CASE BRIEF

Case No. 1

Kansas v. Crane (2002)

1. Kansas v. Crane (2002)

Petitioner – Kansas
Respondent – Crane
2. Cause of Action
 Michael T. Crane the respondent had been guilty of the two incidence of sexual
battery that took place in 1993. In the first instance he exposed himself to the
tanning salon attendant and on the same day he visited a video store and waited till
he became the last customer. Thereafter she grabbed the neck of the clerk and
demanded her to perform oral sex on him and he also threatened to rape her.
 Thus a petition was filed by state in district court to adjudicate Crane as sexual
predator under Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act. This act permits civil
detention of any person convicted for any of the several sexual offenses, but the
Kansas Supreme Court reverse the judgment.
3. Facts
 U.S. Supreme Court had upheld the constitutionality of Kansas Sexually Violent
Predator Act in Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346. While doing so, US Supreme
court had characterized that dangerous sexual offender’s confinement as civil rather
than criminal. They also held that the confinement criterion were embodied in the
statue’s wording which is “mental abnormality or personality disorder” Satisfies
the substantive due process clause.
 Michael T. Crane the respondent had committed sexual offense on two ladies in
1993. He exposed himself to the tanning salon attendant and on the same day,
visited a video store and afterwards when he was the last customer in the store
premises, grabbed the neck of the clerk and demanded oral sex for him and also
threatened her to rape. Crane was a previously convicted sexual offender and the
sate sought his commitment.
  In the Kansas District Court a petition was filed by the state, it was ordered that
Crane must be held committed under the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act.
But the State Supreme Court reversed the judgment and preempted his
commitment.
 They have applied the Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 and held that there must
be some finding that Crane was unable control his dangerous behaviors.
 State of Kansas then appealed to the US Supreme Court to review the Kansas
Supreme Court application of Hendricks case and seeks civil commitment of Crane,
who according to one of the State Psychiatric witness suffers from both exhibition
and antisocial disorder.
4. Procedural History
 State of Kansas in district court seeks order from the court to hold that Michael T.
Crane must be civilly committed under Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act.
 District Court after the jury trail committed Crane, but the same was reversed the
judgment and applied Kansas v. Hendricks, claiming that State must show some
findings to show that crane could not control his dangerous behavior.
 State of Kansas appealed in the US Supreme Court, to review the Kansas Supreme
Court Judgment.
5. Issue.
 Whether a state needs to prove that a defendant cannot control his behavior in order
to civilly commit that defendant?
6. Rule
 For the civil commitment it is required by state to show that the person is having
lack of control over his dangerous act which are threat to the public at large.
 If it was shown that there is no mental or antisocial disorder, the person would be
treated as a criminal.
7. Reasoning/ Analysis
 The case of Kansas v. Hendricks does not set forth any requirement to show the
lack of control on part of accused to civilly commit him.
 But the Constitution does not permit commitment of sexual offender without this
requirement of lack of control.
  In this way the Court held that no State is not required to show the requirement of
Lack of Control. Defendant must be having a little control over his dangerous
behavior which is threat to the society.

8. Conclusion
 US Supreme vacated the judgment and remanded back it for further trial.

Case No. 2

In re Winship (1970)

1. In re Winship (1970)
Petitioner – Winship Appeared on behalf of Juvenile
Respondent – Against the Judgment of New York Family Court.
2. Cause of Action
 In this case the juvenile contested his determination as delinquent on the bases of
preponderance of evidence as inconsistent with the due process clause and claim
that finding of delinquency must be based on proof of beyond reasonable doubt.
3. Facts
 Defendant who is a 12 year boy charged with theft of $112 from pocketbook from
the locker which if done by an adult would be consider as crime of larceny.
 Thus it became necessary to decide whether the juvenile is delinquent or not, and
New York Family court ruled on the bases of §744(b) of NY Family Court Act, that
the determination must be based on a "preponderance of the evidence." Resulting
in commitment of the juvenile.
 The same of affirm by the New York Court of Appeals upholding the
constitutionality of §744(b) of NY Family Court Act.
 Thus the present case came before the US Supreme Court to review and decide the
legality of the decision.
4. Procedural History
 This case came before the New York Family Court who ordered for Commitment
of Juvenile till he became adult that means for six years. They had decided the
 Juvenile as a delinquent by considering the preponderance of evidence as envisaged
under §744(b) of NY Family Court Act.
 This decision was affirmed by the New York Court of Appeals and they also
sustained the constitutionality of §744(b) of NY Family Court Act.
 This resulted into the appeal in the US Supreme Court to review the decision and
decide its consistency with substantive due process clause.
5. Issue.
 Whether proof beyond reasonable doubt is among the essentials of due process and
fair treatment required in the adjudicatory stage for juveniles act which when
committed by an adult constitute a crime?
6. Rule
 It is one of the essentials of due process and fair treatment that at the time of
adjudicatory stage of juveniles act which if done by an adult would be consider as
crime must be proof beyond reasonable doubt.
7. Reasoning/Analysis
 The Proof beyond reasonable doubt is an essential requirement for criminal matters
and the same was not less evident in juvenile proceedings especially when the
juvenile was charged with an act which resulted in his confinement for 6 years.
Thus the respondent city’s argument that delinquency adjudications were not
convictions were baseless.
 It was noteworthy that the main policy for Juvenile Justice System was
rehabilitation but for this process it must not be compromised with some high
standards of proof.
8. Conclusion
 US Supreme Court Reversed the Judgment of New York Court of Appeals.

Case No. 3

Keeler v. Superior Court of Amador County (1970),

1. Keeler v. Superior Court of Amador County (1970),

Petitioner – Keeler
 Respondent – Superior Court of Amador Country

2. Cause of Action
 Petitioner contented the charge of murder based on the contention that fetus is not
the human being as embodied in the murder statute.
3. Facts
 Petitioner is the husband of Mrs. Keeler who has an affair with another person gets
pregnant and later divorced her husband. Petitioner confronted his ex-wife and said
that he will stomp out of her.
 After giving this statement he shoved his knee into the abdomen of his ex-wife and
also hit her on face which makes her unconscious.
 Upon arrival at the hospital the baby was born stillborn and with fractured skull
through caesarian section, and it was stated by the doctor that the baby’s cause of
death and injury caused could be the result of force applied on the abdominal part
by the petitioner.
 Thereafter charges were brought against petitioner for murder of the fetus under the
187 California Penal Code. Petitioner moved to set aside the charge based on his
contention that fetus is not a human being, but the trial court denied the motion,
thus Petitioner moves towards the Supreme Court and seeks a writ of prohibition
against the judgment of the trial court.
4. Procedural History.
 Petitioner Mr. Keeler in the present case firstly moved to the trial court for grant of
motion against the charges as fetus is not the human being and enlarging the scope
of enactment would not be reasonable.
 Considering the contentions of the Petitioner Mr. Keeler and also the status of fetus
in other state legislature and also common law trial court dismiss the motion.
Petitioner then came before the California Supreme Court seeking writ of
prohibition against the judgment of Superior Court of Amador County.
5. Issue
 Whether an “unborn but viable fetus is a human being within the meaning of the
California statute defining murder.”?
 6. Rule
 An unborn but viable fetus does not comes under the definition of Human Being in
the California Penal Code.
7. Reasoning/ Analysis
 The California Statute does not intended to include fetus within the meaning of
Human being. In common law also baby’s death is not consider as death of human
being until he born alive.
 Similarly the court also continuous its rationale for not enlarging its definition to
include Fetus as a Human Being under the act of murder. Even they can construe a
new meaning but it would only operate prospectively.
 Hence, writ of prohibition was granted and feticide is not considered as homicide
under the definition of murder.
8. Conclusion
 In this case the writ of prohibition was granted excluding the feticide to be construe
within the meaning of homicide.

Case No. 4

City of Chicago v. Morales (1999)

1. City of Chicago v. Morales

 Petitioner – City of Chicago
 Respondent – Morales
2. Cause of Action
 Illinois Supreme Court held Chicago’s Gang Congregation Ordinance was
unconstitutional. The City of Chicago contested that the Illinois Supreme Court
decision was not correct and the Ordinance was consistent with due process
clause.
3. Facts
 In the year 1992, Chicago city council had enacted the Gang Congregation
Ordinance prohibiting loitering of criminal street gang members in public
places. The ordinance was stand violated if the police officer reasonably
believed that one or two members standing in the public is a criminal street
 gang member. The same person is loitering means standing in one place with
no apparent purpose. The Police officer ordered to disperse the area and if any
one of them disobeyed. If these grounds were fulfilled then the ordinance was
stand violated by that person.
 Many people were charged for violating this law but the charges were dismissed
by the trial court as they held this law to be unconstitutionally vague. In a
consolidated appeal from several of the holdings regarding Chicago’s Gang
Congregation Ordinance, Illinois Supreme Court affirm the judgment and held
that this ordinance violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
4. Procedural History
 Many People were charged of violating the Chicago’s Gang Congregation
Ordinance. The trail Court dismissed the charges by declaring the ordinance as
unconstitutionally vague and the same was affirmed by appellate court.
 This matter came before the Illinois Supreme Court in a consolidated appeal
and they also held the ordinance to be unconstitutionally vague and not properly
giving notice to the people as which act was prohibited.
 The City Council came before US Supreme Court to review the ordinance and
declare it as constitutional.
5. Issue
 Whether the Ordinance passed by city council is impermissibly vague and
violates the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment?
6. Rule
 A law that prohibit the gang members from loitering is not a violation of due
process clause. But if the ordinance fails to provide proper notice as of which
conduct is prohibited and allows arbitrary enforcement would stand
inconsistent with the Due Process Clause.
7. Reasoning.
 The ordinance was unconstitutionally vague as it fails to provide notice to the
people and also gives too much discretion to the police officer.
  The purpose of notice is to make the ordinary citizen to conform his act to law.
The ordinance prohibits loitering of gang members in public places, and this
ordinance gives the meaning of loiter as standing with an apparent purpose.
Apparent purpose does not have a common meaning to which ordinary citizen
could easily understand.
 Further it provides an absolute discretion to police authorities to determine
which activities could be consider as loitering.
 Thus this ordinance is not proper and was violating the due process clause.
8. Conclusion
 The Judgment of Illinois Supreme Court was affirmed by the US Supreme
Court declaring the ordinance as unconstitutionally vague.

Case No. 5

Johnson v. United States (2015)

1. Johnson v. United States (2015)

Petitioner – Samuel Johnson
Respondent - United States
2. Cause of Action
 Johnson contested and challenged the Armed Career Criminal Act as
unconstitutionally vague as the definition of violent felony was not proper. He
was convicted under the Armed Career Criminal Act for 15 years.
3. Facts
 In the year 2010, FBI started investigating the petitioner for his involvement in
some organization. He then left and joined other organization named as Aryan
Liberation movement. He discloses a fact to an undercover FBI agent that he
manufactured some of the explosives and was having possession of some semi-
automatic weapons. He was arrested after some year and admitted the fact of
possessing some of the dangerous weapons.
 He was charged under Armed Criminal Career Act as he was previously
convicted three prior felony. These felony was consider as violent felony by the
district court.
  Thus due to those violent felony Johnson was subject to a mandatory sentence
of 15 years.
 The district court held that the prior felony must be consider as violent felony
and Johnson was an armed career criminal. The same was affirmed by the
United States court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit.
 Johnson came before US Supreme Court against the judgment through a writ of
certiorari. US Supreme Court has to review that does the law banning
possession of swanned off shot gun would be consider as violent felony and
was constitutionally consistent or not.
4. Procedural History
 The District Court held that Johnson was convicted for prior felony of possessing
some of the weapons which include a swanned off shot gun.
 They consider that as a violent felony and as per the Armed Career Criminal Act
District Court Held Johnson as Armed Career Criminal.
 This decision was then affirmed by the United States Court of Appeal for the Eight
Circuit. Johnson filed a writ against the definition of violent felony under the
Armed Career Criminal Act and contested it as unconstitutionally vague.
5. Issue
 Whether the definition of Violent Felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act
was unconstitutionally vague?
6. Rule
 Law not giving proper notice of which acts are punishable and allows arbitrary
enforcement stands in violation of due process clause.
7. Reasoning
 The definition of violent felony is unconstitutionally vague as the laws which do
not provide notice to the ordinary citizen of which acts are prohibited and are
enforced arbitrarily are violation of due process clause.
 The residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act does not provide the base to
assess whether the act in question is a serious physical threat or having potential
risk for the physical injury. Thus the lack of guideline would result in enforcing the
law and considering the act as violent felony as arbitrary enforcement. Hence the
 violent felony which is decided by the residual clause of ACCA made the act as
unconstitutionally vague.
8. Conclusion

The US Supreme Court granted the writ of certiorari and reversed the judgment of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit.

Case No. 6

Robinson v. California (1962)

1. Robinson v. California (1962)

Appellant – Robinson
Respondent – California State
2. Cause of Action
 Robinson was convicted for being addicted to narcotics, he challenged the law and
contested this to be violation of fourteenth amendment, as a State can criminally
punishes a person who is in possession of drugs and instead of sending the addicted
to rehabilitation center they are convicting him.
3. Facts
 One of the California State Statute Prohibits a person from being addicted. The
Appellant was arrested by the police officer who observed his arms to be in heavy
use of drugs, as he found scars of needles.
 Appellant admitted occasional use of drugs and he was arrested violating the state
statute which make it a criminal offense of being addicted to narcotics.
 The Appellant was convicted by the Jury trail in Municipal Court of Los Angeles.
 On his appeal to the Superior court of Los Angeles contesting that his conviction
was not proper and the State Statute stands in violation of the US Constitution.
 The Superior Court affirmed the conviction, due to which he appealed to the US
Supreme Court to review the California State Statute.
4. Procedural History
  Municipal Court of Los Angeles Convicted Robinson under the California Statute
which make the act of consuming drugs as criminal offense of found being
addicted.
 On his Appeal to the Superior Court of Los Angeles they also affirmed the
conviction and held the California State Laws as consistent with the US
constitution.
 Thus Robinson appealed to the US Supreme Court to review the matter and declare
this California Statute as unconstitutional.
5. Issue
 Whether a State Statute Criminalizing drug addiction stands as consistent with the
constitution?
6. Rule
 A law making a disease such as drug addiction as a criminal offense is violation of
Eight and Fourteenth Amendment of the US Constitution.
7. Reasoning
 The statute makes the status of being addicted as illegal before he reforms. As
addiction can be termed as a disease it would be too harsh on the person to be treated
this act as a criminal offense.
 Thus it stands in violation of Eight and Fourteenth Amendment to give cruel and
unusual punishment.
8. Conclusion

The US Supreme Court held this Law as unconstitutional and struck down the criminalizing of a
status of being addicted.

Case No. 7

R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota (1992)

1. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota (1992)

Petitioner – R.A.V.
Respondent – City of St. Paul
2. Cause of Action
  Petitioner R.A.V. was alleged of burning cross and was charged under the St. Paul
Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance that prohibits certain conduct that causes
resentment in others based on race, color, creed or religion.
3. Facts
 Petitioner a Juvenile and some other individuals was allegedly assembled a cross
and burned it inside the yard of a black family who live across the street to the
petitioner.
 Thus the petitioner was charged under the St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance
that prohibits certain conduct that causes resentment in others based on race, color,
creed or religion.
 Petitioner contested that this was an impermissible content based legislature and
therefore is invalid as per the first amendment. He filed motion to set aside the
charges against him. The trial court granted him motion but the same was reversed
by the Minnesota Supreme Court on the ground of the phrase discussing the arousal.
4. Procedural History
 The Petitioner were charged under St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance for
allegedly burning a cross in the backyard of a black family.
 The petitioner filed a motion in the trial court who dismissed the charges and granted
them motion on the bases of first amendment.
 But the same was reversed by the Minnesota Supreme Court on the bases of arousal
phrase used in the ordinance and limited the conduct as of fighting words.
 Petitioner then filed a petition in the US Supreme Court to review this matter and
declare that the ordinance is consistent with the First Amendment of right to speech
or not.
5. Issue

Whether the St. Paul ordinance is prima facie unconstitutional in that it prohibits otherwise
permitted speech solely on the basis of the subjects the speech addresses?

6. Rule
 State must show that a law or regulation limiting the speech and expression is
reasonable and necessary to achieve states interest.
  Limiting such speech just because they express a disfavored point on the topic is
prohibited by the first amendment of the constitution.
7. Reasoning
 The First Amendment does not empowers City of St. Paul to restrict the speech or
expression just because they offer views on disfavored topics.
 Because of the fact that the ordinance tends to go beyond content discrimination,
and covers viewpoint discrimination, it is thereby unconstitutional. It happens to
prohibit the expression of a variety of many viewpoints, which although it holds to
be repugnant by nature, but are not necessarily so. It is uncharacteristic of any
legislation to impose selective discriminations on speech, and the First Amendment
has imposed a limitation on the content discrimination, on the prohibition by the
State for proscribable speech.
8. Conclusion

The Ordinance was struck down as unconstitutionally vague.

Case Number 8

Lawrence v. Texas (2003)

1. Lawrence v. Texas (2003)

Petitioner - John Geddes Lawrence and Tyron Garner
Respondent – Texas
2. Cause of Action
 Police found two men indulge in sexual conduct in their home and arrested them
under the Laws of Texas that prohibit such conduct between two men.
 They Homosexual is not considered as a fundamental right at that time in any
are of United States.
3. Facts
 In Houston, Texas, Harris County Police officers were dispatched to a private
home because of an announced weapons aggravation. They entered the home
where John Geddes live, and watched Lawrence and another man, Tyron
Garner, taking part in a sex demonstration.
  The men were arrested, held overnight and accused of abusing a Texas Statute
making it a wrongdoing for two people of a similar sex to take part in certain
close sexual lead. Explicitly the rule gave "An individual submits and offense
in the event that he occupied with digress sex with another person of the
equivalent sex"
 The two men were then sentenced before a Justice of the Pease. And the same
was affirmed by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeal after considering the facts
and circumstances.
4. Procedural History
 The case came before the trial court who convicted both the men for
homosexual act and imposes a $100 dollar penalty. In this case both of the
accused had pleaded no contest to the charges and waived their right to trial.
 Then the accused needed the case to be tried by Harris County Criminal Court,
which also affirm the conviction of both the men.
 A three-judge panel of the Texas Fourteenth Court of Appeals heard the case
on November 3, 1999, ruled out the Texas law was unconstitutional and found
that the law abused the 1972 Equal Rights Amendment to the Texas
Constitution, which bars separation dependent on sex, race, shading, statement
of faith, or national birthplace.
 The Court of Appeals chose to audit the case en banc. On March 15, 2001,
without hearing oral contentions, it switched the three-judge board's choice and
maintained the law's lawfulness 7– 2, denying both the substantive fair
treatment and equivalent insurance arguments.
 Attorneys for Lawrence and Garner solicited the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals, the highest appellate court in Texas for criminal issues, to review the
case. Following a year's postponement, on April 17, 2002, that request for was
denied.
5. Issue
 Whether the statute prohibiting particular sexual acts between same – sex
couple violates the due process the clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
6. Rule
  Homosexual acts are not consider as fundamental right, but intimating sexual
acts between adults who consent for the same is protected under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
7. Reasoning
 The Texas Statute making it a criminal offense for two people of a similar sex
to participate in certain personal sexual acts violates the Due Process Clause.
 The Court contemplated that the case turned on whether Lawrence and Garner
were free as grown-ups to participate in the private direct in the activity of their
freedom under the Due Process Clause.
 Their entitlement to freedom under the Due Process Clause gives them the full
ideal to take part in their lead without intervention of the government.
 Similarly Sodomy was not prohibited for heterosexual sexual couples, and
prohibiting the same for same-sex couples would also be unequal for them, and
thus if law makes them as criminal it would be difficult for them to be a part of
society.
8. Conclusion

The US Supreme Court struck down the Texas Statute which prohibits sodomy between same-sex
couple and not the heterosexual couple. They also reverse the conviction of Lawrence and Garner
for violating this statute.

Case No. 9

Commonwealth v. McGowan (2013)

1. Commonwealth v. McGowan (2013)

Petitioner – McGowan
Respondent – Commonwealth
2. Cause of Action

The petitioner was having a license to carry a gun with him but state legislature prohibits loaded
firearms which are not in direct and immediate control of the owner. He filed a petition to strike
the law as unconstitutional.

3. Facts
In this case General Laws makes it unlawful to store firearms which are not in immediate and
direct control of their owner. The petitioner was charged under this law as his licensed loaded gun
was taken away by his female roommate who indulge in a quarrel for $10 loan. This made his
roommate angry and she went in his room taken the loaded gun and threw it in buses. Police officer
charged McGowan in criminal complaint. He moved to dismiss the complaint and claim that the
law was unconstitutional.

4. Procedural History
 In the present case defendant was charged with the criminal compliant of possessing loaded
weapon which is thrown by his roommate into buses as a weapon of not in immediate and
direct control of the owner.
 He moved to dismiss the complaint and thus the motion judge moved these question of
constitutional depth and seriousness to the appellate court.
5. Issue

Whether a law prohibiting and making it unlawful to keep firearms which are not in the immediate
control of owner is unconstitutional?

6. Rule

Second Amendment to the US Constitution guarantees possessing of weapons for safety and
protection in the public.

7. Reasoning

The law which is protecting accidents to occur does not violate Second Amendment. Mandating it
to store weapon unloaded indeed delay the protection which is sought at the time of urgency but
this requirement was enacted to prevent accidents.

The requirement making a firearm not in immediate control of the owner must be locked or
equipped with trigger lock is made to prevent unauthorized access to the firearm and is consistent
with the right to bear arms of the Second Amendment.

8. Conclusion

The case was remanded back to the trail court for further decision and found that law is
consistent
Case No. 10

United States v. Armstrong (1996)

1. United States v. Armstrong (1996)

Petitioner – United States
Respondent - Armstrong
2. Cause of Action
 In the present case a group of individuals were prosecuted for conspiring to possess and
distribute cocaine. They had contested that they were selectively prosecuted because they
were black and the state was unable to provide proof of their prosecution is not based on
their race.
3. Facts
 Christopher Lee Armstrong and others were prosecuted on government charges of
“conspiring to possess with aim to disseminate in excess of 50 grams of cocaine
base (crack) and scheming to appropriate the equivalent.”
 The Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms had observed Armstrong
and others before their arraignment and capture. A motion was filed for discovery
or dismissal by Armstrong, alleging that he was chosen for prosecution since he
was Black.
 The District Court ordered in favor of the motion. District court also ordered the
government to give insights on comparable cases from the most recent three years.
 The Government showed it would not comply with the order. In this manner, the
District Court dismissed the case. The Government appealed in the Court of
Appeals who also affirms the dismissal. It held that the proof prerequisites for a
specific arraignment guarantee don't require a respondent to exhibit that the
government has failed to prosecute other people who are in the similar situation.
 The US Supreme Court had granted certiorari to decide who has the burden of
proving selective prosecution.
4. Procedural History
  The District court granted motion in favor of Armstrong who challenged the
charges and contented that they were prosecuted because they were black.
 District court granted the motion and ordered government state to show the
statistics of the similar cases in past three years. Government rejected to do so,
resulting in dismissal of the case.
 The same was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit court and held
that the defendant is not required to show that government has failed to prosecute
the persons who are similarly situated.
5. Issue
 Whether the criminal defendants who pursue some selective prosecution have to
demonstrate that people of other race were not subject to prosecution?
6. Rule
 For the claim of selective prosecution it is on the criminal defendant to show that
person of different race were not prosecuted for the same crime.
7. Reasoning
 It is burden upon criminal defendants to show that the government has fail to
prosecute the other person of different race for similar crime.
 In this case Armstrong does not provide any evidence that government is not
prosecuting person of different race.
8. Conclusion

The US Supreme Court reversed and denied the discovery motion.

Case No. 11

Graham v. Florida (2011)

1. Graham v. Florida (2011)

Petitioner – Graham
Respondent - Florida
2. Cause of Action
  Graham contented that his sentence was against the eight amendment protection
and giving life imprisonment without chance of parole to juvenile offender in non-
homicidal offense.
3. Facts
 Graham aged 17, was captured for breaking into a house with two other while he
was still on parole for attempted robbery. While his associates stripped the house
searching for cash, they held two men at gunpoint.
 Fortunes came up short on Graham when he dropped off one of his assistants after
he supported a discharge wound. Among different checks, Graham was charged by
the territory of Florida with home invasion robbery.
 Since the province of Florida had recently nullified its parole framework at the time
the court distributed the greatest sentence of life detainment on Graham, this
sentence established a life imprisonment without any chances of parole.
 An appeal for habeas corpus for the review of his sentence was recorded by Graham
in the federal court and his case in the end preceded the Supreme Court of the
United States.
4. Procedural History
 Graham filed a motion in the trial court, but they sentenced him for life imprisonment
without any chance of parole due to abolishing of parole law in Florida.
 The first district court of appeal also affirmed the life imprisonment without parole and
held that this sentence is not a violation of protection guaranteed under eight amendment.
 Florida Supreme Court denied review which results in writ of habeas corpus before the US
Supreme Court.
5. Issue
 Whether the sentence of life imprisonment without giving parole is constitutionally
valid or not?
6. Rule
 A life imprisonment without parole for a minor is violating the eight amendment
and thus stand unconstitutional.
7. Reasoning
  Proportionality is the touchstone of an Eighth Amendment investigation into the
legitimacy of a criminal sentence. Cases tending to proportionality fall into two
general sorts: (I) those that see all encompassing conditions to decide whether a
sentence is unconstitutional; and (ii) those that categorical rules to understand and
define Eighth Amendment parameters. The second kind is suitable in the present
case.
 Taking a look at sentencing, it is noteworthy that a life-without-parole sentences
for juveniles are unusual in the U.S.
 Likewise, the culpability of accused must be considered. The Court has recognized
in past cases that juveniles lack maturity as compared to adults decreasing their
culpability. Besides, Juveniles are progressively ready to be reformed, especially
the individuals who did not indulge in murder.
8. Conclusion

The US Supreme Court reversed the Judgment.

Case No. 12

Patterson v. New York (1977)

1. Patterson v. New York (1977)

Appellant – Patterson
Respondent – New York City
2. Cause of Action

The Appellant after seeing his wife half dressed in the presence of another person killed her friend
and asserted the defense of extreme emotional disturbance, but does not prove it by evidence and
challenge the conviction contending this burden of proving the affirmative defense as violation of
due process rights.

3. Facts
 Appellant, Patterson was accused of and sentenced for the second-degree murder
of his alienated spouse. In December of 1970, Patterson obtained a rifle and went
to his dad in-laws house where he saw his better half through a window half-dressed
in the presence of another man.
  Patterson went into the house and murdered the man by shooting him in the head.
At trial, Appellant raised the defense of extraordinary emotional disturbance.
 Appellant was convicted as his act fulfills the elements of crime and he was not
able to prove his defense of extreme emotional disturbance. Appellant put together
his contention with respect to Mullaney v. Wilbur, where the court held a Maine
statute infringing upon the Due Process Clause.
4. Procedural History
 The trial court found appellant guilty of second degree murder and the same was
affirmed by the New York Court of Appeals, as they found they law to be not
violation of due process.
 Thus the same was appealed before the US Supreme Court to review the sentence
and decide the burden of proving the affirmative defense.
5. Issue
 Whether the due process right of accused stand in violation if he was required to
prove his affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance?
6. Rule
 The burden to prove the affirmative defense is upon the person who raises it.
7. Reasoning
 The state permits a person to raise the affirmative defense, but proving it must be
bear by the person asserting the fact.
 This does not violates due process rights, as adducing evidence is mandatory
requirement to decide the case especially in homicidal offense.
 The intent and cause of death due to his act was clearly establish in this case which
constitutes second degree murder.
8. Conclusion

US Supreme Court Affirmed the Judgment of the lower court.

Case No. 13

Errington and Others' Case (1838)

1. Errington and Others' Case (1838)

 Prosecution – State
Defendant – Errington and others’
2. Cause of action
The act of defendants caused the death of the person which they did not intended to kill.
3. Facts
 Mr. Errington and different people (Defendants) covered a resting man with straw
and threw a shovel of hot ashes on him.
 The straw lighted, and the man consumed to death. Respondents were accused of
the man’s death, and the jury was requested to think about whether they were liable
of manslaughter or murder.
4. Procedural History
 This Case came before the jury and they decide whether their act must be consider as
manslaughter of murder.
5. Issue

Whether the act of defendant who are not intending to kill the person must be consider as
manslaughter or Murder?

6. Rule

The criminal defendant must be held liable of murder where his act was to cause severe bodily
injury.

7. Reasoning

Causing serious bodily injury without intention to kill the victim must not be consider as murder.
But it would be consider that such bodily injuries are enough to kill a person. In this case the bodily
injury which defendant intended to cause are enough to cause death.

8. Conclusion

The Jury found defendant guilty of murder.

Case Number 14

R. v. Vickers
 1. R. v. Vickers (1957)

Appellant – Vickers

Respondent – Regina

2. Cause of Action

Defendants voluntary action resulted into the death of victim, he appealed in the court contending
that he does not have malice or specific intent to kill the victim.

3. Facts
 Vickers was a worker who broke into the basement of a shop which was involved by a
Miss Duckett who was 73, and was small and deaf. Vickers broke into the shop with
the purpose to take cash.
 He was found by Miss Duckett and was assaulted by him and slaughtered. He was
sentenced for the murdered and appeal based on an erroneous instructions of the jury;
malicous aforethought could be suggested if the injured individual was murdered by a
voluntary act of causing grievous bodily injury.
 Miss Duckett had been struck 10-15 times and kicked in the face by such a degree of
force that was high enough instead of quite slight.
4. Procedural History
In this case the lower court convicted the appellant for murder as his act cause the death of
Miss Duckett. He appealed to the Queen’s Bench where it was held that there was implied
malice and affirmed the conviction.
5. Issue

Whether the defendant was rightly convicted for murder as he does not have specific intent to kill
the victim?

6. Rule

If the defendant does an act on another which causes grievous bodily harm and as a result the
victim died, defendant can’t say he did not intended to do so.

7. Reasoning
The defendant cause severe bodily injuries which are sufficient to cause death and thus there was
implied malice in the present case. Malice would be implied if the victim was died due to voluntary
act of accused.

8. Conclusion

Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.

Case No. 15

Commonwealth v. McLaughlin (1928)

1. Commonwealth v. McLaughlin (1928)

2. Cause of Action
 Defendant Appealed against the conviction of second degree murder as the
elements of murder were not fulfilled and he does not have specific intent to kill
any of the person.
3. Facts
 Mr. McLaughlin (Defendant) struck three individuals who were walking in the
street with his vehicle.
 He had seen the general population in the street, yet did not have enough time to
abstain from hitting them. Subsequent to striking the people in question, Defendant
came back to the scene of the accident and endeavored to help them.
 Two of the unfortunate casualties died, and the third was severely injured. The jury
discovered Defendant liable of second-degree murder.
4. Procedural History
 Defendant was charged with second degree murder under the laws of Pennsylvania,
and at jury trial he was convicted for second degree murder.
 He appealed in the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Norfolk and Suffolk
5. Issue
 Whether the criminal defendant must be held liable when there is no evidence
which can demonstrate that the defendant acted with malice?
6. Rule
  Pennsylvania laws consider first degree murder as unlawful killing of a person with
malicious aforethought and specific intent to kill that person. While they consider
second degree murder as all other type of murder.
7. Reasoning
 Pennsylvania has categorize second degree murder as all other type of murder
which does not comes under the type of first degree murder.
 But for the purpose of second degree murder, malice is implied where defendant’s
want demonstrates reckless disregard for human life.
 Thus the present case shows evidence that the defendant did not see the victim on
road leaving him with not time to avoid them clarifies that he does not have specific
intent and he was not driving so recklessly with disregard to safety of other.
8. Conclusion

The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Norfolk and Suffolk reverse the judgment of trial
court

Case No. 16

King v State (1987)

1. King v State (1987)

Appellant – King

Respondent – State

2. Cause of action

Defendant sought review of their conviction against the sentencing of 20 years for the charge of
murder.

3. Facts

Defendant in this case had indulge in a quarrel with Dwight Lee at night club. Later on that night
defendant shot lee who was in car on the passenger’s seat. Defendant’s bullet resulted in death of
the victim lee. He was charged with the offense of murder and convicted for a 20 years of life
imprisonment
 4. Procedural History

In the jury trial Defendant was found guilty of murder as he was having specific intent to kill the
victim. He was sentenced for 20 years and thus he appealed in the Jefferson Circuit Court to reduce
his sentence and review the matter.

5. Issue

Whether the state shows sufficient evidence to prove the guilt of accused beyond reasonable
ground?

6. Rule

The court while considering the evidence must review it in the light of most favorable to the
prosecution. And the appellate court must only have to look that whether the evidence are enough
for jury to decide the case beyond reasonable ground

7. Reasoning

Defendant engaged in reckless and unjustified conduct which shows extreme indifference to
human life. This has caused great threat to the public on highway as he fired pistol on a vehicle on
the highway. This shows sufficient evidence for the jury to convict the defendant for crime of
murder.

8. Conclusion

The decision of trial court’s conviction was affirmed

Case No. 17

State v. Hokenson (1974)

1. State v. Hokenson (1974)

Appellant – Hokenson
Respondent - State
2. Cause of Action
 The defendant contented that he entered with the intent to commit robbery, and does not
have specific intent to kill the officer which means he must not be held guilty of first degree
murder.
3. Facts
 On January 13, 1972, Fred W. Hokenson entered a drug store with the goal to
commit robbery. At the time he entered the store, Hokenson was armed with a
homemade bomb. Over the span of the attempted robbery, Hokenson assaulted the
storekeeper and the bomb felled to the ground.
 Police arrived and captured Hokenson, but prior to leaving the store, one of the
officers lifted Hokenson’ss bomb up from the floor. The bomb exploded and results
in death of the officer. Hokenson was prosecuted for first degree murder, and
convicted.
4. Procedural History
 Second Judicial District Court for Nez Perce County convicted the appellant for first
degree murder as he had made the bomb and taken with a specific intent to kill that
person to tries to stop him from committing robbery.
 He appealed to the Supreme Court of Idaho to review this judgment and concluded that
he must not be held liable for first degree murder as the elements are not fulfilled.
5. Issue
 Whether taking bomb at the place of attempted robbery and its explosion without
planning constitutes first degree murder?
6. Rule

First degree murder is the intentional killing which willful and premeditated and have malicious
aforethought.

7. Reasoning

In the present case taking a handmade bomb shows intent of the defendant that he was with
intention to willfully kill anyone who comes and tries to restrict his act of robbery. Taking a bomb
in such a place itself shows malicious aforethought. It is immaterial that the bomb exploded after
he was arrested by the police.
 8. Conclusion

The Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed the conviction.

Case No. 18

People v. Patterson (1989)

1. People v. Patterson (1989)

Appellant – People
Respondent - Patterson
2. Cause of Action
 Defendant had furnished cocaine to the victim which resulted in her death. He was charged
with felony murder but the court dismissed the charges and prosecution challenged it in
appeal and contended that it was a dangerously inherited act.
3. Facts
 Mr. Pattinson the defendant and other two women had taken cocaine which was
made available to them by the defendant.
 One of the women died because of the acute intoxication of cocaine due to
which the defendant was charged with the offense of felony murder.
 Prosecution argued that defendant must be held liable for felony murder
because he had committed a dangerously inherited act of furnishing cocaine to
the victim.
 The trial court dismissed the murder charge and the same was affirmed by the
court of appeals. Prosecution petitioned the state supreme court to review the
matter.
4. Procedural History
 The People filed an information charge against the defendant for murder.
 The defendant filed a motion to set aside the charges of murder and the same
was contested by the People as of the charge was based on implied murder.
 The trial court dismissed the charge of murder and the same dismissal was
affirmed by the court of appeals in the appeal by prosecution.
  The prosecution then filed a petition in the California Supreme Court to review
this matter.
5. Issue
 Whether the defendant must be held liable for the second degree murder for
furnishing cocaine to a person who dies due to consumption of that cocaine in
excess acute amount?
6. Rule
 Felony Murder is a homicide which is the direct result of commission of an act
that is inherently dangerous for human life.
7. Reasoning
 Felony Murder is the commission of act which is inherently dangerous for
human life, and furnishing cocaine must be regarded as one of the act.
 In determining the complete act the court must take into consideration the act
in abstract not as whole.
8. Conclusion

California Supreme Court reverse the judgment and remanded it back to court of appeals

Case No. 19

State v. Mayle (1987)

1. State v. Mayle (1987)

Appellant – Mayle

Respondent – State

2. Cause of Action

Defendant appealed the conviction to the superior court against the charge of felony murder

3. Facts

Defendant along with his accomplice robbed one of the McDonald restaurant and later on also
brooked into gasoline station. A police officer arrived on the spot and was killed by the
defendant.
 4. Procedural History

The trial court convicted the defendant for felony murder on the spot of gasoline station. He had
admitted the spot in cross examination which forms the reasonable bases of conviction. He
appealed to the Circuit Court Cabell County who affirmed the conviction.

5. Issue

Whether the act of defendant constitutes felony murder of the police officer?

6. Rule

Felony Murder is the rule that charges defendant with first degree murder for killing that occurs
during a dangerous felony.

7. Reasoning

The defendant were committing a felony which is dangerous and thus the victim dies as a result of
the felony. The evidence suggest that breaking into a gasoline station is a dangerous felony which
and victim’s death was caused during commission of that felony.

8. Conclusion

The conviction was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Cabell County.

Case No. 20

People v. Hansen (1994)

1. People v. Hansen (1994)

Plaintiff Respondent - People
Appellant - Hansen
2. Cause of Action

Defendant killed a 13 year old girl by firing the gun on dwelling without aiming, he appealed that
his conduct could not be consider as murder as he does not have the specific intent to kill someone.

3. Facts
  Hansen gave Echaves $40 to get gem meth for him. Rather than anchoring the drugs
to Hansen, Echaves ran with the $40. Hansen then went to Echaves home and fired
shots from his gun into Echaves flat.
 Hansen act resulting in killing a thirteen-year-old young lady within Echaves flat.
 Hansen was accused of second-degree felony murder and the court of appeal
affirmed the conviction.
4. Procedural History
 The trial court found appellant guilty of murder as he had discharge a firearm at
dwelling which is inherently dangerous act.
 The same was affirmed by the court of appeals as they found that such an act is
reasonable enough and must be in mind of accused that it can result into death of
any person.
 The case was appealed in the California Supreme Court to review that this act must
not be consider as murder.
5. Issue
 Whether firing a gunshot on home is consider as felony murder if resulted in death of
person?
6. Rule
Second Degree Felony Murder is committed when the commission of felony not less
included in murder occur and results in homicide.
7. Reasoning

The court opinioned that as long as the original felony is not lesser included offense of murder,
defendant must be held guilty of murder even if the murder was unintended.

8. Conclusion

California Superior Court Affirmed the Judgment of lower Court.

Case No. 21

1. Commonwealth v. Drum (1868)

Prosecution – Commonwealth
Defendant - Drum
 2. Cause of Action

William drum was charged with the offense of murder to kill his friend David Mohigan and in
jury trial he was convicted for the same.

3. Facts
 William Drum was charged with the offense of murder of his friend and grand jury
found him guilty of the offense of Murder. He appealed to the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania and contended that without specific intent he cannot be held liable for
offense of murder,
4. Procedural History

The case was tried by grand jury who found Drum guilty of second degree murder as the intent is
not specifically drawn from evidence. He appealed to the Supreme Court of the State to review the
same.

5. Issue

Whether a defendant must be held liable for the first degree murder if the elements were not
express but only implied?

6. Rule

First degree murder is inclusive of killing which are willful, deliberate and premeditated.

7. Reasoning

Proof of killing must be inferred from the use of deadly weapon against the victim and the same
would help in drawing out the intention of the accused. The act of unlawful killing of a person
with malice aforethought and malice aforethought can be express or implied.

8. Conclusion
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the judgment of Jury

Case No. 22

People v. Perez (1992)

1. People v. Perez (1992)

 Appellant – People

Respondent – Perez
2. Cause of Action

Perez the defendant entered into the home of Mesa and killed her with knife, and he was charged
with murder and later on convicted for the same. On appeal Court of Appeals reduce its conviction
into second degree murder which was challenged by the prosecution in the Supreme Court of
California.

3. Facts
 On September 30, 1988, Mr. Perez (Defendant) left his vehicle close to the place of
Victoria Mesa. He secretly went into the house while Mesa was warming her vehicle.
Respondent beat Mesa and afterward cut her on various occasions with a steak knife
from Mesa’s kitchen.
 After the steak knife broke, Defendant found another blade in the kitchen, which he
used to cause extra injuries on Mesa, she died as a result of this attack. The main
connection among Defendant and Mesa was that they had gone to High school together
ten years before. Accused was found guilty of first degree, planned and deliberate
murder.
 Defendant appealed, and the court of appeals diminished his conviction to second-
degree murder. The prosecution appealed the decision of court of appeals.
4. Procedural History

The case was tried by trial court where the defendant was found guilty of first degree murder. He
appealed to the court of appeals where the court reduce his conviction to second degree murder.
Thus the prosecution state filed an appeal against the judgment of court of appeals contending that
his act was willful killing and must be consider as first degree murder.

5. Issue
 Whether combined evidence of planning activity, motive and manner of killing
supports the first degree murder where any one kind of evidence on its own is
insufficient to prove the murder as willful.
6. Rule
First degree murder includes killing of person that is willful, premeditated, and perpetrated with
express malice aforethought.

7. Reasoning
 The defendant has committed an act where he had observed and have enough time
to reconsider his act and consequences of the same.
 To determine the first degree murder, planning activity, motive and manner of
killing.
 In the present case defendants act of parking the car away from the victim’s home
which shows planning, and motive can be easily drawn as they were known to each
other means if she would have survive she can easily identify the defendant. Lastly
the manner of killing suggests that, he is having specific intent as he picked another
knife after the first was broken.
8. Conclusion

The Court of Appeals decision was reversed and the defendant was convicted for first
degree murder.

Case Number 23

Callins v. Collins (1994)

1. Callins v. Collins (1994)

Petitioner – Callins
Respondent – Collins
2. Cause of Action

The petition for writ of certiorari was filed by the petitioner as he was sentenced to death for
murder is violation of double jeopardy and due process clause.

3. Facts
 Defendant was indicted for two checks of aggravated robbery and murder. In the
second stage he was condemned to death for the Murder.
 Defendant filed petition for habeas corpus, charging that the bifurcated sentencing
stands in violation of the Due Process Clause and double jeopardy. The district
 court denied his appeal to for habeas corpus. The court of appeals affirms the denial.
Respondent appealed to the United States Supreme Court for writ of certiorari.
4. Procedural History
 The district court sentenced defendant to death for murder and his petition for habeas
corpus was denied by the district court on the ground that this sentence does not violate
the due process clause.
 The same was affirmed by the court of appeals and his petition for habeas corpus was
denied, resulting in filing of a writ of certiorari in the US Supreme Court.
5. Issue

Whether the United States Supreme Court’s death penalty jurisprudence requires both the
death penalty to be imposed consistently and the judge have discretion not to impose capital
punishment?

6. Rule

The United States Supreme Court’s death penalty jurisprudence requires both the death penalty to
be imposed consistently and the judge have discretion not to impose capital punishment.

7. Reasoning
 It was held in Furman v. Georgia, 408 US. 238 (1972) that the death penalty must be
imposed with consistency and reasonably.
 Similarly the Fifth Amendment also clarifies that death penalty must be impose and was
not consider as cruel or unusual punishment under Eight Amendment.
8. Conclusion

The writ of certiorari was denied.

Case 24

1. Name of the Case – State v. Guebara

2. Cause of Action – The defendant had filed an appeal against the decision of the District
Court of Finney County (Kansas), wherein he had been held guilty for first-degree murder.
3. Facts of the Case – The wife of the defendant in this case had filed for divorce, alongside
wherein she had also filed before the courts for criminal charges against her husband,
wherein she alleged misdemeanour, battery and theft. The fact that the defendant had shot
and killed his wife when she had attempted to take her daughters from the defendant,
remained undisputed. The daughters had been staying with the defendant as a part of the
pre-agreed terms of visiting. The trial refused the request of the defendant to instruct the
jury for lesser-included offence of voluntary manslaughter, and he appealed against his
conviction for the same
The appellate court affirmed the decision that had been laid out by the trial court. It held
that the evidence that existed was not sufficient as to have the trial court suggest to the jury
regarding the lesser-included offence of voluntary manslaughter. The sufficiency of
provocation had to be met with an objective standard.
4. Rule – The provocation to manslaughter must be such that it would deprive any reasonable
person of his self-control under the circumstances, and thereby, cause him/her to act out of
passion.
5. Conclusion – The Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the Trial Court, and held that
the Trial Court had not erred in refusal to instruct the Jury, and affirmed the decision of
conviction of the defendant for first-degree murder.

Case 25

1. Name of the Case – People v. Chevalier

2. Cause of Action – The State appealed in this case against the reversal of the decision of
the Circuit Court, by the Appellate Court for the Second District (Illinois). The Circuit
Court had found guilty the defendants in the case for the charge of murder. The State
alleged this decision of the Appellate Court to be an erroneous decision.
3. Facts of the Case – Both the defendants that had been charged in the case, had shot and
thereby killed their wives. The defendants had had an argument with their wives, and in
the argument, the wives of the defendants had admitted to their infidelity. The defendants
had then shot their wives and killed them, and both of them were convicted for committing
murder. On appeal, the conviction of the defendants was reversed by the Appellate Court.
 Against this reversal, the State filed an appeal before the Appellate Court, claiming the
decision of the First Appellate Court to be erroneous, and that the proof of provocation
presented by the defendants in the case was not sufficient in legal to reduce the convictions
and mitigating them from murder to voluntary manslaughter.
The Appellate Court in this appeal reversed the judgement of the First Appellate Court,
and reinstated the convictions of the defendants in the case, and states that the First
appellate court had placed its reliance on an incorrect statement of the Illinois legislations.
What it had termed to be an exception, was not actually so. Only finding the parties in the
middle of the act of adultery, or immediately before or after the act, would suffice as an act
of provocation, whereas the other instances would not.
4. Rule – If there is a passion for manslaughter, there needs to be an engenderment with a
provocation of serious nature, and the law recognizes this to be reasonably adequate for
having provoked to such passion for such manslaughter.
5. Conclusion – The Appellate Court in the appeal by the state reversed the judgment of the
First Appellate Court, and reinstated the judgment delivered by the Circuit court, and
reinstated the convictions of the defendants. It also disregarded the objections that were
put forth by the defendants for hearsay testimony.

Case No. 26

Commonwealth v. Troila (1991)

1. Commonwealth v. Troila (1991)

Appellant – Trolia
Respondent – Commonwealth
2. Cause of Action

Defendant killed a man who had made a pass on him and contented his conviction for murder
as erroneous decision because the act of victim was sexually overture and constitutes sufficient
evidence of provocation.

3. Facts

Michael Trolia Stabbed and killed a person who was making a pass on him. The trial court
convicted the defendant for first degree murder. He appealed in to the superior court for
 rejecting the charges of first degree murder and considering voluntary manslaughter as the act
of victim who is making a pass on him was sufficient to prove provocation.

4. Procedural History
 The trial court charged defendant for the murder of a person and convicted him for first
degree murder. He appealed the judgment to the Court of Appeals to review the matter
and consider his act done under provocation due to the sexual overture act of the victim
to reduce his charge.
5. Issue

Whether a sexually overture act provides sufficient bases of provocation to reduce the charge
of murder into voluntary manslaughter?

6. Rule

Voluntary manslaughter is the intentional killing of a person due to the heat of anger and
provocation due to the act of victim himself.

7. Reasoning

In the present case the defendant was not able to show reasonable bases and evidence to show that
the victim’s act are sexually overture as the only evidence present was defendants allegation that
victim was making a pass on him. Thus such evidence is not reasonable enough for provocation.

8. Conclusion

The conviction was affirmed on appeal.

Case No 27

People v. Borchers (1958)

1. People v. Borchers (1958)

Appellant – People/prosecution
Respondent – Borchers
2. Cause of Action
 Defendant killed his girlfriend on her incitement to kill her after the quarrel. The same was
convicted but on separate trial of sanity they had reduced it to voluntary manslaughter.

3. Facts

The defendant Mr. Borchers shot her girlfriend and later on charged with the offense of murder.
It was found that before the night of Dotty, Mr. Borchers girlfriend death she admitted she was
unfaithful and states that she wish she would be dead. And on the day of her death she taunted
defendant to shoot her ultimately resulting in her death. The trial court found him sane at the
time of offense. He entered into a new trail of sanity, but the trial court denied the motion and
also reduce his sentence from second degree murder to voluntary manslaughter.

4. Procedural History

The jury found Defendant guilty of second degree murder and convicted him. He moved to a
new trial of sanity and the same was denied by the trial court but they reduce the sentence from
second degree murder to voluntary manslaughter. This resulted in appeal by prosecution
against the reduced verdict.

5. Issue

Whether the defendant must be held guilty of voluntary manslaughter where he kills another
person in desperation and not in anger or rage?

6. Rule

Voluntary manslaughter is killing of another person on sudden quarrel or under the heat of
anger without malice.

7. Reasoning

In the present case voluntary manslaughter is killing another person under the heat of passion and
the evidence suggest that the wild desperation was caused by conduct of Dotty which leads to her
death.

8. Conclusion

The Judgment of trial court was affirmed.

 Case 28

1. Name of the Case – State v. Dumlao

2. Cause of Action – The defendant appealed against the decision of the trial court for
convicting him on the counts of murder having shot his mother-in-law.
3. Facts of the Case – The defendant had been held liable for the shooting and killing his
mother-in-law, and had been convicted by the Trial Court following a jury trial for the
same. During the trial, the defendant had requested a witness who was an expert, so that he
may testify before the court that the defendant was suffering from paranoid personality
disorder, the symptoms of which was a pathological jealousy regarding the wife of the
defendant. The defendant, Dumlao also requested the trial court to instruct the jury, that
the night of the murder, the defendant was suffering from extreme emotional distress which
could be reasonably explained. This could have resulted in the mitigation of the sentence
of the defendant, but the trial court refused to do the same.
The appellate court reversed the judgment of the Trial Court, that if the defendant caused
death of another person under serious emotional distress or emotional disturbance, then in
that case, the jury can mitigate the murder charge on the defendant to a charge of
manslaughter.
4. Rule – If a defendant caused death of another person, under extreme emotional distress or
mental disturbance, which is unexplainable, then the jury may mitigate the charge of
murder to that of a voluntary manslaughter.
5. Conclusion – The Appellate court approved the appeal of the defendant, and with the
evidence existing that the defendant had shot his mother-in-law believing he had a
reasonable reason to do so, the Appellate Court mitigated the charge on the defendant from
murder to manslaughter.

Case 29

1. Name of the Case – Murray v. State

2. Cause of Action – The defendant in this case sought to have the decision of the District
Court of Uinta County (Wyoming) reviewed, wherein the defendant had been convicted of
involuntary manslaughter, which was in violation of the Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-105(a) (ii),
 and (b) (1988). The alleged decision also ordered restitution against the defendant and
decided the penalties to be paid by the defendant to the victim’s compensation fund.
3. Facts of the Case – The defendant, while drinking, got into an argument with the victim in
the case. Following that, the victim returned to the home of the defendant later that night.
This caused the defendant to fire a handgun several times. One of the bullets that had been
fired accidentally ricocheted from a rock, and hit the victim, resulting in his death several
hours later. The defendant was arrested after that, but he was not given information
regarding the charges that had been made against him. He was then held liable for
involuntary manslaughter, having violated the Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-105(a) (ii) and (b)
(1988). He was also ordered to pay restitution, and to pay penalties for the victim’s
compensation fund.
The defendant then appealed against this conviction, but the appellate court affirmed the
decision of the trial court, but with modifications It set aside the penalties, since the Trial
Court had failed to assess whether the defendant was in capacity to pay the penalties. The
Appellate Court held that the arrest of the defendant was not illegal, despite the fact that
the failure of informing of his charges to him was in violation of the Wyo. R. Crim. P. 4(c)
(3) (revised 1992).
4. Rule – When an unlawful killing of an individual takes place, where the defendant knew
the consequences of his actions, which included the possibility of the death of the victim,
it is voluntary manslaughter.
5. Conclusion – The Appellate Court thereafter set aside the part of the decision of the trial
court wherein the defendant was to pay penalties for contribution to the victim’s
compensation fund, but affirmed the decision of the trial court in all other regards.

Case 30

1. Name of the Case – People v. Rodriguez

2. Cause of Action – The defendant filed an appeal against her conviction for involuntary
manslaughter, and also for her being denied a new trial by the Court.
3. Facts of the Case – The defendant in the case was a woman, Ms. Rodriguez, who had left
behind four of her children, among whom the eldest child was only 6 years old, at home.
However, due to unknown circumstances, her house caught fire, resulting in the death of
 one of her children from the injuries that were suffered during the fire. However, no
evidence whatsoever had been found as to what was the cause of the fire. The defendant
was then convicted for the count of involuntary manslaughter. The Defendant thereafter
requested for a new trial, but the request for the same was denied by the Trial Court. The
defendant thus appealed against the judgment and the denial of her request for a new trial.
The appellate court was thereby faced with the decision if the defendant would be guilty
of involuntary manslaughter where no evidence was in existence as to her having acted out
of malicious intention or negligence of the same manner.
However, the appellate court reversed the order of the trial court, and also the denial of the
trial court to the defendant regarding the new trial. It held that the defendant could only
have been held liable for involuntary manslaughter if there were in existence any evidence
that proved her criminal intent or the criminal negligence on her part. However, since no
evidence for the same existed, the defendant could not be held liable for the same.
4. Rule - Unlawful killing of an individual, which is not preceded by a malicious thought, is
Involuntary manslaughter.
5. Conclusion – The Appellate court decided that the defendant could not be held liable for
the involuntary manslaughter and thus reversed the order of the trial court and the denial
by the Trial court to her request for the new trial.

Case 31

1. Name of the Case – State v. Bier

2. Cause of Action – The defended challenged the decision of the District Court of Cascade
County, Eighth Judicial District (Montana), where the jury trial that had taken place had
found the defendant guilty and had thereby convicted him on the counts of negligent
homicide under the Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-104.
3. Facts of the Case – The defendant had been convicted by the District Court of Cascade
County, Eighth Judicial District (Montana) for the negligent homicide where he had killed
his wife, and this was in violation of the Mont. Code § 45-4-104. The defendant filed an
appeal against this conviction, wherein he argued that there had been failure on the part of
the State to provide evidence as to the mental state of the defendant as is required, nor was
the State able to prove the elements of causation in order to prove a prima facie against the
 defendant for having committed the negligent homicide of his wife. The defendant also
argued that the trial court had made a grave error in not considering an analysis of the scene
of the offence as had been requested by the defendant under the Mont. Code Ann. § 46-16-
502. The defendant also claimed this to be an abuse of discretion.
4. Rule – A person is guilty of negligent homicide when his conduct is a gross deviation from
a reasonable standard of care.
5. Conclusion – The appellate court affirmed the decision of the Trial Court, claiming that
there was no abuse of discretion by the Trial Court in refusing the jury view on the matter,
and that the danger posed to the defendant from his intoxicated wife was a foreseeable risk,
the burden of proof on the State had been met sufficiently, and that the decision of the Trial
Court did not suffer from any discrepancy.

Case 32

1. Name of the Case – People v. Watkins

2. Cause of Action – In this case, the defendant had sought the decision of the District Court,
Fourth Judicial District (Colorado) to be reviewed, wherein he had been convicted on the
counts of second-degree murder, and also for first-degree assault.
3. Facts of the Case – The defendant had been convicted for the counts of second-degree
murder, and a first-degree assault by the trial court, which was after the jury trial. The trial
court had refused to provide the jury with any instructions regarding the lesser-included
offences in the case, and the defendant claimed that in these circumstances it was an error
on the part of the trial court in this case. The defended appealed before the appellate court
requesting a review of the decision of the trial court.
Upon appeal, the court reversed the judgment of the trial court and decided that, even if the
evidence which had been put forth by the defendant for supporting his claim of his and his
brother’s lives being in danger, were to be unreasonable, or even improbable, nevertheless,
 this entitled the defendant to an instruction to the jury from the trial court regarding
criminally negligent homicide.
4. Rule – A person who kills in an unreasonable good-faith belief that his actions were
justified cannot be punished for second-degree murder.
5. Conclusion – The appellate court thus reversed the judgment, and thereafter remanded the
case back to the trial court for a new trial.

Case 33

1. Name of the Case – Harris v. State

2. Cause of Action – The defendant had been convicted for the counts of voluntary
manslaughter, since he had shot and had caused the death of the victim. The defendant had
appealed against the order of the Trial Court wherein the Trial Court had overruled the
request of the defendant for a fresh trial.
3. Facts of the Case – The defendant in the case had shot the victim in the thigh, in the stomach
and the shoulder of the victim, which resulted in the death of the victim. To that, the
defendant argued that he had done so in the act of self-defence. However, the defendant
had been convicted of voluntary manslaughter, following which the defendant moved for
a fresh trial to be initiated. This motion was then overruled by the trial court.
To this decision of the trial court, the defendant filed an appeal, and claimed that the trial
court had erred in its decision to not reduce the charge on defendant from voluntary to
involuntary manslaughter. The issue this faced by the appellate court was whether the
defendant could be held liable for involuntary manslaughter, in the case where the victim
had died, whereas the defendant had only intended to wound, cripple the victim, and not
kill him.
4. Rule – Unlawful killing of an individual, which is not preceded by a malicious thought, is
Involuntary manslaughter.
5. Conclusion – However, the court held that the charges against the defendant cannot be
reduced from voluntary manslaughter to involuntary manslaughter, since involuntary
manslaughter refers to the unlawful killing of the victim, where no malice is involved
beforehand. Defendant here however, had fired his gun voluntarily, and thus, the court
assumed malice on the part of the defendant.
 Case 34

1. Name of the Case – State v. Sety

2. Cause of Action – The appeal is made by the State, against the order of the Trial Court
wherein the Trial Court had directed the reduction of the sentence of the defendant, and
had reduced it from the conviction for a second-degree murder, to a conviction for
voluntary manslaughter, a decision against which the State preferred an appeal, claiming it
to be an abuse of discretion.
3. Facts of The Case – The defendant had been convicted for a second-degree murder by the
Superior Court of Maricopa County (Arizona), against which he appealed. The defendant
argued that the sentence that had been awarded to him of not less than nine years, or more
than ten years, was excessive in nature, and that the trial court should have ordered an
acquittal of the defendant. The Trial court took this into regard, and thereby reduced the
conviction of the defendant, from a second-degree murder to that of a voluntary
manslaughter. This was argued against by the State, who appealed that this reduction was
an abuse of discretion by the Trial Court. However, the Appellate Court reaffirmed the
decision of the Trial Court, and did so upon reviewing the circumstances and facts of the
case. As the appellate Court noticed, although there existed sufficient evidence for criminal
culpability, there was also presence of abundant mitigating circumstances, and the court
also considered the moral character of the defendant. It thereby held that the sentence was
in excess of the crime, as under Ari. Rev. Stat. § 13-1717(B).
4. Rule – The presumption of malice from the use of a deadly weapon is rebuttable and is not
conclusive.
5. Conclusion – The Appellate Court affirmed the conviction so made by the Trial Court, and
reduced the sentence of the defendant to the time that had already been served by him.

Case 35

1. Name of the Case – People v. Ochoa

2. Cause of Action – Appeal by the State against the decision of Court of Appeals (California)
reversing the order of conviction of the defendant.
3. Facts of the Case – The defendant in this case had been found guilty on two counts of gross
vehicular manslaughter, while being in an intoxicated condition, and also for another count
 of vehicular manslaughter. In the trial court, the evidence against the defendant in the case
was admitted, which included evidence for driving under the influence of intoxicating
substances. It also included evidence regarding the defendant having attended driving
school, and also for an alcohol awareness class.
The Court of Appeals had reversed the judgment which had resulted the conviction of the
defendant for having violated the provisions of the Cal. Veh, Code § 20001 and the Cal.
Pen. Code § 191.5(a). The defendant had argued before the Court of Appeals (California)
that the test for “gross negligence” was objective, and the subjective state of the defendant’s
mind in the given situation was prejudicial, and thereby, irrelevant. The Court of Appeals
accepted this and reversed the convictions of the defendant, stating that the evidence so
presented was inadmissible in nature to prove the gross negligence on the part of the
defendant.
However, upon appeal by State, the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals
(California), and stated that the despite an objective test being used, the jury was entitled
to have knowledge of the relevant facts that were also within the knowledge of the
defendant at the time of the act being committed, within which was included the knowledge
of the risk that existed as a result of his conduct. The Court also held that the merely
because the evidence was probative, did not result in them being inadmissible, and that it
did not outweigh its prejudicial effect.
4. Rule – A Conviction that has been based upon the criminally negligent conduct of gross
nature, requires that conscious indifference be proven, or whether any other reasonable
man in the shoes of the defendant would be aware of the risk involved therein due to his
conduct.
5. Conclusion – The Appellate Court in this case reversed the judgment of the Court of
Appeals (California).