TOPIC: CANON 3

GUTIERREZ VS. SANTOS

FACTS:
On August 15, 1958 Benigno Musni and other filed a complaint with the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications against Ricardo M. Gutierrez alleging therein inter alia, that the latter had illegally
constructed dams, dikes and other obstructions across navigable waters, waterways, rivers and communal
fishing grounds located in Barrio San Esteban, Macabebe, Pampanga. They prayed that, pursuant to the
provisions of Republic Act No. 2056, the said obstructions be ordered removed or destroyed. The original
complaint was subsequently amended by adding six more to the streams or waterways mentioned therein.

On December 15, 1958 Gutierrez filed with the Court of First Instance of Pampanga a petition for
prohibition — which was subsequently amended twice — against the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, Florencio Moreno, the Department investigator, Julian C. Cargullo, Senator Rogelio de
la Rosa, Benigno Musni and his complainants, to prevent the carrying out of the investigation referred to
above. Main contentions of the petitioner were: firstly, that Act 2506 was unconstitutional because it
granted judicial powers to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, and secondly, that the
nature and character of the streams and waterways subject of the complaint lodged with the Department
of Public Works and Communications was already res judicata having been the subject of an agreement
between Zobel Family — former owners of petitioner's fishponds, — and the Municipality of Macabebe.
Said case was docketed as Civil Case No. 1520 and was assigned by lottery to Branch I of said court,
presided by the Hon. Arsenio Santos.

On February 25, 1959 respondent de la Rosa filed a motion to disqualify the Hon. Arsenio Santos from
trying and deciding the case, upon the ground that sometime in 1948 he had acted as counsel for fishpond
owners, like the petitioner Gutierrez, in an administrative investigation involving the same or at least
similar issues and properties, and had expressed views in the course of said investigation prejudicial or
adverse to the contention of the respondents in the pending case. Petitioner Gutierrez objected to the
motion aforesaid upon the ground that there was no legal ground upon which Judge Santos could be
disqualified under the provisions of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner should be disqualified from the case

HELD:
YES. In the present case the respondent judge himself has candidly stated that the opinion expressed by
him in a letter dated June 1, 1948 addressed by him as counsel for Manuel Borja and others to the then
Secretary of the Interior, attached to the motion for disqualification as Annex A, "might, some way or
another, influence (on) his decision in the case at bar" (order of April 13, 1959). The fear he has thus
expressed — of not being able to under a truly impartial judgment — does not appear to be capricious and
whimsical, having in mind particularly that in his order of August 11, 1959 denying petitioner's motion
for reconsideration, His Honor reiterated that in the aforesaid letter he informed the Secretary of the
Interior that the streams and rivers to be auctioned, for lease purposes, by the municipal council of
Macabebe, Pampanga, were private and not public streams and rivers; that the streams and rivers subject
of the petition for prohibition filed by herein petitioner were among those that he considered as private in
nature; that, therefore, the interests of Borja and his other clients "were identical to the interests of the
herein petitioner etc." In view of these circumstances, we are constrained to agree with His Honor that the
opinion thus expressed by him years ago "might, some way or another, influence his decision" in the case
before him
 TOPIC: REMOVAL FROM OFFICE
IN RE: FLORDELIZA
(44 PHIL. 608. March 12, 1923)
MALCOLM, J.:

FACTS:
One charge is that the respondent Judge has proceeded in many cases with manifest and evident partiality. It is alleged that
the Judge has deferred unduly to the accused Father Casiano de Vera, the accused Fermin Barranechea, the justice of the
peace Gillego de Vera, the justice of the peace Felix Gallego, and Amado Gimenez, municipal president of Bacon,
Sorsogon. It is further alleged that the Judge has acted with discourtesy toward the complainants, while showing a spirit of
condescension to attorneys Francisco Arellano and Federico Jimenez. The respondent, on the other hand, proffered
satisfactory explanation of these matters, mentioned in the complaint. At best a charge of partiality is difficult to prove and
is one which is to be expected from disgruntled lawyers.

Under the subject of negligent performance of the duties of his office to grave prejudice of the public interest, complaints
alleged that there are too many cases placed on the calendar for one day. Even without taking into consideration the
expected explanation of the respondent, this obviously, is a question which must rest in the in the discretion of the
presiding Judge.

Under the same subject, it is further alleged that court sessions are held only for three hours and a half each day, while
section 165 of the Administrative Code calls for not less than five-hour sessions of courts of first instance except on
Saturdays. The respondent answers that he has held court for five hours each day as prescribed by the law. We accept the
statement of his Honor.

The last and most serious charged presented, having a close relationship with the congestion of cases on the docket of the
court of Instance Of Sorsogon, the delay in the disposition of these cases, especially criminal cases, and lack of
diligence in catching up with the court work, concerns the alleged false certification of the respondent under section 129 of
the Administrative Code, in order to secure the payment of his salary. Attention is invited to a number of cases which were
decided beyond the ninety-day period mentioned in the law, and, with certain qualifications, these facts are admitted by the
respondent. The latter, however, offers four reasons or, more accurately speaking, excuses, for this state of affairs. He
says in the first place that the timing taken by stenographers in transcribing their notes should not be counted in the
computation of the ninety-day period. He contends in the next place that the vacation period should be excluded. He
asserts in the next place that the period should begin to run from the date the clerk reported the case for decision. And,
lastly, his construction of the law is, that an oral decision is sufficient

ISSUES:
Whether or not respondent judge should be removed from office

HELD:
NO. In conclusion, therefore, we have decided to pay no particular attention to the general charges of partiality and
negligence which have been filed against Judge Flordeliza. We do find, however, that he has not displayed that
interest in his office which stops not at the minimum of the day's labors fixed by law, and which ceases not at the
expiration of official sessions, but which proceeds diligently on holidays and by artificial light and even into vacation
periods. Only thus can he do his part in the great work of speeding up the administration of justice and of rehabilitating the
judiciary in the estimation of the people. The mountains of six or seven hundred pending cases in Sorsogon could be
removed by a judge of first instance of alert mind and quick decision, not afraid of work, with the aid of a helpful bar and
a sympathetic government.

As willful and international wrongdoing in receiving compensation has not been demonstrated, we are not prepared to find
that sufficient cause exists in our judgment involving serious misconduct or inefficiency as warrants us in recommending
the removal of the respondent Judge to the Governor-General. We will take such a step if future derelictions of duty of this
character recur.
 TOPIC: INHIBITION OF JUDGES
KILAT VS. MARCIAS
(474 SCRA 101. OCT. 25, 2005)
TINGA, J.:

FACTS:
According to complainant, she was a sixteen (16) year-old working high school student in Ipil, Zamboanga del Sur when she met
respondent in November 1999. One time, respondent fetched her from her school and had dinner with her in a local restaurant.
After dinner, respondent brought her to his vehicle where he kissed and fondled her, assuring her that he will take care of her, her
studies, her expenses and her future. Later, she was brought to a hotel. Despite her plea to be driven home, respondent refused,
telling her that he just wanted her company while he was resting. Complainant tried to go out of the room but respondent caught
up with her and threatened her with a gun. Respondent removed her clothes and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her.
Respondent asked complainant to be his live-in partner, but she did not reply. Respondent threw at complainant P1,500.00 worth
of bills and warned her not to tell any person what had transpired.

Complainant confessed that she was approached by Vice Mayor Edgar Saldia and Mayor Jesus "Siote" Lim of Salug, Zamboanga
del Norte and offered to help her prepare a case for rape against respondent. She refused because respondent did not do anything
wrong to her. Later that day, Mrs. Margie Macias talked to complainant, telling her that she was "heaven-sent," because
Mrs. Macias wanted respondent to be dismissed from his work. Two days later, Vice Mayor Saldia promised her mother that he
will give complainant's father a job in the municipal hall if they agree to the filing of a rape case against respondent. When
complainant's mother refused, Vice Mayor Saldia threatened her with a lawsuit. Reluctantly, complainant was left in the vice
mayor's house where she was locked in one of the rooms. After two or three days, she was brought to the house of Atty. Selda,
where she was forced to sign the affidavit-complaint against respondent. Afterwards, accompanied by the vice mayor's daughter
known to her as "Blanca," they had the affidavit notarized by a public prosecutor. Complainant claims that she attempted to tell
the public prosecutor about the untruthfulness of the affidavit, but she was afraid of Blanca who was then glowering at her.

Meanwhile, complainant filed charges against those accused of kidnapping her, which complaint was endorsed by the Deputy
Ombudsman for Mindanao to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Zamboanga del Norte. The Provincial Prosecutor initially
suspended the resolution of the complaint, but the Department of Justice reversed the resolution and ordered the filing of
informations for grave coercion and serious illegal detention against Mayor Jesus Lim, Vice Mayor Edgar Saldia, Atty. Alanixon
Selda, Margie Corpus-Macias, Ma. Blanca Urongan, Sidney Sy, Dolbert Panangitan, Victonie Panangitan, Salque Bulado, Robert
Abella, Atty. Reynaldo Llego, Tony Gallara, Rick "Doe", and Gingging Enriquez. On 1 December 2003, the Provincial
Prosecutor filed the corresponding information and the case was docketed as Criminal Case No. L-00727, raffled to RTC Branch
28, Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte presided by respondent judge. On 2 December 2003, respondent issued an order for the arrest of
the persons named in the information. The next day, accused moved for the inhibition of respondent from the criminal case on the
ground that respondent is directly involved in the said case. Respondent thus issued an order inhibiting himself from the criminal
proceedings and recommended to the Court that another judge be designated in his place.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent judge should be held administratively liable

HELD:
YES. As properly observed both by the OCA and the Investigating Justice, the issuance of a warrant of arrest is not ministerial in
nature, but rather requires the exercise of judicial discretion on the part of the issuing magistrate. The Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure requires the judge's personal evaluation of the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence within ten (10)
days from the filing of the complaint or information. Only when he finds probable cause should he issue a warrant of arrest or a
commitment order. In Criminal Case No. L-00727, however, respondent judge issued the warrant of arrest a mere day after the
filing of the information charging accused therein with grave coercion and serious illegal detention. Such undue alacrity casts
doubt on the motive of respondent, especially since the accused were known to him to be the same people who instigated the
present administrative case against him, and against whom he filed a civil suit for damages. Moreover, these were the same
people whom respondent claims to have "axes to grind" against him. Respondent's swift issuance of the arrest warrant
suspiciously smells of vengeance and vindication. He might have been prejudiced by the malicious acts of the accused, but he
should not use his position in the judiciary for his personal concerns. In order to avoid suspicions of wrongdoing, a respect for
traditional and prevailing rules must be observed and kept constantly in mind. A judge should, in fine, administer his office with
due regard to the integrity of the judicial system. He must not be perceived as being a repository of arbitrary power but as one
dispensing justice under the sanction of the rule of law. That he inhibited himself after they moved for his inhibition cannot
extenuate his culpability. At the outset, he should have inhibited himself from the case if only to avoid any doubt or suspicion of
bias and partiality against the accused.
 TOPIC: GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW
SALCEDO VS. BOLLOZOS
(623 SCRA 27. JULY 5, 2010)
BRION, J.:

FACTS:
On January 23, 2008 at around 2:30 p.m., while the complainant (together with his niece Rebecca R. Lumbay and his nephew
Alan Jose P. Roa) was supervising an on-going construction over the disputed property, Tanmalack and heavily armed men
arrived and forced themselves inside the fenced premises of the disputed property. The complainant averred that Tanmalack and
his companions harassed and threatened to kill and to harm him and his workers; that Tanmalack uttered defamatory statements
and accused him of land-grabbing; and that Tanmalack and his companions occupied the property and destroyed building
materials such as G.I. sheets, lumber and other construction materials.

The complainant forthwith reported the incident to the nearby police station. The police promptly responded and arrested
Tanmalack and brought him in for questioning. That same afternoon at around 4:45 p.m., Tanmalack, represented by his sister,
Jocelyn Tanmalack Tan, filed the petition on his behalf while Tanmalack was detained by the police for employing "self-help in
preventing squatters from putting up improvements in their titled property.”

Based on the petition and answers to the clarificatory questions propounded to Tanmalack's representative and counsel, the
respondent judge immediately issued a Writ of Amparo dated January 23, 2008, directing "the police officers of Agora Police
Station 3 or Insp. Wylen Rojo . . . to release immediately upon receipt of [the] writ but not later than 6:00 P.M. today, petitioner
Jose Tanmalack, Jr., to the custody of Atty. Francis V. Ku." The respondent judge also directed the police officers to file their
verified return to the petition within five (5) working days, together with supporting affidavits, in conformity with Section 9
of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. Around 5:30 p.m., the Writ of Amparo was served upon SPO3 Aener O. Adajar, PNP Chief
Investigator. At six o'clock in the evening of that same day, the police released Tanmalack to the custody of Atty. Francis Ku.

In his complaint, the complainant questions the issuance of the Writ of Amparo which he claims had been unusually issued with
haste. The complainant claims that the handwritten petition did not give any ground to warrant the issuance of the Writ
of Amparo; that the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion, bias, and obvious partiality, and in grave disregard of
the Rules and the rule of law when he acted upon and granted the letter-petition for the issuance of the Writ of Amparo. The
complainant also alleges that the respondent judge "accommodated" the issuance of the Writ of Amparo because he and Atty.
Francis Ku (Tanmalack's counsel) are members of the Masonic fraternity.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent judge has acted with grave abuse of discretion

HELD:
NO. Although the respondent judge erred in issuing the Writ of Amparo, we find, as the OCA did, that there is no evidence on
record that supports the complainant's allegation that the issuance was tainted with manifest bias and partiality, bad faith, or gross
ignorance of the law. The fact that the respondent judge and Atty. Francis Ku are members of the Masonic fraternity does not
justify or prove that the former acted with bias and partiality. Bias and partiality can never be presumed and must be proved with
clear and convincing evidence. While palpable error may be inferred from respondent judge's issuance of the Writ
of Amparo, there is no evidence on record that would justify a finding of partiality or bias. The complainant's allegation of
partiality will not suffice in the absence of a clear and convincing proof that will overcome the presumption that the respondent
judge dispensed justice according to law and evidence, without fear or favour.

Respondent judge's error does not rise to the level of gross ignorance of the law that is defined by jurisprudence. We take judicial
notice of the fact that at the time he issued the Writ ofAmparo on January 23, 2008, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo has been
effective for barely three months (The Rule on the Writ of Amparo became effective on October 24, 2007). At that time, the
respondent judge cannot be said to have been fully educated and informed on the novel aspects of the Writ of Amparo. Simply
stated, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo at that time cannot be said to be a simple, elementary, and well-known rule that its patent
disregard would constitute gross ignorance of the law.

More importantly, for full liability to attach for ignorance of the law, the assailed order, decision or actuation of the judge in the
performance of official duties must not only be found to be erroneous; it must be established that he was motivated by bad faith,
dishonesty, hatred or some other similar motive.In the present case, the complainant failed to prove by substantial evidence that
the respondent judge was motivated by bad faith and bias or partiality in the issuance of the Writ of Amparo.
 TOPIC: JUDGE’S IMPROPRIETY
BELEN VS. BELEN
(627 SCRA 1. AUG 6, 2010)
CARPIO, J.:

FACTS:
Complainant Michael B. Belen filed a Verified Complaint dated 7 March 2001 with the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA) of the Supreme Court, charging Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belenwith grave
abuse of authority and conduct unbecoming a judge. According to complainant, sometime in March 2004,
respondent judge filed a case for Estafa against complainant's father, Nezer D. Belen, but the same was
dismissed for lack of probable cause by Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Victoria Sunega-Lagman in a
Resolution dated 28 July 2004.

Thereafter, respondent judge allegedly started harassing and threatening complainant with the filing of
several cases against the latter. On 11 January 2007, at 10:00 in the morning, complainant received a
mobile phone text message from the caretaker of his piggery, informing him that respondent judge arrived
and was taking pictures of the piggery. Complainant rushed to the area and saw respondent judge,
accompanied by the Municipal Agriculturist and Sanitary Inspector and the Barangay Chairman,
inspecting complainant's piggery.

Respondent judge also wrote several letters addressed to certain local government authorities and
employees, requesting information on complainant's piggery and poultry business; advising them of the
alleged violations by the complainant of the National Building Code and certain environmental laws; and
reminding the local government authorities of their duty to forestall the issuance of municipal clearance
and license to complainant's business establishment. We enumerate these letters below.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent judge violated Section 1 Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary

HELD:
YES. Respondent judge wrote letters to government authorities and employees to secure public
information regarding complainant's piggery and poultry business; to inform addressees of the laws
allegedly being violated by complainant; and to remind the addressees of their duties as government
officials or employees and warn them of the possible legal effects of neglect of public duties. In writing
these letters, respondent judge's use of his personal stationery with letterhead indicating that he is the
Presiding Judge of RTC of Calamba City, Branch 36, and stating that the letter was "from [his]
chambers," clearly manifests that respondent judge was trying to use the prestige of his office to influence
said government officials and employees, and to achieve with prompt and ease the purpose for which
those letters were written. In other words, respondent judge used said letterhead to promote his personal
interest.
 TOPIC: JUDGE’S IMPARTIALITY
MERCADO VS. SALCEDO
(604 SCRA 4. OCT. 16, 2009)
PER CURIAM

FACTS:
In the letter dated January 2, 2001, the respondent judge was accused of bias and gross partiality in
handling the investigation of the administrative case filed against Judge Napy Agayan (Judge Agayan) of
the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Kapalong-Talaingod, Davao del Norte. The complainant alleged that
the respondent judge mishandled the investigation and based his "findings of facts" on "gossip and
rumors" to aid a fellow judge.

On January 16, 2001, the complainant formally charged the respondent judge of committing these
unethical infractions: (1) Mishandling of, or rendering a false report to the Supreme Court on, his
investigation of Judge Agayan; (2) Grave misconduct and impropriety in possessing and using a stolen
Pajero vehicle with knowledge, actually and constructively, that it was a subject of an Anti-Fencing
Law case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 11728, which he had earlier dismissed; and (3) Serious
irregularities, dishonesty or grave misconduct relating to the handling and improper execution of the final
decision in Agrarian Case Nos. 31-99 to 51-99, entitled Soriano Fruits Corporation and
Others versus Department of Agrarian Reform and/or Land Bank of the Philippines, where the
respondent judge modified the final judgment on the amount of just compensation from which the
respondent judge benefited in the amount of Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00).

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent judge is guilty of violating New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary

HELD:
YES. what appears clear to us is that the respondent judge conducted a very superficial investigation, if
what he did can be labelled as an investigation at all. Based on this shallow effort, he prepared a slanted
report that could not but lead to the exoneration of Judge Agayan. These actions tell us that the respondent
judge deliberately covered up Judge Agayan's absences and irregular attendance. The motivation for all
these is not hard to discern as it can be read between the lines in the respondent judge's report, considered
in light of the attendant facts. He did all these under the mistaken notion of aiding a fellow judge, who
was allegedly too sickly to fully perform his judicial duties. In rendering this assistance, the respondent
judge also overlooked the absences and irregular attendance of the court staff of Judge Agayan.
Under the circumstances, the respondent judge is liable for serious misconduct, given his repeated and
deliberate intention to disregard and violate the legal norms of conduct governing his behavior and action
as a judge. He committed serious misconduct, first, in using and possessing a vehicle with the knowledge
that it was the subject of an anti-fencing case previously before him; and second, he borrowed this vehicle
from a litigant who had pending cases before his sala. Both the character of the vehicle borrowed and the
identity of the lender precluded him from borrowing and using Leopoldo Gonzaga's Pajero. While the
criminal case filed against the respondent judge by State Prosecutor Velasco was dismissed by the
Department of Justice, we agree with Justice Tijam that the respondent judge's acts at least constitute
irresponsible and improper conduct whose effect is to erode public confidence in the judiciary. As aptly
stated by Justice Tijam, the respondent judge's act compromised the image, integrity and uprightness of
the courts of law; it cast suspicion not only in his own impartiality, but also in the impartiality and
integrity of his judicial office, thereby impairing public trust in the exercise of his judicial functions.
 TOPIC: UNBECOMING OF A JUDGE
MACIAS VS. MACIAS
(601 SCRA 203. SEPT. 29, 2009)
NACHURA, J.:

FACTS:
Complainant alleged that sometime in 1998, respondent engaged in an illicit liaison and immoral
relationship with a certain Judilyn Seranillos (Seranillos), single and in her early 20s. The relationship
continued until the time of the filing of the complaint. Complainant enumerated some of the abuses
committed by respondent.

From a list of seven (7) witnesses, complainant manifested that only four (4) witnesses shall be presented.
The first witness, Roel Mutia, testified that he was hired by complainant's son, Marquinjo Macias, to tail
Judge Macias after suspecting that his father was having an illicit affair. In summary, Mutia testified that
he saw Judge Macias and Seranillos enter a house in Dipolog City on the afternoon of October 17, 1999,
and that both dined and spent the night there together inside one bedroom. He said that he accompanied
Marquinjo and complainant the next day to the said house and that he saw complainant pull Seranillos
outside the house creating a commotion within the neighborhood. On cross-examination, Mutia admitted
that he was not sure if Seranillos did spend the night inside the said house, or whether she left that night
and just returned the following morning. Counsel for respondent also pointed to Mutia that the spot where
he positioned himself, while observing Judge Macias, was blocked by leaves and tall trees.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent judge in guilty of unbecoming of a judge

HELD:
YES. Although the charges of immorality and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service were
not satisfactorily proven by complainant, respondent cannot be completely exonerated. Mutia's testimony
that he saw Judge Macias having dinner with Seranillos and entering a bedroom with her may not
satisfactorily prove the charge of immorality, but this act certainly suggested an appearance of
impropriety, Judge Macias being a married man. Such behavior undeniably constituted unbecoming
conduct, a light offense punishable by a fine not less than P1,000.00 but not more than P10,000.00. In
light of the circumstances affecting not only the reputation of Judge Macias himself but the image and
reputation of the whole judiciary as well, we find it reasonable to impose upon him the maximum fine of
P10,000.00.
 TOPIC: SERIOUS CHARGE
BURIAS VS. VALENCIA
(581 SCRA 24. MAR. 13, 2009)
TINGA, J.:

FACTS:
On 4 and 25 August 2005, respondent borrowed money from complainant in the amounts of P5,000.00
and P2,500.00, respectively. The loans were evidenced by promissory notes.

On 25 August 2005, complainant filed a verified complaint for forcible entry and damages with prayer for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction before the MTC of Bulan, Sorsogon, presided
by Judge Marie Louise A. Guan-Aragon (Judge Guan-Aragon). The case was docketed as Civil Case No.
590 entitled Perla Burias vs. Celima Morata.

On 16 June 2006, respondent took over Civil Case No. 590 and, as the new presiding judge in the case,
issued a pre-trial conference order. On 4 and 24 January 2007, respondent again borrowed from
complainant the amounts of P15,000.00 and P3,000.00, as evidenced by two (2) handwritten notes. On 23
March 2007, complainant filed an urgent motion for respondent's inhibition on the ground of delay in the
resolution of the civil case and apparent bias against complainant based on the Order of 6 December
2006.

In her administrative complaint, complainant alleged that on 12 October 2005, respondent endorsed a
check and thereafter exchanged the same for cash in the sum of P5,000.00 that complainant provided.
Said check however was dishonored when presented for payment by complainant. She also averred that
sometime in March 2007, respondent verbally demanded from her the sum of P50,000.00 and that her
P30,500.00 indebtedness be written off in exchange for a favorable decision in Civil Case No. 590.
According to complainant, she refused to accede to the demands of respondent. In April 2007, respondent
reportedly called her up and threatened that she would release any of the two (2) draft decisions she
allegedly prepared favoring respondent in the civil case. Complainant claimed that by reason of these
threats, she was constrained to file the instant administrative case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent judge

HELD:
YES. The OCA held respondent accountable for contracting loans of money from persons with whom her
office has official relations. It ruled that it was improper for respondent to take a loan from a party-
litigant. However, the OCA considered the proof inadequate to support the allegation that the loan was
extended on a promised favorable decision. With respect to the charge of delay in the resolution of Civil
Case No. 590, the OCA sustained respondent's Order dated 6 December 2006. It found nothing in the
records which show that clarificatory procedure was resorted to gain time for the rendition of the
judgment. Neither did OCA find any irregularity in the issuance of the Order denying the motion for
inhibition found by complainant.