MANESE VS.

VELASCO
577 SCRA 108 / G.R. No. 164024 / JANUARY 29, 2009
QUISUMBING, ACTING C.J.

TOPIC: Real party in interest

FACTS:
On 1971, Velasco issued OCT Homestead Patent by the
Register of Deeds in Quezon Province over the subject matter,
foreshore land. He sold the property to Flores. Flores then
sold the property to Flores-Tantoco. The property was divided
into seven (7) lots. Two (2) TCT were sold back to Flores.
Adjacent and contiguous to the alleged foreshore land is the
agricultural land owned by Manese, et.al. Manses filed a
complaint stating that the issuance of homestead patent and
series of transfers involving the property were null and void.
They claim that Velasco committed fraud, misrepresentation,
and falsification in obtaining the said OCT and the sale
between Velasco and Flores were invalid. Velasco moved to
dismiss the complaint. One of the grounds is that the
petitioners do not have legal personality since the property
forms part of the public domain and that only the Solicitor
General can bring an action for reversion or any action
canceling the title. RTC grant the motion to dismiss. CA
affirms RTC’s decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are real party-in-interest

with the authority to file a complaint for annulment of title for
foreshore land.

RURULING:
Petitioners are not party-in-interest in the case. In all
actions or the reversion to the Government of lands of the
public domain or improvements thereon shall be instituted by
the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead, in the
proper courts, in the name of the Republic of the Philippines,
the real party-in-interest.
 Section 2 of Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure states that, “a real party in interest is the party
who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the
suit. Or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless
otherwise authorized by law or there Rules, every action must
be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in
interest.”
TANJUATCO VS. JUDGE GAKO
A.M. NO. RTJ-06-2016 / MARCH 23, 2009
VELASCO, JR. J.

TOPIC:

FACTS:

This administrative case stemmed from the sworn-

complaint1 dated September 24, 2004 of Corazon R.
Tanjuatco filed with this Court, charging Regional Trial Court
(RTC) Judge Ireneo L. Gako, Jr., now retired, with Knowingly
Rendering Unjust Judgment, Gross Partiality and/or Gross
Ignorance in connection with a contract rescission case filed
with respondent’s court.

By Resolution dated August 9, 2006, the Court resolved to

refer the administrative complaint, which was earlier
redocketed as a regular administrative matter, to Court of
Appeals (CA) Associate Justice Josefina Guevarra-Salonga for
investigation, recommendation, and report.2

From the complaint, respondent’s comment thereon, with

their respective annexes, and other documents on record, the
Court gathers the following material facts:

FACTS:

Complainant’s father, Vicente S. del Rosario (Vicente S.), and

her brother, Pantaleon, co-owned eight (8) parcels of land
located in Alumnus, Basak-San Nicolas, Cebu City, with an
aggregate area of 21,000 square meters. Via a "Contract to
Buy and Sell" dated August 23, 1985,3 Vicente S. and
Pantaleon, for PhP 2,156,040, sold the property to the City of
Cebu, for the latter’s abattoir project. As agreed upon, the
purchase price was to be deposited and to remain in escrow
with the Philippine National Bank (PNB) until lot titles shall
have been delivered to the city. Following the 1986 Edsa
event, however, the newly-designated OIC-Mayor of Cebu
City, John H. Osmeña, unilaterally stopped the construction
of the abattoir.
On May 7, 1987, Vicente S. died, leaving behind the following
heirs: his wife, Ceferina Urguiaga, and their eight (8) children,
among whom are complainant, Pantaleon, and Carlos del
Rosario.

Later developments saw Vicente S.’s heirs filing a petition for

the partition of his estate. Docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-
17236 of the RTC of Cebu City, the petition, after several
transfers, eventually landed in Branch 5 of the court, then
presided by respondent judge. According to the respondent,
he held "preliminary conferences among the heirs of Vicente
S. x x x for the purpose of settling the case amicably." 4 The
complainant, on the other hand, narrated that the respondent
held several meetings in his chambers during the preliminary
conferences.5 Upon the heirs’ motion, the respondent
subsequently inhibited himself from handling the case.

At about the same time and based on the above narrated facts,
Vicente B. del Rosario (Vicente B.), represented by his father,
Pantaleon, filed a case against the City of Cebu for the
rescission of the "Contract to Buy and Sell" covering the eight
(8) lots adverted to. Docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-27334
and entitled Vicente B. del Rosario, represented by his
Attorney-in-Fact, Pantaleon U. del Rosario v. City of Cebu,
the complaint, with attachments, was raffled to the
respondent’s Branch 5. The complaint originally carried
the Verification/Certification of Non- Forum
Shopping signed by Pantaleon. The verification was
subsequently replaced by another executed by Vicente B., the
plaintiff, based on plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend
complaint.1avvphi1.zw+ This motion recited that during the
hearing [on] x x x July 3, 2002, this Honorable Court told this
representation to amend the complaint because the
verification/certification of non-forum shopping x x x should
have been executed by plaintiff Vicente B. del Rosario who is
the real party in interest x x x and to allege that the amount
deposited in escrow inclusive of interest accrued should be
paid to plaintiff by way of rentals.6

On February 26, 2003, Isidro and Michael Alain Reyes de

Leon, heirs of Teresita de Leon, who in turn was Virgilio S.’s
niece, moved to intervene in Civil Case No. CEB-27334, but
the court denied the motion.7
By decision dated May 28, 2004, respondent rescinded the
contract in question and awarded the whole purchase price as
rentals to Vicente B. The following events then transpired: (1)
Carlos del Rosario interposed his own motion for
intervention; (2) on August 13, 2004, the city of Cebu filed a
notice of appeal with the RTC;8 and (3) on September 8, 2004,
Vicente B. moved for execution pending appeal, which the
court granted conditioned upon his posting of a bond.9

It is against the foregoing state of things that the complainant

filed her complaint alleging, in gist, the following:

1. During the rescission case hearing on July 3, 2002, the

respondent instructed Pantaleon’s counsel to amend the
complaint and to attach instead the verification of his
son Vicente B., and to allege that the amount deposited
on the escrow, exclusive of the interest accrued, should
be paid to Vicente B. by way of rentals. Vicente B. was,
therefore, made to appear as the plaintiff. By these
actuations, the respondent was no longer acting as an
impartial trier of facts. He was in fact lawyering for
Pantaleon.

2. The respondent admitted the Amended Complaint

despite the fact that Vicente B. failed to pay the
appropriate filing fee for the additional relief sought in
the complaint.

3. On May 28, 2004, the respondent rendered judgment

ordering contract rescission and awarding the purchase
price therefor in escrow to Vicente B. as rentals, despite
his knowledge that one-half of the subject property
belongs to the estate of the deceased Vicente S. and was
already within the jurisdiction and custody of the court
handling the partition case.

4. The respondent issued an Order allowing execution

pending appeal while the motion for intervention filed by
Carlos del Rosario remained unresolved.

In his Comment,10 respondent, inter alia, alleged that: his

May 28, 2004 decision, far from being unjust, was based on
the law and evidence and was in fact beneficial to
complainant, Cebu City being ordered to return the eight (8)
lots subject of the case; Carlos del Rosario’s motion to
intervene was filed only after the decision was rendered; he
was not aware that four of the eight lots involved in Civil Case
No. CEB-27334 were included in Civil Case No. CEN-17236
for partition; there was no need to implead the complainant
as she and the other heirs could very well be represented by
Pantaleon who owned four of the lots in question and is a co-
owner of the other four; no damage was done to the
complainant because the case is on appeal with the CA; the
complainant did not move for intervention in the rescission
case as an indispensable party; and the matter of plaintiff
Virgilio B.’s non-payment of the filing fees was not brought to
the court’s attention. Apropos the allegation about his having
instructed the plaintiff’s counsel on what to do in the case,
respondent countered that it is the court’s duty, in the course
of a hearing, to suggest to litigants and their counsels to follow
the proper procedures so that cases be speedily resolved.

On September 20, 2006, respondent judge reached the

compulsory retirement age of 70. The Court, however,
ordered that the release of his retirement benefits be held in
abeyance until the resolution of this administrative case and
to hold these benefits available to answer for any monetary
penalty that may be imposed.

Following due hearings, the Investigating Justice submitted

on December 6, 2006 an investigation report. In it, she
recommended that respondent judge be adjudged guilty of
knowingly rendering an unjust judgment and grave
misconduct in the performance of his duties and be meted the
penalty of dismissal. She predicated her recommendation on
the guilt of respondents on three (3) main premises, to wit: (1)
respondent proceeded with the rescission case without
impleading indispensable parties; (2) he "lawyered" for the
plaintiff, thus betraying his partiality towards a party in a
case; and (3) he denied and/or refused to act on the motion to
intervene of an indispensable party. Here are some excerpts
of the investigation report:

Admittedly, respondent presided over the Partition Case,

having held preliminary conferences x x x. The fact that he
conducted conferences among the heirs of the deceased
Vicente coupled by the fact that the Partition Case was filed by
one of the heirs in defiance to the position of the other heirs
respecting the settlement of the vast estate, would sufficiently
serve notice to him that there is a severe conflict of interests
among said heirs. Respondent judge may very well insist that
he did not have the opportunity to read the voluminous case
records as well as the Rescission Case [which] would have
alerted him of the need to implead all the heirs of the deceased
Vicente.lawphil

Besides, respondent x x x cannot simply feign ignorance of the

Partition Case. Before he had rendered his now assailed
Decision, [he] was even reminded by plaintiff Vicente of the
pendency of the Partition Case when the latter filed his
opposition to the motion of intervenors De Leon.

So viewed, respondent judge need not wait for the

complainant or the other heirs to intervene in the Rescission
Case, since it is his duty as a judge to ensure that all
indispensable parties are impleaded before resolving a case.
Law and jurisprudence clearly and explicitly dictate
compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. The absence of
an indispensable party in a case renders ineffectual all the
proceedings subsequent to the fling of the complaint
including the judgment.

Parenthetically, when an action involves reconveyance of

property x x x owners of property over which reconveyance is
asserted are indispensable parties x x x.

xxxx

Still and all respondent judge opted x x x to exclude the

complainant and the other heirs of the deceased Vicente based
on the bare supposition that since Pantaleon owns the
remaining half of the subject lots and that Pantaleon is also an
heir of the deceased, there is no longer any need to implead
the other heirs. x x x

Clearly, this manifests the bias and partiality of the

respondent judge in favor of Pantaleon. At this point, it bears
to stress that respondent judge is at a complete loss as to what
capacity Pantaleon stands in the Rescission Case. In his
Comment dated March 8, 2005, respondent judge refers to
Pantaleon, and not plaintiff Vicente, as the plaintiff in the
Rescission Case and the supposed owner of half of the subject
lots.

x x x Whether the Rescission Case was resolved speedily is of

no moment x x x. What remains is the fact that respondent
judge favored Pantaleon and disposed of the Rescission Case
to the detriment of the other heirs of the deceased Vicente. x
xx

Worse, respondent judge had inexcusably failed to act on a

motion to intervene filed by one of the heirs of the deceased
Vicente. While said motion to intervene was filed after the
assailed Decision had been rendered, respondent judge
should have prudently acted on it especially so since the
motion itself had raised the issue of non-joinder of
indispensable parties. x x x

Needless to state, whenever it appears to the court in the

course of a proceeding that an indispensable party has not
been joined, it is the duty of the court to stop the trial and
order the inclusion of such party. Such an order is
unavoidable, for it is precisely "when an indispensable party
is not before the court (that) the action should be dismissed."

What further reflects respondent judge’s utter betrayal of his

duties and responsibilities as a judge is his admission that he
had in fact taught Pantaleon what to do in the case. x x x

Certainly, the fact that respondent judge instructed Pantaleon

to withdraw the verification and certification of non-forum
shopping and replace it with one executed by plaintiff Vicente
is blatantly partial, irregular and in direct violation of
procedural rules. Respondent judge should have dismissed
the complaint outright as provided under Section 5 of Rule 7
of the Rules of Court. x x x

xxxx

All the foregoing are telling proofs that the act of the
respondent judge knowingly rendering the assailed Decision
is indisputably unlawful, anomalous and is totally
inconsistent with any claim of good faith in the performance
of his judicial functions. The evidence on record proves that
the respondent judge committed acts amounting to grave
misconduct.
The Court is unable to fully agree with the recommendation
and the premises and arguments holding it together.

We start off with the role of the respondent in the matter of

the amendment of the complaint. As complainant claims,
respondent judge instructed Pantaleon’s counsel to amend
the complaint in Civil Case No. CEB-27334 and to attach to
the amended complaint the verification of his son, Vicente B.,
and to allege that the amount deposited in escrow, exclusive
of the interest accrued, should be paid to Vicente B. by way of
rentals.

Agreeing with the complainant, the Investigating Justice

stated the observation that said actuations of respondent
judge is "partial, irregular and in direct violation of procedural
rules," adding that the original complaint should have been
dismissed outright pursuant to Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules
of Court.

We are not persuaded.

Contrary to complainant’s posture, the assailed suggestions

made by respondent may be viewed as an attempt to comply
with the guidelines laid down in Administrative Matter No.
03-1-09-SC, more known as the Rule on Guidelines to be
Observed by Trial Court Judges and Clerks of Courts in the
Conduct of Pre-trial and Use of Deposition-Discovery
Measures. The policy behind the pre-trial guidelines is to
abbreviate court proceedings and ensure prompt disposition
of cases and decongest court dockets. Pursuant to this policy,
the judge is expected to determine during pre-trial if there is
a need to amend the pleadings.

Sec. 5 of the pre-trial guidelines reads:

5. If all efforts to settle fail, the trial judge shall:

a. Adopt the minutes of preliminary conference as part

of the pre- trial proceedings and confirm markings of
exhibits or substituted photocopies and admissions on
the genuineness and due execution of documents;

b. Inquire if there are cases arising out of the same facts

pending before other courts and order its consolidation
if warranted;
 c. Inquire if the pleadings are in order. If not, order the
amendments if necessary;

d. Inquire if interlocutory issues are involved and resolve

the same;

e. Consider the adding or dropping of parties.

As it were, respondent judge noticed that the person who

verified Vicente B.’s complaint was his attorney-in-fact,
obviously leading the respondent to conclude that the
verification was defective. He believed a correction was in
order to prevent future complications, such as the filing of a
motion to dismiss the complaint which undeniably will only
prolong or delay the case.

In actuality, no clear benefit redounded to Vicente B. as a

result of respondent’s suggestion, for the requirement on
verification may be made by the party, his lawyer or his
representative or any person who personally knows the truth
of the facts alleged in the pleading.11

Thus, Pantaleon’s verification accompanying the original

complaint would have had sufficed.

Complainant’s assertion that respondent made it appear that

Pantaleon was the plaintiff is a bit specious. The title of the
case, no less, clearly indicated that Vicente B. is the plaintiff,
not Pantaleon.

The Investigating Justice erred too when she concluded that

the complaint should have been dismissed outright under Sec.
5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. Sec. 5, Rule 7 refers to
certification against forum shopping. The correct and
applicable rule is the preceding Sec. 4 of Rule 7 which deals
with verification.

Even if the Investigator cited the correct Rule (Sec. 4, Rule 7),
she would still be incorrect in her conclusion that the
complaint should be dismissed, for it is basic that verification
is only a formal, not jurisdictional, requisite.12Accordingly,
even if the verification is flawed or defective, the Court may
still give due course to the pleading if the circumstances
warrant the relaxation of the rule in the interest of justice.13
On another point, the Investigating Justice faulted the
respondent for not impleading complainant and her brother,
Carlos del Rosario, as parties-plaintiffs. She reasoned that
respondent need not wait for complainant and the other heirs
to intervene, it being the court’s duty to implead all
indispensable parties before resolving the case.

To a certain extent, the Investigating Justice is correct.

While it is true that the pre-trial guidelines (A.M. No. 03-1-

09-SC) obliges the judge, if proper, to add or drop parties to
the case, the inclusion of parties-plaintiffs is a different
situation.

Intervening in a case is not a matter of right but of sound

discretion of the Court. Sec. 2, Rule 19 of the Rules on the
subject, Time to intervene, specifically provides that "the
motion to intervene may be filed at anytime before rendition
of judgment by the trial court." Thus, intervention to unite
with the plaintiffs must be filed before rendition of judgment.
Thus, respondent acted within the bounds of the rules when
he denied Carlos del Rosario’s intervention, filed as the
corresponding motion was after the assailed decision was
rendered.

The investigation report stated that it is the "duty of the judge

to ensure that all indispensable parties are impleaded before
resolving the case." This may be true with respect to the
joinder of defendants as jurisdiction over their persons can be
acquired by means of service of summons. With respect to
other real parties-in-interest as additional plaintiffs, however,
the court cannot simply issue an order towards the
impleadment of said parties as additional plaintiffs. These
proposed plaintiffs must give their consent to their inclusion
as plaintiffs. Otherwise, the addition of such parties will be
useless and irregular considering they may be adverse to the
idea of being parties-plaintiffs in the first place. Thus, the
respondent was correct in not simply adding complainant and
Carlos del Rosario as co-plaintiffs of Vicente B. since the RTC
had yet to acquire jurisdiction over their persons. As a matter
of fact, they filed a motion to intervene but was rejected
because it was filed after the decision was promulgated.
To be sure, the Investigating Justice was mistaken in her
belief that Pantaleon, the attorney-in-fact of plaintiff Vicente
B., cannot represent the other interested heirs like
complainant and Carlos del Rosario even without the joinder
of the latter as co-plaintiffs.

It should be borne in mind that Pantaleon, Carlos del Rosario,

and complainant, as compulsory heirs of Vicente S., are co-
owners of the subject lots. And a co-owner may bring an action
in that capacity without the necessity of joining all the other
co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is deemed to be
instituted for the benefit of all.14When a suit is brought by one
co-owner for the benefit of all, a favorable decision will benefit
them but an adverse decision cannot prejudice their
rights.15 Thus, complainant and Carlos del Rosario stood to be
benefited by the suit filed by Pantaleon, as attorney-in-fact of
Vicente B., as the two, as co-owners, are entitled to their pro-
rata share in the monetary award to be adjudged to Vicente B.
Thus, there was really no prejudice suffered by complainant
or her brother, Carlos, when respondent denied the faulty-
filed motion for intervention.

No one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the
process of dispensing justice can be infallible.16 To hold judges
for every erroneous ruling or order issued, assuming they
have erred, would be nothing short of downright harassment
and would make the judge’s position untolerable.17 To dismiss
a judge for what may be considered as serious offenses under
the Code of Judicial Conduct, there must, ideally, reliable
evidence to show that the judicial acts complained of were ill-
motivated, corrupt or inspired by a persistent disregard of
well-known rules.

While there is no evidence tending to show that respondent

perverted his office for some financial benefits or for
consideration less than honest, respondent to be sure did not
conduct himself, in relation to Civil Case No. CEB-27334, with
the exacting partiality required under the Code of Judicial
Conduct. As the records show, respondent indeed suggested
to Vicente B.’s counsel that the amendment to his complaint
should, in relief portion, include a claim for rentals. This to us
is improper and at least constitutes simple misconduct.

Simple misconduct is punishable under Rule 140 as follows:

B. If the respondent is guilty of a less serious charge, any of
the following sanctions shall be imposed:

1. Suspension from office without salary and other

benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3)
months; or

2. A fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding

P20,000.00.

Since respondent has already retired,18 only a maximum fine

of PhP 20,000 can be imposed under said rule. Since he,
however, had previously been adjudged guilty of and
penalized for various infractions in more than a few
cases,19 with repeated warnings of more severe sanction in
case of repetition, a fine of PhP 100,000 is appropriate.

WHEREFORE, the Court adjudges former Judge Ireneo Lee

Gako, Jr. of the RTC, Branch 5 in Cebu City GUILTY of Simple
Misconduct. He is hereby meted the penalty of FINE in the
amount of one hundred thousand pesos (PhP 100,000) to be
deducted from his retirement benefits.

The Office of the Court Administrator is hereby ordered to

facilitate the processing of the retirement papers of retired
Judge Gako for the speedy release of his retirement benefits.

SO ORDERED.

ISSUE:

RULING:
SOQUILLO VS. TORTOLA
667 SCRA 331 / G.R. No. 192450 / JULY 23, 2012
REYES, J.

TOPIC:

FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING: