thought and gradually habituates
himself to shaking off attachments to sense-attractions. At this
stage of union the yogin feels that he has attained his highest,
and thus even the greatest mundane sorrows cannot affect him
in the least. Yoga is thus sometimes defined as the negation of
the possibility of all association with sorrows2 • One can attain
such a state only by persistent and self-confident efforts and
without being depressed by preliminary failures. When a yogin
attains this union with himself or with God, he is like the
motionless flame of a lamp in a still place, undisturbed by all
attractions and unruffled by all passions3 • The yogin who attains
this highest state of union with himself or witlJ. God is said to
be in touch with Brahman or to attain Brahmahood, and it is
emphatically asserted that he is filled with ecstatic joy. Being in
1 siinti1'fl nirviitza-paramii7Jl mat-Sa7JlSlhiim adhigacchati, VI. xs. The Gitii uses
the words siinti and nirvii1Ja to indicate the bliss of the person who abides in
God. Both these words, and particularly the word nirviitza, have a definite
significance in Buddhism. But the Gltii seems to be quite unacquainted with
the Buddhistic sense of the word. I have therefore ventured to translate the
word nirvii1Ja as "bliss of self-effacement." The word is primarily used in the
sense of "extinguishing a light," and this directly leads to the Buddhistic sense
of the absolute destruction of the skandhas. But the word nirvana is also used
from very early times in the sense of "relief from sufferings·, and "satis-
faction." Thus the Mahii-bhiirata, with which the Gitii is traditionally associated,
uses it in this sense in III. 10438:
sa pltvii sitala7Jl toya7Jl pipiisiirtto mahi-pati/:z;
nirvii1Jam agamad dmmiin susukhl ciibhavat tadii.
Again, in the Afahii-bhiirata, xu. 7150 and 13014, nirvii~ is described as being
highest bliss (parama7JZ sukham), and it is also associated with siinti, or peace,
as it is in the above passage-siinli7JZ nirviitza-paramii7Jl. InMaha-bhiirata, VI.1079,
and in another place it is called a "state of the highest Brahman" (parama1,.n
brahma-ibid. XII. 13239).
2 la7Jl vidyiid du/:zkha-sa7Jlyoga-viyoga'lfl yoga-sa7Jljiiitam, VI. 23.
3 Yathii dipo niviita-stho nengate sopamii smrtii, VI. 19.
XIV] Gitii and Yoga 45 1
union with God, he perceives himself in all things, and all things
in himself; for, being in union with God, he in one way identifies
himself with God, and perceives God in all things and all things
in God. Yet it is no mere abstract pantheism that is indicated
here; for such a view is directly in opposition to the main tenets
of the Gttii, so often repeated in diverse contexts. It is a mystical
state, in which, on the one hand, the yogin finds himself identified
with God and in communion with Him, and, on the other hand,
does not cease to have relations with the beings of the world, to
whom he gives the same consideration as to himself. He does
not prefer his own happiness to the happiness of others, nor
does he consider his own misery and suffering as greater or more
important or more worthy of prevention than those of others.
Being in communion with God, he still regards Him as the master
whom he adores, as the supreme Lord who pervades all things and
holds them in Himself. By his communion with God the yogin
transcends his lower and smaller self and discovers his greater self
in God, not only as the supreme ideal of his highest efforts, but
also as the highest of all realities. As soon as the yogin can detach
himself from his lower self of passions and desires, he uplifts
himself to a higher universe, where the distinction of meum and
teum, mine and thine, ceases and the interest of the individual
loses its personal limitations and becomes enlarged and universal-
ized and identified with the interests of all living beings. Looked
at from this point of view, yoga is sometimes defined in the Gttii
as the outlook of equality (samatva) 1 •
In the Gitii the word yoga has not attained any definite
technical sense, as it did in Pataiijali's Yoga-siltra, and, in con-
sequence, there is not one definition of yoga, but many. Thus
yoga is used in the sense of karma-yoga, or the duty of performance
of actions, in v. 1, and it is distinguished from the sii1flkhya path,
or the path of knowledge, in 11. 39· The word karma-yoga is men-
tioned in III. 3 as the path of the yogins, and it is referred to in
III. 7, v. 2 and XIII. 24. The word buddhi-yoga is also used at least
three times, in II. 49, x. 10 and XVIII. 57, and the bhakti-yoga
also is used at least once, in XIV. 26. The one meaning of yoga that
suits all these different contexts seems to be" association." It has
already been said that this primary meaning of the word is the
central idea of yoga in the Gitii. One of the main teachings of
1 samatva'!l yoga ucyate, 11. 48.
452 The Philosophy of the Bhagavad-gitii [cH.
the Gttii is that duties should be performed, and it is this obli-
gatoriness of the performance of duties that in the Gttii is under-
stood by karma-yoga. But, if such duties are performed from
motiv~s of self-interest or gain or pleasure, the performance could
not lead to any higher end. It is advised, therefore, that they
should be performed without any motive of gain or pleasure.
So the proper way in which a man should perform his duties,
and at the same time keep himself clean and untarnished by the
good and bad results, the pleasures and sorrows, the praise and
blame proceeding out of his own deeds, is to make himself de-
tached from all desires for the fruits of actions. To keep oneself
detached from the desires for the fruits of actions is therefore the
real art (kausala) of performing one's duties; for it is only in this
way that a man can make himself fit for the higher union with
God or his own higher self. Here, then, we have a definition of
yoga as the art of performing one's duties (yoga/:z karmasu kausalam
-II. so). The art of performing one's duties, e.g. the art of keeping
oneself unattached, cannot however be called yoga on its own
account; it is probably so-called only because it is the indis-
pensable step towards the attainment of the real yoga, or union
with God. It is clear, therefore, that the word yoga has a gradual
evolution _to a higher and higher meaning, based no doubt on the
primary root-meaning of" association."
It is important to note in this connection that the process of
prii1Jiiyiima, regarded as indispensable in Patafijali's Yoga, is not
considered so necessary either for karma-yoga, buddhi-yoga, or for
the higher kind of yoga, e.g. communion with God. It has already
been mentioned that the reference to prii1Jiiyiima is found only in
connection with some kinds of s11bstitution-meditations which have
nothing to do with the main concept of yoga in the Gitii. The
expression samiidhi is used thrice in the noun form in the Gitii, in
11. 44, 53 and 54, and three times in the verb form, in vi. 7, XII. 9
and XVII. I I; but the verb forms are not used in the technical sense
of Patafijali, but in the simple root-meaning of sam+ ii +v dhii,
"to give" or "to place" (arpm;a or sthiipana). In two cases
(n. 44 and 53) where the word samiidhi is used as a noun it has
been interpreted by both Sankara and Sridhara as meaning the
object in which the mind is placed or to which it is directed for
communion, viz. God 1 • The author of the Gitii is well aware of
1
In 11. 44, however, Sankara considers this object of mind to be antalzkara1Ja
XIV] GUii and Yoga 453
the moral conflict in man and thinks that it is only by our efforts
to come into touch with our higher self that the littlcnes~ of
passions and desires for fruits of actions and the preference of
our smaller self-interests can he transcended. For, once man is
in touch \vith his highest, he is in touch with God. He has then
a broader and higher vision of man and his place in nature, and
so he identifies himself with God and finds that he has no special
interest of his own to serve. The low and the high, the sinful
and the virtuous, are the same in his eyes; he perceives God
in all things and all things in God, and it is this state of com-
munion that is the real yoga of the Gitii; and it is because in this
state all inequalities of race, creed, position, virtue and vice, high
and low vanish, that this superior realization of universal equality
is also called yoga. Not only is this union with God called yoga,
but God Himself is called Yogesvara, or the Lord of communion.
As a result of this union, the yogin enjoys supreme bliss and
ecstatic joy, and is free from the least touch of sorrow or pain;
and this absolute freedom from pain or the state of bliss, being
itself a result of yoga, is also called yoga. From the above survey
it is clear that the yoga of the Gitii is quite different from the
yoga of Pataiijali, and it does not seetn at all probable that the
Gltii was aware of Pataiijali's yoga or the technical terms used by
him 1 .
The treatment of yoga in the Gitii is also entirely different from
its treatment in almost all the Upani!:;lads. The Katlw Upani~ad
speaks of sense-control as being yoga; hut sense-control in the
Gitii is only a preliminary to yoga and not itself yoga. l\Iost of
the yoga processes described in the other Upani~ads either speak
of yoga with six accessories (~ar.j-atiga yoga) or of yoga with eight
accessories (a~tiinga-yoga), more or less after the manner of
Pataiijali. They introduce elaborate details not only of breath-
control or prii!liiyiima, but also of the nervous system of the body,
ir.Jii, pingalii and su~wm:zii, the nerve plexus, muliidhiira and other
similar objects, after the manner of the later works on the $at-
or buddhi. But Sridhara considers this object to be God, and in 11. 53 Sai1l~ara
anJ Sridhara are unanimous that the object, or the support of the union or
communion of the mind, is God.
1 pasya me ·yogam aisvaram, IX. s, etii'!l v.:ibhuti'!l yoga'!' ra, x. 7· In the
above two passages the word yoga seems to have a different meaning, as it is
used there in the sense of miraculous powers; but even there the commentators
S-..r1kara and Sridhara take it to mean .. association" (yukti) and interpret
aisvara1Jt yoga1!J as "associati~cm of miraculous powers."
454 The Philosophy of the Bhagavad-gitii .[cH.
cakra system. Thus the Amrta-niida enumerates after the manner
of Pataiijali the six accessories of yoga as restraint (pratyiihiira),
concentration (dhyiina), breath-control (prii~iiyiima), fixation (dhii-
rm:zii), reasoning (tarka) and meditative absorption (samiidhz), and
describes the final object of yoga as ultimate loneliness of the self
(kaivalya). The Amrta-bindu believes in an all-pervading Brahman
as the only reality, and thinks that, since mind is the cause of all
bondage and liberation, the best course for a yogin to adopt is to
deprive the mind of all its objects and thus to stop the activity
of the mind, and thereby to destroy it, and bring about Brahma-
hood. Brahman is described here as being absolutely indeter-
minate, uninferable, infinite and beginningless. The K~urika
merely describes prii~iiyiima, dhyiina, dhiira~ii and samiidhi in
association with the nerves, su~um~ii, pingalii, etc. and the nerve
plexuses. The Tejo-bindu is a Vedantic Upani!?ad of the ultra-
monistic type, and what it calls yoga is only the way of realizing
the nature of Brahman as one and as pure consciousness and
the falsity of everything else. It speaks of this yoga as being
of fifteen accessories (paftca-dasiifzga yoga). These are yama
(sense-control through the knowledge that all is Brahman), niyama
(repetition of the same kinds of thoughts and the avoidance of
dissimilar ones), tyiiga (giving up of the world-appearance through
the realization of Brahman), silence, a solitary place, the proper
posture, steadiness of mind, making the body straight and erect,
perceiving the world as Brahman (drk-sthiti), cessation of all states
and breath-control (prii~a-smrzyamana), perceiving all objects of
the mind as Brahman (pratyiihiira), fixing the mind always on
Brahman (dhiira~ii), self-meditation and the realization of oneself as
Brahman. This is, however, a scheme of yoga quite different from
that of Pataiijali, as well as from that of the Gitii. The TriJikha-
briihmm:za speaks of a yoga with eight accessories (a~tiifzga-yoga),
where the eight accessories, though the same in name as the eight
accessories of Pataiijali, are in reality different therefrom. Thus
yama here means want of attachment (vairiigya), niyama means
attachment to the ultimate reality (anuraktil.z pare tattve), iisana
means indifference to all things,prii~a-sa,.yamana means the reali-
zation of the falsity of the world,pratyiihiira means the inwardness
of the mind, dhiira~ii means the motionlessness of the mind,
dhyiina means thinking of oneself as pure consciousness, and
samiidhi means forgetfulness of dhyiinas. Yet it again includes
XIV) Stif!Zkhya and Yoga in the Gitii 455
within its yama and ni'yama almost all the virtues referred to by
Pataiijali. It also speaks of a number of postures after the hatha-
yoga fashion, and of the movement of priir.za in the nerve plexuses,
the ways of purifying the nerves and the processes of bfeath-control.
The object of yoga is here also the destruction of mind and the
attainment of kaivalya. The Darsana gives an affiiilga-yoga with
yama, ni'yama, iisana,priir.ziiyiima, pratyiihiira, dhiirar.zii, dhyiina and-
samiidhi more or less after the fashion of Pataiijali, with a supple-
mentary treatment of nerves (nii{ii) and the movement of the priir.za
and other viiyus in them. The final object of yoga here is the attain-
ment of Brahmahood and the comprehension of the world as miiyii
and unreal. The Dhyiina-bindu describes the self as the essential
link of all things, like the fragrance in flowers or the thread in a
garland or the oil in sesamum. It describes a iatJ-anga yoga with
iisana, priir.za-sa'f{lrodha, pratyiihiira, dhiirar.zii, dhyiina and samiidhi.
It also describes the four cakras or nerve plexuses, and speaks of
the awakening of the serpent power (kur.z{ialini) and the practice of
the mudriis. It speaks further of the balancing or unifying of priir.za
and apiina as leading to yoga 1 • The object of this yoga is the
attainment of the transcendent state of liberation or the realization
of the paramiitman. It is useless to refer to other U pani!?ads; for
what has already been said will be enough to show clearly that
the idea of Yoga in the Gttii is entirely different from that in
the Yoga Upani~ads, most of which are of comparatively late
date and are presumably linked up with traditions different from
that of the Gitii.
the nerves (nti{li) and the vtiyu.f, which probably became associated with the
Panca-rtitra tradition in later times.
The Philosophy of the Bhagavad-gua [cH.
Prakrti is called mahad brahma (the great Brahma or the great
multiplier as procreatress) in the Gita, XIV. 3 1 • It is said there
that this prakrti is described as being like the female part, which
God charges with His energy for the creation of the universe.
Wherever any living beings may be born, the great Brahman or
prakrti is to be considered as the female part and God as the
father and fertilizer. Three types of qualities are supposed to be
produced from prakrti (gU1;ta~t prakrti-sambhaviil) )2 • These are
satt·va, rajas and tamas, which bind the immortal self in its
corporeal body. Of these, sattva, on account of its purity, is
illuminating and untroubling (aniimayam, which Sridhara explains
as nirupadravam or siiutam), and consequently, on account of these
two qualities, binds the self with the attachment for knowledge
(jiiiina-smigena) and the attachment for pleasure (sukha-sangena).
It is said that there are no living beings on earth, or gods in the
heavens, who are not pervaded by the three gw:zas produced from
the pralqti3 • Since the gu1JaS are produced from the prakrti through
the fertilization of God's energy in prakrti, they may be said to
be produced by God, though God always transcends them. The
quality of sattva, as has been said above, associates the self with
the attachments for pleasure and knowledge. The quality of 1·ajas
moves to action and arises from desire and attachment {tn~;tii
sanga-samudbhavam), through which it binds the self with ego-
istic attachments for action. The quality of lamas overcomes the
illumination of knowledge and leads to many errors. Tamas, being
a product of ignorance, blinds all living beings and binds t~em
down with carelessness, idleness and sleep. These three qualities
predominate differently at different times. _Thus, sometimes the
quality of sattva predominates over rajas and tamas, and such a
time is characterized by the rise of knowledge in the mind through
all the different sense-gates; when rajas dominates satt·va and
tamas, the mind is characterized by greed, efforts and endeavours
for different kinds of action and the rise of passions, emotions and
desires; when tamas predominates over sattva and rajas, there is
ignorance, lethargy, errors, delusions and false beliefs.
The different categories are avyakta, or the undifferentiated
1
mama yonir mahad brahma tasmin garbha1Jl da,dhiimy a ham. fiV. 3. I have
interpreted mahad brahma as prakrti, following Sridhara and other commen-
tators. Sankara surreptitiously introduces the word miiya between mama and
yoni and changes the whole meaning.
2 Gita, XIV. 5· 3 Ibid. XVIII. 40.
XIV] Siil!lkhya Philosophy in the Guii
prakrti,buddhi (intellect),aha1_nkara (egohooq), manas (mind-organ)
and the ten senses, cognitive and conative. l~lmzas is higher and
subtler than the senses, and buddhi is higher than the manas, and
there is that (probably self) which transcends buddhi. 1llanas is
regarded as the superintendent of the different senses; it dominates
them and through them enjoys the sense-objects. The relation
between the buddhi and aha1_nkara is nowhere definitely stated.
In addition to these, there is the category of the five elements
(mahabhilta)l. It is difficult to say whether these categories were
regarded in the Gita as being the products of prakrti or as sepa-
rately existing categories. It is curious that they are nowhere
mentioned in the Gita as being products of prakrti, which they are
in Sarpkhya, but on the other hand, the five elements, mmzas,
aha1_nkara and buddhi are regarded as being the eightfold nature
(prakrti) of God 2 • It is also said that God has two different kinds
of nature, a lower and a higher; the eightfold nature just referred
to represents the lower nature of God, whereas His higher nature
consists of the collective universe of life and spirit 3 • The gu1Jas
are noticed in relation to prakrti in III. 5, 27, 29, XIII. 21, XIV. 5,
XVIII. 40, and in all these places the gu1JaS are described as
being produced from prakrti, though the categories are never said
to be produced from prakrti. In the Gzta, IX. 10, however, it
is said that prakrti produces all that is moving and all that is
static through the superintendence of God. The word prakrti is
used in at least two different senses, as a primary and ultimate
category and as a nature of God's being. It is quite possible that
the primary meaning of prakrti in the Gita is God's nature; the
other meaning of prakrti, as an ultimate principle from which the
gu1Jas are produced, is simply the hypostatization of God's nature.
The whole group consisting of pleasure, pain, aversion, volition,
consciousness, the eleven senses, the mind-organ, the five elements,
egohood, intellect (buddhi), the undifferentiated (avyakta, meaning
prakrti existing, probably, as the sub-conscious mind) power of
holding the senses and the power of holding together the diverse
mental functions (sa1_nghata) with their modifications and changes,
is called kfetra. In another place the body alone is called kfelra 4 •
It seems, therefore, that the word kfelra signifies in its broader
sense not only the body, but also the entire mental plane, involving
1 2
Gltii, III. 42, XIII. 6 and 7, xv. 9· Ibid. VII. 4·
3 4
Ibid.
Ibid. Vll. 5· XIII. 2.
The Philosophy of the Bhagavad-gttii [cH.
the diverse mental functions, powers, capabilities, and also the
undifferentiated sub-conscious element. In this connection it may
be pointed out that leyetra is a term which is specially reserved to
denote the complex of body and mind, exclusive of the living
principle of the self, which is called leyetra-jiia, or the knower of
the k~etra, or k~etrin, the possessor of the k~et1·a or the body-mind
complex. It is said that, just as the sun illuminates this whole
world, so does the !?~etrin illuminate the whole k~etra 1 •
It will be remembered that it is said in the Gitii that God has
two different natures, one the complex whole of the five elements,
ahm.nkiira, buddhi, etc., and the other the collective whole of life
and spirit (fiva-bhuta). It will also be remembered that, by the
fertilization of God's power in prakrti, the gut}as, or the charac-
teristic qualities, which pervade all that is living, come into being.
The gu1Jas, therefore, as diverse dynamic tendencies or charac-
teristic qualities, pervade the entire psychosis-complex of aha7Jz-
kiira, buddhi, the senses, consciousness, etc., which represents the
mental side of the k~et1·a. K~etra-jiia, or the k~etrin, is in all prob-
ability the same as puru~a, an all-pervading principle as subtle as
iikiiSa (space), which, though it is omnipresent, remains untouched
by any of the qualities of the body, in which it manifests itself.
It is difficult to say what, according to the Gitii, prakrti is in itself,
before the fertilization of God's energy. It does not seem that
prakrti can be regarded as being identical with God. It appears
more to be like an ultimate principle coexistent with God and
intimately connected with Him. There is, however, no passage in
the Gttii by which the lower prakrti of God, consisting of thecate-
gories, etc., can be identified with prakrti; for prakrti is always
associated with the gu1Jas and their production. Again, it is
nowhere said in the Gttii that the categories aha1JZkiira, senses,
etc., are in any way the products of the gu1JaS; the word gut}a
seems to imply only the enjoyable, emotional and moral or immoral
qualities. It is these gll1;as which move us to all kinds of action,
produce attachments and desires, make us enjoy or suffer, and
associate us with virtues and vices. Prakrti is regarded as the
mother-source from which all the knowable, enjoyable, and
dynamic qualities of experience, referred to as being generated
by the successive preponderance of the gu1JaS, are produced. The
categories of the psychosis and the five elements, which form the
1
Gua., xm. 34·
XIV] Siirrzkhya Philosophy in the Guii
mental ground, do not, therefore, seem to be products of the gm;as
or the prakrti. They seem to constitute a group by themselves,
which is referred to as being a lower nature of God, side by side
with His higher nature as life and spirit. K~etra is a complex of
both the gm;a elements of experience and the complex categories
of body and mind. There seem, therefore, to be three different
principles, the aparii prakrti (the lower nature), parii prakrti or
puru~a, and prakrti. Prakrti produces the gm;as, which constitute
experience-stuff; the aparii prakrti holds within itself the material
world of the five elements and their modifications as our bodies,
the senses and the mind-categories. It seems very probable, there-
fore, that a later development of Sarpkhya combined these two
prakrtis as one, and held that the gu1JaS produced not only the
stuff of our experience, but also all the mind-categories, the senses,
etc., and the five gross elements and their modifications. The gu1Jas,
the::-efore, are not the products of prakrti, but they themselves con-
stitute prakrti, when in a state of equilibrium. In the Gztii prakrti
can only produce the gu1Jas through the fertilizing energy of God;
they do not constitute the prakrti, when in a state of equilibrium.
It is hard to realize the connection between the aparii prakrti and
the prakrti and the gu1Jas. The connection, however, can be imagined
to take place through the medium of God, who is the fertilizer and
upholder of them both. There seems to be hut one puru~a, as the
all-pervading fundamental life-principle which animates all bodies
and enjoys and suffers by its association with its experiences,
remaining at the same time unaffected and untouched by the
effects of the gu1Jas. This naturally presumes that there is also
a higher and a lower puru~a, of which the former is always un-
attached to and unaffected by the gu1Jas, whereas the lower pw·u~a,
which is different in different bodies, is always associated with
the prakrti and its gu1Jas and is continually affected by their
operations. Thus it is said that the puru~a, being in prakrti, enjoys
the gu1Jas of prakrti and this is the cause of its rebirth in good or
bad bodies 1 • There is also in this body the higher puru~a (puru~al;
para/;), which is also called paramiitman, being the passive per-
ceiver, thinker, upholder, enjoyer and the great lord 2 • The word
puru~a is used in the Guii in four distinct senses, firstly, in the
are not to take life, not to take what is not given, to abstain from sex-relations,
to abstain from falsehood, from drinking liquors, from eating at forbidden
times, from dancing and music and from beautifying one's '1ody by perfumes,
garlands, etc. There is also another list called dasa-kusala-kamma, such as not to
take life, not to take what is not given, not to commit adultery, not to tell a lie,
not to slander, not to abuse or talk foolishly, not to be covetous, malicious and
sceptical.
xrv] The Ethics of the Gitii and the Buddhist Ethics 499
then the whole cycle stops. But, though in this causal cycle
ignorance and desires are far apart, yet psychologically desires
proceed immediately from ignorance, and a frustration of desires
produces anger, hatred, etc. In the Gua the start is taken directly
from attachment and desires (kiima). The Buddhist word lNnii
(tanhii) is seldom mentioned in the Gitii; whereas the U pani!?adic
word kama takes its place as signifying desires. The Gua is not
a philosophical work which endeavours to search deepl) into the
causes of attachments, nor does it seek to give any practical course
of advice as to how one should get rid of attachment. The Vedanta
system of thought, as interpreted by Sarikara, traces the origin of
the world with all its evils to ignorance or nescience ( avidyii),
as an indefinable principle; the Yoga traces all our phenomenal
experience to five afflictions, ignorance, attachment, antipathy,
egoism and self-love, and the last four to the first, which is
the fountain-head of all evil afflictions. In the Gua there is no
such attempt to trace attachment, etc. to some other higher
principle. The word ajiiiina (ignorance) is used in the Gitii about
six or eight times in the sense of ignorance; but this "ignorance"
does not mean any metaphysical principle or the ultimate starting-
point of a causal chain, and is used simply in the sense of false
knowledge or ignorance, as opposed to true knowledge of things
as they are. Thus in one place it is said that true knowledge of
things is obscured by ignorance, and that this is the cause of all
delusion 1 • Again, it is said that to those who by true knowledge
(of God) destroy their own ignorance (ajiiiina) true knowledge
reveals the highest reality (tat param), like the sun 2 • In another
place jiiiina and ajiiiina are both defined. Jiiiina is defined as
unvacillating and abiding self-knowledge and true knowledge
by which truth and reality are apprehended, and all that is
different from this is called ajFiiina 3 • Ajiiiina is stated elsewhere
to be the result of lamas, and in two other places lamas is said to
be the product of ajiiiina 4 • In another place it is said that people
are blinded by ignorance (ajiiiina), thinking, "I am rich, I am
an aristocrat, who else is there like me? I shall perform sacrifices
make gifts and enjoy 5 ." In another place ignorance is said to
1
ajiiiineniit•rtmJzjiiiinarfl lena muhyantijantava?z. v. 15.
2 jiliinena tu tad-ajiiiinur_n ye~iim niiiita7JZ iitmana!z. v. x6.
3 adhyiitma-jfiiina-nityatva7f1 talft'a-jiiiiniirlha-durianam etaj-jiiiinam iti prol~
tam ajiiiinam yad ato 'nyathii. Gitii, XIII.@ II
1 lbld. XIV. 16, 17; X. I I; XIV. 8. :; Ibid. v. 16.
32·2
soo The Philosophy of the Bhagavad-gttii [cH.
produce doubts (sa7Jzsaya), and the Gitii lecture of Krg1a is sup-
posed to dispel the delusion of Arjuna, produced by ignorance 1 •
This shows that, though the word ajiiiina is used in a variety of
contexts, either as ordinary ignorance or ignorance of true and
absolute philosophic knowledge, it is never referred to as being
the source of attachment or desires. This need not be interpreted
to mean that the Gitii was opposed to the view that attachments
and desires were produced from ignorance; but it seems at least to
imply that the Gitii was not interested to trace the origin of attach-
ments and desires and was satisfied to take their existence for
granted and urged the necessity of their extirpation for peace and
equanimity of mind. Buddhist Hinayana ethics and practical
discipline are constituted of moral discipline (Sila), concentration
(samiidhi) and wisdom (paniiii). The lila consisted in the per-
formance of good conduct (caritta) and desisting (viiritta) from
certain other kinds of prohibited action. Sila means those par-
ticular volitions and mental states, etc. by which a man who
desists from committing sinful actions maintains himself on the
right path. SUa thus means (I) right volition (cetanii), (2) the
associated mental states (cetasika), (3) mental control (sa7Jzvara),
and (4) the actual non-transgression (in body and speech) of the
course of conduct already in the mind by way of the preceding three
silas, called avitikkama. Sm.nvara is spoken of as being of five kinds,
viz. (I) piifimokkha-sal!lvara (the control which saves him who
abides by it), (2) sati-sa7Jzvara(the control of mindfulness),(3) iiiina-
saf!lvara (the control of knowledge), (4) khanti-sa7Jzvara (the control
of patience) and (5) viriya-sa7Jzvara (the control of active restraint).
Patimokkha-sa~nvara means all self-control in general. Sati-saf!lvara
means the mindfulness by which one can bring in the right and
good associations, when using one's cognitive senses. Even when
looking at any tempting object, a man will, by virtue of his mindful-
ness (satz), control himself from being tempted by not thinking
of its tempting side and by thinking on such aspects of it as may
lead in the right direction. Khanti-sa7Jzvara is that by which one
can remain unperturbed in heat and cold. By the proper adherence
to sila all our bodily, mental and vocal activities (kamma) are duly
systematized, organized and stabilized (samiidhiinam, upadhiira1Jam,
patittha). The practice of szla is for the practice of jhiina (medita-
tion). As a preparatory measure thereto, a man must train himself
1
Gztii, IV. 42; XVIII. 72.
xrv] The Ethics of the Guii and the Buddhist Ethics 501
the above list of virtues, it appears that the virtues are pre-
eminently of a negative character-one should not be angry, hurt-
ful to others, egoistic, proud or vain, should not do anything with
selfish motives, should not be ruffled by pleasure and pain, heat
and cold and should be absolutely unattached. Of the few positive
virtues, sincerity and purity of heart, a forgiving spirit, tenderness,
friendliness, kindness, alertness and sympathy seem to be most
prominent. The terms maitra (friendliness) and karU1Jii (com-
passion) might naturally suggest the Buddhist virtues so named,
since they do not occur in the U pani~ads 1 • But in the Gltli also they
are mentioned only once, and the general context of the passage
shows that no special emphasis is put on these two virtues. They
do not imply any special kind of meditation of universal friendship
or universal piety or the active performance of friendly and sympa-
thetic deeds for the good of humanity or for the good of living
beings in general. They seem to imply simply the positive friendly
state of the mind that must accompany all successful practice of
non-injury to fellow-beings. The Gitli does not advocate the active
performance of friendliness, but encourages a friendly spirit as a
means of discouraging the tendency to do harm to others. The
life that is most admired in the Gitli is a life of unattachedness,
a life of peace, contentment and perfect equanimity and unper-
turbedness in joys and sorrows. The vices that are denounced are
generally those that proceed from attachment and desires, such as
egoism, pride, vanity, anger, greediness, etc. There is another class
of virtues which are often praised, namely those which imply
purity, sincerity and alertness of mind and st~aightness of conduct.
The negative virtue of sense-control, with its positive counterpart,
the acquirement of the power of directing one's mind in a right
direction, forms the bed-rock of the entire superstructure of the
Guli code of moral and virtuous conduct.
The virtue of sameness (samatva), however, seems to be the
great ideal which the Gitli is never tired of emphasizing again and
again. This sameness can be attained in three different stages:
subjective sameness, or equanimity of mind, or the sameness in
joys and sorrows, praise and blame and in all situations of life;
objective sameness, as regarding all people, good, bad or in-
different, a friend or an enemy, with equal eyes and in the same
1
The term maitra occurs only once in the Muktikopani~at, 11. 34, and the
Muktika is in all probability one of the later Upani~ads.
512 The Philosophy of the Bhagavad-gitii [cH.
impartial spirit; and the final stage of the achievement of this
equanimity is the self-realized state when one is absolutely un-
perturbed by all worldly things-a state of transcendence called
gu!liitUa. Thus in the Gttii, II. 15, it is said that he whom sense-
affections and physical troubles cannot affect in any way, who is
unperturbable and the same in joys and sorrows, attains immor-
tality. In II. 38 Kr~IJa asks Arjuna to think of joys and sorrows,
gain and loss, victory and defeat as being the same, and to engage
himself in the fight with such a mind; for, if he did so, no sin wocld
touch him. In II. 47 Kr~IJa says to Arjuna that his business is only
to perform his duties and not to look for the effects of his deeds;
it is wrong to look for the fruits of deeds or to desist from per-
forming one's duties. In II. 48 this sameness in joys and sorrows
is described as yoga, and it is again urged that one should be
unperturbed whether m success or in failure. The same idea is
repeated in n. 55, 56 and 57, where it is said that a true saint
should not be damped in sorrow or elated in joy, and that he
should not be attached to anything and should take happiness or
misery indifferently, without particularly welcoming the former or
regretting the latter. Such a man is absolutely limited to his own
self and is self-satisfied. He is not interested in achieving anything
or in not achieving anything; there is no personal object for him
to attain in the world 1 • To such a man gold and stones, desirables
and undesirables, praise and blame, appreciation and denunciation,
friends and foes are all alike 2 • Such a man makes no distinction
whether between a friend and foe, or between a sinner and a
virtuous man 3 • Such a man knows that pleasures and pains are
welcomed and hated by all and, thinking so, he desires the good
of all and looks upon all as he would upon himself-on a learned
Brahmin of an elevated character, on a cow, an elephant, a dog or
a ca!lt},iila; and the wise behave in the same way 4 • He sees God in
all beings and knows the indestructible and the immortal in all
that is destructible. He who knows that all beings are pervaded
by all, and thus regards them all with an equal eye, does not hurt
his own spiritual nature and thus attains his highest 5 • As the
culmination of this development, there is the state in which a man
transcends all the corporeal and mundane characteristics of the
threefold gUt;as, and, being freed from birth, death, old age and
1 Gitii, III. 17, 18. 2 Ibid. XIV. 24, 25. 3
Ibid. VI. 9·
' Ibid. VI. 31; also v. 18. 5 Ibid. XIII. 28.
xiV] The Ethics of the Gltii and the Buddhist Ethics 513
sorrow, attains immortality. He knows that the worldly qualities
of things, the gu~ws, are extraneous to his own spiritual nature,
and by such thoughts he transcends the sphere of all worldly
qualities and attains Brahmahood 1 •
Apart from the caste-duties and other deeds that are to be
performed without any attachment, the Gitii speaks again and
again of sacrifices, tapas and gifts, as duties which cannot be ignored
at any stage of our spiritual development. It is well worth pointing
out that the Gitii blames the performance of sacrifices either for
the attainment of selfish ends or for making a display of pomp
or pride. The sacrifices are to be performed from a sense of duty
and of public good, since it is only by the help of the sacrifices that
the gods may be expected to bring down heavy showers, through
which crops may grow in plenty. Physical tapas is described as
the adoration of gods. Brahmins, teachers and wise men, as purity,
sincerity, sex-continence and non-injury; tapas in speech is de-
scribed as truthful and unoffending speech, which is both sweet
to hear and for the good of all, and also study; mental tapas is
described as serenity of mind (mana/:t-prasiida), happy temper
(saumyatva), thoughtfulness (mauna), self-control (iitma-vini-
graha) and sincerity of mind; and the higher kind of tapas is
to be performed without any idea of gain or the fulfilment of
any ulterior end 2 • Gifts are to he made to good Brahmins in a
holy place and at an auspicious time, merely from a sense of duty.
This idea that gifts are properly made only when they are made
to good Brahmins at a holy time or place is very much more
limited and restricted than the lVIahayana idea of making gifts for
the good of all, without the slightest restriction of any kind. Thus
i~ is said in the Sik~ii-samuccaya that a Bodhisattva need not be
afraid among tigers and other wild animals in a wild forest, since
the Bodhisattva has given his all for the good of all beings. He
has therefore to think that, if the wild animals should eat him,
this would only mean the giving his body to them, which would be
the fulfilment of his virtue of universal charity. The Bodhisattvas
take the vow of giving away their all in universal charity 3 •
Thus the fundamental teaching of the Guii is to follow caste-
duties without any motive of self-interest or the gratification of
sense-desires. The other general duties of sacrifices, tapas and
1 2
Gttii, XIV. 20, 23, 26. Ibid. XVI. II-17.
3
Sik~ii-samuccaya, ch. XIX, p. 349·
Dll 33
The Philosophy of the Bhagavad-gitii [cH.
gifts are also to be practised by all and may hence be regarded in
some sense as being equivalent to the siidhiira7Ja-dharmas of the
Vaise~ika and Smrti literature. But, if caste-duties or customary
duties come into conflict with the special duties of non-injury
(ahi1JlSii), then the caste-duties are to be followed in preference.
It does not seem that any of the other special duties or virtues
which are enjoined can come into conflict with the general caste-
duties; for most of these are for the inner moral development,
with which probably no caste-duties can come into conflict. But,
though there is no express mandate of the Gitii on the point, yet
it may be presumed that, should a SG.dra think of performing
sacrifices, tapas or gifts or the study of the Vedas, this would
most certainly be opposed by the Gitii, as it would be against the
prescribed caste-duties. So, though non-injury is one of the
special virtues enjoined by the Gitii, yet, when a K!?attriya kills
his enemies in open and free fight, that fight is itself to be re-
garded as virtuous (dharmya) and there is for the K!?attriya no sin
in the killing of his enemies. If a person dedicates all his actions
to Brahman and performs his duties· without attachment, then
sinfulness in his actions cannot cleave to him, just as water
cannot cleave to the leaves of a lotus plant 1 • On the one hand
the Gitii keeps clear of the ethics of the absolutist and meta-
physical systems by urging the necessity of the performance of
caste and customary duties, and yet enjoins the cultivation of the
great virtues of renunciation, purity, sincerity, non-injury, self-
control, sense-control and want of attachment as much as the
absolutist systems would desire to do; on the other hand, it
does not adopt any of the extreme and rigorous forms of self-
discipline, as the Yoga does, or the practice of the virtues on an
unlimited and universalist scale, as the Buddhists did. It follows
the middle course, strongly emphasizing the necessity of self-
control, sense-control and detachment from all selfish ends and
desires along with the performance of the normal duties. This
detachment from sense-pleasures is to be attained either through
wisdom or, preferably, through devotion to God.
1 Gitii, v. xo.
XIV] Analysis of Action
Analysis of Action.
The consideration of the Gttii ethics naturally brings in the
problem of the analysis of the nature of action, volition and agent.
The principal analysis of volition in Hindu Philosophy is to be
found in the Nyaya- Vaise~ika works. Prasastapada divides animal
activities into two classes, firstly, those that are of a reflex nature
and originate automatically from life-functions (jlvana-purvaka)
and subserve useful ends (kiim api artha-kriyiim) for the organism,
and, secondly, those conscious and voluntary actions that proceed
out of desire or aversion, for the attainment of desirable ends and
the avoidance of undesirable ones. Prabhakara holds that volitional
actions depend on several factors, firstly, a general notion that
something has to be done (kiiryatii-jiiiina), which Gangabhatta in
his Bhii!!a-cintiimar.zi explains as meaning not merely a general
notion that a particular work can be done by the agent, but also the
specific notion that an action must be done by him-a sense which
can proceed only from a belief that the action would be useful to
him and would not be sufficiently harmful to him to dissuade him
from it. Secondly, there must be the belief that the agent has the
power or capacity of performing the action (krti-siidhyatii-jiiiina).
This belief of krti-siidhyatii-jiiiina leads to desire (ciklr~ii}. The
Prabhakaras do not introduce here the important factor that an
action can be desired only if it is conducive to the good of the agent.
Instead of this element they suppose that actions are desired when
the agent identifies himself with the action as one to be accom-
plished by him-an action is desired only as a kind of self-
realization. The Nyaya, however, thinks that the fact that an action
is conducive to good and not productive of serious mischief is an
essential condition of its performance.
The Guii seems to hold that everywhere actions are always
being performed by the gur.zas or characteristic qualities of prakrti,
the primal matter. It is through ignorance and false pride that
one thinks himself to be the agent 1 • In another place it is said
that for the occurrence of an action there are five causes, viz. the
body, the agent, the various sense-organs, the various life-functions
and biomotor activities, and the unknown objective causal ele-
ments or the all-controlling power of God (daiva) 2 • All actions
1 Gua, 111. 27; x1n. 29.
2
adhi~thiina1Jl tathii kartii karat}a1Jl ca Prthag-vidham
vividhiiS ca Prthak ce~fii daiva7JZ caiviitra paficamam. Ibid. XVIII. 14.
33-2
The Philosophy of the Bhagavad-gttii [cH.
being due to the combined operation of these five elements, it
would be wrong to think the self or the agent to be the only per-
former of actions. Thus it is said that, this being so, he who thinks
the self alone to be the agent of actions, this wicked-minded person
through his misapplied intelligence does not see things properly 1 •
Whatever actions are performed, right or wrong, whether in body,
speech or mind, have these five factors as their causes 2 • The
philosophy that underlies the ethical position of the Gitii consists
in the fact that, in reality, actions are made to happen primarily
through the movement of the characteristic qualities of prakrt£,
and secondarily, through the collocation of the five factors men-
tioned, among which the self is but one factor only. It is, therefore,
sheer egoism to think that one can, at his own sweet will, undertake
a work or cease from doing works. For the prakrti, or primal
matter, through its later evolutes, the collocation of causes, would
of itself move us to act, and even in spite of the opposition of our
will we are led to perform the very action which we did not want
to perform. So Kr~I).a says to Arjuna that the egoism through
which you would say that you would not fight is mere false
vanity, since the prakrti is bound to lead you to action 3 • A man
is bound by the active tendencies or actions which necessarily
follow directly from his own nature, and there is no escape.
He has to work in spite of the opposition of his will. Prakrti,
or the collocation of the five factors, moves us to work. That
being so, no one can renounce all actions. If renouncing actions
is an impossibility, and if one is bound to act, it is but proper
that one should perform one's normal duties. There are no duties
and no actions which are absolutely faultless, absolutely above all
criticism; so the proper way in which a man should purify his
actions is by purging his mind of all imperfections and impurities
of desires and attachment. But a question may arise how, if all
actions follow necessarily as the product of the five-fold colloca-
tion, a person can determine his actions? The general implication
of the Gitii seems to be that, though the action follows necessarily
as the product of the fivefold collocation, yet the self can give a
direction to these actions ; if a man wishes to dissociate himself
from all attachments and desires by dedicating the fruits of all
his acti.:ms to God and clings to God with such a purpose, God
helps him to attain his noble aim.
1 Gffii, XVIII. 16. 2
Ibid. 3
XVIII. 15. Ibid. XVIII. 59·
XIVj Eschatology
Eschatology.
The Gttii is probably the earliest document where a definite
statement is made regarding the imperishable nature of existent
things and the impossibility of that which is non-existent coming
into being. It says that what is non-existent cannot come into
being, and that what exists cannot cease to be. In modern times
we hear of the principle of the conservation of energy and also of
the principle of the conservation of mass. The principle of the
conservation of energy is distinctly referred to in the Vyasa-bhii~ya
· on Pata1ijali-siltra, IV. 3, but the idea of the conservation of mass
does not seem to have been mentioned definitely anywhere. Both
the Vedantist and the Sarpkhyist seem to base their philosophies on
an ontological principle known as sat-kiirya-·viida, which holds that
the effect is already existent in the cause. The Vedanta holds that
the effect as such is a mere appearance and has no true existence;
the cause alone is truly existent. The Sarp.khya, on the other hand,
holds that the effect is but a modification of the causal substance,
and, as such, is not non-existent, but has no existence separate from
the cause; the effect may therefore be said to exist in the cause
before the starting of the causal operation (kiira1Ja-vyiipiira). Both
these systems strongly obj~ct to the Buddhist and N yaya view that
the effect came into being out of non-existence, a doctrine known
as a-sat-karya-'l•iida. Both the Sarp.khya and the Vedanta tried to
prove their theses, but neither of them seems to have realized that
their doctrines are based upon an a priori proposition which is the
basic principle underlying the principle of the conservation of
energy and the conservation of mass, but which is difficult to be
proved by reference to a posteriori illustration. Thus, the Sarp.khya
says that the effect exists in the cause, since, had it not been
so, there would be no reason why certain kinds of effects, e.g.
oil, can be produced only from certain kinds of causes, e.g.
sesamum. That certain kinds of effects are produced only from
certain kinds of causes does not really prove the doctrine of sat-
kii1ya-1.:lida, but only implies it; for the doctrine of sat-kiirya-viida
rests on an a priori principle such as that formulated in the Gttii
-that what exists cannot perish, and that what does not exist
cannot come into being 1 • The Gttii does not try to prove this pro-
position, but takes it as a self-evident principle which no one could
1
niisato vidyate bhiivo niibhavo vidyate satafz. Gltii, n. 16.
The Philosophy of the Bhagavad-gitii [cH.
challenge. It does not, however, think of applying this prin-
ciple, which underlies the ontological position of the Sa:q1khya
and the Vedanta, in a general way. It seems to apply the principle
only to the nature of self (iitman). Thus it says, "0 Arjuna,
that principle by which everything is pervaded is to be regarded
as deathless; no one can destroy this imperishable one. The bodies
that perish belong to the deathless eternal and unknowable self;
therefore thou shouldst fight. He who thinks the self to be destruc-
tible, and he who thinks it to be the destroyer, do not know that
it can neither destroy nor be destroyed. It is neither born nor
does it die, nor, being once what it is, would it ever be again .... ·
Weapons cannot cut it, fire cannot burn it, water cannot dis-
solve it and air cannot dry it." The immortality of self preached
in the Gitii seems to have been directly borrowed from the
Upani~ads, and the passages that describe it seem to breathe
the spirit of the Upani!?ads not only in idea, but also in the
modes and expressions. The ontological principle that what exists
cannot die and that what is not cannot come into being does not
seem to have been formulated in the Upani~ads. Its formulation
in the Gitii in support of the principle of immortality seems,
therefore, to be a distinct advance on the Upani!?adic philosophy
in this direction.
The first argument urged by KP?I).a to persuade Arjuna to
fight was that the self was immortal and that it was the body only
that could be injured or killed, and that therefore Arjuna need not
feel troubled because he was going to kill his kinsmen in the battle
of Kuruk!?etra. Upon the death of one body the self only changed
to another, in which it was reborn, just as a man changed his old
clothes for new ones. The body is always changing, and even in
youth, middle age and old age, does not remain the same. The
change at death is also a change of body, and so there is no
intrinsic difference between the changes of the body at different
stages of life and the ultimate change that is effected at death,
when the old body is forsaken by the spirit and a new body is
accepted. Our bodies are always changing, and, though the different
stages if\ this growth in childhood, youth and old age represent
comparatively small degrees of change, yet these ought to prepare
our minds to realize the fact that death is also a similar change of
body only and cannot, therefore, affect the unperturbed nature
of the self, which, in spite of all changes of body at successive
XIV] Eschatology
births and rebirths, remains unchanged in itself. When one is born
one must die, and when one dies one must be reborn. Birth
necessarily implies death, and death necessarily implies rebirth.
There is no escape from this continually revolving cycle of birth
and death. From Brahma down to all living creatures there is
a continuous rotation of birth, death and rebirth. In reply to
Arjuna's questions as to what becomes of the man who, after
proceeding a long way on the path of yoga, is somehow through
his failings dislodged from it and dies, Kf!?I).a replies that no good
work can be lost and a man who has been once on the path of
right cannot suffer; so, when a man who was proceeding on the
path of yoga is snatched away by the hand of death, he is born
again in a family of pure and prosperous people or in a family
of wise yogins; and in this new birth he is associated with his
achievements in his last birth and begins anew his onward course
of advancement, and the old practice of the previous birth carries
him onward, without any effort on his part, in his new line of
progress. By his continual efforts through many lives and the
cumulative effects of the right endeavours of each life the yogin
attains his final realization. Ordinarily the life of a man in each
new birth depends upon the desires and ideas that he fixes upon
at the time of his death. But those that think of God, the oldest
instructor, the seer, the smallest of the small, the upholder of aU,
shining like the sun beyond all darkness, and fix their life-forces
between their eyebrows, and control all the gates of their senses and
their mind in their hearts, ultimately attain their highest realiza-
tion in God. From the great Lord, the great unmanifested and
incomprehensible Lord, proceeds the unmanifested (avyakta),
from which come out all manifested things (vyaktayal:z sar•D1i/:l},
and in time again return to it and again evolve out of it. Thus
there are two forms of the unmanifested (avyakta), the un-
manifested out of which all the manifested things come, and the
unmanifested which is the nature of the eternal Lord from whom the
former come 1 • The ideas of de•Da-y1ina and pitr-yana, dak#1,.l1iyana
and uttar1iya1Ja, the black and the white courses as mentioned in
the Upani!?ads, are also referred to in the Gua. Those who go
through smoke in the new-moon fortnight and the later six months
(when the sun is on the south of the equator), and thus ta~e the black
course, return again; but those who take the white course of fire
1 Gnii, v1n. 16-23.
520 The Philosophy of the Bhagavad-gitii [cH.
in the full-moon fortnight and thP former six months (when the
sun is on the north of the equator) do not t"eturn again 1 • No very
significant meaning can be made out of these doctrines. They
seem to be but the perpetuation of the traditional faiths regarding
the future courses of the dead, as referred to in the Chiindogya
Upani~ad. The Guii, again, speaking of others, says that those
who follow the sacrificial duties of the Vedas enjoy heavenly
pleasures in heaven, and, when their merits are exhausted by the
enjoyments of the good fruits of their actions, they come back to
earth. Those who follow the path of desires and take to religious
duties for the attainment of pleasures must always go to heaven
and come back again-they cannot escape this cycle of going and
coming. Again, in the Gttii, XVI. 19, Kp~l).a says," I make cruel
vicious persons again and again take birth as ferocious animals."
The above summary of the eschatological views of the Gztii
shows that it collects together the various traditionally accepted
views regarding life after death without trying to harmonize
them properly. Firstly, it may be noted that the Gitii believes
in the doctrine of karma. Thus in xv. 2 and in tv 9 it is said
that the \Vorld has grown on the basis of karma, and the GUii
believes that it is the bondage of karma that binds us to this world.
The bondage of karma is due to the existence of attachment,
passions and desires. But what does the bondage of ka1·ma lead
to? The reply to such a question, as given by the Gitii, is that
it leads to rebirth. When one performs actions in accordance
with the Vedic injunctions for the attainment of beneficial fruits,
desire for such fruits and attachment to these desirable fruits is
the bondage of karma, which naturally leads to rebirth. The pro-
position definitely pronounced in the Gitii, that birth necessarily
means death and death necessarily means birth, reminds us of the
first part of the twelvefold causal chain of the Buddha-" What
being, is there death? Birth being, there is death." It has already
been noticed that the attitude of the GUii towards Vedic per-
formances is merely one of toleration and not one of encourage-
ment. These are actions which are prompted by desires and, like
all other actions similarly prompted, they entail with them the
bonds of karma; and, as soon as the happy effects produced by the
merits of these actions are enjoyed and lived through, the per-
formers of these actions come down from heaven to the earth and
XIV] Eschatology 521
are reborn and have to pass through the old ordeal of life. The
idea that, there being birth, there is death, and that, if there is death
there is ·also rebirth, is the same in the Gitii as in Buddhism; but
the Gitii form seems to be very much earlier than the Buddhistic
form ; for the Buddhistic form relates birth and death through a
number of other causal links intimately connected together in an
interdependent cycle, of which the Gitii seems to be entirely
ignorant. The Gitii does not speak of any causal chain, such
as could be conceived to be borrowed from Buddhism. It, of
course, knows that attachment is the root of all vice; but it is only
by implication that we can know that attachment leads to the
bondage of karma and the bondage of karma to rebirth. The main
purpose of the Gitii is not to find out how one can tear asunder
the bonds of karma and stop rebirth, but to prescribe the true
rule of the performance of one's duties. It speaks sometimes, no
doubt, about cutting asunder the bonds of karma and attain-
ing one's highest; but instruction as regards the attainment of
liberation or a description of the evils of this worldly life does
not form any part of the content of the Gua. The Gttii has no
pessimistic tendency. It speaks of the necessary connection of
birth and death not in order to show that life is sorrowful and
not worth living, but to show that there is no cause of regret
in such universal happenings as birth and death. The principal
ideas are, no doubt, those of attachment, karma, birth, death and
rebirth; but the idea of Buddhism is more complex and more
systematized, and is therefore probably a later development at
a time when the Gitii discussions on the subject were known.
The Buddhist doctrine that there is no self and no individual
anywhere is just the opposite of the Gitii doctrine of the immor-
tality of the self.
But the Gitii speaks not only of rebirth, but also of the
two courses, the path of smoke and the path of light, which are
referred to in the Chiindogya Upani~ad 1 • The only difference
between the U pani!?ad account and that of the Gitii is that there
are more details in the Upani~ad than in the Gua. But the ideas
of deva-yiina and pitr-yiina do not seem to fit in quite consistently
with the idea of rebirth on earth. The Gitii, however, combines
the idea of rebirth on earth with the deva-yiina-pitr-yiina idea and
also with the idea of ascent to heaven as an effect of the merits
1 Chiindogya Upani~ad, v. 10.
522 The Philosophy of the Bhagavad-gua [cH.
illusory, but considers him the highest truth and reality. Thus
there is no way of escaping from any of the categories of reality-
the two a'l.-yaktas, pral~rti,jiva and the super-personality of Isvara
comprehending and transcending them all. The concepts of
Brahman, jtva, the unmanifested category from which the world
proceeds, and the gU1:zas are all found in the Upani~ads in passages
which are probably mostly unrelated. But the Gitii seems to
take them all together, and to consider them as constituents of
lsvara, which are also upheld by Him in His superior form, in
which He transcends and controls them all. In the Upani~ads the
doctrine of bhakti can hardly be found, though here and there
faint traces of it may be perceived. If the Upani~ads ever speak
of lsvara, it is only to show His great majesty, power and glory,
as the controller and upholder of all. But the Gztii is steeped in
the mystic consciousness of an intimate personal relation with
God, not only as the majestic super-person, but as a friend who
incarnates Himself for the good of man and shares his joys and
sorrows with him, and to whom a man could cling for support in
troubles and difficulties and even appeal for earthly goods. He is the
great teacher, with whom one can associate oneself for acquisition
of wisdom and the light of knowl~dge. But He could be more
than all this. He could be the dearest of the dear and the nearest
of the near, and could be felt as being so intimate, that a man
could live simply for the joy of his love for Him; he could cling
to Him as the one dear friend, his highest goal, and leave every-
thing else for Him; he could consider, in his deep love for Him,
all his other religious duties and works of life as being relatively
unimportant; he could thus constantly talk of Him, think of Him,
and live in Him. This is the path of blzakti or devotion, and the
Gitii assures us that, whatever may be the hindrances and whatever
may be the difficulties, the bhakta (devotee) of God cannot be lost.
It is from the point of view of this mystic consciousness that the
Gitii seems to reconcile the apparently philosophically irreconcilable
elements. The Gitii was probably written at a time when philo-
sophical views had not definitely crystallized into hard-and-fast
systems of thought, and when the distinguishing philosophical
niceties, scholarly disputations, the dictates of argument, had not
come into fashion. The Gitii, therefore, is not to be looked upon as a
properly schemed system of philosophy, but as a manual of right
conduct and right perspective of things in the light of a mystical ap-
proach to God in self-resignation, devotion, friendship and humility.
XIV] V ~1JU, V iisudeva and Kr~1Ja 535
1
Sir R. G. Bhandarkar's Early History of the Deccan, p. 7·
XIV] Vi~~u, V iisudeva and Kr~~a 54 I
to Vasudeva in the inscriptions referred to above can be regarded
as corroborative evidence pointing to the early existence of the
Vasudeva sect, who worshipped Vasudeva or Bhagavat as the
supreme Lord.
Turning to literary references to Vasudeva and Kr~1.1a, we
find the story of Vasudeva, who is also called. by his family name
Kanha and Kesava (probably on account of his bunch of hair), in
the Ghata-jiitaka. The story agrees in some important details with
the usual accounts of Kr~1.1a, though there are some new de-
viations. A reference to the V p~Qi race of K~attriyas is found in
Pa1.1ini, IV. I. I I4 (rfy-andhaka-vrp;zi-kurubhyas ca). The word is
formed by an U7Jiidi suffix, and it literally means "powerful" or
"a great leader 1 ." It also means" heretic" (piifa7JrJa) and one who
is passionately angry (ca7JrJa). It is further used to denote the
Yadava race, and Kr~1.1a is often addressed as Var~1.1eya, and in
the Gltii, x. 37, Kr~1.1a says, "Of the V r~1.1is I am Vasudeva." The
V f~I).is are referred to in Kautilya's Artha-siistra, where the group
of Vr~1.1is (vrp;zi-sangha) is said to have attacked Dvaipayana. The
Ghata-jiitaka also has the story of the curse of Kanha Dvai-
payana as the cause of the destruction of the Vp~Qis. But the
Maha-bhiirata (XVI. I) holds that the curse was pronounced by
Visvamitra, Ka1.1va and Narada upon Samba, the son of Kr~I).a. Two
Vasudevas are mentioned in the Mahii-bhiirata: Vasudeva, the king
of the Paui).9ras, and Vasudeva or Kr~I).a, the brother of Saf!lkar-
~ai).a, and both of them are mentioned as being present in the
great assemblage of kings at the house of King Drupada for the
marriage of Draupadi; it is the latter Vasudeva who is regarded
as God. It is very probable that Vasudeva originally was a name
of the sun and thus became associated with Vi~I).U, who with his
three steps traversed the heavens; and a similarity of Kr~I).a or
Vasudeva to the sun is actually suggested in the Mahii-bhiirata,
XII. 341. 4I, where Narayai).a says, "Being like the sun, I cover
the whole world with my rays, and I am also the sustainer of all
beings and am hence called Vasudeva."
Again, the word Siitvata also is used as a synonym of Vasudeva
or Bhagavata. The word Siitvata in the plural form is a name
of a tribe of the Yadavas, and in the Mahii-bhiirata, vn. 7662, the
phrase Sat'l:atii1J1 vara/.z is used to denote Satyaki, a member of the
Yadava race, though this appellation is applied to Kp}I).a m a
1 Yu.thena vrp;ir ejati, ~g- Veda, I. 10. 2.
542 The Philosophy of the Bhagavad-gttii [cH.
1 The words art! arranged in the order of the English alphalwt. :-ianskrit and
Pali technical terms and words are in small italics; names of books ar{' in italics
w~th a capital. English words and other names arc in Homan with a capital.
Letters with diacritical marks come after ordinary ones.
554 Index
adnta, 207, 306, 36o Agniveia-sa'!llzitii, 277, 432
adr~!iidi-I?Fuhdha'!l, zo6 Agnivda-tantra, 429
adr~!iidi-salwl~rtam, 197 Agnivdya, 228, 230
adr~!iirtha, 383 agraha1Jrt, I04
Adultery, 498 1z. Agrahayal)a, z8z
Advaita-hlzil~a1Ja, 52 n. Agriculture, 502, 505
Admita-bodha-dlpilui, 54, 216 alw'f!zkiira, 75, 102, Io4, 2I7, 23~. 239,
Ad-vaita-brahma-siddhi, 57 245. 257. 262, 305, 347. 458, 463,
Advaita-cmzdrikii, 55 404,496,524
Advaita-cintii-kmtstubha, 56 alza'f!zlii, 235, 237
Advaita-cintiima~zi, 55 a-hetu, 386
Ad?.•aita-dlpikii, 53, 2I6 ahetu-sama, 380 n. 4, 382 n.
Advaita-dlpikii-t:i·cara~w, 53 alzetutab, I66
Ad1.•aita-makaranda, s6 alzi'!lsii, 505, 510, 5I4, 544
Advaita-makaranda-tlkii, 193 Ahirbudlmya-sa7Jzhitii, 46I, 537
Adt·aita-maiijarl, 225 alzita, 277, 278, 42I, 422
Advaita-muktii-siira, 57 n. aihika, 253
Advaita-nirl}aya, 2 I9 aikamatya, 282
Advaita-paiica-ratna, 53, 216 aindriya, 2 54
Admita Philosophy, 2 n. Air, 74, I87, I94, 235, 302, 325, 330-
Ad1.•aita-ratna, 54 334,359. 360,362,4I9
Adt•aita-ratna-ko~a, 54 Airy, 357, 359
Ad?.•aita-ratna-rakFa1Ja, 225, 226 Aitareya, 78, 259 n. 3
Advaita-ratna-vyiikhyiina, 54 Aitareya-briihmal}a, 536
Ach-aita-siddlziinta-vidyotmza, 57 n. Aitareyopani~ad-bhii~ya, 78
Ad'l·aita-siddhi, 53. s6, I I8, 198, 199. aitihya, 376, 379
223 n., .us. 226 Ajita, 6I
Ad?.•aita-siddhy-upanyiisa, 225 n. ajiiiina, 3, 9, IO, so, 55, 73, 74, 76,
Advaita-siistra-siiroddlziira, 55 101, 102, 108, IIO, 112, IIJ, 115,
a.:h•aita-sruti, 8o 153. 154. 195. 196, 204, 217, 222,
Adt,aita-viida, 2 I6 389, 479, 499, soo; its nature, de-
adt•aita-viisanii, 218 pendence on self and transformation
Advaitananda, s6, 82 u., 232 into world-appearance, 10; its no-
Ad?.·aitiinubhi'i.ti, 81 tion in Padmapada or Prakasatman
Advancement, 519 different from that of ~agarjuna, 9;
Advayananda, 7Q its transformations, 10, 53; Vacas-
Advayaral)ya, 231 pati's view of its causality, 11
Advayasrama, 204 njnii7la'!l niibhiiva upiidiinatviin mrdvat,
Adyar, 49, 84 n., 87 I97
Affection, 490, 497 ajiiiita-sattviinabhyupagama, I 7, 270
Affections of viita, 336 akartii, 545
Affective tone, 23 Akhai)Qananda, 52, 103, 193
Affirmations, 75, I66, 27I, 387 Akhai)Qananda l\1uni, 10, 31 n.
Afflictions, 22, 304, 4I4, 499 Akha~ujiitma-prakiisikii, 57 n.
agada-tantra, 276 Akhilatman, 99
Agasti, 228, 230 akhyiiti, 87 n.
Agastya, 433 akli~!a, 414
Age, 370 akrodha, 505, 510
Agent, 77, I69, 310, JI4, 358, 368, a-krtaka, 182
44I,469,470, SIS, 5I6 ak~aka-sa'!ljiie, z86 7l. 4
Ag-<.{i, 539 Ak~apada, 393, 394, 398-401
A~-,'lli, 75, 292 fl., 300 n. 2, 303, 304 alaji, 299
Agnihotra, 54 alambuiii, 354
OJ,:11i-karma, 330 alasiilii, 298 n. 6
Agni-Purii~za, 279 n. Alberuni, 426
Agni~tnma, L', 345 n. Alchemy, 426
A~-,'llivda. 393, 395, 399, 424, 429, Alertness, 511; of mind, 511
432 alga1Jcfu, 297
Index 555
All1J1.Sll, 300 Angry, 367
Alkaline, 357, 358 ani/a, 330
All, I95 Animal, 359, 513
Allala Suri, 52 n. Animate, 359, 360
All-pen·ading, 16, 372, 525, 5.26 Aniruddha, 543. 545
All-pervasi,·e, Ioo mzir·vacanlym!l nlliidi, I I I
aloka-SaTfl'l'Tfa, 5 mzir-vacanlyatii. I 55
alolu patva, 5 I o anirvacanlyatii-'l•acmza, I o 5
Alternating, 63 anin:acanlyii, 81), I 17, 203, 224
AlternatiYe, I8, 377 anirviicya. 35, I I I
Altindische Grammatik, 345 n. r.nin•iicyatva, I 94
Amalananda, 52, 57. s8, 74 ll. 86, I03, anirviicyii m•idyii, I 09
I07-I09, I I9, 260 anitya, 22 11., I20
Amaradasa, 54 anitya-sanza, 380 n. 4
Amara-lw~a, 55 aniyata-vipiika. 249
amar~a. 412 Ankle-bones, 284
amiiviisyii, 292 n. Annam Bhatta, 82 n.
AmfVii, 300 Annihilation, 266
amla, 3I.2 n. 3, 357,358, 361 Annotations, 87
Amrtananda, 3I n., 454 anrta, 383
Amulets,277, 281,282,293,294,301, antal:zkara~a-caitanyayor aikyiidhyiisi'it,
:;64 206
amiirta, 254 anta?zkara~as, 34. so, 56, 65, 72, 75 n.,
a1Jlsa, z86 n. 2, 287 76, 77, 88, 89 n., IOI, I04-I06, I09,
a1Jlsa-phalaka, 286 n. 4 I I3, I I4, 2o6-2IO, 217, 268, 292,
aTflSa-pl[ha, 287 n. 2 295, 306, 344, 452, 484 n. I
llTflSiir!zsa-vikalpa, 338 antabkara~za-visi~ta, 33
anabhilapyen(itmanii, 20 anta!zkara~ziivacchinna1Jl caitanyaTfl, 206
anabhiraddhi, 497 anta!z-sau~iryam, 307
anabhi~miga, 373 antarik~aTfl, 292 n.
mzadhigata, 212, 2I3 Antaryiimi-briihma'!la, 25 I
anadhigatatva, 2I3 antaryiimin, 2I5, 537
anaikiintikat·va, 123 Antecedence, I6o, I72
Analogy, 36, 42, 148, I55, 180, 189, Antipathy, 24, IOI, 245, 248, 267,409,
39I; of dreams, 28; of play, 42 4I2-4I4.490,498,499
Analysis, 65; of consciousn{;ss, 62 mztreblzya~z, 288
ananubhii~a!la, 389 n. anubandha, 338 n., 368 n., 389, 497
ananuyojya, 384 anubandhya, 338 n.
ananyathii··siddha, I6o mzubhava, I49
Ananyanubhava, 82 n. Anubhava-dlpikii, 78
anarthaka, 384, 385 Anubhm•a-viliisa, 57 n.
Anatomical texts, 435 -~nubhavananda, s8, 86
Anatomical treatises, 435 anubhmi, I 99
Anatomy, 355, 433 mzubhriti-svahhii?:a, 4 7 I
anm:asthii, I74 Anubhutisvarupacarya, I I6, I92, I94
aniidy-anirviicyiiddyiisraya~uit, 12 anumata, 389, 39I
aniigatiivek~a!lu, 389, 392 anunziina, 139,194,373,376,379,398,
aniilzata-cakra, 355 40I n.
aniikhyam anablzivyaktam, 232 anupadhii, 505
mziimayam, 462 anupalabdhi-sama, 380 n. 4
aniirambha, 4I6 anupasaya, 397
aniisrava, 22 Anupatiila, 300
aniitman, 6 anus, 296, 426
anekatii, 370 anusayo, 497
anekiinta, 389 anutpatti-sama, 380 n. 4
anekiintha, 391 anm.-'rtta, 63
Anger, 267, 333, 373, 409, 492, 4 1J7, Q1lU-'l.')'GVQSll}'ll, I 5 I
499, 509-SII anuyoga, 3 84
Index
anuyojya, 384 a posteriori, 517
mziihya, 2~7 11. 1 Apparatus, 180
Anvaya-pral<iisilui, 56 Apparent reality, 4
tmvaya-vyatirehi, 400 11. Appaya Dik~ita, 10, II, 17, 44, 47, 49,
am:aya - ·vyatireki - siidhya - vise~a7JI. 52-56, 79, 82 n., 106 n., 108, 216 n.,
'l'iidy-ablzimatam siidlzayati, I21 218, 2I9; his date, lineage and
Anvayiirtlw-prahiiSikii, I 16 works, 2I8 ff.
anvayi, 400 n. Appearance, 3, 5, 8, 13, 2o-22, 28,
anvitiibhidhiina-viida, 227 3I, 37, 101, 105, 109, I94, 195,232,
anyatlu'i-hhyiiti, 87 n., 204, 222 235. 236, 239. 252, 371, 438, 517;
anyii pi1r'l•iipurva- bhrama- sa,zskiira/:z, of unity, 65
109 Appetites, 493
anyedyu(t, 297 Appetitive desire, 501
anyonya-milat-lwmala-saddala, 257 Appreciation, 5 12
anynnyiibhiiva, I22, I3I, 132 Apprehension, 22
migam eva alpatt-·iid upiingam, 273 apradhiina, 370
migana1Jl. 496 apramti, 1 28
Angiras, 281, 544 apramiida, sos
A1igirasa-ka/pa, 283 apratibhii, 389 n.
aizgulaya(t, 215 5 apratyak, 63
A1iguttara-nikiiya, 394 apriipta-kiila, 389 n.
mikura, 169 apriipta-priirtlzanii, 412
aiiilii~zmn, 498 apriiptayo/:z priiptil_z S07JI.)'Oga(z, I 58
a~m, 261 a priori, 517
a~m-lzrasva, 189 apsariib, 228
a~m-hras'l'a measure, 190 apz""irva, 8o
al}uhraS'l:a parimiil}a, 189 apiir·va-?.:idhi, 46
aT}~la, 322 n. Ariiya, 300
af>,75. 501 arbuda, 286 11. 3, 314
aparit. 298 fl. 7 arcii, S37
apadcia, 3!59, 39I Ardent desire, 497
apaf.{atai~a~zab, 245 ardha-supta-prabuddha, 264
apalma'l'O-'l'lletma, IOS ardhiinjali-parimii~za, 343 n.
apai.~zma, 51 o Argument, 18, 26 n., 29, 278, 376
apam, 360, 370 arhatatt'l'O, 248
aparam ojas, 3+3 n. Ari~pnemi, 229
aparii prakrti, 465 Arjuna, 487, 489, soo, 502, so7,
aparicchimziilambaniil<iira, 23 so!5, 512, 516, SI8, 525, 529-532,
apamh~a, 6, 63, lOS S4S
aparuk~a-prallli-virodhiit, 194 Armpits, 326 n.
aparoh~ll-'lJJ'a'L·ahiira-yogya, 149 Ar~zava-var7Jana, I26
Aparok~tinublwva, 78 aroga, 334 n.
Aparol<~iinuhhrui. So arpa~za, 452
apa-siddlu'inta, 389 n. Arrogant, 510
Apasmara, 43 I Adas, 430
apa'l·arga, 44, 248 Arteries, 2s6 n., 289, 290
apavmja, 389, 391 artlza, 327, 340, 3S9, 479, 482, 485
apt1na, 25!5-260, 291, 311, 332, 373, artlza-kriyl1-kiiritva, 32, I08
4+~L ++9. 4S5 artlza-kriyii-siimarthya, 18 3
apt'ina 'l:tiyu, 35S artha-kriyii-siimartlzya-sattvam, 30 n.
apc1niiya sviihii, 448 artha-priipakatva, 137
apiiliga, 342, 351 artha-prc1pti, 38+
apiirtlwlw, 384-, 385, 388, 389 n. Artlza-siistra, 274, 541
apekhii. 496 artha'L'atl, 20
apekFi, 9S arthl11ltara, 388, 389 tz.
apek~ti-budJizi, I 57, I S8 arthiipatti, 18, 389, 391
Aperture, 35+ n., 35S, 356 artlziipatti-sama, 380 n. 4, 382 n.
Apolw-s:ddhi, 49 Artificial process, 358
Index 557
AruQadatta, 429, 434 a~tiiizga-yoga, 453-455
aru1pi, 29I, 344 11. a~thlvantau, 285
asamprajiiiita, 250 a~thlvat, z85 n. 4
asa1{lsargiigralza, I 54, I 55 Atala, 76
Asariga, I64 Atharva, 274, 390
asaiz!{a, 268 Atharvan texts, 299
asmiga-bhiivanii, 264 AtharvaQic charms, 28I
asailga-sastre~za, s24 AtharvaQic hymns, 28!)
a-sarva-gata, 4I0 AtharvaQic rites, 283, 294
asat, ISS, 373 Athan•a-sikhii Upani~ad, 449
a-sat-kiirya-viida, 39, 179, 473, 5 I7 Atharva-siras Upani~ad, 449
asat-klzyiiti, 87 n. Atharva-Veda, 273-275, 277-.zSo, 283,
asiitmya-arthiigama, 416 .Z84, 288, 290, 29I, 293-295. 301,
Ascetic, 373; life, so8; postures, 489 331, 340, 343 n., 344-346, 364, 486,
Asceticism, 229, 267, so8 536, 539; as Atharva and Arigiras,
Asiatic Society of Bengal, 20,5 .281 ;.~.yur-veda an upii1iga of it, 273;
asmitii, 414 Ayur-veda its upm:eda, 274; diseases
aspanda, 265 and their symptoms in, 30I ff.;
Aspects, 238 diseases mentioned in, 296 ff.; dis-
Aspiration, 497 tinguishes hirii and dhamanl, 344 n.;
Ass, I6o, 386 n. head and brain in, 340; its bone
Assembly, 378 system critically compared and con-
Assimilation, 33 I trasted with that of Caraka. Susruta,
Associated, 501 Vagbhata, 284 ff.; its contents as
Association, IS, 2I, 25, 34, I56, I6Q, arranged by Bloomfield, 295 ff.; its
183, 188, I95, 239, 32I, 358, 369, principal contents, 281 ff.: its prob-
375.451,452,456, soo able priority to J!.g-·ceda. 280, 281;
asteya, 505 its relation with Ayur-veda, 275; its
asthi, 3 I7, 328 siikhiis, 283 ff.; its theory of viiyus,
astlzi-mii1!fsa-maya, 257 291, 292; on sirii and dhamani,
asthira, 230, 24I 289 ff. ; rivalry between drugs and
asti, 386 n. charms in, 293 ff.; theory of the
Astragalus, 284 n. 3 origin of dise:1ses in, 299 ff.; viiyu,
Astringent, 358, 359 pitta and kapha in, 33 I ; what niir/i
Astrology, 436 means in, 345
Astronomy, 49 Atharca- Veda and Gopatha-Briihmm.:za,
asukha, 422 295 n. I, 296 n. I
asukham iiyu/:1, 277 Athart:aveda in Kashmir, 283 n.
asura, 3 I4, 535, 539 Atharvii1igirasa1J, z8 1
Asura-vtda, 274 n. 3 atidesa, 389, 39I
asfiyii, 4I3 atikriintiive~a1Ja, 389, 392
asviidu, 358 atimiUra, 296
asubha, 341 atirikta, 388
asuddha, ]6 atisayiidhiina, I 83
Asvattha, 524 atiyo!{a, 320, 32I, 405
Asvattha tree, 523, 524 atlndriya, 347, 366
a~takii, 292 atlsiira, 296, 430
a~ta-siddhi, 427 Atlta-kiila, 387
A!?tiiQga Ayur-veda, 276 Atomic, 367; changes, 194; measure,
A~tiinga-hrdaya, 364 n., 436 189; theory, I5I, 189
A~tiinga - hrdaya - niima - vaidiiryaka- Atoms, 20, 25, IS7. 187-~90, 193, I99,
bhii~ya, 436 306,37I
A~tiiilga-hrdaya-sa1!lhitii, 425, 432- Atri, 399, 401, 429
434 Attachment, 24, IOI, 243, 304, 4I2-
A~tiiilga-hrdaya-vrtti, 436 4I4, 489, 490, 497-499. SOl, 503,
A~!iiilga-sa1{lgraha, 263, 274 n. 3, 284 504, 507, 510, 51 I, 513, 514, 5I6,
n. 3, 304 n. I, 3I7 n. I, 328, 329 n., 521-523
433 Attention, 23, 24
sss Index
Attentive reflection, 24 avidyii-dvitaya, 109
Attock, 429 avidyii-dvitaya-sacivasya, 109
Attractions, 239 avidyii miiyii mithyii-pratyaya iti, 84
atyanttisat, 194 avidya-nivrtti, 85
atthanga-slla, 498 avidyii-potency, I o
Auditory organ, 344 avidyii-sahita-brahmopiidiinam, 1 I
Auditory sense, 374 avidyii stuff, 104
Aufrecht, Th., 435, 439 avidyii-sakti, 9, 203
aupacarika, 328, 329 avidyopiidiina-bheda-viidins, 90
Aupadhenava, 424 avijjii, 498
Aupadhenava-tantra, 435 avijfiatartha, 389 n.
aupamya, 377, 379 avinabhava, 140, 376, 38o
aupapiiduka, 308 m:isa'J!lviidi, I 3 6
Aurabhra, 424 avise~a-sama, 380 11. 4, 382 n.
Auricular, 353 avi~aya, 6
Auspicious rites, 281 avitikkama, soo
Austerities, 441 avyabhicari, I36, 381 n.
a~adha, 295 avyabhiciirl anubhavab, 135
au~adhi, 359 avyakta, 43, I04, 263, 357, 358, 462,
aU~IJya, 362 n. 463, 470, 47I, 473. 476, 5I9, 525,
Authenticity, 78 530, 533
Autumn, 335, 370 avyakto vyakta-karma, 263
Autumnal fever, 299 avyapadeiatma, 234
avabhtisinz, 3 I 7 avyapadesya, 265,374,401
avaccheda, I o 5 Avyayatman Bhagavat Pujyapada,
avacchedakata, I 24 I98
avaccheda-vada, Io6 avyiikrta, 23 n., 104
avacchinna, 96 avyapya-vrttitva-visepto, I 58
Avadhani YaJva, 218 n. Awaking consciousness, 19
avadhi, so8 Awareness, I3, 14, I7-20, 25-30, 3 In.,
avastha, 44 3 2, 63-6 5 , 6 7 , 68, 70, 71, 73, 117,
a·vastu, 202, 203 118, 134. 151, 197. 201, 206, 2II,
avayavz, I87 212, 214; of blue, 27
avedanmJl, 265 Ayodhya, 230
a·vedyatva, I49, I so ayoga, 321, 405
avedyatve satyaparok~a- 'V):avahara- ayuta-siddha, 191
yogyatva'J!l, 149 n. ayuta-siddkatva, 191
A verrhoa acida, 360 n. iibhiisa, 252
Aversion, 335, SIS iibhiciirika, 281
Aviddhakarl).a, 172 Abhoga, 52, 108
avidyamana, 5 acarya, 420
avidya, s, 6, 8, 9, I2, I3, 44, 48, so, 72, Acarya Dik!?ita, 218
73, 84, Ss, 88-9o, 98, 99, 104, Acarya Jetari, 49
105, 109-111, II7, uS, I48, 187, Acaryasuri, 171
204-206, 209, 22 I, 234, 249, 304, iicchiidya, 112
414, 4I5, 479, 498, 499; de- adiina-gantho, 496
scribed as sakti by Gam;lapada, 8; adhiira, II3, 144
in neither of its senses can be adhiira-cakra, 355. 356
material cause, 12; its meanings, I 2; Adisura, I 26
nature of its causality according to iidityas, 292 n., 535, 549
Anandabodha, also according to iigama, 304
Vacaspati 's Brahma-tattva-samz~a, Jigama-priimii1Jya, 542 n. 2, 546,
1 2; not psychological ignorance, but -547
special technical category, I 2; Pad- Agama-si!stra-vivarm;za, 78
mapada's interpretation regarding aghiito, 497
the creative power of, 9; so called iigneya, 3I3, 329 n., 359
because of its unintelligibility, 12 iihiire pafikula-saiifia, 501
Index 559
Ahrika, I72 Ananda-vardhana, 126 n.
iijiiii-cakra, 353 11., 355, 356 ~nandanubhuva, 57 n.
iikii1ikyii, 496 Anandasrama, I96
iikiiia, 74, 75, I04, I6o, I94, 204, 235, A.nandatman, s8, 86
244, 302, 3I2, 3I5, 360, 362, 367, iintarik~a, 357
37I, 374. 379 Anvik~iki, 390, 392
iikiiia-dhiitu, 307 Anjaneya, 443
Akasagotto, 276 iipa!1, 292 n.
iikaia tmz-miitra, 245 iipta, 280, 373
iikiiiiitma ka, 3 59 iiptopadda, 373, 376, 377
iikt7.ta, 48 I, 4g2 iipya, 359
iilambana, 29, 155 iirambhakar,z, 329 n.
Alamviiyana-sar,zhitii, 435 iirjava, 505 n., SIO, 544
ii/aya-vijiliina, 22, 24 Ar~a-Riimiiya7Ja, 23 I
iilayo, 497 iirtava, 313
iilocaka, 304, 341 iirtaviil:z, 292 n.
iilocaka-pitta, 342 iirthi bhiivanii, 480
iima-garbha, 322 n. Aru~zikopani~ad, 252 n.
iimalaka, 294 .i\ryadeva, 51, 124, I64, 165
Amalananda, 82 Arya-dr~lhiiiaya-pari'prcchii, 5
iimii.iaya, 330, 33 I .Arya-vidyii-sudhii-kara, 1 I 2 n.
iinanda, 223 iisana, 454, 455
Anandabodha, so, 5 I, 70, 89 n., 92, iismiga, 44
116, II7, 124, I48 n., I94, I96; his iisatti, 497
doctrine ofavidyii probably borrow- iisayo, 497
ed from MaJ!<;Jana, 90; as inspirer iisii, 496
of many later works of Vedanta, I I8; iispada, 7
his date and works, I I 6; his interpre- iisriiva, 296
tation of the nature of the self, I 18; iissiisa, 459
his refutation of" difference," I I6, iistika, 420
I I7; his view of the nature of a·vidyii, iistikya; 505 n.
I I7 Asadhara, 434
Anandabodha Bhattarakacarya, I2, 49, iihaya, I9, 23, 85, 357
69, I47 n. iifraya-bhilta!z, 59 n.
Anandabodhendra, 231 Aire~a, 300
Anandabodhendra Bhik!?u, 259 n. 2 Aivaliiyana-irauta-siltra, 394
Anandabodhendra Sarasvati, 23 I Asvini, 432
Ananda-dzpa, 57 n. A~a<;lhavarman, 428
.Ananda-dlpa-tzkii, 57 n. .Ataizka-dlpana, 434
Anandagiri, 43 n., 83, 103, I24, I92, iitiviihika iar'ira, 305
- I93. 344 Atma-bodha, 79, 81
Anandajfi.ana, In., 43, 49-51, 78-81, .Atma-bodha-vyiikhyiina, 81 n., I03
92, 100, II6, II9, I24, I72, I89, iitma-dharmopaciira!z, 2I n.
192, 194, I96, 205, 210, 439; con·· iitma-jiinlndriyii1Ji, 310
tents of his work Tarka-sar,zgraha, .Atma-jiiiinopadeia, 78
193, 194; his criticism of Nyaya- .Atma-jiiiinopadda-tzkii, 193
Vaise~ika categories, I93, 194; his iitma-khyiiti, 87 n.
interpretation of the indescribable- iitma-miina, 24
ness of world-appearance and ajiiii- iitman, 8. 2I, s8, I49. 194. 238, 302,
na, I94, I95; his teachers, I92; his 307 1l. 5, 309, 3 IO, 405, 444, 445,
works, 193 472, 518
Ananda-laharf, 79 iitmanalz sar,zvid-rilpatva, 118, I48,
Ananda-lahari-tarl, 79 151
Ananda-mandiikini, 225 iitma-samaviiyl vi~aya-pralliiio jiiiinam,
AnandapGrJ!a, 52, 57, 83, 87 n., I03, I97
123, I26 n. iitma-sneha, 24
Anandatirtha, 442 Atmasukha, 232
s6o Index
Atmasvarupa, 52 n. ance of do~as according to seasons,
iitma-saktyii, 330 335; divergent views on the develop-
iitma-vinigralza, 5 I 3 ment of the foetus referred to in
.Atmiiniitma-vi'L·eka, 79 Caraka-sa'l!lhitii, 307, 308; divergent
.Atmiirpm:za-stava, 219 views regarding viiyu as narrated in
iitmiisrayatva, 17 Caraka, 332 ff.; do~a as prakrti, 334;
iitmiivalokana, 442 dravya, rasa, mrya, vipiika, pra-
.Atmupadesa-·vidhi, 79 bhiiva, 362-366; early references to,
Atreya, 277, 308, 310, 327, 333, 395, 276, 277; epidemics caused by col-
424 lective evil effects, 408 ff.; equili-
.Atreya bhik~u, 395 brium of dhiitus, 327; ethical posi-
Atreya-Caraka, 284, 293, 295 tion of Caraka, 418; fallacies, 380 ff.;
Atreya-Caraka school, 289 foetal development in Susruta and
Atreya Gautama, 394 Caraka, its different stages, 313 ff.;
Atreya Punarvasu, 276 n., 357, 432 formation of foetus in Caraka, Sus-
iivarm:za, 22, 73 ruta and Vagbhata, 302-304; free-
iivarm:za-sakti, 74 dom of will in, 4I I; Ayur-veda,
iivarm.zatviit, I97 function of dhamanis in, according to
iivartta, 35I Sl!Sruta, 350 ff.; function of the dif-
iiyatana, 395, 498 ferent ducts, 347 ff.; future life, be-
iiyiima, 348 11. lief in, 406; good, conception of,
Ayur-veda, 258 n., 273-276, 278, 28o, 404, 405 ; good life and happy life,
28g, 293. 295. 320, 328 n., 354 n., 422,423; good life in Caraka, 418 ff.;
357, 365, 366, 37I, 372, 383, 385, good of the body and of the mind,
387, 389, 390, 392, 393. 395. 396, 4 I 8, 4 I 9 ; heart in the lJ pani!?ads
398, 399, 402, 422, 423, 436; an contrasted with, 344; heart the vital
upa·ceda of Atharva-Veda, 274; a centre of the prii1Jas in, 340; hetu-
part of Atharva- Veda, 278; aper- vidyii in Caraka, 395; inference in,
tures of the dhamanls in, 3 so; appli- compared with Nyaya and Sarp-
cation of inductive methods for the khya, 399,400; is beginningless,274;
discovery of cause in Caraka, 396 ff.; its relation with Atharva- Veda, 275;
are •viiyu, pitta and kaplza only its theory of dhiitu-siimya and dhiitu-
hypothetical entities? 336 ff.; as a va#amya, 319 ff.; its unbroken tradi-
science of life, 277; a separate Veda tion, 274; jiiti fallacy, conception
superior to the other Vedas, 274,275; of, compared with Nyaya, 380-382;
a vedii1iga, 274; brain the centre of yukti,misrepresentation by Santarak-
manas in, according to Bhela, 340; ~ita, 376; yukti pramiiiJa of, 37 5;
brain the seat of sensations, 346; yukti pramii1Ja refuted by Santarak-
Caraka school closely associated with ~ita, 375, 376; life, its definition,
Atlwrva- Veda, 278, 279; Caraka's 367; literature, 422 ff., 435; manas
view of niicf"i, sirii, dhaman"i and and the senses, 367; manas, its
srotas as ducts, 346 ff.; categories theory, 366, 367; meaning of ojas in,
of Caraka and Vaise~ika, 369-372; 343 n.; medical discussions in, 378;
causes of things according to Sus- 1lii~/i, sirii and dhamanl as ducts in,
ruta, 372; circulation of dhiitu in 345, 346; natural place of viiyu, pitta
growth, 322, 323; cognitive cur- and kapha, 331, 336; nature of pitta,
rents in, 347; constructive and de- 330, 331; necessity of logical tricks
structive operations of viiyu, pitta in, 401. 402; number of sirii, srotas
and kapha, 339; control of body and dhamanl according to Susruta,
and mind, 419, 420; Drc;lhabala's 349; number of siriis in, according
distinction of siriis and dhamanls' to Susruta, 352; number of sniiyus
348 tl.; dhaman"is in relation to cog- in, according to Susruta, 352; origin
nition according to Susruta, 351 in the knowledge of hetu and linga,
ff.; dhiitu-mala in, 33 I ; different 395; origin of the world, Susruta on,
functions of viiyu, pitta and kapha, 410; param and aparam ojas in, 343;
337, 338; different kinds of ducts in, perception, obstruction of, 377; per-
347; dispute, methods of, 377 ff.; ception theory of, 373, 374; period
disputes, tenns of, 379 ff.; disturb- of life in, 402; possible existence of
Index
a pre-Caraka literature of it, 277; views of the different Upani~ads
prajfiiipariidha, according to Caraka, regarding the niiqzs contrasted with,
416, 417 ;pramiit;zas in, 373; priit.za in, 345; viiyu, pitta and kapha and their
263; principles of growth, 321, 322; operations in the building of the
psychological theories of perception body, 334 ff.; what is its nature?
of Bhela in, 341; psycho-physical 276
parallelism in, according to Caraka, Ayur-veda-dtpika, 274n. 2, 275 n., 302,
339; rasas, their number, 357-359; 431
rasas, their origin, 359, 360; rebirth, Ayur-veda-rasiiyana, 434
nature of, determined by past life, Ayur-veda-sutra, 436
406, 407; rebirth, proofs of, 407, iiyu~o 'nuvrtti-pratyaya-bhrlta, 333
408; relation of head and heart in, iiyu~yiit;zi, 295
343; right conduct, rules of, ac-
cording to Caraka, 420 ff.; sm_nyogi- Backbite, 510
pur~a, its conception, 368; saiicaya Backbone, 286
and prakopa of do~as, 335; scheme Bad, 246; deeds, 411
of life in Caraka, 415; seat of prii~za Badness, 507
according to Caraka, 342 ; secretory Ba<;lisa, 3 I6, 357
character of •m1yu, pitta and kaplw, bae~aza, 295 n. 1
338; self and the body, 368; self bae~azya, 295 n. I
and knowledge, 368; self and manas, bahu-sruta, 8 5
369; self and the transcendent self Balabhadra Bhattacarya, 225 n.
(para~ztltmii), 368; self, in association Baladeva, 539
with manas, 373; self, nature of, ac- Baladeva Vidyabhii~al).a, 443
cording to Susruta, 410; sorrows, Balance, 326
cause of, according to Caraka, .ps, bali, 278
416; soul, conception of, 372; special Balkh, 357
categories in Caraka, 3~9; special bandha, 232, 234, 267
categories in Susruta, 389 tf.; springs Bandhaka-tantra, 435
of action and right conduct in, 405; bandlzanartz, 497
springs of action in Caraka com- bandho,497
pared with those of other systems, Barren woman, 234
411 ff.; substance and qualities, Basic concept of mind, 24
360-362; subtle body and self in Basic entity, 23 n.
Caraka, 310; Susruta and Sarpkhya, Basis, 11, 29; of truth, I I
372; Susruta's distinction of siras Battle, 505
and dhamanls, 348. ff.; Susruta's Battle-field, 522
views regarding brain as the seat of BadarayaQ.a, 45, 26o; his philosophy,
cognitive and conative nerves, 342; 42; his philosophy is some kind of
synonyms for srotas, 348 n.; the com- bhediibheda-viida or immanence in
bination of the do~as in different re- transcendence, 42
lations, 338; the organs in relation bt1dha, 222
to the ducts, 348; theory of dlziitus biidhakas tarkaft, 141
and upa-dhiitus, 3 22-3 24; theory of bti"hu, 285 n. 6, 338
do~a according to Susruta, 329, 330; Balabhadra, 55
theory of the formation of the body, Balagopala, 78
334; theory of karma in, compared Balagopala Yogindra, 78
with other theories of karma, 402- Balakr~Q.adasa, 78
404; theory of mala-dhiitus, 325 ff.; Biiliivatiira-tarka, 49
theory of prabhiiva, 323; three classes Balhika, 298 n. 4, 316
of inference in Caraka, 398, 399; BaQ.a, sso
transgressions (prajfiiipariidha) the Ba~pacandra, 428, 431
obstacle to good life, in Caraka, 421, Beard, 325
422; transmigration determined by Beginninglcss, 12, 195,217, 454; avid-
dharma and adharma, 4I I; ultimate yii, 48; contact, I 58; series, I 84;
healing in, 4I5; upiiizga of Atharva- time, 249
Veda, 273; validity of the Vedas Being, 10, 36, 46, 148, 203, 234, 238,
established through it, 279, 280; 50 I
Dll
Index
Being-non-being, 234 Bhiigavata-purii1Ja, 220, 532, 542
Denares, 429 Bhagavata- purii1JQ- prathama- sloka-
Bengal, 126, 225 n. vyiikhyii, 225
Besnagar, 539 Bhagavatism, sso
Bhadanta Yogasena, 184 bhiijana-loka-sannivesa-vijiiapti, 23
Bhadra, 284 Bhiiluki-tmztra, 435
Bhadrakapya, 316, 357 Bhiimatl, I I. 25 n., 29, 36, 52, s6,
Bhadrasaunaka, 427 82, 106-109, I I I , 171, 215 n., 220,
bhaga, :z8s n. 7 222 n., 269 11. 2, 427
bhagandara, 276 Bhiimati-tilaka, 52 n., 108
Bhagavad-bhakti-rasiiyana, 225 Bhiimati-viliisa, 108
Bhagavad-gltii, 79, 442 Bhiimatl-·vyiikhyii, xo8
Bhagavad-gitii-bhii$ya, 439 Bhanuji Dik~ita, 55
Bhagavad-gltii-bhii$ya-vivara~a, 439 Bhiinumatl, 362, 363 n., 425, 435
Bhagavad-gitii-bhii~ya-vyiikhyii, 439 Bhiiradviija-sa'!'lzitii, 43 1
Bhagavad-gltii-guljhiirtha-dlpikii, 225 Bharadvajiyas, 540
Bhagavad-gltii-hetu-nir~aya, 443 bhiira-hiira, 62
Bhagavad-gltii-lak$iibharm:za, 443 Bhiira-hiira-sutra, 61
Bhagavad-gltii-pradlpa, 443 Bharata legend, 552
Bhagavad-gltii-prakiiia, 443 bhiiratf sthiina, 355
Bhagavad-gltii-rahasya, 550, 551 n. 1 Bharati Tirtha, 52 n., 81, 216 n.
Bhagavad-gltiirtha-smJlgraha, 443 Bhargava, 431
Bhagavad-gitiirtha-SaT{lgraha-tlkii, 43 9 Bhasa, 394, 550
Bhagavad-gltiirtha-siira, 443 Bhasarvajna, 122
Bhagavad-gltii-siira, 443 Bhaskara, 43 n., 193, 201, 427, 4.28
Bhagavad-gUii-siira-Sa7J'lgraha, 443 Bhaskara Bhana, 435
Bhagavad-gUii-tiitparya-ni~aya, 442 Bhaskara Dik~ita, 56
Bhagavat, 539-542; and Vi~f.lu, 539, Bhasurananda, 79
540 Bhii1ii-pariccheda, 263 n. 1
bhagiisthi, 285 n. 7 Bhii1ya-bhava-prakiiiikii, 148 n.
bha#ajya, 293, 295 Bhiif)la-dlpikii, 1 OJ
bhakti, 226, 442, 439, 53 I, 53 2, 534 Bhii1ya-#ppana, 78
Bhakti-rasiiya11a, 226 BhiiDJiirtha-nyiiya-miilii, 81
bhaktir iidesyii, 278 Bhiitta-cintiima1Ji, 515
Bhakti-siimiinya-nirupatza, ~25 Bhau Sastri, 11 n.
blzakti-yoga, 440, 441, 451 bhiiva, 193, 412
Bhandarkar, R. G., 540, 543, 548 Bhiiva-dlpikii, 443
Bharadvaja, 229, 308, 395, 399 bhiiva-miitra, 1 9
Bharata, 427 Bhavamisra, 435
Bhartrhari, 171 bhiivanii,235,48o-482
Bhartrprapanca, 1, 36, 43, 44, 1oo; bhiivanii-miitra-siim, 23 5
his philosophy of bhediibheda, 43 Bhiivanii-viveka, 87 11.
Bhattacarya Sivaprasad, 232 Bhiiva-prakiisa, 263, 288 n. 1, 433,
Bhattacharya, B., 20 n., 172 n. 435. 436
Bhatta Ananda, 264 Bhiiva-prakiisikii, 79
Bhana Kallata, 263 bhiiva-rupa, 105, 114
Bhatta Narahari, 425 Bhiiva-iuddhi, 87 n.
Bhatta Raghava, 122, 123 Bhiiva-tattva-prakiiiikii, 98, 148
Bhanoji Dik~ita, 54, 55, 217, 219 bhiivatva, 142
bhautiki, 334 Bhavaviveka, 164, x65
bhava, 498 bhiiviibhiivayor dvayor api paraspara-
Bhavabhuti, 1 1 1, 112 prati~eptitmakatviit, 142
Bhavadasa, 87 n. bhiiviidvaita, 85
BhavaniHha, 126 n. Bhiiviirtha-dipikii, 79
Bhavanisahaya, 434 Bhavivikta, 172
Bhavya, 164 bheda, 92, 116, 218, 401 n.
Bhagavata, 251, 544-547, 552; and the Bheda-dhikkiira, 51, 54, 55, 216,
ekiintins, 545; sect, 545 ff. 218
Index
Bheda-dhikkiira-satkriyii, 51, 55 Bloomfield, 276 n., 295
Bheda-dhikkiira-satkriyojjvalii, 51 Blue, 13, 19, 26, 27, 29, 3o-32, 71,
bhediibheda, 44, 46, 201, 20z; earliest 117, 176, 330, 344; 349; awareness,
references to, 43 ; philosophy of 70,71
Bhartrprapafica, 43 Boastfulness, 373
bhediibheda-viida, 42, 43 Bodha-siira, 57
Bhela, 285 n.6, 340,341, 395, 432; Bodha-vidhi, 79
his psycho-physiological theories, bodhiitmaka, 26 5
340 ff. Bodhayana, 43, 251
Bhela-sm_nhitii, 432 Bodhiiyana-Grhya-ie1a-si"itra, 5 so
bhe~aja, 275, 295, 370 Bodhiiyana-Pitr-medha-sUtra, sso
Bhe~aja-kalpa, 432, 436 Bodhendra, 79
bhe~ajiini, 281 Bodhi-caryii·vatiira-panjikii, 4 n., 501
bhi~u, sos Bodhisattva, 513
Bhi!jma, 543 Bodiless emancipation, 252
bhoga-gandham p( rityajet, 267 Bodily, soo; exercises, 419
Bhoja, 324 n., 427, 428, 435 Body, 248, 261, 320, 325, 327, 331,
Bhoja-tantra, 435 340, 352, 365, 387, 447, 469, 498,
bhoktr, 244 501
Bhrama-ghna, 432 Body-building, 338
bhriijaka, 303, 330, 351 Bolling, 289, 299, 301 n. 2
bhruvor madhye, 449 n. 2 Bond,497
bhrnga-riija, 297 Bondage, 174,181, I87,204,232,24h,
Bhusur:t<_la, 257 252,267,415,470,488,497.520
Bhuval;z, 76 Bone, 278, 279, 317, 324, 348, 352;
Bhuvanasundara Suri, 120, 123 channels, 348
Bhal;z, 76 Bony materials, 347
bhami, 292 n. "Bower Manuscripts," 435
bhiUa, 261, 282, 302 n. 2, 314 n., 315, brahma-bhata, 474, 475
319, 33~. 371 brahma-bhuya, 474
bhma-hitatva, 505 brahma-caitanya, 77
bhzlta-prakrti, 197 br!lhma-cakra, 353 n.
bhuta-su~mail;z, 311 brahma-carya, 505
bhtita-vidyii, 276, 425 Brahmacarin, 282, 449, sos
bhiUa-vikiira, 358 n. Brahmadatta, 99
bhtitiitman, 303, 304, 415 Brahmadeva,427,428
bhtitefU dayii, 510 Brahmagraha, 300
Bibliotheca Indica, 344 n. Brahmahood, 37.SS,8I,92,4S0,475,
Bile, 276,317,325 477. 513
Bilious fever, 298 Brahma-jiila-sutta, 394
Billows, 329 Brahma-knowledge, 43, 47, 56, 8s,
Binding, 497 87, 100, 115, 203, 204, 223, 227,
Biomotor, 261, 515: forces, 75, 259, 252
262; functions, 104 Brahman, 1,2,8, 10, 11,16,28,36-39,
Birth, 498, 512, 519 4I,42,45-48,SI,7 3 ,8o,84,88, 9 o,
Bitter, 242, 337 n., 357, 359 96, 99-102, I04-I06, 110, I 12-I IS,
bzja, 235 118, IZ6, 128, 156, 163, 168, 170,
bljiiilkuravat, 257 1~0, 191, 195. 196, 202, 203, 205,
Blackness, 238 215, 217, 221, 222, 234. 236-238,
Bladder, 289, 290, 336, 348, 351 240, 243-245. 265, 271, 275. 340,
Blame, 512 386, 437. 439. 440, 448, 450, 454.
Blind, 309 473-476, 485, 486, 494. 495. 514,
Biindness, 333, 342 523. 524, 530, 533, 534. 538, 548;
Bliss, 46, 450, 504; of mind. 513 nature of causality, 10, 11
Blissfulness, 223 Brahma na jagat-kiira1Jam, 84
Blood, 282, 298, 304, 307, 313, 317, Brahmanandin, 43 11.
318, 322-324, 329-331, 335, 347, brahma-nii¢i, 354, 356
349, 352, 361, 372; currents, 348 brahman-consciousness, 77
Index
Brahma-nirvii1Ja, 474 Breathing forth, 259
Brahma1Jo mukhe, 4 74 Breath-regulation, 256
Brahma-pari1Jiima-viida, 43 Breeding, 505
Brahma-prakiisikii, 49, 82 n. Broken, 337, 338
brahma-randhra, 353 n., 356 Bronchi, 286 n. 2
Brahma-riik~asa, 282 Bronchial tubes, 289 n. 3
Brahma-siddhi, 83, 84, 86-88, 92, 93, Bronchitis, 386
95, 98, 106, II7, 110 n., 112, I78, Brow, 287
I98, 199 Brhad-iira1Jyaka-bhii~ya-tlkii, I93
Brahma-siddhi-!lkii, 45, 83 Brhad-iira1Jyaka-bhii$ya-viirttika- fikii,
Brahma-siddhi-vyiikhyii-ratna, 83 I93
Brahma-stuti, I48 n. Brhad-iira1Jyaka Upani$ad, I, 73, 78,
Brahma-sutra, 2, 5, 6, 8, 25, 28, 29, 83, 25I, 259 n. 3, 26o, 288 n. I, 344, ,.
43 n., 46, 56, 82, 92, IOJ, I08 n., 345.39I, 394
I48 n., I89, I96, 204, 205, 2I8, 220, Brhad-iira1Jyakopani~ad-bhii~ya, 48, 78
246 n., 250 n., 25I, 39I, 495, 549; Brhad-iira1Jyakopani~ad-bhii~ya-viirt ti-
discussion as to whether it pro- ka,78,98
fesses pure monism or bhediibheda, Brhad-yoga-viis#tluz, 232
44 ff.; does not support Sankara's Brhal-laghu-paiijikii, 428
philosophy, 2 Brhaspati-smrti, 25I
Brahma-siitra-bhii~ya, 30, So, 81, budbuda, 3 12 n. 3
I48 n. Buddha, 22 n., 6I, 276, 424, 459, 498,
Bralzma-sfitra-bhii$ya-vyiikhyii, 82 n. 520
Brahma - sfitra - bhii~yiirtha - sa1Jlgraha, Buddhadeva, 17I
82 n. Buddhagho!?a, I64
Brahma-siitra-dtpikii, 82 Buddhapalita, 164, 165
Brahma-sfitra-·vrtti, 82 Buddhas, 3
Brahma-sutro-pmzyiisa, 82 n. Buddhi, 75, 76, I04, 109, I79-I8I, 238,
Brahma-tattv:a-prakiisikii, 82 n. 239, 245, 262, 305, 34I, 344, 347 n.,
Brahma-tatl"l:a-samlk~ii, I2 369, 373. 386, 387, 458, 463, 464,
Brahma-tattva-saytlhitoddipanl, 45 n. 484 n. I, 524
Brahma-vaivarta, 274, 432, 433 n. Buddhism, 58, 117, 228,450 n. I, 459,
Brahmavada, 283 46I, 495, 498, 504, 52 I; analysis of
Brahma- Veda, 280 n. recognition, 65; and Vedanta on the
brahma-·viciira, 56 notion of self-consciousness and re-
Brahma-vidyii/JhaTa1Ja, 56, 82 n. cognition of identity, 33 ff.; avidyii in,
brahma-v:ihiira, 460, 50I and in Gitii, 498-500; criticisms of the
Brahmavijiiana, 54 concept of God of Nyaya and Yoga,
brahma-yajiia, 487 176-I78; criticism of the Sarp.khya
Brahma, 197, 229, 245, 274, 423, 5I9, pari1Jiima doctrine, I7I ff.; develop-
539, 546 ment of the foetus in the Siili-stam-
Brahmananda Giri, 443 ba·-sutra, 307; ideal life of Mahayana,
Brahmananda Sarasvati, 54, 57 n., 77 n., 50 I; its arguments against the self
79, 81, 82, 251 n., 252 n. as individual entity, 58 ff.; its at-
Brahmiinanda-viliisa, 57 n. tempt to interpret self-identity by
Brahmananda Yati, 82 the assumption of two separate con-
Brahmin Sutik!?Qa, 230 cepts, 68; its criticism of Nyaya-
Brahmopani$al, 25I Vaise!1ika categories, I87 ff.; its criti-
Braiu, 340, 353 n., 356 cism of the V edantic identity of self
Bravery, 502 as shown in memory, 66; its doctrine
BrahmaQas, 292, 295 n. I, 30I, 420 of momentariness and artha-kriyii-
Brahmins,228,469,488,498,5o2,504, kiiritii, I82 ff.; its idealism com-
505-507, 5I2, 5I3, 539 pared with that of Sankara and Yoga-
Breast, 286 viis#tha, 268 ff.; its refutation of
Breath, 259 criticism of the non-permanency of
Breath-control, 268, 444, 447, 448, entities by heretical thinkers, I85 ff.;
455 refutation of the soul theory of
Breathing activity, 7 5 various systems of Indian thought in,
Index
178-181; sz/a in, 500, 501; statUS of ca~ur-vaise#ka, 341
the object in, 35; the Vatsiputriyas cala, 332, 338
doctrine of soul, 59 ff.; Vasubandhu's Caland, W., 345 n.
refutation of the soul theory of the Calcutta University, 2 n.
Vatsiputriyas in, s8 ff.; views, list Camphor, 91
of, in, 496 ff. Canals, 352
Buddhist arguments, 176, 188 Canda, 539
Buddhistic, 119, 151, 170, 395, 521, Candracandana,434
551 Candragomin, 49
Buddhistic idealism, 2, 3, 22 11., 25-27, Candrakirti, 3, 51, 164-168, 171, 307;
29. 30, 35, 205, 270, 398; its ex- and Diimaga, 167
planation of the apparent duality of candramii~z, 292 n.
object and awareness, and the diver- Candrikii, 98, 99, 192, 232
sity of objects, 26; its theory that Canvas, 199
things simultaneous are identical, Ca1Jcfiila, 512
26 n.; that all ideas are due to Car:t<;lesvara Varman, 78
viisaniis, 26 Capacity, 40
Buddhistic nihilism, 2, 3 Caraka, 263, 274, 275, 279, 285 n.,
Buddhist Legends, 248 n. 286 n., 287 n., 292, 301, 302, 304,
Buddhist logicians, 166, 170 307, 312, 314-316, 322 11., 327, 329,
Buddhists, 5, 9, 31, 32, 33, 6s, 67, 332, 334-336, 339. 340, 342, 343.
68, 71, 96, 108, 113, 115, 118, 124, 346, 348, 349, 352, 355-357, 359 n.,
125, 136, 171, 172, 186-189, 269, 360 n., 363-366, 368, 369, 371, 372,
367, 375. 399. 412, 415, 433. 435. 375, 376, 378-380, 38z, 383. 384 n.,
496, 499-SOI, SII, 514, 517, 521; 386 n., 388, 389, 393, 395-397, 399,
deny any being as the ground 400, 401-409, 41I, 415, 417-423,
of world-appearance which is like 427-429, 431-435. 471-473. 475
dreams, 5; their quarrel with Caraka-candrikii, 431
the V edantins regarding the nature Caralw-paiijikii, 43 1
of existence as causal efficiency, Caraka-parisi~Ja, 429
32 Caraka-sm!Lhitii, 273 11., 277, 278, 291,
Buddhist subjective idealists, 211 3021l., 308n., 31011., 31311.,314,
Buddhist writers, 51, 171 315 n., 318 n., 319 n., 323 n., 324,
buddhitviikalanm.n, 236 326 n., 327 n., 33 1, 332 n., 334 n.,
buddhi-vaise#ka, 342 335 n., 336 11., 339 n., 340, 342 n.,
buddhi-vibhra1Jlsa, 416 347, 348 n., 360, 361 n., 363, 366 n.,
buddhi-yoga, 444, 451, 452 367 n., 369, 370 n., 371, 373 n.
buddhy-adhi~thiina, 3 1 6 374 n., 375 n., 376 n., 377, 386 n.,
Bulletin de l'Acadbnie des Sciences de 392, 393, 395, 396 n., 397-4-02, 41 I,
Russie, 59 n., 61 n., 62 n. 416, 422, 426, 427, 429, 47 I, 472,
Burlingame, E. W., 248 473 n., 477
Burning, Q7, 335 n. Caraka-tattva-pradlpikii, 43 1
Buhler, G., sso Caraka-tiitparya-tzkii, 310 n., 431
Cardiac plexus, 355
caitanya, 207 Caritrasirpha, I 26 n.
Caitraratha Forest, 357 caritta, soo
cakra, 355, 455 Cartilages, 286 n., 322
cakra-bhramivad-dhrta-sarlral;, 250 Caste, 501, 503, 505
Cakradatta, 426, 43 I Caste-duty, 486, 487, soz-sos, 507,
Cakrapar:tidatta, 275, 276 n., 277, 302 so8, 5I3, 514
n., 303 n., 304, 308, 310, 312 n., Categorical imperative, 493
313 n., 314, 315, 318, 319 n., 322 n., Category, 12, 15, 24, 146, 147, 157,
323, 324 n., 327 n., 332 n., 335. 163, I70, 187, 191, 237, 366, 369,
338 n., 339 n., 340, 343, 347, 348 n., 372, 389
349· 360 n., 361 n., 362-37 I, 373- Cattle, 301
376, 380 n., 384 n., 395, 396, 405 n., Cattle-shed, 509
406 n., 415 n., 425-428, 430-435 catur-m;uka, 189, 190
Cakra system, 454 Catur-mata-siira-sa1JZgraha, 219
566 Index
cauryiibhiiva, 505 Changing, 189; assoctatwn, 63; con-
Causal, 176, 521; agent, 74, 177; ap- tents, 15; materiality, 51; objects,
paratus, 182; complexes, 4; effi- 33; states, 33
ciency, 32, 95, 136, 137, 185; forces, Channel, 291, 324, 344, 347
174; moment, 185; nature, 184; Character, 15, 18, 27 n., 132, 187,
operation, 25,41, 144, 173, 175, 186, J88
517; state, 37; substance, 172; trans- Character-appearance, 13
formation, 44, 172 Characteristic, 4, 6, 18, 38, 162, 176,
Causality, 31 n., 148, 172, 186, 221, 182,199,200,228,233,25I,37I,512
396; of Brahman, 106; of the world Characterized appearances, 22 n., 23;
due jointly to Brahman and Maya entities, 22
according to Padiirtha-tattva, 10 Characterless entity, 271
Causation, 164, 168 Chariot, 229
Cause, 3, II, 22 n., 38-40, 95, 144, Charm,28o,281,293-299, 301; system,
145, 152, 160, 161, 166, 183, 186, 294
18~. 1<)0, 191, 195. 203, 215, 337. Chandogya, 78, 246, 250 n., 259 n.,
366, 372, 374. 375. 389, 396-3<)8, 260, 276 n., 345, 346, 520
516, 517; and effect, 191; of atoms, Chandugya-bhii~}'a-{ikii, 193
187; of the world, 37; unknown, Chiindog)'a Upan#ad,43 n., 333,344 n.,
360 345 n., 498, 521, 544, 548 n.
Cause-effect, 375, 376 Chiindogya-Upani~ad-viirttika, 43 n.
Causeless, 161, 187 Chayii-vyiikhya, 262
Cavity, 352 chedana, 358
caya, 335 chedanrya, 3 57
caya-kiira'f}a-vidve~a, 335 n. Cheeks, 326 n.
ciigiitzussati, 459 Chemical changes, 3 I-;
CaraJ:ta-vaidya, 283, 284 Chemistry. 357
Carvaka, 387, 402 Chest, 336
Central Asia, 435 chidra-malas, 326 n.
Central ~eat, 357 Chimerical, 13 1
Centres, 16 Chintamani, T. R., 196
Cerebral region, 353, 354 Cholera, 282
Cerebrum, 353 n., 356, 357 Christianity, 550
Ceremonies, 468 Church Street, 14
Cervical plexus, 353 Chyle, 317, 322-324, 328, 330, 331,
Cessation, 21, 234, 242; from work, 348, 349
507; of desires, 444; of work, so8 cic-chiiyiipatti, 89 n.
cena, 327, 472 Cid-ananda-dasaslok1, 79
ce~titam, 371 Cid-iinanda--stava-raja, 79
cetanii, 23, 36, 302, 316, 360 n., 368, cid-iitman, 112
471, 477. 500 cikit5a, 278, 288 n., 392, 430
cetanii-dhiitu, 472 Cikitsii-dariana, 432
cetanii-pratisandhiitii, 366 Cikitsa-kaumudl, 432
cetanii'l-'antal.z, 410 Cikitsii-siira-tantra, 432
cetas, 254, 366 Cikitsii-sthiina, 429
cetasika, 500 Cikitsa-tattva-·l.'ijnana, 43 2
ceto-vimutti, 460 cikitsitam, 276
cetya-sa'!lyoga-cetaniit, 236 cikrr~ii, 5 15
cetyatva, 236 cin-miitra-sambandhinl, 197
Ceylonese, 164 cin-miitriiirita-vi~ayam ajnanam, 85
chadmanii, 478 Cinnabomma, 219
chala, 385, 386 n., 401 cintya, 343
Chandal.z-prasasti, I 26 cira-jiigara, 267
Chandas, 24, 275 n., 496, 547 ciraj-jagrat-sthita, 266
Change, 45 Circular bone, 284 n. 4
Changeable, 16, 221 Circulation, 323
Changeful, 241 Circulatory system, 323
Changeless, II, 13, 240; being, 51 Circumstance, 233
Index
cit, 89, 89 n., 235, 243, 244, 271 Cognitional existence, 58
citra-bhitti, 104 Cognitive activities, 256
Citra-mlmii1f1Sii, 220 Cognitive functions, 256
citri7Jz, 353, 356 Cognitive nerves, 342
citri7Jl niidJ, 354, 356 Cognitive operation, 211
Citsukha, 49-SI, 53. s8, 8J, 86, 8711., Cognitive process, 206
92, u6, 119, 124, 138, 147, 148, 149 Cognitive relation, 213
n., 150 n., 152, 154, 156, 157, r6o- Cognitive senses, 76, soo
I63, 171, 172, 192, 194, 198, 217, Cognitive states, 151, 250, 251
218, 222 n.; awareness of aware- Cognized object, 19, 22
ness impossible, 1so, 15 1 ; his analy- Cognizer, 19, 22, 23, 351
sis of illusion, 155; his criticism of Cognizing, 15; activity, 104, 149;
the atomic theory, 157, I 58; his faculty, 1 8o
criticism of "cause" (kiira7Ja), 160 Coherence, 15
ff.; his criticism of Nyaya categories, Cola country, 148 n.
156; his date and works, 148; his Cold, 242, 301, 320, 321, 332, 337 n.,
definition of self-revealing con- 357, 358, 360, 361, 362 n., 365, 408,
sciousness, 148-1 so; his quarrel 419, 500, 510, 51 I
with Prabhakara on the subject of Colic, 346; pain, 298
illusion, 154 ff.; his refutation of Collar bone, 286 n., 287
the category of time, 156, 157; his Collocating, 138, 160; conditions,
refutation of class-concepts (jiiti), 161
r6o; his refutation of drat•ya, 161, Collocation, 168, 174, 187, 516; of
I 6.z; his refutation of numbers, 158; causes, 161, 472, 473; of things,
his refutation of qualities (gu7Ja), 161
162, 163; his refutation of space, Collyrium, 238
157 ; his treatment of the falsehood Colour, 24, 6o, 181, 186, 188, 191, 194,
of the world-appearance, 152, 153; 199. 289, 327, 330, 355. 360, 367,
his treatment of nescience (ajiiiina), 377; cognition, 180; particles, 25 n.
153 ; main content of his Tattva- Colouredness, 374
pradlpikii, 148 n.; nature of self, 151, Colouring pitta, 326 n.
152 Combination, 189, 360
Citsukha Aciirya, his refutation of the Combinations of atoms, 20
Nyaya definition of perception, 138 Command, 48
cit-svarupiif.z, 411 Commentary, 27 n., 29, 38, 43, 52, 54,
citta, 75, 234, 238, 239, 243, 250, 256, 99, 102, 103, 107, ro8, 196, 219,
258,265,292,305, J06, 341 232, 354 1l.
citta-camatkiira, 236 Commentator, 51, 164
citta-·vimukti, 265 Common duty, sos-so7
citta-vrtti, 264 Common good, so6
cittina!z, 292 n. 5 Common self, 181
Opudru, 299 n. 2 Commonsense, 3; view, 2, so8
Class-concept, 40, ro8, 131, 132, 139, Common well-being, so6
148, 159, 162, 163, 187, 188, 194, Communion, 451, 457-459, 466, 467,
371 470,490,492, sor, SOJ, 504, SJO
Class-duties, 486 Community, so6
Class-nature, 188, 189 Compact, 337 n.
Clavicle, 286 n. 2 Compassion, 511
Cleanliness, 505 Compendium, 214
~tinging .,497 Compilation, 49
Closed, 3 Compilers, 53
Cloth, 189 Complex, 4, 25, 65, 215; quality, 17,
Clouds, 205 18
Coarse, 337 n. Compounding, 370
Coccyx, 285 n., 287 n. Conative senses, 75
Cognition, 18-21, 23, 70, 136, 149, Conceit, 373, 409, 510
153, 18o, 188, 214, 239, 243, 274 Conceive, 254
Cognitional character, 29 Concentration, 460, soo, 504
s68 Index
Concept, 234; of contact, 158 Continuous, 241; appearance, 25 n.;
Conception, 236, 247, 524 perception, 213
Conception of Buddhist Nirvii7Ja, The, Contradiction, 110, 137, 147
164 n., 166 n. Contrary, 17
Concepts of duality, 193 Control, 256, 419; of anger, 505, 510;
Conceptual, :;-.36; activity, 236; crea- of mind, 505, 510
tion, 237, 243, 244 Controller, 215
Conch-sheJl, 6, 101, 114, 134-137. Controversy, 125
155 Cooking, 97, 188, 331
Conclusion, 163, 173, 373, 376-378, Co-operant, 184
383, 387 Co-operation, 11, 326
Concomitance, 19, 121, 140, 141, 194, Cordier, Dr P., 425 n., 427,429
374, 388 n., 397 Co-religionists, 501
Concrete, 25, 235 n.; duration, 212; Coronation ceremony, 282
individual, 239; state, 236 Corporeal, 51 2
Conditional, 142 Correspondence, 134
Conditionality of relations, 142 Cosmic universe, 524
Conditioning knowledge, 18 Cosmic world, 526
Conditions, 16, 182, 184 Costal cartilages, 286 n. 1
Conduct, soo, 503 Cotyloid cavity, 287 n.
Conformations, 498 Cough, 296, 298, 300 n.
Congenital viita, 337 Country, 370
Conglomeration, 164, 166 Courage, 328, 333
Conjeeveram, 98 Course, 519
Conjunction, 40 Covetous, 498, 498 n.
Connection, 355 Covetousness, 497, 498
Connotation, 475 Cow, 159, 420, 509, 512
Conscious, 15, 371; centre, 16; mo- Cranial bones, 287 n.
ments, 62; states, 13, 187 Cranium, 287
Consciousness, 14, 18, 28, 30, 33, 35, Craving, 504
6:z-6s, 69, 71, 72, 148, 149, 153, Creation, 72, 178, 234, 235, 242
164, 199, 201, 2os-2o7, 209, 210, Creationism, 1
213, 215, 222, 234, 271, 310, 314, Creative power, 74
318, 360, 366, 368, 369, 387, 406, Creative thought movement, 235 n.
471, 477, 498, 532; of relationing, Creator, 2, 39, 41, 176, 177
33; pure, 22 Creed, 501
Consequence, 183 Critical thinking, 264
Conservation of energy, 5 17 Criticism, 35, 146, 156, 165, 166, 171,
Constant, 63 192, 204, 388; of qualities, 194
Constituent, 17, 18, 74, 322, 371, 525; Cruelty, 373, 409, 510
elements, 59, 304 Cupidity, 497
Constitution, 334 Curatives, 280
Constitutional, 335 Curator, 205
Constitutive stuff, 48 Curd, 40
Constructive, 331 ; instincts, 23; prin- Cures, 280
ciples, 333; tendencies, 24 Currents of sensation, 340
Consumption, 298, 386 Cursing, 282
Contact, 190,194,360,373,374,381 n.; Customary morality, 504, 523
of atoms, 190 Customs, 127, 489, 503
Contact-points, 188 Cyavana, 432
Container, 22, 144 Cycle, 526
Contemporary, so
Contentless, 182 dahana, 333
Contentment,490,492, 501,503 dahariidhikara7Ja, 205 n.
Content of recognition, 66 daiva, 253-255, 310, 407, 4o8, 472,
Contiguity, 367 515
Continuity, 15, 21; of consciousness, daiva yajiia, 487
18o dai'Vi sampat, 510
Index
dak#1J.ii, 292, 544 507-5I I, 516, 519, 520, 522, 529;
dak#1J.iiyana, 519 bonds of, 268; for life, 405
dama, 495, 505 Desirelessness, 228, 490
Damsel, 229 Desisting, 500
Dancing, 498 n. Destiny, 253, 354, 360, 370, 404, 526
dantolukhala, 287 n. 4 Destroyed cause, I86 n.
darsana, 455 Destructibility, 386 n.
dasa-kusala-kamma, 498 Destructible, 197, 5I2
Dasgupta, S. N., 17, 449 n. 1, 501 11. Destruction, 182, 235, 238; of the
Dasarathapriya, 99 atoms, 191; of citta, 268; of mind,
Dasa-sloki-mahii-vidyii-sfitra, 120 448
Dasa-slokl, 79 Destructive, 33 I; play, 178
Data of experience, 157 deia, 358, 389
Dattatreya, 443 desa-kiila-kri'yii-dravyail.z, 240
Datum of perception, 212 Detached, 452
Days, 156 Detachment, 475
dii~ya, 505 11. Determinant of causality, 186
diina, 505 n., 544 Determinate, 23 ; perception, 97;
Darila, 284, 293 thought, 25
Darila Bhatta, 27 5 Determination, 23 n., 55, 75, 186
diiru'f}a, 332 11. Determine, 23
Death, 248, 299, 336, 498, 501, 512, deva, 3 LJ.
523, 526 Devadatta, 62, 7 5
Deathless, 518, 526 Devagiri, 123
Debate, 377 Devaki, 544
Decay, 498 Devaki-putra, 544
Deccan, Early History of the, 540 Devarama Bhatta, 8I
n. 1 devatii, 43
Decisions, 24, 373, 384 deva-yii11a, 5I9, 521
Decoction, 390 n. Devadada, 283
Deeds, 242, 248 Devendra, 55
Deep sleep, 232 Devesvara, 1 I I
Defeat, 512 Devotee, 532
Defects, 38, 214 Devotion, 439-.HI, 503, 52j, 531,534,
Deficiency, 3I9, 326, 335 547; to Vedic gods, 505
Definition, I27, I36, 143, 145, I59- dhai'rya, 264, 505
I6I, I92 ;of cause, I86 ;of perception, dhamani'(i), 289, 290, 343, 344 n., 346-
137 350, 351 n., 352, 355; its pre-Cara-
deha, 446 11. 3 kian senses discussed, 345, 346
deha-sambhava-hetavab, 330 Dhamma-pada, 248, 489, 490, 493
Dejection, 230 dha11ai~a1J.ii, 405
Delirium, 298, 333 Dhanai1_iaya, 7 5
Deliverance, 267 dhanur-iikiire, 35~
Delivery, 290 n. 3 Dhanur-veda, 274
Delusion, I70, 245, 499, 500, SIO Dhanvantari, 316, 424, 425, 432, 433
Demerit, 249, 409, 4I6 dharma, 21, 22 n., I3I, 199, 327, 4ID-
Demons, 230, 295, 300, 468, 47S, 412, 4I6, 4I9, 479. 483, 484, 486-
535 488,494.503,525,538
Denotation of words, I87 Dlwrma-dlzarmi-'l:iniicaya, 49
Denunciation, 512 dharma-kiiya, 22 n.
Denutritive, 357, 358 Dhannakirti, I37, I7I
Dependence, 10, 529 dharma-ll~etra, 502
Dependent on being, 36 dharma-meglw, 25 I
Desirable, 5 I 2 Dharma-mimii1!lSii-pari'bhii~ii, 220
Desire, 24, 91, 178, 179, 252, 264, Dharmaraja Adhvarindra, 52 n., 53, 54,
324, 360, 370, 373, 375, 409, 41 I, 89 n., 105, I98 n., 208, 212, 2I4, 217
412, 422, 442, 450, 45I, 453. 477, dharma-saTJzketa, I85
484, 488, 495. 498, 501, 503, 504, dharma-siistra, 547
57° Index
dharma-sraddhii, 505 Digits, 285
Dhannatrata, 171 Dihaka, 426
dharma-viciira, 56 dik, 157
Dhannaya Dik~ita, 220 Dinakarl, 264 11.
dharmya,514 Diimaga, 26 n., 27 n., 30, 35, 167, 171;
dhii11ya,317 and Candrakirti, 167
dhiira~a, 328,342,454,455 Direct cognition, 32
dhiirin, 343, 368 n. Direct perception, 374
dhiitu, 22 n., 276, 304, 307, 317, 319, Disciplinary measure, so 1
320, 324-329, 331-333, 343, 347, Discipline, 514
349, 389 Discoveries, 280
dhiitu-mala, 331, 332 Discrimination, 23, 24, 250
dhiitu-rasa, 323 n. Discriminative knowledge, 250, 251,
dhiitu-rupa-rasa, 322 305
dhiitu-siimyam, 327 n. Discussion, 99, 129, 377, 378, 392
dhiitu-vai~amya, 319, 320, 326, 328, Disease, 280, 301, 320, 327-332, 335
329, 339 n., 336 n., 337, 359, 366, 370, 372,
dhiitu-vyfi.hana, 3 I 5 376, 377, 384, 385, 390, 393, 397;
dhl, 328, 505 as modifications of do1as, 329; its
dhz-dhrti-smrti-·vibhra§ta, 416 causes, 320 ff.; its theory according
Dhruva, l\'lr, 400 n. to Sarpkhya and Nyaya, 328, 329 11.
dhruvo, 22 n. Diseases of the legs, 299
dhrti, 373, 470, 505 n., 510 Disgust, 501
dhrti-vibhra1Jlsa, 416 Disinclination, 244, 251, 504
dhilma-pii, 420 Disintegrating, 191, 265, 306
dltumo, 497 Disjunction, 360
dhyiina, 256,342,454,455 Disliking, 358
DIZJ'iilla-bindu, 455 Dispute, 377, 379
dhyii11a-yoga, 448, 458 Dissection, 288
Diabetes, 282, 296 Dissociation, 248, 268, 523
Diagnosis, 301 Dissolution, 37, 109, 177, 191, 194,
Dialectic, 118, 127, 170, 171, 225 tt.; 526; of ignorance, 85
criticism, 156; methods, 119; Na- Distance, 360
garjuna and Vedanta, 163; of Sari- Distasteful, 357
kara, 189; Srihar!1a and Nagarjuna, Distinct entities, 31
163 ff. Distinction, 14, 15, 401 n.
Dialectical, 51, 7 2, 146; arguments, Disturbance, 335
218; criticism, 92; subtleties, 192; Diverse, 367
thought, 147 Diversity, 26, 38, 39, 195, 357, 367;
Diarrhoea, 206, 299, 300 tt. 2 of contents, 14
Diet, 384 Divine equipment, 510
Difference, q., 17, 18, 26 n., 27, 30, Divodasa, 424, 432, 433 n. I
6 3 , 6 5 , 7 6, 88, 9 2, 95-97 , u6, 117, Didhiti, 126 n.
127, 13o-132, 148, 161, 199, 200, dik~ii, 292 n.
202, 209, 210, 370; numerical, 14; Dlpika, 78
of characters, 370; of identity, 370 Doctrine, 227,375, 501, 517, 520,521,
Difference- between - awareness -and- 525
object, 17 Dogs, 291, 512
Difference- of- awareness - from - the- Doing good to living beings, 505
object, 18 Dominant, 358
Different, 28, 64, 358, 359; classes, Dormant, 164
161; effects, 161; measure, 190 dofa,300,319 1 325,327,J28,332,334-
Differentiate, 143 337, 339. 341, 362, 366, 372, 383,
Differentiation, 23 n. 390,413, 497; according to Susruta,
Digestion, 303, 322, 323 n., 336, 361- 329,330
363, 365 n., 370 dofa-prakrti/:z, 334 n.
Digestive fire, 333 dotiibhiiva, 214
Digestive function, 328 Doubt, 141,148,377,383,500
Index 57 1
Dramic.lacarya, 43 dul;zkham, 22 n.
draif!, 88 dubkhiibhiive, 92 n.
drava, 359 n. Dullness, 303, 360, 373, 408
dravya, 187, 193, 359-363, 365, 369, duradhigamatii, 261
371,373 Duration, 156
Dravya-gu7Ja-sa7[lgraha, 364 Durgacarya, 535
dravya-prabhava, 359, 363 Durgagupta, 432
dra•vya-yajiia, 487 durniscaya, 255
dravyiitmakatii gu7Jasya, 191 Dur7_liimii, 300
Dream appearances, 203 Duryodhana, King, 502
Dream conceptions, 240 Dusty, 408
Dream construction, 21, 240 Dutt, Dr U. C., 429
Dream experience, 6, 8, 28, 241, 266 Duty, 373, 438, 439, 442, 444, 445,
Dream ideas, 26 457' 480, 484, 501, 505-508, 520-
Dream knowledge, 310, 355 523
Dreamless sleep, 53, IOI, 154, 215 dfl$ya, 328
Dream life, So Dvaidha-nir7Jaya-tantra, 432
Dream objects, 36 Dvaita, 57 n.
Dream perceptions, So dvaitiidvaita, 44
Dream persons, 266 Dvayii•vin, 300
Dream state, 195, 240 dviidasiinguli, 257
Dreams, 5, 19-21, 25, 26, 194, 269, Dvapara age, 410
270, 283 dviira, 47, II2
Drink, 330, 501 Dvaraka monastery, I 92
droha, 413 dve1a, 267, 370, 413, 414
Dropsy, 282 Dvivraniya, 430
Drought, 370 dvy-a7Juka, 189, 190, 193
Drugs, 277 Dyads, 189, 306
Drug system, 294 dyaub, 292 n.
Drupada, 541 Dying, 182 n.
Dry, 332, 357, 361, 408; country, 370 Dynamical, 234, 238
Dryness, 358, 360, 362 n., 365 Dynamic principle, 334
Drc.ihabala, 348 n., 359, 426, 429-431, l)alhal).a, 273, 277, 279, 286 n. 4, 302
433. 434 n. 2, 303, 313 n. 2., 314 n. 2, 329,
Drc.lhabala sarpskara, 434 330, 336 n., 349, 350, 351 n., 372,
drt/ha-hhiivanii, 256 411' 424-428, 435
V,g-drsya-prakara7Ja, 79
drk. 152, 199 Ear, 325, 326 n.
drk and drsya, zoo Earth, 74, 187, 302, 359, 360, 362,
drk-sthiti, 454 367, 501
drsab adrsyatviit, 199 Earthquake, 283
drsya, 88, 152, 199, 232 Earthy, 357, 359
drsyamiina, 369 Eating, 338, 501
dri!iinta, 194, 375, 378, 381 n., 383 Eclipses, 283
dnfii1lta-sama, 381 n. Ecstatic joy, 450, 453
dri!iinta-•l'imddha, 385 Effect,J, I2,38,39,4I, 145,161,174-
dntartha, 383 176, 183, 184, 186, 190, 329 n.,
dnti. 221 359 n., 360, 374. 396-398, 508, 517
Dri!i-snti. 17 n. Effective tones, 23
Driti-snti school, 16 Effectuation, 27 n.
dri#-sri#-viida, 52, 84, 364 Efficiency, x86, 327
Dual experience, 213 Effort, 248, 253, 254, 360, 369, 371,
Dualistic, 2; writers, 192 373
Duality, 95, IOI, 148, 221, 224, 226, Egg (born from), 309, 322
243 ; of subject and object, 88 Ego, 15, 77, 101, 102, 104, 179, 233,
Ducts, 344 n., 345, 346 235,266,369
dubkha,z17,311 Ego-feeler, 104
dul;zkha-sahiwutii, 419 Egoism, 24, 75, 360, 414, 510, 511
572 Index
Egoistic, 217, 511 Eschatological, 520
ejii, 496 Eschatology, 517
Ejective forces, 327 esse est percipi, 268, 272
elw-jl'l•a-viida, 82 fl. Essence,38,40,129,164,168,236,247.,
Eka-iloka, 78 358
eka-vidhir eva allyavyavacchedal;z, 94 Essenceless, 8,35, 169,233; products, 4
eluinta, 389, 391, 546 Essencelessness, 7, 35, 234
elu'inta-dharma, S45 Essentials, IS9
ekcinta-ha/ana~l, 23~ Established, I9
ekiintiu, S4S Eternal, 24, 63, 73, I21, 179, 18o, 188,
Ekanti-Vai!;'r:tavas, S4S 369, 372, 379, 38o; consciousness,
ekiirammana, 4S9 181; entities, 187; soul, 179; sub-
el<iirtha-kriyci-kiiritii, 184 stances, 161; thing, 191
ekiiyana, 548 n. 3 Eternality, 191, 386 n.
Element, 227, 302, 344, 3s8-36o, 369, Eternity of atoms, 187
372,408, SOI, SIS, SI6 Ether, 302
Elemental, 334; body, 303; world, 21S Ethereal, 3S7, 359
Elephant, s I 2 Ethical ideas, 496
Elevation, S32 Ethics, 500, 501, SI4
Eliminatory, I40 Ethics of Buddhism, The, 496 n. 2
Emanations, I, S24 Ethics of the Hindus, so6 n.
Emancipation, 92, 99, IOO, 115, 148, Ever-existent, I 8
J8I, 185, 204, 227, 229, 234, 242, Evil, 445, 497, 498; effects, 408
24S. 246, 248, 249. 2SI, 266, 383. Evolutes, I72
38s Evolution, 16, 24, 372, 410 n.
Emblic :\lyrobalan, 294 Excitants, 29
Embryology, 273 Excitation, I98
Emotional, 464 Excitement, 409, 4IO
Emotions, I49, 152, 153, 245, 411 Excreta, 317, 325, 327-330, 347, Jso-
Empirical, 366 352; channels, 348
Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, Exhalation, 2S8, 449, 4S9, 460
289 n. 4, 299, 301 n. 2 Existence, 26 n., 32, 183, 193, 243,
Endeavour, 2SS 498. Sl7; of the soul, 383
Endurance, 49S, so2, 505 n. Existent, I2, ISS, 194,234,239, 373;
Enemy, 29S, SOl, S09-SII, Sl4· entity, 232
Energy, 244, 327, 333, 373, SIO Existing entity, 181-183
Enjoyable, 464 Experience, 20, 22, 27, 33, 34, 44, 58,
Enjoycr, I8I, I86, s26 66, 68, 72, 7S, 84, 94, IOI, III, 129
Enjoyment, I8I, 229, 238, 246, 368, I38, 149. ISO, I67, I79. 187, 20J,
446.470, S09, S22 266, 270, 271, 280, 368, 404, 46S,
Enmity, 497 468,470,499
Entity, I2, xs, 20, 2I, 3I, 31 n., 68, Experimenting, 384
187, 233, 236 Expiating sins, 282
Entrails, 289 Expiation, 508
Envy, 497 Expiration, 259, 262
Epidemics, 408 External, 271; characteristics, 2I; kar-
Epistemological, 32, 89 n. ma, 238; object, 17, 18, 20, 21, 26,
Epistemologically, 36 27, ISI, 269, 270, 272, 282, 366;
Equanimity, 475, 477, soo, 501, 504, senses, 1s6, 344; sensibles, 22;
so8, SII, SI2, S30, S31; of mind, 511 world, 2S, 26, 26 n., 209, 211, 270
Equilibrium, 236, 237, 327, 329 n., Extinction, 249, 501
333. 3S8, 530 Extra-individual reality, 89 n.
Erroneous, 64; appearance, 6 5; im- Extra-mental, 24
positions, 2I Extreme, so8; idealists, 21
Error, 5, 417; of judgment, 416 Extremism, 504
Eruptions, 326 n. Eye, 32S, 326 n.
Erysipelatous inflammation, 299 Eyebrows, 342, 353 n., 355
esanii, esii, 496 Eye-diseases, 246, 298
Index 573
Fact, 236 Fluids, 302
Factor, 5I6 Foam, 329
Fainting, 498 Foe, 512
Faith, 24, 373, 494, sos, si2 Foetal development, 3 I8; according to
Fallacies, I7, I23, I94, 377, 378, 386, Atreya, 309, 3 IO; divergences of
387 view referred to, 3I6; in the Garbha
Fallacious argument, I75 Upani~ad, 3I2 11.; its processes in
False, 20, 27, 65, I29, I52, ISS, I78, Caraka and Susruta, 317 ff.
I82, 2I3, 217; appearance, 6, 25 n., Foetus, 290, 302, 303, 306-308, 3I4-
96,. 113, I 56, 233; association, I54; 3I7,322, 333,346,384,406,408
cognition, I36; creations, 7, 8; ex- Folklore, 295 n. I
perience, I02, I54, ISS; ignorance, Folk-notions, 295 n. I
4; knowledge, 8, 12, I55, 233, Folly,498
4I4; object, 1 I3; perception, 155, Food, 330,348,349,436, 50I
224; predications, 8; presentations, Food-juice, 308, 33I, 345, 347, 350-
155; relationing, I 54; show, 37, 352, 355
38 Foolishness, 415, 509, 522
Falsehood, I 54, 2 I 7, 498 n.; two mean- Force, 253
ings of, I05 Forehead, 354
Falsity, 152; of the world, 434 Forgiveness, 505, 510
Faridpur, 225 n. Forgiving nature, 505 n.
Fasting, 278, 497 Forgiving spirit, 510, 5II
Fat,3I7,3I8,322,324,325,336,347- Formalism, 119, I24, I25
349, 352, 36I; channel, 348 Formative, 4I5
Fatality, 404 Formless, 254
Fate, 404 Foundation, so6
Fatness, 333 Free-will, 252, 255
Faults of expression, I46 Friend, 510-512
Faulty answer, 384 Friendly, 378, 511
Faulty statement, 384 Friendship, 460, 497, 529, 534
Fear, 333, 492, 510 Frogs, I09
Feeble discrimination, 250 Fruition, 255; of actions, 472
Feeling, 23 n., 24, 7I, 178, I79, 263, Fruits, 333
341, 412, 414, 498; as indifference, Fruit-yielding actions, 246, 247
23 n.; of disgust, 461 Fuel, 249
Feeling-stuff, 4I4 Full-moon, 520
Fellow-being, 5 I I Function, 31, I79, 239, 366, 367, 525;
Fermen.ation, 336 n. of thought, 14
Fetter, 497 Fury, 497
Fever, 282,300,396,398
Fibula, 28 5 n. 6 Gadadhara, 428
Fiery, 357, 359; character, 33I Gadadhara Bhanacarya, I I9, I24
Filosofia Indiana, 398 n. gahana'!l, 496
Fineness, 360 Gain, 503, 508, 5I2
Finished discrimination, 250 gala-guiJt/.a, 298 n.
Finitude, I6 Gall-bladder, 288
Fire, 74, 140, I4I, I6o, I87, I94, 238, gandha, 194, 236, 350
302, 331-334. 359, 526 Gandhabba, 539
Firm will, 24 Gandhamadana, 544
Fistula, 276 Gandharva, 300
Five viiyus, 75 gandharva-pattanam, 233
Fixation of will, 504 Gandharva-tantra, 393
Flame, 182, I84 gantii gacchati, 169
Flashing, 64 gantho, 496
Flesh, 29I, 317, 322, 324, 33I, 342, Gangabhatta, 51 5
347, 349, 352, 36I; currents, 348 Ganga, 354
Flies, 409 Gangadhara, 79, 347-349, 380 n. 2.,
Flowers, 333 429-43I
574 Index
Garigadharendra Sarasvati, s6, 220, 23 I 468, 47o-473. 475-479. 483-488,
Garigahari, 79 490, 492, 495, 496, 498-sos, so?-
Garigapuri Bhattaraka, so, 5 I SI7, 5I9-526, 529, 53I-534, 536,
Garigesa, 54, 125, 126, I46 54I, 545. 546, 548, 549. 55I, 552;
Garigesa Upadhyaya, 119 analysis of how actions are perform-
Gar:tanatha Sen, Mahamahopadhyaya, ed, SIS, SI6; avidyii in and in Bud-
337 n., 353 n. dhism, 498-soo; Asvattha simile of
gm;zcfa-miilii, 298 the Upani~ads, how applied in, 523,
Gar:te8a Bhisaj, 434 524; avyakta, its meanings in,
Garbe, R., 550 470 ff.; Brahman, its meanings in,
garbha-karii bhiivii[z, 309 473 ff.; clinging to God, necessity
Garblza Uparzi~ad, 3I2 n. 3 of, 529, 530; conception of siidhii-
garbhiiiaya, 3 I3 ra1Ja-dharma and vanJa-dharma, 505
garbhotpiida, 328 ff.; conflict between caste-duties
Garland, 498 n., 525 and other duties, 513, 514; conser-
Garm;la, 540 vation of energy principle applied to
Gaw;la, 126 the problem of immortality, 5 I 8;
Gauqa Abhinanda, 232 conservation of energy principle in,
Gau<;la Brahmananda Sarasvati, 79 compared with that of Yoga, Ve-
Gauc.lapada, 2, 7, 21 n., 28, 30, 57 n., danta and Nyaya, 5I7; crude be-
78. 8o, 23I, 234, 262 n. I, 272 ginnings of Sarpkhya in, 467 ff.;
Gaucja-piida-kiirikii, 6, 25 I ethical ideas compared with those of
Gaucjapiidiya-bhii~ya, 78 the Upani~adsandBuddhism,493ff.;
Gaudavaho, 1 I 1 ethics, basis of, 498; God and his
Gau~esvara Acarya, s8 doctrine in, 530 ff.; God, his nature
Gaudorvisa-kula-prasasti, I 26 in,464 ff., 524 ff.; idea of God in, and
Gauri, 82 n. in the Upani~ads, 530; ideal as per-
Gautama, 380, 386 n., 387, 394 formance of sva-dharma in, 50 I, 502;
gavaya, I3I ideal in, compared with the sacri-
gam11ikii, 290 n. 3 ficial and other ideals, 503, 504;
gav'lnyau, 290 ideal of self-surrender, 503; ideal of
Gayadasa, 425, 427, 428, 43 I tapas, 5I3; immortality in, 5I8, 5I9i
Gayi, 372, 4Io · important commentaries on, 443;
giih0,496 interpretation by Madhva, 442; in-
Gandhara, 274-, 298 n. 4 terpretation by Ramanuja, 441, 442;
giindhcln, 353 interpretation by Sarikara, 437, 438;
giiyatn, 294 interpretation by Yamuna, 439; its
gedho, 496 conception of dharma and sacrifices,
Generality, 187 486 ff.; its date, 549 ff.; its differ-
Generator, 23 ence from Mimarpsa, 483 ff.; its
Generic, 374 relation to Sarpkhya, 476,477; its re-
Genesis, 235 lation to Vedanta, 4 77 ff.; karma, re-
ghana, 235 n., 244, 3 I4 birth, and liberation, 520 ff.; I?Jetra
ghana-jiigaras, 267 and k~etra-jiia theory of, 463, 464;
ghana-jiigrat-sthita, 266 meaning of Yoga in, 443 ff.; path of
ghana-sa1fWedana, 235 knowledge and of duty, 528, 529;
ghana-spanda-kramiit, 235 n., 245 performance of duties with unat-
ghanzbhztya, 236 tached mind in, 507 ff.; prakrti,
Ghata-jiitaka, 54 I, 542, 544 puru~a and God in, 464-466; prakr-
ghora, 281 ti-purusa philosophy in, 46I ff.;
Ghosur:t<;li, 539 principal virtues in, 510 ff.; puruJa-
gho~a, 350 silkta conception of God and the
Gho~aka, I7I conception of God in, 524; rebirth
giddhi, 496 and life after death, 5 I9, 520; sattva,
Gifts, 267, 437. 441, 50I, SI3, 5I4 mjas and tamas in, 468 ff.; Sarpkhya,
Girvar:tendra Sarasvati, 52 n., 2I6 its meaning different from that of
Grtii, 25I, 4I8, 437-439, 443-448, classical Sarpkhya in, 457, 458;
450 n. I, 452-455, 457-459, 462- siiytlkJ,ya-yoga, discussion on the
Index 575
meaning of, in. 455-457; sense- Gopala Sarasvati, 103
control in, 488 ff.; sense-control in, Gopalananda Sarasvati, 57 n.
different from that of Buddhism, Gopiilika, 87 n.
490; sense-control in, different from Gopikanta Sarvabhauma, 79
that of Pataiijali, 491, 492; some Gopirama, 79
vicious tendencies denounced in, Gopurarak~ita, 424
509, SIO; standpoint of ethics in, Govardhana, 428, 431
compared with the general stand- Government, 204
point of Hindu ethics, 504 ff.; vir- Govinda Sarasvati, 55
tue of sameness, 511, 512; yoga in, Govindananda, 49, 81, 103, 104, 26I
akin to that of Pafica-riitrayoga,461; Grace, 503
yoga in Patafijali, indebted to yoga Grammarian-philosopher, 171
in, 460, 46I; yoga of, different from Grammatical, I42
that of Patafijali, 451 ff.; yoga of, granthi, 104
different from the Upani~ad yoga, Grass, 350
453 ff.; yoga instructions in, 446 ff.; Grating, 338
yoga, its meaning different from that griihaka-gralza, 25
of Buddhism in, 459, 46o; yogin, his griihya-griihakiinusaya, 22
characteristics, 449, 450; yogin, his Greed, 409, 497, 498, 5IO
relation with God, 450, 45I Greediness, 511
Gltii-bhii~ya, 442 Greedy, 510
Guii-bhii~ya-vivecana, I93 Grief, 247, 333
Gua-bhu~a1Ja-bhii~ya, 443 Griffith, 29I n.
G'itii-nibandhana, 226 grl~ma, 335
Gztiirtha-sa'flgraha, 439, 443 grivii(z, 286
Gltiirtha-satrzgraha-dipikii, 439 Gross, 355
Gztiirtha-vivara1Ja, 443 Grossness, 360
GUii-siiriirtha-satrzgraha, 443 Grounds, 17
Gitiisaya, 439 Growing, 36
Gttii-tattva-prakiiiikii, 443 Growth, 29; of the body, 322
Gttii-tiitparya-bodhini, 58 grha-godhikii, 298 n. 7
Gztii-tzka:. 443 grha-stha, 505
Guii-vivrti, 443 Grhya-sfitras, 28 I
Glandular sores, 296 guda, 28s,n.7
Glenoid cavity, 287 n. 2 gudiibhyalz, 288
go, I3I Gujarat, 192
God, 1, 44, 72, 8o, I I2, I76-I78, 197, gulgulu, 393
229, 254, 372, 402, 403, 410 n., 438- gulpha, 284 n. 4
444, 446, 447. 4S0-453. 457. 459. gulphau, 284
461-467, 473. 474. 476, 477. 484, gu1Ja, I62, 174, 175, 187, 188, 190, 194,
490, 492, 499. SOI-504, 509, 510, 292, 3I4 n., 329, 330, 332, 357, 358,
512, 514-516, 5I9, 522-526, 529, 359 n., 360, 361, 363, 366, 367, 369,
533. 537. 542, 545. 547 370, 372-374. 414, 440, 441, 455-
Goddesses, 245 458, 462, 465-467, 476-478, 512,
God's powers, 42 SIS, 524, 525
God's will, 109 gu1Ja-attachments, 477
Gods, 245, 420, 487 gu1Jamayl miiyii, 477
Going, 169 Gu1Ja-traya-viveka, 57 n.
Gokulacandra, 443 gu1Jatva, 143
Gokulanatha Upadhyaya, 126 n. gzt1Javattviityantiibhii<t•iinadhikara~latii,
Gold, 37, 512 r62
Goldstiicker, Th., 540 gu1Jiitlta, 5 I 2
Gomin, 428 gu1Jin, 314 n. 1
Good, 2I,246,271 ,405; and bad, 23 n.; Gupta empire, 164, 435
deeds, 41 1 ; life, 422 guru, 357, 359 n., 420
Goodness, 507 gurv-iidayab, 3 69
Gopatha-Briihma1Ja, 274 n. 3, 276 n., gurv-iidi, 369
28o n., 283 Gucjha-bodlzaka-satrzgraha, 428
Index
Gut}hartha-dipikii, 443 Heracles, 543
Gut}hiirtha-prakiiia. 220 Heramba Sena, 428
Herb, 298, 358 n., 365
Hair, 325 Heredity, 273
hali/q1Ja, 288 Hermaphrodite, 3 I 2 n. 3
Hallucinations, 5, I8o Hermitage, 229
ha7JlSa, 252 n. Heroism, 502, 505 n., 525
Handful, 343 n. hetiiv ir1yu, 420
hanu-citya, 287 hetu, I2D-I23, I48, I94,374,379,38o,
Hanumad-bhiilya, 443 38I n., 386 n., 387, 388, 395
hanvor dve, 287 n. 4 Hetu-tattvopadesa, 49
Happiness, I I3, 501, SI2, 530 hetv-antara, 388
Happy, 277 ; temper, 5 I 3 hetv-artha, 389, 390
Hara-kinkara, I 22 hetv-iibhiisa, I94, 386 n., 388, 389 n.
Hara - kinkara - nyiiyiiciirya - parama- Higher self, 453, 466
pa~z4ita-bhaua-viidindra, I 22 Himalayas, 2.z9, 370
Hardness, 328, 360 hit{lsii, 4I9
Hare's hom, 5, III, 240 Hindu Ethics, 483, 504; standpoint of,
Hari, 442, 535, 543 504 ff.
Hari Dik~ita, 82 Hindu Mysticism, 449 n. I
haridrii indravaru1Ji, 297 Hindu philosophy, SIS
Hari-gltii, 545 HiraQ.yagarbha, 76
Harihara Paramaharpsa, 57 n. HiraQ.yak~a Kausika, 357
H ari-lzlii-vy_iikhyii, 22 5 Hi1·a1}yiikfya-tantra, 435
Harinatha Sarma, I48 n. hirii, 289, 290, 344, 346
Hariscandra, 427, 43 I Hiriyanna, 1 n., 43, 85 n., 86, 98,
Harmful, 357 100 n.
harfa, 313 History of Indian Logic, 392
hasti-jihvii, 353 History of Indian Philosophy, I, 17,
Hate, 489 265 n. 4, 269 n. I, 27I n. I, 477 n. I,
Hatred, 360, 370, 373, 497-499 50I n.
hatha, 268 History of the Vaif1Java Sect, Early,
Hatha-Yoga, 373, 455 544 n.
Hatha-yoga-pradipikii, 354 n. hitii, 277. 344. 405, 420, 422
havi/:z, 46I hitii niir/is, 345
Harita, 397, 427 Hinayana, 500
Hiirrta-sa1Jlhitii, 432 Hinayana Buddhists, I68
Head, 297,336,340,343 Hoemle, R., 279,284 n. 3, 285 n. 4, 286
Headache, 300 n. 2 n. I, n. 2, n. 3, n. 4, 287 n. 5, 329,
Head disease, 296, 340 424.428-43I,433.434
Health, 330, 384 Holes, 332 n.
Hearing, 236, 360 homa, 28I
Heart, 288, 290 n. 2, 3I6, 340, 344 n., Homogeneous, I4, 377
345t 347. 352, 355 Horns, I9I
Heart diseases, 299 Hostile, 378
Heat, I94, 238, 24I, 320, 321, 325, Hot, 242, 3I2 n., 357-359, 36I-363,
328, 33 I, 358, 360, 362 n., 365, 4I9, 365 n.
500, 510, 511 Householder, 505
Heaven,229, 503,520,523 hriisa/:z, 322
Heaviness, 335 n., 358, 360, 36I, 369 hrf, 24, 5IO
Heavy, 337 n., 357 hrdaya, 288, 340 n.
Heels, 284 hrdaya-stham pipiisii-stlziinam, 348 n.
Heliodorus, 540 hrdayotkleda, 335 n.
Hell, 9I, 489, 5IO hrt, 292
hemanta, 335, 370 hrt-padma-yantr'l-tritaye, 258
hemanta-gri1ma-var1iil:z, 32I n. Hultzsch, E., 2I9
Hemadri, 427, 434 Human body, 278, 302
Hemorrhage, 289; of women, 297 Humanity, 506
Index 577
Human passion, 497 73, 134, I52; products, 223; silver,
Human self, 42 1 18; snake, 206 n.
Humid, 408 Ill-will, 497
Humility, 534 Image, 14, 546
Hunger, 254 Imaginary, 271
Hygienic habits, 308 Imagination, 90, 233, 261, 266, 328,
Hypothesis, 12, 26, 64 367, 373
Hypothetical, 337; entities, 233, 336 Imaginative construction, 21
Immanent, 42, 524; self, 271
icchii, 264, 370, 496 Immediacy, 13, 14, 63, 69, 105
Idea, 26, 30, 3I, I82, I86, 375, soi, Immediate, I49, ISO; antecedence,
5IO, 525 144; contact, 2I I
Ideal, 503, 504; creations, 236 Immediateness, 138
Idealism, I9, 2I, 25, 35, I02, 213, 221, Immoral, 23 n., 464, 478, 484, SOl
256, 268, 270; refutation of, 269 Immortal, 473, 476, 502, 512, S2S,
Idealistic, 231; Buddhism, 231, 234, S26
242; monism, 164; philosophy, 234 Immortality, 294, 456, SI2, 5I3, SI8,
Idealists, 402 521, 537
Ideation, 20, 31 Immutable law, 3 1 n.
Identical, 15, 26, 27, 30, 31 n., 32, Impatience, 373
33. 36, 38, 64, 68, 90, 152, 153. 169, Imperative, 483
172, 173, 183, 184, 202, 224; entity, Imperishable, 476, SI7, 518
34, 202; object, 176; point, 20 Impermanent, 230, 241
Identity, 14, 31, 33, 34, 65, 72, 131, Implication, 18, 148, 384, 521
I 52, 227, 370, 526; as a relation, 14; Importance, 370
function ofthought, 14; in diversity, Impossible, IS9, 169, 188
172; of the awareness, 32, 165; of Impotency, 333
cause and effect, 165; of the self, 34, Imprecations, 295
47, 6s, 67 Impressions, 65, 239, 250
Idleness, 333, 373 Improper use, 321
il/.ii, 257, 292 n., 353, 453 Impure, 36, 37, 38, 303, 408; states,
il}ii niil}i, 354 239
Ignorance, I, 3, 4, 5, 8, 24, 73, 74, Impurities, 327, 503, S04
98, 101, 104, 148, 153. 154. 185, 187, Inactive, 36o
203, 204, 251, 267, 333. 409. 413, Inanimate, 36, 3S9. 360
414, 416, 462, 479, 498-soo, 509, Incantations, 278, 281
510, 522, 529, 530 Incarnation, so2, 525
Ignorant, 367, 378 Inclinations, 23Q, 242, 2S 1, 497
ihiimutra-phala-bhoga-viriiga, 49 5 Incomprehensible, 164
Iliac, 348 Inconsistencies, 166
Ilium, 285 n. 7 Inda, S39
Ill-temper, 497 Indefinability of nescience, 222
Illumination, 62, 178, 204, 210, 211 n., Indefinable, 12, 16, 22, 29, 51, 118,
212 127, 128, IS6, 163, 164, 205, 221,
Illuminator, 526 224, 499, S29; nature, ISS; stuff,
Illusion, 3, 6, 9, 11, 16, 25, 29, 32, 36, 221
47. 64, 69, 101, 110, 114, 148, 194, Indefinite existence, 16
197. 198, 200, 204, 223, 239. 241, Independent co-operation, 184
26I, 524; difference in the theory Independent existence, 59
of, between Nagarjuna and Sankara Indescribable, 3S, 36, 48, 147, 164,
and Gauc.iapada, 7 194. I9S. 203, 221, 232-234. 236,
Illusoriness, S33 265, 271; nature, 109
Illusory, 26, 28, 73, 1o1, 109, 181, 221, Indescribableness, 3S
234, 24o; appearances, 101, 113; Indestructible, 33, 512, S38
character, 217; cognition, 18o; crea- Indeterminable, 134
tion, 468; experience, 185; images, Indeterminate, 22, 401, 454; cognition,
180; impositions, 30, 113, 114, 150, 94; experience, 97; knowledge, 21 ;
194; knowledge, 139; perception, materials, 23
Index
Index, I48 n. Initiation, 547
India, 402 Injunction, 509, 520
Indian anatomists, 286 n. 2 Inner change, 22
Indian Antiquary, 550 Inner consciousness, 26 n.
Indian Interpreter, The, 550 Inner dynamic, 24
Indian literature, 256 Inner law of thought, 29
Indian medical men, 377 Inner psychoses, 22
Indian Medicine, 423, 436 Inner states, I85
Indian philosorhy, I I9, 227, 273, 369, Inoperative, I77, 269
377,395, 4I4, 4I7 ;pessimismin,4I4 Inscriptions, S.l., 2I9
Indian thought, 375, 376 n., 408, 42I Insects, 409
Indifference, 246, 50I Insensible, 254
Indigestion, 348 Inseparable, I9I, 3'74; inherence, I8J,
Indignation, 333, 497 37I
Jndische Studien, 288 n. 2 Inseparableness, I9I; of character,
Indispensable, I 8, 523 I9I; of space, I9I; relation, 36o;
Indistinguishable, 377 relation of inherence, 40
Individual, 33. 58-6o, II5, I3I, I39. Insomnia, 337 n.
I 59, I89, 369; consciousness, 77; Inspiration, 262
good, 485; ignorance, 84; members, Instinctive passions, 252
I88; persons, 84, I09; self, 75; soul, Instinctive subconscious roots, 26
72, 205 n. Instincts, 4I5
Individuality, 449 lnstructions,2I,229,501
Indivisible, I57, I99 Instrument, 45
Indo-Iranian, 295 n. I Instrumental cause, I2, 360, 372,
lndra, 229, 295 n. 3, 304, 328, 433 4IO
indrajiila, 244 Instrumentality, II, II 2
Indrii-v#r.zu, 535 Instruments of cognition, I37
indriya, 23, 238, 239, 366 Intellect, 75, 373, 406
indriya-dhiirar.za, 494 Intellectual, 378; states, I79
indriya-nigraha, 505 Intelligence, 89, 268, 320, 32I, 360,
indriya-vijaya, 405 369,373.375.504, 5I6
Indu, 304, 328, 433 Intelligent, 36, 38
Induction, I48 Intelligible, 36
Indulgence, 509 Intense, 25I
Inequality, 229 Intention, 497
Inert, 337 n. Interdependence, 7, 8, 22
Inertia, 360 Interdependent origination, 3 n.
Inexhaustible, 356 Internal canals, 289
Inexplicable, 20, 29, 48, I56, I58, I85 Internal organ, 3IO n. 2
Inference, I8, 26 n., 32, 63, 66, 68, 72, Interpretation, I, 356
I06, II8, I20, I29, I39, I4I, I48, Intervening, I44
159, I67, I76, I92, I94, I98, 2I3, Intestine, 288, 297, 348, 35I
302, 365, 373-376, 380, 396, 398, Intimate relation, 40
408 Intoxicating drinks, 498
Inferential, 77; cognition, I35; know- Intrinsically, 242
ledge, I8 Intrinsic difference, 20I
Inferior, 378 Introduction, 49
Inferiority, 370, 40I n. Intuitive, 73; consciousness, I54, I99;
Infinite, I6, 63, 73, II3, 454; con- perception, I I3
sciousness, 77; differences, I32; Invalid, I8, I4I, I84, I86
number, 358; regressus, 202; time, Invariability, 3I n.
I32 Invariable, I72, I86; antecedence, I45,
lnflammation,282 I86, 326, 386, 398; concomitance,
Inhalation, 258, 259, 449, 459, 46o I39-I42, I48; connection, I76;
Inherence, 360 power, I85; prognostication, 397
Inherent, 22; movement, 20 Invariably and unconditionally asso-
Inhering cause, I44 ciated, 380
Index 579
Invariably associated, 396 J ayacandra, 126
Invisible, 337 n. Jayanandi, 431
Inward resolution, 482 Jayanta, 51, 107, 279, 28o, 307 11. 1,
Iron age, 402 394, 399, 4I3, 414
Irrelevant, 160 I ayarama, 44 3
Ischium, z8s n. 7 Jayatirtha, 442
itllretariisraya, 97 Jayiikhya-satphitii, 491
itaretariiiraya-prasangiit, 9 s Jayolliisa-nidhi, 220
ltihiisa-veda, 274 n. 3 Jiibiila-briihmat;ta, 251
1-tsing, 433 jiiqya, 10
ir~yii, 413 jiigaruka, 338
lia Upani~ad, 551 jiigrad-viisaniimayatviit svapna, 76
liii, 78 jiigrat, 241, 264
lSiiviisya-bhfiD!a-#ppat;ta, I 93 jiigrat-svapna, 266
liopani~ad-bh{4ya, 78 jiigrat-svapna sthita, 267
lsvara, 39, 48, so, 72, 8o, I I2, 176, Jajala, 283, 432
177, 197, 372, 474, 533; its criti- jiilini, 496
cisms by Kamalasila, 176 ff. Janakinatha, 218 n.
isvara-bhiiva, sos n. jiinu, z8s n. 4
lsvarakr!?r:ta, 8o, 171, 372,·428, 476 jiinuno!z sandm, z8s
livara-satphitii, 547, S48 n. 1 Jiitaka, 248 n., 424
lsvarasena, 431 jiiti, 43. IS9. 194. J8o-J82, 387, 401,
livariibhisandhi, 126 498
l~ta-siddhi, 198, 199, 205, 213 Jealousy, 267
l~ta-siddhi-vivarat;ta, 198 J ejjata, 372, 428
b!a-siddhi-vyiikhyii, 198 jhiina,4s9,46o, soo
jigi1pSanatii, 496
Jackals, 409 jijiiiisii, 384
Jacob, G. A., 82 Jina, 49, so, 72, ?S, 84, 8s, 88-9o,
Jacobi, H., 398 n. 205 n., 235, 236, 239, 304
jaqa, 36 Jinadasa, 428, 431
jaqiitmikii, 105 jiva, 104, 105, 109, IIo, 112
jaqiitmikii avidyii-iakti, lOS jzva-bhuta, 464, 472
J agaddhara, 443 jzva-caitanya, 77
I agadisa, 79 jzva-dhiitu, 241
Jagadisa Bhattacarya, 119, 124 Jivaka, 276, 424
jagan-mithyiitva-dipikii, 57 n. Jivaka-tantra, 435
Jagannatha Paiicanana, 79 jivana, 328
Jagannathasrama, 53, s6, 103, 193, 216 jtvana-purvaka, 515
Jaimini, 479, 486 jzvan-mukta, 24s-247, 250
Jaina, 98, 119, 171, 172, 399, S44, sso jzvan-mukta state, 248
J aiyyata, 427 jfvan-muktatii, 24S
jalada, 283 ]tvan-mukti, 246, 251, 2S2
jalpa, 377-379,401 jivan-mukti-viveka, 214, 216, 2SI,
Jalpa-kalpa-taru, 347 n., 380 n. 2 252 n., 268
Janalz, 76 jivann eva, 2SI
Janardana,49,205, S43 jfva-riiSi, 44
Jaruirdana Sarvajiia, 52 n. jfva-sthiti, z6o
jarighe, 28s ]fva-siltra, 436
jangitja, 293, 294, 295 n. 3 j'ivatviipiidikii, I04
Japan, 294 jiviidana,432
jariiyu, 291 }ivananda, 430, 431
jatru, 286 n. 2 jlviitman, 461
J atiikari.J.a, 427, 432 jivita, 368
Jatukart;ta-satphitii, 432 jivntendriya-virodhinl, 21 n.
jafii, 496 jlvotkriinti, z6o
Jaundice, 282, 297, 298 jiiiina, 100, 272, 491, 499, sos n.
Jaundiced eye, 143 jiiiina-gata-pratyak5atva, 207
sBo Index
Jn!naghana, 82 n. against the non-permanency of en-
jiiiina-kanna-samuccaya, 44, 100 tities answered by, 185 ff.; Yogasena's
jiiiina-niitft, 355 criticisms against the doctrine of
jiiiina-pratisandhiitii, 368 momentariness answered by, 184;
Jiiiina-slUflkalinl, 354, 355 his criticism of the concept of God,
jiiiina-sa'l{lSkiira, 250 176 ff.; his criticism of the concept
Jniina-siira, 232 of lsvara or God, 176 ff.; his treat-
Jiiiina-siddhi, 148 n. ment of the different views of the
Jniinavati, 378 nature of momentariness, 186; his
Jiiana-viisi~!ha, 231 criticism of the doctrine of soul
jiiiina-vi~aylkrtena riipet)a siidrlyam, (Nyaya), 178, 179; his criticism of
134 the soul theory of Kumarila, 179 ff.;
jiiiina-yoga,44I,442,456,487,529 his criticism of the Yoga concept of
Jiianamrta, 99 God, 177 ff.; his doctrine of mo-
Jiianamrta Yati, 78 mentariness, 182 ff.; his refutation
JiiiiniirtJava, 432 of Nyaya- Vais~ika categories, 187
Jiianendra Sarasvati, 54, 79 ff.; his refutation of the SaQlkhya
jniinin, 531 theory of soul, 181; his refutation
Jiianottama, s8, 87 n., 98, 99. 148 n., of the theory of the persistence of
198 entities, 182 ff.; his refutation of the
J iianottama Bhattaraka, 82 n. Upani~ad theory of self, 181; his
Jiianottama Misra, 48 theory of causal efficiency (artha-
jniitatii, 152, 211 kriyii-samarthii), 183 ff.
jiiiitur jiieya-sambandhal:z, 105 Kamalasila and Santarak~ita, their
]obares, 543 criticisms of the SaQlkhya doctrine
Joint causality, 177 of pari~iima, 172 ff.; writers men-
Joint nature, 184 tioned in their work Tattva-sam-
Joint operation, 472 graha and its Paiijikii, 171 .
Joints, 331, 336, 348 Kambalasvatara, 171
Joy, 333, 373, 467, 495, 504, 511, kamma, 500
512 Kanauj, 126
Judgments, 341 Kanha, 541, 544
Jug, 143, 151 Kanhayana, 544
juhvati, 448 Kal).ada, 370
jvara, 296 Ka~ii.da-sutra-nibandha, 123
jyotil:z-sthiina, 318 ka~cjarii, 324, 352
Jyoti~, 275 n. Kal).j~ka, 429 n. 1, 431
j'yoti~a, 547 ka~tha, 353 n.
ka~tha-niitfr, 286 n. 2
Kahola-briihma~a. 251 ka~Jhorasol:z sandhil:z, 348 n.
kaivalya, 251, 454 kapiilam, 287
Kaivalya-kalpadruma, 56 kapiilikii, 285 n. 4
Kaivalyananda Sarasvati, 443 kapha, 257 n. 2, 300, 317, 325-331,
Kaivalyananda Y ogindra, 56 333, 334, 335 n., 336, 337, 339,
Kaivalyasrama, 79 35o-352, 361,365,392
kakii{ikii, 287 kaphofj.a, 286 n. 4
Kak~apufa-tantra, 426 kaphofj.au, 286
Kakubha,300 Kapila, 410 n., 477
kalpa, 275 n., 526, 547 Kapilabala, 429
kalpanii, 90, 238, 239, 312 n., 314, Kapila-Sarpkhya, 458
370 Kapila-tantra, 435
Kalpa-sthiina, 424, 429 kar~a, 389
Kalpa-taru, 52 kar~a-sakti-pratiniyamiit, 174
Kalyal).a Bhatta, 443 Karatha, 432
Kamalajanayana, 225 n. Karavirya, 424
Kamala5ila, 25, 27n., 28, 31n., 171, Kariila-tantra, 435
172, 175, 176, 178, 179, 181-185, karma, 101, 104, 185-188, 237-239,
186 n., 187, 188, 375,376; criticisms 243, 249, 253, 255, 256, 302, 310,
Index 581
339. 357, 359. 360, 37I' 383, 402- kiira1}a, I04, I37, I6o, 374, 389, 395,
404, 408, 437. 439. 488, 52Q-522, 472
524, 533 kiira1}a-~Q1}a-nirodha-sama-kiilafz, 2 In.
karma-blja1Jl mana[z-spanda, 238 kiirQ1}a - k~a1Ja - vila~a1Ja - kiiryasya,
karma-niise mano-niiiafz, 238 2I n.
karma-pu~a, 303 n., 373 kiira1}a-vyiipiira, 5 I 7
karma-sannyiisa, 457 Kiirikii, 2I n., 28, 30, 87, 250, 370
karma-yoga, 44I, 442, 444, 45I, 452, Karttika Kut:t<;la, 427, 428
457. 529 Karttikeya, I07
Karl}a-bhiira, 550 Karut:tya, 228, 230
kanJa-sula, 299 kiirya, I6I,374,389
kartavyatii, 482 kiirya-jiiiinam, 3IO n. 3
kartii, 237, 3I4 kiirya-kiirQ1}atii, 376
kartr, 244, 395, 469, 472, 473 kiirya - kiirQ1}a - viidasya vediinta -
kartrtva, 242 bahir-bhutatviit, 22I
kartrtva-bhoktrtvaikii-dhiirafz, I 04 kiirya-phala, 389
Karuma, 300 kiirya-sama, 380 n. 4, 382 n.
karU1}ii, 4I 2, 460, 5 I I kiiryatii-jiiiina, 5 I 5
k~iiya, 3I2 n., 357, 358 kiirya-yoni, 389
Kathii-vatthu, 247, 248 n. kiisa, 296, 298 n. 4
Katha Upan#ad, 78, 290 n. 2, 344 n., Kiisika, 297 n. 4
345.453.488,494.523,524 Kasi, 424
Katha-vallf, 2 5 I Kiiil-kha1Jt/.a, 429
kathina, 359 n. Kaslnatha Sastrin, 54
Kathopanifad-bhi'ifya-tlkii, I93 Kasiraja, 432, 433 n. I
katu, 3I2 n. 3, 357, 358, 362, 365 n. Kasmira, 434
kaumiira-bhrtya, 276 Kiismlra-piitha, 430
Kaumiira-tantra, 425 Kasyapa, 427
kausala, 452 Kiiiyapa-sa1Jlhitii, 43 I, 435
KauSika-sutra, 27 5, 282-284, 293 Kiithaka, 486, 55I
Kau~ltaki, 25I, 259 n. 3, 283 Kiithaka-sa1Jlhitii, 544
Kau~ltaki-briihmal}a, 544 Kiithakopani~ad-bhiiDJa, 78
Kau$ftaki-Upani~ad, 344 n. Kathmat:t<;lu, 43I
Kautilya, 54I Katyayana, 540
Kaviraj Gangaprasad Sen, 427 Kiiya-cikitsii, 276, 425
Kaviraj Gat:tanatha Sen, 43 I kediirl-kulyii, 323
Kaviraja, 79 Kenopani~ad, 78, I96
kiihiibiiha, 299 Kenopani~ad-bhii~ya, 78
kiikatiilfya, 27I Kenopanifad-bltii$ya-fippana, I93
kiila, I56,235.3I7,32I,358,359,372, Kenopan#ad-bhii~ya-vivara1}a, 78
389, 4IO Kesava-bhatta, 79, 284, 443, 54I, 543
Kalahasti-sarat:ta-Sivananda Yogindra, kevala-jiigaras, 266
2I9 kevala-jiigrat-sthita, 266
kiiliitlta, 386 n., 387 kevaliinvayi, I20, I2I, I23
Kalidasa, 230, 231, 239, 402, 550 kevaliinvayi-hetor eva nirvaktum asak-
kiilpanika-puru~a-bheda, I I 6 yatviit, I23
kiima, 327, 4I2, 4I3, 489, 490, 496, kevaliinvayini vyiipake pravartamiino
499 hetufz, I2I
kiim api-artha kriyiim, 5I5 Kha/aja, 300
kiimya-karma, 99 khale-kapota-nyiiya, 323
kiinti, 57 n. khanti-sa1Jlvara, 500
Kiinyakubjesvara, I 26 Kha1Jtf.ana-kha1}t/.a-khiidya, 57 n., I03,
Kankayana, 3I6,357 119 n., I26, I27, I32, IJ3 n., I34,
Kiinkiiyana-tantra, 435 I4I, I46, I56, I92
kii1}t/.a, 353 Kha1Jtf.ana-kha1Jtf.anam, 126 n.
Kapya, 333 Kha1Jtf.ana-kuthiira, I26 n.
Kapyavaca, 327 Kha1Jt/.ana-mahii-tarka, I 26 n.
kiiraka-vyiipiira,4I Kha1}t/.ana-ma1}t/.anam, 126 n.
s8z Index
Khm;uf.ana-phakkikii, 126 n. Kr~Qatirtha, 56, I I 5
Kha1Jf/.ana-tlkii, 126 n. Krroala,kiira, 220
Kha1Jf/.anoddhiira, 126 n. KnQananda, 196
khara, 332, 359 n. Knr.tanubhuti, 82 n.
Khara1}ada-sa,hitii, 432 Kr~Qiitreya, 276, 427
kha-ta11-miitra, 236 Krroiitreya-tantra, 435
khyiiti, 87 n., 204 krtaka, 182
Kidney, 288, 348 krta-niisanl, 299
Kidney-bean, 358 n. Krtavirya, 316
kiliisa, 297 krta yuga, 546
Kimldin, 296, 300 krti-siidhyatii-jiiiina, 515
Kindness, 511; to the suffering, 510 Krttika, 396
King Ari!!tanemi, 230 krtya, 293
King Dasaratha, 230 k~amii, 505
King KeJadi-Venkatendra, 219 kfa1Ja, 182 n.
King of Gaw;la, 148 n. K~a1Ja-bhaizga-siddhi, 49
King of Kanauj, I 26 kfa1}ika, I82 n., 367
kiiicana7fl, 496 ~a1Jikasya, 32 n.
k#ta,325, 327,331 ~a7:zikatva, 368
kikasiisu, 286 n. 2 ~ara, 104
Kleisobora, 543 kfara pu~a, 468
klesa, 304 K!jatak!jina, 431
klesa-jiieyiivara1Ja, 22 n. K~atriya, 292, 486, 487, 502-507, 514
kli~ta, 414 k~iinti, 505 n., 5 IO
kloma, 288, 318, 348 k~iira, 357, 358, 466
Knowability, I40 K~iirapii1;zi-Sa7[lhitii, 432
Knowable, I40 K!1emaraja, 263
Knower, 34, I52 kJetra, 463-465, 471, 472, 523
Knowing, 263; faculty, 179, I8o kfetra-jiia, 293, 410, 464, 468, 523
Knowledge, 18, 19, 66, I27, 148, I5I- k~etrin, 464
153, 228, 246, 248, 256, 266, 272, ~etriya, 297, 298, 30I
333. 368, 373. 374. 376, 378, 403, k#pta, 300
437, 440, 462, 469, 475, 499, 5oo- k#ti, 245. 501
502, 505 n., 508, 510, 523, 529, 534 kfl1Ja-jiigaraka, 266, 267
Knowledge situation, 25 K~urika, 454
kodho,497 kuhi1,353
Koka, 300 Kuk~ila, 300
KoQ.c;la Bhana, 55, Io8 kula-ku1;zf/.alinl, 3 55
kopo, 497 Kula-paiijikii, 225 n.
Kotalipara, 225 n. kulattha, 363
krami1}a/;l sahakiiri1}a/;l, 183 Kuliirka PaQ<;lita, 49, 51, 119-121, 123,
kriyii, 238, 260 124, 147 n.; introduction of his
kriyiikhya~iiiina,491 Mahii-vidyii syllogisms, 12o-122
kriyii-spanda, 238 Kulluka, 538 n. 1
kriyiitmaka, 261 Kumiira-sa7[lbhava, 230
krodha, 267, 489 Kumiirasira Bharadvaja, 357
krodha-•varjana, 505 Kumiirasiras, 316
Krkala, 75 Kumiirila, 87, III, 112, 120, 147, 171,
k!17luka, 298 179.197.214,479.482,483.485
Kr~Q.a, 438, 449, 455, 489, 500, 502, kumbhaka,257,258
503, 507, 512, 516, 518-520, 525, Kunhan Raja, Dr, 87
529-532, 535. 54I, 543. 544. 546, kuntiipa, 296
547; and Vasudeva, 541 ff. Kuntr, 4B
Kr~Q.a Acarya, 79 kU1}f/.alinl, 354, 356, 455
Kp?Qabhatta Vidyiidhiriija, 442 kwJ4ali energy, 356
K~Qa Devaki-putra, 550 ku1}f/.al;; sakti, 3_56
Kr~Qakiinta, 79 Kuppusvami Sastri, 43 n., 84 n., 87,
Krroa-kutill,ala niitaka, 225 188 n.
Index
Kuruk~etra, 502, 507, 518, 536 Ligaments, 324
Kurus, 545 Light, 70, 153, 332, 357, 36o; of con-
KusumiiiiJali, 141, 393 sciousness, 207
Kusilla, 300 Lightness, 358, 360, 362 n.
kusa grass, 446 Liking, 358
kusalotsiilw, 501 Limitations, 14, 22, 200, 252
ku~tha, 293, 294, 297, 298 Limited forms, 23
Kuvalayiinanda, 220 Limited self, I 13
kilrca, 279, 284 n. 3 Limited truth, 3
kiirca-siras, 284 n. 3 Limitless, 73
Kurma, 75 Linguistic, 167
kilrpara, 285 liiz, 480
liizga, I06, 139, 198, 293, 395, 398
laghu, 332, 338, 357, 359 "· liizga-deha, 306 n. 1
Laghu-candrikii, 85, 225 "· liizga-pariimarsa, 139
Laghu-Jiiiina-·viisi!!ha, 232 liizga-sarlra, 75
Laghu-mahii-·vidyii-vifjambana, 123 liizgadibala-labdhiikiirollekha-miitret]a,
Laghu-sa7!l!Iraha, 83 213
laghutii, 362 n. liizgz, 293
Laghu-tzkii, 79 Lips, 348
Laghu-viikya-vrtti, So Liquid, 337 n.
Laghu-viikya-vrtti-prakii.Sikii, 8o Liquidity, 360
Lak!m;ziivalz, 1 2 5 Liquors, 498
Lak~midhara Desika, 79 Literature, 377
Lak!?midhara Kavi, 56 Liver, 288, 318, 348
Lak!?minrsirpha, 52, 108 Living beings, 36
lalanii-cakra, 355 Lizards, 409
laliifa, 287 lzlii, 42
Laizkiivatiira-sutra, 22 n., 35, 127, 234, Lzliivatz, 147 n.
272, 398 lobha, 409, 413, 489, 497
Larger intestine, 289 lobhana1fZ, 497
Laryngeal plexus, 355 lobhitatta'!l, 497
Larynx, 286 n. 2, 353 n. locaka, 330
Laukika-nyiiya-muktiivali, 30 n. Localization, 23
lavali, 360 n. Locus, I9, 110
lavm;a, 312 n. 3, 357, 358 Locus standi, 130
Law, 493; of causality, 31 n. Logic, 377, 390, 392; of probability,
laya, 104 376 n.
Laziness, 335 Logical, 191, 373; apparatus, 51;
liighava, 315, 362 n. argument, 164; categories, 389; con-
liilasii, 497 sequence, 12 ; dialectic, I 91 ; dis-
Liifyiiyana-Sa'Jzhitii, 435 cussions, 127; disputes, 401; fal-
Lean, 337 n. lacy, 17; formation, 118, 119, 125,
Leanness, 333 129; methods, 51; tricks, 401
Learned, 378 Logically, 19
Learning, 505 lohinz, 29I
Legal literature, 279 lohita-viisasal;, 344 n.
Leprosy, 297 lohitii, 317
Levi, S., 429 n. 1 Lokanatha, 57 n.
Liberation, 187, 414, 415, 437, 438, loka-rak!ii, 440
455.469.470,523,546 loka-sa1fZvrta, 4
Lie, 498 n. loka-sa1fZVrti-satya, 5
Life, 360, 368, 405, 498 n. loka-vyavahiiral;, 3 n.
Life-functions, 515 Lokayata, I 7 I
Life of Niigarjuna from Tibetan and lokottara, 22
Chinese Sources, 398 n. lokottara-nirvikalpa-Jiiiina-liibhiit, 21
Life of the Buddha, 276, 424 n. 1 Longing, 497
Life-principle, 472 Looseness, 333
Index
Lord, 442; of communion, 453 mahii-muni/:z, 22 n.
Lorinser, Dr, 549 mahii-pralaya, 109
Loss, 512 Maharaja, 539
Lotus, 3 s6; in the sky, 5, 240; stalks, lltahii-Riimiiy~a, 23 I
350 n. mahiisupti, 104
Love, 497 lvlahiitala, 76
Lower prakr#, 464 Mahii-vagga, 276
Lower puru§a, 465, 467, 468 Mahii-vidyii, 49. SI, liS, 119-124;
lubhanii, 497 nature of its syllogisms, uo-122;
Lumbar nerve, 353 referred to, defended and criticized
Lumbar plexus, 355 by Nyiiya and V ediinta writers, 1 IS-
Lumbar vertebrae, 287 n. 1 I 20; syllogisms refuted by Vadin-
Lungs, 288, 318 dra, 122-124
Lust, 490, 497 M ahii-vidyii-daiaslokf-vivara~a, 123
Lustful, 367 1klahii-vidyii-vi4ambana, 103, 119 n.,
Lymph, 317, 318, 325 120, 122
M ahii- vidyii- vi4ambana - vyiikhyiina,
Macdonell, A. A., 259, 288 n., 345, 12J
346.486 Mahii-vidyii-vivara~-fippana, 123
mada, 267, 413 Mahavr~a, 298 n. 4
madana, 391 Mahii-vyutpatti, 288 n. 1
Madatyaya, 430 Mahayana, 501, 513
Madhu-kosa, 434 Mahayana monism, 164
Madhu-mati, 434 n. 4 Mahayanists, 30
madhura, 312 n. J, 357, 358 Mahesvara, 428
Madhusudana Sarasvati, 53, 55, 56, Mahesvara Tirtha, 83, 196
77 n., 79, 81, 116, 118, 124, 198, Mahimna/:z Stotra, 226
199, 223 n., 226, 227, 443; his line- Mahidhara, 232
age, date and works, 225, 226; his maitra, 51 I
philosophy in his Vediinta-kalpa- Maitra, s. K., 483 n. I, so6 n.
latikii, 227 lv!aitriiya~a, 471
Madhva, 125, 192, 442, 443 Maitriiya~i, 486, 523
Madhva-mukha-bhaitga, 220 Maitreyi-briihma~a, 251
Madhva school, 118 Maitrl Upan#ad, 259 n., 344 n., 345,
madhya-sanra, 3 16 412,448,449
madhya-viveka, 250 majjii, 317, 328
Madras, 84 n., 87 majjiibhya/:z, 289
Magic, 37, 38, 244; rites, 281 Major term, 139
Magical creations, 37, 38, 467 mala, 234, 239, 325, 327, 328, 334
Magician, 37, 38, 206 n. mala-dhiitu, 325, 327
Magundl, 300 mala-piitra, 289 n. 1
mahad brahma, 462 Malformations, 333
mahat, 305, 340 n. Malice, 497
mahatparimii~a, 189 Malicious, 498 n.
Mahii-bhiirata, 274, 276, 306, 394, Malimluca, 300
418, 419, 450 n., 458, 461, 476, 502, Malia Bhatta, 79
508 n., 535 n., 536, 538, 539, 541- Malleoli, 284 n. 4
546, 548, sso, 552 mamaitlwro, 496
Mahii-bhiirata Anukrama~i, 544 mamattarrz, 496
Mahabharata period, so8 mamiiyitarrz, 496
Mahii-bhii~a. 546, 548 Man,445
mahiibhilta, 362, 463 Mana/:z, 230
Mahadeva, 122 manab-kalpanayii, 230
Mahadeva Vaidya, 79 manal:z - pari~al:z samvid - vyaiijako
Mahadeva Vidyavagisa, 79 jiiiinam, 198
M ahii-lakpna-paddhati, 22 s mana/:z-prasiida, 513
Mahamahopadhyaya Kuppusvami, manal:z-spanda, 254
219 manana, 22, 24
Index
manas, 23, 75, 76, 104, 156, I87, 194, MaQibhadda, 539
I96, 206, 227, 232-234. 236-239. ma1)i-pura-cakra, 355
24I, 243. 244, 246, 255. 262, 292, mara~tiinussati, 459
303, 304, 307 n. 5, 308, 34I, 343, Marbles, I 34
347 n., 35 I n., 355, 356, 358, 36o, marma, 340 n.
366,367-369,371,373.458,463 marman, 313 n.
manasi, 369 ~arrow, 289, 29I, 317, 322, 324, 347,
manas-cakra, 355 348, 361
manda, 359 n. Marshy, 370
manda-viveka, 250 mastakiibhyantaroparinhiit Sirii-sandhi-
~an-god, 525, 532 sanmpiita, 342
~anhood, 525 ~aster, 526
~an-hymn, 537 masti~ka, 340
~anifestation,23,174,235 ;ofmind,256 mast#ka7Jl siro-majjii, 340 n.
Manifests, 5 I mastuluitga, 340
Manifold world, 203 matiinujiiii, 388 n.
mano-javena, 304 ~aterial, IO; cause, 10-12, 45, 51, 74,
manomaya, 76 I I4, I4J, I95, I97, 334, 360, 372,
manomaya-ko~a, 7 5 389, 4Io; objects, I78; power, 105;
manomaya puru~a, 344 staff, II, 76, I95, 217; stuff, 109;
mano-niisa, 25I, 252 things, 175; world, 2I, I08
Manoramii tantra-riija-ttkii, 225 1\tlateriality, 10, 45, 114, 236
manoratho, 497 Materia Medica, 429
mano-vahii, 347 n. ~athuriinatha, 443
mano-vahii-niitft, 355 ~athuriinatha Bhattacarya, I I 9
mantra, 277, 278, 536 Mathuranatha Sukla, 78
mantr, 35I matsara, 413
~anu, 61, 449, 505, 542 n. 3, 546 matsnii, 2~8 n. 3
~anukuladitya, 45 n. matsniibhyiim, 288
~anuscript, 49, 1 I2, 204, 205 ~atter, 44, 3I2, 526
manya, 290 n. 3 matup, 400 n.
manyu, 4I2, 413 matha, 99
mangala-homa, 278 1vfatmata, 300
Jl1aiiju-bhiip1)i, 79 mauna, 5I3
~aQ9ana,52,82-87,96-Io2, IIO,II2, l\1auryas, 540
148 n., I98, 204, 224, 283, 335 n., Maxim, 27, 32, 66,161,389,391, 392;
482; all relations are mental in, of identity, 20I
95, 96 ; Brahma-kii1)t/.a of Brahma- Madhava, 2I4, 2I5,428,433-435
siddhi holds that perception does Madhava Sarasvati, 232
not apprehend diversity of objects, ~adhva-Kara, 428
88, 89; his divergence of view from Madhyamika, 165-I67
Sarvajfiatma ~uni, 85; his identity Miidhyamika-kiirikii, 164, 398, 426
with Suresvara the author of the ~iidhyamika-Sautrantika, I64
Nai~karmya-s·iddhi disproved, 86; /ttliidhyamika-siltra, 3, 5 n.
his refutation of the category of Miidhyamika-vrtti,I6S n., 166n., 168 n.,
difference, 92 ff.; his refutation of 307 n. 3
"difference as negation," 97; his miigha, 294
view of avidyii and miiyii, 89; his mii hi1_nsyiit, 493
view of Brahman as pure bliss, as Miilati-Miidhava, 112
elaborated by SankhaoaQi, 90; re- mii1rzsa, 285, 312 n. 3, 317
ferences to his doctrine by other mii7JlSa-dharii, 3 17
Vedantic writers, 84, 85; the author miina, 373
of Brahma-siddhi, 83; the content of /ttliina-manohara, 120, 124
the Niyoga-kii1)t/.a and Siddhi-kii1)t/.a miinasa, 469
chapters of the Brahma-siddhi of, 98; miinasa pratya~a, 69
the general content of the fourth Mii1)t/.zikya, 78
chapter of his Brahma-siddhi, 87, 88 Mii~zcfukya - Gautjapiidtya - bhii~ya -
ma1)i, 359 n., 364 vyiikhyii, I93
5s6 Index
Mii1J.l}fikya-kiirikli, 78, 92, 192 Menstrual flow, 351
Mii1J.l]ukya-Upan#ad-bhiiDJa, 78 Menstrual product, 313
M ii1J.l}i1kya- U pani~ad- bhiiDJiirtha-sa7p- Mental, 24, soo, 504; causes, 187; con-
graha, 78 tact, 139; control, soo; creation, 233,
Mara, 489 235, 243, 245; diseases, 418; func-
miirdava, 510 tions, 464; inclinations, 491; modifi-
miirga, 348 n., 350 cations, 243; movement, 238; opera-
l\1arici, 316, 333 tions, 22; phenomena, 186; state, 15,
MarkaQ.<;ieya, 3 16 153. I87, 258, soo; tendencies, 468
Martal).<;ia-tilaka-svamin, 107 Mercy, 373
miiruta, 361 Merit, 248, 249, 416
miirutiidhi~{hiinatviit, 3 16 Meru, 370
miitsarya, 267 meru da7J.l}a, 352, 353 n.
Mathara Aclirya, 171 Messenger, 230
Miithara-vrtti. 400 n., 401 n. Metacarpal, 285
miiyii, 10, II, 16, 36, 41, 44, 45, 47, Metaphorical, 329
48, so, 51, 72, 73. 77. 84, 89, 104, Metaphysical, 191, 192, 499, 501, 502,
106, 163, 197, 215, 217, 221, 224, 514
238, 239. 271, 473. 477. 524, 525, Metatarsal, 285
533; alone the cause of the world, Method of interpretation, 2
1 1 ; as an instrumental cause (Brah- Methodological, 337
man being the material cause) ac- Methods, 29, 166
cording to Sarvajiiatma Muni, 11; Methora, 543
differences of view regarding its re- mettii, 460
lation with Brahman, 1 1 ; scholastic meya - svabhiiviinugiimznyiim anirva -
disputes as to the nature of its canlyatii, 127
causality, 11 meyatva, 121
miiyii-miitram, 37 Mice, 409
miiyii-nirmitatviibhyupagamiit, 203 Middle discrimination, 140, 250
miiyii power, 4 76 Migration, 406
miiyii theory, 42 Milk, 59, 6o, 97, 175, 322-324, 350
Measure, 148, 194, 360, 370 Mind, 35 ,76, 15 4 , 156,217,232,243·
Mechanical, 360, 369 256, 331, 339, 355, 367, 368, 377,
medas, 312 n. 3, 317, 324, 325 406, 419, 447. 469, 498, soo-so2,
medhii, 328,373 soB, 512, 530
Medhatithi, 251, 394 Mind activities, 470
Medhatithi Gautama, 393 Mind-associated consciousness, 34
Medical, 358 n., 372, 373, 376, 37~; Mind-body, 523
formulas, 435; herbs, 277, 294; Mind-contact, 70
literature, 295, 300, 301, 354 n.; Mindfulness, soo
practitioners, 277; science, 276; Mind-object contact, 69
system, 352; treatment, 303 n. 4; Mind-organ, 227, 310, 314, 366
writers (later), 299 Mind-person, 344
Medicinal, 359 n. Mind-structure, 524
Medicine, 275, 279, 280, 320, 357, Mineral, 333
359, 360, 363-365, 370, 371, 389, Minor term, 139
403 Miraculous, 294; effect, 364
iWedicine of Ancient India, 424 n. 2 Mirage, 5, 29, 230, 234; stream, 233
Meditation, 90, 256, 259, 447, 460, Mirror, 180
493, 494, 500, 501, 51 I Misconception, 479
Meditative union, 446 Misdeeds, 408
Medium, 229 Misery, 41, 178
medo-dharii, 317 Mitii~arii, 82 n., 107
Medulla oblongata, 355 Mithila, 119, 125, 394
Megasthenes, 543 mithuna, 392
Memory, 24, 148,26I,264,373,374 mithyii, 105
Mendicant, 505 mithyiiciira, 493
Menstrual blood, 350, 352 mithyii-jiiiinam, 8, 12, 413
Index
mithyii-jnana-nimittafz, 105 Morbid elements, 319
mithyii-satJWrta, 4, 5 Morbidities, 325
mithyiitva, 148, 152 Morbidity, 336, 360, 362, 365
mithyii-yoga, 321, 405 Mosquitoes, 409
Mitra, 292 Mother-energy, 355
Mixed rasa, 359 Motion, 163, 360
Mixing up, 370 Motionless, 408
Mimarp.saka, 46, 54, 72, 385 Motor dhamani, 351
Mimarp.sa, 46, 56, 57 n., 86, 88, 98, Motor organs, 261
117, 120, 154. 219, 389, 441, 479, Mouth, 156, 325
483-488, 577; vidhi conception, Movement, 188, 235, 352, 365, 371;
479 ff.; vidhi conception, diverse of thought, 254
views on, 481, 482 Moving, 332, 361
Mimli'f!lsiidhikara7Ja-miilii, 220 mrdu, 359 n., 361
Mfmii1!£Sii-sutra, 280 n., 400 n., 401 n., mrgatn'IJikiidayafz, 21 n.
479 mrtyu, 299
MJmiirp.sii view, 99 Mucus, 276
Mimarp.sists, So, 99, 125, 171, 172, Mudga, 358 n.
180 muditii, 412, 460
Mode of mind, 15 mudriis, 455
Modes of Brahman, 44 mukhya, 259 n. 3
Modification, 22, 25, 30, 101, 183, 186, Muktiivali, 225
210, 215, 233. 243. 372 mukti, 245, 272
Modifications of miiyii, 35 Muktika, 51 1 n.
Moggallana, 248 Muktika-Upani~ad, 246, 247 n., 511 n.
moha,4I3-417,498 l\llukundadasa,443
mohanam, 498 Mukundasrama, 82 n.
Moist, 337 n., 361 Multiplicity, 243
Moistening, 361 Mumma<Jideva, 232
Moisture, 358, 360, 365 Mumuk~-vyavahiira, 23 1
mok~a, 44, 227, 229, 249, 267, 407, Mundane, 512
523 muni, 233. so6
mok~a-siidhana, 228 Munidasa, 431
mok~a-siistra, 385, 423 muiija grass, 296
Molqopiiya-siira, 232 Mufijavan, 298 n. 4
Molecular, 194 Mu~ufaka, 345, 551
Momentariness, 66, 184, 186 Mu7Jf!aka-bhii~ya-vyiikhyiina, 193
1\llomentary, 5, 32, 63, 70, 71, 96, 177, Mu7JI!.aka-Upm1i~ad, so, 78, 250
182, 184-186, 201, 367, 368; ap- 260, 344 n., 345, 494, 495, 551
pearance, 32; cause, 185; character, Mu7Jf!aka-Upan#ad-bhf¥ya, 78
182 n.; existents, 32; flashing, 31, Muralidhar, P., 424
63; ideas, 30; imaginations, 233; Muscles, 254
individuals, 59 Music, 498 n.
1\lloments, 15, 26 n., 27 n., 6o, 65, 151, Mutual dependence, 159
182, 184, 206, 211 n., 236, 238 Mutual help, 184
Mongolia, 164 Mutual interdependence, 140
Monism, 43 Mutual negation, 122, 200, 226
Monistic, 204; interpretation, 218; Mutual reference, 158
type, 228; Vedanta, 219; view, Mutual relations, 204
203 mufjhii, 378
Moon, 6, 26, 330, 525 muliidhiira, 453
Moral, 23 n., 24, 378, 404, 464, 484, murdhni, 449
511, 523; conflict, 453,495; destiny, murttiimurtta-riisi, 44
206, 207; discipline, soo; efforts, miltriitisiira, 296
466, 467; elevation, 447, 457; in- Mysterious centre, 356
junctions, 278; life, 418; precepts, Mysterious Ku7J4alinf, The, 353 n.
494 Mysterious operation, 364
Morality, 522 Mysterious power, 356
5ss Index
Mystic, 534 Na<,iuvil Matham, 198
Mystical cognition, 491 Naga, 75, 539
Mystical state, 451 Naganatha, 434
Nagarjuna, 3, 4, 7, 8, Io, 30, 5I, 119,
natja,345 124, 127, I63-I6 5 , I68, I70, I7I,
Nagnaka, 300 '372, 398, 424-428, 436; his criti-
Nails, 325, 326 n. cism of causation as interpreted by
nairilpya, 174 Bhavya and Candrakirti, 164, 166;
Nai~adha-carita, 126, 393 his criticism of causation contrasted
Na#karmya-siddhi, 17, 8o, 82, 84, 99, with that of the Hinayanists, I68;
100, 102, 148 n .. 198, 199, 216, 251 his criticism of the concept of
Na#karmya-siddhi-tlkii, 148 n. "going," 168 ff.; his distinction of
N aifkarmya-siddhi-vivara1}a, 99 limited truth (sa7{lvrta) and absolute
naifthikf, 415 truth (paramiirtha), 3; his view re-
Naiyayika, 51, 71, Io8, n8, 120, 124, garding production and nature of
127, 128, I31 1 I34 1 I39, 1441 146, things, 41; his main thesis of "no
163, 167, 171, 172, 176, 182, 185, thesis," 163, 164, 166, I67
189, 227, 329, 412 Nagesa, 262
na ki7Jlcid avedifam, 154 Nagesvara, 55
Na~atra-kalpa, 283 niik~atrii1}i, 292 n.
Nakula, 432 niima-rilpa, 498
nalam, 345 n. niima-rilpiinkura, 307
Nara, 537, 543 N iima-sa7Jlgraha-miilikii, 220
Naradanta, 428 Nanii Dik~ita, 17, 52, 222 n., 225
Narahari, 57, 231, 443 niiniipe~a-pratiyoginii7Jl bheda!z pratl-
Narasiq1ha, 79 yate, 95
N arasiq1ha Bhatta, 55 niira, 538
Narasiq1ha Kaviraja, 329 n., 434 niiriiya1}a,439,535,537,539,541,543o
na svarilpa-dr~ti!z prati- yogy- ape~ii, 545, 546, 548, 549; conception of,
199 537.538
Natural forces, I85 NarayaQ.a Dik~ita, 54 n.
Natural quality, 502 NarayaQ.a Jyotisha, 57 n.
Nature, 358 n., 501, 525; of conscious- NarayaQ.a Yati, 79
ness, 64; of knowledge, 194; of NarayaQiisrama, 53, 54, 216
things, 372 NarayaQendra Sarasvati, 78
Nauseating, 501 niisikya, 259 n. 3
nava, 385 iiiina-Sa7Jlvara, 500
nava-dviira7Jl, 292 N eamess, 360
Nava-nltaka, 435 Necessary antecedence, 186
N ava-siihasiHzka-carita, I 26 Neck, 336
nava-tantra, 385 Negation, 85, 91, 95, 97, no, 117, IJI,
naviibhyasta-tantra, 385 IJ2, 143, 162, 182, 194 1 222, 223,
Navel, 318, 342, 350, 352, 355 271, 438
navya-nyiiya, 1 24 Negative, 117,121, ISJ;criticism, 192;
na vyavahiira-bijam, 89 instances, 121; pleasures, 90
Naya-ma1}i-miila, 219 Negativity, 193
Naya-mayfikha-miilikii, 219 Neither-real-nor-unreal, I 17
Nayana-prasiidim, 147, 156 n. Neo-realist, 269
niibhi, 289 Nepal, s8 n.
niihhi-kanda, 355 Nerve-physical, 356
niit/.i, 257,263, 289n., 290, 29I, 344- Nerve-plexus, 353-356, 453, 455
346,348, 353-356; its meaning, 345; Nerves, 256, 342, 356
its number, 345 n., 348; its pre- Nervous system, 344, 352, 453
Carakian senses, 345, 346 Nescience, 6, 9, 45, 101, 117, 148, 153,
niit/.fkii, 345 195. 22I, 222,227,449
niit/.f-sa7JlSparsanodyata, 2 56 Neutral, 357, 378
Niit/.f-vijiiiina, 354 New bones, 286 n. 1
niit/.f-vra7Ja, 296 New moon, 5I9
Index
New Testament, 549 nivasi~yasi, 55 I
Nibandha, I92, 497 nivesanam, 497
nibandha-prqpii.fijali, 49 nivrtti, 507, so8
Nibandha-sa'lflgraha, 273, 424, 427 niyama,278,454.455,491
nibbii7)a, 460 niyama-viddhi, 46
nidarsana, 389, 392 niyantii, 332
Nidiina, 30I, 395, 397, 428, 430, 432, niyati, 372, 4IO
433 niyoga, 392, 48 I
Nidii.na-prampa,434 Niyoga-kii.7Jt/.a, 87, 88, 98
Nidiina-sthiina, 395, 425, 428 n'ila, 29
Niddesa, 539, 542, 549 Nilakar:ttha, 274, 443, 545
nidrii, I04 Nilakar:ttha Bhatta, 434 n. 4
nigamana, 379, 387 Nilakar:ttha Dik~ita, 219
Nigama-tattva-siira-tantra, 353 n. niliigalasiilii, 298 n. 6
Nigamanta Mahadesika, 439 nflikii, 297
nigraha-sthiina, 388, 401 n'irandhra, 354 n.
Nihilists, 127, 234 Non-appropriation, 506
ni~lSvabhiiva, 35 Non-being, 143, 148, 203, 238
nif:zse~a-karmiisaya, 249 Non-Buddhistic, 164
nib,sviisa, 327 Non-distinction, 207-209
nijigi1JlSanatii, 496 Non-eternal, I20-I22, 386 n., 387
Nimbarka school, 443 Non-etemality, I9I
Nimi, 357 Non-existence, 28, 193, 217, 243, 5I7
Nimi-tantra, 435 Non-existent, I2, 28, 32, 4I, III, I20,
nimitta, 74, 395 I2I, IS2, ISS. I6I, 173. I94. 224,
nimitta-kiira7Ja, 360 234. 235. 244, 259. 517
nimflite, 257 Non-existing effects, 174
niranuyojyiinuyoga, 389 n. Non-injury,469,5os,5o6,so8-si 1,514
nirarthaka, 389 n. Non-momentary, 182
niriikiirii buddhib,, I8o Non-moral, 403
niriispadii, 21 n. Non-perception, 200
nirdeia, 389, 390 Non-permanency of entities, 185
nir7)aya, 389 Non-pleasurable-painful, 23 n.
Nirukta, 275 n., 346 n., 535, 547 Non-production, 249
nirvacana, 389, 392 Non-self, 6, 101; elements, 24
nirvii7)a, 23 I, 247, 450 n. 1 Non-stealing, 505
nirvii7)a-miitra, 233 Non-transgression, 500
nir-vikalpa, 22, 374, 401 Normal, 335; duty, 509, SI4, 516;
nir-vikiira, 368 measure, 319; state, 339
Niscaladasa Svamin, 216 n. Nose, 325
Niscala Kara, 427, 429 Nostrils, 367
niscaya, I73. 373, 384 Nothingness, 16
niscayiitmikii, 484 n. 1 Nourishment, 307
niscayiitmikii antabkara7Ja-vrtti, 7 5 Nrga, 107
niscayiitmikiib,, 367 Nrsi111hasvarupa, 52 n.
ni~karfa7Ja, 169 Nrsi111ha Thakkura, 443
nifkriya, I63 Nrsirphasrama Muni, 17, 31, 43 n.,
ni~prakiirikiiyiib saprakiirakatvena bhii- 5I-s6, 57 n., 72, 78, 92, I03, 124,
vab,, 224 216-218; his date and works, 216;
nitamba, 285 n. 7, 287 n. 2 nature of his Vedantic interpreta-
Nityabodha Acarya, 11 I tions, 217
nityaga, 368 n. Number, 158, 162, I88, 360, 370
nitya-naimittika, 442 Numerical, 14; difference, 370; quali-
Nityanatha Siddha, 427 ties, I62
nitya-sama, 380 n. 4, 382 n. Nutrient, 365 n.
nityatva-prati~edhiit, 386 n. Nutritive, 357, 358; elements, I85
nityatviid, 22 n. Nyaya, 19. 40, 51, 57 n., 107, 115, 117,
nityanitya-vastu-viveka, 495 120, 122, 125-127, I37. 143. I46,
Index
Nyaya (cont.) 328,371,372, 515; analysis of voli-
147, 160, 161, 168, 170, 179, 192, tion, 515; criticism of its categories
205, 211, 248, 306, 307, 375. 379. by Sriha~a, 127 ff.; its categories
393, 394, 415, 482, 483 n. 2, 484, criticized by Anandaji'iana, 193, 19-~;
485, 515, 517; its arguments in its categories refuted by Citsukha,
favour of the existence of God criti- 157 ff.; its categories refuted by
cized by Kamalasila, 176 ff.; its idea Kamalasila, 187 ff.; its categories
of emancipation, 248; its theory of refuted by Sankara, 189 ff.
the subtle body, 306; origin of, Nyiiya-viirttika, 106
392 ff.; springs of action in, 412,413 Nyiiya- viirttika- tiitparya - parisuddhi,
Nyaya, categories, 147, 148, 156, 192; 107
definitions, 163; logic, 167; logi- Nyiiya-viirttika-tiitparya-!ikii, 45 n.
cians, 192; perceptions, 168; philo- nyiiya-vistara, 547
sophy, 145, 398; psychology, 414; nyiiyiiciirya, 122
school, 167; system, 374, 408; view, Nyiiyiimrta, 118, 225
178; writers, 124, 127, 146, 157 Nyiiyamrta-tarangi1)f, 118
Nyiiya-candrikii, 57 n., 425, 428 nyuna, 384,385,388,389
Nyiiya-dipiivall, 51, 116, 118, 192
Nyiiya-dlpiivali-tiitparya-!ikii, 116 Object, 17, 19, 25, 27, 29-31, 35, 88,
Nyiiya-dlpikii, 442 358, 367, 401; of awareness, 20, 29,
Nyiiya-kalpa-latikii, 83 209; of consciousness, 64; of know-
Nyiiya-kandall, 83, 85,249 n., 263 n. 1, ledge, 27
306,412 Object-consciousness, 149
Nyiiya-ka1)ikii, 45 n., 83, 85, 87, 107, Objection, 31, 101, 153
482 n. 1 Objective, 21, 22, 24, so8; conscious-
Nyiiya-loka-siddhi, 49 ness, 236; content, 15; entities, 25;
Nyiiya-makaranda, 12, 49, 69 n., 70 n., existence, 21, 149; experience, 102;
89 n., I 16-118, 147 n., 192, 194 ignorance, 77; plane, 73; self, 34;
Nyiiya-makaranda-sa,graha, 192 world, 20, 236
Nyiiya-makaranda-!ikii, 116 Objectively, 236
Nyiiya-makaranda-vivecani, 1 16 Objectivity, 29, 101, 153
Nyiiya-maiijari, 107, 248 n., 278 n., Oblations, 448, 526
307 n. 1, 381, 382 n., 394 n., 399, Obligatoriness, 46
413, 460 n. 1, 480 n. 1 Obligatory duty, 99, so6
Nyiiya-miilii, 81 Observation, 174, 366, 375
Nyiiya-muktiivali, 219 Obstacle, 377
Nyiiya-nibandha-prakiisa, 107 Occasion, 377
Nyiiya-niT1)aya, 193 Occasional, 368
Nyiiya-parisuddhi, 119, 120 Occipital, 287 n. 5
Nyiiya-ra/eyii-ma1)i, 82 n., 220 Ocean waves, 329
Nyiiya-ratna-Jfkii, 45 n. Odour,320, 355,365
Nyiiya-ratniivau, 77 n. Oiliness, 328
Nyiiya-siira, 120, 122 ojas, 293, 315-317, 324 n., 343, 346
N yiiya-siira-viciira, I 22 Old age, 512, 523
N yiiya-siddhiinta-dipa, 54 Older literature, 104
Nyiiya-siddhiinta-maiijan, 218 n. OM, 494,526
Nyiiya-siddhiinta-mafijarf-vyiikhyiina, Omnipresent, 204, 529
218 n. Omniscience, 22, 39, 53
Nyiiya-sudhii, 148 n. Omniscient, so, 118, 177; being, 135;
Nyiiya-sfici-nibandha, 107, 112 God, 72
Nyiiya-siltra, 107, 248, 273, 371, 374, Oneness, 224; of reality, 129
377, 379-38 I, 383 n. I, 386 n., 387, Ontological, 36, 265, 366, 517, 518;
388 n., 393, 394, 398-401 existence, 73; objectivity, 25
Nyiiya-sutra-vrtti, 393 Operation, 144, 177, 198
Nyiiya-siistra, 393, 394 Operative, 177; action, 137; functions,
Nyiiya-sikhiima1)i, 54 76; principle, 333
Nyiiya-tattviiloka, 45 n. Opposite quality, 190
Nyaya-Vaise~ika, 49, 163, 197, JIO, Opposition, 497
Index 59 1
Oppositional relation, 95 pa~e vyiipaka-pratuya-paryavasiina-
Oppositional term, 95 baliit, 121
Organ, 357, 358, 365 pakviiiaya,3I6,317, 330,336
Organism, SIS Palate, 348
Organized, soo Palatine process, 287 n. 4
Organizer, 176 palita, 297
Oriental Hi~torical Manuscripts, 219 Palljaka, 300
Oriental Manuscript Library, 205 Pancreas, z88 n. 3
Origin, 239, 410 n., 526 Pandit, 1711., 217, 222 n., 223 n., 224n.,
Origination, 4, 161, 235; of the sub- 225 n., 270 n.
stratum, 12 Pandit, Mr, 111, II2
Orissa, 164 Panjpur, 429
Orthodox school, 369 panthii, 348 n.
Os calcis, 284 n. 3 Pantheism, 45 I
Oscillating movement, 238 Pantheistic, 1
Oscillation, I s8 Pantzinor village, 429, 430
Os innominatum, 285 n. 7 paiica-dasiiizga yoga, 454
"Osteology," 424, 434 Paiicadasr, 214, 215, 216 n., 251 n.
Otherness, 131, 132 paiica-mahii-bhuta-vikiiriil;z, 3 s8
Oughtness, 482 Paii.canada, 429
Outbursts of pleasure, 245 Paficanallya kiivya, 126
Ovary, 290, 302, 307, 309 Paiica-piidikii, 8, 31 n., 52, 54, 102,
Owls, 409 103, 106, 148, 209, 251
Paiica-piidikii-dhyiisa-bhii~ya-vyiikhyii,
Pada-candrikii, 232, 434 31 n.
Pada-maiijarl, 297 n. 4 Paiica- piidikii- siistra- darpat)a, 3 I n.,
Pada-yojanikii, 79 103
padiirtha, 389, 390 Paiica-piidikii-vivara'l)a, 17, 30, 31 n.,
Padiirtha - candrikii - prabhiisa - nama, 32, 33 n., 34 n., 52, 53, 79, 84, 103,
436 148, 149, 193, 206 n., 208-210 1 214,
Padiirtha-nin:taya, 44 216
Padiirtha-tattva, 10 Paiica-piidikii-vivara'l)a-bhiiva-prakiiSi-
Padiirtha-tattva-nin;.aya, so, S I, 57 n. kii, 31 n.
Padiirtha-tattva-nin:taya-vivara'l)a, I 93 Paiica-piidikii-vivara'l)a-prakiiiikii, 54,
Paddy, 358 n. 103, 217
padma, 356 Paiica-piidikii-vyiikhya, 52 n.
Padmanabha Pai).<;iita, 126 n. Paiica-prakriyii, 52 n.
Padmapada, 8, 9, 30, 3 In., 32, 34, 47, Paiica-riitra, 461, 491, 546, 547,
48, 51, 54, 79, 86, 89 n., 102, Io6, 548 n.
147-149, 151, 209; causality of Paii.casikha, 476
Brahman, 106; his followers, 102, paiica-vidham adhyiitman, 537
103; his view of perception, etc., paiicendriya-gu'l)iivahii, 355
105, 106; meaning of ajiiiina, 104, paiiczkara'l)a, 74 n., 76
105; quarrel with Buddhists re- Paiicikara'l)a-bhiiva-prakiisikii, 79
garding the nature of existence, 32; Paiiclkara'l)a-prakriyii, 79
regarding the nature of self-con- Paiiclkara'l)a-tiitparya-candrikii, 79
sciousness, 33 ff. Paiict.kara'l)a-tlkii-tattva-candrikii, 79
Padma-purii'l)a, 393 Paiiczkara'l)a-viirttika, 79
padma-yugma-traya, 257 Paiiclkara'l)a-viirttikiibhara'l)a, 79
Paila, 432 Paiiclkara'l)a-vivara'l)a, 79, 193
Pain, 175, 181, 203, 242, 248, 343, Paiijikii, 3 I n., 171
360, 366, 369, 371, 373. 412, 463, paiiiiii, soo, 504
470, Sio-SI2 pa'l)idhi, 497
Painful, 23 n., 242 para,36o,369, 370,378
Painting, 203 parab iitmii, 368
Paippalada, 283 paraloka#a'l)ii, 405
pakja, 121, 139 parama-guru, 86
pak~a-dharmatii, 148 parama-ha1Jlsa, 252 n.
592 Index
Parama-hatftSa-Upan#ad, 252 n. Pataiijali, 259 n., 265, 304 n., 403, 408,
parama7Jl pada'J!l, 228 4IO n., 4I4, 431,436,443,447,451-
parama-sulqma, 4I I 455, 458, 460, 461, 476, 477. 491,
Paramananda, I 26 n. 492, 504, 539. 540, 542. 543, 546,
paramiitzu, 189, I9J 548, 549
paramiirtha, 5 Patafijali-sutra, 5 I7
paramiirtha-darsana, 248 Patella bone, 285 n. 4
paramiirtha-prapii, 443 Path of wisdom, 495
paramiirtha-rupa, 4 Pathology, 434
paramiirtha-satya, 3 Patience, J6o, 50o-502,5IO
paramiitman, 445, 446, 455, 46I, 465, Patient, 296
466 patitthii, 459, 500
paramiitma-riisi, 44 pafigho, 497
Paramesvara, 53, 2o6 paurtzamiisz, 292 n.
param ojas, 343 pauru~a, 252-254,272,525
pararrz dhiima, 533 pau~a-viidins, 402
para puru~a, 468 Pau~a, 294
paraspariidhyiisa, I I 3 Pau~kalavata, 424
parasparopakiiritii, I 84 Pau~kaliivata-tantra, 435
para-tantratii, IO pa~#ka, 28I, 296
para-vijfiapti-vise~iidhipatyiit, 21 n. pavamiina, 292 n.
pariidi, 369 pavana, 333
para prakrti, 465 Pamnasa demon, 300
pariirtha, 4I2 piicaka, 303, 330
Parasara, 25 I Piidma-tantra, 548 n. 3
Pariisara-sa'J!lhitii, 432 piika, 362 365, 370
Pariisara-smrti, 83, 252 n. Pal).gava, 502, 545
paribandho, 497 Pal).gya, 2I9
Paribhii~ii, 53 Pal).ini, 297 n., 538-540, 542, 543
Parietal, 287 n. 5 pii'IJi-piida-saliikiidh#thiina, 285 n. 3
pariggaho, 496 piitzi-piidiinguli, 285 n. I
parigraha, 409 papa, 522
parihiira, 388 piiramiirthika, 2, 44
Parimala, Io6 n. piira7Jlparya, 374
paritziima,2I,38,39.44,46, I72, I90, Parasarya, 3 I 6
193, I94, 224, 370, 372, 4IO; cause, piiribhapka, 363
45; doctrine, I7I; view of causation, piirimiitzt;lalya, I89; measure, I90
45 Parsvanatha, 544
paritziimi-kiiratza, 5 I piirft)l, 284
paripiika, 27 n. piirthiva, 359
parisQ7Jlkhyii-vidhi, 47 pf'4atztja, 54I
parispanda, 256 pii§iitzavat-samam, 266
pari~at, 378 Pataii.jala-Sarpkhya, I77
Parjanya, 300 n. 2 piitiila, 76, 300
paro/qatviid acintya7Jl, 316 Patrasvarnin, I72
Particles, I57 Pataliputra, 427
Particular, 63 piifimokkha-sa7JlVara, 500
Partless, I57, 158, 190, I99 Pea, I69
Parts, 40 Peace, 444, 450, 490, 500, 501, 503,
Parvataka-tantra, 435 5II
paryanuyojyope/qatza, 389 n. Peacefulness of mind, 5IO
Passion, 229, 373, 414, 4I9, 45I, 453, Pearl, 525
459, 477, 489, 493. 497. 498, 529, Peculiarities, I59
531 Pelvic bone, 287 n. I
Passionlessness, 47 5 Pelvic cavity, 285
Passive, 24 Pelvis, 340, 348
paiavab, 292 n. pema7Jl, 497
paiyantl, 353 Penances, 539
Index 593
Penis, 296, 326 n. Philosophy, 44, 51, 66, 73, 228, 504,
People, 509 509,517, 525; of BadarayaJ.la, 36
Perceived universe, 241 Phlegm, 299, 300, 325, 365, 391
Perceiver, 22, 67, 135, 139, 155, 2oo- Phlegmatic diseases, 299
202, 209, 234. 341 Physical, 238, 369, 404, 504; diseases,
Perceiving, 330; power, 200; principle, 418; process, 48; propulsion, 48o;
199 sciences, 273; trouble, 512; world,
Perceiving-self, 200 270
Perception, 17, 18, 20, 21, 65, 88, 92, Physician, 277, 278, 328 n., 338, 357,
u6, II7 1 135, 145, 148, 159, 167, 387, 389, 392, 415
x8o, 187, 192, 194, 200, 202, 205, Physiological activity, 331
207, 208, 212, 213, 226, 234, 254, Physiological effects, 360
269, 270, 302, 373. 374. 377. 401, Physiological functions, 261, 263, 331,
407; of identity, 65 333
Percepts, 270 Physiological operations, 332, 335
Perceptual, 77; data, 156; experience, Physiological position, 332
105; knowledge, 77, 192; process, picchila, 359 n., 361
208, 217 pihii, 497
Percipi, 19 Pilgrimage, 230, 441, so8
Performance, 502 Pillar, 26
Perfwnes, 498 n. piizgalii, 257, 292, 353 n., 354, 453,
Pericardium, 284 n. 3 454
Permanence, 186 pi't)tf,a, 43, 312 n., 314
Permanent, 22, 179, 241, 368, 369; pipiisii, 496
consciousness, 71; convictions, 240; pipiisii-sthiina, 288 n. 1
entity, 22; perceiver, 187; self, 71, Pipe, 346
179; subject, 366; substance, 145 pippali, 299 n. I
Persistence, 18, 67; of knowledge, 18 Pischel, R., 345 n.
Persistent, 188, 241 Pisiica, 282, 300
Persisting cause, 183 Pisiica-veda, 274 n. 3
Persisting entity, 183, 184 pitr-yiina, 519, 521
Person, 252, 255, 367 pitta, 257, 276, 282, 296, 300, 317,
Personality, 1 Io, 524 319, 320, 325-337. 339. 341, 344.
Perspiration, 351 ; channels, 348 347. 349. 350, 361, 362, 365, 392,
Pessimism, 414, 504 524; nature of, 330, 331
Pessimistic tendency, 521 pitta-dharii, 317
pen, 314, 318 pittala, 334 n.
Petta Dik~ita, 54 n. pitta-prakrti, 328, 334
phala, 359 pittiisaya, 350
phala-tyiiga, 444 pithara-piika, 194
phale ner~yu, 420 piyato, 490
Phantom show, 1 1 pllu-piika, 194
pha't)0,342,351 Placenta, 291
Pharmacopreia, 277 Planet, 333
Pharyngeal plexus, 355 Plant, 333, 359
Phiilguna, 294 Plato, 506
Phenomena, 177, 501 Playful activity, 42
Phenomenal, 126, 127, 167, 499; Playful instincts, 178
appearance, 48; reality, 167; self, plan, 289
415 Pleasantness, 358
Phenomenon, 374 Pleasing, 337 n.
Philosopher, 38, 446 Pleasurable, 23 n., 242; experience,
Philosophic, 502; analysis, 467; know- 91; state, 181
ledge, 246, 523; truth, 504; view, Pleasure, 68, 175, 247, 248, 343, 360,
2; wisdom, 494 366, 369, 371, 373. 374· 404, 412,
Philosophical, 228, 501 ; development, 452, ~63,487, 504,508-512,520
48; idea, 366; ignorance,417; truth, Pleasure-seeking, 507
230 Plexus, 353 n., 356
594 Index
plihan,288 prajniipariidha, 321, 339, 405, 415-
Pluralistic experience, 204 418,422
Plurality, 38, 39, 95, 161, I95; of prakarat;za, 57 n., 231
causes, I6I Prakarat;za-pancikii, 249
Points of dispute, 389 prakara7Ja-sama,38on., 382n., 386,387
Poison, 359 n., 361, 497 Prakatiirtha-vivaraTJa, 46, 49, so, 72,
Polemic, I26, I27 196-I98, 205, 206, 213; its philo-
Polemical, 204 sophy, dates, etc., 196-I98
Poles, 208 prakiiSa-h~atviit, 197
Politics, 385 Prakasananda, I7-I9, 31 n., 52, S;>,
Polluting agents, 326-328 55, 56, 84, 22I, 223-225, 270; Brah-
Pollution, 4o8, 409 ma and the world in, 224; discus-
Popular belief, 377 sions regarding awareness in, I7-
Positive, 47; cause, 197; entity, 182; I9; discussions regarding subjective
experience, I54; knowledge, 154; idealism in, I7; miiyii in, 224; nature
quality, 152; unity, I53 of ajniina in, 222; nature of iinanda
Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus, in,223; negative dialectics of, 18, I9;
253 n., 356 n. quarrel with Vasubandhu of, 19;
Positivity, I93 theory of causality in, 221-223;
Possession, I58 view-point of his work, 220, 221;
Postures, 455 works of, 225
po~aka-rasa, 323 n. Prakasanubhavananda, 17 n.
Potency, 8, JI, 175, 359, 361-363, Prakasatman, 9, Io, 17, 30, 33, 82, 84,
370 89,10J-1o6, II8,148,I49,151,I9J,
Potency-in-chief, 364 208-2I0, 214, 222-224, 234; his
Potential, 23 n.; ajniina, 53; energy, quarrel with the Buddhists regard-
356 ing nature of objects, 30, 31
Potentialities, 24 Prakiisiitma-Sri-carat;zail;, I04
Potter, 249 prakopa, 335 n.
Potter's wheel, 246 prakrti, 42, 72, 101, 104, 109, 175, 177,
Power, 8, 22, 2IS, 243, Sio; of con- I8I, 238, 239, 250, 258, 265, 272,
trolling others, 505 n.; of produc- 334. 335. 372, 388, 4IO, 440, 455,
tivity, 26 n. 457. 461-465, 467, 473. 477. 478,
Prabandha-parisodhinl, 52 n. 482, SIS, SI6, 525, 526, 533. 534
Prabhakara, 66, 67, 69, I47, I54, ISS, prakrti-do~as. 335 n.
I97, 249, 483, SIS; his analysis of prakrti-miina, 335 n.
illusion, I54; his idea of emanci- prakrti'f!l yiinti miimikiim, 526
pation, 249 pralaya, 37, 48, I9I
prabhiiva, 323,362,364-366 pramii, 128, IJ7, I94, 206, 2I2, 213
Prabodha-candrikii, 443 pramiida, 4IJ
Prabodha-candrodaya niitaka, 220 pramii7Ja, 77, I28, 137, I67, 194, 204,
Practical action, 152 222, 254. 373. 375. 376, 379. 380,
Practical discipline, 500 384 fl.
Practical movement, ISS pramiir;a-caitanya, 207, 208
Practice, 487, 500, SI4 Pramii1Ja-manjan, I 20, I 24
prade/a, 389, J9I Pramii1Ja-miilii, 12, I3, 51, 116, 118,
pradhiina, I72, 370,440 148, 192
Pradyumna, 543, 545 pramii1Ja-samuccaya, 44
Pragalbha Misra, 126 n. Pramiit;za-viirttikiilaizkiira, 49
Pragmatic, 371; basis, 152 Pramii1Ja-viirttikiilaizkiira-!lkii, 49
Praise, 5I2 Pramii1Ja-vidhva1J1.Sana, 398 n.
prai~ya-prai~ayofz sambandha/:z, 481 Pramii1Ja-vidhva1JI.Sana-sambh/4ita-vr-
prajii/:z, 292 n. tti, 398 n.
Prajapati, 484 Pramiit;za-vrtti-nirt;zaya, I 98
prajnapti-sat, s8 pramiitr, 77, 105
prajnii, 24,265,491,504,548 prameha, 343 n.
Prajfiakara Gupta, 49 Pram~a-dfpikii, 442
PrajiianAnanda, 79, 196 pram~atviit, 121
Index 595
pramiti, 77 pratyiitma-ved_va, 22
Pramodapurandara Acarya, 225 n. pratyetavya, I9
pra1J.etii, 332 pratyudiiharati, 342
prasaizga, 389, 391 PraUijhiinubhuti, 81
prasaizga-pratidntiinta-sama, 380 n. 4 Pravacana-bhii~a, 250
prasaizga-sama, 381 n. pravartanii, 482
prasiida, 3I8, 325, 492 pravartate, 3 I4
prasiida-dhiitu, 325 pravrtti, 389, 507
prasiira, 336 n. pravrtti-siimarthya, I30
Prasthiina-bheda, 225 prayatna, 238, 369-37I
prasyandana, 349 prayatniidi, 37I
prasama, 335 prayatniinta, 369, 370
Prasastarnati, I72 prayatniintanyaka, 381 n.
Prasastapada, I62, 249, 412, 4I3, 505, prayatniintarlyakatva, 382 n.
5I5 prayojana, 383, 384 n. I
Prasastapiida-bhii~ya, I6J n. priikrta-miina, 3I9, 320
Prasnanidhana, 428 priiktana, 253
Praina-Upan#ad, 78, 290n., 344 n., priimii1Jya, 214
345 prii1Ja,75.76, 104,258-z6o, 262,291,
Prasna- Upan#ad-bhii~a, 78 292, 303, 311, 332, 3J3, 340, 342,
prathamii-bhfimikii, 264 344,346,347,349,352,356,373,448,
pratibandha, I76 449; as depending on the head, 340;
pratibimba, 48 as vibration, 263 ; as vital parts, 342;
pratibimba-viida, I06 channels of, 347, 348 ; heart the
pratijnii, 379, 387 centre of, 340; history of the mean-
pratijfiii-hiini, 388 ing of, 259 ff.; seat of, according to
pratijniintara, 388 n. Caraka, 342
pratijnii-sannyiisa, 388 n. prii1J.Qi~a1Jii, 405
Pratimii-niifaka, 394 n. prii1Ja-karmii1Ji, 448
pratinivi~tii, 378 prii't}amaya-ko~a, 76
pratipak~a-bhiivanii, 460 prii't}a-nirodha, 258, 268
pratipannopiidhau n#edha- pratiyogit- prii~za-sarrzyamana, 454
vam, 222 prii't}a-spanda, 256, 257
pratipannopiidhiiva-pratiyogitva, 217 prii't}a-vahii, 3 I8
pratisa1{lSkartr, 425 priitJa-vahiiniirrz srotasii7p hrdayarrz mil-
prati~!hii, 279, 285 lam, 343
prat#fhiipanii, 379 prii't}a viiyu, 348, 355
prati-tantra-siddhiinta, 383 prii1Jiipiina-gatl ruddhvii, 448
prattkopiisanii, 448, 488 prii1Jiiyasviihii,448
prattta, I9, 128 prii'l)iiyiima, 256, 257, 447-449, 452-
pratitya-samutpiida, 3 n., 8 455, 458
pratyabhijnii, 33,65,67 priipty-apriipti-sama, 38o n. 4, 38I n.
pratyag iitman, 6 priirabdha-karma, 247, 250
Pratyagbhagavan, 147 Priitisiikhyas, 276
Pratyag-rupa-bhagavan, I I9 n. priitlttka-sattva, 270
pratyak, 63 priiyas-citta, 275, 278, 28I, 295, 296
pratyak-cit, I IO Pre-condition, 405, 506
pratyak-citi, 9 Predatory birds, 409
Pratyak-svarupa-bhagavat, I56 n. Predominance, 367
pratya~a, 92, I94, 207, 373, 374, 376, Preferment, 50I
379, 407, 41 I Preparatory measure, 500
Pratyak~adevayathacarya, 439 prera1Ja, 481
Pratyak~a-siinram, 354 n. Presentation of the false, I54
Pratyak-tattva-pradipikii, 222 n., 223 n. Pride, 267, 373, 409, 509-511
pratyaktva, J: 15 Principle of consciousness, 20, 22
praty-anuyoga, 384 Principle of difference, 6o
pratyaya, 395 Principle of intelligence, 20
pratyiihiira, 454, 45 5 Principle of thought, 3 5
Index
Privilege, 505 PuQQabhadda, 539
prl~ana, 328 pu~ya, 522
Probability, 373 pupphusa, 258 n., 3 I8
Probandum, I20, I2I, I39, I40 Puriil)a, 43, 74, 78, 228, 279, 328,
Probans, 139 547
Proceedings and Trallsactionsof the First Purii~a-veda, 274 n. 3
Oriental Conference, Poona, 400 n. Pure, 36, 303; annihilation, 234;
Proceedings of the Madras Oriental awareness, 33; being, I3; bliss, I3,
Conference, 232 90,113,215, 223; blissfulness, 92;
Process, 256, 377 cessation, 234; consciousness, 22,
Procreator, 525 30, 33-35, 46, 65, 7I-74, 77, IOI,
Product, I3, 1~, 23, 33I; complexes, 4 I05, Il8, I79. I8I, 197. 203-207,
Production, II, I8, 25, 32, 37, 38, 4I, 209, 2II, 227, 235, 236, 238, 241-
62,166, I68,I73,I74,I77, I82,I84, 243; essencelessness, 234; extinc-
I86, 187, I9o, 235, 236; of action, tion, 233; happiness, 22; idea, 234;
473; of knowledge, I8 intelligence, 8, I3, 2I, 22, so, 89 n.,
Prognostication, 396, 397 I02, IIQ, 233, 477; negation, 234;
Prohibitions, 504 thought, 24; vacuity, 235
Projection of objectivity, 25 Purificatory rites, 278
Proof, I28 Purity, 469, 502, 505, 5IO, 5II, 5I3,
Proper discernment, I34 5I4, 542; of heart, 510; of mind,
Proper measure, 325 438,44I
Proper proportion, 327 pur~a, 3I7
Property, 357-360, 365, so6 purl~a-dharii, 3I7
Propulsion, 48I, 482 puntat, 344
Prosperity, 50 I puru~a, I81, 234, 24I, 250, 251, 255,
Protection, 505 265, 272, 379. 380, 385, 388, 440,
Proud, SIO, 511 457, 458, 46I, 465-467, 472, 477,
Pr~tha-gatiisthi, 287 n. I 524, 537
Pr~tih, 286 puru~alz parafz, 465
Prthak, 370 puru~a-kiira, 256
Prthaktva, I94, 370 pu~a-niiriiya~a, 537
Prthivi, 75 PurUfa-niicaya, 342 n.
Psychical frame, IOS PurUfa-sukta, 523, 524, 537
Psychical process, 48 purUfiirtha, 547
Psychological, 108, 265, 366; appear- puru~ottama, 55, 4I6, 466
ance, 32; constituents, 58; duality Puru!}Ottama Dik!}ita, I I 5
of awareness, 29; elements, 58-6o; Puru!}Ottama Sarasvati, 79, 225
entities, 59; existence, 73; experi- Puru!}ottamavana, I20
ence, 170; ignorance, 12, I09; pury-anaka, 245
necessity, 25; objectivity, 25; objects Pus, 325, 330
of awareness, 29; self, 9; thought, PUfpiifijali, So
35 puraka, 257, 258
Psychologically, 3 I PurQaprajiia, I 20
Psycho-physical parallelism, 339 PiirQak!}a Maudgalya, 357
Psychosis, 24, 29, 250, 254, 464 Pur~nanda, 232, 354 n.
Psychosis-transformations, 22 Pliil).ananda Sarasvati, 79
Pthisis, 288, 299 PurQananda Tirtha, 78, 79
Pubic, 348; bone, 285 n. 7; nerve, PurQananda Yati, 353 n.
353 purva, 400 n.
Pubis, 285 n. 7 purva-kiila-bhiivitva, I 6o
Public good, 485 purva-pa~a, 389, 39I
pudgala, 58, 59 purva-prajfiii-sarrzskiira, I04
Pudgala-viniscaya, 58 n., 59 n. purva-ropa, 336 n., 396, 397
punar-ukta, 388, 389 n. purvavat, 398-400
Punan·asu, 395 PUrvottara - mimiimsii- viida- naksatra-
Punarvasu Atreya, 393 miilii, 2I9 . .
Pungent, 337 n., 357-359, 363 pu~a. 353
Index 597
pfitikii, 296 riiga, 267,4I3,4I4,4S9,497
piiya, 330 n. riiga-dve~a, 420
riigiidi, 369
Qualification, 1S6 Raghavananda,7S, IIS
Qualitative change, I 5 Raghavendra Svamin, 443
Qualities, 5, 143, I4S, I52, ISS, I6I, Raghavendra Yati, I7 n.
I62, IS7, 190, 359, 360, 369-374, riija-karmii1Ji, 296
37S, 462, 50 I, 505 n., 5 I5 Raja Makhindra, 21S
Quick, 337 n. riijasa, 367, 373, 46S-47o
Quickness, I56 Riija-taraizgi1}t, 43 I
Rajanaka, 443
Race, 50I riik~asas, 2S3
Radius, 2S5 n. 6 Rama, 229,230,255,507,546
Rage, 497 Ramabhadra, 79
Raghunatha, I46 Ramabhadra Dik~ita, 43 I
Raghunatha Siromai).i, II9, I24, Ramabhadrananda, 56
126 n. Ramabhadrasrama, 55
Rains, 59, J2I, 327, 335, 370 Ramacandra, 79, 23S
rajas, 72, 74, 75, 303, 3I4, 3I9, 329, Ramacandra Tirtha, 79
367, 372,4I9,436.4s6,46S Ramacandra Y ajvan, 220
rajas element, 26I Ramacandrarya, Sz n.
rajo-vahana-niifjyal:z, 344 n. Ramadatta, 99
Rajputana, 539 Ramadeva, 23I
Rajshahi, 49 Ramakai).tha, 443
Rajwade, V. K., 55I n. Ramakr~J.la, 53, 216 n., 443
Rak~a!,z, 300 Ramakr~J.la Adhvarin, zoS
rakta, 3I7, 324, 326, 327, 339, 352 Ramakr~J.la Bhatta, 434 n. 4
rakta-dharii, 3 I7 Ramakp;;Qa Dik~ita, 54
rakta-du~ti. 324 RamanarayaQa, 443
ram, 55I Ramanatha, 57 n., 434
Rangaraja Adhvarin, 54 Ramanatha Vaidya, 434
Rangaraja Makhindra, 21S Riimarfidn, 264 n.
Rangoji Bhatta, 55, 1oS Ramatirtha, 52, s6, 79. S5, II I, 115,
raiijaka, 330 I IS, I9J
rasa, I94, 236, 302, JI2 n. 3, 317,322- Ramadvaya, I97, I9S, 204, 205, zoS,
325, 327, 32S, 339, 343 n., 347, 34S, 2I2-2I4; ajiiiinas as many, 2IO, 21 I;
350, 357-366, 390, 391 continuity of perception through a
rasa-dhiitu, 323 rapid succession ajiiiina covering
rasa-du~ti. 324 and its removal in, 2I I; his date and
Rasa-ratniikara, 427 work, 204, 205; his definition of
Rasa-sara, I 23 right knowledge different from that
rasa-sthiina, 350 of Vediinta-paribhii~ii, 212; his re-
rasa-viihim, 34S n. lation with Paiica-piidikii, 209, 210;
Rasiibhivyaiijikii, 56 his theory of Vedantic perception in
Rasiitala, 76 contrast to that of Vediinta-pari-
rasiiyana, 276, 30I bhii~ii and Sikhiima1}i, 225 ff.; his
Rasiiyana-tantra, 425 view different from that of the
Rasika-raiijint, 443 Vediinta-paribhii~ii on the subject of
rati, 490, 497 the continuity of perception, 211;
Ratnakirti, 49 his view of time, 2 11, 2 I 2 ; move-
Ratna-prabhii, IOJ, I04, 429 ment of vrtti and perception, zoS-
Ratna-tfilikii, 56 2IO; place of anta!,zkara1Ja in per-
Ratna Vajra, 49 ception, zoS-2I2; pure conscious-
rauk~ya, 337, 362 n. ness and perception, 2 I I
Ravigupta, 432 Ramajiia Pai).<;leya, 225 n., 226
Ray Chaudhury, Dr, 544, 550 Ramananda, 52 n., Sz n., 439
Radheya, 4S Ramananda Sarasvati, IO, 3 I n., s6.
Ra<;lhamalla, 326 n. So, IOJ, I96
Index
Ramanandatirtha, 79, 232 Relativity, I 57
FUunanuja,43, I25,20I,2I9,262,439, Rele, 353 n., 354
44I,442, 542 Religion, 525
Riimiinuja-bhii~a, 262 n. 2 Religious, 367, 509, 525; discipline,
Riimiinuja-mata-kha1_ujana, 220 488; duty, 505; endeavours, 488
Riimiiya'l}a, 229, 230, so6 Remoteness, 369
Riimiiya'l}a-bhiirata-siira-sa't[lgraha, 220 Renunciation,252,444,457.458,sio,
Riimiiya'l}a-siira, 220 5I4
Riimiiya'l}a-siira-sa't[lgraha, 220 Repentance, so8
Riimiiya'l}a-siira-stava, 220 Repetition, 3 6o
Riimiiya'l}a-tiitparya-niY'l}aya, 220 Reply, 388
Riimiiya1}a-tiitparya-sa1fll5raha, 220 Reports on Sanskrit Manuscripts, 2I9
Ramendra Yogin, 57 n. Repository, 22
Ramesvara Bharati, 82 n. Repulsions, 239
riisi, 44 Resemblance, 13 I
React, 23 Resolution, 253
Real, 117, I67, 27I; God, 2;ignorance, Respiratory process, 258 n. 1
4; objects, 26; souls, 2; substance, Responsibility, SOl, sos, 507. soB
23; transformation, 38, 39, 44; Result, 376
world, 2, 20 Retentive power, 373
Realism, 27I Revelation, I3-I6, I97
Realistic, I, 2, 2I3; definitions, I63, Reward, 503
I68; interpretation, 38; logic, I67; Rhetoric, 220
transformation, 38, 39, 44 Rhetorician, I7I
Reality, 5, IS, 20, 73, I IS, I65, I8I, Ribs, 286 n. 2
I86, I93, I95, 206 n., 236, 245, z68, Rice, 358 n.
499 Right cognition, I34, 136, I37
Realization, 233, 239, 524 Right conduct, 405, 406, 423
Rearing, 505; of cows, 505 n. Right knowledg(', 99, I53, I8I, I87,
Reason, I20, I2I, I23, I39, I48, I94, I94, 206, 2I2, 2I3, 229, 239, 248,
375 251, 261
Reasoning, 24, 376, 377 Right perception, 135
Rebirths, 75, 90, 305, 407, 465, 52o- Right thinking, 90
523, 530 Right volition, soo
recaka, 257, 258 Ritual, 547
Recentes Decouvertes de MSS. Midi. Ritualistic, 284
caux Sanscrits dans l'Inde, 425 n. Rockhill, W., 276, 277, 424 n. I
Receptacle, I79, 526 roga-bh#ag-jitiya-vimiina, 377
Recognition, 65, 67, I84 rohi'l}l, 3I7, 396
Recognition of identity, 33, 34, 66; in romiivarta, 342
Buddhism and Vedanta, 33 ff. Root, 347, 365; desires, 243; inclina-
Rectum, 288, 318, 331, 336, 348, 35I tions, 243, 255
Red, 27, 344 n., 349 Rooted instincts, 248
Reed, 346 Root-impression, 3 I
Reflection, 50, 55 Rope,7, 37,73, Io6
Refutation, 127, I46, I47, I6o, I88, Rosy, 349
I89, I92; of action, I88 Roth, 274, 283
Relation, IS, 22, 24, 25, 34, 44, 96, I06, Rough, 332, 338
I2I, I44. 146, IS2, 158, I59. I67, Roughness, 360
I73. 19I, 203, 204, 372, 374. 397; ruci, 497
of identity, 34; of inherence, I48, Rudimentary element, 76
IS8, I87-I89; of inseparability, Rudra, 538
I94 Rug-viniscaya, 434
Relationing, 3I rilk~a, 332, 338, 357, 359, 361, 363,
Relationship, I52 398
Relative concept, 9I rilpa, 377
Relative space, 157 rapatva, 374
Relativistic, I64, 2I3; philosophy, I64 rilpin, 202
Index 599
rilra!z, 298 n. 4 samaveta-samaviiya, 374
~-Veda,28I,345,346,394,486, 535, samaya-viruddha, 385
537 sama-yoga-viihin, 3 19
~g-Vedic, 301; hymns, 28o; sacrifices, samiidhiina,459, 500
281 samiidhi, 24, 251,452,454,455,484 n.,
IJ..ju-vivara1}a, 52 n. 500, 504
~k,274.390, 526 samana,75,258,260,291, 332
~k~griva, 300 sambandhi-svabhiiva-janya, 142
r#, 295 n. 3, 394, 539 sambandhi-svabhiiva-Srita, 142
rtava!z, 292 n. sambhiivanii-bhiiO'a, 103
Sameness, 511; in all situations of life,
sabhiiga-santati-vicchediikhya'!l, 21 n. 511; in blame, 511; in joy, 511; in
Sabhii-parva, 544 praise, 51 1 ; in sorrow, 51 1
sac-chiistra, 267 samlclna, 370
Saccidananda, 79 samuccaya, 389, 392
Sacral nerve, 353 samudga, 287
Sacral plexus, 3 55 samutthiina, 395
Sacrifice, 353 n., 437, 441, 448, 473, Samyagbodhendra Sarpyamin, 52 n.
479, 483, 485, 487, 501, 504-506, samyagjfiiiniidhigama, 249
510, 513, 514, 523, 526, 535, 537 samyak, 135
Sacrificial, 43 n., 494; actions, 493; samyak-paricchitti, 1 34
duties, 474, 479; performance, 522 sa'!lbhava, 384
sacro-coccygeal plexus, 355 SO'!lbhii!ii, 378
Sacrum, 285 n., 287 n. SO'!lbhinnobhaya-riipatviit, 104
sad-asadbhyii'!l vila/qa1}am, 127 sa,ghiita. 463
Sadananda, 55,231 sa1'{lgraha, 49
Sadananda Kasmiraka, 57, 196 SatflhaTIO, 378
Sadananda Vyasa, 443 Sa'!lhitii-kalpa, 283 n.
Sadasiva, 219 Sa'!lhitii-vidhi, 283 n.
Sadasivendra Sarasvati, 82 n. SO'I]'ljfiii, 23
sa-deha-muktatii, 245 sa'!lkalpa, 373
sad-vrtta, 405, 420 sa'!lkalpa-nagarO'!l, 233
Sages, 395, 539 sa'!lkalpa-puTU~a, 233
sagu1}a-brahma, 218 Sarpkaq;ar;ta, 539, 542, 543, 545, 546,
sahabhiita'!l kiiryam, 186 548
Sahadeva,432 SO'Tflkhyii, 370
saha-ka'.Zthikii, 289 n. 3 Sa'Tflklepa-siinraka, 11 n., 17, 43 n.,
sahakiiri, 160 45 n., 52, 54, 56, 85, IIQ-II2, 115,
sahakiiri-kiira1}a, 109 216, 223 n.
Sahapala Deva, 427 Sa'fl/qepa-iiirlraka-sambandhokti, 52 n.
sahasriira, 353, 356 S07!llqepa-iiinraka-siira-s07!lgraha, 1 16,
sahasriira-cakra, 3 56 225
sahopalambha-niscaya, 49 Sa'Tflpriipti, 397 n.
sahopalambha-niyama, 26 n., 35 sa1f!Sarga, 338 n.
sahopalambha-niyamiid, 26 n. S01f!Siira, 44
Saint, 247, 420, 501, 5o6 Sa1f!Siira-tara1}f, 232
Saintly persons, 264 sa'Tflskiira, 65, 36o, 370
Saline, 358, 359 S01f!S!li, 234, 238
Salt, 357 sa'flsaya, 383, 389, 392, 500
Salvation, 228, 305 sa'Tflsaya-sama, 380 n., 382 n., 386, 387
sama, 236 SO'fls/ela, 307
sama-dhiitob, 327 n. sa1flslela-pratyaya, 207
sama-pittiinila-kapha, 334 SO'TflVOra, 500
samatva, 451, 511 sa1Jzvatsariifz, 292 n.
sama-·viita-pitta-ilepnan, 334 n. sa'Tflvedanamaya, 256
samaviiya,4o, 148,183,184,187,189- SO'TflVid, 63, 149, 201, 208, 235, 259
191, 194, 371, 374; relation, 374 sa7!Zvit-karma, 68
samaviiyi-kiira1}a, 143, 360 sa1flt,;t-spanda, 254
6oo Index
SaTflvit-svarupa-bhuto bhedaft, 64 ajfiiina in, I I 5 ; commentaries on his
sa1fZvrta, 3 Sa7Jl~epa-siinraka, 115, 116; differ-
Sa1{lVfltlsa1flVTtiini, 348 n. ence of his view with that of Man-
SaTflvrti, 3, 22; as mithyii-sa7Jlvrti and c,lana, 85; his date, I I2; his view ~f
loka-Sa1fZvrti, 4; its meanings, 3 the causality of miiyii, I I ; nature of
sa7Jlvrti-satya, 3 ajfiiina, I I 2; nature of Brahman,
Sa7Jlyamana, 444 I I4; Vedanta and Buddhism in,
sa1{lyoga, 40, IS8, 194, 373 115
sa1{lyoga-puru~a, 415 sarva-pratyayiinii1{l yathiirthatvam,
sa7Jlyoga-vibhiiga, 370 I48
Sa7Jlyogin, 40 Sarva-siddhiinta-rahasya-fikii, 55
sa1{lyogi-purufa, 368 sarva-srotii1{lsi ayana-bhiitiini, 347
sa1{lyukta-samaviiya, 374 sarva-tantra-siddhiinta, 383
Sa1{lyukta-samaveta-samaviiya, 374 Sarvato-bhadra, 443
Sanaka-sa7Jlhilii, 435 Sar•oiiilga-sundan, 434
sandhiiya S07Jlbhiifii, 378 sarviipahnava, 265
sandhi, 286 n. 2 Sarviirtha-siddhi, I I9 n.
Sandhyakara, 43 I sarve bhiivii anutpanniifz, I67
san kiisafz, 386 sarvendriya-param, 34I
san k~ayafz, 386 sat, I94. 373
sannipiita, 338 n. satas cetyii7Jlsa-cetaniit, 236
sannyiisa, 418 satata-kriyii, 370
sannyiisin, 252 sati, soo
santiinikii, 317 sati-sa1{lvara, soo
santhava1Jl, 497 sat-kiirya-viida, 39, I6S, I72-I74, 472,
Sangha,459 473, 477, 5I7; its criticisms by
Sailghabhadra, I7I Kamalasila and Santarak!}ita, I72 ff.
sailgo, 497 sattii, 10
sankalpa, 75, 264 satthakamma, 276
sankalpa-jiigara, 266 sattva, 72, 74, I83, I93, 197, 206, 250,
sankhiira, 498 303, 308, 3I3, 3I9, 329, 366, 367,
sankhyii, I 94 372,4I9,436,4s6,462,468, 542
sankoca, 348 n. sattva-sa7Jlruddhi, SIO
saficaya, 409 sattva stuff, 2 I I
sarar_ziit siriifz, 347 sattva-iuddhi, 438
Sarasvati, 354 satya, 4, 76, 383, sos, SIO
sarasvatl, 353 Satyabodha, 98
sarga, 177 satya-vacana, sos, 544
Sarpa-veda, 274 n. 3 Satyavan, 306 n. I
sarva-bzja, 22 satya-yuga, 409
Sarva-darsana-sm_ngraha, 2I4 Saubhiigya-vardhinl, 79
Sarva-darsana-siddhiinta-sa7Jlgraha, 55 saukfmya, 3IS
Sarva-dhara, 432 sau~yiit, 349
sarva-dofa-prakopar.za, 416 saumanasyiini, 296
sarva-gata, 474 saumya, 3I3
sarva-jarfopiidiina-bhutii, 203 saumyatva, 5I3
sarva-jfia, I06, I95 Saunagas (grammarians), 540
SarvajnanarayaQ.a, 57 n. Sautrlintikas, 26 n.
Sarvajna-pitha, 98 sa-vikalpa, I07
Sarvajna Sarasvati, 56 sa-vyabhiciira, 384, 386 n.
sarvajfiatii, 22 sa-vyabhiciira hetu, 386 n.
Sarvajna Visve8a, 55 siidhaka, 330
Sarvajnatma Bhagavat, 52 n. siidhana, I I 5
Sarvajnatma Muni, I 1, I7, 43 n., 47, siidharmya-vaidharmya-sama, 380 n. 4
50, 52-54, 57, 72, 8 5 , 105, I I0- siidhiirar.za, 357. so6
112, 115, 116, 223, 224; ajfiiina and siidhiirar.za-dharma, sos, so6, 5I4
truth, 114; ajfiiina in relation with siidhiirar.zatva, 358
Brahman, 112 ff.; association of siidhupad#!a-miirger.za, 252, 253
Index 6or
siidhya, I39, 380, 38I n., 388 n. Siityaki-tantra, 435
siidhya-sama, 386 n., 387 Saym:1a, 79, I87, 2I5, 28o n., 28I, 283,
siidhyiibhiivavad-avrttitvam, I 20 288 n., 289, 290, 292, 293, 298 n.,
Siihasiiilka-carita, 428 299, 344 n., 345 n., 346
Saketa (city), 540 Scapula, 286 n. 4
siik# consciousness, 2I4 Scattering, 337 n.
siik#n, 53, I54 Sceptical, 498 n.
Sarna, 274 Scheme of life, 4I5
siimagrf, I6I, I64 Scholastic, I I, I24; logicism, I24
Saman, 526 Scholasticism, I I 9
siimarthyiitisaya, 97 Science, 73; of life, 278
siimiinya, 371, 397 Scriptural command, 522
siimiinya-chala, 385, 386 Scriptural injunction, 228
siimiinya-pratyiisatti, I39 Scriptural text, 252
siimiinyato-dr~!a, 398, 399, 400 n. Scriptures, I I4, 253, 267
Samin, 57 n. Seal, Dr Sir B. N., 356 n., 483 n.,
Sarpkhya, 36, 37, 42, 74, 89 n., Ioi, 506 n.
I07, 115, I65, I72-175, I8I, 227, Seasons, 389
242, 250, 260, 292, 300, 304, 3I2, Seat of consciousness, 302
3 I4, 328 n., 329 n., 332, 372, 388 n., Second moon, 26
394, 4IO, 4I I, 4I4, 45 I, 455-458, Secretions, 288 n., 325,327, 3JI, 337-
46I, 463, 465, 467, 468, 472, 473. 339, 345
475-477, 493. 5I7, 5I8, 549. 550; Secretive aspect, 33 I
arguments, I73; its general criti- Secretory character, 337 n.
cisms by Kamalasila, I75; philo- Secretory currents, 346
sophy, 273 n., 428; physics, 273; Seed, I6o, I85, 235
prakrti, 74; refutation of its soul Seeds of memory, I 87
theory by Kamalasila, I8I; system, Seeming appearances, 235
366 Self, I, 8, I6, 2I, 23, 24, 33, 34, 42, 65,
Sarp.khya and Nyaya, on the theory of 68, 7I, 73. 76, IOI, II2, I48, I52,
do~as, 328, 329 n. I56, I8o, I8I, I94, I97, 206 n., 211,
Sii'l!lkhya-kiirikii, 8o, I06, I I6, 249, 2I5, 2I7, 223, 308-JIO, 343, 35I,
250 n., 262, 304, 377, 400 n. 367-369, 373. 387, 388, 40I, 444-
Sarpkhya pari1Jiima, criticisms of, by 446, 462, 47I, 473. 5I2, 5I6, 5I8,
Santarak!?ita and Kamalasila, I7 I ff. 525
SiiTJzkhya-pravacana-bhii~ya, 262, 305, Self-abnegation, 228
306 n. I Self-alienation, 240
Sii'l!lkhya-sii.tra, 250, 372 Self-cognizing, 74
Sii'l!lkhya-tattva-kaumudf, 45 n., 305 n. Self-conscious, 235; ego, 238
Sarpkhya-Yoga, 26I, 262, JIO, JI3 n., Self-consciousness, 22, 68, I8I, I95,
4I4, 546; its doctrine of subtle body, 236
304, 305; its idea of emancipation, Self-contained, I4; state, 239
249, 25o;prii1Jain, 26I, 262 Self-contentedness, 477
Sarpkhyic, 3 I I Self-contradiction, I23
Sarpkhyist, I65, I7I, I7J, 234, 5I7 Self-control, 242, 244, 277, 373, 44I,
SiiTJzriijya-siddhi, 56 448,493.500,505, 5IJ, 5I4
sandra, 359 n. Self-controlled, 420
siira, 359 n. Self-criticism, 272
siirajjanii, 497 Self-dependence, I7
siirajjitattam, 497 Self-directed, 236; consciousness, 236
Saranga, I 23 Self-dissociated, I2I
Siirasvata-prakriyii, I 92 Self-evident, IJ, I6, 483
siiriigo, 497 Self-flashing, 236
Siiriirtha, 99 Self-gain, 507
siitmya, 308 Self-good, 405
siittvika, 367, 373, 468 Self-hood, 24
Siitvata, 54I-543, 546, 547 Self-identity, 34, 66-68, 7I
Satyaki, 54I Self-illumination, I48
Index
Self-interest, 470, 486, 507, 508, 5I3 Sense-experiences, 24
Selfish interest, 48 5 Sense-faculties, 23, 24, 58
Selfishness, 503 Sense-functioning, 24
Self-knowledge, 227, 239, 373, 437, Sense-gates, 462
442,493.499 Sense-gratification, 5 IO
Self-love, 24, 4I4, 507 Sense-illusions, 5
Self-luminosity, 70, 73, I04 Sense-impressions, 349, 35I
Self-luminous, 8, 65, 68, 70, 126, I68, Sense-knowledge, 25, 208, 355
199-20I, 217; consciousness, 204 Sense-modifications, 23
Self-manifesting, 8, 69 Sense-object, 23, 62, 76, 77, I8o, I94,
Self-meditation, 466 206, 207, 2I5, 320, 32I, 332, 343.
Self-mortifications, 469 35I, 367, 373. 463
Self-ostentation, 416 Sense-organ, I38, I87, 213, 269, 309,
Self-perception, 67, 73 3IO, 315, 327, 332, 333, 358, 360,
Self-persistence, 67, 68 366, 515
Self-realization, 456, 5I5, 532 Sense-perception, 23, 24, 30, I 16, I67
Self-realized state, 512 Sense-pleasure, 5 I4
Self-recognition, 195 Sense-property, I99, 359 n., 360
Self-reflecting, 235 Sense-quality, 355
Self-restrained, 277 Sense-uncontrollability, 488
Self-revealed, I52, I8o, 20I Sensible, 28, 29, 369
Self-revealing, 69, 72, 74, I04, 110, Sensory consciousness, 357
I56, 197, 201, 221; consciousness, Sensory dhamanl, 35I
33. ISO, I52, I54 Sensory nerves, 349
Self-revelation, 63, I09, 110, I29, I48, Sentence, 236
149. lSI Separateness, I48, I62, I94, 360
Self-same, 97 Separation, I94, 370
Self-satisfied, 512 Sequence, 20
Self-seeking, 507 Series, 23, 26 n.
Self-shining, 15 Serpent Power, 356
Self-shiningness, 36 Sesamum, 97
Self-surrendering, 46I sefvara-Sii'f!lkhya, 476
Self-thinking, 235 Sex-attraction, 509
Self-validity, 214; of knowledge, 2I4 Sex-continence, 421, 469, 505, 513
Selling, 505 Sex joy, 324
Semen, 302, 304, 307, 313, 317, 322, Sex-relation, 498 n.
323 n., 330, 347, 352, 36I, 372; Sex-strength, 276
channels, 348 Sex-union, 509
Seminal fluid, 322-324 Shama Sastry, Dr, 436
Semi-statical creation, 235 n. Shamefulness, 24
Senart, E., 550 Sharp, 361
Sensation, 48, 269; of smell, 342 Sharpness, 360, 362 n., 365
Sense, 23, 35, I5I, 153, 194, 239, 254, Sheath of knowledge, 75
26I, 292, 344. 360, 366, 368, 369, Shivering, 294 n., 30I
401,406,489,493 Shoots, I6o, I69
Sense-affections, 512 Shoulder-blade, 286
Sense-attraction, 450, 488 sibbanl, 497
Sense-channels, 89 n. siddham, 390
Sense-cognition, 58, 73, 349, 367, Siddha-siira-sa7JZhitii, 432
373 Siddha-yoga, 427, 428, 433, 435
Sense-contact, 138, 145, I52, 154, 374, siddhiinta, 383, 385
498 Siddhiinta-bindu, 77 n., 226
Sense-control, 453,459,487,490, 49I, Siddhiinta-bindu-nyiiya-ratniivall, 79
502, sos, SII, 514 Siddhiinta-bindu-sandlpana, 79
Sense-data, 34. s8, 6o, I76, I8o, I88, Siddhiinta-bindu-slkara, 220
35I Siddhiinta-bindu-tlkii, 225 n.
Sense-desire, 5I3 Siddhiinta-candrikii, 434
Sense-enjoyments, 73 Siddhiinta-dlpa, I I 5
Index
Siddhiinta-dlpikii, I7, 57 n. smrti-bhra1!lsa, 417
Siddhiinta-lesa, Io, II, I7, 44, 47, 49, smrti-siistra, 438
so, 53, 72, 2I6 n. smrti-vibhra7JZSa, 4I6
Siddhiinta-lesa-sa1Jlgraha, 220 Snake, 7, 37, 74
Siddhiinta-muktiivali, II, I 7, I 8 n., Snake-charms, 28I
222 n., 223 n., 225, 263 n.; its view sniiv.:a, 289, 346
that miiyii alone is the cause of world- sniiyu, 257, 285 n., JI2 n., JI3 n., JI8,
appearance; and Brahman the basis 352
of miiyii, I I sneha, 328,442,497
Siddhiinta-nidiina, 337 n. snigdha, 357, 359 n., 36I, 363
Siddhiinta-nyiiya-ratna-pradlpikii, 79 Social order, 509
Siddhiinta-ratniikara, 220 Society, 509
Siddhiinta-siddhiiiijana, 56 Sockets, 286 n.
Siddhiinta-tattva-bindu, 55, 79, 225 Soft, 337 n., 36I
Siddhiinta-tattva-bindu-{tkii, 55 Softness, 360
Siddhiinta-viveka, 5 I Solar, 145, I48;vibrations, 156, I57
Siddhi-kiit;uja, 87, 88, 98 soma, 303, 330, 333, 359, 428
Siddhi-sthiina, 357, 426, 429 soma-cakra, 356
Significance, 504 Sorcery, 30 I
sikatiivati, 290 n. 3 Sorrow, 249, 295, 3I I, 4I6, 467, 504,
siliifijiilii, 298 n. SII-513, 530
Silver, 37, 113, 135 Soul,44, I78, 236, 248,3oJ,3o6,3o9,
Similarity, I 3 I, I 34 311, 314, 343, 356, 357, 360, 367,
Simile, 26 n., 329 37I, 372,406,530
Simultaneity, IS6 Soul theory (Kumarila), criticized by
Simultaneous,3I n.,388n.; production, Kamala.Sila, 179 ff.
I78 Soul theory (Nyaya), criticized by
Simultaneously, 26, 27, 3I n., I78 Kamala.Sila, 178, I79
Sin, 246, 404, 4.09, 4I4, 422, 442, so8, Sound, 24, 6o, 182, 355, 367, 382 n.,
522 386 n., 387
Sincerity, 469, 502, 505 n., Sio, 511, Sound-cognition, I8o
5I3, 5I4; of mind, 505 Sound-potential, 236
sineho, 497 Sour, 33I, 357
Sinful, 409 Sourasenoi, 543
Sinner, 5I2 Source, 358, 4Io n.
Sitarama, 82 n. South India, 53
Skanda, 107 Space, I68, 194, 36o, 369, 381 n.
Skanda-purii7Ja, 393 Space-determinations, 23
skandha, 58, 59. 286, 450 n. Space-locations, 29
Skeleton, 288 spanda, 235 n., 244, 254, 263
Skill, 502, 505 n. spanda-sakti, 104, 257
Skin, JI7, 324,330, 348,36I, 367 spandiispandiitmaka, 234
Skull, 279, 352, 353 n. sparsa, I94, 236
Slander, 498 n. Spatial, I6; difference, 370; extension,
Sleep, 257, 26I 25 n.
Sleepiness, 373 Special capacity, 175
Slim, 337 Special efficiency, 97
Slipperiness, 360, 365 Special power, 40
Slippery, 36I Specific, 357, 374; agency, 359; caste-
Slow, 338 duty, 506, 507; duty, sos, 506, 514;
Smaller intestine, 336 ignorance, 77; nature, 358; par-
Smaller self, 45 I ticulars, I48; peculiarities, I87;
Smartness, 505 n. purpose, 359; qualities, IJ9, I89;
Smell, I94, 236, 330, 36o, 367 relation, 3 I
Smoky, 16o, 408 Speculation, 373, 4Io n.
Smooth, 337 n., 357 Speech,24I,254,333,338,469;organ,
Smoothness, 328, 360 346
smrti, 54, 238, 239, 373, 514, 549 Sphota-siddhi, 87 n.
Index
Spider, 74, 178 Subhuti Gautama, 316
Spider's webs, 178 Subject, 27, 29, 31, 35, 88
Spinal column, 287 n., 352, 353 Subject-consciousness, 149, 211
Spinal cord, 353, 355-357 Subjective, 22, 24, 180, 187, 204, 377,
Spine, 353 n. so8, 522; act, 197; character, 522;
Spiral, 355 cognition, 19; conscience, 522; ego,
Spirit, 234, 282 236; experiences, 102, 149; ideas,
Spiritual categories, 467 2 1, 48 ; idealism, 48 ; ignorance, 7i ;
Spleen, 288, 348 illumination, 206; mental, 16; same-
Spring, 335, 370 ness, 51 I ; states, 149; thought, 236
Springs of action, 411, 413 Subjectively, 217, 233
sprhii, 4I3 Subjectivistic, 213
srotas, 29I, 346-350, 352 Subjectivity, 9
Stabilized, soo Subject-object awareness, 29, 33
Stage, 236, 238 Subject-object consciousness, 24
stana, 286 Subject-object knowledge, 250,266
Star, 333 Subject-objectless, 235, 238, 271
State, 236, 250; of deep sleep, 245 Subject-object relation, 88, I<'S, 144,
Statical, 234 146, I 52, 153
Stcherbatsky, s8 n., 59 n., 61 n., I66 n. Subodhinl, 55, 73, 75 n., I 15, 443
Steadiness, 328, 360, 4I9, 505, 5 IO; of Subrahmal)ya, 8 I
mind, 492 Subrahmal)ya Agnicin Makhindra,82 n.
Steady, 491 Substance, 19, 47, 51, 117, I43, 158,
Sternum, 286 n. 161, 162, 167, 172, 187, 188, 191,
sthairya, 419 193, 194, 203, 261, 3 s8-36o, 363,
Sthairya-viciira7Ja, 126 369-371, 373
sthaviriintra, 289 Substanceless, 16, 233
sthiilakas, 286 n. 3 Substance-stuff, 12
sthiilakiirbudas, 286 n. 3 Substantial, 337 n.
sthiina-•djiiapti, 23 Substantiality, 38, 48
sthiiniini, 336 Substantive, 187; basis, 23; reality, 20
sthiipana, 452 Substitution-meditation,449, 452,479,
sthiipanii, 379 488
sthira, 241, 359 n. Substratum, 19, I94, I95
Sthiramati, 19, 21, 22 n. Subtle, 332, 377; states, 245
sthira-pratyaya, 240 Subtle body, 75,245,302,306, 351 n.;
Sthira-siddhi-du~a1)a, 49 in Sarpkhya-yoga, Vaise~ika and
sthita-dhi, 440, 49I Nyaya, 304-306; agreement of the
sthita-priij1ia, 247, 491 Vedanta and Caraka, 3I2
sthiti, I8, I69, I77. 231 Subtler, 368
sthiila, 337 n., 359 n. Success, 512
stimita-gambhira, 232 Succession, 20, 156, 179
Stomach, 330, 33I, 336, 362 Successive processes, 374
Stone, SI2 Sudhindra Y ati, 443
Stormy, 408 Suffering, 238,247,368,373,404,479,
Straightness of conduct, 51 1 522
Strength, 327, 336 Sufficient cause, 18
stn-karmii1)i, 296 Sugar-cane, 361
Student, 505 suhrt, 378
Studies in the Medicine of Ancient India, Suitability, 370
279 n., 284 n., 286 n. Suitable, 370
Study, 505, 510, 514 sukha, 22,277,370,422
Stuff, 10; of world-objects, 35 sukha-dul;zkhe yugapaj janyete, 91
Suali, L., 398 n. sukham iiyul;z, 277
Sub-conscious,21, 33, 34; impressions, Sukhaprakasa Muni, s8, 86, I 16, 148 n.
33. 250 sukha-riipa, 217
Subhe~aja, 276 n. sukha-sanga, 462
sublzi~aktama, 293 Sumati, 172
Index 6os
Summer, 327, 335, 370 Sutala, 76
Sun, 330,499,525 su~ma, 305, 332, 337, 359
Suniimii (demon), 300 suk~ma-deha, 304
Suparl_la, 539 suk$ma-sarlra, 75, 76
Superficial changes, 24 sfik~mii?z-Siriilz, 346
Super-imposed, 206 Suryapan<;lita, 443
Super-imposition, I49, 209, 2I3 su.~a. 290
Superior, I78 Su~al).i, 290 n. 4
Superiority, 370, 40I n. Siita-sarphitii, 25 I
Supe:--person, 476, 529, 533 Sutra-bhii$ya-vyiikhyiina, 82 n.
Super-personality, 478, 524, 525 s~ttras, 38, 39. 4I, 44
Support, I43; of miiyii, 45 Sutra-sthiina, 329, 330, 366
Supposition, I 8, 3 I SUtriitman, 76, 2 I 5
Supreme bliss, 453 svabhiiva,4,89, 372,4I0
Supreme essence, I6 svabhiiviitiiaya, I73
sura, III sva-dhanna, 439, 502
Suranandi, 428 svakiirat~a-sattii-samaviiya, 4 I
Surat, I64 sva-lak~a'{la, 167
Suresvaracarya, I n., I7, 46, 48, 5 I, sva-miina, 325
52, 57, 78-8o, 82-87, 98-102, I05, svapna, 264
111, 112, 147 n., I48 n., I92, I98, svapna-jiigara, 266
216; karma and emancipation in, svapna-nara, 266
99; karma andjiiiina, 100; nature of sva-prakiiia, 69, I48, I97
ajiiiina, IOI, I02; nature of self and sva-prakaiatii, 108
self-realization, Ioo, IOI sva-prakiisii cit, I09
Surgery, 276, 330 Svar (world), 76
Suriya, 539 svarilpa-bheda, I 29
susuk~miin, 342 Svarilpa-nirt)aya-tlkii, I93
Susruta, 263, 273, ~75-279, 284 n., sva-sal!ljiiii, 389
285 n., 286 n., 287 n., 302 n., 303 n., sva-sa'l!tvedana-miitrakam, 235
304,3I6,3 I7, 329 n., 330-333, 334n., sva- sa'l!lvin- nairape~etJ.a sphurm;am,
342, 344 n., 348, 349, 350 n., 35I, I97
352, 36I n., 362-365, 372, 389, 410, svastyayana, 278, 281
423-426, 429, 433, 435; his de- svasyiipi svena vedyatviipiitiit, I 5 I
scription of the apertures of the svatalz-priimii~ya, 2I4
dhamanls, 350; his description of the sva-vi~aya-jiiiina-jana.nam, 32
function of the dhamanls, 350 ff.; sva-vyiighiita, I23
on dhiitu-mala, 331; his view re- svaya'l!lbhu-linga, 355
garding the relation of dhamanls to svaya'l!l-Prakiisa, I49
cognition, 35I ff.; his view regard- Svayarpprakasa, 56, 82, I92
ing siriis and dhamanls, 349 ; his Svayarpprakasa Yati, 79
view that the cognitive and cona- Svayarpprakasa Yogindra, 57 n.
tive nerves are attached to the brain, Svayarpprak.asananda, 56
342; his view that iot~ita is a do~a, 329 sviibhiivikalz sambandhalz, I4I
Sufruta-candrikii, 425, 428 sviibhinna- kiirya-janakatvam upiidii-
Sufruta-saTJZhitii, 258 n., 273, 276 n., natvam, 45
277,279,313 n., 3I5 n., 3I8 n., 33I n., sviidh#!hiina-cakra, 355
335 n., 336 n., 342 n., 344 n., 349 n., sviidu, 358
372 n., 377 n., 389 n., 390, 423-429 Svamidasa, 428
Susruta school, 289 Svamikumara, 43 I
Susruta-Siltra-sthiina, 36I n. Svamindraplirl).a, 52 n.
su#riilz, 3 52 Sviinubhuti-prakiisa, 55
SU~Um'{lii, 292, 353-355, 453, 454 sviirtha, 4 I 2
SU~Um'{lii niir}f, 345 Sviitma-yoga-pradlpa, 57 n.
su~upta, 241, 264 sviividyayii, 84
su~upta-sadrsa-sthiti, 264 Sweet, 242, 309, 325, 327, 337 n., 347,
su~uptavat, 245 357-359, 362, 365 n., 366
s~upti, 232, 344 Sweetness, 36I
6o6 index
Syllogism, I 19-I 22, 373 that the world-appearance is mere
Symbolic sacrifice, 544 illusion is dogmatic, as also the
Symbolic syllables, 499 doctrine that the self is the only
Symbols, 337 ground on which all illusions are
Sympathy, 247, 511 imposed, 8; his commentary cannot
Symptoms, 293, 295, 320, 329 n., 336, satisfactorily convince that the sz7tras
337, 348 n. professed unqualified monism, 42;
Syncretist~c, 54; works, 55 his criticism of the atomic theory,
Synonymous, 348 I 89 ff.; his criticism of the theory of
Syrup, 358 samaviiya, I90; his definition of il-
System, 375, 525 lusion, 5, 6; his dialectic arguments,
Systematic study, I 189 ff.; his explanation as to the
Systematized, 500 illusory creation by ignorance: in-
Sabara, 87, I7I terpretation of his explanation by his
sabda, 346, 376, 38I n., 383 other followers, 8; his explanation of
sabda-brahma, 354 n. the causal theory on realistic lines
Sabda-nirpaya, I03 n. as against Nyaya, 39-41; his four
sabda-nyiiyiirtha, 392 important followers and the diver-
sabdatva, 374 gence of their views, 4 7, 48; his
sabdiirtha, I 87 idealism compared with that of Yoga-
saitya, 362 n. viisi~!ha and Buddhist idealism, 268
Saiva, 54, 2I8, 2I9, 443; authorities, ff.; his interpretation of the Brahma-
263; commentary, 218; philosophy, siltra and the U pani~ads as recon-
2j2 ciliation of the pantheistic and dua-
Saiva-bhii~ya, 218, 220 listic tendencies, 2; his interpreta-
Saiva-kalpa-druma, 220 tion of illusion in Gau~apada's Kiiri-
Saivism, 49 kii, 6; his realistic interpretation of
Sakadhtimaje (demon), 300 the Brahma-sz7tras with parenthetic
saktaya~l, 243 reservation, how far justifiable, 39;
sakti. 8, 10, 22, 40, 44. I04, I75. 215, his refutation of Buddhist idealism,
2I8, 362, 363 269, 270; his refutation of Buddhis-
faktimat, 44 tic idealism, 27; his refutation of
iuluna, 297 the charge of the incompatibility of
sulya, 276, 390, 424 the production of the impure world
Salya-tantram, 330 n., 425 from the pure Brahman, 37; his re-
sama, 444. 495. 505 n. futation of the Sarpkhya criticism of
Sambuka, 506, 507 Vedanta, 36, 37; his two different
Sankara, 2, 5-9. I I, 2I, 25, 27-30, 35. analogies regarding the production
37-39.41-44.46,48, 5I,77-?9,8I, of the world from Brahman, 37; his
85-87,89,92,99,Ioo, 102, Io5,Io8, view of the nii(fis and the heart, 344;
III, Il2, II9, I24, I5I, I7I, 172, his views regarding sirii anddhamani,
189, I91, 196, 2I8-221, 228, 23I, 344 fl.; his works and followers,
246, 250, 26o-262, 267, 268, 270, n-82; how far he is justified in
272, 288 n., 311, 344, 346, 437, 438, sometimes taking paripiima analogies
442, 443. 446, 448, 449, 452, 453. and sometimes the view of magical
456-458, 474, 478, 495, 499, 504, creation, 38; originator of Vedanta
507, 533, 549; and some Buddhists dialectics, 163; special nature of his
differ regarding the ontology of dialectic as distinguished from that
illusion, 5; attempts to prove that of Srihar~a and Citsukha, I9I, I92
his philosophy was realistic, 2 ; bhe- Sailkara-bhiiBJa, 1 I, I03, I08, 25I
diibheda interpretation prior to, 43; Sankara-dig-vijaya, 82, 86, I I2
contradicts his own view on ideal- Sankara Misra, I03 n., I26 fl., 356
ism, 28 did not elaborate the exact Sankara school, 3, 30, 44, 62
nature of the causality of avidyii or Sankarasvamin, 172
of Brahman, 1 I ; emphasizes that Sankara Vedanta, I I, 16, 17, 34, 35,
waking experience is as false as III, I48, 214
dream experience in Gau~apada's Sailkara-vijaya, I I I
commentary, 28, 29; his assertion Sankarananda, 82, 86, 2I5,443
Index
smikii, I4I Se~agovinda, 55
sankha, 287 n., 342 Se~anrsirpha, 205
SankhapaQ.i, 83, 87, 89 n., 90, 9I, 94, Se!,>a Sanigadhara, I 19, 196
353. 354 se~avat, 398, 399. 400 fl.
sarat, 335 Sikhiimm;i, 53, 54, 74 n., 208
sar'ira-chidra, 348 n. sik~a. 5 4 7
sanrl, 303 n. 4 Si~ii, 275 n.
Sarku (demon), 300 Si~a-samuccaya, 501, 5I3
Sasadhara Acarya, 54 Singhana, I23
Satapatha-briihmat;a, 279, 286, 289, Sipivi~ta, 535
368,394.424,486,535-537 sirasi ~at, 287 n.
sauca, 505, 510 siras-tiilv-antara-gatam, 34I
Saunaka, 316 sirti, 256, 289, 29I, 3I8, 342, 344, 346,
Saunaka-tantra, 435 348-350, 352, 354
Saunakiya, 283 sirii-sarm;i-kofare, 256
saurya, 328, 370, 505 n. Si~ya-hitai#~u. I 26 n. ,
siibdl bhiivanii, 479. 480 Siva, 82 n., 218, 265
Sakalya, 252 Sivadayalu Sridharasvamin, 443
sakha, 283 Sivadasa, 364, 43I, 432, 435
siikhii-nii.lj'lniim, 290 n. 2 Siva-kar7Jiimrta, 220
Sakunteya, 357 Sivalala Sarman, 79
siiliikya, 276, 424 Siva-lllii71Java, 2I9
Siiliikya-tantra, 425 Siva-purii7Ja-tiimasatva-kha7Jr!atza, 220
Salikanatha, I47 n., 249 Sivarama, 57 n., 103
Siili-stamba-sutra, 307 Siva-sutra-vimarsinl, 263 n.
santa, 234. 235. 28I Siva-sakti-siddhi, I 26
Santarak!,)ita, 25, 28, 3 I n., 58 n.~ I7I. Siva-tattva-viveka, 220
I72, I75, I76, I78, I79, I81-I88, Sivaditya, I47 n.
375, 376; his argument against the Sivaditya Misra, I2J
U pani~adic view similar to that of Siviidvaita-ni71Jaya, 220
Sailkara, 28 Sivananda-lahari, 220
siinti, 450 n., 5 IO ._<;ivananda-lalzari-candrikii, 220
Santi-kalpa, 283 Sivananda Yati, 57 n.
Siinti-sataka, 460 n. I Siviircana-candrikii, 220
Sii7Jf/.ilya-sUtra-!ikti, 225 Siviirka-ma1Ji-dlpikii, 219, 220
siirada, 298 n. Sivopadhyaya, 263
Sanra, 35on., 351 n., 352 n., 415, 469 Sivotkar~a-candrikii, 220
Sanra-brahmm;a, 25 I Sivotkar~a-mafijari, 220
Siinraka-bha~ya, 56, 246 n. sighra, 338
Siiriraka-bhii~ya-prakafiirtha, 49 Sila, 459, 500, 50 I, 504
Siiriraka-bhii~ya-f'lkii, I 93 Strfa, 340
Sariraka-mzmiil!lSii-bha~ya, 56, 78, 8o sir~akti, 296, 299. 340
Siirlraka- mimii1Jlsii- nyiiya - sa1Jlgraha, s"ir$iimaya, 299
30 n., 82 Sita, 332,335, JJ8,J57.359. 36I
Siinraka-mlmii1!1Sii-sa1Jlgraha, 82 n. Sita-virya, 36I
Siinraka - mzmii1JlSii- sfitra - siddhanta- sitOfma-varfa-/ak~aiJiilz, 321 fl.
kaumudl, 82 n. sfto~miinilailz, 314
Siiriraka-nyiiya-ma7Jimiilii, 82 n. ilak~7Ja, 359 n.
Siirtra-padmin'i, 435 sle~ma, 299
Siinra-sthiina, 284 n. sle~ma-dharii, 3 I7
Sarngadhara, 288 n., 326 n., 327 n., sle~mala, 334
435; his view of mala, 326 sle~man, 276, 282, 296, 319, 325, 327,
siistra, 253. 254. 385, 445 328, 330-333, 335, 336, 337 n., 344,
Siistra-darpa7Ja, 82, IOJ, 108 n. 347· 349. 37I, 39I
~<;astra-prakiiSikii, 83, 193 slepna-prakrti, 328, 334
Siistra-siddhiinta-lesa-!ikii, 225 : slermii. 299
siistriintara, 399 sli~. 330
se~a. 4.90 n. ilolw, 230
6o8 Index
Sloka-sthiina, 392 142 ; his refutation of " difference,"
Sloka-viirttika, 428 I 29 ; his refutation of the category of
soci, 297 "difference," 129 ff.; his refutation
sm;zita, 302, 312 n., 329, 330, 335 n., of the definition of cause, 143-145;
350 his refutation of the definition of
sraddhii,292,468,494 perception, 137, 138; his refutation
iriiddha, 282 of the notion of instruments of
Srima (demon), 300 knowledge in, 137; his view that all
Sritii/.l, 340 definitions may be proved false,
Sri, 294 128 ff.; his view that world-appear-
Sribrahma, 428 ances are false because all definitions
Sri-darpm;za, I 26 n. of any of their categories are self-
Sridhara, 49, 147 n., 264 n., 306, 412, contradictory, 147; method of his
444, 446, 449 n., 452, 453 n., 456, dialectic, 133; perception cannot
462, 474. 478, 484 challenge the instruction of the
Srihar~a. 24, 51, 53, 54, 56, 57, 83, 92, Upanif?ads, 129; precursors of his
IOJ, 119, 124-129, IJI-133, 135, dialectic, KamalasiJa and Santarak-
137-139, 141, 143-147, 163, 164, ~ita, 171 ff.; responsible for the
z68, I7o-172, 192, 194, 218, 248; growth of verbalism in the new
awareness and its object cannot be school ofNyaya, 146 ;similarityofhis
similar, IJ4; Buddhist precursors of dialectic to that of Nagarjuna, 127
pre-Sankara Vedanta dialectic, Ka- Srikal).lida, 354, 355
malasila and Santarak~ita, I7 I ff.; Srikal).tha, 218, 219
compared and contrasted with Na- Srikal).tha Bhatta, 79, 427, 432
garjuna, 170, 171; his assertion of Srikal).tha Datta, 428, 435
indefinability of all appearances is a $rimad-iinanda-iailiihva-panciisya1ft sa-
direct challenge to N ya ya-V aisef?ika, tata1ft bhaje, 193
which thinks that all that is know- Srimad-bhagavad-g'itii, 228, 247, 250
able is definable, 127 ; his criticism Snmad-bhiigavata-tikii, 226
of" being," 142; his criticism of the Srimadhava,427,428
Buddhist definition of right cogni- Srinatha Cu<;lamal).i, 225 n.
tion, 136; his criticism of the defini- Srinivasa, 120
tion of "invariable concomitance," Srinivasa Y ajvan, 57 n.
141, 142; his criticism of the nature Srirailganatha, zo8
of concomitance (vyiipti), 139, 140; Srisirpha, I 23
his criticism of non-being, 142; his Sn-vidyii-paddhati, 225
criticisms often refer to Nyaya irot;zi-guda-Sll1JlSraya, 33 1
definitions rather than to Nyaya sro~'i, 285
thought, 146; his criticism of the iro~li-phalaka, 285 n. 7
N yaya definition of " cause," 144; Sruta-prakiisikii, 262 n.
his criticism of the Nyaya definition S,ngiitaka, 342
of right cognition, I33 ff.; his criti- subha, 341
cism ofthe Nyaya theory of relation, Subhagupta, 172
144; his criticism of the possibility Subhankara, 126 n.
of knowing the class-concepts, 139, Jubhiiiubha, 23 n.
140; his criticism of substance and subhiiiubha-karma-vipiika, 23 n.
quality, 143 ; his criticism of tarka, suci-dravya-sevana, 505
140, 141; his criticism of Udayana, suddha, 36
141; his date, works and followers, suddha-Sa1JlVit-mayii-nanda-rfipa, 264
125, 126; his dialectic compared Suddhananda, 192
with that of Nagarjuna, 163; his sukra, 312 n., 317, 328
dialectic distinguished from that of iukra-dharii, 317
Sankara, 191, 192; his difference sukra-priidur-bhiiva, 3 5 I
with the Madhyamika posttlon, SU'IJ.thf, 363
168; his difference with Vacaspati su#ra-kara, 332 n.
and Mal).<;lana, IOI; his ontologie ~ma, JOO, JOI, 33 I
argument for the existence of Brah- s~mi~o jvarasya, 298
man, 128; his refutation of analogy, Sudra,5o2, 504, so6, 514,531
Index
sula, 298, 346 Tantra school, 354, 355, 357
sunya, 234,27I, 330 Tantra-siddhiinta-dlpikii, 2 I 9
iunyatii, 7 tantra-yantra-dhara~z, 3 32
Sunya-viida, 426 tantra-yukti, 389, 390
Sunya-vada theory, 3 Tailgalva, 300
silnya-viidin, 2, 35 Tanka, 43 n.
Sunya-viidin Buddhists, 7 ta7Jhii,490,496,499
Svayathu, 43 I tapalz,76,229,423,437,469,506,5o8,
svetii, 3I7 5IO, 513, 5I4, 523, 536, 544
Svetiisvatara, 4 7 I tapo-yajiia, 487
iyena sacrifice, 38I n., 483 n. tarka, 140, I4I, 376, 454
~atj-ailga, 343 Tarka-ciirf.iima7Ji, 54
~arf.-anga yoga, 453, 455 Tarka-dlpikii, Io8
~arf.-iisraya, 3 I 2 n. Tarka-kii7Jrf.a, 87,88,92
$arf.-dariatJa-sa1Jlgraha-vrtti, I48 n. Tarka-piida, 84 n.
~arf.-indriya, 366 Tarka-sa1Jlgraha, 49· son., SI, I 16 n.,
$~#-tantra, 476 l19 n., 192, I93, 194 n., 2Io, 211,
$at-cakra-nirupa~ta, 353 n., 354 377
Tarka-viveka, 5 I, 79
Tachibana, 496 tarko 'pratyak~a-jiiiinam, 376
Tactile, I76 taru7.1a asthi, 286 n.
Tactual particles, 25 n. Taste, I8I, 194, I99, 236, 355, 357-
Tactual sense, I 56 360,362-366,370
tad anusandhatte, 238 Taste cognition, I8o
tadiitve, 374 tathya-sa'f!Zvrti, 4
tad-bhava-bhiivitii, 376 tat param, 499
tad-utpatti, I 83 tattva, I93
tadvati tat-prakiiraka-jiiiinatvam, 2I4 Tattva-bindu, 45 n., 87 n., I07
taijasa, 548 Tattva-bodha, 57 n.
taikp;ya, 362 n. Tattva-bodhim, 52 n., 54, 115, 216 n.,
Taittirlya, 78, 486 2I7
Taittirlya-Arm:zyaka, 538 Tattva-candrikii, 79, I93, 43I
Taittinya-bhii~ya-fippm;a, I 93 Tattva-cintiima7.1i, 54
Taittinya-bhii~ya-viirttika-tlkii, I 93 Tattva-cintiima7Ji-prakiiia, 54
Taittirlya-briihma7Ja, 25I, 28on.,29In. Tattva-dlpana, 10, 52, 79, I03, 193,
Taittirlya-priitiiakhya, 3 94 208 n., 210
Taittiriya-sa1Jlhitii, 536 Tattva-dlpikii, 79, 222 n.
Taittirlya Upani~ad, 494 fqttva-jiiiina, 252
Taittinyopani~ad-bhii~ya, 78 Tattva-kaumudl, 250
Taking of pure food, 505 Tattva-kaustubha, 54, 2 19
takman, 298, 299, 300 n. 2 Tattva-muktii-kaliipa, 1 I9 n., 262 n. 3
tala-kurca-gulpha, 285 n. Tattva-muktiivali, 2I9
Taliitala, 76 Tattva-pradlpikii, 51, 83, 119 n., I39,
tamas,72, 74,104,234, 267,30J,304, I47, 148 n.
314, 318, 319, 329, 367, 372, 419, Tattva-samlk~ii,45 n.,83,87, Io6, I07,
436.456,462,468,499 IIOn.,II6
tan-miitras, 74, 236, 245, 305, 477 Tattva-SatJzgraha, 20 n., 25, 27 n., 28 n.,
tanniiiomuktir iitmanalz, 99 31 n., I7I, I72 n., x82 n., x86 1z.
tantra, 276 n., 352 Tattva-sm.ngraha-paiijikii, I74 n.
Tantra anatomy, 356, 357 tattva-sraddhii, 495
Tantra-ciirf.iima7Ji, 353 n. Tattva-iuddhi, 57 n.
Tantra literature, 354 n. tattva-tlkii, 43 n.
Tantra philosophy, 356 Tattva-vaii("iradl, 45 n., 262, 306 n.
Tantra physiology, 273 Tattva-'l.ibhiikara, 250
Tantras, niirf.i-cakras in, 354-356; su- Tattva-vibhiivanii, 8 7 11.
~Um1Jii, its position in, 353, 353 n., Tattva-vivecana, 54
354; system of niiqts in, 352-354 Tattva-vivelw, 54, 72
Tantra-siira, 432 Tattva-Tiveka-dlpana, 54, 217 n.
610 Index
Tattviiloka, 49, so, 193 Thoughtfulness, 513
Tattviinusandhiina, 56 Thought-movement, 235 n., 254
Tattvopadeia, 8 I Thought-principle, 35
Taxila, 276, 424 Thought-processes, 21, 256, 369
Taylor, 219 Thought-stuff, 29
tiidiitmya, 3 I n., 183 Thought-substance, 24
tiidiitmya-pratui, 40 Throat, J3I, 348, 361, 365
tiilu, 287 n. 4 Tibet, I64
ttilu-mula, 288 n. I Tibetan, 59 n., 164
ttilu~aka, 287 n. 4 Tibia, 285 n. 6
tiimasa, 373, 468 Tiger, 509, 513
tiimasika, 367 tikta, 3I2 n. 3, 350, 357, 358
ttimrti, 3 I7 Tilak, 550, 551 n.
Tantric charms, 281 Tilakasvamin, I07
Tal).c;la, 283 Time,68, I48, 156, I57, I07, I94,32I,
Ttirti-bhakti-tarmigitfi, 225 358, 360, 369, 370, 372; and space,
Ttitparyu-bodhini, 216 n. 266
Ttitparya-candrikii, 44 I Tirumalai Nayaka, 219
Ttitparya-praktisa, 23 I, 235 n., 266 tiryag-ga, 351
Tiitparya-!ikti, I07 tl/q1Ja, 359, 361
Teacher, 254, 378, 420, 513, 534 tivratara, 25I
Teaching, 378, 505 tivrii, 291
Technical term, 377 Tongue, 326 n., 331, 348, 367
Teeth, 326 n. Topic, 377
tejas, 236, 24I, 245, 3I2, 313, 362, Tortoise, I09
505 n., 5IO Touch, I94,236,355,358,36o
Tejo-bindu, 454 Toxicology, 435
tejo-dhiitu, 307 toya, 333
Tekka Matha, 49 Trachea, 286 n. 2
Telang, K. T., I22, 123, 549, 550 Trade, 505 n.
Temperament, 378 Tradition, 78, I02, 377
Temples, 287 Tranquillity, 229
Temporal, IS, 16, 342; bones, 287 Transcendence, 5 I 2
n. 5; determinations, 187 Transcendent, 21, 22, 524, 526; re-
Temptation, 50I ality, 16; self, 10, 368; state, 455
Tendons, 348, 50I, 510, 5II, 516 Transcendental, I68; principle, 72
Term, 373 Transformation of Brahman, 42
Terminology, I4 Transformations, 2o-23, 25, 35, 36,
Testicles, 3I8 38, 51, 88, I04, 114, I7I, I77. 198,
Testimony, 39, 114, 170, 373 206, 207, 210, 211, 22I, 224, 232,
Texts, 17 233. 332, 347. 50I
Theist, 226 Transgression, Ioo, 275, 405, 422, 505
Theistic, 1 Transitory, 490
Theology, 525 Transmigration, 372, 4I I
Theory, 357, 501; of creation, I94; Transparent, 337 n.
of momentariness, 3 I ; of pain, 9 I ; trasare1JU, I 57
of perception, I68; of substances, 37 I Trayyanta-bhiiva-pradipikii, 52 11.
Thesis, 19, 2I, 29, I63, I65, 166, I7o, Treta age, 409, 4Io
I83, I89, I94, 232, 387 Triads, 306
Thickness, 360 Trickery, 378
Thing, 359 n., 498, 510 trika, 285 n. 7
Third Oriental Conference, 1 n. trika-sa1{lbaddhe, 286 n. 4
Thirst, 335 n., 348 tri-kiila, 375
Thoracic vertebrae, 286 n., 287 n. I Trilocana, 107
Thought, 23, 189, I91, 236, 266, 302, Trilocanaguru, I07
367, 373.405,4I4 Tri1[liikii, 2I, 22 n., 25, 26 n., 29, 35
Thought-activity, 235, 240, 272 Trinity College, I4
Thought-creation, 235 n., 244 Trinity Street, 14
Index 611
Tripathi, 49. son., I I6, 192, 193 n., 196 Umbilicus, 289
tri-praluim-malzii-sthur;ram, 257 n. 2 Unaffected, 42
Tripurl-prakara1')a-flkii, I 93 Unattached, 510, 511
Trisikha-briihma7Ja, 454 Unattached ness, 511
Triune, 23 Unattachment, 524
trive7Jl, 354 Uncaused, 63
tri-vidha, 401 n. Unchangeable, 24, 33, 42, 45, 63, 73,
Trivikramadirya, 52 n. 164, 179, 206 n., 221, 240, 271, 368,
trivrt-kara7Ja, 74 n. 369, 476; consciousness, 181
Troubles, 501 Uncompounded, 74
True associations, 155 Unconditional, 176
True experience, I 55 Unconditionality, 160
True knowledge, 164, 174, 246, 457 Unconnected, 230
True proposition, 155 Unconscious, 181
True recognition, 155 Unconsciousness, 265
Trunk, 343 Uncontradicted existence, 30
Truth, 3, I 14, 118, 378, 494, 495, 534 Undemonstrable, 22
Truthful, 513 Underlying consciousness, 53, zo6,
Truthfulness, 373, sos, 510 207, 209
trR~ii, 413, 415 n., 499 Undesirable, 5 12
trtlyaka, 297 Undetermined fruition, 249
Tubercles, z86 1z. 3 Undifferentiated, 23 n., 474; aware-
tuccha, 224 ness, 211
tulyiirthatii, 3 71 Unhappy, 277
turya, 264, 267 Unhealthy, 320
turyiitUa, 264, 266 n. Uniform motive, 178
Tlibingen, 283 Unimportance, 370
tyallta-lwrtrtva-vihlzramab, 245 Uninferable, 454
tyiif!a, sos, so8, 510 Unintelligent, 36-38
tyiiga-miitra, 228 Unintelligible, 12, 138, 143
Tippa7Ja, 425, 428 Uninterrupted succession, 25 n.
'Jlkii-ratna, 52 n. Unique, 13, 228; relation, 31
Unity, 8s, 243; of consciousness, 179;
ubhayedyub,, 297 texts, 46, 81
Ubiquitous, 14 Universal, 63, 139, 374; altruism,
ucchlankhau, 285 501 ;characteristic, 159; compassion,
ucchviisa, 327 461; concomitance, 140; duty, so6;
ucitena pathii, 313 friendship, 501, SII; piety, SII;
Udara, 431 pity, 501; self, 6, 9; spirit, 457
udara, 287 n. 1, 289 Universality, 8s, 194
Udayana, 49, 51, 107, II9, 123-126, Universe, I I
134, 140, 141, 147 n.; criticized by Unknowable, 263
Srihan?a on the subject of tarka, 141 Unlimited, 63
udiina, 75, 259, z6o, 332 Unmanifested, 232, 263,357,358,471,
udiislnii, 378 519, 525, 530; state, 236
udiivarta, 391 Unmada, 431
uddeia, 389, 390 Unmiida-cikitsitam, 341 n.
Uddyotakara, 119, 124, 137 n., 147 n., Unnameable, 234
171, 182 n., 186, 384 n., 393, 394, Unperceivable, 138
400n. Unperceived, 199
Ui, H., 398 n. Unperturbed, soo, sro, 512
Ulna, z8s n. 6 Unperturbedness, 51 1
Ultimate, 233, 236; being, 235; caus- Unproduced, 63, 182
ality, ro6; cause, 111, 114, 237; con- Unreal, 127, 271; appearances, 48
sciousness, 22; entity, 232-234; prin- Unreality, 128, 165, 246, 252
ciple, 474; reality, 8, 13, 22, 42, 98, Unreasonable, x86
168, 199,221,271, 454; specific pro- Unrighteous, 409
perties, 371; truth, IS, 494. so8 Unspeakable, 35, 89 n., 203, 204, 221
Index
Unsubstantial, 202, 203 upiidhi, 72, 142
Unsuitable, 370 upiilambha, 388
Unsuitability, 370 upiinga,273, 274,276,279
Untenable, 358 upiiya, 359, 389
Unthinkable, 22, 221, 362-364, 529 upekkhii, 460
Untruthfulness, 373 upek$ii, 23 n.
U7Jiidi, 54 I Upholder, 526
u~l~lulw, 318 Upodghiita, 28o n., 283 n.
Uj>lu·aryate, 26 I Upper worlds, 76
upacaya, 235 ll. uras, 286
upaciira-chala, 386 n. Urinal canal, 296
upadesa, 3~9. 390 Urinary disease, 343
Upadeia-siihasrl, 79, 81 Urine, 325, 327-330, 347, 35o-352
U padesa-siihasri-vi'l.Tti, 193 Uru~uja, 300
upadlzii, 412, 415 ussado, 497
upadlziira~za, 459, soo Usanas-sa1fzlzitii, 435
upa-dhiilu, 324 u~7Ja, 312n., 357,35911.,361
upahiira, 183 Uterus, 313
Upallrama-pariihrama, 220 utlwr~a-prakar~a-rupa, 401 n.
upalabdhi-sama, 380 n., 382 n. utkar$iipakar~a- Var1}yiivar1J.ya-vikalpa-
upalal?,w~w, I I siidhya-sama, 380 n., 38 I tz.
upamii, 3~0 Utpala, 49
upamiina, 148, 377 Utpatti, 231
ufmnaya, 379 utpatti, 232
upaniilzo, 497 utsiiha, 327
upanilwndlw, 497 uttama!z puru~al;, 466
Vpani~<H.1ic, 205 n., 494, 499; simile, Uttamamrta, 99
467 uttara, 380, 391
l lfllllli,wd-ratna, s8 Uttara-sthiina, 433
Upani~ads, I, 2, 8, 37-30, 46, s8, 78, Uttara-tantra, 329, 330, 332, 3~9. 424,
92, 98, 100, II3, 114, II6, 12<), 151, 425, 427, 429
215, 226, 259, 260, 276, 333, 344, Uttara-vasti, 426
448, 453. 455. 47I, 475. 478, 493. uttariiya~za, 519
495, 496, 51 I 1l., SIS, 520, 525, 530, Uveyaka, 172
532, 536, 548, 551; as one consistent Uvula, 259, 355
philosophy borrowed by Sankara iilw, 375, 377
from his predecessors, 2; commen- ilhya, 389, 392
tators before Sankara, I ; ethical firdhva-gii niil]l, 345 n.
ideas in, 494, 495; heart in, 344; firdhva-mula'f!l tripiid Brahma, 523
nature of its philosophy under Gau- firu-nalaka, 285 n. 8
<;lapada's influence, 2; their view of firfi, 285
self criticized by Kamalasila, 181;
their views regarding the niil}is, Vacuity, 21, 234
344 fT. Vacuous space, 59
Upani~ad texts, 8o, 87, 88, 98,132 Vagina, 289, 290 n., 291, 313 n.
upapatti-sama, 3~0 n. 4, 382 n. vahana-piika-snelza, 328 n.
uparati, 495 Vaibha~ikas, 186 n.
upasamiinussati, 459 Vaideha Janaka, 316
Upasama, 231 Vaideha king, 357
upasamana, 358 vaidharmya, 13 2
upasamaniya, 357 vaidya, 385
upasaya, 397 V aidyaka-sarvasva, 432
upatiipa, 293, 309 Vaidyakii$fiiitga - hrdaya - vrtter bhe -
U pavar~a, 43 ~aja-niima-sfici, 436
upaviisa, 278 Vaidyanatha Dik~ita, 81
upm•eda, 274, 276 Vaidyavacaspati, 434
upiidiina, 9, 334,497,498 Vain, SII
upiidiina-kiira~za, 12, 372 vairiigya, 231, 412, 439, 454
Index
Vairiigya-satalw, 460 11. knowledge, 20; arguments of San-
Vaise~ika, SI, ss. 119, I2o, 125, I57. kara for psychological dualitv of
I79. I89-I92, I94. 248, 262, 272, awareness do not apply to Vasu-
302, 307 n., 369, 412, sq.; cate- bandhu, 29; central features of his
gories, 55, I 92; its theory of the philosophy, 24, 25; did not deny
subtle body, 306; philosophy, I93, objectivity of objects of awareness,
332 n., 398 n.; physics, I92, 273; but regarded objects as awarenesses,
springs of action in, 4I2; system, 29; experiences like dreams, 20; his
366, 37I; theory, I90 date, 20 n.; his denial of the doctrine
Vaise#ka-bhii~ya, 162 of pure vacuity, 2I; his idealistic
Vaise#ka-siUras, 356, 369-37I conceptional space, 25; his idealistic
Vaisya, 502, 504, sos, 53I, 542, 546 explanation of physical eYents, 2I;
vai~wnya, 320 his refutation of the atomic theory,
Vai~Dava, I25, I92, 2I9, 44I, 443. 20; his theory of iilaya-vijiiiina, 22;
532 his theory of pure consciousness and
Vai~1_lavism and Saivism, 543 n., 549 n. its power, 22; his theory of thought
Vaitaral)a, 424 transformations, 21; his view of
Vaitara.1Ja-tantra, 435 thought as real substance and its
vaitiina, 283 threefold transformations, 23 ff.; his
V aitiina-sfitra, 284 view that illusory impositions must
Vaiyiisilw-nyiiya-miilii, 8I have an object, 2I; perceptual know-
Vajrii, 353, 354 ledge of the material world not trust-
val?riimuniina, I 20 worthy, 20; salwpalamblw-niyama
Vakulakara, 43 I absent in, 26 n. I; world-construc-
Valabhi, I64 tion as false as dream-construction,
·valaya, 284 n. 4 2I
valayii.sthi, 284 n. 4 Vasumitra, I7I
'lmliisa, 298 n., 299 'L'asv-aizlw-vasu-'l.·atsare, I07
Valid, I2, IS8, I66, I84; means of Vasi~tlza-riima-sm!l'Viida, 229
proof, 236; proofs, I67 'l!asyiitman, 420
Validity, I66, I70 vati, 400 n.
Vallabhacarya, I47 n., 156 n., 443 Vatsapa, 300
Varp.sidhara Misra, 250 n. Vavrviisas, 300
Vll1lll'!l, 497 vii,330
vanatho, 497 Vacaspati 1\lisra, 11, I 2, 25 n., 29,36 n.,
vani~thu, 289 45. 47. 48, SI, 52, s6, 57. 74 n., 8I-
Vanity, 509-511 83, 87, IOI, I03, IOS, I06, I09, III,
Varigasena, 427, 435 I I2, I I6, I I9, I24, I26 n., I96, 220,
Varada PaD<;lita, 57 n. 250, 26o, 262, 272, 305, 306 n., 393,
Vararuci, 432 394; admits jlva as the locus of
Vararuci-saf!llzitii, 432 avidyii and Brahman as its object,
Vardhamana, I07, I26 n. 110; admits two kinds of aj1iiina,
Variability, 384 108; discussions regarding his date
van:za-dharma, 505 and teachers, I07; his account of the
van:zaka, 52 n. Sautrantika view of the existence of
vartJ.iisrama-dharma, 505 the external world, 26 n. 2; his de-
vartJ.ya-sama, 386, 387 finition of truth, 108, I09; his differ-
var~ii, 335 ence with Sarvaji'Hitma lVIuni, no;
Varur:ta, 292, 300 n. 2 his explanation regarding the nature
Varying states, I8o of object, 29; his followers, Io8;
vasanta, 335 his reference to other Buddhistic
Vasi~tha, 229, 257 arguments regarding the falsity of
vasti, 289 n. I, 340, 426 space, 28 n. ; his view of ill us ion, I I o ;
vasti-kriyii, 296, 426 his view of the status of the object
vastu, 203 of knowledge, I I I ; method of his
vastut'L'll, 38 commentary, 108; on the Sarpkhya-
Vasubandhu, I9-21, 25, 26 n., 29, 35, Yoga theory of the subtle body,
s8-6o, 62, 164, I7I; admits pure 305
Index
Viiciirambhm;la, 216 334, 335 n., 336, 337 n., 339, 344,
vada,377.379.401 349, 350, 352, 361, 362 n., 371,
Viidiivali, 57 n. 392
Vadiraja, 443 Viitaja, 300, 301, 331
Vadivagisvara, 196 Viita-kalii-kaliya, 332 n.
Vadindra, 120, 122-124, 196; his date viitala, 334
and works, 122, 123 viita-prakrti, 328, 334
Vagbhata, 274, 284 n. 3, z8s n. 6, viiti, 299
286 n. 1, 288 n. 1, 304, 327, 329, viitlkiira, 299
332, 425, 427, 432-434; diseases as viiti-krta-niisan'i, 299
modifications of do~as, 3 29; his view viiti-krtasya-bhe~ajlm, 300
of do~a, dhiitu and dhiitu-mala, 332; Vatsiputriyas, 59, 6o, 62, 182
his view of do~a, dhiitu and mala, Vatsyayana, 119, 124, 171, 248, 384
327 ff. n. I., 390, 393' 399 n., 400 n., 401 n.,
Vagbhata junior, 363 413
V iigbhata-khm:zr;fana-ma~uJana, 42 5 Vayorvida, 333
Vagisa Gosvamin, 225 n. viiyu, 75, 245, 257 n., 259 n., 260, 262,
Vahata, 263, 433 263, 276, 291, 300, 304, 311, 313,
V iijasaneyi-sa1flhitii, 536 315, 318, 325-331, 33211., 333-336,
·viij'ikara1J.a, 276, 30I 338, 339, 345, 348, 349, 362 n.,
Viijzkara1J.a-tantra, 425 363, 365, 384; according to Caraka,
viik, 346 332 ff.
viik-chala, 385, 386 n. vedanii, 23
'lliikya-do~a, 384, 385 Vedas,44,224,236,274,275,277,279,
Vakyakara, 43 n. .z8o, 294, 333, 390, 405, 407, 438,
·viikya-prasa7JZSii, 385 478, 481, 484, 487, 493. 49•h 514.
viikya-se$a, 389, 391 szo, 524, sz6, 545. 547. 548
V iikya-vivara1J.a-vyiil~hyii, I 9 3 Veda-stuti-flkii, 225
Viikya-vrtti, So, 81 vedaviidina[l, 424
V iikya-vrtti-prakiiiikii, So Vedadhyak~a - bhagavat - pujyapada,
Viikya-vrtti-tzkii, 193 52 n.
Valmiki, 229, 230 Vedananda, 52 n.
viina-prastha, 505 Vedanta, 1, 3. 13, 15, 18, I9, 29, 33,
vii1i-mana[l-sarira-pravrtti, 32 I 34,37.44,47,53,54.S6,S7,69,7I-
•vii1imaya, 469 73, 86, 96, 107, IIS, 118, 124, 125,
Vapyacandra, 431 127, 128, 156, 168, 192, 198, zos,
viira~zii, 353 zo8, 216, 2I7, 220, 223, 224, 227,
'l:iiritta, soo 23I, 234, 242, 261, 271, 310, 311,
viir#ka, 345 410, 438, 472, 474. 476, 478, 479.
Viirttika, 1 n., 48, 52, 78, 83, 84, xoo, 488, 499, 504, 512, SI8, 548, sso;
102 ajiliina and prakrti in, 74; all sub-
Varyovida, 357 jective notions are only contents, and
viisanii, 26, 27 n., 186, 187, 237-239, therefore outside the revelation in,
243, 245, 251, 255-257, 264, 266, 16; analysis of consciousness in, 63
268, 269 ff.; apprehension of objects involving
viisaniibhidhiinab, 242 objective characters, objects and the
viisanii-k~aya, 252 pure immediacy of revelation in, 13;
Vasi!1tha, 230, 231, 238, 255 Anandabodha's arguments in favour
V iisi~!ha-Riimiiym:za, 231 of the self-luminosity of the self
V iis#!ha-Riimiiya~za-candrikii, 231 and its criticism of the Prabhakara
Viis#tha-siira, 232 in, 69, 70; beginnings of the dia-
V iisi~tha-siira-gur;lhiirthii, 23 2 lectical arguments in, s 1 ; Buddhist
viistavl, 224 criticism of the identity of the self
Vasudeva,535,538-s44.548,549;and and its reply in, 66, 67, cognitional
Kr~l).a, 541 ff. revelation not a product in, 13; con-
Viisudevaka, 539 tinuation of the school of Vacaspati
Vasudevendra, 57 n. up to the seventeenth century in, 51,
viita, 258, 282, 296, 319, 327, 330- 52; continuation of the schools of
Index
Suresvara, Padmapada and lVIaQ.Q.ana tent, infinite and non-temporal in,
up to the fourteenth century in, 52, 16; principle of revelation neither
53; continuity of conscious life in, subjective nor objective in, I6;
I 5 ; criticism of Buddhistic analysis quarrel with the Prabhakaras on the
of recognition in, 65; difference be- subject of revelation in, 67; reasons
tween pure intelligence and cog- adduced as to why COh'Tlition cannot
nitional states in, I3; does not admit be cognized in, q.; refutation of the
any relation between the character arguments against the self-luminosity
and the object, but both are mani- of the self in, 68, 69; revelation can-
fested in one simple revelation, I3; not be individuated, I 6; revelation
eleventh century writers in, 49; identical with self in, 15; self-iden-
everything else which is not a prin- tity proved through memory in, 67;
ciple of revelation is miiyii in, I6; seventeenth and eighteenth century
existence of self cannot be proved writers more under the influence of
by inference in, 68 ; existence of self Vacaspati, Surdvara and Sarvaji'iat-
is only proved through its imme- ma than of the Vivara1Ja in, 56. 57;
diacy and self-revelation in, 68, 69; Srihar~a. Citsukha and the nwhii-
general writers after the fourteenth 'l•idyii syllogism of Kularka in, 51;
century greatly under the influence status of the object in, 35; tenth
of the Vivara~w school in, 53; idea century writers in and Buddhism in,
of jlvan-mukti in, 25I; in what sense 48, 49; the evolution of the micro-
CO!-,mizing is an act, in what sense it cosmos and macrocosmos from aj-
is a fact in, I 5;" I" only a particular 1iiina, 74, 75; the self limited by
mode of mind in, I 5; its account of miiyii behaves as individuals anJ as
the anta(!lwmiJa, 75; its account of God in, 72; the theory of trivrt-
the ko~as, 7 5, 76; its account of the kara1J.a and paiici-kanliJa in, 7+;
possibility of recognition, 65, 66; its Vidyarm:rya's analysis of the recog-
account of the universe, 76; its nizer in, 66; Vidyarar:tya 's conten-
account of the 'lYiyus, 75; its central tion that the self-identity cannot be
philosophical problem, 47; its chief explained by the assumption of two
emphasis is on the unity of the self, separate concepts in, 67, 68; writers
72, 73; its conception of identity from the seventeenth to the nine-
differentiated from the ordinary log- teenth century in, 57 n. 1; writers
ical concept of identity, I4; its cos- inspired by Jagannathasramai\irsirp-
mology, 73-77; its diffccence with ha and Appaya in, 55; writers in-
the Mahayanists regarding nature spired by Kr~r:tananda of the seven-
of objects in the Vivarm:za school, 30; teenth century in, 56; writers of the
its theory of the subtle body, 311; sixteenth and seventeenth centuries
its three opponents, Buddhist, Nai- in, 55
yayika and Mimarpsaka, 71, 72; its Vedanta arguments, uS, 128
twofold \Tiew, 13; logical explana- Vedanta dialectic, 125; history of its
tion as regards the nature of identity rise and growth, 12+, 125; malzii-
in, 14; meaning of cognizing in, 15; vidyii syllogisms of Kularka as its
meaning of prii1Ja in, 260, 261; direct precursor in, 124, 125
memory does not indicate aware- Vedanta dialectics, 57 n., 163, I7I;
ness of awareness in, 67; mental forerunners of, 171 ff.
states and revelation in, 15 ; nature Vedanta epistemology, 149, 154.
of ajiiiina and its powers in. 73, 74; Vediinta-hrdaya, 57 11.
nature of the anta/:zlwra1J.a in, 76, 77; Vedanta idealism, 151
nature of the obligatoriness of its Vt'diinta-lwlpa-latihii, 225, 226
study in, 46; no cognition camtot Vediinta-kalpa-taru, 108, 119 11., 260
be cognized again in, 14; notion of Vediinta-kalpa-taru-maiijarl, 108
" I" as content in, 15; possible bor- Vediinta-kalpa-taru-parimala, 1oS, 226
rowing of its theory of perception Vediinta-kaumudl, 52, 53, 197, I98,
from Sarpkhya by Padmapada in, 204-206, 209, 210, 211 n.
89 n.; principle of revelation de- Veda1lta-kaumudi-'L)'iildzy(/na, 205
signated as self or iitman in, I 6; Vediinta-lwustubha, g~ 11.
principle of revelation is self-con- Vediinta-naya-hhfi~a1Ja, sr,, ~2
Index
Vediinta-pariblu'i~ii, 17 11., 30 n., 54, Verbal definitions, 146
74 n., 75 n., 105, 207, 2o8, 209 n., Verbalism, I71
2I 1 n., 217, 223 n. Verbal nature, 163
Vediinta-pariblui~ii-prakiiSilu"i, 54 n. Verbal repetition, 385
Vedanta philosophy, 19, 51, 62, II2 Verbal sophisms, 146
Vediinta-siira, 54, 55,73 n., 75 n., 8111., Verbal usage, I84
IOJ, 26I Vertebrae, 287 11. I
Vt•diinta-siddlziinta-candrikii, 56 Vertebral column, 285 11. I, .287 n. 1,
Vediinta-siddhiinta-muktiivalt, 57 n., 353
270 vibhava, 537
Vediinta-siUra, 228, 260-262 'l>ibhriga, I s8, 194, 360
Vcdiinta-sfilra-nmhtiivali, 82 Vibhrama-vivelw, 87 11.
Vecliinta-silduimm;i, 54 'l•iblulti, 549
V edtinta-tattva-dlpana-v:ytikhyii, 54 Vibration, 256; of the prii7Ja, 256
rTedtlnta-tattva-lwwmuli, 45 II. Vibratory, 254; activity, 257, 258, z61;
Vedtinta-taltva-vi'l'elw, S·h 216, 2I7 n. movement, I88
Vedanta teachers, 17, 30 'l'iclira, 358, 359
Vedanta texts, +7 victlrmJ.tl, 264, 373
Vedanta topics, XI Vice, 194, 248, 305, 373, 487, 493,
Vedanta writers, 55 498, 507, 510, 511, 522
Vedantacarya, 441 'l·icil~ilstl, 4 I 3
Vt:dantic, 3I 11., 52 n., <)2, 3I I; attack, Vicious,22,23,409, 414; endll·ssseries,
I 25; circle, 55; concqlt of salvation, 130; infinite, 40, 70, I 17, 132, 162,
227; conct:pts, 14H; cosmolo~y. 73, 174, 178, 185; infinite regress, 128,
226; development, 48; doctrines, 255
228; idealism, 36; influence, 477, Viciousness, 373
478; interpretation, 49; interpreta- Victory, SI2
tion by Bhartrprapai'ica, 1 ; inter- 'l.1iddt"!O, 497
preters, 208; monism, 224; pro- Videha, 427
blems, 228; self, 33; texts, 90, 98, 'l'l"deha-mukti, 252
<)<), 102; writers, 44, 53 Videha-tantra, 435
Veuantin, 30, 234 vidhiina, 389, 391
Vedantist,I2,JI,96, I24, I25, 128,I57, vidhi, so, 479-483
107, I68, 225, 517 Vidhi-rasiiya11a, 220
vedtt1if?a, 274, 276 V idhi:.rasiiya11opajl'l'anl, 2 20
Vedii1it-:a-stlra, 432 Vidhi-viveka, 45 n., 86, 87, 106, 482
Vedii.rtha-sa1!tgraha, 43 n. 'l'idhura, 3 51
Vedic commands, 479, 48I-4-86 vidhurii, 342
Vedic commentator, 215 vidradha, 299
Vedic dharma, 533 Vidvan-ma11orami"i, 79
Vedic duties, 43 n., 46, 99, IOO, 437 Vid'l•an-mano-raiijmzl, 261 11. 1
Vedic index, 345 n., 346 n., 486 n. 3 vidvat-sm.nnyiisa, 251, 25211.
Veuic India, 301 Vidyabhusan, Dr, 393, 394
Vedic injunctions, 468 'l'idyli, 12, 238, 239. 505
Vedic knowledge, 495 Vidycibhara~ra, 126 n.
Vedic religion, 493 'l'idyiibhltVa 1 I 2
Vedic texts, 74 11., 98, 129 'l'idyiibhlpsita, 495
Vedisdze Studien, 345 n. Vidyadhaman, 79
'l.'ega-pravartmw, :P7 Vidyclmrta-var#7Jl, 1 15
Vegetables (horn from), 309 Vidyarar:tya, 52, 53, 57, 69, 70 11., 78,
Veins, 256, 289, 290, ~p8 82, 83, 86, IOJ, 214, 216, 251, 252;
Venis, 17 11. a fol1ower of the Vivara7Ja view, 215;
Veti.kata, 43 11., 82 11., 119, I2o, I23, his date and works, 214, 216; his
200 idea of ]lvan-muhti, 251 ; his view
Veri.katanatha, 441 that miiyli and Brahman are the
Verikatesa, 432 joint cause of the world-appearance,
vermJz, 497 21 5; the writer of Paficadast and
Verbal cummanu, 4 79 of the ]lvan-mukti-viveka, ::!51 11.
Index
Vidyarar.lya 1\Juni, 66, 67 Vindhyasvamin, I7I
Vidyaratna, K., 2 11. vinibandhanam, 497
Vidyii siiNarl, I03, 126 11., I32, I34 n. 'l'in1iii1la, 498
Vidyii-surabhi, 99 Violent, 408
l 7 idyii-srl, 82 11. viparlfa-dharmat'l.'a, 6
·oidyi:-taru, I07 viparyaya, xo. 381, 39I
Vidyatirtha, 2IS n. viparyiisa, 5; {error), four kinds of, 5
View, 366, 369, 378; of things, I3 vipiika, 22-24, 362-364, 366, 391
Vigorous, 303 'l•iral?ti, 25 I, 252
Vigraha-'l•yii'l'artanl, 165 viriij, 43
'l•z:r;rhya-sm!zhhii~ii, 378 viriit, 21 5, 548
Vijayanagara, 219 virclw, 3 IS
Vijaya-prasasti, 126 Virility, 301, 333
Vijayarak~ita, 428-430, 432, 434, 435 'l'iriya-Sllt!IVllYll, 500
vij1iapti, 20 'l•irodho, 497
'l•ijfiapti-miitratii, 22, 24 Virtue, 194, 248, 305, 373, 404, 493,
Vijiiapti-mlitratii-siddhi, H) n. 508, 5IO, 51 I, 514, 522
'l,jjiiiina, 23, 127, I64, 307, 343, 373, Virtuous, 23, 367, 414, 51 I, 5I2, 514;
491, 505 n. deeds, 246
Vijiiiina-bhairava, 264 'l'iruddlw, 384, 385, 386 n., 388
Vijnanabhikt:'u, 262, 443 viruddha hetu, 386 11.
vijiiiina-dhiitu, 307 visalpa, 299
Vijiiiina-kaumudl, 264 'l'isalpalw, 299
'l•ijiiiina-l~riyii-salai-dvayiisraya, I 04 visarga, 370
'l•ijiiiinamaya, 76 'l'isarpa, 299, 430
'l't}iiiinamaya-ko$a, 75 t•isattikii, 497
•m:iniina-miitra, I<), 22, 234 Visible, I 57, 337 n.; do$a, 337 n.
t#1iiina-pari~u1ma, 2 I Vision, 333
t•z}fiiina-viida, 20, 209, 228, 27:!. Visual, 176; consciousness, 6I; organ,
·mjiiiinn-'l'iidins, 2, 242 31; perception, 20,25 ll.; st·nse, IS6
Vijiiiiniimrta-bhiirJ•a, 262 'L•iSada, 332, 359 n., 361
·vikalpa, 75 n., 236, 2Cn, 389, 392, 'l'ise~a, 148, 187, 1~9. 371,397
401 n. 'l'isi~tn-dl·t·atii-hhal\ti, 505
vikalpa-viisanii, 23 'l·iH${asyai•va iinanda-padiirthatviit, 223
vi lliira, 320. 3 69 Visi~tadvaita, 57 n., 441
Vikrama-sarpvat, 107 ?·iSi,f[t"idvaita-'lJ/idin, 439
Vikramasila, 49 ?•iSuddlw-calu·a, 3 55
'l'ikrti, 334, 335, 358, 386 n., 388 'l•is?•a, 76, 54S
'l'ik~epa, 73, 389 11. Visvahharati, 58 11.
?•ik$epa-sakti, 7 4 Visvadeva, I 15
vih$ipati, I I 2 Visvamhhara, 79
t•ilayana-riipii vrddhil; pralwpa?z, 335 n. Visvanatha Tirtha, 220
t•iliipanl, 264, 265 Visvarupa Acarya, 82, 83, 86, 87, 251
vimukta, 251 vis?·a-rilpatii, 241
Vimuktatman, I98, 199, 201, 203-205; Visvamitra, 230, 54I
criticism of the bhcdiibheda view by, Viivamitra-sa1Jlhitii, 432
20I, 202; criticism of the sahopa- Visvesvara, 443
lambha-niyamiit by, 201; his date and Visvesvara Pa~:t~iita, So
works, 198; his refutation of" differ- Visvesvara Sarasvati, 55
ence," I 99, 200; nature of pure con- Visvesvara Tirtha, 78
sciousness in, 199; tries to prove an Visvdvarananda, 82 n.
intrinsic difference between aware- Visvesvarasrama, 57 n.
ness and its ohject, 201 ; world- t'ifvodarii, 353
appearance like a painting on a vi~ama-pravartanii, 4I6
canvas in, 203 visama-vijiitlna, 416
Vi'T!lsatihii, 19, 20 n., 2I n., 26 n., 29 vi~amiihiiropayogitviit, 334 n.
Vinaya-Pitaka, 276 Vi~a-tantra, 425
viniisa-prati;odhiit, 386 n. Vi$aya, 23, 30, 104, I 10, 11~ 1 152
Index
vi~aya-caitanya, 207 Vomiting, 348
vijaya-gata-pratyak§atva, zo8 vra't)ah, 330 n.
v#aya-titik~ii, 495 Vrddha-Vagbhata, 3I7 n. I
vi~aya-viJnapti, 22 vrddhii};,, I03
vi~aya-vi~ayi-bhiiva, I44, I52 vrddhi, 322
v#ayiin indriyii't]iim, 34I vrkka, 3I8
vi~ayopalabdhi, 373 Vrnda, 427, 435
Vi~Qu, 535, 536, 538, 546-549; and Vp:mis, 539, 541, 543
bhagavat, 539, 540; conception of, vnya, 323, 365 n.
535, 536; conception of, and of vrtti, s6, 70, 87, zo6, 207, 210, zs6,
niiriiya't]a, 537, 538 306
Vi~Qubhatta, 52 n. vrtti-caitanya, 208
Vi~'t]u-dharmottara, 279 n. vrtti-Jniina, 77
Vi~'t]u-mukhii, 536 vrttilliira, 43
Vi~'t]u-pada, 536 Vrtti-prabhiikara, 216 n.
Vi~'t]u-purii't]a, 25I vrtti transformation, 206
V#'t]u-purii1}a-tikii, I48 n. Vrtti-viirttika, 220
V#'tJu-smrti, 279 n. vyakta, 470
Vital centres, 340 vyakter apaiti, 386 n.
Vital currents, I79 vyartha, 388
Vital element, 3I5, 3I6 vyatireki, 400 n.
Vital functions, 357, 487 vyavasiiya, I07, 384
Vitality, 241, 328, 336 vyavasiiyiitmikii, 484 n. I
Vital parts, 342 vyiidhi, 336 n.
Vital powers, 2I Vyiidhi-sindhu-vimardana, 43 2
Vital principle, 24I Vyiikara't)a, 275 n., 547
vita't]qii, 377, 379, 401 Vyiikarm;za-viida-nal?~atra-nuilii, 219
Vitthala Dik~ita, 443 vyiikhyiina, 389, 39:a
Vivara't]ll, 53. 54. 56, IOJ, 208, 201), Vyiillhyiina-dlpikii, 123
216 n., 222; line, 104; school, 34, 53, Vyiikhyii-sudhii, 55
57 vyiikulita-miinasa.~, 3 I 2 n. 3
Vivara~za-prameya-smpgraha, 52, 53, vyiina, 259, 260, 291
63 n., 65 n., 66 n., 67, 70 n., 83, 84, vyiipiido, 497
86, 87, 103, 214, 216 'lryiipiira, 137, 186
T'ivara1_Za-siddhiinta-candrikii, 434 vyiipiirab prera{zii-rupalz, 48I
rri·varm:za-siddhiinta-cinttimm;i, 329 n. 'L'}"iipti, 120, 139, 148, 194
Vi't·ara't)a-tiitparya-dlpikii, 148 n. vyiipti-graha, 148
Vivara1_Zopanytisa, 10, 31 n., 103, 2I6 n. vyiiro~a1}am, 498
Vivara1Jopanyiise Bhtiratmrtha-vaca- Vyasa, 78, 87, 259 n. 2
nam, 216 n. Vyiisa-bhii~ya, 25I, z6z, 265, 305, 408,
vivarta, 38, 39, 224; cause, 45; view, 476, 517
46, 215; view of causation, 224 Vyasatirtha, I 18, 225, 226
vivarta-kiira1_Za, so, 51 Vyasasrama, 119
Vh•eka-cii.dtinza't]i, 79 'L'yiivahiirika, 2, 44
vi·l:eka-ni~patti, 250 vyiivrtta, 63
vividi~ii-smrmyiisa, 252 n. vyiiyiima, 419
Virasi1Jzhti•valokita, 436 vyuha, 545, 546, 548
virya, 241, 351, 359, 36I-366, 370,
39I, SOl \Vackernagel, 345 n.
vita, 256 Waking experiences, 6, 8, 28
Vocal activities, 500 Waking ideas, z6
Vocal organs, 254 Waking life, 8o, I I 5
Void, 272 Waking state, 26, 240, 241, 257
Volition, 23, 24, 71, 152, 153, 463, Walleser, 398 n.
SIS Warm, 358,361,408
Volitional states, 179, 18o Washerman, I6o
Volitional tendency, 479 Waste-products, 325, 327, 33I, 337
Voluntary, SIS Watchfulness, 505
Index
VVater,74,I87,I94.302,33I-334,347, yasmin sunya'!l jagat sthitam, 234
349, 352, 357-360, 362, 364, 367, Yasomitra, 58 n., 62
so1 ; channels, 348 .yathiirthiinubhava, 2 I 3
VVatery, 33I, 357, 359; character, 331 yathiirthiinubhavab, pramii, 13 3, 2 1 2
VVay, us, 367 yathii-vidhi, 294, 295
VVeak, 338 Yaugacaryas, 120
VVealth, 5Io Yadava, 54I, 543
VVeber, Dr Albrecht, 288 n., 486 n. Yadaviibhyudaya, 220
VVell-being, so9 Y iidaviibhyudaya-{ikii, 220
VVhirlwind, 408 Yadavananda Nyayacarya, 225 n.
VVhite, 349; leprosy, 282 Yajftavalkya, I07, 252, 286 n. 1
VVhitney, VV. D., 340 n. Yiijiiavalkya-Dharma-siistra, 279 n.
VVhole, 20, "t-o, I52, I57, I87 Yamunacarya, 43<J-441, 541, 546, 547
VVill, I49, 248, 402, 4I s; force of, 264; yiitudhiinas, 296, 300
to live, 4I4 Yellow, 27, I76, 330; awareness, 70,
VVilling, 263 7I
VVill-power, 242 Yellowness, I43
VVindpipe, 286 Yoga, 107, Io9, 2so, 258, 265, 356,
VVinter, 327, 335, 370 389, 390, 415, 439. 440, 443-445.
VVisdom, 24, 257, 442, 444, 49I, 494, 447. 451-453. 456, 457. 460, 461,
soo, S02,504, sos, 514,530,532 466, 467, 489, 499. 504, 512, 514,
VVise, 378, 531 519, 547; concept of God criticized,
VVish, 497 I77; springs of action in, 414
VVorld, I, 3, 11, SI, 114, 230, 236 yoga-dhiirm:zii, 449 n. 2
VVorld-appearance, I, s, 9-I2, I9, 45, Yoga discipline, 242
46,48,55,74,98, IOI,IOS, 106, IIO, Yoga literature, 354 n.
III, 117, 118, I47, I52, I68, I70, Yoga practices, 273, 436, 440, 44~,
2I5 1 2I7 1 221, 224, 230, 233-236, 477
239-24s, 256, 268 Yoga processes, 453
VV orld -construction, 21 yoga-sevii, 450
VVorld-creation, 39, 42, 242 Yoga-siUra, 5 n., 251, 265, 304 n., 403,
VVorld-experience, 3, 4, I70 408,443.45I,461, 549
VVorldly life, 521 Yoga-sutra-bhii~ya, 87
VVorld-manifestation, 410 n. Yoga system, 436
VVorld-objects, 2I, 28, 36 yoga-sataka, 425, 436
VVorld-order, 533 Yoga Upani~ads, 455, 46I
VVorld-phenomena, so yoga-viihitviit, 332 n.
VVorld-process, 73, I7o Yoga-viirttika, 262, 355
VVorms, 297, 298, 300 Yoga-viis#tha, 17, 57 n., 228, 23011.,
VV orship, 537 231-234. 237. 240, 246, 247. 250 11.,
VVounds, 330 251-254. 259. 263, 264 n., 26S-26~,
VVrath, 497 270-272, 402 n.; citta and move-
VV rong construction, I 54 ment, 258; conception of fivan-
VV rong notion, 9 mukti, 245 ff.; denial of daiva in,
VVrong perception, I37 255; energy and its evolution, 34-3 ff.;
energy and world-appearance, 243 ff.;
yad antar-jiieya-rilp01fl, 27 n. estimate of its philosophy, 271,
yadrcchii, 372, 410 272; free-will and destiny, 253; its
yajna, 292 n., 448, 487, 488 doctrine of priirabdha-kamw, 246,
yajna-vidab,, 448 247; its idealism compared with
Yajii.esvara Makhindra, 2I8 n. that of Prakasananda, 270, 271 ; its
Yajus, 274, 390, s26 idealism compared with that of
Yakkha, 539 Sankara and Buddhist idealism, 268
J·akna, 288 ff.; jivan-mukti and Nyaya eman-
yak~as, 283, 468 cipation, 248; jlvan-mukti and the
ya~man, 297 n. s, 298 Prabhakara idea of emanicpation,
Yama, 25I, 311, 432, 454, 455, 49I 249; jlvmt-mukti and the Sarpkhya
yantm, 257 idea of emancipation, 249, 250; fi-
620 Index
Yoga-viisi$/ha (cont.) Yoga-vas#tha-tiitparya-prakiiSa, 240 n.
van-mukti and the Sarpkhya-yoga Yoga-vdsiltha-tiitparya-smpgraha, 232
idea of emancipation, 249-251 ;jfvan- Yogacara, 164
mukti and Vidyaral)ya's doctrine of Yogananda, 57 n.
jivan-mukti, 251; jivan-mukti com- Yoganandanatha,436
pared with Buddhist sainthood, 247, yogiiriiljha, 444, 445, 446 n.
248; jivan-mukti compared with Yoge$vara, 453
sthita-priijiia, 247; karma, manas Yogins, I89, 256, 440, 444. 446-451,
and the categories, 237-239; nature 454
of kartrtva, 242 ff.; nature of the Yogi-yiijiiavalkya-sa7Jlhitii, 354
work, other works on it and its date, Yogisvara, 57 n., 122
228-232; origination of the world yogyatii, 150
through thought-movement, 235- yoni, 358
237; place of free-will in, 254; prii1Ja yuddhe ciipy apaliiyana, 505 n.
and priir.ziiyiima in, 257 ff.; prii1Ja yudh, 551
vibration and knowledge in, 256; Yudhi~thira, so8, 509
right conduct and final attainment Yugasena, 172
in, 267, 268; stages of progress to- yuj,443.444,446
wards saintliness in, 264 ff.; theory yujir, 443, 444
of spanda, 235-237; ultimate reality yujir yoge, 443, 444
is pure intelligence, 232,233; viisanii yuj samiidhau, 443
and prii1Ja vibration in, 256, 257; yukta, 446 n. 1, 458
world-appearance is entirely mental yukta iislta, 449
creation and absolutely false, 233, yukti, 359, 360, 370, 373, 375, 376
234 Yukti-dipikii, 45 n.
Yoga-viisi$tha-Riimiiya'!fa, 228, 232 Yukti-prayoga, 49
Yoga-viisiuha-sa7Jlk$epa, 232 yuiijyiit, 446 n. 4
Yoga-viisi$tha-siira, 232
Yoga-viisi${ha-siira-sa1Jzgraha, 232 Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenliindi-
Yoga-viisi${ha-slokiib, 232 schen Gesellschaft, 345 n.
A HISTORY
OF
INDIAN PHILOSOPHY
BY
SURENDRANATH DASGUPTA, M.A.,
Ph.D. (Cal. et Cantab.), D.Litt. (Hon.) (Rome)
F.R.S.L., LE.S.
VOLUME III
CAMBRIDGE
A'T THE UNIVERSITY PRESS
PUBLISHED BY
THE SY~DICS OF THE CA:\1BRID(;E L':-.:IVERSITY PRESS
June 1939
CONTENTS
CHAPTER XV
THE BHASKARA SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY
PAGE
I Date of Bhaskara
2 Bhaskara and Sailkara 3
3 The Philosophy of Bhaskara's Bha~ya 6
CHAPTER XVI
THE PANCARATRA
I Antiquity of the Paiicaratra I2
2 The Position of the Paiicaratra Literature I4
3 The Paiicaratra Literature 2I
4 Philosophy of the :Jayakhya and other Sa'f!lhitii.s 24
s Philosophy of the Ahirbudhnya-sa'f!lhita 34
CHAPTER XVII
THE MVARS
I The Chronology of the Arvars . 63
2 The Philosophy of the Arvars . 69
3 Ar.vars and Sri-vai~Q.avas on certain points of controversy in religious
dogmas 8s
CHAPTER XVIII
AN HISTORICAL AND LITERARY SURVEY OF THE
VISI$TADVAITA SCHOOL OF THOUGHT
1 The Ar.agiyas from Nathamuni to Ramanuja 94
2 Ramanuja IOO
3 The Precursors of the Visi~tadvaita Philosophy and the contem-
poraries and pupils of Ramanuja IOS
4 Ramanuja Literature I I4
s The Influence of the A.rvars on the followers of Ramanuja I34
CHAPTER XIX
THE PHILOSOPHY OF YAMUNA.CARYA
1 Yamuna's doctrine of Soul contrasted with those of others 139
2 God and the World . IS2
3 God according to Ramanuja, Venkatanatha and Lokacarya ISS
4 Visi~tadvaita doctrine of Soul according to Ramanuja and Ven-
katanatha IS9
S Acit or Primeval Matter: the Prakrti and its modifications I 62
xu Contents
CHAPTER XX
PHILOSOPHY OF THE RAMANUJA SCHOOL OF THOUGHT
PAGE
1 Sankara and Ramilnuja on the nature of Reality as qualified or un-
qualified I65
2 Refutation of Sankara's avidyii • I75
3 R!milnuja's theory of Illusion-All knowledge is Real 179
4 Failure of theistic proofs . I 89
CHAPTER XXI
THE NIMBARKA SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY
PAGE
l Teachers and Pupils of the Nimbarka School • 399
2 A General Idea of Nirnbarka's Philosophy
3 Controversy with the Monists by Madhava Mukunda
(a) The Main Thesis and the Ultimate End in Advaita Vedanta are
untenable . 416
(b) Refutation of the Sailkara Theory of Illusion in its various Aspects 422
(c) Refutation of the Sankarite View of Ajniina • 424
4 The PranziiT}as according to Madhava Mukunda . 426
5 Criticism of the views of Ramanuja and Bhaskara 429
6 The Reality of the World . 435
7 V anamali Misra . 440
CHAPTER XXII
THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIJN"ANA BHIK$U
1 A General Idea of Vijiiana Bhik~u's Philosophy. . 445
2 The Brahman and the World according to Vijiiana-mrta-bha~ya . 454
3 The Individual . 460
4 Brahma-Experience and Experience 465
5 Self-Luminosity and Ignorance 468
6 Relation of Sarpkhya and Vedanta according to Bhik~u . 471
7 Maya and Pradhana . 476
8 Bhik~u's criticism of the Sarpkhya and Yoga 479
9 I ivara-gftii, its Philosophy as expounded by Vijiiana Bhik~u 482
CHAPTER XXIII
PHILOSOPHICAL SPECULATIONS OF SOME OF THE
SELECTED PURA~AS
1 Vi~~u Purii~ • 497
2 V iiyu Purii~a • 502
3 ~Yarka~fjeya Purii~a 506
4 Naradfya Pura~a 507
5 Kurma Pura~a • 509
APPENDIX TO VOLUME I
The Lokayata, Nastika and Carvaka 512-550
INDEX • 551
CHAPTER XV
THE BHASKARA SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY
Date of Bhaskara.
UnAYANA, in his Nyiiya-kusumiifijali, speaks of Bhaskara as a
commentator on the Vedanta in accordance with the traditions of
the trida1}l}.a school of Vedanta and as holding the view that
Brahman suffers evolutionary changes 1 . Bhanoji Dik!?ita also, in
his Tattva-viveka-tikii-vivara1}a, speaks of Bhana Bhaskara as
holding the doctrine of difference and non-difference (bhediibheda) 2 •
It is certain, however, that he flourished after Sankara, for, though
he does not mention him by name, yet the way in which he refers
to him makes it almost certain that he wrote his commentary with
the express purpose of refuting some of the cardinal doctrines of
Sankara's commentary on the Brahma-siitra. Thus, at the very be-
ginning of his commentary, he says that it aims at refuting those
who, hiding the real sense of the siitra, have only expressed their
own opinions, and in other places also he speaks in very strong
terms against the commentator who holds the miiyii doctrine and
is a Buddhist in his views 3 • But., though he was opposed to Sankara,
it was only so far as Sankara had introduced the miiyii doctrine,
and only so far as he thought the world had sprung forth not
as a real modification of Brahman, but only through miiyii. For
1 Trida~uJa means " three sticks." According to 1\Ianu it was customary
among some Brahmins to use one stick, and among others, three sticks.
Pandita Vindhvesvari Prasada Dvivedin, in his Sanskrit introduction to
Bhask~r~'s comme~tary on the Brahma-sutra, says that the Vai~Q.ava commen-
tators on the Brahma-sfitra prior to Ramanuja, Tanka, Guhadeva, Bharuci and
Yamunacarya, the teacher of Ramanuja, were all trida~4ins. Such a statement
is indeed very interesting, but unfortunately he does not give us the authority
from which he drew this information.
2 "Bha!fabhiiskaras tu bhedii-bheda-vediinta-siddhiinta-viidc"; Bhattoji Dik-
1
l'iisudt"l'a e·va upiidima-kiira~lll1!l jagatn nimitta-kiira~lll'f!l ali It' manyante . ..
tad e/at Sllr7.'ll1!l Sruti-prasiddham e'Vll tasmii1l Pliitra nirukara~ll_\'W!l pasyii.ma!l.
Bhiiskara-blu"i~ya, II. 2 . .p.
2 lhid.
3
I hid. III. 4· 26, p. 208; sec also Par:H;lita \'imlhycsyari's Introduction.
' .S,ailwra-njaya, X\'. So.
xv] Bhiiskara and Saizkara 3
late Dr Bhawdaji in the l\Iara~ha country, near Nasik, in which it
is stated that one Bhaskara Bhana of the lineage (gotra) of SaQ.<;lilya,
son of Kavicakravarti Trivikrama, who was given the title of
Vidyapati, was the sixth ancestor of Bhaskaracarya of SaQ.<;lilya
lineage, the astronomer and writer of the Siddhanta-siromaQ.i; and
he maintains that this senior Vidyapati Bhaskara Bhana was the
commentator on the Brahma-siitra 1• But, though this may be
possible, yet we have no evidence that it is certain; for, apart from
the similarity of names 2 , it is not definitely known whether this
Vidyapati Bhaskara Bhana ever wrote any commentary on the
Bralzma-siitra. All that we can say, therefore, with any degree of
definiteness, is that Bhaskara flourished at some period between the
middle of the eighth century and the middle of the tenth century,
and most probably in the ninth century, since he does not know
Ramanuja 3 •
lzetufz. Bluiskara-bhii~ya.
2 Ibid. II. 3· I8, 22, 23-
3 Blziiskara-blziiDJa, 1. I. I. In holding the view that the Bralzma-siitra is
in a sense continuous with the Jl.limiit.nsii-siitra, which the former must follow-
for it is after the periormance of the ritualistic duties that the knowledge of
Brahman can arise, ::md the latter therefore cannot in any stage dispense with the
need for the former-and that the Bralzma-siitras are not intended for any
superior and different class of persons, Bhaskara seems to have followed Upa-
var!?a or Upavar~acarya, to whose commentary on the MimiiTJlSii-siitra he refers
and whom he calls the founder of the school (iiistra-sampradiiya-pravartaka).
Ibid. 1. 1. I, and n. 2. 27. See also 1. 1. 4: iitma-jniinii-dlzikrtasya karmablzir vinii
apavargii-nupapatter jniinena karma samucciyate.
8 The Bhiiskara School of Philosophy [cH.
have the highest knowledge are beyond the duties of life and courses
of ritualistic and other actions enjoined by the scriptures, or that
those for whom these are intended are not fit to have the highest
knowledge; in other words, the statement of Sankara that there
cannot be any combination (samuccaya) of knowledge Cfiiiina) and
necessary ritualistic duties of life (karma) is false. llhaskara admits
that pure lwrma (ritualistic duties) cannot lead us to the highest
perception of the truth, the Brahman; yet knowledge (jtiiina) com-
bined with the regular duties, i.e. jiiiina-samuccita-karma, can lead
us to our highest good, the realization of Brahman. That it is our
duty to attain the knowledge of Brahman is also to he accepted, by
reason of the injunction of the scriptures; for that also is one of the
imperative duties imposed on us by the scriptures-a 'i.·idhi-the
self is to be known (iitmii ·vii are dra~fa'l~vafz, etc.). It is therefore
not true, as Sankara asserted, that what the ritualistic and other
duties imposed on us by the scriptures can do for us is only to make
us fit for the study of Yedanta by purifying us and making us as far
as possible sinless; Bhaskara urges that performance of the duties
imposed on us by the scriptures is as necessary as the attainment
of knowledge for our final liberation.
Bhaskara draws a distinction between cognition (jtiiina) and
consciousness (caitanya), more particularly, self-consciousness
(iitma-caitanya). Cognition with him means the knowleJ.ee of ob-
jective things, and this is a direct experience (anubhm.'a) arising out
of the contact of the sense organ, manas, and the object, the presence
of light and the internal action of the memory and the sub-conscious
impressions (sm!zskiira). Cognition is not an active operation by
itself, but is rather the result of the active operation of the senses in
association with other accessories, such that whenever there is a
collocation of those accessories involving the operation of the senses
there is cognition 1 . Bhaskara is therefore positively against the con-
tention of Kumarila that knowledge is an entity which is not directly
perceived but only inferred as the agent which induces the in-
tellectual operation, but which is not directly known by itself. If an
unperceived entity is to be inferred to explain the cause of the per-
• jiiiina-kriyii-kalpaniiyii'!l pramiiTJii-bhii:viit .. .. iilokmdri_va-mana!z-sm?zskiire~u
hi satsu sa'!l'i'edanam utpadyate iti tad-ablzii'i·e twtpadyate, yadi prmar apara'!l
jiiiina'!l kalpyate tasyiipy anyat tasyiipy anyad ity mzm·astlzii; na ra j'llina-
kriyanumiine lingam asti, smm!edanam iti cen 11a, agrhfta-sambandlwtt:iit. Bhiiskara-
blziisva. 1. 1 1.
xv] The Philosophy of Bhaskara's Bhii~ya 9
ceived intellectual operation, then another entity might be inferred
as the cause of that unperceived entity, and another to explain that
and so on, and we have a vicious infinite (anavasthii). Moreover, no
unperceived entity can be inf(;rred as the cause of the perceived
intellectual operation; for, if it is unperceived, then its relation with
intellectual operation is also unperceived, and how can there be any
inference at all? Thus, cognition is what we directly experience
(anubhava) and there is no unperceived entity which causes it, but
it is the direct result of the joint operation of many accessories.
This objective cognition is entirely different from the subjective
consciousness or self-consciousness; for the latter is eternal and
always present, whereas the former is only occasioned by the col-
locating circumstances. It is easy to see that Bhaskara has a very
distinct epistemological position, which, though similar to Nyaya
so far as the objective cognition is concerned, is yet different there-
from on account of his admission of the ever-present self-con-
sciousness of the soul. It is at the same time different from the
Sailkarite epistemology, for objective cognition is considered by
him not as mere limitation of self-consciousness, but as entirely
different therefrom 1• It may also be noted that, unlike Dhar-
marajadhvarindra, the writer of the Sanskrit epistemological work,
Vediinta-paribhii~ii, Bhaskara considers manas as a sense-organ 2 •
On the subject of the self-validity of knowledge Bhaskara thinks
that the knowledge of truth is always self-valid (svatal:z-pramiir;a),
whereas the knowledge of the false is always attested from outside
(paratal:z pramiit;a) 3 •
As has already been said, Bhaskara does not think that libera-
tion can be attained through knowledge alone; the duties imposed
by the scriptures must always be done along with our attempts to
know Brahman; for there is no contradiction or opposition between
knowledge and performance of the duties enjoined by the scriptures.
There will be no liberation if the duties are forsaken 4 • The state of
salvation is one in which there is a continuous and unbroken con-
sciousness of happiness5 • A liberated soul may associate or not
associate itself with any body or sense as it likes6 • It is as omniscient,
1 kecid iihul:z iitmii pramiiyiim i11driya-dviiropiidhi-nirgama-v#aye1u vartate . •.
1
atha ekasmin siitisaye keniipyanyena niratisayena bhavitm·yam iti iihnst·it
samiina-jiitiyenii'nyeua rzir-atisaya-dasiim adhirii~lht na bhm:itm·_,·am iti:
na tii'L·ad a{!rima~z lwlpal; kalpyate'nupalambhatah
llalzi d!~flll!l sarii•nJdi 'l')'V,le'l'll priipta-t·aibhm·m~l.
Jr:ama-p1l"imc"i~lya, p. J.
xv1] Position of the Paiicarii.tra Literature 15
The very word siitvata indicates a lower caste!, and the words
bhiigavata and siitvata are interchangeable. It is said that a siitvata
of the paiicama caste who by the king's order worships in temples is
called a bhiigavata. As a means of livelihood the satvatas worship
images and live upon offerings for initiation and those made to temple
gods; they do not perform the Vedic duties, and have no relationship
with the· Brahmins, and so they cannot be regarded as Brahmins. It
is also said that even by the sight of a man who takes to worship as
a means of livelihood one is polluted and should be purified by
proper purificatory ceremonies. The Paiicaratra texts are adopted
by the degraded satvatas or the bhagavatas, and these must therefore
be regarded as invalid and non- Vedic. l\Ioreover, if this literature
were founded on the Vedas, there would be no meaning in their
recommendation of special kinds of rituals. It is for this reason
that Badarayal)a also refutes the philosophical theory of the
Paficaratra in the Brahma-sutra.
It may, however, be urged that, though the Paiicaratra injunc-
tions may not tally with the injunctions of Brahminic Smrti litera-
ture, yet such contradictions are not important, as both are based
upon the Vedic texts. Since the validity of the Brahminic Smrti
also is based upon the Vedas, the Paiicaratra has no more necessity
to reconcile its injunctions with that than they have to reconcile
themselves with the Paficaratra.
The question arises as to whether the Yedas are the utterances
of a person or not. The argument in favour of production by a
person is that, since the Vedas are a piece of literary composition,
they must have been uttered by a person. The divine person who
directly perceives the sources of merit or demerit enjoins the same
through his grace by composing the Vedas for the benefit of human
beings. It is admitted, even by the 1\Iimarpsakas, that all worldly
affairs are consequent upon the influence of merit and demerit. So
the divine being who has created the world knows directly the
sources of merit and demerit. The world cannot be produced
directly through the effects of our deeds, and it has to be admitted
that there must be some being who utilizes the effects of our deeds,
producing the world in consonance with them. All the scriptural
1 Thus Manu says:
vais'yiit tu jiiyate vriityiit sudhanviiciirya eva ca
bhiir~as ca nijanghas ca maitra-siitvata eva ca.
Agama-priimii~ya, p. 8.
16 The Paficariitra [cH.
texts also support the admission of such an omnipotent and omni-
scient God. It is this God who, on the one hand, created the Vedas,
directing the people to the performance of such actions as lead them
to mundane and heavenly happiness, and on the other hand created
the Paficaratra literature for the attainment of the highest bliss by
the worship of God and the realization of His nature. There are
some who deny the legitimate inference of a creator from the crea-
tion, and regard the Vedas as an eternally existent composition,
uncreated by any divine being. Even in such a view the reason why
the Vedas and the consonant Smrtis are regarded as valid attests
also the validity of the Paficaratra literature. But, as a matter of
fact, from the Vedas themselves we can know the supreme being
as their composer. The supreme God referred to in the Upani~ads
is none other than V iisude'l'a, and it is He who is the composer of the
Paficaratra. Further, arguments are adduced to show that the ob-
ject of the Vedas is not only to command us to do certain actions or
to prohibit us from doing certain other actions, but also to describe
the nature of the ultimate reality as the divine person. The validity
of the Paficaratra has therefore to be admitted, as it claims for its
source the divine person ~arayaiJa or Vasudeva. Yamuna then
refers to many texts from the Variiha, Liizga and 1\1atsya Purii7Jas
and from the il1anu-sa'!thitii and other smrti texts. In his Puru~a
nin-IJGJ'a also, Yamuna elaborately discusses the scriptural argu-
ments by which he tries to show that the highest divine person re-
ferred to in the U pani~ads and the PuraiJas is NarayaiJa. This
divine being cannot be the Siva of the Saivas, because the three
classes of the Saivas, the Kapalikas, Kalamukhas and Pasupatas, all
prescribe courses of conduct contradictory to one another, and it is
impossible that they should be recommended by the scriptural
texts. Their ritualistic rites also are manifestly non-Vedic. The
view that they are all deriYed from Rudra does not prove that it is
the same Rudra who is referred to in the Vedic texts. The Rudra
referred to by them may be an entirely different person. He refers
also to the various Pural)as which decry the Saivas. Against the
argument that, if the Paiicaratra doctrines were in consonance with
the Vedas, then one would certainly have discovered the relevant
Vedic texts from which they were derived, Yamuna says that the
Paiicaratra texts were produced by God for the benefit of devotees
who were impatient of following elaborate details described in the
XVI] Position of the Paiicariitra Literature
Vedic literature. It is therefore quite intelligible that the relevant
Yedic texts supporting the Paficaratra texts should not be
discovered. Again, when it is said that Sal).9ilya turned to the
doctrine of bhakti because he found nothing in the four Vedas
suitable for the attainment of his desired end, this should not be
interpreted as implying a lowering of the Vedas; for it simply
means that the desired end as recommended in the Paficaratras is
different from that prescribed in the Vedas. The fact that Pafi-
caratras recommend special ritual ceremonies in addition to the
Vedic ones does not imply that they are non-Vedic; for, unless it is
proved that the Paficaratras are non-Vedic, it cannot be proved that
the additional ceremonies are non-Vedic without implying argu-
ment in a circle. It is also wrong to suppose that the Paficaratra
ceremonies are really antagonistic to all Vedic ceremonies. It is
also wrong to suppose that Badarayal).a refuted the Paficaratra
doctrines; for, had he done so, he would not have recommended
tl1em in the IV/ahiibhiirata. The view of the Paficaratras admitting
the four vyuhas should not be interpreted as the admission of many
gods; for these are manifestations ofVasudeva, the one divine person.
A proper interpretation of Badarayal).a's Brahma-sutras would also
show that they are in support of the Paficaratras and not against them.
Even the most respected persons of society follow all the
Pancaratra instructions in connection with all rituals relating to
image-worship. The arguments of the opponents that the Bhaga-
vatas are not Brahmins are all fallacious, since the Bhagavatas have
the same marks of Brahmahood as all Brahmins. The fact that
.1.\Ianu describes the pmicama caste as siitvata does not prove that
all siitvatas are paiicamas . .1.\Ioreover, the interpretation of the word
siitvata as paiicama by the opponents would be contradictory to
many scriptural texts, where siitvatas are praised. That some
siitvatas live by image-building or temple-building and such other
works relating to the temple does not imply that this is the duty of
all the Bhagavatas. Thus Yamuna, in his Agama-priimiir;ya and
Kiismiriigama-priimii1Jya, tried to prove that the Paficaratras are as
valid as the Vedas, since they are derived from the same source,
viz. the divine Person, N iiriiya1Ja 1 •
1
The Kasmzriigama is referred to in the Agama-priimii~ya, p. 85, as another
work of Yamuna dealing more or less with the same subject as the Agama-
pramii~ya, of which no MS. has been available to the present writei".
D 111 2
The Paiicariitra [cu.
From the tenth to the seventeenth century the Saivas and the
Srlvai~I}avas lived together in the south, where kings professing
Saivism harassed the Sr1vai~r_1avas and maltreated their temple-
gods, and kings professing Srlvai~I}avism did the same to the Sai,·as
and their temple-gods. It is therefore easy to ima~inc how the
sectarian authors of the two schools were often an\.ious to repudiate
one another. One of the most important and comprehensive of such
works is the .'-,'iddlulnta-ratnii7:ali, written by \"er1kata Sudhl.
\"erikata Sudhl was the disciple of \"erikatan~J.tha. lie was the son
of Srisaila Tatayarya, and was the brother of Sri Saila Srinivasa.
The Siddlulnta-ratnthali is a work of four chapters, containing
over JOO,ooo letters. lie lived in the fourteenth and the fifteenth
centuries, and wrote at least two other works, RaluHJ'll traya-stlra
and Siddluinta-'l:aijayanti.
~Iany treatises were written in which the Paiicaratra doctrines
were summarized. Of these Copalasiiri's l'aiicartltra-rak~ii
sa'!Igraha seems to be the most important. ( ;opalasuri was the son
of Kr~I}addika and pupil of \"ed~l.ntaramanuja, who was himself the
pupil of Kr!?I}adesika. I lis l'aiicartltra-Hll?~il deals with the various
kinds of rituals described in some of the most important Paiicaratra
works.
It thus seems that the Pai1caratra literature was by many writers
not actually regarded as of \" cdic origin, though among the
Srlvai~I}avas it was regarded as being as authorit:lti\-c as the \"cdas.
It was regarded, along with the Sar~1khya and Yoga, as an accessory
literature to the \"cdas 1 • Yamuna also speaks of it as containing a
brief summary of the teachings of the \"cdas for the easy and im-
mediate usc of those devotees who cannot atford to stud,· the \·ast
\"edic literature. The main subjects of the Paiicaratra literature arc
directions regarding the constructions of temples and images,
1
Thus \"cilka,an;Jtha, quoting \"yasa, says:
ida,!mwhn-pani$ada'!' catur-'l·cda-sam-am·ittl'!'
scl'!lkhya-ynga-krtclntt•na fltliiuJ-rcltrii-ml-sahditam.
,...,.t'S'l'ClYll-J[imci'!IStl, p. '19.
SornetinU's the Pancaratra is regarded as the root nf the: \"edas, and sometimes
the \"edas arc: rc:gankd a-. the root of the Pancar:aras. Thus \'eilkatanatha m the
aho\·c: context quott·s a passage from \' yasa in which l'aiicaratra is regarded as
the root of the \'t:das-" mahaftJ n·da-n·ksasva multJ-blu4ftJ mtlluln tl\'Wn. '' lie
quotes also another passage in \\hich th~ \·ejas are regarded as the ~oot of the
Pancar~itras-" srutimlllam idll'!' tcmfrll'!l prcUfltl~ltl-kalpa-siitrm·at." In another
passage he speaks of the Pancaratras as the alternatin~ to the \' eJas -" clhihht•
t·cda-mcmtr;i~lll'!l pculca-rcltro-dilt'na t:tl."
XVI] Position of the Paficariitra Literature
descriptions of the various rituals associated with image-worship,
and the rituals, dealing elaborately with the duties of the Srl-
vai~Q.avas and their religious practices, such as initiation, baptism,
aild the holding of religious marks. The practice of image-worship
is manifestly non-Vedic, though there is ample evidence to show
that it was current even in the sixth century B.C. It is difficult for
us to say how this practice originated and which section of Indians
was responsible for it. The conflict between the Vedic people and
the image-worshippers seems to have been a long one; yet we know
that even in the second century B.C. the Bhagavata cult was in a
very living state, not only in South India, but also in Upper India.
The testimony of the Besnagar Column shows how even Greeks
were converted to the Bhagavata religion. The 1\lahii.bhiirata also
speaks of the siitvata rites, according to which Yi~Q.U was wor-
shipped, and it also makes references to the Vyiiha doctrine of the
Paii.caratras. In the 1\'iiriiya~iya section it is suggested that the
home of the Paiicaratra worship is Sveta-dvlpa, from which it may
have migrated to India; but etforts of scholars to determine the
geographical position of Sveta-dvlpa have so far failed.
In the Purii!zas and the smrti literature also the conflict with the
various Brahminic authorities is manifest. Thus, in the Kurma
purii!za, chapter fifteen, it is said that the great sinners, the Paii.-
caratrins, were produced as a result of killing cows in some other
birth, that they are absolutely non- \"edic, and that the literatures
of the Saktas, Saivas and the Paiicaratras are for the delusion of
mankind 1 . That Paii.caratrins were a cursed people is also noticed in
the Pariisara purii~a 2 • They are also strongly denounced in the
vasi~tha-SGf!lhitii, the Siimba-purii~a and the Suta-sa'!lhitii as great
sinners and as absolutely non- \T edic. Another cause of denounce-
ment was that the Paii.caratrins initiated and admitted within their
1
jagattayii lakn•amii~zii sii lak~nzlr iti glyate. Alzirbudhnya-sa,zhitii, III. 9·
2
Ibid. II. 59·
3
sviitmztrya-miila icchii-tnzii prek~ii-riipa~z kriyii-phala!z.
Ibid. III. 30.
4
umne~o yab susa'1{lkalpa!z sarvatriivyiihatab krtau
avyakta-kiila-PU1Jl-rii.pii"!l cetmziicetmziitnzikiim. Ibid. III. 30, 3 1.
6
so'ya1Jz sudarsmza1Jz rziinza Sa1Jzkalpalz spandanii-tnzakab
vibhajya bahudhii riipm!Z bhiive bhiive'vati~tbate. Ibid. III. 39·
XVI) Philosophy of the Ahirbudhnya-sarJlhitd 37
and no reason can be assigned as to why it suddenly changes itself
from a potential to an actual state 1• It is one and exists in identity
with the Brahman, or the ultimate reality. It is this power which
creates as its own transformation all categories pure and impure and
all material forms as emanations from out of itself. It manifests
itself as the kriyii, the virya, tejas and the bala of God, mere forms
of its own expression and in all forms of duality as subject and
object, as matter and consciousness, pure and impure, the enjoyer
and the enjoyed, the experiencer and the experienced, and so on.
When it moves in the progressive order, there is the evolutionary
creation; and, when it moves in the inverse order, there is in-
volution.
From a pair of two different functions of this power the dif..
ferent forms of pure creation come into being. Thus from know-
ledge (jiitina) and the capacity for unceasing work of never-ending
creation (bala) we have the spiritual form of Sarpka~al).a. From the
function of spontaneous agency (aiJvarya) and the unaffectedness
in spite of change (virya) is generated the spiritual form of Prad-
yumna; and from the power that transforms itself into the world-
forms (Sakti) and the non-dependence on accessories (tejas) is pro-
duced the form as Aniruddha. These three spiritual forms are
called vyilha (conglomeration) because each of them is the resultant
of the conglomeration of a pair of gut_zas. Though the ~wo gut_zas
predominate in each vyiiha, yet each vyiiha possesses the six
qualities (~atf.-gut.za) of the Lord; for these are all but manifestations
of Vi~I).u 2 • Each of these forms existed for 16oo years before the
next form emanated from it, and at the time of the involution also
it took 16oo years for each lower form to pass into the higher form.
Schrader, alluding to the JVIahii-Sanatkumiira-Sa1J2hitii, says:
"Vasudeva creates from His mind the white goddess Santi and to-
gether with her Sarpkar~al).a or Siva; then from the left side of the
latter is born the red goddess Sri, whose son is Pradyumna or
Brahman; the latter, again, creates the yellow Sarasvati and to-
avatiiras have come straight from Aniruddha or through other avatiiras. Thus
Brahman comes from Aniruddha and from him l\'lahdvara; Hayasir!jla comes
from 1\Iatsya, a manifestation of Kp;>l).a. According to the Padma-tantra, Matsya,
Kurma and Varaha come from Vasudeva, Nrsi111ha, Vamana, Srirama, and
Parasurama from Saqlkar!;lal).a, Balarama from Pradyumna and Kr!;>Qa and Kalki
from Aniruddha (Padma-tantra, 1. 2. 31, etc.). But according to the Lak$mf-
tantra (11. 55) all the "Libhavas come from Aniruddha. There is another kind of
ovatiira, called arcii"L·atiira. The image of Kr!;lQ.a, Nrsiqlha, etc., when duly conse-
crated according to the V ai$7Java rites, becomes possessed with the power of
Vi!;li).U and attains powers and influences which can be experienced by the devotee
( Vi~vaksena-sarrzhitii, quoted in Tatt"L•a-traya). In the aspect in which Aniruddha
controls all beings as their inner controller, he is regarded as the antaryiimy-
a•vatiira. There are thus four kinds of avatiiras, vibhava, iivesa, arcii and antary-
iimin. The thirty-nine vibhava avatiiras are Padmanabha, Dhruva, Ananta,
The Paiicariitra [cH.
panionship in mundane forms to those saints who cannot live with-
out it, and this is the interpretation of the word paritriir.za (protec-
tion) in the Gitii; secondly, for destroying those who are opposed
to the saints; thirdly, for establishing the Vedic religion, the
essence of which is devotion to God 1 •
In the form as antaryiimin, or the inner controller, the Lord
resides in us as the inner controller of the self, and it is through His
impulsion that we commit evil deeds and go to Hell or perform
good deeds and go to Heaven. Thus we cannct in any way escape
1
Certain peculiar interpretations of the iccha-sakti, kriya-sakti and siik$iit-
sakti are to be found in the Sitii-upwzi$ad. The Satvata-sm.nhihi (IX. 85) describes
twelve other energies such as
lah$ml!z, pus[ir, daya nidrii, k5ama, kantis sarasratl,
dlzrtir maitrl ratis lU$!ir matir d'L·adasiiml smrtii.
See also Schrader's Introduction to Pancaratra, p. 55· The theory of these
energies is associated with the m:atara theory.
2
Schrader, on the evidence of Padma-tautra, says that god as para or ulti-
mate is sometimes identified with and sometimes distinguished from the 1.-yiilza
Vasudeva. The para Vasude\·a becomes ?.:yiiha Vasude\·a with His one half and
remains as Narayarya, the creator of the primeval water (maya). Pancaratra,
p. 53·
bhiiti!z suddhetara vip_wb puru$0 dvi-caturmaya!z
sa maminam samiihiiro brahma-ksattriidi-bhediniim.
. . .Ahirbudlmya-sw_nhita, VI. 8-9.
XVI) Philosophy of the Ahirbudhnya-sa'!lhitii 43
rajas and lamas in succession, i.e. the original primeval energy as
gu'!la (called sometimes prakrli in cognate literature) was first
evolved into sativa gu'!la; from it evolved the rajas, and from the
rajas evolved the lamas. This original undevelopedgu'!la produced
from Pradyumna (which, in other words, may be termed prakrli)
receives impregnation from the fervour of Aniruddha, and thereby
evolves itself first into sativa, then into rajas, and then into
lamas. This doctrine can therefore be regarded as sal-kiirya-viida
only in a limited sense; for without this further impregnation from
the fervour of Aniruddha, it could not by itself have produced the
different gu'!las of sativa, rajas and lamas 1 •
Aniruddha, however, was directed by Pradyumna not only to
develop the unconscious power (sakli) but also the puru~a which
exists as it were inside that power, which shows itself as niyali
(destiny) and kala (time). From the unconscious power as destiny
and time evolves first the sativa and from it the rajas and from the
rajas the lamas. According to the V#vaksena-sa1(lhilii, Aniruddha
created Brahma and Brahma created all the men and women of the
four castes 2 •
Buddhi evolves from lamas and from that aha1J1kiira and from
that evolve the five lan-miilras, and also the eleven senses. From
the five lan-miilras the five gross elements are produced, and from
these, all things, which are the modifications of the gross elements.
The word puru~a is used here in a special sense, and not in the
ordinary Sarp.khya sense. Pur~a here signifies a colony of selves,
like cells in a honeycomb3 • These selves are associated with the
beginningless viisaniis or root-impressions. They are but the special
antabstha-pUYU$G'!l sakti'!l tiim iidiiya SfJa-milrti-gii'!l
somvardhayati yogena hy qnirudhalz sva-tejasii.
Ahirbudhnya-sa'!lhitii, VI. 14.
1 The Vi~vaksena-sa'!lhitii criticizes in this connection the Vec!ic people, who
did not believe in the monotheistic God but depended on the Vedic sacrificial
rituals and work for the attainment of Heaven and ultimately fell down to the
course of mundane life (sa7!1Siira) :
trayl-miirge~u ni~t~iitilb phala-tJiide ramanti te
deviidfn eva manviinii na cu miim menire param
tamalz-prtiytis tv ime kecin mama nindii'!l prakurvate
sa'!lliipo'!l kurt.•ate vyagra7!1 veda-vtide~u ni~thitiifz
mti'!l na jiinanti mohena mayi bhakti-pariinmukhiifz
svargii-di~u ramonty ete at.·asiine patanti te.
Tattva-traya, p. 128.
sarvtitmanti'!l sama~[ir yii koso madhu-krtiim iva.
Ahirbudhnya-Sa1fthitii, VI. 33·
44 The Paiicariitra [ Cll.
and which at the time of the creative process showers itself as rain
and produces the food-grains, and which at the beginning of the
dissolution shows itself as a drying force, begins to manifest itself
as showering clouds and produces the food-grains. By consuming
the food thus produced by nature n1en fall from their original state
of perfect knowledge (jfiiina-bhra1J1Sa'f!l prapadyante). At such a
stage the original manus produce the scriptures for the guidance of
those men who have fallen from their original omniscience.
Thence me'l can only attain their highest goal by following the
guidance of the scriptures 1 . It thus appears that the power of
Vi~Qu as consciousness, bliss and action splits itself into t\vofold
form as the realizing activity and the object, called respectively the
bhiivaka and the bhiivya. The former is the thought-activity of the
Lord and the latter is that part of Him which manifests itself as the
object of this activity. This leads to the pure and the impure crea-
tion. The kutastha puru~a of the four manus stands intermediate
between the pure and the impure creation2 • There is nothing what-
soever outside the sphere of the Sudarsana sakti of the Lord.
On the central question of the relation of God with the jivas the
general view of the Paiicaratra, as well as that of the Alzirbudlmya,
seems to be that at the time of dissolution they return to God
and remain in a potential form in Him, but again separate out at the
time of the new creation. At the time of emancipation, however,
they enter into God, never to come out of Him. But though they
enter into Him, they do not become one with Him, but have an
independent existence in Him or enter into the abode of Yi~l)u, the
VaikuJJtlza, which is often regarded as identical with Him. This is
probably a state of what is found in many places described as the
siilokya-mukti. In the fourteenth chapter of the Ahirbudhnya-
sa'f!lhitii mukti is described as the attainment of Godhood (bhaga-
*lJattii-mayi mukti, or vainzava~n tad 'l-'iset padam )3. The means by
tat tu vaidya1Jl paya}; priisya sarve miinava-mana·vii};
jiiiina-bhra1Jlsa1Jl prapadyante sarva-jliii~z svata eva te.
Ahirbudlmya-smtthitii, VII. 61, 62.
Compare this with the Jewish Christian doctrine of the fall of man, as suggested
by Schrader's introduction to the Pancaratra, p. 78.
a'!lsayo}; puru~o madhye ya}; stlzital; sa catur-yugab
iuddhe-tara-maya7Jl 'L·iddhi kil!astha1Jl tm.n mahii-mune. Ibid. VII. 70.
Compare the view of the GaU<J.iya school, which regards the jlva as the tatastlzii
sakti of God, which is between the antarmigii and the 'L'ahirmigii sakti. .
3
Ibid. XIV. 3, 4 and 41.
XVI] Philosophy of the Ahirbudhnya-sa1{lhitti
which mukti can be attained is said to be a virtuous course of action
without seeking any selfish ends 1 • Thejivas are described as begin-
ningless, infinite, and as pure consciousness and bliss, and as being
largely of the nature of God (bhagavanmaya); but still they are
described as owing their existence to the spiritual energy of God
(bhagavad-bhavital:z sada) 2• This idea is further clarified when it is
said that side by side with the bhiivya and the bhiivaka powers of
God we have a third power called the pu'f!l-sakti, of which we hear
in the Gila as K~etrajiia-sakti and in the Gau~liya school as tatastha
sakti3 • Apart from the three powers of God as creation, mainte-
nance and destruction, He has a fourth and a fifth power called
favour (anugraha) and disfavour (nigraha). The Lord is, of course,
self-realized and has no unachieved end, and has absolutely unim-
peachable independence; but still in His playful activity He acts
like a king just as He wishes4 • This idea of krirjii is repeated in the
Gaurjiya school as lila. All these activities of His are but the dif-
ferent manifestations of His thought-activity called sudarsana. In
His own playful activity as disfavour He covers up the natural con-
dition of the jiva, so that in place of His infinitude, he appears as
atomic, in place of His omnipotence, he can do but little, in place
of His omniscience, He becomes largely ignorant and possesses but
little knowledge. These are the three impurities and the three types
of bondage. Through this covering activity the jiva is afflicted with
ignorance, egoism, attachment, antipathy, etc. Being afflicted by
ignorance and the passions, and being goaded by the tendency to-
wards achieving the desirable and avoiding the undesirable, He
performs actions leading to beneficial and harmful results. He thus
undergoes the cycle of birth and rebirth, and is infested with dif-
ferent kinds of root-instincts (vasana). It is through the power of
this bondage and its requirements that the powers of creation,
maintenance and destruction are roused and made active to arrange
for rewards and punishments in accordance with the karmas of the
jivas. As proceeding from the very playful nature of God, which
precedes time (kala), and is beginningless, the bondage also is said
to be beginningless. The above description of bondage as happening
siidhana7Jl tasya ca prokto dharmo nirabhisandhikal;l.
Ahirbudhnya-sa7Jlhitii, XIV, 4·
2
Ibid. 3 pu7JZ-sakti/:l kiilamayy anyii pumiin so'yam udirital;l. Ibid. XIV. 10.
sarvair an-anuyojya7JZ tat sviitantrya7JZ divyam zSitu/:l
aviipta-viiva-kiimo'pi kru!ate riijavad vasz. Ibid. XIV. 13.
52 The Paiicariitra [cH.
at some time through a process of fall from original nature is by way
of analysis of the situation. Through the power of God as anugraha,
or grace, God stops the course of karma for a jiva on whose con-
dition of sorrow and suffering He happens to take pity. \Yith the
cessation of the good and bad deeds and their beneficent and harm-
ful results through the grace of God the jiva looks forward to
emancipation and is moved by a feeling of disinclination and begins
to have discriminative knowledge. He then turns to scriptures and
to teachers, follows the course of action dict;Ited by Sarpkhya and
Yoga, and attains the Vedantic knowledge, finally to enter the
ultimate abode of Yi~t:tu.
Lak~mi is regarded as the ultimate eternal power of Yi~t:tu, and
she is also called by the names Gauri, Sarasvati and Dhenu. It is
this supreme power that manifests itself as Sarpkar~al).a, Pradyumna
and Aniruddha. Thus, these separate powers are observable only
when they manifest themselves, but even when they do not mani-
fest themselves they exist in God as His great supreme power
Lak~mi. It is this Lak~mi that is called Brahma, Yi~I).U, or Siva.
The vyakti, avyakti, puru~a and kiila or siiiJlkhya and yoga are all
represented in the Lak~mi. Lak~mi is the ultimate supreme power
into which all the others resolve themselves. As distinct from the
other manifested powers it is often called the fifth power. The
emancipated person enters into this Lak~mi, which is regarded as
the highest abode of Yi~t:tu (para!Jl dhiima or parama~n padam), or
the highest Brahman. This power (sakti) is also regarded as having
an inner feeling of bliss; and yet it is of the nature of bliss, and is
designated as the bhiiva form of Yi~I).U and also as the ujfl:ala
(shining). This sakti is also regarded as discharging the five func-
tions (pmica-krtya-karz) of creation, maintenance, destruction,
grace and disfavour mentioned above. Brahman, as associated with
this sakti, is called the highest Yi~I).U as distinguished from the
lower Yi~I).U, the god of maintenance. This sakti is always in a state
of internal agitation though it may not be observed as such from
outward appearance. This internal agitation and movement are so
subtle that they may appear to be in a state of absolute calmness
like that of the ocean 1 • Thus sakti is also called the miiyii of Yi~l).u 2 •
sadii pratiiyamiinii'pi silk$mair bhiivairalak$aT)ai}_z.
nirvyiipiire1.:a sii bhiiti staimityam iva co' dadhe}_z.
tayai vo'pahita7Jl Brahma nirvikalpa1Jl niraiijanmrz.
Ahirbudhnya-sarrzlu"tii, LI. 49·
mciyii'scarya-karatvena paiica-krtya-karz sadii. Ibid. LI. s8.
XVI) Philosophy of the Ahirbudhnya-sa1Jlhita 53
It is a part of this power that transforms itself as the bhiivya and the
bhiivaka sakti, of which the latter is also known by the name
sudarsana. The bhiivya shows itself as the world, and its objective
import is the world.
The thought-activity by which the concept shows itself in the
ideal and in the objective world as thought and its significance, the
object, is the epitome of the power of Sudarsana. When all the ex-
ternal movement of the objective is ideally grasped in the word, we
have also in it the manifestation of the power of Sudarsana, or the
supreme thought-activity of God. All the causality of the objective
world is but a mode of the manifestation of the Sudarsana power.
Thus not only all the movements of the external world of nature
and the movement implied in speech, but the subjective-objective
movement by which the world is held together in thought and in
speech are the manifestation of the Sudarsana power. All expressions
or manifestations are either in the way of qualities or actions, and
both are manifestations of the Sudarsana power of God. Our words
can signify only these two ways of being. For this reason they refer
only to the Sudarsana, which is attributive to God, but cannot ex-
press the nature of God. Words, therefore, cannot reveal the nature
of God. The word may hold the universe within it as its mystic
symbol and may represent within it all its energies, but, in any case,
though it may engulf within it the whole universe and secure the
merging of the universe in itself and can identify itself with God,
-such identification can only be with the Sudarsana power of God,
and the entrance into God, or the realization of Him through the
word or thought, can only be through the Sudarsana power, which
is a part of Lak~mi. Thus unity with God can only mean union with
Sudarsana, or entrance into Lak~mi 1 •
Adoration (nama~z) means the spontaneous acceptance of the
highest Lord as the master on the part of a man who has achieved
it through a wise enlightenment2 • Superiority (jyiiyiin) consists of
greatness of qualities and existence in earlier time3 • God alone is
superior, and everything else is inferior. The relation between the
latter and the former is that the latter exists for the former or is
dependent on the former. This relation is called (Se~a-se#tii). The
1 Alzirbudhnya-sa1Jzhitii, LI. 69-78.
2 prek~iivatai:z pravrttir yii prahvi-bhiivii-tmikii svatab
uckr~laf!l param uddiiya tan namal.z parigzyate. Ibid. LII. 2.
kiilatu gm;awi caiva prakar~o yatra ti~thati
iabdas ta't{l mukhyayii vrttyii jyiiyiin ity avalambate. Ibid. LII. 4·
54 The Paiicariitra [cH.
relation between the two is that one should be the adorer and the
other the adored (nantr-nanta~'Ya-bhiiva). True adoration is when
such an adoration proceeds naturally as a result of such a relation,
without any other motive or end of any kind-the only idea being
that God is supremely superior to me and I am absolutely inferior
to Him 1 . This process of adoration not only takes the adorer to
God, but also brings God to him. The presence of any motive of
any kind spoils the effectuation of the adoration. This adoration is
the first part of the process of prapatti, or seeking the protection of
God 2 • Now on account of the presence of beginningless root-
impressions (viisanii), and of natural insignificance of power and
association with impurity, man's power of knowledge or wisdom
becomes obstructed; and when a man becomes fully conscious of
such weakness, he acquires the quality of kiirpa1Jya or lowliness.
A feeling or consciousness of one's independence obstructs this
quality of lowliness. The great faith that the supreme God is always
merciful is called the quality of malzii-~·is'l-·iisa. The idea that God is
neutral and bestows His gifts only in proportion to one's deeds
obstructs this quality. The idea that, since He is all-merciful and
all-powerful, He would certainly protect us, produces the quality
of faith in God's prot<:ctive power. The notion that God, being
qualityless, is indifferent to any appeal for protection obstructs this
quality. Acceptance of the Lord as the supreme master whose
commands should on no account be disobeyed produces the quality
of docility (priitikulya-'l-'h·arjana). Service of God in a manner not
prescribed in the scriptures obstructs this quality. The strong re-
solve of the mind to work in accordance with God's wishes, with
the full conviction that the sentient and the non-sentient of the
world are but parts of His nature, produces the quality of sub-
mission. An inimical disposition towards the beings of the world
obstructs this quality. A true adoration (namafz) to God must be
associated with all the aforesaid qualities. 'True adoration must
carry with it the conviction that the sense of possession that we have
in all things, due to beginningless instinctive passions and desires,
is all false, and the adorer should feel that he has neither inde-
pendence nor anything that he may call his own. "::\Iy body, my
1
upiidhi-rahitenii' ya'!l yena bhiivena cetanab
namati jyiiyase tasmai tad vii namanam uryate.
Ahirbudlznya-SW!Ihitii, LII. 9·
phalepsii tad-·virodhinl. Ibid. LII. 1 5.
XVI] Philosophy of the Ahirbudhnya-sa1Jlhitii 55
riches, my relations do not belong to me, they all belong to God";
such is the conviction that should generate the spirit with which
the adoration should be offered. The adorer should feel that the
process of adoration is the only way through which he can obtain
his highest realization, by offering himself to God and by drawing
God to himself at the same time. The purpose of adoration is thus
the supreme self-abnegation and self-offering to God, leaving no-
thing for oneself. The world comes out of God and yet exists in a
relation of i"'lherence, so that He is both the agent and the material
cause of the world, and the adorer must always be fully conscious
of the greatness of God in all its aspects.
The above doctrine of prapatti, or nyiisa, or sarm.zii-gati, as the
means of winning God's grace, has also been described in Chapter
XXVII and it virtually means the qua!ities just described 1 • sarat_zii-gati
is here defined as prayer for God's help in association with the con-
viction of one's being merged in sin and guilt, together with a belief
in one's ~.bsolute helplessness and a sense of being totally lost with-
out the protecting grace of God 2 • The person who takes to the path
of this prapatti achieves the fruits of all tapas, sacrifices, pilgrimages
and gifts, and attains salvation easily without resorting to any other
methods3. It is further said that 0'1 the part of the devotee following
the path of prapatti all that is necessary is to stick firmly to the
attitude of absolute dependence on God, associated with a sense of
absolute helplessness. He has no efforts to make other than to keep
himself in the prayerful spirit; all the rest is done by God. Prapatti
is thus a upiiya-jiiiina and not a upiiya; for it is a mental attitude
and does not presuppose any action. It is lik\! a boat on which the
pas~enger merely sits, while it is the business of the boatman to
do the rest4 •
sodlui hi veda-viduso vadantv e1tam mahii-mzme
Jn.ukz7lyasya saf!Zkl;lpa!z priitikalv~sya t•arjana1J1.
ra~i~yatl ti t•isviisn goptrva-varm:zarrz tathii.
iitma-1!ik~epa-kiirpm:zye ~a4-vidhii sarm:zii-gatifz.
Ahirbudhnya-sarrzhitii, XXXVII. 27, 28.
aham asmy apariidhiiniim iilayo'kiiicmw' gatifz
tv:am e?"o 'piiyablzz7to me bhave'ti priirtlzanii-matifz.
sarm:ziigatir ity-ukiii sii deve'smin prayujyalii1J1..
/bid. XXXVII. 30, 3 I.
:t /bid. XXXVII. 34 and 35·
atra 11a·ui' ti drnantad upiiya-jiianam eva tu
narer_za krtyam anyat tu nat·ikasye'va taddharefz.
A hirbudhnya-S07Jlhit a.
The Paiicartitra [cH.
tion found in the Siikta Tantras, according to which the Kur;uf.all exists in the
place down below described as the iarlra-madhya.
2 Ibid. XXXII. 33-37. These locations and functions are different from what
and that specific deity, by the practice of the mantras; and the
other is that of the yoga 1 • Alzirbudhnya, however, concentrates its
teachings on the former, and mentions the latter in only one of
its chapters. There are two types of soul, one within the influence
of the pralqti and the other beyond it. The union with the highest
is possible through karma and yoga. Karma is again of two kinds,
that which is prompted by desires (pravartaka) and that which is
prompted by cessation of desires (nivartaka). Of these only the
latter can lead to emancipation, while the former leads to the attain-
ment of the fruits of desires. The highest soul is described as the
subtle (sukpna), all-pervading (sarva-ga), maintaining all (sarva-
blzrt), pure consciousness (jiiiina-riipa), without beginning and end
(aniidy-ananta), changeless (a-vikiirin), devoid of all cognitive or
conative senses, devoid of names and class-notions, without colour
and quality, yet knowing all and pervading all, self-luminous and
yet approachable through intuitive wisdom, and the protector of
alP. The yoga by which a union of our lower souls with this highest
reality can be effected has the well-known eight accessories, yama,
niyama, iisana, prii~ziiyiima, pratyiilziira, dhiira1_la, dhyiina and
samiidhi.
Of these, yama is said to consist of beneficial and yet tnlthful
utterance (satya), suffering at the sufferings of all beings (dayii),
remaining fixed in one's path of duty even in the face of dangers
(dlzrti), inclination of all the senses to adhere to the path of right
conduct (Sauca), absence of lust (bralzma-carya), remaining un-
ruffled even when there is a real cause of anger or excitement
(k~amii), uniformity of thoughts, deeds and words (iirjava), taking
of unprohibited food (mitiilziira), absence of greed for the property
of others (asteya), cessation from doing injury to others by word,
deed or thought (alzi'!lSii) 3 • A~iyama is described as listening to
Vedantic texts (siddlziinta-srav:al}a), gifts of things duly earned to
proper persons (diina), faith in scriptural duties (mali), worship of
Yi~QU through devotion (is'L·ara-piijana), natural contentment with
arvar) were the last to come. The traditional date ascribed to the
earliest .Arvar is 4203 B.c., and the date of the latest Arvar is
2706 B.C. t, though modern research('s on the subject bring down
their dates to a period not earlier than the seventh or the eighth
century A.D. Traditional information about the Arvars can be had
from the different '' Guru-paramparii" works. According to the
Guru-paramparii, Bhutatt-, Poygaiy- and Pey-arvars were incarna-
tions of Vi':'r:IU's Gada, Sm;kha and ~Yandaka, and so also Kadan-
mallai and Mayilai, while Tiru-mari!?ai Piran was regarded as the
incarnation of the cakra (wheel) of Yi~I)u. Namm' -arvar was in-
carnation of Vi~vaksena and Kula-sekhara Peru-mal of the Kaus-
tubha of Vi~I)u. So Periy-arvar, Tol)c;iar-ac;ii-poc;iiy-ar.var and Tiru-
mangaiy-arvar were respectively incarnations of Garw;la, Vanamiilii
and Siirizga of Vi~I)u. The last Arvar was Tiru-pa1.1-arvar. ~\r:Ic;ia!,
the adopted daughter of Periy-arvar, and l\Iadhura-kaviy-arvar, the
disciple of Namm' -arvar, were also regarded as Arvars. They came
from all parts of the l\Iadras Presidency. Of these seven \Vere
Brahmins, one was a K~attriya, two were Siidras and one was of the
low Panar caste. The Guru-parampariis give incidents of the lives
of the Arvars and also fanciful dates B.C. when they are said to have
flourished. Apart from the Guru-parampariis there are also mono-
graphs on individual Arvars, of which the following are the most
important: ( 1) Divya-suri-carita by Garuc;ia-vahana Pal)c;iita, who
was a contemporary of Ramanuja; (2) Guru-paramparii-prabhii'l:am
of Pinb' -aragiya Peru-mal Jiyar, based on the Di'l_,ya-siiri-carita
and written in mm;i-pravii[a style, i.e. a mixture of Sanskrit and
Tamil; (3) Periya-tiru-murjiy-arjaivu of Anbillai KaQc;ia<;iai-yappan,
written in Tamil; (4) Upadesa-ratna-miilai of l\laQavaJa l\Ia-muni,
written in Tamil, contains the list of Arvars; (5) Yatindra-prava~za
prabhiivam of Pillai Lokacaryar. The other source of information
regarding the Arvars is the well-known collection of the works of
Arvars known as N iil-iiyira-divya-prabandham. Among these are
the commentaries on the Divya-prabandham and the Tiru-'Dtiy-mo_ri
of Namm' -arvar. In addition to these we have the epigraphical
evidence in inscriptions scattered over the l\1adras Presidency 2 •
The Arvar sees a likeness of his lord in the blue water-lily, and
sees the lord's form everywhere:
All places, shining like great lotus pools
On a blue mountain broad, to me are but
The beauties of his eye-the lord of earth
Girt by the roaring sea, heaven's lord, the lord
Of other good souls, black-hued lord-and mine!
The devotee also felt the sweetness of God's love and the fact
that it is through Divine Grace that one can be attracted towards
Hitn and can love Him:
1
Pope::'s translation of the Tiru viicha-kam, p. 77.
XVII] A.rviirs' controversy with Srz-vaip:avas
Honey from any flower sip not, though small
as tiniest grain of millet seed !
\Vhene'er we think of Him, whene'er we see,
whene'er of Him our lips converse,
Then sweetest rapture's honey ever flows,
till all our frame in bliss dissolves!
To Him alone, the mystic Dancer, go;
and breathe 1/is praise, thou humming-bee!
Here the latter view is that of Ramanuja and his followers. It must,
however, be pointed out in this connection that the so-called dif-
ferences between the Arvars and the Ramanujists on the cardinal
points of religious faith are a discovery of later research, when the
writings of the Arvars had developed a huge commentary literature
and Ramanuja's own writings had inspired many scholars to make
commentaries on his works or to write independent treatises
elucidating his doctrines. The later scholars who compared the
results of the Arvar and the Ramanuja literatures came to the con-
clusion that there are some differences of view between the two
regarding the cardinal faith of religion. This marks a sharp anti-
thesis between the Arvaric Teilgalai school and the VaQ.agalai
school, of which latter Yeilkata was the leader. These differences are
briefly narrated in the A~tiidasa-bheda-nin.zaya. The cardinal faith
of religion according to Ramanuja has been narrated in the
A~tiidasa-rahasyiirtha-vivarar.za. The main principle of religious
approach to God is self-surrender or prapatti. Prapatti is defined
as a state of prayerfulness of mind to God, associated with the deep
conviction that He alone is the saviour, and that there is no way of
attaining His grace except by such self-surrender 1 • The devotee is
extremely loyal to Narayal).a and prays to Him and no one else, and
all his prayers are actuated by deep affection and no other motive.
The virtue of prapatti involves within it universal charity, sym-
pathy and friendliness even to the most determined enemy 2 • Such
a devotee feels that the Lord (sviiml), being the very nature of his
own self, is to be depended on under all circumstances. This is
called the state of supreme resignation (nirbharatva) in all one's
affairs 3 • The feeling of the devotee that none of the assigned
scriptural duties can be helpful to him in attaining the highest goal
and not Sr;: is the only agent who removes our sins, but others hold that sins may
be removed also by Srz in a remote manner, or, because Srl is identical with
Niiriiyat:za; as the fragrance is with the flower, she has also a hand in removing the
sins. Ibid. p. 5·
lakpnyii upiiyatva'l'!l bhagavata iva siik~iit abhyupagantavyam. Ibid.
The A.rviirs [cH.
for God is interpreted by the older schools as involving an attitude
in which the faults of the beloved devotee are points of endearment
to Him 1 • In the later view, however, filial affection is supposed to
involve an indifference or a positive blindness towards the faults of
the devotee. God's mercy is interpreted by the older school as
meaning God's affliction or suffering in noticing that of others.
Later schools, however, interpret it as an active sympathy on His
part, as manifested in His desire to remove the sufferings of others
on account of His inability to bear such miseries 2 •
Prapatti, otherwise called nytisa, is defined by the older school
as a mere passivity on the part of the Lord in accepting those who
seek Him or as a mental state on the part of the seeker in which he
is conscious of himself only as a spirit; but such a consciousness is
unassociated with any other complex feeling, of egoism and the like,
which invests one with so-called individuality. It may also mean
the mental state in which the seeker conceives himself as a subsidiary
accessory to God as his ultimate end, to \Vhom he must cling
unburdened by any idea of scriptural duties 3 ; or he may concen-
trate himself absolutely on the supreme interest and delight that he
feels in the idea that God is the sole end of his being. Such a person
naturally cannot be entitled without self-contradiction to any
scriptural duty. Just as a guilty wife may return to her husband,
and may passively lie in a state uf surrender to him and resign her-
self, so the seeker may be conscious of his own true position with
reference to God leading to a passive state of surrender 4 • Others
think that it involves five elements: (i) that God is the only saviour;
1
yathii kiimukal.z kiimmyii miilinyarrz hhogyatayii n·zkaroti tathii bhaRat'iin
iisrita-do~am svzkaroti itare tu viitsalym!i niima do~iidarsit·l'nm. A~!iidasa-bheda
nir~aya, p. 6.
It is further suggested that, if a devotee takes the path of prapatti, he has not
to suffer for his faults as mu-:h as others would have to suffer.
2
The first alternative is defined as para-duhkha-du~lkhitz•mrz dayii. The
second alternative is sviirtha-nirapeh$a-para-dubkha-sahip;utii dayii; sa ca tan
niriikara~zPcchii. In the first alternative dayii is a painful emotion; in. the second
it is a state of desire, stirred up by a feeling- of repugnance, which is midway be-
tween feeling and volition. !hid. p. 6.
3
prapattir niima a-ni'l.'t"irm.za-miitram a-cid-z·yiiz·_rtti-miitrarrz 'l.'ii a-z·idheym!:
se~atz·a-jfiiina-11u"itram "l.'ii para-se~atai-ka-rati-riipa-parisuddha-yc"itluitmya-j;iana
miitrarrz" vii. Ibid. p. 6.
According to some, any of these conditions would define pra{'atti "ato'prati-
~edhiidy-anyatamai' z·a iti kecit kathavanti." Ibid.
anu~tlu"inc"i-nupapatte!z, pratyuta
4
atyanta-para-tantrasya 'l.'irodizatz·ena
anU$!atur iinarthakyamuktam Srlz•acana-hlui$a~z.-l, ciram unya-parayii bhiirvan"i
kadiicid bhartr-snkiisam iigatayii miim angllwru iti z·iil<ym·at cetwza-k_rta-prapat-tir
iti. Ibid. p. 6.
xvn] A.rviirs' controversy with Sri-vair~Javas
(ii) that He is the only end to be attained; (iii) that He alone is the
supreme object of our desires; (iv) that we absolutely surrender and
resign ourselves to Him 1 ; and (v) supreme prayerfulness-all
associated with absolute trustfulness in Him.
There are some who define the prapanna, or seeker of God, as
one who has read the Arvar literature of prabandhas (adhita-
prabandhal; prapannal; ). Others, however, think that the mere study
of the prabandhas cannot invest a man with the qualities of prapatti.
They think that he alone is entitled to the path of prapatti who can-
not afford to adopt the dilatory courses of karma-yoga, jiiiina-yoga
and bhakti-yoga, and therefore does not think much of these
courses. Again, the older school thinks that the person who adopts
the path of prapatti should give up all scriptural duties and duties
assigned to the different stages of life (iisrama); for it is well evi-
denced in the Gitii text that one should give up all one's religious
duties and surrender oneself to God. Others, again, think that the
scriptural duties are to be performed even by those who have taken
the path of prapatti. Further, the older school thinks that the path
of knowledge is naturally against the path of prapatti; for prapatti
implies the negation of all knowledge, excepting one's self-sur-
rendering association with God. The paths of duties and of know-
ledge assume an egoism which contradicts prapatti. Others, how-
ever, think that even active self-surrender to God implies an ele-
ment of egoism, and it is therefore wrong to suppose that the paths
of duties and of knowledge are reconcilable with prapatti on ac-
count of its association with an element of egoism. The so-called
egoism is but a reference to our own nature as self, and not to
ahafzkiira, an evolute 2 • Again, some think that even a man who has
1
In the second alternative it is defined as follows:
an-anya-siidhye svii-bhz~te mahii-viiviisa-purvakam
tad-eko' -piiyatii yiicnii prapattii iarm:zii-gati/:z.
These are the five angas of prapatti, otherwise called nik~epa, tyiiga, nyiisa or
iarm:zii-gati (AHiidasa-bheda-nir~aya, pp. 6, 7). The difference between the first
and second alternative is that, according to the former, prapatti is a state of mind
limited to the consciousness of its true nature in relation to God; on the part of
God also it indicates merely a passive toleration of the seekers flocking unto Him
(a-niviira~a-miitram). In the second alternative, however, prapatti is defined as
positive self-surrendering activity on the part of the seekers and unconditional
protection to them all on the part of God. It is, therefore, that on the first
alternative the consciousness of one's own true nature is defined in three ways,
any one of which would be regarded on that alternative as a sufficient definition
of prapatti. The first one is merely in the cognitive state, while the second involves
an additional element of voluntary effort.
2
Ibid. pp. 8, 9·
The A_r'ciirs [cH.
adopted the path of prapatti may perform the current scriptural
duties only \vith a view to not lending any support to a reference
to their cases as pretexts for neglect of normal duties by the un-
enlightened and the ignorant, i.e. those that have adopted the path
of prapatti should also perform their duties for the purpose of
loka-sa'!lgraha. Others, however, think that the scriptural duties,
being the commandments of God, should be performed for the
satisfaction of God (bhagavat-prity-artham), even by those who
have taken the path of prapatti. Otherwise they would have to
suffer punishment for that.
The accessories of prapatti are counted as follows: (i) A positive
mental attitude to keep oneself always in consonance with the
Lord's will (iinukulyasya sm!zkalpa~); (ii) a negative mental attitude
(priitikulyasya varjanam), as opposing anything that may be con-
ceived as against His will; (iii) a supreme trustfulness that the Lord
will protect the devotee (rak#u:atiti 'l'isviisafz); (iv) prayer to Him
as a protector (goptrtva-7-·arm:zam); (v) complete self-surrender
(titma-nik~epal}); (vi) a sense of complete poverty and helplessness
(karpm:zyam). The older school thinks that the man who adopts the
path of prapatti has no desires to fulfil, and thus he may adopt any
of these accessories which may be possible for him according to the
conditions and inclinations of his mind. Others, however, think
that even those who follow the path of prapatti are not absolutely
free from any desire, since they wish to feel themselves the eternal
servants of God. Though they do not crave for the fulfilment of any
other kind of need, it is obligatory upon them to perform all the six
accessories of prapatti described above.
The older school thinks that God is the only cause of emancipa-
tion and that the adoption of the path of prapatti is not so; the later
school, however, thinks that prapatti is also recognized as the cause
of salvation in a secondary manner, since it is only through prapatti
that God extends His grace to His devotees 1 • Again, the older
schools think that there is no necessity for expiation (prayascitta)
for those who adopt the path of prapatti; for with them God's grace
is sufficient to remove all sins. The later schools, however, think
that, if the follower of the path of prapatti is physically fit to per-
form the courses of expiation, then it is obligatory on him. Accord-
ing to the older school a man possessing the eight kinds of devo-
1 A~!iidaia-bheda-nin;aya, p. 10.
xvn] A.rvars' controversy with Sri-vai~'l}avas 93
tion (bhakti), even if he be a mleccha, is preferred to a Brahman and
may be revered as such. According to the later schools, however,
a devotee of a lower caste may be shown proper respect, but he
cannot be revered as a Brahman. Again, on the subject of the
possibility of pervasion of the atomic individual souls by God, the
older schools are of opinion that God by His infinite power may
enter into the atomic individuals; the later schools, however, think
that such a pervasion must be of an external nature, i.e. from out-
side. It is not possible for God to penetrate into individual souls 1 •
As regards Kaivalya the older schools say that it means only self-
apperception. He who attains this state attains the highest stage of
eternity or immortality. The later school, however, thinks that he
who has merely this self-apperception cannot attain immortality
through that means only; for this self-apperception may not neces-
sarily mean a true revelation of his nature with reference to God.
He can realize that only as he passes through higher spheres and
ultimately reaches V aikuntha-the abode of God, where he is
accepted as the servant of the Lord. It is such a state that can be
regarded as eternal 2 •
1 A$!iidaia-bheda-nin:zaya, p. 12. The view is supported by a reference to
Varadacarya's Adhikarm:za-cintiimm:zi.
2 The eighteen points of dispute as herein explained have been collected in
of twelve. The king of the place had a p:riest of the name of Akkaialvan, who was
a great debater. Yamuna challenged him and defeated him in an open debate
held in the court of the king. He was given half the kingdom as a reward. He
seems to have been very arrogant in his O!arlier days, if the wording of his challenge
found in the Prapmmiimrta can be believed. The words of challenge run as follows:
ii sailiid tidri-kanyii-cara7Ja-kisalaya-nyiisa-dhanyopaka7}thiid
ii rakso-nlta-sltii-mukha-kamala-samulliisa-hetos ca setoh
ii ca p1·acya-praUcya-k~iti-dhara-yuga tadarkacandriivaim!lsiin
m"imii'flSii-siistra-yugmn-srama-'l·imala-manii mrgyalii1Jl miidrso'nyalz
Ch. III.
3 A story is told in the Prapannamrta that, when Yamuna became a king and
inaccessible to him, Rama 1\Iisra was concerned how he could carry out the com-
mantis of his teachers and initiate Yamuna to the path of <ievotion. He got in
touch with Yamuna's cook, and for six months presented some green vegetables
(ai.arlw-st"ilw) which Yamuna very much liked. \Vhen, after the six months, the
king asked how the rare ve~etables found their way into tl:e kitchen, Rama l\lisra
stayed away for four days praying to Ranganatha, the deity, to tell him how he
could approach Yamuna. In the meanwhile the king missed the green vegetables
and asked his cook to present Rama :Misra when next he should come to the
kitchen. Rama 1\tisra was thus presented to Yamuna.
Dill 7
The Visi~ta-dvaita School [cH.
instructions of Rama Misra was to direct him to go to Kurukanatha
(Kurugai-kkaval-appan) and learn from him the a~tiinga-yoga,
which had been left with him (Kurukii) by Nathamuni for Yamuna.
Yamuna had many disciples, of whom twenty-one are regarded
as prominent. Of tht:se disciples, l\1ahaplirl).a belonged to the
Bharad,·aja gotra, and had a son named PuQ.<)arikak~;;a and a daughter
named Attutayi. Another disciple, called Srisailaplirl).a, was known
also by the name Tatacarya 1 . Another of his disciples, Go~thiplirQ.a,
was born in the PaQ.<)ya country, where also, in the city of Srima-
dhura, was born another of Yamuna's disciples, l\Ialadhara. In the
city of l\Iaraner in the PaQ.<;lya country was born another disciple,
l\Iaraner Nambi, a sudra by caste; a further disciple, Kaiiciplir:Qa,
who was also of the sildra caste, wa5 born in t~e city of Punamalli.
Yamuna used to invest all his disciples with the five Vai~Q.a\·a
sa'!lskiiras, and he also converted the Cola king and queen to the
same faith and made over the kingdom !te had hitherto enjoyed to
the service of the deity Ranganatha of Srirangam. SrisailaplirQ.a,
or Bhuri Srisailaplirl).a, or l\1ahapflrl).a had two sons, two sisters and
two daughters. The elder sister, Kantimati, was married to Kdava
Yajvan, also called Asuri Kesava, Ramanuja's father, and the second
sister, Dyutimati, was married to Kanalak~a Bhatta, and a son was
born to them called Govinda. Kurda, who was long in association
with Ramanuja, was born of Ananta Bhatta and l\Iahadevi, and this
Kuresa was the father of Anantacarya, writer of the Prapanniimrta 2 •
Dasarathi was born of Ananta Dik~ita, ofVadhiilagotra, and Lak~mL
Dasarathi had a son called Kal).<)a<)anatha, who was also called
Ramanujadasa. They are all associates of Ramanuja, who had
seventy-four prominent disciples.
Yamuna was very fond of Namm' -arvar's works, the doctrines
of \\ hich were often explained to the people. Yamuna wrote six
works: (i) Stotra-ratnam, in adoration to the deity Yarada; (ii)
Catufz-Sloki; (iii) Agama-priimii~ya; (iv) Siddhi-traya; (v) Gitiirtha-
Sa1!1gralza; (vi) J\1ahii-puru~a-nir~zaya 3 • Of these the Siddhi-traya is
the most important, and the section on Yamuna in this volume has
been based almost entirely on it. The Agama-priimii~zya is a work in
which he tries to establish the high antiquity and undisputed
1
Prnpanuiimrta, Ch. I I 3. p. 440.
2
Ibid. Ch. 1 so, p. 450. Anantacarya, called also Ananta Suri, was the pupil of
~ailararigesa-guru. He reveres also Ramyajamatr-maha-muni.
See Yerikatanath~'s introductiOI. to the Gltiirtha-sm.ngraha-ra~ii.
3
XVIII] The A:ragi'yas from Niithamuni to Riimdnuja 99
Ramanuja2 •
It has already been said that IVIahapun;a (Nambi), disciple
of Yamuna, had two ;:;isters, Kantimati and Dyutimati, of whom
the former was married to Kesava Y ajvan or Asuri Kesava of
Bhutapuri and the latter to Kamalak!?a Bhatta. Ramanuja (Ilaya
Perumal), son of Kesava Yajvan, was born in A.D. 1017. He re-
ceived his training, together with his mother's sister's son Govinda
Bhatta, from Yadavaprakasa, a teacher of Vedanta of great reputa-
tion. The details of Yadavaprakasa's views are not known, but it is
very probable that he was a monist 3 • Before going to study with
different from Narayat:Ja, but always associated with Him. He thus tries to refute
all the views that surpose Lak~mi to be a part of Narayat:Ja. Lak~mi should also
not be identified with miiyii. She is also conceived as existing in intimate associa-
tion with Narayat:Ja and, like a mother, exerting helpful influence to bring the
devotees into the sphere of the grace of the Lord. Thus Lak~mi is concei,·ed to
have a separate personality of her own, though that personality is merged, as it
were, in the personalit) of 1'\arayat:Ja and all Hi!> efforts, and all her efforts are in
consonance with the efforts of :1\jarayat:Ja (parasparii-nukiilatayii sar·vatra siima-
rusyam). On the controversial point whether Lak~mi is to be considered a jiz·a
and therefore atomic in nature, the problem how she can then be all-pervasive,
and the view that she is a part of Narayat:Ja, Venkatanatha says that Lak~mi is
neither jh·a nor Naraya1_1a, but a separate person ha,·ing her being entirely de-
pendent on God. Her relation to l'arayat:Ja can be understood on the analogy of
the relatiun of the rays to the sun or the fragrance to the A0wer.
1
sz·a-dharma-fiiiina-z·airiig)·a-siidh)•a-bhakty-eka-gocarcl/:z
niiriiya~ab para1Jl brahma gltii-siistre samuditab
Gitc"irtha-SmJigraha, verse I.
2
• l\lost of the details of Ramanuja 's life are collected from the account given
m the Prapanniim!la by Anantacarva, a junior contemporary of Hamanuja.
3
• Yadava held that Brahman, though by its nature possessing infinite quali-
ties, yet transforms itself into all types of living beings and also into all kinds of
inanimate things. Its true nature is understood when it is realized that it is one
XVIII] Riimiinuja 101
1
Prapamu'im!fa, IX, p. 26. The interpretation of this passage by Govinda-
carya and Gho!?a seems to me to be erroneous; for there is no reference to
Sathakopa here. Kuresa, or Srivatsanka Misra, had two sons; one of them was
baptized by Ramanuja as Parasara Bhattarya and the other as Ramadesika.
Ramanuja's maternal cousin, Govinda, had a younger brother, called Bala
Govinda, and his son was baptized as Parankusa-pun)arya.
2
The name of Dasarathi's father is Anantadik~ita.
3
His baptismal name was Govindadasa. After his com·ersion he v.rote a
book entitled Yati-dlwrma-samuccaya. This Govindadasa must be distinguished
from Govinda, son of the aunt of Ramanuja, v.ho had been com·erted to Sai,·ism
hy Yadavaprakasa and was reconverted to Srivai~l)avism by his maternal uncle
Srisailapurl)a, pupil of Yamuna. Govinda had married, but became so attached
to Ramanuja that he renounced the world. Srisailapurl)a wrote a commentary un
the Sahasra-glti. Ramanuja had another disciple in Pul)<;larikak~a, l\lahapurl)a's
son.
4
His baptismal names were Devarat and Devamannatha.
XVIII) Riimiinuja IOJ
total period of twelve years only; but Rau holds that this period must be about
twenty years, of which twelve years Wt>re spent in Yadavadri.
3
Srr Riimiinujiiciirya, by S. K. Aiyangar, :\l.A. ~atesan and Co., !\Iadras.
XVIII) Riimiinuja 105
Brahma-sfitra, 1. J. 28.
. Deussen's remark that the entire discussion of splw[a is deri,-ed from
L pavar~a is quite unfounded. According to Katlu"i-sarit-siigara Upa,·ar~a was
the teacher of Panini.
2
Savara, also: in his commentary on the sth sutra of the J1iml"i1!1sii-sfitra, 1.
I· 5, refers to a Vrtti-l~ara, a 1\limarpsa writer prior to Savara. The fact that in the
bhaua on the same sfitra Savara refers to Lhagavan Upavar~a by name makes it
very probab:e that the r·rtt£-kara and Upavar~a were not the same person.
XVIII] Ramanuja
this was summarized very briefly by the older teachers. He says,
further, that in making his bhii~ya he has closely followed the in-
terpretation of the Sutra, as made by Bodhayana 1 • Ramanuja also
owes a great debt of gratitude to Yamuna's Siddhi-traya, though he
does not distinctly mention it in his bhii~ya. It is said that Yamuna
had a large number of disciples. Of these, however, 1\lahaplirl)a,
Gosthiplirl)a, IVIaladhara, Kaficiplirl)a, Srisailaplirl)a, also called
Tatacarya (Ramanuja's maternal uncle), and Srirailganatha-
gayaka were the most i!llportant. Srisailaplirl)a's son Govinda, the
cousin and fellow-student of Ramanuja with Yadavaprakasa, be-
came later in life a disciple of Ramanuja 2 • Of the seventy-four
prominent disciples of Ramanuja, Pral)atartihara of Atreya gotra,
Kure8a or Srivatsailka l\Iisra, Dasarathi, Andhraplirl)a or Vata-
pun;a, Varadavi~I)u, Yatisekhara-bharata, Yadava-prakasa or
Govinda and Yajiiamurti are the most important 3 • Of these
Dasarathi of Vadhlila gotra and Varadavi~I)u or Varadavi~I)u Misra
were the sister's sons of Ramanuja. Varadavi~I)U was better known
as Vatsya Varadaguru. Kure8a or Srivatsailka l\Iisra had a son
by AQ.<;lal, called Parasara Bhattarya, who defeated the Vedantin
Madhavadasa and afterwards became the successor of Ramanuja 4 •
Parasara Bhattarya had a son called Madhya Pratoli Bhattarya or
Madhya-vithi Bhattarya. Kuresa had another son named Pad-
manetra; Padmanetra's son was called Kuruke8vara 5 • Kurukt:S-
vara' s son was Pundarikaksa, and his son was Srinivasa. Srinivasa
had a son N rsi111harya. Th~y belonged to the Srisaila lineage, pro-
bably from the name of Bhuri Sri Sailapurna, Kuresa's father.
Nrsi111harya had a son called Ramanuja. Ramanuja had two sons,
1 Sudarsana Suri, in his conunentaryon the bhii~ya C<illed the Sruta-prakaiika,
criticism does not always reach the highest level. It was customary
for the thinkers of the Sari.kara and the lV1adhva schools in the
fourteenth, fifteenth and sixteenth centuries to accept the concepts
of the new School of Logic of ::\1ithila and Bengal and introduce
keen dialectical analysis and criticism. But for some reason or other
this method was not adopted to any large extent by the thinkers of
the Srivai~.Q.ava school. Yet this was the principal way ill which
philosophical concepts developed in lat:er times.
In dealing with the names of teachers of the Ramanuja school,
one Guru-paramparii mentions the name of Paravadibhayarikara,
who was a pupil of Rarr.yajamatr muni and belonged to the Vatsya
gotra. Prativadibhayari.kara was the teacher of Sathakopa Yati. The
treatise spe.-:.ks also of another Ramyajamatr muni, son of Anantarya,
grandson of Prativadihhayari.kara and pupil of Srivenkatesa. It also
mentions Yedantaguru~ of the Vatsya gotra, a pupil of Ramyaj-
amatr muni and Yaradarya; Sundaraddika, of the Vatsyagotra, son
of Prativadibhay.arikara; Aparyatmamrtacarya, son of Sriveri.kata-
guru anJ grandson of Prativadibhayari.kara. This V eri.katacarya had
a son called Prativadibhayari.kara. Ramyajamatr muni had a son
called Srikf~I)a-ddika. Puru~ottamarya, of the Vatsya gotra, was
the son of Sriveri.katacarya. Srlkf~I)a-desika had a son called
Ramyajamatr muni, who had a son called Kr~I)a Suri. Anantaguru
had a son called Yeri.kata-ddika. Srinivasaguru was pupil of
Veri.katarya and Vatsya Srlnivasa, who had a son called Anantarya.
It is unnecessary to continue with the list, as it is not very useful
from the point of view of the development of the Srlvai~I)ava school
of philosophy or littrature. The fact that the names of earlier
teachers are reverently passed on to many of those who succeeded
them makes it difficult to differentiate them one from the other.
But the history of the sehoul is unimportant after the sixteenth or
the early part of the seventeenth ct:ntury, as it lost much of its force
as an intellectual movement. In the days of the -~rvars the Srlvai~
.Q.ava movement was primarily a religious movement of mystic and
intoxicating love of God and self-surrender to Him. In the days of
Ramanuja it became intellectualized for some time, but it slowly
relapsed into the religious position. As with Sari.kara, and not
as with 1\ladhva, the emphasis of the school has always been on the
interpretations of Vcdic texts, and the intellectual appeal has always
been subordinated to the appeal to the U pani~adic texts and thc!r
XVIII] Riimiinuja II3
interpretations. The chief opponents of the Ramanuja school were
the Sankarites, and we may read many works in which copious re-
ferences are tnade by writers of the Sankara school who attempted
to refute the principal points of the bhii~ya of Ramanuja, both from
the point of view of logical argument and from that of interpreta-
tions of the Upani~adic texts. But unfortunately, except in the case
of a few later works of little value, no work of scholarly refutation
of the views of Ramanuja by a Sankarite is available. The followers
of Ramanuja also offered slight refutation of some of the doctrines
of Bhaskara, Jadava-prakasa, and Madhva and the Saivas. But their
efforts were directed mainly against Sankara.
It has already been noted that Ramanuja wrote a bhii~ya on the
Brahma-sutra, Vediirtha-sa'!lgraha, Vediinta-siira and Vediinta-dipa,
a comment~!'Y on the Srimad-bhagavad-gitii, Gadya-traya, an<!
Bhagavad-iiriidhana-krama 1 • According to traditional accounts,
Ramanuja was born in A.D. IOI7 and died in I I37· The approximate
dates of the chief events of his life have been worked out as follows:
study with Yadavaprakasa, I033; first entry into Srirailgam to sec
Yamuna, I 043; taking holy orders, I 049; flight to M ysore for fear
of the Cola king's persecution, I096; conversion of Bitti-deva, the
Jain king of Mysore, the Hoysala country, I098; installing the
temple God at l.VIelukot, I Ioo; stay in Melukot, up to 1 I I6; return
to Srirailgam, I I 18; death, I I 372 • His nephew and disciple Dasarathi
and his disciple Kurcsa were about fifteen or sixteen years junior
to him 3 • :Ramanuja's bhii~ya, called also Sri-bhii~ya, was com-
mented on by Sudarsana Suri. His work is called Sruta prakiisikii,
and is regarded as the most important commentary on the Sri-bhii~ya.
t•ip:zv' arcii-krtam avanotsukojiiiina1!l srlgftii-vivarm:za-bhii~ya-dipa-siiriin
1
'f.Jijaya.
The T'isi~!ii-d~·aita School [cH.
Ramanuja Literature.
As already noted, the principal commentary on Rama11uja's
bhii~ya, was the .Sruta-prakiisikii by Sudarsana Suri. Even before
this .Sruta-prakiisilu"i was \vritten, another commentary, called ~·ri
bhii~ya-·vi'L·rti, was written by Rama-misra-dcsika, a disciple of
Ramanuja, under his own direction. This work was written in six
chapters and was not a commentary in the ordinary sense, but a
study of the principal contents of Ramanuja's blzii~ya. This Rama
Misra was a different man from Rama :\Iisra, the teacher of Yamuna.
The .Sruta-prakiisikii had a further study, entitled Bhii:va-prakiisihii,
by \T'iraraghavadasa. Criticisms of this work were replied to in a
work called Bhii~ya-praktisikii-dz"i~a7:zoddhiira by Sa~hakopacarya, a
writer of the sixteenth century. The Sruta-prakiisikii had another
commentary, called Tiilikii, hy Yadhiila Srlnivasa, a writer who
probably belonged to the fifteenth century. The contents of the
.Sruta-prakiisikii were summarized in a work called .Sruta-prakiisikii-
siira-sa1Jlgraha. The blzii~ya of Ramanuja was further commented on
in the Tattva-siira, by Yatsya Yarada, a nephew of Ramanuja. The
name of the commentator's father was Dcvaraja, and his mother
was Kamala, a sister of Ramanuja. He was a pupil of Srlvi~IJucitta,
a disciple of Kuresa. This Tatt'L·a-siira provoked a further criticism,
called Ratna-siiri!zf, by Ylra-raghava-dasa, son of Yadhula N ara-
sif!1ha-guru and pupil of Yadhiila Yaradaguru, son of Yadhiila
Venka~acarya. He also himself wrote a commentary on the ~'rf
bhii~ya, called Tiitparya-dipikii. Yira-raghava-dasa lived probably in
the later half of the fourteenth or the beginning of the fifteenth
century. Ramanuja's views were also collected together in a
scholarly manner in a work called ..:.Vaya-mukha-miilikii, by Apyaya-
dik~ita, who was born in the middle of the sixteenth century.
Ramanuja's blzii~ya is also dealt with by the famous Ycnkatanatha,
in his work Tatt'L·a-tikii. The .Sri-blzii~ya had another commentary
called Naya-prakt"isikii, by ~Ieghanadari, a contemporary of Yen-
katanatha of the fourteenth century 1 • A further commentary is
1
l\Ieghanadari's great w1:,rk, .Vaya-dyu-ma~1i, has been treated in detail in a
later section. He was the son of .A..treyanatha and his mother's name was Adh,·ara-
nayika. He had three brothers, Hastyadrinatha or Varaf}adrisa, Varadarat, and
Rama _l\lisra. This Varaf}adrisa should not be confused with Dasarathi 's grandson,
who was of Vadhula (!otra. !\leghanadari"s other works arc Blui?.·a-prabodlw and
Mumuk~ii-piiya~sa'!lgraha.
XVIII] Riimiinuja Literature 115
writer, has heen collected from the introduction to the :\hsore edition. of the
Tattva-muktii-lwliipa. -
Cr;Janii-lak~a~llltT•a-vise~itam eviirthe siidhm.at·cam dlwrma-lal:sanmn. isvara-
2
mimiir!lSii, p. , 8. . . .
XVIII) Riimiinuja Literature 125
the word dharma may be otherwise used by some persons, yet its
accepted meaning, as defined above, remains unaltered. The
instructions of the Smrtis, Purii1Jas, Paiicariitras, Brahma-
sutras, etc., are to be regarded as dharma, as being based upon the
Vedas, which are their source. The validity of the nature of dharma
cannot be determined by a reference to any other pramii7Ja than the
scriptural texts. In all matters of doubt and dispute the 1l1imii1Jlsii-
siitra should be interpreted in such a manner that it does not come
in conflict with the views of Badariiyal)a, who was the teacher of
Jaimini.
Venkatanatha's son was also a great writer on Vedanta. He was
called Kumara Vedantacarya, Varadarya or Varad~natha or V arada
Desikacarya or Varadariija Siiri or Varadanayaka Suri or Varada-
guru. He wrote a Tatt'IJa-traya-culuka-sa1Jlgraha, a work in Sanskrit
prose, in which he summarizes the contents of the Tamil
Tattva-traya-culuka of Venkatanatha, describing the fundamental
Srivai~I)ava doctrines regarding soul, matter and God 1 • His
other works are Vyavahiiraika-sa~yatva-kha7Jtjana, Prapatti-kiirikii,
Rahasya-traya-culuka, Carama-guru-nir'l}aya, Phala-bheda-kha1J-
tjana, A!iidhana-sa~ngralza, Adhikarar;a-cintiima'l}i, Nyiisa-tilaka-
vyiikhyii, Rahasya-traya-siiriirtha-sa1Jlgraha. The last three works
are commentaries on Venkatanatha's Adhikara7Ja-siirii'l•ali, 1Vyiisa-
tilaka, and Rahasya-traya-siira. Varadarya lived till the end of the
fourteenth or the beginning of the fifteenth century.
1\tleghanadari lived probably in the twelfth and the early thir-
teenth centuries. He was closely associated with his elder brother
Rama 1\tlisra, a pupil of Ramanuja. He wrote a Naya-prakiisikii, a
commentary on the Sri-bhii~ya, Bhiiva-prabodha, Mumuk~ii-piiya
sa1Jlgraha, and Naya-dyu-mar;i. The last work is one of the most
recondite works on the Visi~tii-dvaita school of thought, and its main
contents have been noted in a separate section. He was the son
of Atreyanatha and Adhvara-nayika. He had three brothers,
Hastyadrinatha, Varadarat, and Rama Misra.
Ramanujadasa or l\1ahacarya wrote a Brahma-siitra-bhii~yopa
nyiisa, a commentary on the Sri-bhii~ya. He wrote also a Piiriisarya,
in which he tried to show that the commentaries of Sankara,
1\tladhva and others were not in consonance with the Siitras of
and in the present work notice is taken only of the Sanskrit works of
these writers (mostly in the manuscript form) which have been
available to the present writer. Both Pillai Lokacarya and Saumya
Jamaq· muni, called also Vadikesarl, were sons of K~I).apada, but
this Saumya Jamatr muni must be distinguished from a later
Saumyajamatr muni, called also Yattndrapraval).acarya, who was a
much more distinguished man. Parasara Bhattarya was probably
born before A.D. 1078 and he died in A.D. 1165. He was suc-
ceeded by Vedantl l\!Iadhava or Nanjiyar, who was succeeded by
Namburi Varadaraja or Lokacarya I. He was succeeded by Pillai
Lokacarya, a contemporary of Venkatanatha, and Sruta-:prakasika-
carya or Sudar8ana Suri. It was in his time that the l\1ahomedans
attacked Srlrangam. as has already been mentioned in connection
with our account of Yenkatanatha. The Mahomedans were ex-
pelled from Srlrangam hy Goppal).arya, and the image of Ranga-
natha was re-installed in A.D. 1293. It was at this time that the
famous Saumya Jamatr muni (junior) was born. The senior Saumya
Jamatr muni, younger brother of Pillai Lokacarya, called also
Vadikesarl, wrote some commentaries on the Divya-prabaizdhas, a
work called Dipa-prakiisa, and Piyaruli-ceyalare-rahasya. He is
referred to by the junior Saumya Jamatr muni, called also Vara-
vara muni, in his Upadda-ratna-miilii, Tattva-traya-bhii~ya and
Srivacana-bhii~a1_la-vyiikhyii. We cannot be sure whether the
Adhyiitma-cintiima~zi, in which Vadhula Srlnivasa is adored as his
teacher, was written by Saumya Jamatr muni. Mahacarya also de-
scribed himself as a pupil of Vadhlila Srlnivasa, and, if the senior
Saumya Jamatr and 1\lahacarya were pupils of the same teacher,
1\lahacarya must have lived in the fourteenth century. If, however,
the junior Saumya Jamatr wrote the Adhyiitma-cintiima1}i, Maha-
carya will have to be placed at a later date.
The present writer has been able to trace only three books in
Sanskrit by Pillai Lokacarya: Tattva-traya, Tattva-sekhara, and
Srivacana-bhu~a1_la 1 • The Tattva-traya is a very useful compendium
of the Srlvai~I).ava school of thought, in which the nature of the in-
animate (acit), the souls, God and their mutual relations are dealt
1 Some of his other works are j\Jumuk~u-ppatf.i, Prameya-sekhara, Nava-
has, however, vanished from India, and we can know only from
references in other works that their original writings were also in
the form of sutras 1 .
Yamuna's philosophy was directly opposed to the doctrine of
the Carvakas. It is best therefore that we should deal here with
Yam~na's theory of soul in connection with the pretensions of the
Carvakas. Yamuna takes his stand on the notion of self-conscious-
ness. He says that our preception "I know" distinctly points to the
self as the subject, as distinguished from the perception of the body
as "this is my body," which is closely akin to other objective per-
ceptions such as "this is a jug," "this is a piece of cloth." \Yhen I
restrain my senses from external objects and concentrate myself on
myself, I have still the notion of my self as " I," which arises in me
without the least association of my hands or feet or any other parts
of the body. The body as a whole cannot be said to be indicated by
my perception, when none of the parts of the body shine forth in it.
Even when I say "I am fat," "I am lean," the notion of" I" does
not refer to the external fat or lean body, but to some mysterious
entity within me with which the body is wrongly associated. \Ye
should not forget that we also say "this is my body" as we should
say "this is my house," where the body is spoken of as being dif-
ferent from the self as any external object. But it may be objected
that we also say "my self" (mamiitmii); but this is only a linguistic
usage which expresses that difference, whereas the entity perceived
is just the same and identical. The confusion which is fdt in the
fact that the notion of" I" refers to the body is due to this, that the
self bas no perceivable shape or form as have ordinary external ob-
jects (such as jug, cloth, etc.), by virtue of which they are dis-
tinguished from one another. Those who are not sufficiently dis-
criminating cannot rest content with the formless self, and conse-
quently confuse the soul with the body, more particularly because
they find that corresponding to any and every desire of the soul
there is a corresponding change of the body. They think that, since,
corresponding to any mental change, such as new feeling, thought,
or desire, there is a corresponding physical or physiological change
of the body, there is no other soul different from the body. But, if
1
The first siUra of llrhaspati is atha tatt·vm!l t:yiikhyiisycimab; the second is
prithi'l.·y-ap-tejo-·ciiyur iti tattvani and the third is tebhyas caitanya'f!J ki~zv:iidi
bhyo mada-sal>tivat.
XIX] Yamuna's doctrine of Soul
we try to find out by a deeper self-introspection what we mean by
"I," we find that it is an entity, as the subject, as the" I," as distinct
from the objects which are not self and which are indicated as this
or that. Had the notion "I know" referred to the body, the bodily
parts would surely have been manifested in the notion, as external
objects shine forth in all external perception as this or that. But it
is not so; on the contrary, by introspection I find that the self is an
entity which is independent in itself, and all other things of the
world are for the sake of my self; I am the enjoyer, whereas every-
thing else is the object of my enjoyment; I am not for the sake of
any body; I am an end in myself and never a means for anything
else (a-pariirtha). All combinations and collocations are for the
sake of another, whom they serve; the self is neither the result of
any collocation nor does it exist for the sake of serving another.
l\1oreover, consciousness cannot be regarded as being a product
of the body. Consciousness cannot be thought to be like an in-
toxicating property, the product of the four elements; for the com-
bination of the four elements cannot produce any and every sort of
power. There is a limit to the effects that a certain cause can pro-
duce; in the production of the intoxicating property it is the atoms
which happen to possess that property; intoxication is not to be
compared with consciousness; nor has it any similarity to any
physical effect; nor can it be thought that there are atoms in which
the property of consciousness is generated. Had consciousness been
the result of any chemical change, such as we find in the produc-
tion of the red colour by the combination of lime with catechu,
there would have been particles of consciousness (caitanya) pro-
duced, and our consciousness would then have been the sum total
of those particles of consciousness, as in the case of any material
chemical product; the red colour produced by the combination of
lime with catechu belongs to an object every particle of which is
red; so, if consciousness had been a chemical product of the
material of this body, there would have been generated some
particles of consciousness, and thus there would have been per-
ceptions of many selves in accordance with each particle of con-
sciousness, and there would be no identity of consciousness and
experience. Thus it must be admitted that consciousness belongs
to an entity, the soul, which is different from the body.
Nor can consciousness belong to the senses; for, if it belonged
The Ph£/osophy of Y iimuniiciirya [cH.
to each of the senses, then that which was perceived by one sense
(e.g. the eye) could not be perceived by another sense(e.g. the touch),
and there would not rise the consciousness ''I touch that which I
had seen before." If all the senses together produced conscious-
ness, then we could not perceive anything with one sense (e.g. the
eye), nor could we have any consciousness, or the memory of the
object of any particular sense after that sense was lost; when a man
was blinded, he would lose all consciousness, or would never re-
member the objects which he had seen before with his eyes.
Nor can the manas be regarded as iitman; for it is only an organ
accepted as accounting for the fact that knowledge is produced in
succession and not in simultaneity. If it is said that the man as
may be regarded as being a separate organ by which it can know
in succession, then practically the self, or iitman, is admitted; the
only difference being this, that the Carvakas call manas what we
(Yamuna and his followers) call iitman.
The ViJiliina~·iidin Buddhists held that knowledge, while self-
manifesting, also manifested the objects and so knowledge should
be regarded as the self (iitman). Against these Buddhists Yamuna
held that, if any permanent seat of knowledge was not admitted,
then the phenomenon of personal identity and recognition could
not be explained by the transitory states of self-manifesting know-
ledge; if each knowledge came and passed, how could one identify
one's present experiences with the past, if there were only flowing
states of knowledge and no persons? Since there was no penna-
nence, it could not be held that any knowledge persisted as an
abiding factor on the basis of which the phenomenon of self-
identity or recognition could be explained. Each knowledge heing
absent while others came, there was no chance of even an illusion
of sameness on grounds of similarity.
The doctrine of the Sankara school, that there is one quality less
permanent pure consciousness, is regarded hy Yamuna as being
against all experience. Thus, consciousness is always felt as be-
longing to a person and as generated, sustained for a time, and then
lost. At the time of deep sleep we all cease to possess knowledge,
and this is demonstrated by our impression on waking that we have
slept for so long, without consciousness. If the anta~zkara~za, which
the Advaitins regard as the substratum of the notion of "1," had
been submerged during the sleep, then there could not have been
XIX] Yamuna's doctrine of Soul 143
on waking the notion that "I slept so long." Nobody has ever ex-
perienced any pure knowledge. Knowledge as such must belong
to somebody. The Sankarites say that the rise of knowledge means
the identity of the knowledge with the objects at the time. But this
is not so; for the truth of the knowledge of an object is always with
reference to its limitations of time and space and not to the in-
trinsic quality of the thing or the knowledge. The assertion also that
knowledge is permanent is without any foundation; for whenever
any knowledge arises it always does so in time and under the limita-
tions of time. Nobody has ever experienced any knowledge divested
of all forms. Knowledge must come to us either as perception or
as inference, etc.; but there cannot be any knowledge which is
absolutely devoid of any forms or modifications and absolutely
qualityless. The Sankarites regard the self as pure consciousness or
anubhuti, but it is apparent that the self is the agent of anubhuti, or
the knower, and not knowledge or pure consciousness. Again, as in
Buddhism, so in Sankarism, the question of recognition remains
unsolved; for recognition or personal continuity of experience
means that the knower existed in the past and is existing even now
-as when we say, "I have experienced this" -but, if the self is
pure consciousness only, then there cannot be any perceiver per-
sisting in the past as well as in the present, and the notion "I have
experienced this" is not explained, but only discarded as being
illusory. The consciousness of things, however, is never generated
in us as " I am consciousness," but as " I have the consciousness of
this" ; if all forms were impure impositions on pure consciousness,
then the changes would have taken place in the consciousness, and
instead of the form "I have consciousness" the proper form of
knowledge ought to have been "I am consciousness." The San-
karites also hold that the notion of the knower is an illusory im-
position on the pure consciousness. If that be so, the consciousness
itself may be regarded as an illusory imposition; if it is said that the
pure consciousness is not an imposition, since it lasts till the end-
the stage of emancipation-then, since the result of right know-
ledge (tattva-jiiiina) is this, that the self ceases to be a knower, false
knowledge should be welcomed rather than such a right knowledge.
The notion "I know" proves the self to be a knower and apart from
a knower so manifested no pure consciousness can be experienced.
The notion " I " at once distinguishes the knower from the body,
The Philosophy of Y timuntictirya [cH.
the senses, the manas, or even the knowledge. Such a self is also
called a siik~i (perceiver), as all objects are directly perceived by it.
The Sii'f!Zkhya view is that it is the ahmikiira or buddhi which may
be regarded as the knower; for these are but products of prakrti, and
thus non-intelligent in themselves. The light of pure consciousness
cannot be regarded as falling on them and thereby making them
knowers by the reflection of its light; for reflection can only
happen with reference to visible objects. Sometimes it is held by the
Sati.karites that true consciousness is permanent and unchangeable,
that the ego (ahankiira) derives its manifestation from that and yet
reveals that in association with itself, just as a mirror or the surface
of water reflects the sun; and, when these limitations of alzankiira,
etc., are merged during deep sleep, the self shines forth in its own
natural light and bliss. This also is unintelligible; for if the- ahan-
kiira, etc., had all been manifested by the pure consciousness, how
can they again in their turn manifest the consciousness itself?
Actually it cannot be imagined what is the nature of that mani-
festation which pure consciousness is made to have by the alzan-
kiira, since all ordinary analogies fail. Ordinarily things are said to
be manifested when obstructions which veil them are removed, or
when a lamp destroys darkness, or when a mirror reflects an object;
but none of these analogies is of any use in understanding how
consciousness could be manifested by ahankiira. If, again, con-
sciousness requires something else to manifest it, then it ceases to
be self-manifesting and becomes the same as other objects. It is
said that the process of knowledge runs on by successive removals
of ajiiiina from the consciousness. Ajiiiina (na-jiiiina-not know-
ledge) may be understood as absence of knowledge or as the mo-
ment when some knowledge is going to rise, but such an aji'iiina
cannot obstruct consciousness; the Sati.karites hold, therefore, that
there is an indefinable positive ajiiiina which forms the stuff of the
world. But all this _is sheer nonsense. That which manifests any-
thing cannot make that thing appear as a part of itself, or as its own
manifestation. The ego, or ahankiira,- cannot also manifest another
consciousness (which is different from it) in such a way that that
consciousness shall appear as its own manifestation. So it has to be
admitted that the self is not pure consciousness, but the self-
conscious ego which appears in all our experience. The state of
deep sleep (su~upti) is often put forward as an example of pure
XIX] Yamuna's doctrine of Soul 1 45
the blue colour; so the world and the individuals may also be con-
ceived in accordance with the teaching of the U pani~ads as being
inseparably related to Him. This meaning is, indeed, more legiti-
mate than the conception which would abolish all the world mani-
festation, and the personality of all individual persons, and would
remain content only to indicate the identity of their pure in-
telligence with the pure intelligence of Brahman. There is not any
pure, all-absorbing, qualityless intelligence, as the Sankarites assert;
for to each of us different and separate ideas are being directly
manifested, e.g. our feelings of indi\·idual pleasures and pains. If
there were only one intelligence, then everything should have shone
forth simultaneously for all times. Again, this intelligence is said to
be both Being (sat), intelligence (cit), and bliss (iinanda). If this
tripartite form be accepted, it will naturally destroy the monistic
doctrine which the Sankarites try to protect so zealously. If, how-
ever, they assert that these are not separate forms or qualities, hut
all three represent one identical truth, the Brahman, then that also
is not possible; for how can bliss he the same as intelligence?
Pleasure and intelligence are experienced hy all of us to be entirely
different. Thus, in whichever way we try to scrutinize the Sankarite
doctrines, we find that they are against all experiences and hardly
stand the strain of a logical criticism. It has, therefore, to he ad-
mitted that our notions about the external world are correct and
give us a true representation of the external world. The manifold
world of infinite variety is therefore not merely an illusory ap-
pearance, but true, as attested hy our sense-experience.
Thus the ultimate conclusion of Yamuna's philosophy demon-
strates that there are, on the one side, the self-conscious souls, and,
on the other, the omniscient and all powerful lsvara and the mani-
fold external world. These three categories are real. He hints in
some places that the world may he regarded as heing like sparks
coming out of lsvara; but he docs not elaborate this thought, and
it is contradicted by other passages, in which lsvara is spoken of as
the fashioner of the world system, in accordance with the :'\yay a
doctrine. From the manner in which he supports the :\yaya
position with regard to the relation of lsvara and the world, both in
the Siddhi-traya and in the Agama-priimii~rya, it is almost certain
that his own attitude did not differ much from the 1Vwlva attitude,
which left the duality of the world and li'l·ara ah~ol~Itely unrc-
XIX] God and the World 1 55
solved. It appears, therefore, that (so far as we can judge from his
Sz"ddhi-traya) Yamuna's main contribution consists in establishing
the self-consciousness of the soul. The reality of the external world
and the existence of lsvara had been accepted in previous systems
also. Yamuna thus gives us hardly any new ideas about lsvara and
His relation to the souls and the world. He does not make inquiry
into the nature of the reality of the world, and rests content with
proving that the world-appearance is not false, as the Sankarites
supposed. He says in one place that he does not believe in the ex-
istence of the partless atoms of the N aiyayikas. The smallest particle
of matter is the trasare~u, the specks of dust that are found to move
in the air when the sun's rays come in through a chink or hole. But
he does not say anything more than this about the ultimate nature
of the reality of the manifold world or how it has come to be what
it is. He is also silent about the methods which a person should
adopt for procuring his salvation, and the nature and character-
istics of that state.
Yamuna, in his ligama-priimii~ya, tried to establish that the
Pafica-riitra-sa1J1hitii had the same validity as the Vedas, since it was
uttered by Isvara himself. Vi~QU, or Vasudeva, has been praised in
the Purusa-siikta and in other places of the Vedas as the supreme
Lord. The Piisupata-tantra of the Saivas is never supported by the
Vedas, and thus the validity of the Piisupata-tantra cannot be com-
pared with that of the Paiicariitra-sa1J1hitii.
this is hardly a desirable state, since there is not here the infinite joy
which the Vai~~ava emancipation can bring. Ramanuja has written
of mukti as a state which a man can acquire when he is divested of
all a·vidyii, and has the natural intuition of the Supreme Soul and his
relations with Him. He had distinguished this state from that
mukti in which a man is divested of all karmas and realizes himself
in himself, as obstructing the qualities of lsvara from him. This
kaivalya, or realization of one's own self as the highest, is thus
distinctly a lower emancipation. It is not out of place to say that
V eilkatanatha had pushed bhakti and the human goal of mukti
distinctly further on to the side of feeling, by defining bhakti as a
feeling of joy and mukti as servitude to lsvara.
from iikiisa, which offers room for the movement of things. Akiisa
is not a mere vacuity or non-occupiedness, but a positive entity.
Thus it is seen that the indeterminate matter of prakrti, with
its three qualities, passes through many stages and at last exhibits
the phenomenal world, which produces happiness and misery in
accordance with a man's destiny (adnta) and good or bad deeds.
The force of adnta is not a separate entity, but the favour and dis-
favour of !Svara, which works in accordance with the good or bad
deeds of men.
CHAPTER XX
PHILOSOPHY OF THE RAMANUJA
SCHOOL OF THOUGHT
having a real objective existence, the error being due to the non-apprehension of
other elements which are objecti"·ely existl:'nt and associated with the entity
which is the object of illusory perception, but which owing to defects are not
perceived. See ibid. pp. 187, d~8.
xx] Riimiinuja's theory of Illusion
can explain the intermixture of bhutas, but not of the bhautikas, or
the later modifications of the five elements into the varied sub-
stances such as conch-shell and silver, which are mutually mis-
apprehended for each other on account of their similarity. It has,
therefore, to be maintained that in these bhuta-modifications also
the trivrt-kara1Ja principle applies to a certain extent; for here also
the molecules or atoms of things or substances are made up of large
parts of some bhuta-rnodification and ·smaller parts of one or more
of other bhuta-modifications.
I
The conch-shell molecules are thus
made up of large parts of conch-shell material and smaller parts of
the silver material, and this explains the similarity of the one ele-
ment to the other. The similarity is due to the real presence of one
element in the other, and is called the pratinidhz-nyaya, or the
maxim of determining similarity by real representation. So in all
cases of misapprehension of one thing as another through similarity
there is no misapprehension in the strict sense, but a right appre-
hension of a counterpart in the other object constituting the basis
of the similarity, and the non-apprehension of the bigger and the
larger part which held the counterpart coeval with it. It is because
the conch-shell contains a major part of conch-shell element (sukty-
a'!lia) and only a minor part of silver that it passes as conch-shell
and not as silver. Conch-shell cannot serve the purpose of silver,
despite the silver element in it, on account of the obstruction of the
major part of the conch-shell element; and it is also on account of
this that under normal circumstances the silver element in it is
hidden by the conch-shell element, and we say that we perceive
conch-shell and not silver. When it is said that this is conch-shell
and not silver (neda1Jl rajala1Jl ), the "not silver" has no other
meaning than that of the conch-shell, the apprehension of which
dispelled the idea of silver. It is the conch-shell that is designated
in its negative aspect as "not silver" and in its positive aspect as
conch-shell.
Ramanujacarya, alias Vadiharp.sambuvahacarya, the maternal
uncle of Venkatanatha, seems to support the Ramanuja method of
sat-khyiiti by showing that all the other three rival theories of
illusion, such as that of anyatha-khyati, akhyati, and the anirva-
canlya-khyati, cross each other and are therefore incompatible. But
he takes great pains to show that the sat-khyati theory may be sup-
ported on the basis of the logical implications involved in both the
184 Philosophy of the Ramtinuja School of Thought [en.
anyathii-khyiiti and the akhyiiti types of realism. He starts the dis-
cussion by taking for granted the akhyiiti type of realism and its
logical implications. He holds that it also would ultimately lead to
anyathii-khyiiti, and that therefore (excepting the sat-khyiiti), of all
the khyiitis, anyathii-khyiiti is perhaps the best. He says in his
Nyiiya-kulisa that, since the way of knowledge requires that the
sense-organs should reach their objects, even in illusory perception
there must be some objects which they reach; for they could not
convey any knmvledge about an object with which they were not in
contact 1 . The defect (do~a) cannot account for the production of
new kno\\ledge, for it only serves to obstruct anything from being
perceived or known. Defects only obstruct the course of the
natural sequence of cause and effect 2 , just as fire would destroy the
natural shooting pmvers of seeds 1 . :\loreover, taking the old ex-
ample of the conch-shell-silver, it may be asked how, if there was
no silver at all objectively present, there could be any knowledge of
such an absolutely non-existing thing? Since our awareness can-
not refer to non-existing entities, all forms of a\vareness must
guarantee the existence of corresponding objects. \Vhat happens in
the case of the illusion of conch-shell-silver is that there is memory
of silver previously experienced and the "this," which is ex-
perienced at the time of the illusion; and it is on account of the de-
fects (do~a) that it is not grasped that the silver is only a memory of
past experience, while it is only the "this" in front of us that is
experienced at the time (do~iit pramu~£ta-tada7-·amarsab) 3 •
Vadiharpsamhuvaha, weighing the various arguments of the
rival theories of anyatlzii-khviit£ and aklzyiiti, deals with the argu-
ments of the anyathii-khyiiti view which holds that it is the conch-
shell that appears as sih·er. As against the objections raised by such
a view in opposition to the akhyiiti view, viz., if each thing is dif-
ferent from every other thing, how can an illusion be explained as
being due to the non-apprehension of the difference between the
silver remembered and the" this" perceived directly in experiencL'?
.\rguing in its favour, he says that the difference which is not
smrti~l. Ibid.
xx] Ramiinuja's theory of Illusion
apprehended here consists of that characteristic which exists in
things by virtue of which one thing is not confused with or misappre-
hended as another thing, and it is the non-apprehension of this
differentiating characteristic that causes the misapprehension of
the conch-shell as silver (sal!lsarga-virodhi-vaidharmya-vise~a-rupa
bhedii-grahafz pravrtti-hetu/;)1. But the real objections to holding
this akhyiiti view of illusion to be ultimately sufficient consists in
the fact that it cannot do away with the necessity of the synthetic
operation (saf!Zsarga-vyiipiira) consisting of a thing being regarded
as such-and-such, as found in all discussions of disputants, in all
our behaviours and concepts of error and illusion. ·This forces us
to accept the anyathii-khyiiti view as an unavoidable and ultimate
explanation 2 • Vadiharp.sambuvaha urges that, since the silver is
felt to be in that which is only a piece of conch-shell, this must
imply the imposition of the one on the other (which is the essential
part of anyathii-khyiiti). Just as in the real perception of a piece of
silver the object before us is experienced as silver, so in the conch-
shell-silver illusion, the object before us is experienced as silver,
1
l\Jadras Govt. MS. 1\:o. 4910.
2
Like the seniors referred to by Ramanuja, Prabhakara also considers all
knowledge to be valid (yathiirtha1Jl sarvam e'l:e'ha nj1iiinam iti, Pralwrm:za-pancikii,
p. 32), though the former does so on ontological grounds and the latter on psycho-
logical and experiential grounds. Salikanatha, representing Prabhakara's view,
says that, whatever is the content of awareness, that alone is known, and at the
time of the conch-shell-silver illusion, what is knmvn is "this is silver," but there
is no knowledge of conch-shell, since it is not the content of awareness at the
time. Thus it cannot be said that the illusory knowledge consists of knowing the
conch-shell as silver, hut of the "this" as silver; for, when there is the knowledge
of illusory silver, there is no knowledge of conch-shell. What happens in illusory
perception is that through defects the differentiating l:haracteristics of the conch-
shell are not apprehended and the conch-shell is perceived only in its general
character as an obje~t. Then there is memory of silver, and through a defect in
the mental process (mano-do~iit) the silver is not remembered v-:ith its original
association of time and place as that silver which was perceived there, but is simply
remembered as an image of silver (tad-ity-m,zia-pariimarsa-vivarjitam). Though
there is no such dcrinite experience that I remember silver, yet the idea of
silver has to be admitted to be due to memory; for it cannot be due either to per-
ception or to inference or to any other source of knowledge. Thus, through the
elimination of all other sources of knowledge, sih·er has to be admitted to be due
to memory (mw11ya-gatita!z smrtir atrii"'l:agamyate). On account of the absence
of a feeling that I remember a past experience, the memory of silver cannot be
distinguished from a percept; for it is only these facts that distinguish a present
percept from a reproduced image; and so we fail to differentiate between this
memory and the actual perception of some object before us (the differentiating
characteristics of which are entirely lost to us through defects of sense-organs or
the like). On account of the non-apprehension of the distinction, these two dif-
ferent kinds of awareness themselves produce the illusion of a direct and im-
mediate perception of silver which is not there at the time, and even tempt us to
186 Philosophy of the Ramanuja School of Thought [cH.
and here also it is the conch-shell that appears as silver. When the
illusion is dispelled, we say that "this is not silver"; this cannot
mean the mere presence of the conch-shell, but it must mean the
denial of the imposition that was made previously. For, if nega-
tions could be treated as positive entities, then there would be no
difference between positives and negatives (badhyasya vidhi-
riipatve vidhi-ni~edha-vyatyiisa'!l ca ni~edlze biidha iti tulyiirthat'[·iit) 1 •
The akhyiiti view speaks of non-apprehension of absence of as-
sociation (e.g. of conch-shell-silver, asa1J1sargiigraha) to be the
cause of illusion. It may well be asked, \Vhat is this absence of
association? It cannot be the mere thing itself; for, had it been so,
we should expect that the thing itself (say the conch-shell) is not
perceived and this alone constitutes error, which is impossible.
Moreover, the silver is felt to be in front of us as the object we per-
ceive and not as something which we remember. ~Te know that,
when we perceive illusorily that "this is silver," there is the per-
ception of a false association (biidhaka-sa'!lsarga-grahm;am); but the
concept of non-apprehension of difference (bhediigraha) never seems
to be practically realized in experience. If we inquire into the
nature of what constitutes falsity or contradiction (e.g. in conch-
shell-silver), \Ve find that it is not the fact that a conch-shell when
burnt becomes ash while silver, when burnt, may be made into a
finger-ring that constitutes error, but the fact that what was believed
to be capable of being rendered into a finger-ring by being put into
fire cannot be so done (yadi tv-aizguliyakadi-hetutayiibhimatasya
vya'[·ahiirasya bhasma-hetutvako hy atra '['ise~a~z). If this is what is
really meant by falsehood, it is nothing but the apprehension of the
cause of one kind of action as being another cause (anya-hetu-
vyavahiiro 'nya-lzetutayiivagata~z). This will be anyathii-khyiiti; for,
if even here it is urged to be non-apprehension of difference, then
stretch our hands to pick it up, as if there were a real piece of silver before us.
(See Prakarm;a-paiicikii, Ch. IV, J-.:aya-'t·Uhi.)
Sudarsana Suri, commenting on the akhyiiti view in his Sruta-prakiisikii in
connection with his commentary on the yathiirtha-khyiiti view of Ramanuja 's
seniors, says that the akhyiiti view has the advantage of superior simplicity or
the minimum assumption, viz. that in illusion only an indefinite object is seen,
and the distinction between this and the image roused in memory by it is not
apprehended. This has to be admitted in all theories of illusion, and in addition
other assumptions have to be made.
1
Nyiiya-kulisa of Vadiharpsambuvaha Ramanujacarya, Govt. Oriental l\'lS.
No. 4910.
xx] Riimiinuja's theory of Illusion
the experience in such cases of the belief of one thing as another is
not explained 1 • In all such cases the final appeal must be made to
experience, which attests all cases of illusion as being the appear-
ance of one thing as another 2 •
But though Vadiharp.sambuvahacarya thus tries to support the
anyathii-khyiiti view of illusion, yet he does not dismiss the akhyiiti
view of error curtly, but admits that it may also properly explain
facts of illusion, when looked at from another point of view. For,
if there was not the non-apprehension of difference between silver
and conch-shell, the conch-shell could not be mistaken as silver.
So, even in anyathii-khyiiti, there is one element of akhyiiti in-
volved; for in order that one may behave towards a piece of conch-
shell in the same way as one would do to a piece of silver, it is
necessary that one should not be able to distinguish between what
one sees before one and what one remembers. But, 'though the
negative fact of akhyiiti, i.e., non-apprehension of difference, may
be regarded in many cases as a necessary stage, yet the positive fact
of association (sa'!lsarga) or synthesis has to be admitted as an in-
dispensable process, connecting the different elements constituting
a concrete perception. The root-cause of all our behaviour and
action, being of the nature of synthetic association, it would be
wrong to suppose that non-apprehension of difference could by
itself be made a real cause of our actions (na ca mula-bhute sa'!lsarga-
jiiiine pravrtti-kiira1_le siddlze tad-upajivino nirantara-jiiiinasya
pra'l·rttihetutvam iti yukta'!l vaktu'!l) 1 • Although Vadiharp.sam-
buvaha spends all his discussions on the relative strength of
aklzyiiti and anyathii-khyiiti as probable theories of illusion, yet he
refers to the view of illusion mentioned by Ramanuja that all things
are present in all things and that therefore no knowledge is illusory.
He considers this view as the real and ultimately correct view. But,
if this were so, all his discussions on the akhyiiti and anyathii-
klzyiiti theories of illusion would be futile. Vadiharp.sambuvaha
does not, however, attempt to show how, if this theory be admitted,
the other theories of akhyiiti or anyathii-khyiiti could be sup-
1 yadi ca'trii'pi bhedii-grahab sarm.za'!l syiit tato'bhimiina-vise~a-krta-badha
1
karm:za-priimii7Jyasya iifraya-priimii1JYasya ca jiiiina-priimii1]yii-dhlna-jiiiina-
tviit tad ublza):a-priimii1Jya-siddhy-artham api jiiiina-priimii7Jyam eva viciiranlyam.
Nyiiya-siira, p. 35·
z pramii-kara1JG'?l pramii1Jam ity uktam iiciiryai/:1 siddhiinta-siire pramo-
tpiidaka-siimagrl-madhye yad atisayena pramii-gu7Jaka'?l tat tasyii/:1 kiirQ1JGm;
atisayas ca •oyiipiira/:1, yad dhi yad janayitvaiva )•ad janayet tat tatra tasyiiviintara-
vyiipiiral:z. sii~iitkiiri-pramiiyii indriya'?l kiira7Jam indriyii-rtha-sa'?lyogo 't!iintara-
vyiipiira/:1. Ramanuja, Siddhiinta-sa'?lgraha. Govt. Oriental MS. No. 4988.
1
sa ca siimagry-antar-gatasya na kasyacid ekasya kiirakasya kathayitu'!'
piirycte, siimagryiis lu so'tisaya/:1 suvacal:z sannihitii cet siimagrl sampannam eva
phalam iti. Nyiiya-maiijarl, p. 1 3·
4
siikalya-prasiida-lahdha-pramiti-sambandha-nibandhana~t pramiitr-pramey-
ayor mukhya-svarupa-liibha/:1. Ibid. p. 14.
204 Philosophy of the Riimiinuja School of Thought [cH.
collocation of causes consists of ideational and non-ideational
(hudhiihodha-s·vab/zii'[·a) factors!.
If the view of the Vediinta-paribhii~ii is to be accepted, then the
Sankarite view also is very much like the Ramanuja ,·iew on this
point; for both Dharmarajadhvarlndra and Ramakr~Q.a agree in de-
fining pramiil}a as the instrument of right knowledge. In the case
of visual perception or the like the visual or the other sense organs
are regarded as pramii~w; and the sense-contact is regarded as the
operation of this instrument.
The difference hetwecn the Nyaya view and the Ramanuja ,.it-w
consists in this, that, while the Nyaya gives equal importance to all
members of the collocation, the Ramanuja view distinguishes that
only as the instrumental cause which is directly associated with the
active operation (vyiipiira). Even the Sankarites agree with such a
productive view of knowledge; for, though they believe conscious-
ness to be eternal and unproduced, yet they also believe the states
of consciousness ('l'!tti-jiiiina) to be capable of being produced.
Both the Ramanuja and the Sankara beliefs accept the productive
view of knowledge in common with the Nyaya view, because with
both of them there is the ohjective world standing outside the sub-
ject, and perceptual knowledge is produced hy the sense-organs
when they arc in operative contact with the external objects.
A distinction, however, is made in the Ramanuja school between
kiiral}a (cause) and karal}a (important instrument), and that cause
which is directly and intimately associated with certain operations
leading to the production of the effect is called a kara~w 2 • It is for
this reason that, though the Ramanuja view may agree regarding
the siimagri, or collocation as causes, in some sense it regards only
the sense-organ as the chief instrument; the others are accessories
or otherwise helpful to production.
There are Buddhists also who believe that it is the joint colloca-
tion of mental and extra-mental factors of the preceding moment
which produce knowledge and external events of the later moment;
but they consider the mental factors to be directly producing know-
ledge, whereas the extra-mental or external objects are mere ac-
cessories or exciting agents. Knowledge on this view is determined
1
bodhii-bodha-n·abhii't'ii siimagrl pramii1}am. Nyiiya-mmljari, p. 1 5·
2
tat-kiira7Jiiniir!l madhye yad atisayena kiiryotpiidaka'!l tat kara1}am. Riimii-
nuja-siddhiinta-sa'!lgraha. Govt. Oriental I\1S. No. 4988.
xx] V eizkatanatha's treatment of Pramii'{la 205
terpretation given by Uddyotakara is that in all cases of doubt there are three
factors, viz. knowledge of the (1) common or (2) special features, (3} opposite
assertions and contending persons associated with a non-determinate state of
mind due to the want of definite realization of any of the contrary possibilities,
and a hankering to know the differentia. Uddyotakara thinks that doubt can arise
not only from a conflict of knowledge, but also from a conflict of opinions of con-
tending persons, vipratipattib being interpreted by him as •viidi-vipratipattil_z.
This view is also held by the Prajiiii-paritrii1Ja by Varadavi~I)U Misra, as is
evident from the following iloka:
siidlziirm:zii-krter dntyii-nekii-kiira-grahiit tathii,
vipaicitii'!l viviidiic ca tridhii sa'!liaya i~yate.
Prajiiii-paritrii1Ja, quoted in the Nyiiya-pariiuddhi, p. 61.
This view is criticized by Venkatanatha as a blind acceptance of the Nyiiya view.
1
As an example of doubt arising from perception of similar traits, Vatsyayana
gives the example of man and post, in which the common traits (viz. height, etc.)
are visible, but the differentia remains unnoticed. The example given by him of
doubt arising from perception of special characteristics is that odorousness, the
special character of earth, is not characteristic of dravya (substance), karma
(action), and gu1Ja (quality}, and this may rouse a legitimate doubt as to whether
earth is to be classed as substance, quality, or action. Similarly, from the special
characteristic of odorousness of earth a doubt may arise as to '' hether earth is
eternal or non-eternal, since no other eternal or non-eternal thing has this
characteristic.
xx] Error and Doubt according to V eizkataniitha 213
substances and that this is the cause of doubt, it may be pointed out
that doubt is due not to this distinguishing characteristic, but to the
fact that earth possesses qualities common to both eternal and non-
eternal substances. There are some who think that doubt through
vipratipatti (i.e. through uncertainty arising from reasoned asser-
tions of con~ending persons) may also be regarded as a case of doubt
from samiina-dharma (i.e. perception of similar traits), because the
opposed assertions have this similarity amongst themselves that
they are all held as true by the respective contending persons.
Venkatanatha, however, does not agree with this. He holds that
doubt here does not arise merely on the strength of the fact that the
opposed assertions are held as tn1e by the contending persons, but
because of our remembering the diverse reasons in support of such
as~ertions when the relative strength of such reasons or possi-
bilities of validity cannot be definitely ascertained. Thus, viprati-
patti has to be accepted as an independent source of doubt. Doubt
arises generally between two possible alternatives; but there may
be cases in which two doubts merge together and appear as one
complex doubt. Thus, when it is known that one or other of two
persons is a thief, but not which of them, there may be a doubt-
" this man or that man is a thief". In such a case there are two
doubts: "this man may or may not be a thief" and "that man may
or may not be a thief," and these merge together to form the com-
plex doubt (sa'f!lsaya-dvaya-samiihiira). The need of admitting a
complex doubt may, however, vanish, if it is interpreted as a case
where the quality of being a thief is doubted between two indi-
viduals. Doubt, however, involves in it also an assertory aspect, in
so far as it implies that, if one of the alternatives is n1led out, the
other must be affirmed. But, since it cannot be ascertained which
of them is ruled out, there arises the doubt. There is, however, no
opposition between doubt and the assertory attitude; for all doubts
imply that the doubtful property must belong to one or other of the
alternatives 1 •
But there may be cases in which the two alternatives may be
such that the doubtful property is not in reality affirmable of either
of them, and this is different from those cases in which the alter-
natives are such that, if the doubtful property is negated of the one,
1
sarvasminn api sa,iaye dharmy-a,iadau nirf)ayasya dustyajatviit. Nyiiya-
pariiuddhi, p. 66.
214 Philosophy of the Ramanuja School of Thought [cH.
/hid.
3
jiiiina-kara7Jaja-j;iiina-sm_rti-rahitii matir aparok~am. \" enkatan~tha 's Syiiya-
parisuddhi, pp. 7o-7 1. This vit!W has also been supported in the Prameya-sa7!1graha
and Tattt·a-ratniikara.
xx] Error and Doubt according to V eizkataniitha 217
ferent from the relation and the relata, but implies them. The re-
lations and the relata thus jointly yield the conception of a de-
terminate being 1 • The unifying trait that constitutes determinate-
ness is not an extraneous entity, but is involved in the fact that all
entities in this world await one another for their self-manifestation
through relations, and it is this mutual awaitedness that constitutes
their bond of unity, through which they appear connectedly in a
determinate conception 2 • It is this mutual awaitedness of entities
that contributes to their apprehension, as connected in experience,
which is simultaneous with it, there being no mediation or arresting
of thought of any kind between the two 3 • The fact that all our per-
ceptions, thoughts and ideas always appear as related and con-
nected is realized in universal experience. All linguistic expressions
always manifest the purport of the speech in a connected and re-
lated form. Had it not been so, communication of ideas through our
speech would have been impossible.
Nirvikalpa knowledge is a cognition in which only some funda-
mental characters of the object are noted, while the details of
many other characters remain unelaborated 4 • Sa'l'l·kalpa knowledge,
on the other hand, is a cognition of a number of qualities and
characters of the object, together with those of its distinctive
features by which its differentiation from other objects is clearly
affirmed 5 •
On the analogy of visual perception, the perception of other
senses may be explained. The relation of samaviiya admitted by the
Naiyayikas is discarded by the Ramanuja view on account of the
difficulty of defining it or admitting it as a separate category.
Various relations, such as container and ~ontained, contact and the
like, are revealed in experience in accordance with the different
directions in which things await one another to be related; and
1
na ca pratyekarrr viii~tatii-piital:z militiiniim eva viii$!atviit. Naya-dyu-ma~i.
2
eka-buddhi-vi1ayatii- rhii~ii'!' padii-rthiiniim anyo-nya-siipekla-svarupatvarrr
militatvam. Ibid.
3
visii!atva-dhl-Vi$ayatve ca te$ii'!l siipek$alt!a1Jt ca yaugapadyiit tatra viriimii-
pratlteb siipek$atii siddhii ca. Ibid.
• nirvikalpakarrr ca gha!ii-der anullekhitii-nuvrtti-dharma-ghatatvii-di-katipaya-
t.iie$a~a-t-·iii$!atayii-rthii-t-•acchedakarrr jiiiinam. Ibid.
5
ullekhitii-nut.'!tty-iidi-dharmakii-neka-t-iiela~-viii$!atayii siikfiid-vastu-vya-
t.·acchedaka'!l jiiiinarrr sat-ikalpakam. Ibid.
Venka~anatha however defines savikalpa and ninikalpa knowledge as
"sa pratyavamaria-pratyak$a'!t savikalpakam" and " tad-rahitarrr pratyak$m.n
nin:ikalpakam." Nyiiya-pariiuddhi, p. 77·
220 Philosophy of the Riimiinuja School of Thought [cH.
nirvikalpakam. Ibid.
3
Nyiiya-pariiuddhi, p. 77.
• biila-muka- tiryag- iidi-jniiniinii'!l anna- ka7)Jaka-vahni- vyiighrii-di- iabda-
vaiii$1Yii- na•vagiihitve'pi i$!a- d·vai$yatii- vacchedakii- nnatvii- hitva- ka7Jfakatvii-
di-prakiirii-·vagiihitvam asti. Nyiiya-siira commentary on Nyiiya-pariiuddhi by
Srinivasa, p. 78.
222 Philosophy of the Riimiinuja School of Thought [cH.
vision. Here there must first be the perception of the attributes of
the sandal as perceived by the visual organ, as rousing sub-con-
scious impressions of fragrance associated with the nasal organ and
giving rise to its memory, and finally associating it with the attri-
butes perceived by the visual organ. But in the perception of
attribute and substance there is no necessity of assuming such a
succession of the elements constituting a complex; for the data
which give rise to the perception of the attribute and those which
give rise to the perception of substance are presented to the senses
simultaneously and are identically the same (eka-siimagri-vedya-
viSe~a1_le~u tan-nirapek~at'l·iit) 1 • The main point of this discussion
consists in our consideration of the question whether relations are
directly perceived or not. If relations are regarded as being the
very nature of the things and attributes that arc perceiYed (n·arupa-
sambandha), then, of course, the relations must necessarily be per-
ceived with the perceived things and attributes at the first moment
of sight. If the relation of attributes to things be called an inherent
inseparable relation (samm.:iiya), then this, being an entity, may he
admitted to be capable of being grasped hy the eye; and, since it
constitutes the essence of the linking of the attributes and the thing,
the fact that it is grasped by the eye along with the thing and the
attribute ought to convince us that the relatedness of attribute and
thing is also grasped by the eye. For, if it is admitted that sama'l'tiya
is grasped, then that itself makes it unexceptionable that the attri-
bute and things are grasped, as the former qualifying the latter.
Like the attribute and the thing, their relation as constituting their
relatedness is also grasped hy the senses (dharmm:ad dharmi1.·ac ca
tat-sambandhasyii'py aindriyakat'cii-'vise~e1_Za graha1_Za-sambha'l·iit)?..
For, if the relation could not be grasped by the senses at the time
of the perception of the thing and the object, it could not be grasped
by any other way at any other time.
In the savikalpa perception, the internal impressions are roused
in association with the visual and other senses, and they co-operate
with the data supplied by the sense-organs in producing the inner
act of analysis and synthesis, assimilation and differentiation, and
1 Nyiiya-parisuddlzi, p. 78: surablzi-candana'!l su'ya'!l ghata ity-iidi-jl"iiine~u
arzublziiTyii anubhritit?:iit, yan nai'l'll'f!l tan nai'l'a'f!l _vathii {!hatab. Prthit·f itareMn·o
hhidyate gandlzm·att'l'iit yan nait'll'f!l tan nai'l'G'f!l yathii jalam. In the above i-n-
stance an-anubhii'l'}'ll.tt·a (non-cognizahility) belongs only to immediate intuition.
There is thus no sa-pak~a of anuhluiti where an-anubhii?')"llf'l'll was found he fore.
2 ida'f!l 't'c2cya'f!l prameyat'l·iit (this is definahle, hecause it is knowahlc) would,
under the supposition, imply that the concomitance of the negation of t·iicyat'l'G
and prameyat'l•a, viz. m·iicyat'l•a (indcfinahle) and aprameyatt·a (unknowable),
would be demonstrable; which is absurd, since no such cases are known.
xx] l ~enkataniitha' s treatment of Inference 231
1 sa-pak~a are all instances (outside the instance of the inference under dis-
cussion) where the hetu or reason is known to co-exist with the sadhya or
probandum.
232 Philosophy of the Riimiinuja School of Thought [cH.
'l'aratva-di-siidr.tvii-bhiinit." Ibid.
3 ekasya y;Lgapat sad-asadii-tmaka-f}iruddlza-dharmavattvii-nupapattetJ. tad-
upapattiiv api siid.rsyci-nupapatteica ... silnya-vastrmi pramci~ti-blui·viito tat-sad-
bhiive'pi tasya rajata-siid,rsyii-bhiiviicca tato 1za prav,rttitJ. Ibid.
xx] Epistemology according to Meghanadari and others 243
Again it is said that the illusory silver is called indefinable
(anirvacaniya) because it is different from pure being such as the
self which is never contradicted in experience (iitmano biidhii-yogiit)
and from non-being such as the chimerical entities like the hare's
horn which can never be objects of knowledge (khyiity-ayogiit). But
in reply to this it may very well be urged that the being of the self
cannot itself be proved, for if the self were the object of kpowledge
it would be as false as the world appearance; and if it were not it
could not have any being. It cannot also be said to have being be-
cause of its association with the class concept of being, for the self
is admitted to be one, and as such cannot be associated with class
concept 1 • Again want of variability cannot be regarded as a con-
dition of reality, for if the cognitive objects are unreal because they
are variable, the knower himself would be variable on account of his
association with variable objects and variable relations, and would
therefore be false. Again being (sattii) is not as universal as it is
supposed to be, for it is different from the entities (jug, etc.) to
which it is supposed to belong and also from negation in the view
that holds negation to be a positive category 2 • If the self is re-
garded as self-luminous, then it may also be contended that such
self-luminosity must be validly proved; and it may also be urged
that unless the existence of the self has already been so proved
its character cannot be proved to be self-luminous. 3
Again the akhyiiti view is liable to two different interpretations,
in both of which it may be styled in some sense as yathiirtha-khyati.
In the first interpretation the illusion is supposed to be produced in
the following manner: the visual organ is affected by the shining
character of something before the eyes, and this shining character,
being of the same nature as that of the silver, the shining character
of the silver is remembered, and since it is not possible to dis-
1 tasya drsyal'L·ti-nabhyupagame sasa-vi~ii~ti-dl-siimyam. titmanatz prameyatii
ca ne'~!e'ti, na tatas tat-sattii-siddhib. tad-abhyupagatau ca ptapaiicavanmithytit-
Val!l • •. titma-vyakter ekatvti-bltimtiniit tad-vyatirikta-padtirthasyti' sattvti-bhimtin-
ticca sattii-samavtiyitvti-nupapatte~z. Meghanadari, Naya-dyu-marzi.
2 atha ghata-Pa!ii-d£-bhedtinii'!l vytivartamtinatventi'ptiramtirthyam . .. titma-
Ibid.
3 kiiica sva-la~a'}ii-dtnii'!' jiityii-dlniiiica samvrti-siddhiinii'f! nirdharmakatve'pi
1 mrt-suvar~ii-divat-kiirya-vise~a-·vya·vasthiipaka-kiira~a-sv:abhiiva-siijiitya
vivak$iiYii7Jl gomaya-mak#kli-dy-iirabdha-v:rscikii-di~u vyabhiciiriit. Tattva-muktii-
kaliipa, Sarviirtha-siddhi, p. 22.
Dill 17
258 Philosophy of the Riimant~ja School of Thought [cH.
to this is that the association of pure intelligence with worldly ob-
jects is through the instrumentality of karma. It is also not possible
to infer the existence of Jl,fanas as a separate category through the
possibility of the thinking operation, for this may well be explained
by the functioning of the subconscious root-impressions; for even
the assumption of mind would not explain the thin~ing operation,
since manas, by itself, cannot be regarded as capable of producing
thought. Manas, being merely an instn1ment, cannot be regarded
as playing the role of a substance of which thought may he re-
garded as a modification. In the state of dream also it is not neces-
sary to assume the existence of a separate category of ahaf!ikiira to
explain dream experiences, for this may well be done by mind
working in association with subconscious root-impression. The
breathing operation in deep, dreamless s]cep may also be explained
by ordinary bio-motor functions, and for this there is no necessity
for the assumption of mahat.
It is also wrong to suppose that the cause must he of a more
unlimited extent than the effect, for it is not testified in ordinary
experience, in which a big jug is often found to be made out of a
lump of clay of a smaller size. It is also wrong to suppose that
whatever is found to abide in an effect must also be found in its
cause (na hi yad yenii' nugatam tat tasya kiira1_lam iti n(vamaft ), for the
various qualities that are found in a cow arc never regarded as its
cause. Following the same assumption, one would expect to find
a separate cause of which the common characteristics of the prakrti
and its evolutes are the effects, and this would involve the admission
of another cause of the prakrti itself (~yaktii-~~vakta-siidhiira~za
dharmii~ziirrz tad-ubhaya-kiira~za-prasangiit tathii ca tattvii-dhikya-
prasaizgaM. Thus, the argument that an effec_t must have as its cause
qualitative entities that inhere in it is false. The earthiness (mrtt~·a)
which inheres in the jug is not its cause, and the earthy substance
(mrd-dravya) which shows itself in its unmodified form or its modi-
fied form as jug cannot be said to be inherent in the jug. Again the
argument that things which are related as cause and effect have the
same form is also false; for if this sameness means identity, then no
distinction can he made between cause and effect. If this sameness
means the existence of some similar qualities, then there may be
such similarity with other things (which are not cause and effect)
as well. Again applying the same analogy to the Sarpkhya doctrine
xx] Ontological categories according to ·veizkataniitha 259
of pur~as (which are admitted to have the common characteristic
of intelligence), the Sarpkhyists may well be asked to hold a new
category as the cause of the puru~as. Further, two jugs which are
similar in their character are not for that reason produced from the
same lump of clay; and, on the other hand, we have the illustration
of production of effects from an entirely different cause, as in the
case of production of insects from cow-dung. Thus, from our ex-
periences of pleasure, pain, and dullness it does not follow that
there is a common cause of the nature of pleasure, pain, and dull-
ness, for these experiences can in each specific instance be explained
by a specific cause, and there is no necessity to admit a separate
common cause of the nature of three gU1:zas. If for the explanation
of the ordinary pleasurable and painful experiences a separate
pleasure-and-pain complex be admitted as the cause, then there
may be further inquiry regarding this pleasure-and-pain complex
and this will lead to infinite regress. Again if the three gU1:zas are
regarded as the cause of the world, then that would not lead to the
affirmation that the world is produced out of one cause; for though
the three gU1:zas may be in a state of equilibrium, they may still be
regarded as having their special contribution in generating the
varied types of effects. Thus, the trigU1:za or the prakrti of the
Sarpkhya can never be proved by inference. The only mode of
approach to the doctrine of prakrti is through the scriptures. The
three gU1:zas rest in the prakrti, and in accordance with the gradual
prominence of sativa, rajas, and lamas, three kinds of mahat are
produced. From these three types of mahat three kinds of aha1J1-
kiiras are produced. Out of the first type (i.e. siittvika aha1J1kiira)
the eleven senses are produced. Out of the last type (viz. the
tiimasa aha1J1kiira) the tanmiitras (also called the bhutiidi) are pro-
duced. The second type of aha1J1kiira (called riijasa aha'!zkiira) be-
haves as an accessory for the production of both the eleven senses
and the bhutiidi. There are some who say that the conative senses
are produced by riijasa aha1J1kiira. This cannot be accepted, as it
is against the scriptural testimony. The tanmiitras represent the
subtle stage of evolution between the tiimasa aha1J1kiira and the
gross elemental stage of the bhutas 1 • The sabda-tan-miitra (sound-
1 bhiltiiniim avyavahita-silk~mii-vasthii-vis#tarrz dravya7!' tanmatrarrz dadhi-
kasyacid e·va bhavati iti tad-iitmakaft. atal; S'l'o-tpattiiv eva sviitmani dhvwnse
sannihite katha'!l kw~ii-ntara'!l priipnuyiit. Sarviirtha-siddhi, p. 72.
xx] Ontological categories according to V eiikataniitha 273
as elaborated above. Again when the momentarist says that all
things are momentary, how does he explain the fact that the effect-
moment is caused by the cause-moment? If causation means no-
thing more than immediate succession, then the universe at a par-
ticular moment is caused by the universe at the preceding moment.
The problem is whether such immediacy of succession is by itself
competent to produce the effect-moment or needs the accessories
of space and time. If such accessories are not necessary. then
spatial co-existence or concomitance (as in the case of smoke and
fire) ought not to lead to any inference. If such accessories are
awaited, then it would mean that whatever is produced at any unit
of space has also its cause in that unit of space and that unit of time.
On such a view the effect-moment would be in the space and time
of the cause, and thus the cause-space or cause-time would be
co-extensive in two moments. If this were admitted, then the
momentarist might as well admit that the cause persists in two
moments. So, the momentarist who does not admit persisting time
and space cannot also admit that any sequence should be con-
ditioned by them. If it is said that a cause-moment starts its effect
in the very space or time in which it exists, then there would be no
unity of the series between the cause and the effect; and, by sup-
position, they are regarded as having different sets of moments for
themselves. There might be superimposition but no unity of the
series. If the unity of the series be not admitted, then the expecta-
tion that just as when a cotton-seed is dyed there is redness in the
cotton, so in the moral sphere whenever there is the viisanii or root-
inclination there is also its fruit, fails. The co-existence of the
causal-moment and the effect-moment does not imply the unity
that is expected in a normal cause and effect relation, and it would
therefore be difficult to say that such an effect has such a cause, for
the momentaristic theory cannot establish the bond between cause
and effect.
Let us now analyse the concept of momentariness. It may mean
the fact that ( 1) an entity is associated with a moment (k~a!la
sambandhavattva), or (2) association with a momentary unit of time
(k~a!la-kiila-sambandhatva'f!l), or (3) existence for only one moment
(k~ar.za-miitra-vartitva), or (4) absence of relation with two moments
(k~a!la-dvaya-sambandha-sunyatva), or (5) identity with the moment
of time (k~a!la-kiilatva1J1), or (6) being determinant of the moment-
Dill x8
274 Philosophy of the Riimiinuja School of Thought [cH.
character (k~a1}a-piidhitva1J1). The first alternative is inadmissible,
for even those who believe in persistent entities admit that such
entities, since they persist in- time, are associated with a moment.
The second alternative is inadmissible because the Buddhists do
not believe in any separate category of time apart from the ~afla 1 •
On such an admission, again, an entity as time which is beyond a
k~ar.za has to be virtually accepted, which contradicts the doctrine
of momentariness. The third alternative is directly contradicted in
the experience of recognition which testifies to the fact that we touch
what we see. The fourth view is also for the same reason contra-
dicted in experience; and if any supposed entity which is not itself
a ~afta is not associated with two time-moments, then it can have
only a chimerical existence, and, curiously enough, the Buddhists
often compare all existent entities with chimerical objects 2 • The
fifth alternative is also inadmissible, for just as an entity exists in a
unit of space and cannot be identical with it, so also it cannot be
identical with the time in which it exists, and it is directly contra-
dicted in experience. The sixth alternative is also inadmissible for
the reason that if objects were in their own nature determinants of
moments, then there would be nothing to explain our notion of
temporal succession 3 ; and all our experiences depending on such
a succession would be contradicted. If things did not persist in
time and were absolutely destroyed without leaving any trace
( niranvaya-viniisa~l ). then the ordinary experience of the world in
which things are done for the purpose of reaping their benefits
could not be explained. The man who had done some work would
not wait a moment for his reward. In the Ramanuja view per-
sistence of the self is well explained in self-consciousness. The
theory that such a self-consciousness refers only to the suc-
ceeding terms produced in the series of the iilaya-vijiiiina is
only a theory which has no verification, and such a theory
is directly contradicted by the well attested maxim that the
experience. of one individual cannot be remembered by another
(nii'nya-dHta1J1 smaraty anyal;). There is also no way in which the
1 kiilam e'Vii'nicchatas te ko'sau k~m;za-kiila!z kai ca tasya sambandhafz. Sarviir-
tha-siddhi, p. 74·
2 yasminnanityatii niisti kiiryatii'pi na vidyate ~asmin yathii kha-puspiidiiviti
posed to exist. Nor are they justified in holding that nature in itself
suffers change in every moment, for that virtually amounts to the
existence of a persisting entity which suffers modification 1 •
The Buddhist assumption that things are destroyed entirely,
and there are no elements in them that persist (niranvaya-viniisa),
on the analogy that flames are destroyed without leaving any trace
of their existence, is false. For, from various other instances, e.g.
the case of jugs, cloth, etc., \\'e find that their destruction means
only a change of state and not entire annihilation; and from this
analogy it is reasonable to suppose that the elements of the flame
that are destroyed are not completely annihilated but persist in in-
visible forms. Even when a flame is destroyed, the tip of the wick
is felt to be slightly warm, and this is certainly to be interpreted as
a remnant of the heat possessed by the flame. If the last stage in the
destruction of an entity he regarded as lapsing into entire annihila-
tion, it would have no causal efficiency and as such would be non-
existent. If the last stage is non-existent, then its previous stage
also would have no causal efficiency and would be non-existent, and
so on. This would lead to universal non-existence.
material, the 'l'!fti is regarded as their transformation in the form of the object
and not contact. The Yoga view, however, as explained by Bhik~u, is that the
citta passes through the senses and comes in contact with the object and is
transformed into its form in association with the senses. The transformation,
therefore, is not of the citta alone but of the citta together with the senses.
282 Philosophy of the Riimiinuja School of Thought [cH.
When one says "I, a fat person, know," it is difficult to say that the fatness
belongs to the body and the knowledge to some other entity. If the expression
"my body" seems to imply that the body is different, the expression " I am fat"
demonstrates the identity of the body and the self. What is definitely perceived
cannot be refuted by inference, for in that case even fire could be inferred as cold.
Perception is even stronger than scriptures and so there is no cause of doubt
in our experience; therefore there is no reason to have recourse to any inference
for testing the perceptual experience. The Sarp.khya argument, that those which
are the results of aggregation must imply some other entity for which the aggrega-
tion has been named (just as a bedstead implies someone who is to lie on the bed),
is ineffective; for the second-grade entity for which the first-grade conglomera-
tion is supposed to be intended may itself await a third grade entity, and that;
another, and this may lead to a vicious infinite. To stop this vicious infinite the
Sarp.khya thinks that the self does not await for any further entity. But instead
of arbitrarily thinking the self to be ultimate, it is as good to stop at the body and
to think that the body is its own end. The argument that a living body must have
a soul because it has life is false, for the supposed self as distinct from the body
is not known to us by other means. One might as well say that a living body must
have a sky-lotus because it has life. The Carvaka ultimately winds up the argu-
ment and says that the body is like an automatic machine which works by itself
without awaiting the help of any other distinct entity presiding over it, and is the
result of a specific modification of matter (ananyii-dh#thita-svaym_n-viihaka-
yantra-nyiiyiid vicitra-bhuta-pari1}ati-viie~a-sambhavo'ya7fZ deha-yantral; ). Sarvii-
rtha-siddhi, p. IS7·
Dlll 19
290 Philosophy of the Riimiinuja School of Thought [cH.
visual and the tactile sense-organs are limited to the apprehension
of their own peculiar sense-data or sensibles, and none of them is
competent to affirm the identity of the object through two dif-
ferent sense-appearances or sense-characteristics. Veilkata further
says that the view that the impressions of the various senses ac-
cumulate in the heart, and that it is through such an integration of
experiences in the heart that there is an appearance of one concrete
individual, is wrong; for no such centre of integration of impres-
sions inside our bodies is known to us, and if such a centre in the
body is to be admitted there is no harm in admitting a separate soul
in which these impressions inhere 1 .
Consciousness also cannot be regarded as the self, for con-
sciousness is an experience and as such must belong to some in-
dividual separate and distinct from it. In the passing conscious
states there is nothing that abides and persists which can integrate
the past and present states in itself and develop the notion of the
person, the perceiver. Therefore, it has to be admitted that there is
a conscious ego to which all cognitions and experiences belong.
Such an ego is self-luminous in the sense that it is always manifest
by itself to itself and not merely the locus of self-knowledge. Such
a self-revealing ego is present even in our dreamless sleep, and this
is attested by later recollections in which one feels "I slept happily";
and it is not contradicted by any experience. Even when one is re-
ferred to by another as "you" or " this," the ego in the latter is all
the time self-manifested as "I." Such an ego refers to the soul
which is a real agent and experiencer of pleasure and pain and a
cognizer of all cognitions and as such is a real moral agent and is
therefore distinguished from other kindred souls by its specific efforts
leading to specific kinds of deeds and their fruits. The efforts,
however, of the individual agents are themselves pre-determined
by the resulting fruits of actions in previous births, and those
by other actions of other previous births. Those who say that
efforts lead to no efforts contradict themselves in all the practical
behaviour which presupposes a belief in the efficacy of efforts.
Only such of the efforts as are directed towards the attainment of
the impossible or towards objects which require no effort are found
1
tvad-#ta-sa'!lskiira-koie miinii-bhiiviit, aneke~iim aham-arthiiniim eka-
sarlra-yoge CQ tatas ca 'l'OT07!1 yatho-pa/ambham ekasminn aham-arthe sarvais
sa1J1Skiirii-dhiinam. Surviirtha-siddhi, p. 160.
xx] The Nature of Soul according to V eizkataniitha 291
dyotakafz. asti hi Jubhe tv asau tzqyati du~krte tu na tu1yate' sau parama}_, sarfrf
iti. Sarviirtha-siddhi, p. 179.
292 Philosophy of the Ramanuja School of Thought [cH.
From the opponent's point of view, even if the self is regarded
as all-pervasive, that would not explain the happening of favourable
or unfavourable effects; for though the self may be co-extensive
with those distant places, yet its adr~ta or unseen merit occurs not
throughout the entire pervasive self, but only in a part of it, and as
such, since it is not in touch with the place where the effect will
happen, it cannot very well explain it.
1
a11arthii-t'i11ii-bhr"lta-sukha-kiimaniito ni·r:rtta'!l karma 11i~kiimam. San•t"irtha-
siddhi, p. 202.
2
tad evam dhr-smikocaka-karma-dh'l·amse dhi-1:ikiiia e'l'a brahmii-nubhutih.
Ibid. p. 220. . . .
a sa et:a dharma~ so' dharmas ta'f!l ta'f!l pmti nara'f!l bhm·et
piitra-karma-t•iiqe~ra deia-kiilii·capek~ya ca. Ibid. p. 221.
xx] Nature of Emancipation according to V eizkafaniitha 295
of Brahman and is pursuing the meditation of God, sinful or
virtuous actions are both inefficacious, the older ones being de-
stroyed by the meditation itself and the new ones incapable of being
associated with him-the wise man.
The eschatological conception of the Ramanuja school as ex-
plained by Veilkata is that the soul of the true devotee escapes by a
special nerve in the head (mi'irdhanya-niitfi) and is gradually lifted
from one stage to another by the presiding deities of fire, day,
white fortnight, the vernal equinox, year, wind, the sun, the moon,
lightning, Varul).a, lndra and Prajapati, who are appointed by God
for the conducting of the departed devotee 1 •
The state of final emancipation is regarded as the rise of the
ultimate expansion of the intellect. But though this is a state which
is prodt!ced as a result of devotional exercises, yet there is no
chance that there would ever be a cessation of such a state, for it is
the result of the ultimate dissociation of all causes, such as sins or
virtues, which can produce a contraction of the mind. Therefore,
there can never be a falling off from this state.
An emancipated person can assume bodies at his own will. His
body is not a source of bondage to him, for only those whose bodies
are conditioned by their karma may be supposed to suffer bondage
through them. The state of emancipation is a state of perfect bliss
through a continual realization of Brahman, to whom he is attached
as a servant. This servitude, however, cannot beget misery, for
servitude can beget misery only when it is associated with sins.
The emancipated person is omnipotent ir_ the sense that God is
never pleased to frustrate the fulfilment of his wishes.
The emancipated person regards all things as being held in
Brahman as its parts and as such no mundane affair can pain him,
though he may have the knowledge that in the past many things in
the world caused him misery.
Veilkata denied the possibility of attaining emancipation in this
life, for the very definition of emancipation is dissociation from
life, sense-organs and the body generated by karma. So when we
hear of jivanmukta or those emancipated in their lifetime, it is to
be interpreted to mean a state similar to the state of emancipation.
The contention of the Advaitins that the principal avidyii vanishes
with knowledge, yet that its partial states may still continue binding
1 Sarviirtha-siddhi, pp. 226-227.
296 Philosophy of the Riimiinuja School of Thought [c H.
the emancipated person with a body, is false. For if the principal
avidyii has vanished, its states cannot still continue. IVloreover, if
they do continue in spite of the knowledge, it is impossible to im-
agine how they will cease at the death of the emancipated person.
1
Sarira-viida (MS.).
2 etaj-ji·vasye' da'!l sariram ity-iidau iidheyatva'!l tasya ca sarlrii-padiirthai-
kadese k!tau anvya-yiid vii taj-jlva-ni~t~a-k!ti-prayukta-S'i.'lya-ce~tii-siimiinyakam
idam iti bodhah. Ibid.
8
jlva-sarl;e 'l'!k~iidau Ifvara-sarlre pan•atiidau ca siik~mas:ya tat-tat-k!ti-
prayukta-ce~!ii-vise~asya ailglkiiriin na sarlTa-'l 1)'U'l 1 ahiira-vi~ayat'l•ii-nupapatti~.
Ibid.
t yasya cetanasya yad drm')'U'!l san·ii-tmanii dhiirayitU'!l sakya'!l tat tasya
Jarframitik!ti-prayukta-sva-p;·atiyo![ika-patana-pratibandhaka-sa'!lyoga-siimiinya-
vattva'!l sarira-pada-pravrtti-nimittam. Ibid.
xx] God in the Ramanuja School 2 99
... #ia'f!l snrvam asya priiptam e·va bhavatiti tiitparya7p griihyam . .. sarva-
kiirya-vi1nJ.-·a-pratihatii-nanyii-dhfne-chiiv:iin iivarab, jfvas tu na tathii. Ibid.
p. 386.
1 tat-tat-karmii-carat.za-parit.zate-ivara-buddhi-t,iie1a eva adnfam. Ibid. p. 665.
304 Philosophy of the Riimiinuja School of Thought [cH.
1
Tattva-muktii-kaliipa, pp. 663, 664.
2
sa evcina7Jl bhfiti7Jz gamayati, sa ena'!l prlta?z prt'f}iiti e~a e·l.'a siidlm karma
kiirayati ta7Jl k$ipiimy ajasram asubluz-nityii-di-bhil:z pramii~za-satail:z ls'l-·ara-przti-
kopiibhyii7Jz dharmii-dharma-phala-priiptir m·agamyate. Ibid. p. 670.
xx] Dialectical criticism against the Sankara School 305
is that the perceived entity is false. To this the reply is that the
falsity of the relation does not prove the falsity of the relata; the
relation between a hare and a horn may be non-existent, but that
will not indicate that both the hare and the horn are themselves
non-existent. Following that argument, the perceiver might just
as well he declared as false. If, however, it is contended that the
perceiver, being self-luminous, is self-evident and cannot there-
fore be supposed to be false, the reply is, that even if, in the absence
of the act of perceiving, the perceiver may be regarded as self-
revealing, what harm is there in admitting the perceived to have
the same status even when the perceiver is denied? If, however,
it is said that the cognition of objects cannot be admitted to be self-
established in the same way as the objects themselves, it may be
asked if consciousness is ever perceived to be self-revealed. If it is
said that the self-revealing character of consciousness can be esta-
blished by inference, then by a counter-contention it may be held
that the self-revealing character of the universe can also be proved
by a suitable inference. It may again be questioned whether, if the
Sankarite wishes to establish the self-revealing nature of Brahman
by inference, its objectivity can be denied, and thus the original
thesis that Brahman cannot be the object of any process of cognition
must necessarily fail.
The Sankarite may indeed contend that the followers of Rama-
nuja also admit that the objects are revealed by the cognition of the
self and hence they are dependent on the perceiver. The reply to
such a contention is that the followers of Ramanuja admit the ex-
istence of self-consciousness by which the perceiver himself is re-
garded as cognized. If this self-consciousness is regarded as false,
then the self-luminous self would also be false; and if this self-
consciousness be admitted as real, then the relation between them
is real. If the self-revealing consciousness be regarded as im-
possible of perception and yet real, then on the same analogy the
world may as well be regarded as real though unperceived.
The objection that the known is regarded as false, since it is
difficult logically to conceive the nature of the relation subsisting
between the knower and the known, is untenable, for merely on
account of the difficulty of conceiving the logical nature of the
relation one cannot deny the reality of the related entity which is
incontestably given in experience. Therefore the relation has some-
316 Philosophy of the Riimiinuja School of Thought [cH.
how to be admitted. If relation is admitted to be real because it is
experienced, then the world is also real because it is also experienced.
If the world is false because it is inexplicable, then falsity itself
would be false because it is inexplicable.
The objection that there can be no relation between the past
and the future is groundless, for the very fact that two things exist
in the present time would not mean that they are necessarily re-
lated, e.g. the hare and the horn. If, however, it is said that it may
be true that things which exist in the present time are not necessarily
related, yet there are certain entities at present which are related,
so also there are certain things in the present which are related with
certain other things in the past and the future. It is no doubt true
that the relation of contact is not possible between things of the
present and the future, but that does not affect our case, for certain
relations exist between entities at present, and certain other rela-
tions exist between entities in the present and the future. \Vhat re-
lations exist in the present, past and future ha,·e to be learnt hy
experience. If spatial contiguity be a special feature of entities at
present, temporal contiguity would hold between entities in pre-
sent, past and future. However, relation does not necessarily mean
contiguity; proximity and remoteness may both condition the
relation. Relations are to be admitted just as they are given by ex-
perience, and are indefinable and unique in their specific nature.
Any attempt to explain them through mediation would end in a
conflict with experience. If an attempt is made to refute all rela-
tions as such on the ground that relations would imply further re-
lations and thus involve a vicious infinite, the reply is that the
attempt to refute a relation itself involves relation and therefore
according to the opponent's own supposition stands cancelled.
A relation stands by itself and does not depend on other relations
for its existence.
Eighteenth Objection. In refuting the view of the Sankarites that
self-luminous Brahman cannot have as an object of illumination
anything that .is external to it, Venkata argues that if nescience be
itself inherent in Brahman from beginningless time, then there
would be no way for Brahman to extricate itself from its clutches
and emancipation would be impossible. Then the question may be
asked, whether the a'l.'idvii is different from Brahman or not. If it
be different, then the ~onism of the Sankara philosophy breaks
xx] Dialectical criticism against the Sankara School 317
down; if it be non-different, then also on the one hand Brahman
could not free itself from it and on the other hand there could be no
evolution of the a•lJidyii which has merged itself in the nature of the
Brahman, into the various forms of egoism, passions, etc. If this
avidyii be regarded as false and therefore incapable of binding the
free nature of Brahman, the objection may still be urged that, if
this falsehood covers the nature of Brahman, how can it regain its
self-luminosity; and if it cannot do so, that would mean its de-
struction, for self-luminosity is the very nature of Brahman. If the
avidyii stands as an independent entity and covers the nature of
Brahman, then it would be difficult to conceive how the existence
of a real entity can be destroyed by mere knowledge. According to
Ramanuja's view, however, knowledge is a quality or a character-
istic of Brahman by which other things are known by it; experience
also shows that a knower reveals the objects by his knowledge, and
thus knowledge is a characteristic quality of the knower by which
the objects are known.
Nineteenth Objection. In refuting the view of Sankara that
ignorance or avidyii rests in Brahman, Veilkata tries to clarify the
concept of ajfiiina. He says that ajiiiina here cannot mean the
absolute negation of the capacity of being the knower; for this
capacity, being the essence of Brahman, cannot be absent. It
(ajiiiina) cannot also mean the ignorance that precedes the rise
of any cognition, for the Sailkarites do not admit knowledge as
a quality or a characteristic of Brahman; nor can it mean the
negation of any particular knowledge, for the Brahman-con-
sciousness is the only consciousness admitted by the Sankarites.
This ajfiiina cannot also be regarded as the absence of knowledge,
since it is admitted to be a positive entity. The ajfiiina which
can be removed by knowledge must belong to the same knower
who has the knowledge and must refer to the specific object
regarding which there was absence of knowledge. Now since
Brahman is not admitted by the Sankarites to be knower, it is im-
possible that any ajfiiina could be associated with it. The view that
is held by the members of the Ramanuja school is that the indi-
vidual knowers possess ignorance in so far as they are ignorant of
their real nature as self-luminous entities, and in so far as they
associate themselves with their bodies, their senses, their passions,
and other prejudices and ideas. When they happen to discover their
318 Philosophy of the Riimiinuja School of Thought [cH.
folly, their ignorance is removed. It is only in this way that it can
be said to be removed by knowledge. But all this would be im-
possible in the case of Brahman conceived as pure consciousness.
According to the view of Ramanuja's school, individual knowers are
all in their essential natures omniscient; it is the false prejudice and
passions that cover up this omniscience whereby they appear as
ordinary knowers who can know things only under specific con-
ditions.
Twentieth Objection. Yenka~a, in refuting the definition of
immediate intuition (anubhzl.ti) as that which may be called
immediate perception without being further capable of being an
object of awareness (avedyatve sati aparok~a-vyavalziira-yogyatvam ),
as given by Citsukhacarya in his Tatt1-•a-pradipikii, raises certain
objections against it as follows. It is urged by the Sankarites that
if the immediate intuition be itself an object of further cognitive
action, then it loses its status as immediate intuition and may be
treated as an object like other objects, e.g. a jug. If by the words
"immediate intuition" it is meant that at the time of its operation
it is self-expressed and does not stand in need of being revealed by
another cognition, then this is also admitted by Ramanuja. Further-
more, this intuition at the time of its self-revelation involves with
it the revelation of the self of the knower as well. Therefore, so far
as this meaning of intuition is concerned, the denial of self-
revelation is out of place.
The words "immediate intuition" (anubhiiti) are supposed to
have another meaning, viz. that the intuition is not individuated in
separate individual cognitions as limited by time, space or indi-
vidual laws. But such an intuition is never experienced, for not
only do we infer certain cognitions as having taken place in certain
persons or being absent in them, but we also speak of our own
cognitions as present in past and future, such as ''I know it,"
"I knew it" and the like, which prove that cognitions are tem-
porally limited. It may be asked whether this immediate intuition
reveals Brahman or anything else; if it reveals Brahman, then it
certainly has an object. If it is supposed that in doing so it simply
reveals that which has already been self-expressed, even then it will
be expressive of something though that something stood already
expressed. This would involve a contradiction between the two
terms of the thesis avedyatve sati aparok~a-vyavahiira-yogyah·am,
xx] Dialectical criticism against the Sankara School 319
for, following the arguments given above, though the Brahman
may be regarded as immediate, yet it has been shown to be capable
of being made an object of intuition. If on the other alternative this
intuition expresses something else than Brahman, that would bring
the opponent to a conclusion not intended by him and contra-
dictory as well.
Just as one may say that one knows a jug or a cloth or an orange,
so one may say that one knows another man's awareness or one's own.
In this way an awareness can be the object of another awareness
just as another object. Again, if one cannot be aware of another
man's awareness, the use of language for mental understanding
should cease.
If the immediate intuition itself cannot be made an object of
awareness, that would mean that it is not known at all and conse-
quently its existence would be chimerical. It cannot be urged that
chimerical entities are not perceivable because they are chimerical,
but entities do not become chimerical because they cannot be per-
ceived, for the concomitance in the former proposition is not con-
ditional. The Sankarites would not hold that all entities other than
immediate intuition are chimerical. It may also be held that chi-
merical entities are not immediate intuition because they are chi-
merical; but in that case it may also be held that these objects (e.g.
a jug) are not immediate intuition because of their specific characters
as jug, etc. The whole point that has to be emphasized here is that
the ordinary objects are other than immediate intuition, not be-
cause they can be known but because of their specific characters.
The reason that an entity cannot be called immediate intuition if it
can be known is entirely faulty 1 •
If, again, Brahman is manifest as only immediate intuition,
then neither the scriptures nor philosophy can in any way help us
regarding the nature of Brahman.
Twenty-first Objection. The Sankarites deny the production of
individual cognitions. In their view all the various forms of so-
called cognitions arise through the association of various modes of
avidyii with the self-luminous pure consciousness. In refuting this
view Veilkata urges that the fact that various cognitions arise in
time is testified by universal experience. If the pure consciousness
be always present and if individual cognitions are denied, then all
1 Sata-diqa1)l, n. 78.
320 Philosophy of the Riimiinuja School of Thought [cH.
objects ought to be manifested simultaneously. If, however, it is
ascertained that though the pure consciousness is always present
yet the rise of various cognitions is conditioned by other collocating
causal circumstances, the reply is that such an infinite number of
causal conditions conditioning the pure consciousness would be
against the dictum of the Sankarites themselves, for this would be
in conflict with their uncompromising monism. Now if, again, it is
held that the cognitive forms do really modify the nature of pure
consciousness, then the pure consciousness becomes changeable,
which is against the thesis of Sankara. If it is held that the forms
are imposed on pure consciousness as it is and by such impositions
the specific objects arc in their turn illuminated by consciousness,
then the position is that in order that an object may be illuminated
such illumination must be mediated by a false imposition on the
nature of pure consciousness. If the direct illumination of objects
is impossible, then another imposition might be necessary to
mediate the other false impositions on the nature of pure conscious-
ness, and that might require another, and this would result in a
vicious infinite. If the imposition is not false, then the conscious-
ness becomes changeable and the old objection would recur. If,
however, it is urged that the objects are illuminated independent
of any collocating circumstances and independent of any specific
contribution from the nature of the pure consciousness, then all
objects (since they are all related to pure consciousness) might
simultaneously be revealing. If, again, all cognitions are but false
impositions on the nature of pure consciousness, then at the time
of an illusory imposition of a particular cognition, say, a jug, no-
thing else would exist, and this would bring about nihilism. It may
also be asked, if the Sankarite is prepared to deny the world on
account of the impossibility of any relation subsisting between it
and the perceiver, how can he launch himself into an attempt to
explain the relation of such a world with Brahman?
On the other hand, the experience of us all testifies to the fact
that we are aware of cognitions coming into being, staying, passing
away, and having passed and gone from us; except in the case of
perceptual experience, there is no difficulty in being aware of past
and future events; so the objection that the present ·awareness can-
not be related to past and future events is invalid. The objection
that there cannot be awareness of past or future entities because
xx] Dialectical criticism against the Saizkara School 321
they are not existing now is invalid, for past and future entities also
exist in their own specific temporal relations. Validity of awareness
consists in the absence of contradiction and not in the fact of its
relating to an entity of the present moment, for otherwise an il-
lusory perception of the present moment would have to be con-
sidered as valid. Thus, since it is possible to be aware of an aware-
ness that was not there but which comes into being both by direct
and immediate acquaintance and by inference, the view of the
Sankarites denying the origination of individual awareness is in-
valid. In the view of Ramanuja, knowledge is no doubt admitted
to be eternal; yet this knowledge is also admitted to have specific
temporal characters and also specific states. Therefore, so far as
these characters or states are concerned, origination and cessation
would be possible under the influence of specific collocative cir-
cumstances. Again, the objection that since pure consciousness is
beginningless it cannot suffer changes is invalid, for the Sankarites
admit avidyii also as beginningless and yet changeable. It may also
be pointed out in this connection that the so-called contentless
consciousness is never given in experience. Even the consciousness
in dreamless sleep or in a swoon is related to the perceiver and
therefore not absolutely contentless.
Twenty-second Objection. It is urged by the Sankarites that the
pure consciousness is unchanging because it is not produced. If,
however, the word unchanging means that it never ceases to exist,
it may be pointed out that the Sankarites admit ajiiiina to be un-
produced and yet liable to destruction. Thus there is no reason why
a thing should not be liable to destruction because it is not pro-
duced. If it is urged that the destruction of avidyii is itself false,
then it may be pointed out with the same force that the destruction
of all things is false. Moreover, since the Sankarites do not admit
any change to be real, the syllogism adduced by them that an entity
which is unproduced is not changeable falls to the ground. The dif-
ference between Sankara's conception of Brahman and that of
Ramanuja is that according to the former Brahman is absolutely
unchangeable and characterless, and according to the latter the
Brahman is the absolute, containing within it the world and the
individual beings and all the changes involved in them. It is un-
changeable only in so far as all the dynamical change rises from
within and there is nothing else outside it which can affect it. That
Dill 21
322 Philosophy of the Riimiinuja School of 11wught [cu.
is, the absolute, though changeable within it, is absolutely self-
contained and self-sustained, and is entirely unaffected by anything
outside it.
Twenty-third Objection. The Sankarites urge that since con-
sciousness is unproduced it cannot be many, for whatever is many
is produced, e.g. the jug. If it is a pure consciousness which appears
as many through the conditioning factors of a·vidyii, it may be
asked in this connection whether, if the pure consciousness cannot
he differentiated from anything else, it may as well be one with the
hody also, which is contrary to Sankara's thesis. If, however, it is
replied that the so-called difference between the body and the pure
consciousness is only a false difference, then it would ha\·e to be
admitted and that would militate against the changeless character
of Brahman as held by the Sankarites. Again, if the real difference
between the body and the pure consciousness be denied, then it
may he urged that the proposition following from it is that things
which in reality differ are produced (e.g. the jug); but according to
the Sankarites jug, etc., are also not different from Brahman, and
thus a proposition like the abo\·e cannot he quoted in support.
l\Ioreover, since the m:idyii is unproduced, it follows that according
to the maxim of the Sankarites it would not be different from
Brahman which, howe\·er, the Sankarites would undoubtedly he
slow to accept. It cannot also be held that an awareness does not
differ from another awareness on the supposition that different
awarenesses are but seeming forms imposed upon the same con-
sciousness, for so long as we speak of difference we speak on!y of
apparer.t difference and of apparent divergent forms; and if the
apparent divergent forms are admitted, it cannot be said that they
are not different. Again, it is urged that the same moon appears as
many through wavy water, so it is the same awareness that appears
as many, though these are identically one. To this the reply is that
the analogy is false. The image-moon is not identical with the moon,
so the appearances are not identical with awareness. If it is said
that all image-moons are false, then on the same analogy all aware-
nesses may be false and then if only one consciousness be true as a
ground of all awarenesses then all awarenesses may be said to be
equally true or equally false. Again, as to the \·iew that the prin-
ciple of consciousness as such does not differ from indi\·idual
cognitions, such a position is untenable, because the Ramanujists
xxj Dialectical criticism against the Sankara School 323
do not admit the existence of an abstract principle of consciousness;
with them all cognitions are specific and individual. It may be
pointed out in this connection that according to the Ramanujists
consciousness exists in the individuals as eternal qualities, i.e. it
may suffer modification according to conditions and circum-
stances.
Twenty-fourth Objection. In objecting to the unqualified cha-
racter of pure consciousness Venkata says that to be unqualified is
also a qualification. It differs from other qualities only in being
negative. Negative qualifications ought to be deemed as objection-
able as the positive ones. Again, Brahman is admitted by the
Sankarites to be absolute and unchangeable, and these are quali-
fications. If it is replied that these qualifications are also false, then
their opposite qualifications would hold good, viz. Brahman would
be admitted as changeable. Again, it may be asked how this un-
qualified character of Brahman is established. If it is not esta-
blished by reason, the assumption is invalid; if it is established by
reason, then that reason must exist in Brahman and it will be quali-
fied by it (the reason).
Twenty-fifth Objection. Veilkata denies the assumption of the
Sankarites that consciousness is the self because it reveals it to
itself on the ground that if whatever reveals it to itself or whatever
stands self-revealed is to be called the self, then pleasure and pain
also should be identical with the self, for these are self-revealed.
V eilkata further urges that the revelation of knowledge is not abso-
lutely unconditional because revelation is made to the perceiver's
self and not to anything and everything, a fact which shows that it
is conditioned by the self. It may also be pointed out that the re-
velation of knowledge is not made to itself but to the self on one
hand and to the objects on the other in the sense that they form
constituents of knowledge. Again, it is testified by universal ex-
perience that consciousness is different from the self. It may also
be asked whether, if consciousness be identical with the self, this
consciousness is unchangeable or changeable. Would later recog-
nition be imposE,ible? In the former alternative it may further be
asked whether this unchanging consciousness has any support or
not; if not, how can it stand unsupported? If it has a support, then
that support may well be taken as the knower, as is done by the
Ramanujists. It may also be pointed out h~re that knowledge being
21-2
324 Philosophy of the Riimiinuja School of Thought [cH.
a character or a quality cannot be identified with that (viz. the self)
which possesses that character.
Twenty-sixth Object-ion. The Sankarites assert that the self is
pure consciousness. Therefore the perception of self as "I" is
false, and therefore this notion of "I" is obsolete both in dreamless
sleep and emancipation. To this Venkata's reply is that if the notion
of "I" is obsolete in dreamless sleep, then the continuity of self-
consciousness is impossible. It is no doubt true that in dreamless
sleep the notion of the self as "I" is not then manifestly ex-
perienced, but it is not on that account non-existent at the time, for
the continuity of the self as "I" is necessarily implied in the fact
that it is experienced both before the dreamless sleep and after it.
Since it is manifestly experienced both before and after the dream-
less sleep, it must be abiding even at the time of the sleep. And
this self-consciousness itself refers to the past and the present as
a continuity. If this ego-notion was annihilated during the dream-
less sleep, then the continuity of experience could not be explained
(madhye cii' hama-rthii-bhiive sa1Jzskiira-dhiirii-blziiviit, prat£sandhiinii-
bhiiva-prasailgas ca). It is a patent fact that in the absence of the
knower neither ignorance nor knowledge can exist. It cannot also
be said that the continuity of experience is transmitted to pure
consciousness or avidyii during the dreamless sleep; for the pure
consciousness cannot be a repository of experiences, and if avidyii
is the repository it would be the knower, which is impossible; and
the fact of recognition would be unexplainable, for the experience
associated with avidyii cannot be remembered by the entity to
which the ego-notion refers. Moreover, the experience of a man
rising from sleep who feels "I slept happily so long" indicates that
the entity referred to by the ego-notion was also experienced during
the sleep. Even the experience referring to the state in drear.tless
sleep as "I slept so soundly that I even did not know myself" also
indicates that the self was experienced at that time as being ignorant
of its specific bodily and other spatial and temporal relations. It
cannot be contended that the entity denoted by the ego-notion
cannot abide even in emancipation, for if there was no entity in
emancipation no one would attempt to attain to this stage. The
existence of pure qualityless consciousness at the time.of emancipa-
tion would mean the annihilation of the self, and no one would ever
be interested in his own self-destruction. Moreover, if the entity
xx] Dialectical criticism against the Sankara School 325
denoted by the ego-notion is not a real entity, then the view (often
put forward by the Sankarites) that the entity denoted by the ego-
notion is often falsely identified with the body or the senses would
be meaningless. If the illusion be due to a false imposition of
false appearances, such as the body or the senses, on the pure con-
sciousness, then that cannot be called the delusion of the ego-
entity as the body and the senses. It cannot also be said that in the
experience of the self as "I" there are two parts, the pure con-
sciousness which is eternal and real and the egohood which is a
mere false appearance. For if it is so in the ego-experience it might
also be so in other experiences as objectivity as this or that. 1\Iore-
over, if this is so, what is there to distinguish the specific experience
as subjectivity from the experience as objectivity? What is it that
constitutes the special feature of subjectivity? Thus it may be con-
fidently stated that the ego-entity is the real nature of the self.
Twenty-seventh Objection. It is urged by the Sankarites that the
notion of the self as the knower is false because the ultimate reality,
being the self-luminous Brahman, is absolutely unchangeable. The
attribution of the characteristic of being a knower would be incom-
patible with this nature. To this it may be replied that if the fact
of being a knower is regarded as a changeable character, then !Jeing
or self-luminosity would also be a character, and (hey also would be
incompatible with this nature. The change of the states of knowledge
does not in any way affect the unchangeable nature of the self, for
the self is not changed along with the change of the cognitions.
Ttventy-eighth Objection. It is well known that the Sankarites
conceive of pure consciousness which is regarded as the witness
(siik#n), as it were, of all appearances and forms that are presented
to it, and it is through its function as such a witness that these are
revealed. It is through this siik#-consciousness that the continuity
of consciousness is maintained, and during dreamless sleep the
blissfulness that is experienced is also made apparent to this siik#-
consciousness. The Ramanujists deny this siik#-consciousness be-
cause it is unnecessary for them; its purpose is served by the func-
tions of a knower whose consciousness is regarded as continuous in
the waking state, in dreams, and also in dreamless sleep. Venkata
urges that the manifestation of blissfulness which is one with pure
consciousness is implied by the very nature of pure consciousness
as self-revealed. It may also be pointed out that the sensuous
326 Philosophy of the Riimiinuja School of Thought [cH.
Vatsya Varada.
Regarding the doctrine of Vedic injunction that one should
study the Vedas, Vatsya Varada in his Prameya-miilii holds the
view, in contradistinction to the Sahara Bhii~ya, that Vedic in-
junction is satisfied only in the actual reading of the Vedic texts and
that the Vedic injunction does not imply an inquiry into the mean-
1
surya-di-sambandha-visefo-padhitalz Prthivya-didesanam eva kala-sa1Jlfnii.
Naya-dyu-ma~i, p. 168.
II Ibid. pp. 243-246.
350 Philosophy of the Riimiinuja School of Thought [cH.
ing of those texts. Such an inquiry proceeds from the normal in-
quisitive spirit and the desire to know the various applications in
the practical performances of sacrifices. These do not form a part
of the Vedic injunction (vidhi).
Vatsya Varada holds that the study of the Vedic injunction and
the inquiry relating to Brahman form the parts of one unified scrip-
ture, i.e. the latter follows or is a continuation of the former; and
he mentions Bodhayana in his support.
Sankara had thought that the study of the Mima111sa was in-
tended for a class of people but not necessarily for those who would
inquire into the nature of Brahman. The Purva-mima111sa and the
Uttara-mima111sa were intended for different purposes and were
written by different authors. These should not therefore be re-
garded as integrally related as two parts of a unified work. To this
Vatsya Varada, following Bodhayana, takes exception, for he thinks
that though the Purva-mima111sa and Uttara-mimarpsa are written
by different authors yet the two together uphold one common view
and the two may be regarded as two chapters of one whole book.
Vatsya Varada also, in referring to Sankara's view that the
Purva-mima111sa assumes the existence of a real world, whereas the
purport of the Brahma-sutra is to deny it and therefore the two can-
not be regarded as having the same end in view, challenges it by
affirming the reality of the world. Sankara's argument, that all
which is cognizable is false, would imply that even the self is false;
for many U pani!?ads speak of the perceptibility of the self. His de-
claration of the falsity of the world would also imply that the false-
hood itself is f~.lse, for it is a part of the world. Such an argument
ought to be acceptable to Sankara, for he himself utilized it in re-
futing the nihilists.
Regarding the denial of the category of difference by the
Sankarites Vatsya Varada says that the opponent cannot by any
means deny that difference is perceived, for all his arguments are
based on the assumption of the existence of difference. If there
were no difference, there would be no party and no view to be
refuted. If it is admitted that the category of difference is per-
ceived, then the opponent has also to admit that such a perception
must have its own peculiar and proper cause. The real point in the
conception of difference is that it constitutes its other as a part of
itself. An object in its own nature has twofold characteristics, the
xx] V atsya Varada 35 1
characteristic of its universal similarity with other things of its class
and the characteristic in which it differs from others. In its second
characteristic it holds its others in itself. When it is said that a thing
is different it does not mean that the difference is identical with the
thing or but another name for the thing, but what is meant is that
a thing known as different has an outside reference to other entities.
This outside reference to other entities, when conceived along with
the object, produces the perception of difference.
The conception of difference involves the conception of nega-
tion as involved in the notion of otherness. If this negation is dif-
ferent in nature from the object which is conceived as "different"
or as the "other" of other objects, then since this negation cannot
be directly known by perception '' difference" also cannot be known
directly by perception. The Vi~tii-dvaita theory admits that" dif-·
ference" can be directly perceived. In order to prove this point
Vatsya Varada gives a special interpretation of "negation"
(abhiiva ). He holds that the notion of negation of an entity in
another entity is due to the latter's being endowed with a special
character as involving a reference to the former. The notion of
negation thus proceeds from a special modified character of an ob-
ject in which the negation is affirmed. There are many Sailkarites
who regard negation as positive, but in their case it is held to be a
special category by itself which is perceived in the locus of the
negation by the special pramii1J.a of non-perception. Though posi-
tive its notion is not produced according to them by the special
modified nature of the object perceived in which the negation is
affirmed. But Vatsya Varada holds that the notion of negation is
due to the perception of a special modified nature of the entity in
which the negation is affirmed 1 • The negation revealed to us in one
object as the otherness of another object means that the latter is in-
cluded in a special character of the former which makes the reference
as the otherness possible.
Vatsya Varada also emphasizes the view that the tests referring
to Brahman as satya, jfiiina, ananta, etc., indicate the fact of the
possession of these qualities by God and that the monistic interpre-
tation that these together refer to one identical being, the Brahman,
is false. He also describes the infinite and unlimited nature of
1
prati"yogi-buddhau vastu-vi"iefa-dhlr tmo'petii. nii.stl' ti vyavahii.ra-hetulz.
Varada, Prameya-mii.lii., p. 35 (MS.).
352 Philosophy of the Riimiinuja School of Thought [CH.
Brahman and explains the exact sense in which the world and the
individuals may be regarded as the body of God and that the in-
dividuals exist for God who is their final end. He also deals in this
work with certain topics regarding the external rituals, such as
shaving of the head, wearing the holy thread, etc., by ascetics.
Varada, in his Tattva-siira, collects some of the specially inter-
esting points of the Bhii~ya of Ramanuja and interprets them in
prose and verse. Some of these points are as follows: (i) The view
that the existence of God cannot be logically proved, but can be
accepted only from scriptural testimony. (ii) The special inter-
pretation of some of the important U pani!?adic texts such as the
Kapyiisa text. (ii_i) The results of the discussions of the important
adhikara1_las of Vedanta according to Ramanuja. (iv) The doctrine
that negation is only a kind of position. (v) The interpretation of
the apparent dualistic and monistic texts. (vi) The discussion re-
garding the reality of the world, etc.
This Tattva-siira provoked a further commentary on it called
Ratna-siiri~ti by VIra-raghava-dasa, a son of Badhula Narasi111ha
Guru, disciple of Badhlila Varada Guru, son of Badhula Venka-
tacarya. Some of Vatsya Varada's other works are: Siirii-rtha-
catu~taya, Aradhanii-sa1Jlgraha, Tattva-nir1}aya, Prapanna-piirijiita,
Y ati-liizga-samarthana and Puru~a-nin1}aya 1 •
prove that NarayaQa is the highest God. He refers in this work to his Puru~a
nir~aya where, he says, he has discussed the subject in more detail.
xx] Ramanujacarya II alias Viidi-Hartzsa-Navamvuda 353
existence of some other entity different from it. The real notion of
negation is thus only" difference." A negation is described as that
which is antagonistic to a positive entity and there is thus no way in
which a negation can be conceived by itself without reference to a
positive entity. But a positive entity never stands in need of its
specification through a reference to negation 1 • It is also well known
that the negation of a negation is nothing else than the existence of
positive entity. The existence of negation cannot be known either
by perception, inference, or by implication. Veti.kata, in further ex-
plaining this idea, says that the idea of absence in negation is de-
rived from the association of the object of negation with a different
kind of temporal or spatial character 2 • Thus, when it is said that
there is no jug here, it merely means that the jug exists in another
place. It is argued that negation cannot be regarded as the existence
of positive entity, and it may be asked if negation cannot be
regarded as negation, how can negation of negation be regarded
as the existence of positive entity. Just as those who admit negation
regard negation and existence of positive entity as mutually denying
each other, so the Ramanujas also regard the existence of positive
entities and negations as denying each other in their different
spatial and temporal characters. Thus it is not necessary to admit
negation as a separate category. When an existing entity is said to
be destroyed, what happens is that there is a change of state.
Negation-precedent-to-production (priiga-bhiiva) and the negation
of destruction do not mean anything more than two positive states
succeeding each other, and there may be an infinite series of such
states. If this view is not admitted, and if the negation of destruc-
tion (pradhva1Jlsii-bhiiva) and the negation-precedent-to-production
(priig-abhiiva) be regarded as separate categories of negation, then
the destruction of negation-precedent-to-production and negation-
precedent-to-production of destruction will depend upon an in-
finite series of negations which would lead to a vicious infinite. It is
the succession of a new state that is regarded as the destruction of
the old state, the former being a different state from the latter. It is
sometimes held that negation is mere vacuity and has no reference to
the existence of positive entity. If that were so, then on the one hand
1 athii'bhiivasya tad-rupa,. yad-bhiiva-pratipak~atii nai'vam adyii'py asau
1
yad ukta'!1 bralzma~wb pari1;.iimitayii upiidiinatve pari')iimasya pari1J,iimi-
samiina-salttikat?:a-niyamena kiiryasyii'pi satyat'l:a-prasmiga iti. tatra ki'!l pari-
r.Jiima-iabdena kiirya-miilra'!1 'l'i'l.·ak#tam, uta rupii-ntarii-pattil;; dh·va'!15asya
avidyii-ni'l.·rtteica .tJarir.Jiimi-samiina-sattiikat'L·ii-bhii?:iit na hi tad-rupe7Ja pari1J,iimi
kiiicid asti. na dvitlya'!1 rupii-ntarii-patte~z parir.Jiimi-miitra-siipek~at'l.·iit gaurave')a
n·a-samiina-sat t iika-pari1J,iimy-apek~ii-blzii'L·iit. Sad -t·idyii-viJaya, p. 77.
xx] Ramanujadasa alias Mahacarya
unmanifested, and the manifestation of the world-appearance
would be impossible. If the veiling is something different from
ajiiiina, then since that something is not in any way related with
pure consciousness its operation would not explain the world-
illusion. If this veiling is supposed to render the ajiiiina in-
definable, then it may be asked if this veiling is something different
from ajiiiina or identical with it; in the latter case it would not de-
pend on it and in the former case it is meaningless to regard ajiiiina
as antagonistic to :erahman. Thus, since the limitations through
which the Brahman manifests itself are sufficient to explain the
limited appearance of Brahman as world-objects, it is unnecessary
to admit a separate aj1iiina.
Again, if ajiiiina can veil the pure siilqi-consciousness, then the
whole world would be blind and there would be no knowledge at
all. If the sa/qi-consciousness cannot be veiled, then the Brahman
also cannot be veiled. Further, if Brahman is always self-luminous,
then it can never be hidden by ajiiiina. If it is said that the self-
luminosity of Brahman means that it cannot be the object of cog-
nition (a-vedyatva) or of immediacy (aparok~a), then it is un-
necessary to indulge in the conception of veiling, for the non-
cognizabilityis neitherofthetwo. Again, the Sailkarites hold that the
ajiiiina hides the bliss part of Brahman but not the part of its con-
sciousness. This is obviously impossible, for they hold that bliss
and pure consciousness are identical; and if that were so, how can
the bliss part be covered without covering also the part of con-
sciousness, and how can one identical partless being, the Brahman,
be divided into two parts of which one is covered while the other is
not? Again, if the self is admitted to be of the nature of pure bliss,
and if our love of pleasure is explained as being due to the illusory
construction of the ego on this self, then since all things of the
world are but illusory impositions on the self, all things in the world
would be dear to us and even pain would be pleasurable.
In the third chapter Mahacarya refutes the Sailkarite theory of
the support of ajiiiina. It is held by some exponents of the Sailkara
school that the ajiiiina-constituents of the objects are supported in
the pure consciousness underlying these objects. Though there are
the modifications of these ajiiiina entities, yet they may have rela-
tion with our ego-consciousness, for both the ego and the objects
are but the states of a ground-ajiiiina. To this Mahacarya says that
368 Philosophy of the Riinuinuja School of Thought [cH.
Saila Srinivasa.
Saila Srlnivasa was the disciple of Kaul).<;iinya Srlnivasa
Dik!?ita, the son of Srlnivasa Tatacarya, and the brother of
Anvayarya Dik~ita. He was very much influenced by the writings
of his elder brother Anvayarya and some of his works are but
elaborations of the works of his elder brother who wrote manv
books, e.g. Virodha-bhaiijani, etc. Saila Srinivasa wrote at lea~t
six books: Virodlza-nirodha, Bheda-darpa7Ja, Adtt·aita-tt·ana-kuthiira,
Siira-darpm.za, ~1ukti-darpa7Ja, ]1Iiina-ratna-darpa7Ja, Gu7Ja-
darpa7Ja, and Bheda-ma7Ji.
1 Kiiryii-dhikarm:za-viida, II. 7-
xx] Saila Sriniviisa
In his Virodha-nirodha, probably the last of his works, he tries
mainly to explain away the criticisms that are made on the different
Ramanuja doctrines by the Sai'tkarites, and also by the writers of
other Vedanticschools-viz. that the Ramanuja views are not strictJy
faithful to the scriptural texts-by showing that the scriptural texts
favour the Ramanuja interpretations and not the views of the other
Vedantic writers.
In the first chapter of the Virodha-nirodha Saila Srinivasa first
takes up the view that the Brahman is both the material and efficient
cause of the world-which he thinks is possible only in the concep-
tion th:1t Brahman has the individual souls and the matter-stuff
associated with Him (brahma1_li cid-acid-visi~ta-riipatiim antare1_la na
ghatate). The Brahman remains unchanged in itself but suffers
transformations through its two parts, the soul and the matter-
stuff. Brahman as cause is associated with souls and the matter-
stuff in their subtle forms, and when it undergoes transformation
the souls expand and broaden as it were through the various in-
tellectual states as a result of their karma, and the matter-stuff
passes through its grosser stages as the visible material world; the
portion of God as the inner controller of these two suffers trans-
formation only so far as it is possible through its association with
these two transforming entities1 • When the scriptural texts deny
the changing character of the Brahman, all that is meant by them is
that it does not undergo the changes through which matter and in-
dividual souls pass through their karma, but that does not deny the
fact that Brahman is the material cause2 • Brahman has two parts,
a substantive and a qualifying part, and it is the substantive part
that through its subtle material parts becomes the transforming
cause of the grosser qualifying material part. This material part
being inseparable from Brahman may be regarded as subsisting in
it. So also the Brahman has a spiritual part which undergoes a sort
of expansion through thought-experiences and behaves as indi-
vidual souls. Thus Brahman suffers modification through its
physical and spiritual parts, and from this point of view God is
1 acid-a1Jlsasya kiirm..zii-vasthiiyii1Jl iabdii-di-vihlnasya bhogyatviiya iabdii-di-
bhl:dii-bheda-sruti-'L•riita-jiita-sandeha-santatii!z
bheda-darpm:zam iidiiya niscinvantu n·pascita~z.
Bheda-Jarpa~za. 1\lS.
xx] Saila Srzniviisa
cause of its own form, colour, etc. There is thus nothing which can
lead us to suppose that the material cause and the instrumental
cause cannot exist together in the same entity. It may further be
contended that the same entity cannot behave as the material and
instrumental cause with regard to the production of another entity.
To this the reply is that the internal structure of rod is both the
material cause for its form as well as the instrumental cause for its
destruction in association with other entities. Or it may be con-
tended that time (kala) is the cause for both the production and
destruction of entities (kiila-ghata-Sa'f!lyogii-dika'f!l prati kiilasya
nimittatviid upiidiinatviicca). To this the obvious reply would be
that the behaviour of the same entity as the material and the in-
strumental cause is limited by separate specific conditions in each
case. The association of separate specific conditions renders a dif-
ference in the nature of the cause; and therefore it would be in-
exact to say that the same entity is both the material and the instru-
mental cause. This objection, however, produces more difficulty in
the conception of the causality of Brahman according to the
ViSi~!iidvaita theory, for in our view Brahman in His own nature
may be regarded as the instrumental cause and in His nature as
matter (acit) and souls (cit). He may be regarded as the material
cause 1 • It is sometimes objected that if Brahman as described in
the texts is changeless, how can He be associated with changes as
required by the conception of Him as the material and instrumental
cause, which involves the view of associating Him with a body?
Moreover, the association of body (Sarira) with God is neither an
analogy nor an imagery. The general conception of body involves
the idea that an entity is called the body where it is only controlled
by some spiritual substance2 • To this the reply is that Brahman
may Himself remain unchangeable and may yet be the cause of
changes in His twofold body-substance. The objection is that the
material world is so different from the bodies of animals that the
conception of body cannot be directly applied to it. The reply is
that even among animal bodies there is a large amount of diversity,
1 eva'f!l hi brahma1_ly' api no' piidiinatva-nimittatvayor virodhab; tasya cid-
iarfram. Ibid. This subject has been dealt with elaborately in Sri Saila Srinivllsa's
Siira-darpa1Ja.
390 Philosophy of the Riimiinuja School of Thought [cH.
e.g. the body of a man and the body of a microscopic insect. Under
the circumstances we are to fall upon a general definition which
would cover the concept of all bodies and ignore the individual dif-
ferences. The definition given above suits the concept of bodies of
all living beings and applies also to the concept of the world as the
body of Brahman. This is also supported by the Sruti texts of the
Antaryiimi-briihma~a, where the world has been spoken of as the
body of God. If there is an apparent difference in our conception
of body as indicated in the definition as testified by the Vedic texts,
with our ordinary perception of the world which does not reveal
its nature as body, the testimony of the Vedic texts should prevail;
for while our perception can be explained away as erroneous, a
scientific definition and the testimony of texts cannot be dismissed.
Our ordinary perception is not always reliable. We perceive the
moon like a small dish in size, whereas the scriptural testimony
reveals its nature to us as much bigger. When there is a conflict
between two sources of evidence, the decision is to be made in
favour of one or the other by the canon of unconditionality
(ananyathii-siddhatva). An evidence which is unconditional in its
nature has to he relied upon, whereas that which is conditional has
to be subordinated to it. It is in accordance with this that some-
times the Vedic texts have to be interpreted in such a manner that
they may not contradict perceptual experience, whereas in other
cases the evidence of perceptual experience has to be dismissed on
the strength of scriptural testimony. It cannot also be said that the
evidence of a later pramii~a will have greater force, for there may be
a series of errors, in which case there is no certitude in any of the later
pramii~as. Again, there is no force also in mere cumulation of evi-
dence, for in the case of a blind man leading other blind men mere
cumulation is no guarantee of certitude 1 . In the case of the con-
flict of pramii~as, the dissolution of doubt and the attainment of
certitude are achieved on the principle of unconditionality. That
which is realized in an unconditional manner should be given pre-
cedence over what is realized only in a conditional manner2 • Our
powers of perception are limited by their own limitations and can-
1
na ca paratt•iid uttare'}a pur1.•a-biidha}_z iti yuktm_n dhiirii-viihika-bhrama-
sthale ·vyabhiciiriit ata e?'ll na hlulyasl?'am opi niT1:ziiyaka'!l satii'ndha-nyiiyena
aprayojakat•viic ca. Siddhiinta-cintiima'}i. l\1S.
2
ananyathii-siddhat·vam e·va ·virodhy-apriimii'}ya-vyavasthii pakatii-va::che-
dakam i~yate. Ibid.
xx] Saila Srinivtisa 39 1
not therefore discern whether the world tnay after all be the body of
the transcendent Brahman, and therefore it cannot successfully
contradict the testimony of the Vedic texts which declare the world
to be the body of God. The Vedic texts of pure monism are intended
only to deny the duality of Brahman, but it can well be interpreted
on the supposition of one Brahman as associated with his body, the
world. The denial of dualism only means the denial of any other
being like Brahman. Thus Brahman as cit and acit forms the
material cause of the world, and Brahman as idea and will as
affecting these is the instrumental cause of the world. The twofold
causality of Brahman thus refers to twofold conditions as stated
above. which exist together in Brahman 1 •
In the Vedantic texts we have expressions in the ablative case
indicating the fact that the world has proceeded out of Brahman as
the material cause (upiidiina). The ablative case always signifies the
materiality of the cause and not its instrumentality2 • But it also
denotes that the effect comes out of the cause and it may be ob-
jected that the world, being always in Brahman and not outside
Him, the ablative expressions of the Vedantic texts cannot be justi-
fied. To this the reply is that the conception of material cause or the
signification of the ablative cause does not necessarily mean that
the effect should con1e out and be spatially or temporally dif-
ferentiated from the cause. Even if this were its meaning, it may
well be conceived that there are subtle parts in Brahman corre-
sponding to cit and acit in their manifested forms, and it is from
these that the world has evolved in its manifested form. Such an
evolution does not mean that the effect should stand entirely out-
side the cause, for when the entire causal substance is transformed,
the effect cannot be spatially outside the cause3 • It is true that all
1 sarva-sanra-bhutii-vibhakta-niima-rupii-·vasthii panna-cid-acid-viii1ta-ve1e~a
being of a ritualistic nature, does not warrant any treatment in this work.
CHAPTER XXI
THE NIMBARKA SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY
admit that the world is different from Brahman. The real meaning of
the view that God is the material cause of the world is that though
everything springs from Him, yet the nature of God remains the
same in spite of all His productions. The energy of God exists
in God and though He produces everything by the diverse kinds
of manifestations of His energies, He remains unchanged in His
Self!.
Puru~ottama makes reference to Devacarya' s Siddhanta-
jahnavi, and therefore lived after him. According to Pandit
Kisoradasa's introduction to Sruty-anta-sura-druma, he was born
in 1623 and was the son of Narayal).a Sarma. The present writer is
unable to substantiate this view. According to Pandit Kisoradasa
he was a pupil of Dharmadevacarya. 2 Devacarya wrote a com-
mentary on the Brahma-siitras called the Siddhiinta-jiilznavi, on
which Sundara Bhatta wrote a commentary called the Siddlziinta-
setukii.
namely, that the Brahma-hood can be attained only by such a process of nidi-
dhyiisana, it is called the apurva-vidhi.
The 1Vimbiirka School of Philosophy [cH.
iraya-do~ab. Ibid. p. q.
410 The Nimbarka School of Philosophy [cH.
are possible only through the operation of the subconscious im-
pressions of previous valid cognitions 1 • Again, the reflection of the
pure consciousness in the ajfiiina is impossible, for reflections can
take place only between two entities which have the same order of
existence. From other considerations also the illusion has to be
regarded as illegitimate. Illusions take place as the result of certain
physical conditions such as contact, defect of the organs of per-
ception, the operation of the subconscious impressions, etc. These
conditions are all absent in the supposed case of the illusion in-
volved in the ego-intuition.
The Sati.karites described miiyii as indefinable. By" indefinable,,
they mean something that appears in perception but is ultimately
contradicted. The Sati.karites define falsehood or non-existence as
that which is liable to contradiction. The phenomena of miiyii
appear in experience and are therefore regarded as existent. They
are liable to contradiction and are therefore regarded as non-
existent. It is this unity of existence and non-existence in miiyii that
constitutes its indefinability. To this Anantarama's objection is that
contradiction does not imply non-existence. As a particular object,
say a jug, may be destroyed by the stroke of a club, so one know-
ledge can destroy another. The destruction of the jug by the stroke
of the club does not involve the supposition that the jug was non-
existent. So the contradiction of the prior knowledge by a later one
does not involve the non-existence or falsity of the former. All
cognitions are true in themselves, though some of them may
destroy another. This is what the Nimbarkists mean by the
sat-khyiiti of knowledge. The theory of sat-khyiiti with them means
that all knowledge (khyiiti) is produced by some existent objects,
which are to be regarded as its cause (sad-dhetukii khyiiti, sat- khyiiti).
According to such a view, therefore, the illusory knowledge must
have its basic cause in some existent object. It is wrong also to
suppose that false or non-existent objects can produce effects on
the analogy that the illusory cobra may produce fear and even
death. For here it is not the illusory cobra that produces fear but
the memory of a true snake. It is wrong therefore to suppose that
the illusory world-appearance may be the cause of our bondage.
Since illusions are not possible, it is idle to suppose that all our
1
adhyiiso nii'niidi!z, purva-pramii-hita-Sa7Jlskiira-janyat?:iit. Vediinta-tattt·a-
bodha, p. 14.
XXI] A General Idea of Nimbarka's Philosophy
perceptual, inferential, and other kinds of cognitions are produced
as associated with an ego through sheer illusion. Right knowledge
is to be regarde<;l as a characteristic quality of the self and the pro-
duction of knowledge does not need the intervention of a vrtti. The
ajiiiina which prevents the flashing in of knowledge is our karma
which is in accumulation from beginningless time. Through the
operation of the sense-organs our selves expand outside us and are
filled with the cognition of the sense-objects. It is for this reason
that when the sense-organs are not in operation the sense-objects
do not appear in cognition, as in the state of sleep. The self is thus
a real knower (jiiiitii) and a real agent (kartii), and its experiences as
a knower and as an agent should on no account be regarded as the
result of a process of illusion 1 •
The self is of the nature of pure consciousness, but it should
yet be regarded as the real knower. The objection that what is
knowledge cannot behave in a different aspect as a knower, just as
water cannot be mixed with water and yet remain distinct from it,
is regarded by the Nimbarkists as invalid. As an illustration
vindicating the Nimbarka position, Puru!?ottama, in his Vediinta-
ratna-maiiju~ii, refers to the case of the sun which is both light
and that from which light emanates. Even when a drop of water
is mixed with another drop the distinction of the drops, both
quantitative and qualitative, remains, though it may not be so
apprehended. The mere non-apprehension of difference is no proof
that the two drops have merged into identity. On the other hand,
since the second drop has its parts distinct from the first one it must
be regarded as having a separate existence, even when the two drops
are mixed. The character as knower must be attributed to the self;
for the other scheme proposed by the Sankarites, that the character
as knower is due to the reflection of the pure consciousness in the
vrtti, is inefficacious. The sun that is reflected in water as an image
cannot be regarded as a glowing orb by itself. Moreover, reflection
can only take place between two visible objects; neither pure
consciousness nor the antal;.karar.za-vrtti can be regarded as visible
objects justifying the assumption of reflection.
The ego-intuition refers directly to the self and there is no
illusion about it. The ego-intuition thus appears to be a continuous
revelation of the nature of the self. After deep dreamless sleep one
1 Vediinta-tattva-bodha, p. 20.
The Nimbiirka School of Philosophy [cH.
says "I slept so well that I did not know even myself." But this
should not be interpreted as the absence of the ego-intuition or the
revelation of the self. The experience "I did not know myself"
refers to the absence of the intuition of the body and the mental
psychosis, but it does not indicate that the self-conscious self had
ever ceased to shine by itself. The negation involved in the denial
of the perception of one's self during dreamless sleep refers to the
negation of certain associations (say, of the body, etc.) with which
the ego ordinarily links itself. Similar experience of negation can
also be illustrated in such expressions as "I was not so long in the
room," "I did not live at that tim~,p etc., where negations refer to
the associations of the ego and not to the ego. The self is not only
to be regarded as expressed in the ego-intuition, but it is also to be
regarded as distinct from the knowledge it has. The perception of
the self continues not only in the state of dreamless sleep but also
in the state of emancipation, and even God in His absolute freedom
is conscious of Himself in His super-ego intuition. lie is also all-
Merciful, the supreme Instructor. and the presiding deity of all our
understanding. Like individual selYes God is also the agent, the
creator of the universe. If the Brahman were not an agent hy
nature, then He could not have been the creator of the universe,
even with the association of the miiyii conditions. l 1 nlike Brahman
the activity of the individual souls has to depend upon the operation
of the conative organs for its manifestation. The self also really ex-
periences the feelings of pleasure and pain. The existence and
agency of the human souls, however, ultimately depend on the will
of God. Yet there is no reason to suppose that God is partial or
cruel because lie makes some suffer and others enjoy; for I Ie is like
the grand master and Lord who directs different men differently
and awards suffering and enjoyment according to their individual
deserts. The whole idea is that though God awards suffering and
enjoyment to individuals and directs their actions according to their
deserts, He is not ultimately hound by the law of karma, and may
by His grace at any time free them from their bondage. The law of
karma is a mechanical law and God as the superintendent decides
each individual case. He is thus the dispenser of the laws of karma
but is not bound by it 1 . The human souls are a part of the
1 na vaya'!f brahma-niyantrt·vasya karma-siipek~att'l•a'!l brilma}_z, kintu
punyii-di-karma-kiirayitrtve tat-phala-diitrt·ve ca. Vediinta-ratna-maiiju~ii, p. 14.
XXI] A General Idea of Nimbiirka's Philosophy
nature of God and as such are dependent on Him for their essence,
existence, and activities (tad-iiyatta-svarupa-sthiti-purvikiil;. ). God
being the ultimate truth, both the human souls and inanimate
nature attain their essence and existence by virtue of the fact that
they are parts of Him and participate in His nature. They are there-
fore entirely dependent on Him for their existence and all their
operations.
The individual souls are infinite in number and atomic in size.
But though atomic in size they can at the same time cognize the
various sensations in various parts of the body through all-pervading
knowledge which exists in them as their attribute. Though atomic
and partless in their nature, they are completely pervaded by God
through His all-pervading nature. The atomic souls are associated
with the beginningless girdle of karma which is the cause of the
body, and are yet through the grace of God finally emancipated
when their doubts are dissolved by listening to the instructions of
the siistras from the teachers, and by entering into a deep Ineditation
regarding the true essence of God by which they are ultimately
merged in Him. God is absolutely free in extending His mercy and
grace. But it so happens that He actually extends them to those
who deserve them by their good deeds and devotion. God in His
transcendence is beyond His three natures as souls, the world and
even as God. In this His pure and transcendent nature He is
absolutely unaffected by any changes, and He is the unity of pure
being, bliss and consciousness. In His nature as God He realizes
His own infinite joy through the infinite souls which are but con-
stituent parts of Him. The experiences of individuals are therefore
contained in Him as constituents of Him because it is by His own
ik~m:za or self-perceiving activity that the experiences of the indi-
vidual selves can be accounted for. The existence and the process
of all human experience are therefore contained and controlled by
Him. The individual selves are thus in one sense different from
Him and in another sense but constituent parts of Him. In Bhas-
kara's philosophy the emphasis was on the aspect of unity, since
the differences were due to conditions (upiidhi). But though
Nimbarka's system is to be counted as a type of Bhedii-bheda
or Dvaitii-dvaita theory, the emphasis here is not merely on the part
of the unity but on the difference as well. As a part cannot be
different from the whole, so the individual souls can never be dif-
The Nimbiirka School of Philosophy [cH.
ferent from God. But, in the state of bondage the individuals are
apt to forget their aspects of unity with God and feel themselves
independent in all their actions and experiences. When by absolute
self-abnegation springing from love the individual feels himself to
be absolutely controlled and regulated by God and realizes himself
to be a constituent of Him, he loses all his interests in his actions
and is not affected by them. The ultimate ideal, therefore, is to
realize the relation with God, to abnegate all actions, desires and
motives, and to feel oneself as a constituent of Him. Such a being
never again comes within the grasp of mundane bondage and lives
in eternal bliss in his devotional contemplation of God. The de-
votee in the state of his emancipation feels himself to be one with
God and abides in Him as a part of His energy ( tat-tiidiitmyii-nubha-
va-purvaka'f!l visvarupe bhagavati tac-chaktyii-tmanii avasthiinam) 1 •
Thus, even in the state of emancipation, there is a difference be-
tween the emancipated beings and God, though in this state they
are filled with the utmost bliss. With the true realization of the
nature of God and one's relation with Him, all the three kinds of
karma (saiicita, kriyamii1Ja and iirabdha) are destroyed 2 • Avidyii in
this system means ignorance of one's true nature and relationship
with God which is the cause of his karma and his association with
the body, senses and the subtle matter. The priirabdha karma, or
the karma which is in a state of fructification, may persist through
the present life or through other lives if necessary, for until their
fruits are reaped the bodiless emancipation cannot be attained 4 •
Sainthood consists in the devotional state consisting of a continual
and unflinching meditation on the nature of God (dhyiina-paripiike1la
dhruva-smrti-para-hhakty-iikhya-jiiiinii-dhigame). Such a saint be-
comes free from the tainting influence of all deeds committed and
collected before and all good or bad actions that may be performed
later on ( tatra uttara-bhii1-'inal;. kr(yamii1Jasya piipasya iiSle~ab
tat-priig-bhutasya saiicitasya tasya nasal;.. Vediinta-kaustublza-prablzii,
lV. 1. 13). The regular caste duties and the duties of the various
stages of life help the rise of wisdom and ought therefore always to
be performed, even when the wisdom has arisen; for the flame of
1 Para-pak~a-giri-vajra, p. 591.
2
!hid. p. 59~- 3
!hid.
' ,,;du~o vidya-miihiitmyiit saiicita-kriya>nii')ayor iiile~a-'t.'iniisau, priirabdhasya
tu karma7Jo hhogena t•iniisa~z, tatra priirabdhasya etac charzrena itara-sarlrair vii
blmktt:ii viniisiin-mok~a iti samk~epa!z. Ibid. p. 583.
XXI] A General Idea of Nimbiirka's Philosophy
this light has always to be kept burning (tasmiit vidyo-dayaya svii-
srama-karmii-gnihotra-di-riipa1Jl grhasthena, tapo-japa-dini karmii:l}i
urdhva-retobhir anu~theyiini iti siddham). But the conglomeration of
deeds which has started fructifying must fructify and the results of
such deeds have to be reaped by the saint either in one life or in many
lives as the case may be. The realization of Brahman consists in the
unflinching meditation on the nature of God and the participation
in Him as His constituent which is the same thing as the establish-
ment of a continuous devotional relationship with Him. This is in-
dependent of the ontological fusion and return in Him which may
happen as a result of the complete destruction of the fructifying
deeds (priirabdha karma) through their experiences in the life of the
saint (vidya-yoni-sarira) or in other lives that may follow. A saint,
after the exhaustion of his fructifying deeds, leaves his gross body
through the su~umnii nerve in his subtle body, and going beyond
the material regions {prakrta-ma1J¢ala) reaches the border region-
the river viraja-between the material regions and the universe of
Vi~1Ju 1 • Here he leaves aside his subtle body in the supreme being
and enters into the transcendent essence of God (Vediinta-
kaustubha-prabhii, IV. 2. I5)· The emancipated beings thus exist in
God as His distinct energies and may again be employed by Him
for His own purposes. Such emancipated beings, however, are
never sent down by God for carrying on an earthly existence.
Though the emancipated beings become one with God, they have
no control over the affairs of the worl-1, which are managed entirely
by God Himself2.
Though it is through the will of God that we enjoy the dream
experiences and though He remains the controller and abides in us
through all stages of our experiences, yet He is never tainted by the
imperfections of our experiental existence ( Vediinta-kaustubha and
its commentary Prabha, III. 2. I I). The objects of our experiences
are not in themselves pleasurable or painful, but God makes them
so to us in accordance with the reward and punishment due to us
according to our good or bad deeds. In themselves the objects are
1 para-loka-gamane dehiid utsarpa~a-samaye eva vidu~ab pu~ya-piipe nira-
vaie~a'!l k~lyate, . .. vidyii hi sva-siimarthyiid eva sva-phala-bhuta-brahma-priipti-
pratipiidaniiya . .. ena'!l deva-yiinena pathii gamayitu'!l su~ma-iarfra'!l sthiipayati.
Vediinta-kaustubha-prabhii, III. 3· 27.
2 muktasya tu para-brahma-siidharmye'pi m"khila-cetanii-cetana-patitva-
tan-ni'yantrtva-tad-vidhiirakatva-sar•va-gatatvii-dy-asambhaviit jagad-vyiipiira-
t-•arjam aiit!aryam. Ibid. IV. 4· 20.
The Nimbtirka School of Philosophy [cH.
but indifferent entities and are neither pleasurable nor painful
(Vediinta-kaustubha-prabhii, III. 2. 12). The relation of God and
the world is like that of a snake and its coiled existence. The coiled
(ku1_ltjala) condition of a snake is neither different from it nor
absolutely identical with it. So God's relation with the individuals
also is like that of a lamp and its light (prabhii-tadvator iva) or like
the sun and the illumination (prakiisa). God remains unchanged in
Himself and only undergoes transformation through His energies as
conscious (cic-chakti) and unconscious (acic-chakti) 1• As the indivi-
duals cannot have any existence apart from Brahman, so the material
world also cannot have any existence apart from him. It is in this
sense that the material world is a part or constituent of God and is
regarded as being one with God. But as the nature of the material
world is different from the nature of God, it is regarded as different
from Him 2 •
The Vedic duties of caste and stages of life are to be performed
for the production of the desire of wisdom (vividi~ii), but once the
true wisdom is produced there is no further need of the per-
formance of the duties (Ibid. III. 4· 9). The wise man is never
affected by the deeds that he performs. But though ordinarily the
performance of the duties is helpful to the attainment of wisdom,
this is not indispensable, and there are many who achieve wisdom
without going through the customary path of caste duties and the
duties attached to stages of life.
giri-vajra, p. 1 2.
2 Ibid. p. 14.
Dill
The Nimbiirha School of Philosophy [cH.
difference has a separate specification as a special order of dif-
ferenceness. lVIort~over, since difference reveals only the particular
modes of the objects, these difficulties cannot arise. In perceiving
difference we do not perceive difference as an entity different from
the two objects between which it is supposed to suhsist 1 . One
might equally well find such a fault of mutual dependence on the
identification of Brahman \\-ith fi'l'a, since it depends upon the
identification of the jiva with the Brahman.
A further discussion of the subject shows that there cannot be
any objections against "differences" on the score of their being
produced, for they mere]y subsist and are not produced; or on the
possibility of their being known, for if differences were never per-
ceived the Sankarites would not have been so anxious to remove
the so-called illusions or mis-perception of differences, or to mis-
spend their energies in trying to demonstrate that Brahman was
different from all that was false, material and the like; and the saint
also would not be able to distinguish between what was eternal and
transitory. Again, it is held that there is a knowledge which contra-
dicts the notion of difference. But if this knowledge itself involves
difference it cannot contradict it. \\rhatever may signify anything
must do so by restricting its signification to it, and all such re-
striction involves difference. Even the comprehension that demon-
strates the illusoriness of "difference" (e.g. this is not difference,
or there is no difference here, etc.) proves the existence of "dif-
ference." l\1oreover, a question may be raised as to whether the
notion that contradicts difference is itself comprehended as dif-
ferent from difference or not. In the former case the validity o(t,he
notion leaves "difference" unmolested and in the second case,
i.e. if it is not comprehended as different from "difference," it be-
comes identical with it and cannot contradict it.
If it is contended that in the above procedure an attempt has
been made to establish the category of difference only in indirect
manner and that nothing has been directly said in explanation of
the concept of difference, the reply is that those who have sought
to explain the concept of unity have fared no better. If it is urged
that if ultimately the absolute unity or identity is not accepted then
1
nii'py anyonyii-sraya!z bheda-pratyak$e pratiyogitii-·vacchedaka-stambhatvii-
di-prakiiraka-_fiiiinasyai'·va hetut?·iit na tii·vad bheda-pratyak~e bhedii-sraytid
bhinnat·vena pratiyogi-jiiiinaTJl hetul:z. Para-pak$a-giri-vajra, pp. 14, 15.
xx1] Controversy with Monists by Miidhava Alukunda 419
that would lead us to nihilism, then it may also be urged with the
same force that, differences being but modes of the objects them-
selves, a denial of difference would mean the denial of the objects,
and this would also land us in nihilism. It must, however, be noted
that though difference is but a mode of the objects which differ, yet
the terms of reference by which difference becomes intelligible (the
table is different from the chair: here the difference of the table is
but its mode, though it becomes intelligible by its difference from
the chair) are by no means constituents of the objects in which the
difference exists as their mode. The Sati.karites believe in the re-
futation of dualism, as by such a refutation the unity is established.
The thesis of unity is thus though, on the one hand dependent upon
such refutation and yet on the other hand identical with it because.
all such refutations are believed to be imaginary. In the same manner
it may be urged that the demonstration of difference involves with
it a reference to other terms, but is yet identical in nature with the
object of which it is a mode; the reference to the terms is necessary
only for purposes of comprehension.
It must, however, be noted that since difference is but a mode
of the object the. comprehension of the latter necessarily means the
con1prehension of all differences existing in it. An object may be
known in a particular manner, yet it may remain unknown in its
differential aspects, just as the monists hold that pure consciousness
is always flashing forth but yet its aspect as the unity of all things
may remain unknown. In comprehending a difference between any
two objects, no logical priority which could have led to a vicious
circle is demanded. But the two are together taken in consciousness
and the apprehension of the one is felt as its distinction from the
other. The same sort of distinction has to be adduced by the
monists also in explaining the comprehension of the identity of the
individual souls with the Brahman, otherwise in their case too there
would have been the charge of a vicious circle. For when one says
"these two are not different," their duality and difference depend
upon a comprehension of their difference which, while present,
prevents their identity from being established. If it is held that the
duality is imaginary whereas the identity is real, then the two being
of a different order of existence the contradiction of the one cannot
lead to the affirmation of the other. The apology that in compre-
hending identity no two-term reference is needed is futile, for an
420 The Nimbiirka School of Philosophy [cH.
identity 1s comprehended only as the negation of the two-term
duality.
Thus, from the above considerations, the main thesis of the
Sankarites, that all things are identical with Brahman, falls to the
ground.
According to Nimbarka the ideal of emancipation is participa-
tion in God's nature (tad-bhiivii-patti). This is the ultimate end and
summum bonum of life (prayojana). According to the Sankarites
emancipation consists in the ultimate oneness or identity existing
between individual souls and Brahman. The Brahman in reality is
one with the individual souls, and the apparent difference noticed
in our ordinary practical life is due to misconception and ignorance,
which impose upon us a false notion of duality. l\ladhava l\1ukunda
urges that in such a view, since the individual souls are already one
with Brahman, they have nothing to strive for. There is thus really
no actual end (proyojana) as the goal of our strivings. l\ladhava
1\llukunda, in attempting to emphasize the futility of the Sankarite
position, says that, if the ultimate consciousness be regarded as one,
then it would be speckled with the various experiences of indi-
viduals. It cannot be held to be appearing as different in accordance
with the variety of conditions through which it appears, for in our
experiences we find that though through our various cognitive
organs we have various experiences they are also emphasized as
belonging to one being. Variability of conditions does not neces-
sarily imply a variety of the units of experience of individual beings,
as is maintained by the Sankarites. The pure and ubiquitous dif-
ferenceless consciousness (nir'l.-·isc~a-caitanya) cannot also be re-
garded as capable of being identified as one with the plurality of
minds (anta}:zkarar;a). Again, it is admitted by the Sankarites that
in dreamless sleep the mind is dissolved. If that were so and if pure
consciousness is regarded as being capable of manifesting itself
through false identification with minds, there would be no ex-
planation of the continuity of consciousness from day to day in the
form_ of memory. It cannot be urged that such a continuity is
maintained by the fact that minds exist in a state of potency
(sarrzskiirii-tmanii' vasthitasya) in the deep dreamless sleep; for the
mind in a potent state cannot be regarded as carrying impressions
and memories, since in that case there would be memories even in
dreamless sleep.
xx1] Controversy with ll-lonists by ll-ladhava Mukunda 421
essence is destroyed, and thts would almost be the same as the miiyii
doctrine of the Sankarites, who hold that the essential nature of
both God and souls is destructible.
It is wrong to suppose that individuals are but parts of which a
structural Brahman is constituted, for in that case, being made up
of parts, the Brahman would be itself destructible. \Vhen the scrip-
tures speak of the universe and the souls as being but a part of
Brahman, the main emphasis is on the fact that Brahman is infinite
and the universe is but too small in comparison with it. It is also
difficult to imagine how the minds or the antafzkarm:zas can operate
as conditions for limiting the nature of the Brahman. How should
Brahman allow these so-called conditions to mutilate its nature?
It could not have created these conditions for the production of
individual souls, for these souls were not in existence before the
conditions were in existence. Thus the Bhaskara doctrine that the
concept of distinction and unity of Brahman is due to the operation
of conditions (aupiidhika-bhediibheda-viida) is entirely false.
According to the Nimbarka view, therefore, the unity and dif-
ference that exist between the individuals and Brahman is natural
(sviibhii'l·ika) and not due to conditions (aupiidhika) as in the case of
Bhaskara. The coiling posture (ku~ujala) of a snake is different from
the long snake as it is in itself and is yet identical with it in the
sense that the coiling posture is an effect; it is dependent and under
the absolute control of the snake as it is and it has no separate ex-
istence from the nature of the snake as it is. The coiled state of the
snake exists in the elongated state but only in an undifferentiated,
unperceivable way; and is nothing but the snake by which it is
pervaded through and through and supported in its entirety. So
this universe of matter and souls is also in one aspect absolutely
identical with God, being supported entirely by Him, pervaded
through and through hy Him and entirely dependent on Him, and
yet in another aspect different from Him in all its visible manifesta-
tions and operations 1 . The other analogy through which the Nim-
barkists try to explain the situation is that of the sun and its rays which
are at once one with it and are also perceived as different from it.
1 yatlu1 ku~l~lalii-'L'nstlui-pamwsya ahe(z ku~l~lalmrt 7'_wzkttl-f>nmw11'tlt pratyak~a
V anamall Misra.
Yanamali l\1isra, a native of Triyaga, a village "·ithin two miles
of llrindavan, of Bharadvaja lineage, in his Vediinta-siddhiinta-
sm_ngraha, called also Sruti-siddhiinta-sa~ngralza, gives some of the
important tenets of the Nimbarka school. The work is written in
the form of Kiiril~iis and a commentary on it and is hased on the
commentary on the Rrahma-sutra by Nimbarka and other com-
mentaries on it.
2
1 Para-pak~a-giri-·vajra, p. 420. Ibid. p. 429.
XXI] Vanamiili Mih'a
He regards sorrow as being due to attachment to things that are
outside one's own self, and the opposite of it as happiness 1 • All
actions performed with a view to securing any selfish end, all per-
formance of actions prohibited by Vedic injunctions and non-
performance of duties rendered obligatory by Vedas produce sins.
The opposite of this and all such actions as may please God are
regarded as producing virtue. It is the power of God which is at the
root of all virtue and vice which operates by veiling the qualities
of God to us. This nescience (avidyii) is real and positive and
different in different individuals. It produces the error or illusion
which consists in regarding a thing as what it is not; and it is this
false knowledge that is the cause of rebirth 2 • This avidyii is dif-
ferent with different individuals. It is through this avidyii that one
gets attached to one's possession as "mine" and has also the false
experience of individual freedom. In reality all one's actions are
due to God, and when a person realizes this he ceases to have any
attachment to anything and does not look forward for the fruits of
his deeds. The avidyii produces the mind and its experiences of
sorrows and pleasures; it also produces the false attachment by
which the self regards the experiences as its own and ceases to realize
its own nature as pure knowledge and bliss. Only the videhi-muktas
enjoy this state; those in the state of jzvanmukti or sainthood enjoy it
only to a partial extent. It is on account of attachments produced by
ignorance that man is stirred to be led by the will of God. But as
the ignorance is a true ignorance, so the experience of sorrow is also
a true experience. All our rebirths are due to our actions performed
against the mandates of the Vedas or for the fulfilment of our
desires3 • The purity of the soul is attained by the realization of the
idea that all our actions are induced by God and that the performer
has no independence in anything. When a person feels that it is
through false association with other things, and by considering
oneself as the real independent agent that one gets into trouble, one
naturally loses all interest in one's actions and experience of
1 Sruti-siddlzil.nta-sa'!t~ralza, 1. 9, 10, 11.
2 prati-jl'l'a1JZ 'l·iblzinnii syiit satyii ca blziiva-rupitJl I a-tasmi'JZS tad-dhiyo hetur
nidiina1Jl jlva-sa1JlS!lau. II Ibid. 1. 15.
3
atal:z kiimym!t ni~iddhaTJZ ca dul:zklz-a'l'lja1JZ tyajed budhal:z. Sruti-siddhiinta-
sa1Jlgralza, 1. 63. According to Vanamali Misra at death a person goes to Heaven
or to Hell according to his deeds and then after enjoying the fruits of his actions
or suffering therefrom he is born as plants and then as lower animals, then as
Yavanas or mlecclzas and then in lower castes and finally as Brahmins.
The 1\rimbiirka School of Philosophy [cH.
pleasure and pain, and regards all objects as being invested with
harmful defects. It is this disinclination or detachment that pleases
God. The process of attaining devotion is also described in the
scriptures as listening to the Upani~ads (Srava~a), realizing their
meaning with logical persuasion (manana), and continual medita-
tion on the nature of God as an unceasing flow (nididhyiisana)l.
The last can come only as a result of the first two; for meditation
involves a direct realization which is not possible without the per-
formance of srm·a~a and manana. It is only through the purifica-
tion of the mind by the aho,·e processes that God is pleased
and makes l limself directly intuited (aparok~a) hy the devotee, just
as one can intuit the musical melodies and tunes through musical
discipline. This direct intuition i.;; of the very nature of one's own
self. For at this stage one has no functioning of the mind. The
destruction of experiential knowledge is identical with the intuition
of Cod. This stage therefore implies the annihilation of m:idyii or
the mind 2 • It is in this wav that the nature of God as bliss is
realized by man in his state of supreme emancipation; hut e\·en then
it is not possible for him to know all the qualities of God, for e\·en
God l limself does not know all l lis qualities. Such an emancipa-
tion can be realized only through the grace of God. In the state of
emancipation, man exi8ts in Cod just as the fish s\\·ims about in the
ocean. God creates because of the spontaneity of I lis grace and not
in order to increase His grace; so also emancipated souls dally in
God out of the spontaneity of their essence as bliss and not in order
to increase their bliss 3 . The nature of God is always within us, and
it is onlv- when it is directlY- intuited that we can attain sah-ation.
Some people attain emancipation in this world while others attain
it in the upper worlds through which they pass as a result of their
deeds. But emancipation of all kinds may be defined as the ex-
istence of man in his own nature as a result of the destruction of
nescience 4 • The jiTamnuktas or saints are those whose m_·idyii has
anyli-rtha-1-·i~aya~1 puro brahmti-kara-dhiyc/1!1 sadti
nididhytisana-sabda-rtlw jllyate sudh(vll'!' hi sab.
/)ruti-siddhlinta-Sa'!ZRraha, 11. 13.
2
brahma-gocarasya t·edti111a-'l:l1Sita-manasi utpmmasya ii-parok~yasya ya!z
priiRa-bhm·ab tasya abhii1·o dlll-m!ISO j;hina-tad-dh1·a'!1Sti-nyatara-rzipo jiitina-
bmhma1}ab sambandhai}, sa'!lSllra-dastiyli'!l 7liisti. Ibid. 11. 1 Q.
3
tinando-drekato 1_·i~1,11Jryathii s_rstyti-di-ce~tanam.
tatlzc'i mulaa-citl'im krflhi na t1.• tincmda-'l-iTrddlwve. Ibid. II. 37·
4 n·a-rripe1,1a stlzitir muktz; aj1icina-dhTa'!lsa-prin·akam ( ihid. 11. s8). This
mukti can be of four kinds: sllrripya, i.e. the same t'xtt:rnal form as Kp:~I)a;
XXI] Vanamiili Misra 443
been destroyed, but who have still to suffer the effects of their
priirabdha karma. The realization of God can destroy the saiicita
and kriyama1Ja karma, i.e. previously collected karma and those
that are performed in the present life, but not the priirabdha karma,
i.e. the karma that is already in a state of fruition.
It is wrong to suppose that the attainment of a state of bliss can
be desired by any person; the state desired can only be one in which
a person enjoys unobstructed bliss 1 . In a state of deep dreamless
sleep one can enjoy a little bliss, but not the full bliss, as the
mayavadins hold. There is but little difference between the mayii-
vadins and the Buddhists; the difference is only in the mode of
expression 2 •
The self is regarded as atomic, but its existence is definitely
proved by the notion of the ego (aha1Jl-pratyayavedya) who enjoys
all his experiences. Even though he may be dependent upon God,
yet he is a real and active agent who works through the influence of
avidya. The existence of the self is also proved by the continuity
of experiences through all stages of life. The self-love manifested
in all beings for selfish ends also shows that each person feels a self
or soul within himself and that this self is also different in different
individuals. The difference between jiva and zsvara is that the
former is of little power and little knowledge and always dependent,
and the latter is omniscient, omnipotent and independent; He
makes the jivas work or assert their supposed independence by His
avidya-power. The jivas are thus different from God, but as they
exist in Him at the time of emancipation and as all their actions are
guided by the avidya-power of God, they are regarded also as being
siilokya, i.e. existence in the same sphere as God; siiyujya, as being merged in
God; siimlpya, as existence in proximity to God as associated with a particular
form of Him. The merging in God called siiyujya should not be regarded as being
unified with God. This merging is like the animals roaming in the forest. The
emancipated beings are different from God, but exist in Him (eva,. muktvii
harer blzinna ramante tatra modatab (Ibid. II. 61). They can thus come out of
God also, and we hear of them as entering in succession the bodies of Aniruddha,
Pradyum:ta, Sarpkar!?al)a and Vasudeva. Such emancipated beings are not
associated with the creation and destruction of the worlds, but remain the same
in spite of all cosmic changes. They are like the being of Svetadvzpa referred to in
the Narayal)iya section of the ]}fahiibhiirata. But they are still always under the
control of God and do not suffer any sorrow on account of such control.
1 puru~ii-rtha'!' sukhitva,. hi na tv iinanda-svarilpatii. Sruti-siddhiinta-
sa7Jtgraha, II. 96.
3 meyato na ·cise~o· -sti miiyi-saugatayor mate
bhangz-miitra-bhidii tu syiit ekasminn api darsane. Ibid. n. 136.
444 The Ninzbarka School of Philosophy (CH. XXI
one with Him. The mind of the individual heing a creation of God's
avidyii, alii lis world experience is also due to God's activity. In His
own nature as self the jivas, the individuals, have the revelation of
God's nature which is pure hliss. The existence of individuals in
their own essential nature is therefore regarded as a state of salva-
tion. The individuals in their essential nature are therefore of the
nature of sat, cit and iinamla, and though atomic they can enjoy the
experiences all over the hody through their internal functioning
just as a lamp illuminates the \Vhole room hy rays. The experience
of sorrow also is possible through the expansion or dilatation of the
mind (anta~z-lwrww) through the various parts of the body and hy
means of the help of m."idyii by which the ji'l'll wrongly identifies
himself with other objects. As the relation of the self with other
objects takes place through the antab-karwza of each person the
sphere of experience of each of the jh·as is limited by the functioning
of his own anta~z-karm;a. The anta~z-karm_1a is different in different
persons.
The Upani~ads speak of God as the all (sart'lll!l khalv'ida'f!l
Uralmza), and this is due to the fact that I Ic pervades all things and
controls all things. It means that the souls are dependent on I lim
or maintained in I lim (tad-iidhiirat'l·a), hut it doc~ not mean their
identity with llim. God is llimsclf able to create all things by
I limself; hut for I lis pleasure, for I lis mere sportive dalliance, I Ic
takes the hdp of pralqti and the destiny born out of the deeds of
human beings as I lis accessories. Though (;od makes all persons
act in the manner in which they do act, yet I lis directive control is
regulated in accordance with the adr~ta or the destiny of the human
beings which is heginninglcss. The theory of kanna doctrir:e herein
suggested is different from that propoundnl by Patanjali .. \ccording
to Patanjali and his commentators, the fruits of the deeds, i.e.
pleasure or pain, arc enjoyed hy the persons while they arc free to
act hy themselves. I lcre, however, the freedom of the individuals is
controlled and limited by God in accordance with the previous
good or bad deeds of the individual, which arc heginninglcss. Thus
in our ordinary life not only our pleasures and pains but also our
power to do good or bad actions are determined by previous deeds
and the cons<.:qucnt control of God.
CHAPTER XXII
THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIJNANA BHIK$U
(destiny) ami h~la (time) are the two manifestations of the po\\er of trans-
Cl·ndt·nt hila as arising from aniruddha. From this kiila first arises the sattt·a-
RWW and from that the rajo-f!U~lll and thence the tamo-Ku~za.
It is further said that it is time which connects and separates. The lui/a of
course in its own turn derives its power from the self-percci,·ing acti,·ity (sudar-
sww) of \'i~~u. That the pmhrti transforms itself into its evolutes i-. also due to the
dynamic function of kiila.
The Ahi!lwm 1"!tli on the Sii'!lkhya-kiirikii, howe\·er, n·f(·rs to tht.· doctrine
of kiila as tht• cause of the world (lulla~1 srjati blultani, kiila~l SmJiharate pmjcl~l I
kiilab supte~u jcigarti tasmc"it kiilas tu kiirm;am) and refutes it hy sa~ ing that there
is no separate entity as kiila lkiilo niima na kas cit padcirtho'sti), then· are unly
thn·e catcgt'lrie~. ,·yakta, m·yakta and puru~a. and kiila falls \\ ithin them
(vyaktam myaktam puru~a iti traya~z e1·a padiirthii~l tatra lul/o antarhlllltab).
2 The .·lhirbwJ/mya-SmJlhitii, howen~r. explains the singular numbt.·r by the
The Individual.
In his commentary on the lsvara-gitii, Bhik~u says that the more
universal has a wider sphere than the less universal and therefore
it is called Brahman in relation to it. The cause of an effect is wider
and more universal than the effect and is therefore called Brahman
in comparison with it. Thus there is a hierarchy of Brahmans. But
that which is at the apex of the hierarchy is the highest universal
and the ultimate cause, and is therefore called the highest Brahman.
Brahman is thus the highest and the ultimate reality. The deter-
minations that make the universe of matter exist in Brahman as
merged in its nature as thought. Creation means that these de-
terminations which exist there in a potential form and without any
operation are manifested and made operative as the world of nature.
God in His nature as pure consciousness has a full and complete
acquaintance of all the possible developments and modifications of
the pre-matter as evolving into the actual universe. The starting
point in the evolution of the pre-matter or prakrti is the moment
of its association with the spirits. The scriptural text says that the
Lord entered into the prakrti and the puru~as, disturbed the equi-
librium and associated them with one another. The purzt~as are,
however, like sparks of consciousness and it is not possible to
produce any disturbance in them. The disturbance is thus produced
in the prakrti and the effect of such disturbance in the prakrti on
the purzt~as is interpreted as seeming disturbances in the puru~as
as well. The purzt~as are to be conceived as being parts of God and
there cannot be a real identity between the puru~as and the
Brahman. The so-called identity between the purzt~as and the
Brahman refers merely to the fact of the puru~as being the con-
stituent entities in the being of God such as that which exists be-
tween the parts and the whole. The assertion of the Sailkarites that
the individual soul is the same as Brahman and that the difference
is due to external limitations of nescience or on account of reflec-
tions through it is wrong. The kind of unity that exists between the
individual souls and the Brahman lies in the fact that they are in-
distinguishable in character from it (avibhiiga). If the reality of
inJividual souls is denied, that would amount to a denial of religious
and moral values and of bondage and emancipation.
XXII] The Individual
In this connection it is also urged that the individual souls are
derived from God just as sparks come out of fire or the son comes
out of the father. The individual souls resemble God so far as they
are of the nature of pure consciousness. But though they have
come out of Him, yet they retain their individuality and thus pre-
serves for them the sphere of their moral career. The individual
souls are free and emancipated in their own nature, they are all-
pervasive and they also hold the universe within them in their
consciousness. In all these they share the nature of Brahman. But
in association with the limiting conditions (upiidhi) they appear
as finite and limited. \Vhen the entire career of the individual souls
is known as existing in Brahman as part of it, as being manifested
out of it as separate entities, as leading a career of their own in
association with the limiting conditions and ultimately dissociating
themselves from them and realizing their own natures as one with
Brahman and in a sense different from it, this is the true philosophic
knowledge and realization of their own nature. When the indi-
viduals start their career and destiny in life they are different from
Brahman; but there was a time when they remained in one un-
divided unity with Brahman. But in spite of this unity the Brahman
is always felt as different and as the other of the individuals, and
this difference is never sublated 1 . But the difference of this view
from the Sarrkhya is that the Sarrkhya is satisfied only with con-
sidering the individuality and separateness of the puru~as, but the
Vedantic view as interpreted herein cannot ignore the fact that in
spite of their separateness they are one in essence with Brahman
and have sprung out of it, and after the fulfilment of their career of
individuality and destiny will again be merged in it, and even during
their mundane career have an aspect of undividedness with Brahman
inasmuch as they are the powers or energies of it 2 • The difference
that exists between the individuals and Brahman is most apparent
during the mundane career on account of the fact that the world of
nature has a separate existence in the consciousness of the individual
centres and each one of them is limited to his own experiences.
But at the time of dissolution, when the world of nature merges in
the Brahman as a potential level of its energies, the individuals are
1 bhedii-bhedau vibhiigii-·vibhiiga-rilpau kiila-bhedena aviruddhau anyonyii-
ltham. Ibid. 1. 1. 2.
The Philosophy of Vijiiiina Bhi~u [en.
also merged in it and have no separate spheres of experience for
themselves and thus cease to have any descriptive definition of
themselves.
The nature of the relation of part and whole that exists between
the individuals and Brahman is regarded as that subsisting between
the son and the father. The father is reborn in the son. Before birth
the son lies in a state of undivided unity in the vital energy of the
father and yet when he separates out of him it is the same vital
energy of the father that repeats itself in its new career and has a
sphere of activity which is definitely its own. Again, when it is said
that the individuals arc parts of Brahman, it should not be inter-
preted to mean that they have any share in the existence of Brahman
as God or world-creator. God is not homogeneous in 1lis nature,
but the element of individuation and differentiation always exists
in Him. Had lie hecn a homogeneous being His parts would have
no specific differentiation and they would be like the parts of space
which arc always indistinguishable from one another. But the fact
that God has within llim the principle of differentiation explains
the fact that the individuals resemble Brahman only in the aspect
of their consciousness hut have no share in I lis creative functions
or omnipotence. The Saf!lkhyists hold that sah·ation is attained
through dissociation of attachment as" mine" to one's experiences,
mental faculties, senses, understanding and body, owing to one's
knowledge of the fact that the self is the self-shining entity to which
all experiences appear and within which they arc held together as
one with it though they arc all different from it. But the \"cdanta as
herein interpreted holds that the attachment as "mine" vanishes
with the knowledge of self as pure consciousness, with the know-
ledge of God as the being from which they come into being, by
which they arc maintained and into which they ultimately return,
and with the knowledge that they all exist in the consciousness of
God as parts of it; and that the self is not the real cnjoycr of the
experiences but is only the consciousness in which the universe and
its experiences shine forth. Thus, though both in the Sarpkhya and
in the Vedanta as herein interpreted salvation is attained through
the dissolution of the false attachment as "mine-ness," the dis-
solution of" mine-ness" is here due to an entirely ditfcrent philo-
sophic conception 1 •
1
Vzj";iana-mrta-bhti~ya, p. 56.
xxn] The Individual
Consciousness is not a quality but it is the very substance of the
self. Just as light is a substance which illuminates other things, so
consciousness is also a substance which illuminates other things.
When one says" I know it," knowledge appears to be a quality of
''I" which is neither self nor a homogeneous entity. The" I" is a
complex of sense-faculties, understanding, etc., to which a quality
can be attributed; the self is not a complex entity, but a homo-
geneous simple substance-the consciousness. The complex entity,
the ''I,'' expresses all things by a manifestation of consciousness.
Bliss or happiness, however, cannot be regarded as a self-revealing
substance, but it is an independent substance like sorrow which is
revealed by consciousness. Neither the Brahman nor the self can
therefore be regarded as being of the nature of bliss or happiness
as this is a modification of prakrti and has therefore to be regarded
as expressible (drsya) and not as expressing (darsana). The con-
sciousness requires the intermediary of intellectual functions for
the illumination of objects, but consciousness in itself does not re-
quire the intermediary of any other functions, as such a view would
lead only to an infinite regressus without solving the point at issue.
It is also wrong to suppose that the principle of consciousness
exercises any operation in order to reveal itself, for an entity cannot
operate on itself (karma-kartr-·virodhiit). If for the above reasons
the self cannot be regarded as being of the nature of bliss, then at
the time of salvation also there cannot be any bliss in the self. There
is only a cessation of sorrow at that time, or rather a cessation of
both happiness and sorrow which is technically called a state of
happiness or sukha (sukha'!l dul)kha-suklza-tyayal;) 1 • At the time
of emancipation all conditioning factors such as the intellectual
functions and the like are dissolved and as a consequence thereof
all experiences of pleasure and pain also vanish, for these are sub-
stances belonging to objects which were presented to the self
through these conditions. When the U pani!?ads say that the self is
dearest to us, it need not necessarily be supposed that it is the
pleasure that is dearest to us, for the self may be regarded as being
valued for its own sake; it may also be supposed that pleasure here
means the cessation of pain 2 • The desire for immortality or con-
1 Vzjniinii-mrtii-bhii~ya, 1. 1. 2.
2 iitmatvasyii'pi prema-prayojakatviit du!zkha-nivrtti-rilpattviid vii bodhyam.
Ibid.
The Philosophy of l ~zj"iiiina Bhik~u [cH.
tinued existence of the self illustrates the feeling of fondness that
we all have for ourselves. The other view, that the ultimate object
of realization is extermination of all sorrow is also not open to any
objection on the ground that pleasure and pain never belonged to
the selves; for the association of pleasure and pain is only with re-
ference to their enjoyment and suffering and not directly as a bond
of attachment to the self. The term "bhoga," which may be trans-
lated only semi-accurately as "experience," has a twofold applica-
tion as referring to buddlzi or psychosis and to purzt~a. The prakrti
is composed of sukha, du~zklza and moha substances, and buddhi i~ an
evolute of the prakrti; therefore, when the buddlzi is in association
with sukha or dubklza, such an association supplies the buddlzi with
the stuff of which it is made and thus sustains and maintains its
nature and constitution. But when the word blwga has a reference
to puru~a, it means that the pleasure or sorrow held in the buddlzi is
reflected on it and is thereby intuited. It is this intuition of pleasure
and pain through their reflection in the punt~a that is regarded as
their bhoga or experience by punt~a. The buddlzi cannot have any
blzoga or experience, even in a remote sense of the term, for the
simple reason that it is unconscious. But it may well he argued that
since the punt~a is not in reality the ego, it cannot have any ex-
perience in any real sense of the term; and since it cannot in reality
have any experience of sorrow, it cannot in reality regard its cessa-
tion as being of the utmost value to it. The reply to such an objec-
tion is that the realization of the fact that the cessation of sorrow is
of ultimate value to the experiencer, the puru~a, leads the suddlzi on
its onward path of progress. Had it not been so there would be no
movement of the buddhi on lines of utility. So though pleasure and
pain do not belong to puru~a. they may yet be experienced by it and
the buddhi may be guided by such experiences.
When the Upani~ad says "that art thou," the idea at the back
of it is that the self is not to be identified with any of the clements
of the psychosis-the buddlzi-or with any of the evolutes of the
prakrti. The self is part of the pure consciousness-the Brahman.
When a man learns from the Upani~ad text or one's teacher that he
is a part of Brahman he tries to realize it through a process of
meditation. The difference of the Vedantic view from that of
SafTlkhya is that the latter rests with the individual selves as the
ultimate entities whereas the former emphasizes the Brahman as
XXII] Brahma-Experience and Experience
the ultimate reality, and also the fact that the reality of all other
things, the selves and the matter, depends ultimately on their
participation in it.
1
yoga hl'ivarasya jagan-nimittatvarp. prakrtitventi'bhyupagacchanti livaro-
ptidheh sattva-viie~asya purva-sargiya-tat-sarp.kalpa-vaitit sargti-dau sva-tantra-
prakrtita utpaty-m:zglktirtit. Vijiitina-mrta-bhti~ya, 11. 1. 2.
The Philosophy of l ~ijiuina Bhi~u [cH.
lamas. This also explains the Pural)ic view of the gradual deriva-
tion of satt'l·a, rajas and lamas as stages in the evolution of pralqti
through which at a later stage the cosmic evolution takes place.
Thus the pralqti which remains associated with God as the ,·chicle
of I lis knowledge and will is unchangeable and cternal 1 •
tmzmiitra, it is not the iikiiia that does so but the bhritii-di manifesting itself as
iikiiia, i.e. it is through some accretion from bhzttii-di that the iikiiia can produce
the sparia-tanmiitra. Akiiia!z iikiisamayo bluitii-dib sparia-tanmiitra1Jl sasarja.
2 See the commentary to iloka. Vif~U Purii~a, I. 2. 44·
3 The commentator notes that the word manas here means anta!zkara1J.a,
tnza (to which are to be added the mountains and the hills) which
have no inner or outer consciousness and may be described as
having, as it were, closed souls (sa1Jlvrtii-tman). Not being satisfied
with this He created the animals and birds, etc., called tiryak-srota.
The animals, etc., are called tiryag, because their circulation is not
upwards but runs circularly in all directions. They are full of tarhas,
and are described as a·vedina~z. The commentator notes that what
is meant by the term avedin is that the animals have only
appetitive knowledge, but no synthetic knowledge, i.e. cannot
synthesise the experience of the past, the present and the future and
cannot express what they know, and they have no knowledge about
their destinies in this world and in the other, and are devoid of all
moral and religious sense. They have no discrimination regarding
cleanliness and eating; they are satisfied with their ignorance as
true knowledge, i.e. they do not seek the acquirement of certain
knowledge. They are associated with the twenty-eight kinds of
viidha 1 • They are aware internally of pleasure and pain but they
cannot communicate with one another 2 • Then, being dissatisfied
with the animal creation, God created "the gods" who are always
happy and can know both their inner feelings and ideas, and also
the external objects, and communicate with one another. Being
dissatisfied with that creation also He created "men," which
creation is called ar1-,•ak-srotas as distinguished from the creation of
gods which is called ii.rddhva-srotas. These men have an abundance
of lamas and rajas, and they have therefore a preponderance of
1 In the Sii'!zkhya-kiirikii, 49, we hear of twenty-eight 'l'iidhiis. The reference
Ahirbudlznya.
2 Viiyu Pura~za, 3· 23.
3 tac-chiistra-yuktyii sva-mati-prayatniit
samastam iivi~krta-dhr-dhrtibhyal:z. Ibid. 3. 24.
It speaks of five pmmii1J.as. Ibid. 4· I6.
5
' Ibid. 4· .zs. Ibid. 4· 24.
504 Philosophical Speculations of Selected Puriir;as [cH.
harman and their fruits are collected in it for determining ex-
perience, it is called citi. Since it remembers the past, it is called
smrti. Since it is the storehouse of all knowledge, it is called
mahii-tman. Since it is the knowledge of all knowledge, and since
it exists everywhere and everything exists in it, it is sa'f!lvit.
Since it is of the nature of knowledge, it is called jniina. Since
it is the cause of all desideratum of conflicting entities, it is called
vipura. Since it is the Lord of all beings in the world, it is called
lsvara. Since it is the knower in both the k~etra and the
k~etrajiia, and is one, it is called ka. Since it stays in the subtle
body (puryii1!l sete) it is called puru~a. It is called svayambhu,
because it is uncaused and the beginning of creation. ltfahiin being
stirred up by the creative desire manifests itself in creation through
two of its movements, conception (sa'f!lkalpa) and determination
(adhyavasiiya). It consists of three gu~as, sattva, rajas, and tamas.
With the preponderance of rajas, aha1J1kiira emerged from mahat.
With the preponderance of tamas there also emerges from mahat,
bhutii-di, from which the bhutas and tanmiitras are produced. From
this comes the iikiisa as vacuity which is associated \Vith sound.
From the modification of the bhutii-di the sound-potential (sabda-
tanmiitra) has been produced. When the bhutiidi covers up the
sound-potential, then the touch-potential was produced. \Vhen the
iikiisa covers up the sound-potential and the touch-potential, the
viiyu is produced. Similarly the other bhiitas and qualities are pro-
duced. The tanmiitras are also called avise~as. From the vaikiirika
or siittvika-aha'f!lkiira are produced the five cognitive and the five
conative senses and the manas 1 •
These gw_zas work in mutual co-operation, and thereby produce
the cosmic egg like a water-bubble. From this cosmic egg, the
k~etrajiia called Brahmii-also called Hiranyagarbha (the four-faced
God)-is produced. This god loses His body at the time of each
pralaya and gains a new body at the time of a new creation 2 • The
cosmic egg is covered by water, light, heat, air, iikiila, blzutiidi,
mahat, and avyakta. The eight prakrtis are also spoken of, and
probably the cosmic egg is the eighth cover3 •
1
This is Jifferent from other accounts. No function is ascribed to the
riijasa alw1Jlkiira, from which the conati\·e senses are generally derived.
2 V iiyu Puriir_za, 4· 68.
3 The passage is obscure, as it is difficult to find out exactly what these eight
2
1 Skanda Purii~za, II. 9- 24, verses 1-10. Ibid. verses 65-74.
3 4
Padma Purii7Ja, I. 15, verses 164-177· Ibid. verses 177-186.
5 6
Ibid. verses I87-190. Niiradzya Purii7Ja, I. 3· 4·
8
7
Ibid. verse 9· Ibid. verse 7.
soB Philosophical Speculations of Selected Purii:l:zas [cH.
of Adhyiiya 33·
8 Niiradzya Purii1Ja, verses 4, S· ·
-sabda, sparsa, rupa and rasa. These four qualities entered smell-
potential, from which sprang into existence gross bhumi (the earth),
which has all the five qualities of sabda, sparsa, rupa, rasa, and
gandha.
Mahat, ahmrzkiira and the five tanmiitras are in themselves un-
able to produce the orderly universe, which is effected through the
superintendence of the puru~a (puru~ii-dh~thitatviic ca) and by the
help of avyakta (avyaktii-nugrahe1Ja). The universe thus created has
seven coverings. The production of the universe, and its mainten-
ance and ultimate dissolution, are all effected through the playful
activity (sva-lilayii) of God for the benefit of his devotees 1 •
1 The God is called NarayaQ.a, because He is the ultimate support of all
human beings:
narii~iim ayana1Jl. yasmiit tena niiriiya~as smrta!z.
Kurma Purii~a, IV. 62.
APPENDIX TO VOLU1V1E I
THE LOKAYATA, NASTIKA AND CARVAKA
passage; in the previous sentence there was a word viidassiidana which was
translate~ as "through the pleasure they take in discussion," whereas the literal
translation would be "by the taste (assiida) of the disputation," and here it
means " pursuing that smell" people do not turn their minds to virtuous
deeds.
Dill 33
Appendix to Volume I
progress in merit 1 ." Thus, from the above and from many other
passages from the Pali texts it is certain that the Lokiiyata means a
kind of tricky disputation, sophistry or casuistry practised by the
non-Buddhists which not only did not lead to any useful results but
did not increase true wisdom and led us away from the path of
Heaven and of release. The common people \Vere fond of such
tricky discourses and there was a systematic science (Siistra or
sattha) dealing with this subject, despised by the Buddhists and
called the ~·itm;ujii-sattlza 2 • Lokiiyata is counted as a science along
with other sciences in Diglzanikiiya, 111. 1. 3, and also in A1iguttara,
I. 163, and in the Di·vyii~·adiina it is regarded as a special branch of
study which had a bhii~ya and a pravacana (commentaries and
annotations on it) 3 •
There seems to be a good deal of uncertainty regarding the
meaning of the word Lokiiyata. It consists of two words, lolw and
iiyata or ayata; iiyata may be derived as ii + ym!z + kta or from
ii + yat (to make effort)+ a either in the accusative sense or in the
sense of the verb itself, and ayata is formed with the negative
particle a and yat (to make effort). On the passage in the Agga-
va~nsa which has already been referred to, it is derived firstly as
a+ yatanti (makes great effort) and the synonyms given are
ussiilzanti viiyamanti, and secondly as a+ yatanti, i.e. by which
people cease to make efforts (lena loko na yatati na zhati ~·ii iokii-
yatam). But Prof. Tucci quotes a passage from Buddhaghoso's
Siirattha-pakiisini where the word iiyata is taken in the sense of
1 See Dialogues of the Buddha, I. 168. The translation is inexact. The
phrase "All is impure; all is not impure" seems to be absent in the Pali text. The
last passage quoted from Vidhura-pa~u;lita-jiitaka (Fausboll, n, p. z86) which is
one of the most ancient of the jiitakas runs as follows: "na se?.:e lokiiyatika1Jz na'
etam paiiiiiiya vaddlzana1Jz." The unknown commentator describes the lokiiyatika
as " lokayiitikan ti anattha-nissitam sagga-maggiinii'!l adiiyaka'!l ani'yyiinikam
vitm;rja-salliipam lokiiyatika-'l•iida1!Z na se'l.·eyya." The Lokiiyata leads to mis-
chievous things and cannot lead to the path of Heaven or that of release and is
only a tricky disputation which does not increase true wisdom .
•2 Rhys Davids seems to make a mistake in supposing that the word l 'idaddlw
in Vidaddhan"idi is only the same word as 'l'ita~ujii wrongly spclt (Dialogues of the
Buddha, 1. 167) in the Atthasiilinz, pp. 3, 90, 92, 241. The word 'l'idaddha is
not 'l'itm;rjc"i but 7.ndagdha which is entirely differ~nt from 7.·ita~ujii.
3
lokiiyata'!l bhii~ya-pravacanam, Di·vyii'l.·adiina, p. 630; also clzandas£ 'l'ii
'l•yiikarm;e 'l'ii lokiiyate ·vii pramii~za-mtmii'!lsii)'ii'f!l 'l.'ii na cai-~iim iihii-pohab pra-
jiziiyate. Ibid. p. 633.
It is true, however, that lokiiyata is not always used in the sense of a technical
logical science, but sometimes in its etymological sense (i.e. what is prc\·alcnt
among the people, loke~u ayato lokii-yatab) as in Di7.')'ii'L·adiina, p. 619, where we
find the phrase "lokt"iyata-yajiia-mautre~u ni~~zcllab."
The Lokiiyata, N iistika and Ciirviika
ayatana (basis), and lokayata according to this interpretation means
"the basis of the foolish and profane world 1 ." The other meaning
of lokayata would be loke~u ayata, i.e. that which is prevalent
among the common people, and this meaning has been accepted by
Cowell in his translation of Sarva-darsana-saf!lgraha and here the
derivation would be from a+ yam+ kta (spreading over) 2 • The
Amara-ko~a only mentions the word and says that it is to be in the
neuter gender as lokayatam. It seems that there are two lokayata
words. One as adjective meaning "prevalent in the world or
among the common people" and another as a technical word
meaning "the science of disputation, sophistry and casuistry"
(vitm:u;la-vada-satthaf!l); but there seems to be no evidence that the
word was used to mean "nature-lore," as suggested by Rhys
Davids and Franke, or "polity or political science" as suggested
by other scholars. The Sukra-niti gives a long enumeration of the
science and arts that were studied and in this it counts the nastika-
sastra as that which is very strong in logical arguments and regards
all things as proceeding out of their own nature and considers that
there are no \Tedas and no god 3 • l\ledhatithi, in commenting upon
Manu, VII. 43, also refers to the tarka-vidya of the Carvakas, and all
the older references that have been discussed show that there was
a technical science of logic and sophistry called the Lokayata.
Fortunately we have still further conclusive evidence that the
Lokayata-sastra with its commentary existed as early as the time
of Katyayana, i.e. about 300 B.c. There is a Vartika rule associated
with vn. 3· 45 "van;aka-tanta·ve upasaf!lkhyanam," that the word
'lJan;aka becomes van:zaka in the feminine to mean a blanket or a
wrapper (pra·cara~a), and Patafijali (about 150 B.c.), in inter-
. preting this vartika sutra, says N-lat the object of restricting the
formation of the word var~aka only to the sense of a cotton or
woollen wrapper is that in other senses the feminine form would
probably Nature-lore, wise sayings, riddles, rhymes and theories, handed down
by tradition, as to the cosmogony, the clements, the stars, the weather, scraps of
astronomy, of elementary physics, even of anatomy, and knowledge of the nature
of precious stones, and of birds and beasts and plants (Dialogues of the Buddha,
1. 171). Franke translates it as "logische beweisende Naturerklarung," Digha, 19.
3 yuktir vauyasi yatra sarva1Jz svtibhavika1Jl mala1Jl-kasyii'pi ne'i·varal:z kartii na
believe in the future world (para-loka) or in the sacrificial creed. Thus he says,
haitukii. nastikii niisti paraloko, niisti dattam, nc"isti hutam ity ev·a'!z sthita-praJiiii!z.
4 Jl1anu, xn. 111.
5 paralokab asti'ti yaS)'a matir asti sa iistikafz, tadn"parito nc"istika?z; pramc1-
1}ii-nupiitinl yasya mati}_z sa di~tika}_z. Kiisiku on Pal)ini, IV. 4· 6o. Jayiiditya lived
in the first half of the seventh century.
The Lokiiyata, Nastika and Ciirviika 5'9
definition of niistika in lV1anu's own words as one who controverts
the Vedic doctrines (veda-nindaka 1 ). Thus the word niistika means,
firstly, those who do not believe in the existence of the other world
or life after death, and, secondly, those who repudiate the Vedic
doctrines. These two views, however, seem to be related to each
other, for a refu~al to believe in the Vedic doctrines is equivalent to
the denial of an after-life for the soul and also of the efficacy of the
sacrifice. The niistika view that there is no other life after the
present one and that all consciousness ceases with death seems to be
fairly well established in the U pani!?adic period; and this view the
Upani!?ads sought to refute. Thus, in the Katha Upani~ad Naciketa
says that there are grave doubts among the people whether one does
or does not exist after death, and he was extremely anxious to have
a final and conclusive answer from Yama, the lord of death2 •
Further on Yama says that those who are blinded with greed think
only of this life and do not believe in the other life and thus con-
tinually fall victims to death3 • Again, in the Brhad-iirm:zyaka
Upani~ad (11. 4· 12, IV. 5· 13) a view is referred to by Yajfiavalkya
that consciousness arises from the elements of matter and vanishes
along with them and that there is no consciousness after death 4 •
J ayanta says in his Nyiiya-maiijari that the Lokiiyata system was
based on views expressed in passages like the above which repre-
sent only the opponent's (piir'vu-pa~a) view 5 • Jayanta further states
in the same passage that no duties are prescribed in the lokiiyata;
it is only a work of tricky disputation (vaita1}r;lika-kathai'vii'sau) and
not an iigama6 •
References to the niistikas are found also in the Buddhist litera-
1 Jl.fanu, 11. 11. Medhatithi in explaining niistikii'-kriintam (Manu, VIII. 22)
identifies niistikas with lokiiyatas who do not believe in the other world. Thus
he says, yathii ndstikai/:z para-lokii-paviidibhir lokiiyatikii-dyair iikriintam. But in
Manu, IV. 163, niistikya is explained by him as meaning the view that the Vedic
doctrines are false: 'i:eda-pramar:rakiiniim arthiinii'!l mithyiitvii-dhyavasiiyasya
niistikya-iabdena pratipiidanam.
:: ye'yam prete 'f.:icikitsii manzJF)'e astf'ty eke nii'yam astl'ti cai'ke, etad-vidyiim
anuii$1as t'l.·ayii' ha'!l varii~zii'!l eFa 'fJaras trtzyah. Katha, 1. 20.
3 na siimpariiyal:z pratibhiiti biila'!l pramiidy-anla'!l 'l.'itta-mohena miitfham; a}'a1f1
loko niisti para iti miinf punah punar vaiam iipadyate me. Ibid. II. 6.
4 vijiiiina-ghana e'l'a etebhyal:z bhiitebhyo samutthiiya tiiny evii'nuvinaiyati, na
that there is neither virtue nor vice and thus no action can lead to
any fruit 1 • This is what is here called the doctrine of akiriya and it
is in a way an answer to the question what may be the visible re-
ward in this life of being a recluse. Since there is neither virtue nor
vice, no action can produce any meritorious or evil effect-this is
one kind of niitthikaviida. But it is wrong to confuse this akiriya2
doctrine with the doctrine of inactivity (akiiraka-viida) attributed
to Sarpkhya by Silailka in his commentary on Sutra-krtiifiga-siltra,
1. 1. 13. That akiiraka doctrine refers to the Sarpkhya view that the
souls do not participate in any kind of good or bad deeds 3 •
Let us now turn to another nihilistic teacher, viz. Ajita Kesa-
kambali. His doctrines are briefly described· in Digha, 11. 22-24,
where Ajita says: "There is no such thing as alms or sacrifice or
offering. There is neither fruit nor result of good or evil deeds.
There is no such thing as this world or the next (n' atthi ayaf!Z loko
na paro loko). There is neither father nor mother, nor beings
springing into life without them. There are in the world no recluses
or Brahmins who have reached the highest point, who walk per-
fectly and who, having understood and realized, by themselves
alone, both this world and the next, make their wisdom known to
others. A human being is built up of the four elements; when he
dies the earth in him returns and relapses to the earth, the fluid to
the water, the heat to the fire, his wind to the air, and his faculties
pass into space. The four bearers, with the bier as the fifth, take the
dead body away; till they reach the burning ground men utter
eulogies, but there his bones are bleached and his offerings end in
ashes. It is a doctrine of fools, this talk of gifts. It is an empty lie,
mere idle talk, when men say there is profit therein. Fools and wise
alike, on the dissolution of the body, are cut off, annihilated and
after death they are not." 4 Ajita Ke8akambali was so called because
he used to wear a garment made of human hair which was hot in
summer and cold in winter and was thus a source of suffering. 4
It is easy to see that Ajita Kesakambali's views were very similar to
1 Buddhaghoso, in commenting on it says, sabbathiipi piipapunniinam
kiriyam eva pafikkhipati. Sumangala-viliisinl, I. 160.
2 This has been interpreted by Dr Barua as representing the doctrine of
PuraQa Kassapa, which is evidently a blunder. Prebuddhistic Indian Philosophy,
Calcutta, 1921, p. 279.
3 bale ca pa'}l}.ite kiiyassa bhedii ucchi_jjanti vinassa11ti, na honti param mara'}ii
pure and free from karma and thus attains mok~a, but seeing the success of its
favourite doctrines it becomes joyous and seeing them neglected it becomes
angry, and then being born again attains purity and freedom from karma by the
performance of good deeds and is again born through joy and antipathy as be-
fore. Their canonical work is one containing twenty-one siltras. In commenting
on 1. 3· 3· I I thlanka mentions also the Digambaras along with the Ajrvakas, but
it does not seem that he identifies them in the way Hoemle states in his scholarly
article on the Ajzvakas in the Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics. The exact
phrase of Silanka is iijrvakii-dinii'!l para-tlrthikiinii'!l digamvariit;zii'!l ca asad-
iicaranair upaneyii.
2 Hoernle, in his article on the Ajrvakas in the Encyclopaedia of Religion and
Ethics, says: "From this fact that Gosala is called Makkhaliputta or Mankhali
(Maskarin), i.e. the man of the bamboo staff, it is clear that originally he belonged
Appendix to Volume I
as Ajivakas 1 • It is, therefore, very doubtful whether the Ajivakas
could be identified with the Digambara Jains unless by a confusion
in later times, probably on account of the fact that both the Digam-
baras and the Ajivakas went about naked 2 •
The fundamental tenet of Gosala appears in more or less the
same form in Uviisagadasiio, 1. 97, I IS, II. I I I, IJ2, Sarrzyutta
Nikiiya, III. 2IO, Aiiguttara Nikiiya, 1. 286 and the Dfgha Nikiiya,
II. 20. In the last-mentioned work Gosala is reported to say to king
Ajatasatru: "There is no cause for the sufferings of beings; they
therefore all suffer without any cause; there is no cause for the
purity (visuddhi) of beings; they all become pure without any cause;
there is no efficiency in one's own deeds or in the deeds of others
(n' atthi atta-kiire na'tthi parakiire) or in one's free efforts (puri~a
kiire); there is no power, no energy, no human strength or heroic
endeavours (pariikkama) 3 • All vertebrates (sabbe sattii), all animals
with one or more senses (sabbe pii~ii), all lives emanating from eggs
or ovaries (sabbe bhutii), all vegetable lives, are without any power
or efficiency. They become transformed in various forms by their
inherent destiny, by their manifestation in various life-forms, and
by their different natures (niyati-saizgati-bhava-pari~ati), and it is
in accordance with their six kinds of life-states that they suffer
pains and enjoy pleasures." Again, in the Sutra-krtiiizga szl.tra, II.
6. 7, Gosala is reported to say that there is no sin for ascetics in
having intercourse with women 4 • These doctrines of Gosala
to the class of eka-dm:uJins (or da'}t}in) ascetics; and, though he afterwards joined
Mahavira and adopted his system, he held some distinguishing tenets of his own,
and also retained his old distinguishing mark, the bamboo staff." This is all very
doubtful, for firstly mankha and maskarin cannot be identified; secondly, mankha
means a beggar who carried pictures in his hands-mankhas citra-phalaka-'l'yagra-
karo bhik~ka-vise~a!z (Abhayadeva Suri's comment on the Bhagavatl-siUra,
p. 662. Nirnaya Sagara ed.). Gosala's father was a mankha and his name was
Mankhali from which Gosala was called Makkhaliputta. Both JacoLi (Jain a
Sutras, II. 267 footnote) and Hoernle (Afi'l·aka, Encyclopaedia of Rel~gion and
Ethics, p. 266) are here wrong, for the passage referred to is Silanka's com-
mentary on Sutra-krtiiizga-siitra, III. J. I I (iijlvakii-dlniim para-tlrthikiiniif!Z
digamvarii'}ii'!Z ca ), and the "ca" in the passage which is to be translated as "and "
and not as "or" distinguishes the Jfjz·vakas from the Digam·varas.
1
nagnii to dig-viisii!z k~apar;a!z sramar;as ca jz·cako jaina!z, iiji'L·o mala-dhiirl
nirgrantha!z kathyate ~at}bhi~z. II. I 90.
2 Divyiivadiina, p. 427, refers to an episode where a Bw;Jdha image was dis-
other dead bodies. Thus, when he was challenged by Mahavira, who forbade his
disciples to hold any intercourse with him, he is reported to have said that the
Makkhaliputta Gos~tla who was the disciple of Mahavira was long dead and born
in the abode ofthe gods while he was in reality Udayi-kuQ<;liyayal)iya, who in the
seventh and the last change of body through reanimation had entered Gosala's
body. According to Gosala, a soul must finish eighty-four thousand mahii-kalpas
during which it must be born seven times in the abode of the gods and seven
times as men, undergoing seven reanimations, exhausting all kinds of karmas.
See Bhagavati-sutra, xv. 673, Nirl)aya Sagaraed. See also Hoernle's two Ap-
pendices to his translation of Uviisagadasiio and the article on Ajfvika, Encyclo-
paedia of Religion and Ethics, p. 262. A mahii-kalpa is equal to Joo,ooo saras and
one sara is the time required to exhaust the sands of the seven Ganges (each
Ganges being soo yojanas or 2250 miles in length, 2! miles in breadth, and
so dhanus or 100 yards in depth), at the rate of putting xoo years for the removal
of one grain of sand. See ibid.; also Rockhill's Appendix I to his Life of the
Buddha.
2 According to Silanka they were a sect of Buddhists wearing blue garments,
prasiddlzam anumiina1,n ciirviikair apl'~yate e·va, yat tu kais cit laukikmJt miirgam
atikramya anwniinam ucyate tan ni~idlzyate. Vadideva Suri also quotes a siitra
of Purandara in his commentary Syiid'L·iida-mtniikiira on his Pramii1Ja-1laya-tattz·a-
lokii-latikiira, 11. I 3 I : pramii7Jasya gau7Jat'L·iid anumiiniid artlza-niscaya-durlablziit.
3 avyablziciirii-·vagamo hi laukika-lzetilniim
mmmeyii'·vagame nimittartt sa niisti tmztra-siddhe~u ·
iti na tebhyal:z parok~ii-rthii'·vagamo nyiiyyo'ta idam
uktam anumiiniid artha-niscayo durlabha~z.
The Lokiiyata, Niistika and Ciirviika 537
apply against the Jaina view of inference which is based on the
principle of necessary implication (anyathii-nupapattli.v eva tat-svarii-
patvena svikli.rli.t).
Other objections also made against the possibility of a valid in-
ference are as follows: ( 1) impressions made by inferential know-
ledge are dim and not so vivid (aspa~tatvli.t) as those produced by
perception; ( 2) inference has to depend on other things for the de-
termination of its object (svartha-niscaye para-pek~atvli.t); (3) in-
ference has to depend on perception (pratyak~a-piirvakatvli.t);
(4) inferential cognitions are not directly produced by the objects
(arthad anupajiiyamli.natviit); (5) inference is not concrete (avastu-
vi~ayatvli.t); (6) it is often found contradicted (badhyamiinatvli.t);
(7) there is no proof which may establish the law that every case of
the presence of the hetu should also be a case of the presence of the
sadhya (sadhya-sadhanayol;z pratibandha-sadhaka-pramli.tJli.-bhiivad
vii)l. None of these can be regarded as a reason why inference
should be regarded as invalid from the Jaina point of view. For in
reply to the first objection it may be pointed out that vividness has
never been accepted as a definition of pramli.1Ja, and therefore its
absence cannot take away the validity of an inference; illusory per-
ceptions of two moons are vivid, but are not on that account re-
garded as valid. Again, an inference does not always depend on
perception, and even if it did, it utilized its materials only for its
own use and nothing more. Perception also is produced from
certain materials, but is not on that account regarded as invalid.
The inference is also produced from objects and is as concrete as
perception since like it it involves universals and particulars.
Again, false inferences are indeed contradicted, but that is no
charge against right inferences. The invariable relationship be-
tween a hetu and a siidhya can be established through mental
reasoning (tarka) 2 •
J ayanta points out in this connection that a law of universal
agreement of the siidhya with the hetu has to be admitted. For an
inference cannot be due to any mere instinctive flash of intelligence
(pratibhii). If a knowledge of invariable and unconditional agree-
ment was not regarded as indispensable for an inference, and if it
was due to a mere instinctive flash, then the people of the Cocoanut
1
Vadideva Suri's Syadvada-ratt~tikara, pp. 131, 132. Nirl).aya Sagara Press,
1914- 2 Ibid.
Appendix to Volume I
island who do not know how to make fire would have been able to
infer fire from smoke. Some say that the invariable association of
the lzetu with the siidhya is perceived hy mental perception (miinasa-
pratyak~a). They hold that in perceiving the association of smoke
with fire and the absence of the former when the latter is absent,
the mind understands the invariable association of smoke with fire.
It is not necessary in order to come to such a generalization that one
should perceive t!-le agreement of smoke and fire in all the infinite
number of cases in which they exist together, for the agreement
observed in the mind is not between smoke and fire but between
smoke-ness and fire-ness (fz:alanat~·ii-di-samiinya-purabsaratayii
~')·iipti-grahm;iit). The objection against this view would be the
denial of class-concepts as held by the Carvakas, Buddhists, and
others. There are others, again, who say that even if universals are
admitted, it is impossible that there should be universals of all cases
of absence of fire as associated with the absence of smoke, and
under the circumstances unless all positive and negative instances
could he perceived the inductive generalization would be im-
possible. They, therefore, hold that there is some kind of mystic
intuition like that of a yogin (yogi-pratyak:'ia-kalpat!z) by which the
invariable relation (pratibandha) is realized. Others hold that an
experience of a large number of positive instances unaccompanied
by any experience of any case of failure produces the notion of
concomitance. But the Nyaya insists on the necessity of an ex-
perience of a large number of instances of agreement in presence
and absence for arriving at any inductive generalization of con-
comitance1. The Carvakas, of course, say to this that in deter-
mining the unconditional invariable agreement of every case of a
hetu with its siidlzya the absence of visible conditions may be
realized by perception; but the possibility of the existence of in-
visible conditions cannot be eliminated even by the widest ex-
perience of agreement in presence, and thus there would ah,·ays be
the fear that the invariable concomitance of the hetu with the
siidhya may be conditional, and thus all inference has the value of
more or less probability but not of certainty, and it is only through
perceptual corroboration that the inferences come to be regarded
as valid2 • The reply of Nyaya to this is that the assertion that in-
1 Nyii:ya-manjarl, p. 122.
2 athii-numiinm.n na pramii1}a'f!l yogyo-piidhiniirJZ )''"Jg)'ii-rwpalabdhyii'bhiinl-ni.~
caye' py' ayogyo-piidhi-swikayii '<yahhiciira-SWJlSa_\'tll satasab sa/zacaritayor api
t-·yabhiciiro-palabdhes ca loke dhiimii-di-dursanii-ntara~n 'l:almyii'di-'l·_\·m:ahc"iras ca
The Lokiiyata, N iistika and Ciirviika 539
ference is not valid is itself an inference based on the similarity of
inferential processes with other invalid mental processes. But this
does not properly refute the Carvaka position that inductive
generalizations are only probable, and that therefore (as Purandara
says) they acquire some amount of validity by being corroborated
by experience and that they have no force in spheres where they
cannot be corroborated by perceptual experience.
Since the Carvakas do not attribute any more validity to in-
ference than probability, other forms of pramli1Jas, such as the
testimony of trusty persons or the scriptures, analogy or implica-
tion, also were not regarded as valid. According to Udayana's
statement, the Carvakas denied the existence of anything that was
not perceived, and Udayana points out that if this doctrine is con-
sistently applied and people begin to disbelieve all that they do not
perceive at any particular time, then all our practical life will be
seriously disturbed and upset 1 • The school of dhurta Ciirviikas, in
their Sutra work, not only denied the validity of inference but
criticized the Nyaya categories as enunciated in the Nyiiya-sutra,
I. 1. 1, and tried to establish the view that no such enumeration of
categories was possible 2 • It is no doubt true that the Carvakas ad-
mitted perception as the only valid pramli7Ja, but since illusions
occurred in perception also, ultimately all pramli7Jas were regarded
as indeterminable by them.
The Carvakas had to contend on the one hand with those who
admitted a permanent soul, such as the Jains, the Naiyayikas, the
Saq1khya-yoga and the l\1imaq1sa, and on the other hand with the
idealistic Buddhists who believed in a permanent series of con-
scious states; for the Carvakas denied all kinds of existence after
death. Thus they say that since there is no permanent entity that
abides after death, there is no existence after death. As the body,
understanding and sense-functions, are continually changing, there
cannot be any existence after death, and hence no separate soul can
be admitted. According to some, Carvakas consciousness is pro-
sambha1•ana-miitrat saf!Zviidena ca priimii1Jyii-bhimiiniid. Tattva-cintiima7Ji
Annumiti. For a similar view see Russel, "On the notion of Cause" in his
1llysticism and Logic.
1
Udayana's lv-yiiya-husumiii1jali, 111. 5, 6.
2 ciir·ciika-dhilrtas tu athii'tas tattva1Jt vyiikhyiisyiima iti pratijniiya pramii7Ja-
INDIAN PHILOSOPHY
BY
SURENDRANATH DASGUPTA
VOLUME IV
INDIAN PLURALISM
CA:\1 BRIDGE
-\T THE UNIVERSITY PRESS
PUBLISHED BY
THE SYNDICS OF THE CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
tqht
RABINDRANATH TAGORE,
and those martyrs and patriots who have
died or worked
for the liberation and elevation of
India
THIS HUMBLE WORK, WHICH SEEKS TO DISCOVER
INDIA AT ITS BEST AND HIGHEST, IS
DEDICATED WITH SINCEREST
REVERENCE AND
HUMILITY
PREFACE
THE third volume of the present series was published in 1940.
The manuscript of the fourth volume was largely ready at that
time and it would have been possible to send it for publication at
least by 1942. But the second world-war commenced in 1939 and
although the Cambridge University Press was prepared to accept
the manuscript even during war-time, the despatch of the manu-
script from Calcutta to Cambridge and the transmission of proofs
to and fro between England and India appeared to me to be too
risky. In 1945, after retiring from the Chair of Philosophy in the
Calcutta University, I came to England. But shortly after my arrival
here I fell ill, and it was during this period of illness that I revised
the manuscript and offered it to the University Press. This explains
the unexpected delay between the publication of the third volume
and the present one. The promises held out in the preface to the
third volume, regarding the subjects to be treated in the present
volume, have been faithfully carried out. But I am not equally
confident now about the prospects of bringing out the fifth volume.
I am growing in age and have been in failing health for long years.
The physical and mental strain of preparing a work of this nature
and of seeing it through the Press is considerable, and I do not
know if I shall be able to stand such a strain in future. But I am
still collecting the materials for the fifth volume and hope that I
may be able to see it published in my life-time.
The present volume deals with the philosophy of the Bhiigavata-
purii1Ja, the philosophy of Madhva and his followers, the philosophy
of Vallabha and the philosophy of the Gau<;liya school of Vai~I)avism.
So far as I know, nothing important has yet been published on the
philosophy of the Bhiigavata-purii1Ja and that of Vallabha. Two
important works by Mr Nagaraj a Sarma of Madras and by Professor
Helmuth von Glasenapp on the philosophy of Madhva have been
published in English and German respectively. But so far nothing
has appeared about the philosophy of the great teachers of the
Madhva school such as Jaya-tirtha and Vyasa-tirtha. Very little is
known about the great controversy between the eminent followers
of the Madhva school of thought and of the followers of the
Vlll Preface
Sankara school of Vedanta. In my opinion Jaya-tirtha and Vyasa-
tirtha present the highest dialectical skill in Indian thought. There
is a general belief amongst many that monism of Sankara presents
the final phase of Indian thought. The realistic and dualistic
thought of the Sarp.khya and the yoga had undergone a compromise
with monism both in the Pural)as and in the hands of the later
writers. But the readers of the present volume who will be intro-
duced to the philosophy of Jaya-tirtha and particularly of Vyasa-
tirtha will realize the strength and uncompromising impressiveness
of the dualistic position. The logical skill and depth of acute
dialectical thinking shown by Vyasa-tirtha stands almost unrivalled
in the whole field of Indian thought. Much more could have been
written on the system of l\!Iadhva logic as explained in the Tarka-
tiil_ldava of Vyasa-tirtha. In this great work Vyasa-tirtha has
challenged almost every logical definition that appears in the
Tattva-cintiimani of Gangesa, which forms the bed-rock of the new
school of N yaya logic. But this could have been properly done
only in a separate work on the l\1adhva logic. Of the controversy
between the monists of the Sankara school and the dualists of the
l\1adhva school, most people are ignorant of the .1.\Iadhva side of
tht case, though there are many who may be familiar with the
monistic point of view. It is hoped that the treatment of the
philosophy of .1.\Iadhva and his followers undertaken in the present
volume will give new light to students of Indian thought and
will present many new aspects of dialectical logic hitherto undis-
covered in Indian or European thought.
The treatment of the philosophy of Vallabha which is called
visuddhiidvaita or pure monism, presents a new aspect of monism
and also gives us a philosophical analysis of the emotion of devotion.
Though readers of Indian philosophy may be familiar with the
name of Vallabha, there are but few who are acquainted with the
important contributions of the members of his school.
I have not devoted much space to the philosophy of the
Bhiigavata-puriil_la. l\iuch of its philosophical views had already
been anticipated in the treatment of the Sarp.khya, yoga and the
Vedanta. As regards the position of God and His relation to the
world the outlook of the Bhiiga·vata-puriil_la is rather ambiguous.
The Bhiigavata-puriil_la has therefore been referred to for support
by the Madhvas, Vallabhas and thinkers of the Gau9iya school.
Preface IX
CHAPTER XXIV
THE BHAGAVATA PURA~A
PAGB
The Bhiigavata-pura7}a •
2 Dharma 2
3 Brahman, Paramatman, Bhagavat and Parameivara II
4 Kapila's philosophy in the Bhiigavata-purii7}a 24
S Eschatology • 49
CHAPTER XXV
MADHVA AND HIS SCHOOL
Madhva's life 51
2 Madhva Gurus s6
3 Important Madhva works 57
4 Teachers and writers of the Madhva School . 90
s Ramanuja and Madhva • 94
CHAPTER XXVI
MADHVA'S INTERPRETATION OF THE BRAHMA-SUTRAS
CHAPTER XXVII
A GENERAL REVIEW OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF MADHVA
1 Ontology ISO
2 Pramii1}Qs (ways of valid knowledge) 160
3 Svatafz-priimii~ya (self-validity of knowledge) 168
4 Illusion and Doubt 173
s Defence of Pluralism (bheda) 178
xu Contents
CHAPTER XXVI I I
MADHVA LOGIC
PAGB
Perception 181
2 Inference (Anumiina) 184
3 Tarka (Ratiocination) 188
4 Concomitance (Vyiipti) 197
5 Epistemological process in Inference 200
6 Various considerations regarding Inference 200
7 Testimony 202
CHAPTER XXIX
CONTROVERSY BETWEEN THE DUALISTS AND
THE MONISTS
CHAPTER XXX
CONTROVERSY BETWEEN THE DUALISTS AND
THE MONISTS (cont.)
. CHAPTER XXXI
THE PHILOSOPHY OF V ALLABHA
PAGB
CHAPTER XXXII
CAITANYA AND HIS FOLLOWERS
Caitanya's biographers . 384
2 Life of Caitanya 385
3 Emotionalism of Caitanya 389
4 Gleanings from Caitanya-Caritiimrta on the subject of Caitanya's
philosophical views 390
5 Some companions of Caitanya 393
CHAPTER XXXIII
THE PHILOSOPHY OF JIVA GOSV AMI AND BALADEVA
VIDYABH0$A~A, FOLLOWERS OF CAITANYA
Ontology 396
2 Status of the World 405
3 God and His Powers 409
4 God's relation to His devotees 410
5 Nature of bhakti 415
6 Ultimate Realization 428
7 The joy of bhakti 430
8 The philosophy of Baladeva VidyAbhli!?aQa 438
INDEX 449
CHAPTER XXIV
THE BHAGAVATA-PUR)i.f;lA
The Bhagavata-pura:ga.
THE Bhiigavata-purii1Ja shares with the Bhagavad-gitii a unique
position in the devotional literature of India. It cannot however
claim the same antiquity: before the tenth century A.D. no references
to it have been discovered by the present writer. Even Ramanuja
(born in A.D. 1017) had not mentioned its name or made any
quotations from it. But by the time of Madhva the work had become
famous: one of the principal works of Madhva (thirteenth century
A.D.) is called the Bhiigavata-tiitparya, in which he deals with the
principal ideas of the Bhiigavata-purii1Ja, and lays emphasis on
them so far as they support his views. The thoughts of the
Bhiigavata-purii1Ja are loftily poetic, but the style is more
difficult. The present writer is of opinion that it must have been
composed by a Southerner, as it makes references to the A!vars,
who have probably never been referred to by any writer in Northern
or Upper India. The Bhiigavata-purii1Ja, however, was so much
appreciated that immediately commentaries were written upon it.
Some of these commentaries are :
Amrta-rangil;zi, Atmapriyii, Kr~'!la-padi, C aitanya-candrikii, Jaya-
mangalii, Tattva-pradipikii, T iitparya-candrikii, T iitparya-dipikii,
Bhagavallilii-cintiima1Ji, Rasa-maiijari, Sukapak~yii Prabodhini, a
tikii by Janardana Bhatta, a tikii by Narahari, Prakiisa by Srinivasa,
Tatt'lJa-dipikii by KalyaQ.a Raya, a tikii by Kp?Q.a Bhatta, a tikii by
Kaura Sadhu, a tikii by Gopala Cakravarti, Anvaya-bodhini by
Ctl(;lamal)i Cakravarti, Bhiiva-prakiisikii by Narasirp.hacarya, a tikii
by Yadupati, Subodhini by Vallabhacarya, Pada-ratniivali by
Vijayadhvaja-tirtha, a tikii by Vitthala Dik~ita, Siiriirtha-darsini by
Visvanatha Cakravarti, a tikii by Vi~I)usvamin, Bhiigavata-candrikii
by Viraraghava, Blziiviirtha-dipikii by Sivarama, Bhiiviirtha-dipikii
by Sridhara-svami, Sneha-pura'l}i by Kesavadasa, a tikii by Srivasa-
carya, a tikii by Satyabhinava-tirtha, a tikii by Sudarsana Suri,
a tikii by Braja-bhu~al).a, Bhiigavata-purii1Jiirka-prabhii by Hari-
bhanu, Blziigavata-puriil}a-prathama-Sloka-tikii by Jayarama and
2 The Bhiigavata-purii:l}a [cH.
Madhusiidana Sarasvati, Paiicama-skandha-tikii by Vallabhadirya,
Subodhini by Balak~Q.a Y ati, V ai~ava-to#~i by Sanatana Gosvami,
Budharaiijini by Vasudeva, Nibandha-prakiisa by Vinhala Dik~ita,
Anukrama~ikii by Vallabhacarya, Ekiidaia-skandha-tiitparya-cand-
rikii by Brahmananda, Anukrama~ikii by Vopadeva. Many other
works also have been written on the diverse subjects of the
Bhiigavata-purii7Ja and some have also summarized it. Some of
these works are by Ramananda-tirtha, Priyadasa, Visvesvara,
Puru~ottama, Srinatha, v rndavana Gosvami, Vi~I).U Puri and
Sanatana.
Dharma.
The word dharma, ordinarily translated as "religion" or
"virtue," is used in very different senses in the different schools
and religious traditions of Indian thought. It will be useful to deal
with some of the more important of these notions before the reader
is introduced to the notion of dharma as explained in the Bhiigavata-
purii~a. The Mimii'!lsii-siitra begins with an enquiry regarding the
nature of dharma, and defines it as that good which is determinable
only by the Vedic commands. 1 According to Sahara's and
Kumarila's interpretation, the good that is called dharma means
the Vedic sacrifices that lead to good results-the attainment of
Heaven and the like. The fact that the Vedic sacrifices may bring
about desirable results of various kinds can neither be perceived
by the senses nor inferred from other known data; it can be known
only from the testimony of the Vedic commands and directions.
Dharma, therefore, means both the good results attainable by the
Vedic sacrifices and the sacrifices themselves, and, as such, it
is determinable only by the Vedic injunctions. Desirable results
which are attained by rational and prudent actions are not dharma:
for by definition dharma means only those desirable results which
are attainable by operations which are performed strictly in ac-
cordance with Vedic injunctions. But in the Vedas are described
various kinds of sacrifices by the performance of which one may
take revenge on his enemies by destroying them or causing grievous
injuries of various kinds to them, but action causing injury to any
fellow-being is undesirable, and such action cannot be dharma.
1 athiito dlzarma-jijniisii. .\llmii'!lsii-siUra, 1. 1. 1.
codanii-lak~ano'rtho dharma!•- Ibid. 1. 1. 2.
XXIV) Dharma 3
Dharma in this sense has nothing to do with God, or with ordinary
or customary morality, or any kind of mystical or religious fervour
as we understand it now. It simply means Vedic rituals and the
good results that are supposed to follow from their performances;
it has but little religious or moral application; and such a dharma
can only be known through scriptural injunctions 1 . It contains
however just a little germ of the idea of non-injury, inasmuch as the
performance of rituals for injuring others is not included within its
content. Dharma also definitely rules out all kinds of emotion,
mystic feeling, and exercise of intellect or thought of any descrip-
tion, and merely presupposes a strict loyalty to external scriptural
commands; there is not the slightest trace here of any internal
spiritual law, or rational will, or loyalty to God's will. The scrip-
tural command however is categorically imperative in some cases,
whereas in others it is only conditionally imperative, i.e. conditioned
by one's desire for certain good things. Kumarila, in interpreting
this idea, says that any substance (dravya), action (kriya) or quality
(gu~) which may be utilized to produce happiness, by a particular
kind of manipulation of them in accordance with Vedic commands,
is called dharma 2 • Though these substances, qualities etc. may be
perceived by the senses yet the fact that their manipulation in a
particular ritualistic manner will produce happiness for the per-
1 ya eva ireyas-karab, sa eva dharma-sabdena ucyate; katham avagamyatiim;
yo hi yiigam anutifthati, taTJZ dhiirmika iti samiica~ate; yasca yasya kartii sa tena
vyapadiJyate; yathii piivakalz, liivaka iti. tena ya!z pu~aTJZ ni!zireyasena SaTJZyu-
nakti, sa dharma-sabdena ucyate ... ko'rthalz-yo nilzireyasiiya jyotiftomiidil;.
ko'narthalz-yalz pratyaviiyiiya!z. Sabara-bh{4ya on MimiiTJZsii-sutra, 1. 1. 2.
Prabhakara however gives a different interpretation of this rule, and suggests
that it means that every mandate of the Vedas is always binding, and is called
dharma even when by following it we may be led to actions which are injurious
to other people:
tatalz sarvasya vediirthasya ki>ryatvam arthatvaTJZ ca vidhryata iti syeniidi-
niyogiiniim api arthatvaTJZ syiit.
Siistra-drpikii, p. 17, Nirt).aya-sagara Press, Bombay, 1915.
Kumarila, further interpreting it, says that an action (performed according to the
Vedic commands) which produces happiness and does not immediately or
remotely produce unhappiness is calied dharma.
2 phalaTJZ tiivad adharmo'sya syeniidelz sampradhiiryate
yadii yene~ta-siddhil; syiid an~thiiniinubandhinf
tasya dharmatvam ucyeta tatalz syeniidi-varjanam
yadii tu codanii-gamya!z kiiryiikiiryiinapek~ayii
dharmalz pnti-nimittQTJZ syiit tadii syene'pi dharmatii
yadii tvaprui-hetur ya!z siik~iid vyavahito'pi vii
so'dharmas codaniitalz syiit tadii syene'py adharmatii.
Sloka-varttika, on sutra 2, sloka 27o-273.
I-2
4 The Blziigavata-purii~za [cH.
former can be known only by Vedic injunctions; and it is only with
regard to this knowledge that the dharma is dependent on the
Vedas 1 • Doing an injury to one's enemy may immediately give one
happiness, but by its nature it is bound to produce unhappiness in
the future, since it is prohibited by the Vedic injunctions. [But
injury to the life of animals in the performance of sacrifices does
not produce any sin, and must be regarded as being included
"·ithin dharma.]
On the other hand, there are actions performed with the motive
of injuring one's enemies, which are not commanded by the Vedas,
hut the methods of whose performance are described in the Vedas
only in the case of those who are actuated by such bad motives:
these actions alone are called adlzarma. Thus not all injury to life
is regarded as sinful, but only such as is prohibited by the Vedas:
whereas those injuries that are recommended by the Vedas are not
to be regarded as sin (adharma) but as virtue (dharma). By nature
there are certain powers abiding in certain substances, actions or
qualities which make them sinful or virtuous, but which are sinful
and which can only be known by the dictates of the scriptures 2 •
Dharma and adlzarma are thus objective characters of things,
actions, etc., the nature of which is only revealed by the scriptures.
It has already been noted above that Prabhakara gave an
entirely different meaning of dharma. With him dharma means
the transcendental product (apiirva) of the performance of
Yedic rituals which remains in existence long after the action is
completed and produces the proper good and bad effects at the
proper time 3 .
The smrti literature is supposed to have the Vedas as its sources,
and therefore it is to be regarded as authoritative; even when its
contents cannot be traced in the Vedas it is inferred that such Vedic
drm)'a-kriyii-gu~tiidlnii1!l dlzarmatz·m!L sthiipayiuate
te~iim aindriyakat?:e'pi na tiidnipye,_,a dlwrmatii
sreyafz-siidfw1lalii fly e,Wlf!l nit_l'm!l 'l'edcil pratlyate
tiidnipyeT_Ia ca dharnwtnl1!l tasman nendriya-gocara!t.
Sloka-nirttilw, szltra 2. 1 J, q ..
dluu-miidharnuirtlziblzir nil)'ll1!l mrgyau 'l'ldhi-ni~edlwlwu
knu·id llS)'ll ni,~iddftatnic c/wktifz siistre~za bodlzitci ...
'l·idym1ulnii hi kathyante ialltayo drm·ya-karma~ziim
tad e1·a cedm!l kurmeti Sii:;tram e?.•cinudlziinllti.
/hie/. 249, .Zj I.
~ llfl hi ;_, oti~!mntldi-_\'t~~as_\'ti{>i dlwrmat?·am asti. a{>url'liSJ'll dlwrmat?'ci-
l.hyu('aJ.:anull. .•. ;,Hlla-dt{>il.a,
. p ..lJ, Bombay, I1JI5.
XXIV) Dharma 5
texts must have existed 1 •
It is only when the smrtz IS directly
contradicted by the Vedas in any particul<;Ir injunction or statement
of fact that the former is to be regarded as invalid. The smrti works
are therefore generally regarded as a continuation of the Vedas,
though as a matter of fact the smrti works, written at different times
at a later age, introduce many new concepts and many new ideals;
in some of the smrtis, however, the teachings of the Purii:l)as and
Smrtis are regarded as possessing a lower status than those of the
Vedas 2 • On the relation of the Smrtis and the Vedas there are at
least two different views. The first view is that, if the Smrtis come
into conflict with the Vedas, then the smrti texts should be so in-
terpreted as to agree with the purport of the Vedic texts; and, if that
is not possible, then the smrti texts should be regarded as invalid.
Others hold that the conflicting smrti text should be regarded as
invalid. Mitra Misra, commenting on the above two views of the
Savara and Bhatta schools, says that, on the first view, it may be
suspected that the author of the conflicting smrti texts is not free
from errors, and as such even those non-conflicting smrti texts
which cannot be traced in the Vedas may be doubted as erroneous.
On the second view, however, smrt£ is regarded as valid, since no
one can guarantee that the non-conflicting texts which are not
traceable to the Vedas are really non-existent in the Vedas. Even
in the case of irreconcilably conflicting texts, the smrti directions,
though in conflict with the Vedic ones, may be regarded as
optionally valid 3 • The Vedic idea of dharma excludes from its
concept all that can be known to be beneficial, to the performer or
to others, through experience or observation; it restricts itself
wholly to those ritualistic actions, the good effects of which cannot
be known by experience, but can only be known through Vedic
commands 4 • Thus the digging of wells, etc., is directly known by
experience to be of public good (paropakiiriiya) and therefore is
not dharma. Thus nothing that is dntiirtha, i.e. no action, the
1
virodhe tvanapek~ya7!Z syiid asati hyanumiinam. Mzmii'!ZSii-rutra, I. 3· 3·
2
atafz sa paramo dharmo yo vediid avagamyate
a1-·ara!z sa tu vzj"iieyo ya!z purii~iid~ smrtafz
tathii ca vaidiko dharmo mukhya utkr~tatviit, smiirtafz anukalpa!z apakr~tatviit.
Vyiisa-smrti as quoted in Vzramitrodaya-paribh~iiprakiiia, p. 29.
3
See Vzramitrodaya, Vol. I, pp. 28, 29.
t tathii pratyupasthita-niyamiiniim iiciirii~ii'!Z dnfiirthatviid eva priimii~yam . ..
prapiis taf/.iigiini ca paropakiiriiya na dharmiiya ity evii'vagamyate.
Sabara-bhii~a on Mfmii'!ZSii-sutra, I. 3· 2.
6 The Bhiigavata-puriil}a [cH.
beneficial effects of which may be known through experience, can
be called dharma. The Angira/:z smrti echoes this idea when it says
that, excepting efforts for attaining self-knowledge, whatever one
does out of his own personal desire or wish is like child's play and
unnecessary 1 •
l\1any of the important Smrtis however seem to extend the limits
of the concept of dharma much further than the pure Vedic com-
mands. As Manu's work is based entirely on the purport of the
Vedas, he is regarded as the greatest of all smrti writers ; whatever
smrti is in conflict with Manu's writings IS invalid 2 • Manu defines
dharma as that which is always followed by the learned who are
devoid of attachment and antipathy, and that to which the heart
assents 3 • In another place Manu says that dharma is of four kinds;
the observance of the Vedic injunctions, of the injunctions of smrti,
the following of the customary practices of good people, and the
performance of such actions as may produce mental satisfaction
(iitmanas tustil:z) to the performer 4 • But the commentators are very
unwilling to admit any such extension of the content and meaning
of dharma. Thus Medhatithi (9th century), one of the oldest com-
mentators, remarks that dharma as following the Vedic injunctions
is beginningless; only the Vedic scholars can be said to know
dharma, and it is impossible that there should be other sources from
which the nature of dharma could be known. Other customs and
habits and disciplines of life which pass as religious practices are
introduced by ignorant persons of bad character (murkha-dui;Jila-
puru~a-pravarttital:z): they remain in fashion for a time and then
die out. Such religious practices are often adopted out of greed
( lobhiin mantra-tantriidi!u pravarttate) 5 • The wise and the good are
ashes, carrying hwnan skulls, going about naked or wearing yell'>w robes, are
adopted by worthless people as a means of living. Ibid. II. I.
XXIV) Dharma 7
only those who know the injunctions of the Vedas, who carry them
into practice out of reverence for the law, and who are not led
astray into following non-Vedic practices out of greed or antipathy
to others. And, though a man might be tempted in his mind to
perform many actions for his sense-gratification, real contentment
of the heart can come only through the performance of Vedic
deeds 1 • Consistently with his own mode of interpretation
Medhatithi discards not only the Buddhists and the Jains as being
outside the true Vedic dharma, but also the followers of Paiicaratra
(i.e. the Bhagavatas) and the Pasupatas as well, who believed in the
authority of the authors of these systems and in the greatness of
particular gods of their own choice. He held that their teachings
are directly contrary to the mandates of the Vedas: and as an
illustration he points out that the Bhagavatas considered all kinds
of injury to living beings to be sinful, which directly contradicts the
Vedic injunction to sacrifice animals at particular sacrifices. Injury
to living beings is not in itself sinful: only such injury is sinful as is
prohibited by the Vedic injunctions. So the customs and practices
of all systems of religion which are not based on the teachings of the
Vedas are to be discarded as not conforming to dhanna. In in-
terpreting the phrase smrti-Sile ca tad-vidiim, Medhatithi says that
the word Sila (which is ordinarily translated as "character") is to
be taken here to mean that concentration which enables the mind
to remember the right purports of the Vedic injunctions 2 • By
customary duties (aciira) Medhatithi means only such duties as are
currently practised by those who strictly follow the Vedic duties,
but regarding which no Vedic or smrti texts are available. He
supposes that minor auspices and other rituals which are ordinarily
1 In interpreting the meaning of the word hrdaya (heart) in the phrase
hrdayena abhyanujnata Medh.atithi says that the word hrdaya may mean "mind"
(manas, antar-hrdaya-vartnni buddhyiidi-tattviini); on this supposition he would
hold that contentment of mind could only come through following the Vedic
courses of duties. But, dissatisfied apparently with this meaning, he thinks that
hrdaya might also mean the memorized content of the Vedas (hrdaya'!l veda/;, sa
hy adhito bhiivanii-riipetJll hrdaya-sthito hrdayam). This seems to mean that a
Vedic scholar is instinctively, as it were, led to actions which are virtuous,
because in choosing his course of conduct he is unconsciously guided by his
Vedic studies. A man may be prompted to action by his own inclination, by the
example of great men, or by the commands of the Vedas; but in whichever way
he may be so prompted, if his actions are to conform to dharma, they must
ultimately conform to Vedic courses of duties.
2
samiidhil;z Silam ucyate •.. yac cetaso'nya-vMaya-vyiilqepa-pariharetJll siistrii-
rtha-niriipar;a-pravattatii tac chilam ucyate. Medh.atithi's commentary, n. 6.
8 The Bhagavata-purtiiJa [cH.
performed by the people of the Vedic circle have also ultimately
originated from the Vedic injunctions. Similarly it is only the
feeling of self-contentment of those persons who are habituated to
work in accordance with the Vedas that can be regarded as indi-
cating the path of dharma. It simply means that the instinctive
inclination of the true adherents of the Vedas may be relied on
as indicating that those actions to which their minds are inclined
must be consistent with the Vedic injunctions, and must therefore
conform to dharma. Other commentators however take a more
liberal view of the meaning of the words sila, iitmanas t~ti and
hrdaye1}a abhyanujiiiita. Thus Govindaraja explains the last phrase
as meaning "absence of doubt" (antab-kara1_Za-cikitsii-sunya), and
Narayal).a goes so far as to say that, unless the heart approves of the
action, it cannot be right: Ramananda says that, when there is any
doubt regarding two conflicting texts, one should act in a way that
satisfies his own mind. The word sila has been interpreted as
"character" (vrtta or caritra) by Ramananda in his Manvartha-
candrikii and as dissociation of attachment and antipathy by
Govindaraja: Kulluka takes it according to Harita's definition of
sila as involving the qualities of non-injury to others, absence of
jealousy, mildness, friendliness, gratefulness, mercy, peace, etc.
Self-satisfaction can in practice discern the nature of dharma, but
only when there are no specified texts to determine it. Thus, though
the other later commentators are slightly more liberal than Med-
hatithi, they all seem to interpret the slight concession that l\!lanu
had seemed to make to right character and self-contentment or
conscience as constituent elements of dharma, more or less on
Medhatithi's line, as meaning nothing more than loyalty to
scriptural injunctions.
It has been pointed out that Medhatithi definitely ruled out the
Pafi.caratra and the Pasupata systems as heretical and therefore
invalid for inculcating the nature of dharma. But in later times
these too came to be regarded as Vedic schools and therefore their
instructions also were regarded as so authoritative that they could
not be challenged on rational grounds 1 •
true nature, and then its relation to absolute truth and absolute
good is self-evident: the normal realization of this relationship is
what is called dharma or worship of God, or what Sndhara calls
the tender worshipfulness towards God. The primary qualifications
needed for a person to make a start towards a true realization of the
nature of dharma in himself are, that he should have no jealousy
towards others, and that he should have a natural feeling of friendli-
ness towards all beings. The implications of this concept of dhanna
in the Bhagavata, which breaks new ground in the history of the
development of the notion of dharma in Indian Philosophy, are
many, and an attempt will be made in the subsequent sections to
elucidate them. That this dissociation from all extraneous elements
ultimately means motiveless and natural flow of devotion to God
by which the spirit attains supreme contentment, and that it is
supreme dharma, is very definitely stated in 1. 2. 6: If anything
which does not produce devotion to God can be called dharma,
such a dharma is mere fruitless labour 1 . For the fruits of dharma
as defined by the Vedic injunctions may lead only to pleasurable
consequences which are transitory. The real dharma is that which
through devotion to God leads ultimately to self-knowledge, and
as such dharma cannot be identified with mere gain or fulfilment of
desires. Thus dharma as supreme devotion to God is superior to
the Vedic definition of dharma, which can produce only sense-
gratification of various kinds.
1
advayatva7Jl ca asya s·vaya7J1-siddha-tiid!siitiid!sa-tattviintariibhiiviit rea-
iaktyeka-sahiiyatviit, paramiiSraya7J1 ta7J1 vinii tiisiim asiddhatviic ca.
Tattt•a-sandarbha, p. 37·
2
Bhiigavata-purii't}a, XI. 3· 35-39.
XXIV] Brahman, Paramiitman, Bhagavat, Paramesvara 15
sa'!ljnii and k~etrajniikhya. This part"i mc"iyil or the s'l:ari"ipa-sakti is also sometimes
called yoga-miiyii.
2 !le'rtha'!l yat pratl_\'eta 1W pratlyeta Clitmani
tad ·cidyt"id iitmmw mc"iyii1!l _vathiibluiso yatlui tama/:z.
Bhiigavata, 11. 9· 33·
xx1v] Brahman, Paramiitman, Bhagavat, Paramesvara 17
undifferentiated. There exists no other entity similar or djs;similar
to it, and it is this fact that constitutes its infinitude and its reality.
According to them such a reality cannot have any separate power
or even any power which may be regarded as its essence (svarupa-
bhuta-sakti). For, if such a power were different from reality, it
could not be its identical essence; and if it were not different from
reality, it could not be regarded as being its power. If such an
essential power, as distinct from reality, be admitted, such a power
must be of the same nature as reality (i.e. of the nature of pure
consciousness); and this would make it impossible to conceive of
this power as contributing God's diverse manifestations, His
transcendent forms, abode and the like, which are admitted to be
the principal creed of the Vai!?I).avas. But against the views of the
followers of Sankara it may be urged that even they have to admit
that the Brahman has some power by which the world-appearance
is manifested; if the world is wholly a creation of miiyii and
Brahman has nothing to do in it, there is no good in admitting its
existence, and the maya would be all in all. This power cannot be
different in nature from the reality that possesses it, and, since the
nescience or avidyii cannot exist without Brahman, it is an addi-
tional proof that the avidyii is also one of his powers. The power of
any entity always exists in it as its own self even when it is not
manifested. If it is argued that the Brahman is self-shining and
that it does not require any power, it may be replied that the
very reason by virtue of which it is self-shining may be regarded
as its power. In this way Jiva follows some of the fundamental
points in R.amanuja's argument in favour of the doctrine that
ultimate reality, the Brahman, is not formless and qualityless, but
a qualified being, having its powers and qualities. In attempting
to prove this view Jiva follows briefly the central argument of
Ramanuja. But Jiva introduces the notion that the relation of the
qualities and powers of ultimate reality is supra-logical, inexplain-
able on logical grounds, and that therefore in a mysterious manner
the powers are different from reality and yet one with it; so that in
spite of the manifestation of ultimate reality as concrete God with
human forms, dress etc., He is, at the same time, unchanged in His
own changeless existence as Brahman. The introduction of the
mystic formula of incomprehensibility seems to discharge the
Vai!?I).avas of this school from all responsibility oflogically explaining
D IV
18 The Bhiigavata-purii1Jil [cH.
their dogmas and creeds, and, thus uncontrolled, they descend
from the domain of reason to the domain of the puriit;tic faith of a
mythological character.
In describing the special excellences of God, Jiva follows
R.amanuja in holding that He has none of the evil qualities that
are found in the world, but possesses all the excellent characters
that we can conceive of. In the light of the concept of incompre-
hensibility (acintya) all these excellent characters are regarded as
somehow manifestations of His essential power and therefore
identical with Him. The introduction of the supra-logical concept
of acintya enables Jiva and other interpreters of the Bhiigavata of
his school to indulge in eclecticism more freely than could other-
wise have been possible; and thus it is that, though Jiva follows
R.amanuja in admitting ultimate reality to be qualified, he can in
the same breath assert that ultimate reality is formless and character-
less. Thus he says that, though the followers of R.amanuja do not
accept the view of Brahman as characterless, yet admission of
characters naturally presupposes the admission of the characterless
also 1 • The idea of introducing the concept of the supra-logical in
order to reconcile the different scriptural texts which describe
reality as characterless (nirvi.Se~a), qualified (viliJta) and many, can
be traced to the introduction of the concept of viSe~a in the philo-
sophy of Madhva, already described in a previous chapter, by
which Madhva tried to reconcile the concept of monism with that
of plurality. The Bengal school of Vai~I)avism, introduced by
Caitanya, is based principally on the Bhiigavata-purii1J.O., and of the
many writers of this school only two are prominent as authors of
philosophical treatises, Baladeva Vidyabhii~ai).a and Jiva Gosvami.
Of these Baladeva has again and again referred to the indebtedness
of this school to the philosophy of Madhva, and to the initiation of
Caitanya as an ascetic by a follower of the Madhva school of
Vai~I)avism. Though he was a junior contemporary of Jiva
Gosvami and a commentator of the latter's Tattva-sandarbha, yet
he often reverts to Madhva's doctrine of viJe~a in reconciling the
monistic position with the positions of qualified monism and
pluralism. Had he adhered to ]iva's concept of the supra-logical, the
1
yadyapi Jn-Ramiinujfyair nirvile1a'!l brahma na manyate tathiipi savi!eFa'l'
manyamanair viie1iitirikta7!1 mantavyam eva.
)Iva's Sarva-sa,.viidinf, p. 74 (Nityasvariipa Brahmacari's edition).
XXIV] Brahman, Paramiitman, Bhagavat, Paramefvara 19
concept of viSe~a would have been entirely unnecessary. Baladeva,
however, uses not only the concept of viSe~a, but also the concept
of the supra-logical (acintya), and he characterizes the concept of
viSe~a as being itself the concept of the supra-logical. Thus in his
Siddhiinta-ratna he says that the qualities of consciousness, bliss,
etc., do not differ Jrom the nature of Brahman, and yet Brahman
is consistently described as possessing these different qualities
because of the supra-logical functions of viSe~a (acintya-viSe~a
mahimna). ·This assertion does not involve the doctrine that reality
is from a particular point of view different from its qualities and
from another point of view identical with them (na caiva'l!'
bhedabhedau syiitiim ), and the only solution of the difficulty is to
assume the doctrine of the supra-logical (tasmiid avicintyataiva
sara!UJm). In this connection Baladeva further says that the doctrine
of viSe~a must be accepted as something which even in the absence of
difference can explain the phenomena of difference1 • This concept of
'lJiSe~a, however, is to be applied only in reconciling the simultaneous
plurality and unity of ultimate reality. But so far as the relation be-
tween reality and individual souls is concerned, their difference is
well known, and therefore the application of the principle of viSe~a
would be unjustifiable. The principle of viSe~a is, however, applied
not only in reconciling the unity of Brahman with the plurality of
his qualities and powers, but also with his divine body, divine dress,
his divine abode and the like, so that though these appear to be
different from him they are at the same time identical with him2 •
Speaking on the same topic, }Iva holds that God Vi~Q.u's power
of consciousness (cic-chakti) is identical with His own essence.
When this essence is on the way to produce effects, it is called
power (sva-rupam eva karyyonmukha'!' sakti-sabdena uktam ). Now
this special state of reality cannot be regarded as different from it,
and can have no separate existence from it, since it can never be
regarded (cintayituT{l aJakyatvad) as different from the essence of
reality; since moreover difference itself cannot be regarded as being
in any way different, the difference between the power and its
possessor is unthinkable, incomprehensible and supra-logical. This
view is not that of Ramanuja and his followers, who regard the
1
Siddhiinta-ratna, pp. 17-22 (Benares, 1924).
:! tathii ca f.Jigrahadel) sva-rupiinatireke'pi vile1iid eva bheda-vyavahiiral).
Ibid. p. 26.
2·2
20 The Bhagavata-purii1Ja [cH.
power as different from its possessor; yet, since they also believe
that God's powers are essentially contained in Him, there is a good
deal of similarity between the Ramanuja school and the Bengal
school of Vai!?Qavism1 . Arguing against the followers of Sankara,
}iva says that even in the Upani!?ad passage on pure consciousness,
bliss, the Brahman (vijiiiinam iinanda'f!l Brahma), the consciousness
and the bliss cannot be identical, for then the two words would be
mere repetition; they cannot be different, for then Brahman would
have two conflicting qualities within himself. If the two words
vijiiiina and iinanda mean the negation of ignorance and of sorrow,
then these two negations, being two different entities, are co-
existent in Brahman. If the two negations mean one entity, how
can one entity be the negation of two different things? If it is said
that only agreeable consciousness is called bliss, then again the
quality of agreeableness stands out as a separate quality. Even if
these words stood merely as negations of ignorance or sorrow, then
these also would be specific characters; if it is urged that these are
not specific characters, but represent only special potencies
(yogyatii) by virtue of which ignorance and sorrow are negated,
then nonetheless those special potencies would be special characters.
Thus the theory that ultimate reality is characterless is false. The
characters of Brahman are identically the same as his powers,
and these are all identical with his own self.
On the subject of the nature of self, }iva says that individual
selves are not pure consciousness, but entities which are charac-
terized by self-consciousness as "ego" or "1." Individual souls
are on no account to be regarded as being identical with God or
Paramatman, and each individual self is different from every other2•
These individual souls are of atomic size and therefore partless.
The atomic self resides in the heart, whence it pervades the whole
body by its quality of consciousness, just as sandal paste pervades
the whole neighbourhood by its sweet smell. Just so, individual
selves are atomic, but they pervade the bodies in which they are
located by their power of consciousness. Consciousness is called a
quality of the self because it is always dependent on that and serves
its purpose (nitya-tad-iilrayatva-tac-che~atva-nibandhanal.z)3 • Again,
1
Sarna-sa7Jlviidinl, pp. 29, JO.
2
tasmiit prati-k~etra7Jl bhinna eva jlv~. Ibid. p. 87.
3
Ibid. p. 94·
xx1v] Brahman, Paramiitman, Bhagavat, Paramesvara 21
consciousness, being thus dependent on the self, expands and
contracts in order to pervade the different bodies in which it may
be operating at the time. Being thus different from God, individual
selves, even in emancipation, remain separate and distinct. They
are thus produced from the highest self (Paramatman or God), and
they are always under His absolute control and pervaded by Him.
It is on this account that God is called Paramatman as distinguished
from individual souls (iitman). They are like rays emanating from
Him and are therefore always entirely dependent on Him and
cannot exist without Him 1 • They are also regarded as God's
disengaged power (tatastha-sakti), because, though they are God's
power, yet they are in a way disengaged and separately situated
from Him, and therefore they are under the delusion of God's other
power, miiyii, which has no influence on God Himself; and there-
fore, though individual selves are suffering under the blinding
operation of ignorance (avidyii), the highest self (paramatman) is
absolutely untouched by them. As individual souls are the powers
of God, they are sometimes spoken of as identical with Him and
sometimes as different from Him. Of these individual selves some
are always naturally devoted to God, and others are dominated by
ignorance and are turned away from Him; it is the latter that are
the denizens of this world and suffer rebirth.
Miiyii, the external power (bahiraliga-sakti) has two functions,
creative (nimitta) and passive (upiidiina); of these, time (kala),
destiny (daiva), and actions (karma) represent the former, and the
three gu1Jas the latter. Individual selves contain within them as
integral parts elements of both these functions of miiyii. The
creative function of miiyii has again two modes, which operate
either for the bondage or for the liberation of man. This creative
miiyii also typifies the cosmic knowledge of God, His will and His
creative operation3 • Knowledge of God is also regarded as twofold
-that which is His own self-knowledge and which forms a part of
His essential power (svarupa-sakti), and that which is turned
3 Subodhini points out here that in this state, in which the puru~a blinds him-
self, he is called jiva. Vijaya-dhvaji, however, takes it in the sense that the
transcendent puru~a or isvara which had accepted the prakrti as its own thus
blinds the individual souls through it. Sridhara says that there are two kinds of
puru~a. isvara and ji·ca; and, further, that according to its blinding power
(ii·cara7Ja-sakti) and creative power (vik~epa-sakti) prakrti is twofold; and that
puru~a also is twofold, according as it behaves as individual souls or as God.
XXIV] Kapila's philosophy in the Bhiigavata-purti1}a 25
In addition to these there is the twenty-fifth category, called time
(kala), which some regard as a separate category, not as an evolute
of prakrti, but ~ the transcendental effort of puru~a (used in the
sense of God) 1 . It is said that God manifests Himself in man
internally, as his inner self, as the controller of all his experiences,
and externally, as time in the manifold objects of experience. Thus
there are twenty-five categories if time, individual soul, and God
are taken as one; if time is taken separately and God and puru~a are
taken as one, there are twenty -six categories; and if all the three are
taken separately, there are twenty-seven categories 2• It is the puru~a
which is to be taken as being under the influence of pra/qti and as
free of it in its transcendent capacity as God (in an implicit manner).
It is by the influence of time (kala) that the equilibrium of the
gu!las in the pra/qti is disturbed and that their natural transforma-
tions take place; and through the direction of laws of kanna
superintended by God the category of mahat is evolved 2 • It is
curious that, though malzat is mentioned as a stage of pra/qti, it is
only regarded as a creative state (vrtti) or prakrti, and not as a
separate category. In another passage in the Blziigavata it is said
that in the beginning God was alone in Himself with His own
dormant powers, and not finding anything through which He could
reflect Himself and realize Himself, He disturbed the equilibrium
of His miiyii power through the functioning of time and through
His own self(puru~a), impregnating it with consciousness; and thus
the process of creation started through the transformations of the
prakrti3 • In another passage the question is raised how, if God is
free in Himself, can He put Himself in bondage to miiyii; and
the reply given is that in reality there is no bondage of God, but,
just as in dreams a man may perceive his own head to be stn1ck off
his body, or may perceive his own reflection shaking in water on
account of its ripples, so it is but the reflection of God that appears
as individual souls suffering bondage to world-experience~. It
follows therefore, according to this view, that individual souls are
illusory creations, and that both they and their world-experience
must consequently be false 4 • In another passage which immediately
1 prabhava7Jl pau~a7Jl prii.hu!J kii.lam eke yato' bhayam. Ibid. III. 26. 16.
2 Prakrti is not included in this enumeration; if it were, there would be
twenty-eight categories.
3
Ibid. II. 5· 22, 2J. 4 Ibid. Ill. 5· 22-27.
The Bhagavata-purti7Ja [cH.
follows the previous one it is definitely stated that the world only
appears in consciousness, but that in reality it does not exist1 • It is
clear that these passages of the Bhiigavata distinctly contradict the
interpretation of its philosophy given by }iva in the previous section,
as they deny the reality of individual soul~ and the reality of world-
appearance. 2 But this is just what we may expect if we remember
that the Bhiigavata is a collection of accretions from different hands
at different times and not a systematic whole. If the Sarpkhya
theory described in II. 5, III. 5, III. 7 and III. 26 be interpreted
consistently, then the result is that there are two fundamental
categories, God and His own maya, the prakrti; that God, in His
desire to realize Himself, reflects Hims~lf in the prakrti, which is
but His own power, and it is through this impregnation of Himself
in His own power that He appears as individual souls suffering the
bondage of prakrti; it is again through this impregnation of Himself
that prakrti is enlivened by consciousness; and then, through His
creative effort, which is designated as time, the equilibrium of
the gu1_Zas of prakrti is disturbed, the transformatory movement is
set up in the prakrti, and the categories are evolved.
In a passage in the fifth chapter (v. 12. 6--()) the existence of
wholes is definitely described as illusory. There are no entities but
the partless atoms, and even these atoms are imaginary construc-
tions without which it would not be possible to conceive of wholes.
All our conceptions of the external world start with atoms, and all
that we see or feel gradually grows through a series of accretions.
This growth in accretion is not a real growth, but is only an
application of the time-sense. Time is theref