Leibniz - Philosophical Essays
Leibniz - Philosophical Essays
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THEOLOGY . PHILOSOPHY
PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS
BY LEIBNIZ SELECTED AND
TRANSLATED BY MARY MORRIS
INTRODUCTION BY C. R. MORRIS
GOTTFRIED WILHELM LEIBNIZ, born in
1646 at
Leipzig.
Entered the University of
Leipzig
at the
age of fifteen. Obtained a
professorship at the
University of Altdorf
before he was twenty-one. Elected F.R.S.
in 1670. In 1676 went to live at the Court
of Hanover and died in 1716.
PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS
LEIBNIZ
at The
Temple Press Letchworth
and decorated by Eric Ravilious
for
J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd.
Aldine House
Bedford St. London
First Published in this Edition 1934
INTRODUCTION
GOTTFRIED WILHELM LEIBNIZ has been described as a man
of universal attainments and of almost universal genius.
A courtier, diplomat, scholar, mathematician and philo-
sopher, he is perhaps the most brilliant figure among modern
philosophers. The history of philosophy has always
recognized him as one of the greatest of system-builders.
Now in the twentieth century he receives in addition an
even higher esteem for the brilliance of some of his particular
ideas and for the close thinking of some of his detailed
arguments. With Descartes he shares the merit of having
a more authoritative insight into the method and value of
mathematics and physics than any other philosopher of the
first rank. And with Hume he shares the honour of setting
the stage for the rejuvenation of modern philosophy in the
critical philosophy of Kant.
the same. But the laws of the nature of mind are different
from those of the nature of body.
We must look then for an explanation of the present
state of a mind in previous states of the same mind, and
nowhere else whatever. If this were not so, there could be
no responsibility and no identity. Furthermore, we shall
find that on this principle we can give some explanation of
a number of obvious facts of experience which have hither-
to been unexplained. But this Leibniz works out in more
detail when he comes to consider the philosophy of Locke.
world is not the only possible world, but the best of possible
worlds; everything is ordered not by a mechanistic necessity,
but by the moral necessity to work for the highest good of
minds; this is achieved by making the kingdom of nature
subservient to the kingdom of minds, God being at once the
Architect of the one and the Monarch of the other.
C. R. MORRIS.
1934.
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE
In the lifetime of Leibniz only one complete work of
his on philosophy
was published: Essais de Theodicee sur la bonU de Dieu, la liberU de
?homme tet I'originc du mal, 1710. Other important philosophical
works are the correspondence with Samuel Clarke on the principles of
:
ON REASON. 1714
ON THE ULTIMATE
......
PRINCIPLES OF NATURE AND OF GRACE, FOUNDED
32
C95 xxxili
PART I
end all at once, that is to say they can only begin by creation
and end by annihilation, whereas what is compound begins
or ends by parts.
7. There is also no means of explaining how a monad can
be altered or changed within itself by any other created thing,
since it is impossible to displace anything in it or to conceive
of the possibility of any internal motion
being started,
directed, increased, or diminished within it, as can occur
in compounds, where change among the parts takes place.
Monads have no windows, by which anything could come in
or go out. Accidents cannot become detached, or wander
about outside substances, as the 'sensible species' of the
4 MONADOLOGY
Scholastics used to do. Thus neither substance nor accident
can enter a monad from without.
8. Monads, however, must have some qualities, otherwise
parts.
14. The passing state, which involves and represents a
plurality within the unity or simple substance, is nothing
other than what is called perception) which must be carefully
MONADOLOGY 5
21. And
it does not follow that when in that state the
45. Thus God alone (or the Necessary Being) has the
MONADOLOGY u
privilege that He must exist if He is possible. And as nothing
can prevent the possibility of that which has no limits, no
negation, and consequently no contradiction, this alone is
things which are outside of it. And this body is organic, when
it forms a kind of automaton or natural machine, which is a
thing connected
is together, and each body acts on every other
body more or less according to the distance, and is affected by
it by reaction, it follows that every monad is a mirror that is
knowledge.
6. The researches of the moderns have taught us, and it is
the most perfect and the most happy and consequently the
most lovable of substances, and since pure true love consists
in the state which causes pleasure to be felt in the perfections
1
'by weight, measure, number', etc.
30 PRINCIPLES
and happiness of the beloved, this love ought to give us the
greatest pleasure of which a man is capable, when God is
the object of it.
Him as we ought if we know Him as
17. It is easy to love
I have described. For although God is not sensible to our
external senses, He is none the less very lovable and gives
great pleasure. We see how much pleasure men derive from
honours, although they do not consist of qualities that appear
to the external senses. Martyrs and fanatics (although the
affection of the latter is ill regulated) show of what the
E95
ON THE ULTIMATE ORIGINATION OF THINGS
23 NOVEMBER 1697
such and such things will come into being. Since then the
ultimate root must be in something which is of metaphysical
necessity, and since there is no reason of any existent thing
except in an existent thing, it follows that there must exist
some one Being of metaphysical necessity, that is, from whose
essence existence springs; and so there must exist something
different from the plurality of beings, that is the world, which,
as we have allowed and have shown, is not of metaphysical
necessity.
Let me explain a little more distinctly how out of truths
that are eternal or essential or metaphysical there arise
34 THE ORIGINATION OF THINGS
truths that are temporal, contingent, or physical. First we
must notice, from the very fact that something exists rather
than nothing, that there is in things that are possible, or in
you will find yourself at the end kept out of certain refractory
spaces, and thereby compelled to leave empty more spaces
than you need have done, and more than you wished. There
is, however, a definite formula by which the greatest possible
success in filling the spaces is easily obtained. For instance,
if we
suppose ourselves told to construct a triangle, there
being no other principle of determination, the result is that
THE ORIGINATION OF THINGS 35
we draw an equilateral triangle; and if we are required to go
from one point to another, and nothing further is added to
determine the way, we shall choose the path that is easiest or
shortest. Similarly, once it has been granted that a being is
better than a not-being, that is, that there is a reason why
something should exist rather than nothing, or that transition
from possibility to actuality is to take place, then, even if
nothing further is determined, the consequence is that there
exists as much as ispossible in view of the capacity of time
and place (or of the possible order of existing) in very much
the same way as tiles are fitted together so as to put in as
many as possible within the given area.
From this it is now wonderfully clear how in the very
origination of
things a certain Divine mathematics or
plained) why the world should exist rather than not, and why
it should exist just as it is rather than otherwise (this reason
is
certainly to be found in the tendency of what is possible
towards existence); but more than this, if we come down to
details, we see the marvellous way in which metaphysical
laws hold sway in the whole of nature the laws of cause, of
potency, of activity, and how they prevail even over the
purely geometrical laws of matter themselves, as I found
to my great wonder when I was giving an account of the
laws of motion; so much so, indeed, that though from my
early youth, when I was more of a materialist, I had defended
the law of the geometric composition of forces, I was finally
forced to abandon it, as I have explained at greater length
elsewhere.
Here then we have the ultimate reason of the reality both
of essences and of existences in a Unity, which must certainly
be greater, higher, and prior to the world itself, since through
it alone not only the existent things, which the world contains,
but also the things that are possible have their reality. It
cannot be found except in one single source, because of the
interconnection of all these things with one another. It is
evident that from this source existent things are continually
issuing and being produced, and have been produced, since
it is not clear why one state of the world rather than another,
yesterday's state rather than today's, should flow from the
world itself. It is also evident how God acts not only
physically but also freely; and how there lies in Him not only
the efficient but also the final cause; and how from Him
proceeds the reason not only of the greatness or potency
that there is in the mechanism of the universe as now
established, but also of the goodness or wisdom involved in
the establishing of it.
38 THE ORIGINATION OF THINGS
In case someone may think that moral perfection or good-
ness here being confused with metaphysical perfection or
is
been said not only that the world is the most perfect physic-
ally, or, if you prefer it, metaphysically, or in other words
that that series of things will be forthcoming which in actual
fact affords the greatest quantity of reality, but also that
the world should be the most perfect morally, because true
moral perfection is physical perfection in minds themselves.
Hence the world is not only the most wonderful machine,
but also in regard to minds it is the best commonwealth, by
whose means there is bestowed on minds the greatest possible
amount of felicity or joyfulness; and it is in this that their
physical perfection consists.
But, you will say, we find in the world the very opposite
of this. Often the worst of sufferings fall upon the best men;
the innocent (I speak not only of the brutes, but of men also)
are afflicted, and are slain even with tortures; indeed the
world, especially if we look at the government of the human
race, seems rather a confused chaos than an affair ordained
by some supreme wisdom. So it appears at first sight, I
allow: but on deeper examination it must be agreed that the
1
Simon Foucher (1644-96), a Canon of Dijon, who professed
philosophical scepticism. Cf. pp. 109-28.
9 i.e. it is no
part of your professed purpose to enter . . .
45
46 LETTER TO FOUCHER
outside us, this is the subject with which your inquiries are
primarily concerned. Now in the first place it cannot be
denied that the very truth of hypothetical propositions
themselves is something which is outside us and which does
not depend on us. For all these hypothetical propositions
assert what would or would not be, granting something
or contrary; and consequently they assure us that the
its
the first it follows that we are, from the other it follows that
there is something other than us; something other, that is to
say, than that which thinks, which is the cause of the variety
of our appearances. Now the one of these two truths is as
incontestable and as independent as the other; and through
fastening on the first only in the order of his meditations, M.
Descartes failed to reach the perfection which he had aimed
at. If he had exactly followed what I call thefilum medi-
1
tandi, I think that he would have brought to completion
philosophy? But the greatest genius in the world is
first
unable to force matters, and we must of necessity enter by
the gates provided by nature if we are not to go astray.
Moreover, one man alone cannot do everything at the outset;
and for my part when I consider all the fine things M. Des-
cartes has said, and said by himself, I marvel rather at what
he has done than that there is something that he failed to do.
I admit that I have not yet been able to read his writings
with all the care I intend to devote to them, and my friends
are aware that it has so happened that I read almost all the
recent philosophers before him. Bacon and Gassendi were
the first to fall into my hands ; their familiar and easy style
1 Arnauld's own
letter reads as follows: God had then no more
freedom in all this, supposing He had once willed to create Adam
than to argue that God was free, supposing He had once willed to create
me, not to create a being capable of thought. (This sentence is some-
what confused, but it sufficiently indicates the line of argument.
It will be seen that the whole passage is loosely and confusedly
written, as if Leibniz were in some difficulties to state his view.)
1 i.e. that
which necessarily follows from a given hypothesis.
LEIBNIZ AND ARNAULD 59
from all eternity the whole succession of the universe, without
itsdiminishing His freedom in any way.
It is evident also that this objection separates off from one
another acts of will on the part of God, which are really
connected together. We must not consider God's will to
create a particular Adam as separated from all His other
acts of will in regard to the children of Adam and all the
human race; as if God first made the decision to create Adam
without any relation to his posterity, and none the less by
that decision, according to my view, deprived Himself of the
freedom to create the posterity of Adam, as seemed to Him
good. This would be a strange way of reasoning. Rather
we should think of God as choosing, not just any Adam
vaguely, but a particular Adam, of whom there exists among
the possible beings in the ideas of God a perfect representa-
tion, accompanied by certain individual circumstances, and
possessing among other predicates that of having in the
course of time certain posterity; we must think of God, I say,
as choosing him with an eye to his posterity, and so as
equally at the same time choosing the one and the other. I
cannot see what harm there is in that. If He acted otherwise,
He would not be acting like God. Let me suggest a com-
parison. A wise prince, when he chooses a general whose
connections he knows, in effect chooses at the same time a
number of colonels and captains, whom he well knows the
general will appoint, and whom he will not want to reject for
reasons of prudence: yet they do not in any way destroy his
absolute power, nor his freedom. The case is exactly the
same with God for much stronger reasons. Therefore, to be
exact, we must recognize in God a certain more general and
comprehensive will, in which He has an eye to the whole
order of the universe, since the universe is like a whole which
God apprehends in a single view. This will virtually includes
all the other acts of will about what is to come into this
.
Every man who acts wisely considers all the circumstances
. .
but he adds that, now that he knows what my view is, that is
enough to enable him to grant it sufficiently to try and find out
whether it removes all the difficulties; a matter of which he is
still in doubt.
I see that M. Arnauld has not remembered, or at least has
not concerned himself about, the opinion of the Cartesians,
who hold that God establishes by His will the eternal truths,
like those regarding the properties of the sphere. But as I
am not of their opinion any more than M. Arnauld, I will
simply explain why I hold that we must philosophize
differently about the notion of an individual substance than
we do about the specific notion of a sphere. This is because
the notion of a species includes eternal or necessary truths
only, whereas the notion of an individual includes sub
ratione possibilitatis l what is fact, or what is related to the
existence of things and to time; and consequently it depends
on certain free decisions of God, considered as possible.
For truths of fact or of existence depend upon God's decisions.
Further, the notion of a sphere in general is incomplete or
abstract; that is to say we only consider the essence of a
sphere in general or in theory, without regard to individual
circumstances. Consequently the notion does not include
in any way what is required for the existence of a certain
sphere. But the notion of the sphere which Archimedes
1 'considered under the head of
possibility'; i.e. that which is,
as a matter of fact, an actual fact is considered, not as actual
fact, but as possible.
LEIBNIZ AND ARNAULD 63
had placed upon his tomb is a fully worked out notion, and is
bound to include everything which belongs to the object of
that form. This is why in the case of individual considera-
thought.
'
which are concerned with individuals', what is individual
1
designs of God and about the primary laws, that this uni-
verse has a certain principal or primary notion, of which
particular happenings are merely consequences without,
however, eliminating freedom and contingency, to which
certainty is in no way inimical, since the certainty of events
is partly based on free actions. ... To speak exactly, it should
1 i.e. considered in
general, as opposed to considered in respect
of its unique, individual character
fl
numerically only.'
66 LEIBNIZ AND ARNAULD
when it is a question
belong, of determining whether all
the / which exists during the time BC. Since then the pre-
sumption is that it is the same individual substance enduring
throughout, or rather that it is I who exist in the time AB,
being then in Paris, and that it is still I who exist in the time
BC, being then in Germany, it follows necessarily that there
isa reason which makes us say truly that we endure, that is,
that I who was in Paris am now in Germany. For if there is
no reason, we should have as much right to say that it is
LEIBNIZ AND ARNAULD 67
another person. It is true that my internal experience
convinces me a posteriori of this identicalness, but there must
be a reason a priori. Now it is not possible to find any other
except that both my attributes in the preceding time and
state and my and state are
attributes in the later time
1
'they are included in the same subject'.
1 '
in a true proposition the predicate is included in the subject',
i.e. because God's knowledge is inaccessible to us as finite
intelligences. We
should not suppose that we can understand
68 LEIBNIZ AND ARNAULD
notions of things. But, rightly understood, what I have
just said must be allowed, since God would only be brought
in as much as is necessary. For we should not need to
assert that God, in considering the Adam whom He is
deciding to create, sees in him everything that will happen
to him; it is enough that we can always prove that there must
be a complete notion of this Adam which contains them. For
all the predicates of Adam either depend upon other predi-
problem.
As for the which we conceive that God acts in
manner in
1
note i.
Cf. p. 65,
f
'from the side of the thing itself; i.e. the notion is of
something really existing, and not of an imaginary or merely
possible object.
72 LEIBNIZ AND ARNAULD
'
1
in general terms, or in terms of its essence or of its specific
or incomplete notion'.
1 'for in
a true proposition the notion of the predicate is always
included in the subject'.
r
Cf. p. 64, note.
LEIBNIZ AND ARNAULD 73
my view it depends on these decisions, and that it is not
necessary though it is intrinsic. You insisted on the diffi-
culty that would be involved in saying that if I do not go
on this journey as I am bound to do, I shall not be I; and
I explained how it be said or
may not. Finally I gave
may
a decisive reason, which my
opinion takes the place of
in
. . . You suppose that I will not say that a body can move
itself; and so, since the soul is not the real cause of the
movement of the arm, nor is the body, the cause will there-
fore be God. But I am of a different opinion. I hold that
all that is real in the statewhich is called motion proceeds
as much from the corporeal substance as thought and will
proceed from the mind. Everything happens in each
substance in consequence of the first state which God gave
to it in creating it, and, extraordinary intervention apart,
His ordinary intervention consists simply in the conserva-
tion of the same substance, in conformity with its precedent
state and with the changes which it carries within it. Never-
theless, quite right to say that one body impels another;
it is
that is to say that the fact is that one body never begins
to have a given tendency except when another body which
is touching it has a proportionate loss, in accordance with
the constant laws which we observe in phenomena. And
in fact, motions being real phenomena rather than entities,
a movement as phenomenon is in my mind the immediate
consequence or effect of another phenomenon, and similarly
in the minds of others. But the state of a substance is
not the immediate consequence of the state of another
particular substance. . . .
is
composed, so that it will not have any at all, if each
entity of which it is composed is itself an entity by aggre-
gation; or else it is necessary to look further for a different
foundation of its reality, which, if it is at every stage neces-
sary to go further in looking for it, can never be found.
I agree, sir, that in all corporeal nature there are nothing
but machines (which are often animated); but I do not agree
that there are nothing but aggregates of substances \ and if
there are aggregates there must also be some true substances
of which the aggregates are made up. We
must then come
down to either the mathematical points, out of which some
authors compound extension, or to the atoms of Epicurus
and M. Cordemoy (which are things that you and I alike
reject), or else we must acknowledge that no reality can be
found in bodies; or finally we must recognize some substances
as having a genuine unity. I have already said in another
letter that a combination of the Grand Duke's diamond and
the Great Mogul's diamond may be called a pair of diamonds,
but that is only an entity of reason: when they are put
side by side, that will be an entity of imagination or of
You say that you do not see what leads me to admit that
there are such substantial terms, or rather corporeal sub-
stances, endowed with a genuine unity. It is because I do
not conceive of any reality at all as without genuine unity.
According to my view the notion of singular substance
involves consequences which are incompatible with its being
an entity by aggregation. I conceive of there being properties
in substance which cannot be explained by extension, shape,
and motion, besides the fact that there is no exact and fixed
shape in bodies because of the actual subdivision of the con-
tinuum ad infinitum. Moreover, motion inasmuch as it is
only a modification of extension and a change of neighbour-
hood, involves an imaginary element, so that it is not possible
to determine to which of the subjects that change it belongs,
unless we have recourse to the force in corporeal substance
which is the cause of the motion. I admit that there is no
need to mention these substances and qualities in order to
explain particular phenomena, but neither is there any need
to mention the intervention of God, the composition of the
continuum, the plenum, and countless other things. We
can explain mechanically, I fully admit, the particularities
of nature; but my point is that after having accepted or
assured the principles of mechanics themselves, we cannot
establish them a priori except by metaphysical arguments;
and even the difficulties de compositione continui l will never
be resolved so long as extension is regarded as constituting
the substance of bodies, and we go on embarrassing ourselves
by our own chimeras.
1
Cf. p. 76, note 3.
LEIBNIZ AND ARNAULD 81
I think, too, that to allow genuine unity or substance to
man almost alone is to be as limited in metaphysics as those
following one another, all the rest being nothing but phe-
nomena, abstractions, or relations.
No kind of arrangement will ever be found which can make
a genuine substance out of a number of entities by aggrega-
tion. For example, if the parts which fit together into one
and the same design are more competent to produce a
genuine unity than are parts which are in contact, then all
the officials of the Dutch East India Company will make a real
substance far better than a heap of stones. But what else is
a common design but a resemblance, or rather an ordered
arrangement of actions and passions, which our mind notices
in different things? If on the other hand we prefer the unity
based on contact, we are faced by other difficulties. Hard
bodies have perhaps nothing uniting their parts except the
say, you do not agree that the soul has any more thought
and knowledge of the movement of the lymph in its lymphatic
ducts than of the movements of the satellites of Saturn; if
I mean something else, you do not know what I mean, and
body falling from the same height acquires the same velocity
whether the descent be perpendicular and sudden, or sloping
and not so fast. Consequently the distinction of times does
not affect my objection. These things are so evident that I
might perhaps return to M. PAbb6 C. the compliment of
some of his expressions, but I think it is more fitting not to
descend to these amusements. The fact is, I think, that my
objection is so simple that its very simplicity operated to
deceive him, since he could not believe that a comment which
was so easy could have escaped the notice of so many able
people. This is why, noticing the difference in the times, he
leapt upon that, without giving himself leisure to reflect that
it is only incidental. I have a sufficiently good opinion of
his mind and of his sincerity to hope that he will now agree
about this himself, and I think that what follows will help
even more to make him see the truth of the matter. In
order, too, to anticipate the doubts of those who may think
it isa satisfactory answer to my
objection to say that the
insensible matter which presses heavy bodies downwards
THE QUANTITY OF MOTION 91
and causes their acceleration, has lost exactly the quantity
of motion which it imparts to the bodies; I answer that I
inch, B
with its velocity will be able to climb 10,000 inches.
Thus the force of both together is capable of raising i pound
io,ooi inches. Now according to the third Cartesian rule,
after the shock they will travel together in company at a
97
98 THE NEW SYSTEM
Although I am one of those who have done much work on
mathematics, I have constantly meditated on philosophy
from my youth up, for it has always seemed to me that in
philosophy there was a way of establishing something solid
by means of clear proofs. I had travelled far into the world
of the Scholastics when mathematics and modern writers
lured me out again, while still a young man. I was charmed
with their beautiful of explaining nature mechanically,
way
and scorned, with justice, the method of those who only make
use of forms or faculties, from which we learn nothing. But
later, when I tried to get to the bottom of the actual principles
of mechanics in order to give an explanation of the laws of
nature which are known through
experience, I became aware
that the consideration of an extended mass is not of itself
enough, and that use must also be made of the notion of
force,which is fully intelligible, although it falls within the
sphere of metaphysics. It seemed to me also that the opinion
of those who transform or degrade the lower animals into
mere machines, though it seems possible, is improbable, and
unity.
2. The unity of a clock, to which you refer, is on my
A
1 letter from Foucher to Leibniz was published in this copy
of the Journal, giving a number of objections to the New System.
For an earlier letter of Leibniz to Foucher, see pp. 45-51.
no THE NEW SYSTEM
3. It is not in the disposition of the organs that I find the
principle of consciousness in animals; I agree that this
Bayle proceeds:
Moreover, the reason why this gifted man does not fancy the
Cartesian system appears to me a false supposition, for it
cannot be said that the system of occasional causes makes the
action of God intervene by miracle (deus ex machina) in the
122 THE NEW SYSTEM
reciprocal dependence of the body and the soul: for as God does
not intervene except in accordance with general laws, His action
in this matter is not in any way out of the ordinary. It is not
for this reason alone that I do not fancy the Cartesian system;
and some slight consideration of my own doctrine will show
that I find init positive reasons for
adopting it. Even if the
hypothesis of occasional causes had no recourse to miracle,
it appears to me that mine would none the less possess
other advantages. I have said that three systems can be
imagined which might explain the communion between the
soul and the body; that is, (i) the system of the influence
of the one on the other, which is that of the Schools, taken
in the common sense this I agree with the Cartesians in
people believe. If, for example, God decreed that all bodies
should tend to move in circles, and that the radii of the
circlesshould be proportionate to the size of the bodies, we
should have either to say that there was a way of carrying
this out by means of simpler laws, or else to admit that God
' '
1
In the few lines here omitted Leibniz comments by the way
on Bayle's statement that a simple body to itself describes a
left
straight line. He points out that this is true if we consider only
THE NEW SYSTEM 125
We must also remember that the soul, simple though it is,
has always a sensation which is composed of several percep-
tions at once; and this serves the purpose for my theory as
much as if it were composed of parts, like a machine. For
each preceding perception has some influence on those which
follow, in conformity with a law of order which is to be found
in perceptions as well as in motions. Moreover, the majority
of philosophers, for several centuries, who have endowed
with thoughts both souls and angels (whom they hold to be
destitute of all body), not to mention the intelligences of
Aristotle, admit the occurrence of spontaneous change in a
simple being. I add that, since the perceptions which exist
together in the same soul at the same time include a truly
infinite multitude of small feelings, indistinguishable from
one another, which the future will develop, we must not be
L95
128 THE NEW SYSTEM
that ships without men have sometimes reached their
destined shore. Is there anything that makes it impossible
for this to happen several times to the same ship, and con-
sequently as many times as it puts to sea which will only
happen a certain number of times? Since the number of
accidents is not
infinite, not only God but even an exceedingly
excellent finite spirit would be able to foresee all the accidents
to which the ship would be exposed, and could find out by
solving a geometrico-mechanical problem the structure of the
ship and the places, times, and methods of its putting to sea
which would make it adjust itself in the best way to this
finite number of accidents. Do we not know that men are
sufficiently skilful to make automata capable of turning at
a specified place at street corners, and of adjusting them-
selves in this way to a certain number of accidents? And
a Mind proportionally greater would provide against accidents
in greater numbers. And if this excellent Mind did not find
these accidents already given, but was free to make them
arise or cease at His will, it would be incomparably easier
still for Him to
satisfy this demand, and to adjust in advance
and by a pre-established harmony the ship to the accidents
and the accidents to the ship. Thus it is the gravest mistake
to doubt whether the infinity of God is great enough to be
able to succeed in this.
2. Let us apply to the person of Caesar the new system of the
union of the soul and the body: according to this system we must
say that the body of Julius Caesar exercised its motive power in
such a way that from birth to death it followed a constant pro-
gression of changes which corresponded in the last degree of
exactness to the perpetual changes of a particular soul which
the body did not know, and which made no impression on it.
Bodies do not know what takes place in the soul, and the
soul makes no physical impression on the body. M. Bayle
agrees with this; but God has supplied this lack not by Him-
self
giving the body at intervals new impressions to make it
THE NEW SYSTEM 129
obey the soul, but by making this automaton such in the
firstplace that it will carry out what the soul commands
punctually as to both time and place.
We must say that the ride according to which this faculty of
Caesar's body had to produce these actions was such that he
would have gone to the Senate on such a day and at such an
hour, that he would there have uttered such and such words , etc.,
even though it had pleased God to annihilate Caesar's soul the
day after it was created.
There is nothing strange in this when once we bear in mind
that as great a craftsman as God can make an automaton
which resembles a valet and is capable of performing his
function, and of carrying out at a specified place whatever
it was ordered to do over a long period of time. The body
is an automaton of this kind in
regard to the mind.
We must say that this motive power punctually changed
itself and modified itself in accordance with the volubility of the
since renewed, and which has moreover been left to itself without
ever having any knowledge of its lesson ? Is this not much more
incomprehensible than the navigation of which I spoke in the
preceding paragraph ?
place so that they move in such and such a way. Every one,
a
except few of the Cartesians, rejects this siipposition.
It is rejected not as impossible but as unlikely.
And there is no Cartesian who would accept the view if it
1
Bayle points out (in 3, which is omitted here) that the
changes which occur in the soul, corresponding to all the actions
and interactions between the organs of the body and between
the body and other bodies, are infinite in number, and urges
that this infinity makes the theory of a pre-established harmony
between spontaneous unities quite incredible. Leibniz replies
that the fact that the variety of changes is infinite does nothing
to increase the difficulty; it only gives ground for 'wondering
still further at the Divine artifice '.
THE NEW SYSTEM 131
God was able to make bodies which could perform mechanically
all the things that we see other men do.
The Cartesian will not deny that it is
possible for God to
make such an automaton; but he will not allow that other
men are in fact inanimate automata of this kind. He will
the machine.
In denying this we do not claim to set limits to the power and
knowledge of God. We simply mean that the nature of things
requires that the powers given to the created being should
necessarily have certain limitations. It is absolutely necessary
that the activity of created things should be proportioned to their
essential state , that it should be exercised in accordance with the
132 THE NEW SYSTEM
character which is fitted to the given machine ; for according to
the axioms of the philosophers everything which is received is
proportioned to the capacity of the subject.
M. Bayle keeps on reverting to this supposed power given
to the body to enable it to accommodate itself to the soul.
I do not require any such thing; I do not go outside the
limitations of created things, nor of the state of bodies or
machines. There is nothing in the artifice of the Divine
machine which surpasses the knowledge and the power of
God. Since He knows everything which can be known, and
can do everything which can be done, He knows the number
(which is limited) of the volitions of man: and He has the
ability to make a machine capable of carrying them out.
We may therefore reject as impossible M. Leibniz's hypothesis,
since it involves greater difficulties than that of automatism.
This argument would be good if the theory of automata
had been convicted of impossibility, but since the contrary
is manifest and has been sufficiently proved by the Cartesians,
it is only a question of greater and less, which involves no
difficulty when it is a question of a power and a wisdom which
are infinite. Although man reasons about matters which
are abstract and which surpass the imagination, he none the
less has in his imagination signs which correspond to them,
such as letters and characters. There is no understanding
so pure as not to be accompanied by some imagination.
Thus there is always in the body something mechanical which
corresponds exactly to the sequence of thoughts present in a
man's mind, in so far as that which can be imagined enters
and consequently the automaton of his body
into the matter,
has no more need of the influence of the soul, or of the
supernatural assistance of God, than has that of the brute's
body.
It maintains the existence of a continual harmony between
two substances which do not act on one another.
Why not? since they originate from one and the same
THE NEW SYSTEM 133
Author who was willing and able to arrange that they should
agree without acting on one another.
But if the valets were machines, and punctually performed
this and that whenever their master commanded, such a thing
proceeds uniformly and equally in the same line without its ever
happening to it to turn to right or to left or to turn back. Epicurus
was made fun of when he invented the motion of atomic 'swerve';
he postulated it
gratuitously to get himself out of the labyrinth
of the fatal necessity of all things, and he could give us no reason
for this new part of his hypothesis. It offended against the
most obvious notions of our minds, for it is evident that if an
atom which has pursued a straight line for two days is to turn
aside from route at the beginning of the third day it must
its
these that it
represents the bodies outside itself, and that it
arrives at distinct thoughts dissimilar to the preceding ones
because the bodies which it represents have passed suddenly
to something which powerfully affects its own body. Thus
the soul sometimes passes from white to black, or from yes
to no, without knowing how, or at least in an involuntary
manner. For what its confused thoughts and its sensations
produce in it, is attributed to the bodies. It is not surprising,
therefore, if a man who is eating jam and feels himself stung
by an insect, passes immediately from pleasure to pain in
spite of himself. For the insect was already affecting the
man's body by getting near him before stinging, and the
representation of this already affected his soul, albeit in-
sensibly. Little by little, however, what is insensible
becomes sensible, in the soul as in the body; this is how it
happens that the soul modifies itself against its own inclina-
pain, etc.; we are not looking for several things, of which one
produces hope, another despair, and so on.
M. Bayle is right to reject this view of the compound
nature of the soul, for would make it capable of destruction
it
mentally his opinion on this point does not differ from mine,
or rather from the common opinion, inasmuch as he recognizes
two sources of our knowledge, the senses and reflection.
I am not sure that it will be so easy to reconcile him with
us and with the Cartesians when he maintains that the mind
does not always think, and in particular that it is without
perception during dreamless sleep; and when he protests
that since bodies can exist without motion, souls also might
well exist without thought. But here I answer somewhat
differently from what is usual; for I maintain that, naturally,
a substance cannot exist without activity, and that there
never even exists a body without motion. Experience is
already in my favour on this point, and to be persuaded of it
it is only necessary to consult the illustrious Mr. Boyle's
is
equally unreasonable to reject the one or the other on the
pretext that it is beyond the reach of our senses. Nothing
takes place all at once, and it is one of my most important
and best verified maxims that nature makes no leaps. This
I called the law of continuity when I spoke of it in the first
News of the Republic of Letters; and the use of this law in
physics is very considerable it means that the passage from
:
the small to the great and back again always takes place
through that which is intermediate, both in degrees and in
parts, and that a motion never immediately from rest,
arises
nor is reduced to it
except through a smaller motion, just as
we never manage to traverse any given line or length without
first traversing a shorter line although till now those who
have exhibited the laws of motion have not observed this
law, believing as they did that a body can receive in a moment
a motion contrary to its preceding one. All this brings us
to the conclusion that observable perceptions come by degrees
from those which are too small to be observed. To think
otherwise is to have but little knowledge of the immensely
subtle composition of things, which always and everywhere
include an actual infinity.
I have also noticed that, by virtue of insensible variations,
two individual things can never be perfectly alike, and that
they must always differ more than numero. This at once
puts out of court the blank tablets of the soul, a soul with-
out thought, a substance without action, the void in space,
atoms and even particles not actually divided in matter,
absolute rest, complete uniformity in one part of time, place,
1 An early name for the philosophy of mind or spirit.
LEIBNIZ AND LOCKE 153
or matter, the perfect globes of the second element which
are the offspring of the original perfect cubes,1 and a thousand
other fictions of the philosophers fictions arising from their
incomplete notions, and not admitted by the nature of things,
but merely allowed to pass because of our ignorance and of the
slight attention we pay to the insensible; they can only be
made tolerable by being limited to abstractions made by the
mind, which protests that it is not denying any of the things
which it considers irrelevant to the present inquiry but only
setting them on one side. Otherwise, if we thought in good
earnest that the things we do not apperceive are not there in
the soul or in the body, we should fail in philosophy as in
2
politics, by neglecting TO pucpov, insensible progressions;
whereas an abstraction is not an error, provided we know that
what we are ignoring is really there. This is the use made
of abstractions by mathematicians when they speak of the
perfect lines they ask us to consider, and of uniform motions
and other regular effects, although matter (that is to say the
mixture of the effects of the always
surrounding infinite) is
making some exception. We
proceed in this way so as to
distinguish the various considerations from one another, and
to reduce the effects to their reasons as far as is possible to us,
and to foresee some consequences; for the more careful we are
to neglect no consideration which we can regulate, the more
does practice correspond to theory. But it belongs to the
Supreme Reason, which misses nothing, distinctly to under-
stand the whole infinite, and to see all the reasons and all the
consequences. All that we can do in regard to infinities is to
know them confusedly, and at least to have distinct knowledge
that they exist. Otherwise we should have a very poor
recognition of the beauty and grandeur of the universe; we
should also be unable to have a sound physics to explain the
nature of bodies in general, and still less a sound pneumatics
1
The reference is to the vortex theory of Descartes.
' '
1 lit. the small ; by neglecting very small items.
i.e.
154 LEIBNIZ AND LOCKE
to include the knowledge of God, of souls, and of simple
substances in general.
This knowledge of insensible perceptions serves also to
explain why and how two souls, whether human or of some
other identical species, never come perfectly alike from the
Creator's hands, but each has always from the beginning its
own relation to the point of view it will have in the universe.
But this follows from what I pointed out previously about
two individuals, namely that their difference is always more
than a numerical one. There is also another important point
on which I am obliged to differ not only from the opinions
of our author, but also from those of the greater part of the
moderns; that is, that like most of the ancients I hold that all
superhuman beings, all souls, all simple created substances,
are always joined to a body, and that there never are entirely
between the more and the less sensible, the more and the less
perfect, or the other way round, and so the past or future
state of the soul is as explicable as its present state. The
smallest reflection suffices to show that this is reasonable,
and that a leap from one state to another infinitely different
state could not be natural. I am surprised that the schools
should have causelessly given up natural explanations, and
should have been ready deliberately to plunge into very great
and thus to provide occasion for the apparent
difficulties
Locke uses the word in this connection (to represent the Latin
subtilis) in the correspondence with the Bishop of Worcester.
156 LEIBNIZ AND LOCKE
speak of immortality through grace merely do so to preserve
appearances, and at bottom are not very far from those
Averroists and certain pernicious Quietists, who picture an
absorption and reunion of the soul with the ocean of Divinity,
a notion whose impossibility is perhaps shown up by my
system alone.
It appears, moreover, that we differ also in regard to
hinders the approach of two bodies, when they are moved one
towards another, I call solidity . but if any one think it better to
. .
call it impenetrability , he has my consent [Essay, Bk. II, ch. iv, i],
But I do not think that Leibniz's word here (roide) can properly
be translated by solid. The word hard is rejected by Locke on the
ground that a hard body is no more solid than a soft one.
LEIBNIZ AND LOCKE 157
I have also shown that cohesion, which could not of itself
1
Italics indicate Locke's own exact words.
* Theseitalics are Leibniz's.
1 In the English edition 1 1 runs as follows The next thing to be
:
considered is, how bodies produce ideas in us; and that is manifestly
by impulse, the only way which we can conceive bodies to operate in.
4
'Everything will now happen which I declared to be im-
possible.'
LEIBNIZ AND LOCKE 159
is, isin this going rather too much from one extreme to the
other. He makes difficulties about the operations of souls,
when it is only a question of admitting what
not sensible, is
great ends of religion and morality are secured barely by the im-
mortality of the soul, without a necessary supposition that the
soul is immaterial.
In his reply to this letter the learned bishop, to show that
our author was of another opinion when he wrote the second
book of his Essay, cites from it on page 51 this passage (taken
from the same book, chapter xxiii, 15), where it is said that
by the simple ideas we have taken from our own minds we are
able to frame the complex idea of an immaterial spirit. And
thus by putting together the ideas of thinking, perceiving, liberty,
and power of moving themselves, and other things, we have as
clear a perception and notion of immaterial substances as we
LEIBNIZ AND LOCKE 161
have of material. He further cites other passages to show
that the author opposed mind to body. He says (page 54)
that the ends of religion and morality are best secured by
proving that the soul is immortal by its very nature, that is to
say immaterial. He further adduces (page 60) this passage,
that all our ideas of the several sorts of substances are nothing but
collections of simple ideas ; and that thus our author believed
that the idea of thinking and willing gave a different substance
from that given by the idea of solidity and impulse; and ( 17)
regards these ideas as constituting body as opposed to mind.
The Bishop of Worcester might have added that from the
fact that the general idea of substance is in body and in mind,
it does not follow that their differences are
modifications of
one and the same thing, as our author has just said in the
passage I quoted from his first letter. It is necessary to
distinguish properly between modifications and attributes.
The faculties of having perception and of acting, extension,
and solidity, are attributes of perpetual and principal predi-
cates; but thinking, impetus, shapes, and motions are modifi-
cations of these attributes. Further, we ought to distinguish
between physical (or rather real) genus, and logical or ideal
genus. Things which are of the same physical kind or which
are homogeneous, are of the same matter so to speak, and can
often be changed one into another
by changing their modifi-
cations, like circles But two heterogeneous
and squares.
things may have a common logical genus, and then their
differences are not simple accidental modifications of one
self-same subject or of one self-same metaphysical or physical
matter. Thus time and space are quite heterogeneous things,
and we should be wrong to imagine some kind of common real
subject which had only continuous quantity in general and
whose modifications resulted in time or space. People may
laugh at these philosophical distinctions between two genera,
the one only logical, the other real, and between two matters,
one physical that of bodies the other only metaphysical
162 LEIBNIZ AND LOCKE
or general, as if someone said that two parts of space are of
the same matter or that two hours are also of the same matter
as one another. Yet these distinctions are not a mere
matter of terms, but are in the things themselves; and they
seem to be particularly relevant here, where their confusion
has given rise to a false conclusion. These two genera have
a common notion, and the notion of real genus is common to
both matters, so that their genealogy would be as follows:
*
Real, whose differ- (
Metaphysical merely in which
,
immateriality.
With regard to all this I may say, before coming to the
explanation of my opinion, that it is certain that matter is
things.
1
The number of the section refers to the section in the corres-
ponding chapter and book of Locke's Essay; i.e. in this case
to Essay, Bk. I, ch. i, 21. It will be seen that Leibniz does not
always follow the order of Locke's sections, but sometimes takes
the points in an order that suits his own argument. A large part
of the present chapter is omitted here.
8
Cf. p. 142, note.
168 LEIBNIZ AND LOCKE
otherwise, rather than because these propositions have been
printed naturally in the mind ?
THEOPIIILUS. Both these doctrines are true. The nature
of things and the nature agree. And since
of the mind here
you oppose the consideration of the thing to the apperception
of what is printed in the mind, your objection shows, sir,
that those whose doctrines you are upholding understand
by innate truths, only such as would be approved naturally,
as if by and without apprehending them except
instinct,
confusedly. There are some of this nature, and I shall
have occasion to speak of them. But what is called the
natural light presupposes a distinct knowledge, and often
enough the consideration of the nature of things is nothing
else than the knowledge of the nature of our mind and of
these innate ideas, for which there is no need to search outside.
Thus I call innate those truths which have no need of such
consideration for their verification . . .
characters could not be read by those eyes which saw other things
very well.
TH. The apperception of what is in us depends upon the
presence of attention and upon order. Now it is not only
possible, it is also fitting, that children should pay more
attention to the notions of sense, because attention is
'
1
There is nothing in the intellect which was not previously in
the senses; provided we make the reservation, except the intellect
itself/
174 LEIBNIZ AND LOCKE
external, sensible objects or of the internal operations of
our soul.
TH. To avoid a dispute over which we have delayed too
long, Imust make it quite clear at the outset, sir, that when
you say that ideas come to us from the one or the other of
these causes I understand you to speak of the actual per-
ception of them, for I think I have shown that they are in us
before they are apperceived in so far as they contain anything
distinct. 1
CHAPTER IX
Of Perception
i. PH. Let us now turn to the ideas of reflection in detail.
Perception , as it is the first mind exercised about
faculty of the
our ideas, so it is the first and simplest idea we have from
reflection. Thinking signifies that sort of operation of the
mind about our ideas, wherein the mind is active ; where it, with
some degree of voluntary attention, considers anything. For in
bare naked perception, the mind is, for the most part, only
he had in his former state, and about the change in his ideas,
when his sense of hearing began to function. These people
who are born deaf and dumb can go further than we think.
There was one at Oldenburg in the time of the last count,
who became a good painter, and showed himself very rational
in other respects. A very learned man, Breton by nation-
ality, told me that at Blainville, a place ten leagues from
Nantes, belonging to the Duke of Rohan, there was about
1690 a poor man living in a hut, near to the castle outside
the town, who was born deaf and dumb, and who took letters
and other things to the town, finding the houses by means of
signs made him by the people who used to employ him. At
last the poor man became blind too, and still did not give up
performing services, and carrying letters to the town on the
strength of what he was told by touch. He had in his hut a
plank which went from the door to the place where his feet
were, and which made him aware by its movement when
any one came in. People are most negligent not to acquire
exact knowledge of the ways of thinking of such persons. If
i8o LEIBNIZ AND LOCKE
he is no longer alive, there is likely to be someone in the
who could still give us some information about him,
vicinity
and make us understand how he was shown the things he
was to do. But to return to what the man born blind,
who beginning to see, will think about the globe and the
is
eyes, and which might arise from a flat painting on the table,
represented bodies, until touch had convinced him of it, or
until, by dint of reasoning about rays according to the laws
of optics, he understood by the lights and the shadows that
there was something there which arrested these rays, and that
it was this which remained present to his sense of tcuch. He
would arrive at this view finally, when he saw the globe and
cube rolling along, and changing shadows and appearances
as the result of their motion, or even when, the two bodies
All B is C
All A is B
.'. all A is C.
Here follows about a page of instances of identical proposi-
1
premises being taken for true also, it follows that the contrary
of the other premise must be true. It is true that in the
Schools of logic they prefer to make use of conversions. 1 . . .
1
The validity of conversions themselves, Leibniz says, must be
demonstrated from the primary principle, that of contradiction ;
(1) No A is B, :. no B is A.
(2) Some A is B, .*. some B is A.
(3) All A is B, .'. some B is A.
Demonstration of the first conversion in Cesare, which is of
the second figure:
No A is B
All B is B
.'. no B is A.
Demonstration of the second conversion in Datisi, which is
Some A is B
/. some B is A.
Demonstration of the third conversion in Darapti, which is
TH. I believe you are right, and I even think that to these
kinds of certainty or certain knowledge you might add know-
ledge of the probable] thus there will be two sorts of knowledge
as there are two sorts of proofs, of which the one produces
certainty, while the other arrives at probability only. But let
us turn to the quarrel between the Sceptics and the Dog-
matists over the existence of things without us. We have
already touched upon it, but we must return to it here. I have
had much argument about this both personally
in the past
and by with the late M. PAbb6 Foucher, Canon of
letter
in the world, may yet have but a very obscure perception of their
agreement.
TH. Usually, when ideas are fundamentally understood,
their agreements and disagreements appear. Nevertheless,
I admit that there are sometimes ideas so compounded that
much care needed to develop what is hidden in them; and
is
maker might his handiwork; and the less skilful the workman
is, the more often is he obliged to rehandle and correct his
1
LEIBNIZ'S SECOND PAPER
1
Clarke had objected to Leibniz's statement in his First Paper
'
that Mr. Newton says that space is the organ which God makes
use of to perceive things by '. Cf p. 192. .
196 LEIBNIZ AND CLARKE
machine, is derived rather from the effect of the machine
than from its cause. We seek information less regarding
the power of the mechanician than regarding his in-
vention. Thus the reason alleged for praising God's
machine that He made it entirely without borrowing any
matter from outside is not enough. It is a shift to which
the author has been compelled to resort. The reason why
God is to be preferred above another mechanician is not
only because He makes the whole, whereas the artisan has
to seek for his material. This superiority would arise from
l
LEIBNIZ'S THIRD PAPER
1
'idols of the tribe, idols of the cave.'
200 LEIBNIZ AND CLARKE
reason preserving the same positions for bodies
why God,
among themselves, should have arranged bodies in space
thus and not otherwise, and why everything was not put
the other (for instance) by changing east and west.
way round
But if nothing other than this order or relation, and
space is
placing them in it, these two conditions, the one as things are,
the other supposed the other way round, would not differ
from one another: their difference exists only in our chimerical
supposition of the reality of space in itself. But in truth the
one would be just the same as the other, as they are abso-
lutely indiscernible; and consequently there is no occasion
to search after a reason for the preference of the one to the
other.
6. The same is true of time. Suppose someone asks why
God did not create everything a year sooner; and that the
same person wants to infer from that that God did something
for which He cannot possibly have had a reason why He did
it thus rather than otherwise, we should reply that his
inference would be true if time were something apart from
simple and mere will would be to remove from God the power
of choice, and that this would be to fall into fatalism. But
quite the reverse is true. I maintain that God has the power
of choice, since I base it on the reason for the choice which is
in conformity with His wisdom. And it is not this fatalism
(which nothing but the order of the highest wisdom or of
is
one, not enough for perception: a blind man does not see,
is
same thing under two names. Thus the hypothesis that the
universe should have originally had another position in time
and place from that which it actually had, and yet all the
parts of the universe should have had the same position with
regard to one another as that which they have in fact re-
ceived, is an impossible fiction.
1
Sophia, Electress of Hanover, mother of George I of England.
LEIBNIZ AND CLARKE 205
7. The same reason which shows that space outside the
world is
imaginary proves that all empty space is something
imaginary; for they differ only as the great from the small.
8. If space is a property or an attribute, it must be
say if
they were something other than certain orders of
things, what I am saying would be a contradiction. But
since this is not the case, the hypothesis is contradictory,
that is an impossible fiction.
to say it is
17. It is
very what happens in geometry where, by
like
the very supposition that a figure is greater, we sometimes
prove that in fact it is not greater. It is a contradiction;
but the contradiction is in the hypothesis, which for this
very reason is shown to be false.
18. The uniformity of space means that there is neither
internal nor external reason for discerning its parts, and
for choosing between them. For such external reason for
discerning could only be founded in the internal one; other-
1
'acting without doing anything'.
1 Cf.
p. 199, note.
LEIBNIZ AND CLARKE 207
wise it would be discerning the indiscernible, or choosing
without discerning. Will without reason would be the
'chance' of the Epicureans. A God whoacted by such a
will would be a God only in name. The source of these
errors is want of care to avoid what is derogatory to the
Divine perfections.
19. When two incompatible things are equally good, and
when one has no advantage over the other either in itself
or in combination with others, God will produce neither.
its
1
38. Those who imagine that active forces diminish of
themselves in the world, do not properly understand the
principal laws of nature, and the beauty of the works of
God.
41. The author says that space does not depend on the
situation of bodies. I answer that it is true that it does not
Since therefore all the various motions that are in the world are
perpetually decreasing, 'tis absolutely necessary, in order to
preserve and renew those motions, that we have recourse to some
1
active principles .
(The translation from Newton's Latin is
by* Clarke.)
Several sections containing a further discussion of the nature
of miracles are omitted here.
LEIBNIZ AND CLARKE 209
P.S.
1
LEIBNIZ'S FIFTH PAPER
8
8. But the good, whether true or apparent, in a word the
motive, inclines without necessitating, that is to say without
imposing an absolute necessity. For when God (for instance)
chooses the best, that which He does not choose and which is
things.
And I have sufficiently shown in my Theodicy that
10.
this moral necessity is good, and in conformity with Divine
perfection, and in conformity with the great principle of
existences, which is that of the need of a sufficient reason;
whereas absolute metaphysical necessity depends on the
other great principle of our reasonings, the principle of
essences, that is to say that of identity or contradiction: for
what absolutely necessary is the only possible course, and
is
properly considered.
1 6. To say also that the mind may have good reasons for
acting when has no motives, and when things are absolutely
it
they were tivo: and it is from this error that their perplexities
1
'numerically only*.
LEIBNIZ AND CLARKE 215
about what they called the principle of individuation arose.
Metaphysics has ordinarily been treated as a mere doctrine
of terms, like a philosophical dictionary, without ever coming
to a discussion of things. Superficial philosophy , like that of
the Atomists and Vacuists, fabricates for itself things which
higher reasons render inadmissible. I hope that my proofs
will change the face of philosophy, in spite of feeble contra-
dictions such as I meet with here.
28. I do not say that two points of space are one and the
same point, nor that two instants of time are one and the
same instant, as seems to be imputed to me. But it may be
imagined through lack of knowledge that there are two
different instantswhen there is one only, as I observed in
17 of my foregoing reply that often in geometry we suppose
there to be two, so as to show up an opponent's error, and
find but one. If someone supposed that one straight line
cut another at two points he would ultimately find out that
these two pretended points must coincide and can only make
one. This also happens when a straight line, which in all
other instances cuts a given curve, becomes a tangent.
29. I have proved that space is nothing other than an
order of the existence of things, which is observed when they
exist simultaneously. Thus the fiction of a finite material
universe, the whole of which moves about in an infinite empty
space, cannot be admitted. It is altogether unreasonable
and impracticable. For besides the fact that there is no
real space outside the material universe, such an action
would be without purpose; it would be working without
doing
anything, agenda nihil agere. No change which could be
observed by any one whatever would be occurring. Such
216 LEIBNIZ AND CLARKE
things are the imaginings of philosophers with incomplete
notions, who make of space an absolute reality. Mere
mathematicians who do but concern themselves with the
play of the imagination are capable of fabricating to them-
selves such notions; but they are destroyed by higher reasons.
1 Clarke had said To say that God could not have altered the
:
'
none the less useful. For the rest, I have acted rather like
49. We
cannot say that a certain duration is eternal, but
we can say that the things which last for ever are eternal,
because they are always acquiring a new duration. What-
ever of time and of duration does exist, since it is successive,
continually perishes. And how could a thing exist eternally
which properly speaking never exists? And how could a
thing exist, no part of which ever exists? In the case of time
R95
224 LEIBNIZ AND CLARKE
nothing exists but instants, and an instant is not even a
part of time. Whoever gives proper consideration to these
observations will easily understand that time can only be an
ideal thing. And the analogy of time and space will indeed
make us judge that the one is as ideal as the other. Still, if,
when it is said that the duration of a thing is eternal, this
only means that the thing endures eternally, I have nothing
further to say.
with what I have said above ( 47), to show how the mind
comes to form the idea of space, without its being necessary
for there to be a real and absolute being, corresponding to
228 LEIBNIZ AND CLARKE
that idea, outside of the mind and outside of relations. I
do not say then that space is an order or situation, but an
order of situations, or an order according to which situations
are arranged ; and that abstract space is this order of situations
which are conceived as possible. Thus it is something ideal,
but the author appears not to want to understand me. I
have already replied ( 54) to the objection that an order is
not capable of quantity.
105. The author objects that time could not be an order of
successive things, because the quantity of time can become
x *
in his fatherland', i.e. when he is at home in his own
country, and not travelling.
'
* of
earning daily bread'.
MISCELLANEOUS EXTRACTS 235
causes us to forget the master for the valet and the end for
the means. This, as the poet says, is exactly propter vitam
vivendi perdere causas. 1 It is very much like a miser pre-
(if we
leave on one side the illumination of grace) is the
demonstrative knowledge of the greatest truths by their
causes or reasons, it must be admitted that metaphysics or
natural theology, which treats of immaterial substances, and
particularly of God and the soul, is the most important of all.
And it is
impossible to make progress in this without knowing
the genuine notion of substance, which I explained in such a
way in my last letter to M. Arnauld that he himself, who is
so exact, and who had been shocked by it at the outset, gave
to it his acceptance.
. . .
Suppose, for example, that someone marks a number of
points on a sheet of paper entirely at random, in the manner
of those who practise the ridiculous art of geomancy. I say
that it is possible to find a geometrical line whose motion is
constant and uniform in accordance with a certain rule, such
that this line shall pass through all the points, and in the same
order in which they were marked by the pen. . . . Nor is there
any instance of a face whose contour does not form part of a
'
1
Fragment without superscription. (Date unknown)
The best apologia that could be made for M. Descartes
would be to complete his hyperbolic spectacles, which are
the only useful things he discovered if it were practicable
to do so; and I could wish that Fr. Malebranche and others,
who assume the task of defending everything he said, were
obliged to do it.
9
From the
l
if 2. ... This view that has been held regarding Mr. Hobbes,
that he taught an absolute necessity of all things, has seriously
injured his reputation, and would have done him harm, even
had it been his only error.
clear that a good part of the mirror is black and diverts the
B A c
i
i
\
been growing in perfection from all eternity; but
following
the hypothesis of the triangle, there would have been a
beginning. The hypothesis of equal perfection would be that
of the rectangle A. I do not yet see the way to show
demonstratively which we ought to choose by pure reason.
However, although on the hypothesis of growth the state of
the world could never be perfect absolutely, taken at any
given instant, yet the actual sequence would none the less
be the most perfect of all possible sequences, for the reason
that God always chooses the best possible. . . .
248 MISCELLANEOUS EXTRACTS
1
Fragment without superscription. (Date unknown)
2
Fragment without superscription. (Date unknown)
I realized, sir, from the little talk I had the honour to have
with you, that you meditate deeply on the nature of human
freedom. And this it is which drives me to expound to you
more clearly what I referred to in conversation, so that I may
profit by your opinion of it. I hold that it is in the interests
of piety and faith to reconcile the way in which our will acts
not only with the dogmas of faith, but also with the great
principles of reason, which hold sway everywhere else, and
are the foundations of our knowledge. Otherwise we seem
to be yielding the victory to impious men and atheists, or at
the least to be confirming and strengthening them in their
errors. This is why I never could fancy the opinion of those,
who maintain that the principle of contradiction does not
apply in Divinis, and that we do in fact find an exception to
itin the case of the Trinity of the Divine Persons, as is
admitted to some extent by those who introduce certain
virtual distinctions. Now it is the same reason which
'
1 I have imagined and have gone over it all beforehand
it all
'
in my mind.
1
Bossuet.
1 Taken from Bodeman's Catalogue (cf. p. 241, note).
MISCELLANEOUS EXTRACTS 251
makes me doubt whether it is fitting to say that another
principle, which is of hardly less general application than the
principle of contradiction, does not apply with regard to
freedom the principle, namely, that nothing ever takes
place without its being possible for one who knew everything
to give some reason why it should have happened rather than
not. All the more so, because it seems to me that this
(Date unknown)
' '
From the Theodicy .
1710
1
Desinefata deumflecti sperare precando.
LAUR. What more can I do? I have given you wine and
meat of my own growing, such as my little estate can provide.
Nectar and ambrosia you must ask of the gods such divine
food cannot be found among men. Listen to St. Paul, that
chosen vessel who was caught up into the third heaven, who
heard there unspeakable things. He will reply by invoking
the parallel of the potter, the incomprehensibility of the ways
of God, and our admiration for the depth of His wisdom.
Yet it is well to note that we do not ask why God foresees the
event, for that we understand; it is because it will happen.
But we ask why He orders it so, why He hardens the heart
of one, why He takes pity on another. We
do not know
what reasons He may have for it, but the fact that He is very
262 MISCELLANEOUS EXTRACTS
good and very wise is enough make
its judge them good.
to And
as He is His decrees and His opera-
just also, it follows that
tions do not destroy our freedom. Some have sought for a
reason. They have said that we are made of a corrupt and
impure mass of mud. But Adam and the angels were made
of silver and gold, and they sinned none the less. Some-
times, also, our hearts are hardened after regeneration. We
must then seek another cause of evil, and I doubt if even the
angels know it. For they continue happy and praising God.
Boethius paid more attention to the answer of philosophy
than to St. Paul's. This is the cause of his failure. Let us
believe in Jesus Christ, who is the virtue and wisdom of God ;
He teaches us that God desires the salvation of all, that He
desires not the death of a sinner. Let us trust in the Divine
mercy, and let us not, through our vanity and our malice,
become incapable of enjoying it.
blinding majesty.
Qualisque videri
Coelicolis et solet.
1
quanta
beauty you will admire when, after a happy passing from this
mortal condition into a better state, the gods shall have made
'
you capable of knowing it.
At this moment Theodorus awoke, gave thanks to the god-
dess, and praised the justice of Jupiter, Inspired by what he
had seen and heard, he continued in his office of high priest
with all the zeal of a true servant of his god, and with all the
joy of which mortal man is capable. It appears to me that
MISCELLANEOUS EXTRACTS 267
this continuation of the story throws light on the difficulty
on which Valla did not wish to touch. If Apollo adequately
Daedalus, 257
Darapti: a mood of the syllogism, 184
Datisi: a mood of the syllogism, 184
De Diaeta, 102
Delphi, 259, 262
Democritus: Greek philosopher born about 81 B.C., 101, 103,
131* i35 165, 193-4
Des Argues, Gaspard (1593-1662) French mathematician, especi-
:
Herrenhausen, 204
Hessen Rheinfels, Landgraf Ernst von (1623-93): statesman
and soldier, keenly interested in philosophy. He acted
as go-between in the early stages of Leibniz's correspondence
with Arnauld, 52, 57, 61
Hippocrates (born c. 460 B.C.) greatest physician of antiquity,
:
Jansenists, 52
Jesuits, 52
Jesus Christ, 57, 155, 236, 262
John Frederick, Duke of Brunswick (d. 1679) . vni
Journal de Pans, 114, 116
Journal des Savans, 117, 118, 190
Judas, 56, 258, 260
Jupiter: Roman name for Zeus, the king and father of the
gods, 259, 261-3, 265-6
Jupiter: the planet, 86
Jurieu, Pierre (1637-1713): French Protestant theologian,
famous for his polemics with Bossuet, 197
Magdeburg, 216
Mahomet (c. 571-632) founder of Islaraism. Caliph is the title
:
Nantes, 179
New Essays, xvii, xxvii, xxxi, 14191
Newton, Isaac (1642-1727): English mathematician, physicist,
astronomer, and philosopher; author of Philosophiae Natu-
ralis Principia Mathematica and Optiks, viii, xx, xxxii, 157,
162, 192-229, 243-4
Nouvelles de la Republique des Lettres, 88, 152
Nova Zembla, 144
Nuremberg, vii
Odyssey, 127
Oldenburg, 179
Oldenburg, Henry (1615-77): natural philosopher and man of
letters, vii
Optics, 192, 195, 208, 227
Ovid, 249
48
Rohan, Henri, Due de (1579-1638): a French general, 179
Romans, 144
Rome, 262, 266
Rorarius, Girolomo (1485-1556): Italian man of letters, who
upheld the view that animals have rational minds, 5, 13, 126
Royal Society, vii
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SIB WALTER SCOTT'S WORKS:
Abbot, The. 124 L Ivanhoe. Intro, by Ernest Rhys. l
Anne of Geierstein. 125 L. Kenilworth. 135
I. Antiquary. The. 126 L Monastery. The. 136
Black Dwarf and Legend of Old Mortality. 137
Montrose. 128 Peveril of the Peak. 133
Bride of Lammermoor. 129 Pirate, The. 139
Castle Dangerous and The Snr- Quentin Durward. 140
geon's Daughter. 130 x. Redgauntlet. 141
Count Robert of Paris. 131 x, Rob Roy. 1 42
ORATORY
L Anthology of British Historical Speeches and Orations. Compiled by
Ernest Rhys. 714
Bright's (John) Speeches. Selected with Intro, by Joseph Sturge. 252
Burke's American Speeches and Letters. 340
(See also ESSAYS)
Demosthenes: Select Orations. 646
Fox (Charles James): Speeches (French Revolutionary War Period).
Edited with Introduction by Irene Cooper Willis, M.A. 759
Lincoln's Speeches, etc. Intro, by the Rt. Hon. James Bryce. 206
(See also BIOGRAPHY)
Macaulay's Speeches on Politics and Literature. 399
(See also ESSAYS and HISTORY)
Pitt's Orations on the War with France. 145
PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY
L A Kempls' Imitation of Christ. 484
Ancient Hebrew Literature. Being the Old Testament and Apocrypha.
Arranged by the Rev. R. B. Taylor. 4 vols. 253-6
Aristotle, The Nlcomachean Ethics of. Translated by D. P. Chase.
Introduction by Professor J. A. Smith. 547
(See also CLASSICAL)
Bacon's The Advancement of Learning. 719
(See also ESSAYS)
Berkeley's (Bishop) Principles of Human Knowledge, New Theory of
Vision. With Introduction by A. D. Lindsay. 483
Boehme's (Jacob) The Signature of All Things, with Other Writings.
Introduction by Clifford Bax. 569
Browne's Religio Medici, etc. Introduction by Professor O. H. Herford. 92
Bunyan's Grace Abounding and Mr Badman. Introduction by G. B.
Harrison. 815 (See also ROMANCE)
Burton's (Robert) Anatomy of Melancholy. Introduction by Holbrook
Jackson. 3 vols. 886-8
Butler's Analogy of Religion. Introduction by Rev. Ronald Bayne. 90
Descartes' (Rene) A Discourse on Method. Translated by Professor John
Veitch. Introduction by A. D. Lindsay. 570
L Ellis' (Havelock) Selected Essays. Introduction by J. S. Collie. 930
I, Gore's (Charles) The Philosophy of the Good Life. 924
Hobbes' Leviathan. Edited, with Intro, by A. D. Lindsay, M.A. 691
Hooker's Ecclesiastical Polity. Intro, by Rev. H. Bayne. 2 vols. 201-2
Hume's Treatise of Human Nature, and other Philosophical Works.
Introduction by A. D. Lindsay, M.A. 2 vols. 548-9
James (William): Selected Papers on Philosophy. 739
Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. Translated by J. M. D. Melklejohn.
Introduction by A. D. Lindsay, M.A. 909
PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY continued
Keble'sThe Christian Tear. Introduction by J. O. Shairp. 690
King Edward VI. First and Second Prayer Books. Introduction by th
Right Rev. Bishop of Gloucester. 448
L Koran, The. Rodwell's Translation. 380
Latimer's Sermons. Introduction by Canon Beaching. 40
Law's Serious Call to a Devout and Holy Life. 91
Leibniz's Philosophical Writings. Selected and trans, by Mary Morris.
Introduction by C. R. Morris, M.A. 905
Locke's Two Treatises of Girl) Government. Introduction by Professor
William S. Carpenter. 751
Malthus on the Principles of Population. 2 vols. 692-3
Mill's (John Stuart) Utilitarianism, Liberty, Representative Government.
With Introduction by A. D. Lindsay, M.A. 482
v Subjection of Women. (See Wollstonecraft, Mary, under SCIENCE.)
More's Utopia. Introduction by Judge O'Hagan. 461
L New Testament. Arranged in the order in which the books came to the
Christians of the First Century. 93
Newman's Apologia, pro Vita Sua. Intro, by Dr Charles Sarolea. 836
(See also ESSAYS)
Nietzsche's Thus Spake Zarathustra. Translated by A. Tille and
M. M. Bozman. 892
Paine's Rights of Man. Introduction by G. J. Holyoake. 718
Pascal's Pensees. Translated by W. F. Trotter. Introduction by
T. S. Eliot. 874 [C.I.B. 403
Haxuayana and the Mahabharata, The. Translated by Roinesh Dutt,
Kenan's Life of Jesus. Introduction by Right Rev. Chas. Gore, D.D. 806
Robertson's (F. W.) Sermons on "
Ea
and Bible Subjects. Each
' ---.--
Religion and Life, Christian Doctrine,
Volume with Introduction by Canon
Burnett. 3 vols. 37-9
Robinson's (Wade) The Philosophy of Atonement and Other Sermons.
Introduction by Rev. F. B. Meyer. 637
Rousseau's (J. J.) The Social Contract, etc. 660 (See also ESSAYS)
St Augustine's Confessions. Dr Pusey's Translation. 200
L St Francis: The Little Flowers, and The Life of St Francis. 485
Seeley's Ecoe Homo. Introduction by Sir Oliver Lodge. 305
Spinoza's Ethics, etc. Translated by Andrew J. Boyle. With Intro-
duction by Professor Santayana. 481
Swedenborg's (Emmanuel) Heaven and Hell. 379
The Divine Love and Wisdom. 635
The Divine Providence. 658
L ., ., The True Christian Religion. 893
ROMANCE
Aucassin and Nicolette, with other Medieval Romances. 497
Boccaccio's Decameron. (Unabridged.) Translated by J. M. Risir.
Introduction by Edward Hutton. 2 vols, 845-6
L Banyan's Pilflfrim's Progress. Introduction by Rev. H. E. Lewis. 204
Burnt Njal, The Story of. Translated by Sir George Dasent. 558
L Cervantes' Don Quixote. Motteux's Translation. Lockhart's Intro-
duction. 2 vols. 385-6
Chretien de Troves: Eric and Enid. Translated, with Introduction and
Notes, by William Wistar Comfort. 698
French Medieval Romances. Translated by Eugene Mason. 557
Geoffrey of Monmouth's Histories of the Kings of Britain. 577
Grettir Saga, The. Newly Translated by G. Alnslie Might. 699
Gudrun. Done into English by Margaret Armour. 880
Guest's (Lady) Mabinogion. Introduction by Rev. R. Williams. 97
Beimskringla: The Olaf Sagas. Translated by Samuel Laing. Intro-
duction and Notes by John Beveridge. 717
Sagas of the Norse Kings. Translated: by Samuel Laing.
Introduction and Notes by John Boverldge. 847
Holy Graal, The High History of the. 445
Kalevala. Introduction by W. F. Kirby, F.L.S., F.E.S. 2 vols. 259-60
Le Sage's The Adventures of Gil Bias. Intro, by Anatole Lo Bras. 2 vols.
MacDonald's (George) P ban tastes: A Faerie Romance. 732 [437-8
(See also FICTION)
Malory's Le Morte d' Arthur. Intro, by Professor Rhys. 2 vols. 45-6
L Morris (William): Early Romances. Introduction by Alfred Noyes. 261
The Life and Death of Jason. 575
Morte d' Arthur Romances, Two. Introduction by Luoy A. Paton. 634
Nibelungs, The Fall of the. Translated by Margaret Armour. 312
Rabelais' The Heroic Deeds of Gargantua and Pantagrnel. Introduction
by D. B. Wyndham Lewis. 2 vols. 826-7
Wace's Arthurian Romance. Translated by Eugene Mason* Laya-
mon's Brut. Introduction by Luoy A. Paton. 578
SCIENCE
Boyle'sThe Sceptical Chymist. 559
Darwin's The Origin of Species. Introduction by Sir Arthur Keith. 811
(See also TRAVEL) [E. F. Bozman. 922
L Eddlngton's (Sir Arthur) The Nature of the Physical World. Intro, by
slid: the Elements of. Todhunter's Edition. Introduction by Sir
""*-, K.O.B. 891
>erimental Researches in Electricity. 576
BLuman Faculty. Revised by Author. 263
5>-e:
.ss and Poverty.
h on
e&
560
tto RaU ^ ** of HeaUn*
Harvey's Circulation of the Blood. Introduction by Ernest Parkyn. 262
Howard's State of the Prisons. Introduction by Kenneth Ruck. 835
Huxley's Essays.
~
Introduction by Sir Oliver Lodge. 47
b Lectures and Lay Sermons. Intro. Sir Oliver Lodge. 498
SCIENCE continued
Lyell's Antiquity of Man. With an Introduction by R. H. Rastall. 700
Marx's (Karl) Capital. Translated by Eden and Cedar Paul. Intro-
duction by O. D. H. Cole. 2 vote. 848-9
Miller's Old Red Sandstone. 103
Owen's (Robert) A New View of Society, etc. Intro, by O. D. H. Cole. 799
L Pearson's (Karl) The Grammar of Science. 939
Ricardo's Principles of Political Economy and Taxation. 690
Smith's (Adam) The Wealth of Nations. 2 vols. 412-13
Tyndall's Glaciers of the Alps and Mountaineering in 1861. 98
White's Selborne. Introduction by Principal Windle. 48
Wollstonecraft (Mary), The Rights of Woman, with John Stuart Mill's
The Subjection of Women. 825