Special Ops Theory
Special Ops Theory
Special Ops Theory
ISBN 978-1-941715-25-3
Joint Special Operations University
Brian A. Maher, Ed.D., SES, President
Francis X. Reidy, Interim Director, Center for Special Operations Studies and Research
Robert Nalepa, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret., Editor in Chief
Lisa Sheldon, B.A., Advertising, JSOU Press Editor
Cindy Snyder, B.A., Mass Communications/Journalism, Assistant JSOU Press Editor
Resident Senior Fellows
Joint Special Operations University Peter McCabe, Ph.D., Political Science, Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret.
and the Center for Special Operations Studies and Research Will Irwin, MMAS, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.
Paul Lieber, Ph.D., Mass Communication & Public Affairs
The Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) provides its publications David Ellis, Ph.D., International Relations, Comparative Politics
to contribute toward expanding the body of knowledge about joint special Editorial Advisory Board
operations. JSOU publications advance the insights and recommendations
Roby C. Barrett William W. Mendel
of national security professionals and the Special Operations Forces (SOF) Ph.D., Middle Eastern & South Asian History Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.
students and leaders for consideration by the SOF community and defense Public Policy Center Middle East Institute and JSOU Senior Fellow
JSOU Senior Fellow
leadership. Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro
JSOU is the educational component of the United States Special Opera- James J.F. Forest Major General, Brazilian Army, Ret.
Ph.D., Higher Education Administration JSOU Senior Fellow
tions Command (USSOCOM), MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. The JSOU Associate Professor, School of Criminology and
mission is to educate SOF executive, senior, and intermediate leaders and Justice Studies, University of Massachusetts James F. Powers, Jr.
Lowell and JSOU Senior Fellow Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.
selected other national and international security decision makers, both JSOU Senior Fellow
military and civilian, through teaching, outreach, and research in the Mario Forestier
Chief Warrant Officer, U.S. Army, Ret. Bryan C. Price
science and art of joint special operations. JSOU provides education to the Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Joint Special Operations Command
men and women of SOF and to those who enable the SOF mission in a joint Center for Counterterrorism Studies Ph.D., Political Science
Director, Combating Terrorism Center at
and interagency environment.
Thomas H. Henriksen West Point
JSOU conducts research through its Center for Special Operations Ph.D., History
Richard H. Shultz, Jr.
Studies and Research (CSOSR) where efforts center upon the USSOCOM Hoover Institution, Stanford University
Ph.D., Political Science
and JSOU Senior Fellow
mission: Director, International Security
Bernd Horn Studies Program, The Fletcher School,
USSOCOM mission. USSOCOM synchronizes the planning of Special Colonel, Canadian Dept. of National Defence, Ret. Tufts University and JSOU Senior Fellow
Operations and provides Special Operations Forces to support persistent, Ph.D., War Studies
Command Historian, CANSOFCOM Education Robert G. Spulak, Jr.
networked, and distributed Geographic Combatant Command operations and Research Centre Ph.D., Physics/Nuclear Engineering
in order to protect and advance our Nation’s interests. Sandia National Laboratories
Russell D. Howard and JSOU Senior Fellow
Brigadier General, U.S. Army, Ret.
Press publications are available for download from the JSOU Library Jessica Glicken Turnley
John D. Jogerst Ph.D., Cultural Anthropology
web page located at https://jsou.libguides.com/jsoupublications. Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret. Galisteo Consulting Group
and JSOU Senior Fellow
James Kiras
Ph.D., History Rich Yarger
School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Ph.D., History
Air University and JSOU Associate Fellow JSOU Senior Fellow
Special Operations Theory
Foreword by Professor Colin S. Gray
Essays by
Charles Cleveland Tom Searle
Edited by
Peter McCabe and Paul Lieber
*******
The JSOU Center for Special Operations Studies and Research (CSOSR) is currently
accepting written works relevant to special operations for potential publication. For
more information, please contact the CSOSR Director at [email protected].
Thank you for your interest in the JSOU Press.
*******
ISBN 978-1-941715-25-3
The views expressed in this publication are entirely those of the
authors and do not necessarily reflect the views, policy, or position
of the United States Government, Department of Defense, United
States Special Operations Command, or the Joint Special Operations
University.
Authors are granted academic freedom provided their work does not
disclose classified information, jeopardize operations security, or
misrepresent official U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empowers
authors to offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the
interest of furthering debate on key issues.
Recent Publications of the JSOU Press
Special Operations Contracting: 21st Century Approaches for Service and
Technology Acquisition, JSOU Report 17-5, Benjamin Tkach
Outside the Box: A New General Theory of Special Operations, JSOU Report 17-4,
Tom Searle
Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco: Change, Instability, and Continuity in the Maghreb,
JSOU Report 17-3, Roby Barrett
A Social Marketing Analysis for Suicide Prevention Initiatives in USSOCOM: A
Framework for Future Research and Success, JSOU Report 17-2, R. Craig Lefebvre
A Unified Theory for Special Operations, JSOU Report 17-1, Richard W. Rubright
IS and Cultural Genocide: Antiquities Trafficking in the Terrorist State, JSOU Report
16-11, Russell D. Howard, Marc D. Elliott, and Jonathan R. Prohov
On the cover. In August 2016, JSOU held a symposium to examine the notion of
special operations theory and whether such theory is valid, suitable, and necessary.
GRAPHIC BY JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS UNIVERSITY.
Contents
From the Director.......................................................................... vii
Foreword
Professor Colin S. Gray .....................................................................ix
vi
From the Director
T his is the third of three volumes that follow from an August 2016 JSOU
symposium on special operations theory. This compendium is not a
comprehensive or exhaustive treatment of special operations theory. Rather,
it is intended to continue the conversation and, at least, bring to a culminat-
ing point the argument over whether a theory of special operations is neces-
sary and if the suggestions are suitable, feasible, and acceptable. The editors
of this compendium, JSOU resident senior fellows, highlight opposing views
and conclude with an academic, joint special operations perspective on the
status of the theory argument.
There is no official or accepted general theory, but there is a strong desire
for one and there is evidence that parts of such a theory have existed for
decades at various headquarters, schools, and team rooms across the enter-
prise. On the other hand, some regard theorizing in general as a neces-
sary intellectual exercise, but of little operational value. No matter where
you stand on the subject, this monograph is worthy of your time and
consideration.
The Center for Special Operations Studies and Research is especially
pleased to welcome Professor Colin Gray’s contribution and foreword. Com-
bined with references to other seminal works and JSOU Press monographs
on special operations theory, we trust that this will serve as a benchmark
until there is a change of conditions, authorities, doctrine, or operations.
Francis X. Reidy
Interim Director, Center for Special Operations Studies and Research
vii
Foreword
ix
Second, I must admit I find myself undaunted by the wide variety of
demands that SOF can attract. There is a core of competencies that serve, if
not quite a myriad, at least many tasks in many different places. Versatility
and adaptability generally serve well enough. The SOF soldier has to be a
warrior athlete who can think strategically. Those are tough requirements
to pose for SOF selectors, but that is what needs to be. This may well be
somewhat contrary to the norm in American popular culture, but SOF have
to be physically, mentally, and emotionally superior. That is why selection
needs to be arduous.
Third, a working theory of special operations provides essential guid-
ance on the context for their professional military duties, and also as to the
categories of action that may impinge upon them. Another way of express-
ing this would be to say that theory provides vital historical and strategic
mapping for SOF. Nothing lasts forever, but theory can identify political and
strategic phenomena that persist.
Fourth, theory identifies core skills essential for the conduct of special
operations. The need for these, though they have to be somewhat adjusted
and adapted for a changing technical context, persists generically for gen-
erations. The basic attributes required for the successful conduct of special
operations have persisted over time and are relevant to many tactical con-
texts. SOF doctrine should not be limiting in its necessary influence.
Fifth, concerning SOF personnel, the quality of the soldier must always
be of superior importance over quantity. While a truly excellent large force
may be preferable to a truly excellent small one, it should be understood that
a notable increase in force size always must mean a reduction in the average
quality of soldiers. This has always been true historically, with no significant
exceptions. Leonidas of Sparta knew it, and we do not know it any better!
Sixth, while intellect is of high importance in the planning and con-
duct of special operations, it gains advantage by exercising that sometimes
rare quality we can term ‘strategic sense.’ Historically, it is not obvious that
this quality can be taught, but experience can trigger its appearance if it is
already there intuitively. Strategic theory and its evidential backing at least
can attempt to teach with some historical exemplars. It is important to note
that although the quality of key personnel for SOF is vitally significant, the
choice of appropriate targets for special operations is usually more signifi-
cant still.
x
Seventh, while on one hand it is, of course, essential for SOF to exercise
and develop teamwork to a high degree, it would be as well to remember
that institutional loyalty can prove testing for the military discipline that
operations frequently need for their contributions to overall strategic effect.
In extreme dysfunctional mode, one can be troubled by evidence for what
might develop into what amounts to a ‘private army.’ To some degree, tribal-
ism is both inevitable and desirable in the military, but it can be taken too
far and is hard to arrest.
Eighth, admittedly somewhat in contrast to the previous point, the global
history of SOF misuse is all too rich. Especially in an ideologically egalitarian
popular democracy like the United States, the very idea of truly special forces
is something that is almost culturally unethical. A mass army, as was raised
in WWII, and even as performed in Vietnam in the 1960s, proved that some
examples of average soldiery were very average indeed. The Cincinnatus
model of the citizen soldier rarely is a contemporary phenomenon (or most
probably in ancient Rome also). However, it is only prudent for the planners
of special operations to be engaged both in design and execution of SOF.
Ninth, and finally, I considered carefully the critique of a special opera-
tions theory developed and presented by one scholar in particular, James
Kiras. His argument is impressively deep and wide in reach, but I suspect that
it fails to empathize sufficiently with particular features that are unique to
special warfare, even though they abut, if do not actually intrude, elsewhere
also. What can and must be said, though, is that the chapter here generically
hostile to theory creation for special operations, raises fundamentally impor-
tant arguments that need unambiguous and preferably clear and certain
answers, before further effort is expended upon this task. The highly criti-
cal chapter makes a vital contribution to the effort to consider theorization
for special operations. I am confident that there are answers sufficient to
reply persuasively to the critical chapter, but they need to be developed and
engaged fully in the debate that this whole project needs to know in order
to continue further. By way of a fairly generic very brief comment on the
critique offered, I believe that the authors chose to categorize some activities
in existing Services problematically and in ways that could, arguably should,
belong under a special operations ‘Eagle.’
The monograph produced for it can be regarded as essential training
before probable, but only probable, deployment in action supportive for a
dominant theory of special operations. Where should the venture drive next?
xi
As a first step, I suggest that competent and plausible answers need to be
provided in answer to the first-rate critiques offered in this volume. Follow-
ing that necessary vital exercise, concentrated and focused work is needed
to produce a draft that would be relevant to all institutional members of the
broad special operations community. It is possible, even probable, that it
would not be highly pleasing to the entire community, but ironically such
may need to be the case.
Endnotes
1. H.R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies that Led to Vietnam (New York: HarperCollins
Publishers, 1997).
xii
McCabe: Introduction
Peter McCabe
Dr. Peter McCabe serves as a Resident Senior Fellow at the Joint Special
Operations University (JSOU). He came to JSOU from the U.S. Central
Command where he worked as a strategic policy planner. Prior to that, he
retired from the U.S. Air Force as a Colonel in 2011. He received his Ph.D.
in political science from the University of Florida with a focus on interna-
tional relations and comparative politics.
1
JSOU Report 17 -6
3
JSOU Report 17 -6
The general’s remarks are an important read for everyone within the
SOF enterprise. Today, SOF are the main effort in many conflicts; SOF have
a responsibility to more fully develop its “operational art so it can be bur-
nished, improved, taught widely, practiced, then critiqued, and changed.”
This opening chapter sets the stage for the theories and counterarguments
in later chapters.
4
McCabe: Introduction
6
McCabe: Introduction
7
JSOU Report 17 -6
Endnotes
1. Colin S. Gray, “Concept Failure? COIN, Counterinsurgency, and Strategic Theory,”
PRISM 3, no. 3 (June 2012): 17.
2. William H. McRaven, Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare:
Theory and Practice (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1995).
3. James D. Kiras, Special Operations and Strategy: From World War II to the War
on Terrorism (New York: Routledge, 2006).
4. Robert G. Spulak Jr., A Theory of Special Operations: The Origin, Qualities, and
Use of SOF (Hurlburt Field, FL: JSOU Press, October 2007); Robert G. Spulak
Jr., Innovate or Die: Innovation and Technology for Special Operations (Tampa,
FL: JSOU Press, December 2010).
5. Jessica Glicken Turnley, Cross-Cultural Competence and Small Groups: Why SOF
are the way SOF are (Tampa, FL: JSOU Press, 2011); Jessica Glicken Turnley,
Retaining a Precarious Value as Special Operations Go Mainstream (Hurlburt
Field, FL: JSOU Press, February 2008).
6. Harry R. Yarger, 21st Century SOF: Toward an American Theory of Special Opera-
tions (Tampa, FL: JSOU Press, April 2013).
8
McCabe: Introduction
7. William Knarr, Jessica Glicken Turnley, Dona J. Stewart, Rich Rubright, and
Jason Quirin, Special Operations Forces Mixed-Gender Elite Teams (Tampa, FL:
JSOU Press, June 2014).
8. Colin S. Gray, Tactical Operations for Strategic Effect: The Challenge of Currency
Conversion (Tampa, FL: JSOU Press, November 2015).
9. Richard Shultz, Military Innovation in War: It Takes a Learning Organization,
A Case Study of Task Force 714 in Iraq (Tampa, FL: JSOU Press, July 2016).
10. Paul S. Lieber, Rethinking Special Operations Leadership: Process, Persuasion,
Pre-existing, and Personality (Tampa, FL: JSOU Press, 2016).
11. Richard W. Rubright, A Unified Theory for Special Operations (Tampa, FL: JSOU
Press, 2017).
12. Tom Searle, Outside the Box: A New General Theory of Special Operations (Tampa,
FL: JSOU Press, 2017).
9
Cleveland: Symposium Remarks
I have purposely tried to kind of stay away from all things Special Opera-
tions Forces (SOF) for certainly this first year. I don’t know whether that
is a good thing or a bad thing, but what it has allowed me to do with a little
bit of over a year in retirement is put 400 steaming hours on my boat. And
for those who don’t know, about a year before I retired I bought a boat, and
have been, when I can, living life at seven knots and at anchor or holed up
at a marina some place, and frankly, that gives you time to think and reflect
on, what for me was, 37 years in the Army, add to that four years at the
Academy, and so that’s over 40 years, and of that 36 years of them basically
were in special forces.
The one firm conclusion that I have drawn upon reflection, is that I could
not have picked a finer way to serve the country, and I enjoyed every minute
of it; well, maybe not every minute of it, a good portion of it, and certainly
there was nothing, I think, that could have been more professionally satisfy-
ing. My goal is to put three times that amount on the boat this year. So you
kind of know where my mind is on this stuff, and just to put it in perspective,
there is life beyond the walls, the compound, and the uniform, but what you
do is incredibly important.
Reflection has showed me that you really don’t necessarily notice it when
you are in the middle of it, but looking back on it and looking from out-
side in, I cannot tell you how much the country depends on you. And so
11
JSOU Report 17 -6
it is incumbent on you to think about the business that you are in, and do
some deep thinking about this profession. That’s why I applaud Brian Maher
[President] at the Joint Special Operations University, and the United States
Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). You won’t hear me say that
very much. I do not applaud USSOCOM for many things, but I do applaud
them for beginning this, and having this symposium, because they need a
presence where thinking is most vigorous, and where questioning of the
precepts and the assumptions that form the basis of who we are takes place.
You have the correct brain power assembled here to make a significant
dent in the question of whether or not you need a SOF theory or a theory
of special operations; I think that’s better put. You know, as [JSOU Senior
Fellow] Jim Powers pointed out, I mean it was a descriptor really in the
original concept and we think holistically about it. You have civilian special
operations assets in the country as well, and you have conventional forces
that do things that look very special operations-like or can be. So, the lines
are blurry and we need to ensure that whatever we come up with explains
and basically doesn’t necessarily draw the hard lines but accommodates the
flow between civilian and military, and conventional and special operations.
Those are realities of the world we live in and whatever you come up with
have to, I think, accommodate that reality.
You are going to get a chance to not only talk about the problem, but I
hope actually lay out some markers about what solutions might SOF theory
consist of and it’s not uniquely special operations theory, which again you
can come down on that side as well, and there are probably some School
of Advanced Military Studies purists out there that would say: “Hey! The
theory is already written. It came down from the mountain somewhere in
Germany, and now someone has codified it.” But I hope it’s not just SOF
theory. I hope we can at least agree on the idea that what constitutes today’s
current operating theory is proving inadequate because it appears to me that
it’s failing the nation.
At the end of the day, success is what this is all about and not losing, win-
ning, although sometimes you campaign to not lose, which is different than
a campaign to win. You have to understand the nuances. At the end of the
day, you know, [former deputy commander of U.S. Army Special Operations
Command] Dick Potter once said, “Hey, Charlie!” This was when he retired.
Jim Powers and I were just talking about Potter. He lives within proximity of
Potter, which means he is his de facto aide de camp, I guess. If you worked
12
Cleveland: Symposium Remarks
for Dick Potter once, you worked for him always, right? But, he used to tell
me: “Hey, make sure you are successful because a successful Army pays pen-
sions.” So I now have a stake in your success. I realize that. Okay. So I look
forward to helping and providing a little bit of a perspective.
Now I have to admit, I struggle with the word ‘theory’ in what we are
trying to do. I am not sure, and this is probably more a failing on my part,
which I probably shouldn’t admit so freely, but I am not sure what the theory
for conventional operations is; I mean whether we can pin it down. So, is
theory the right word? I don’t know. Maybe it is. Maybe Clausewitz more.
Maybe we’re Sun Tzu updated. You know, I don’t know. I will let you figure
that out. Again, we have got the brain power here to do that.
The two Joint Special Operations University theory monographs were
very helpful, and I encourage you to read those, but I think both encoun-
ter the problem that confounds most attempts at trying to generalize or
provide overarching tenets and principles to special operations, namely to
encompass, in my view, both the indigenous centric war fighting capability
in foreign internal defense and unconventional warfare (UW), and the other
part of the community using [Naval Postgraduate School, Dr.] Rothstein’s
term, “a hyper-conventional raiding capability.” Well, they are in many,
many, many ways different.
They are different by design, by structure, by selection, and so part of the
question is how fungible are SOF? And your theory needs to answer that
question or help answer that question, or provide the framework to answer
that question. Because right now, it really is up to the individual commander
or those planning staff officers. A Navy SEAL team looks like an Operational
Detachment Alpha, looks like a United States Marine Corps Forces Special
Operations Command team, looks like a Ranger squad, or a Ranger platoon.
At some point, we have to recognize that there is a limit to fungibility.
And one thing about Rothstein who coined the term, I think, appropri-
ately, you know. He is a retired special forces guy who I first met I think in
El Salvador, San Miguel, when he was an advisor there. I see Rothstein on
the docket here, but you really need to know that this is a very experienced
SOF operator, as well as being a very, in my view, one of the premier think-
ers in the business.
So it is either that, you know, the squaring of those two problems, and
it becomes so general if you try to provide one of these tenets, one of these
principles of theory to encompass both things, that it either becomes so
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JSOU Report 17 -6
general as to be SOF truth-like, right? So, humans are more important than
hardware, which is a great bumper sticker. It is true, but it doesn’t neces-
sarily help you plan the campaign. Right? And it hasn’t, frankly, proven to
be all that beneficial here locally when you try to fight for resources. Right?
Or it’s wrong. All SOF are culturally savvy warrior diplomats, and we know
that’s not true.
And everyone knows in the business, as Jim pointed out, that the special
forces missions aren’t much help either, direct action, special or strategic
reconnaissance, essentially tactical missions, and not necessarily SOF alone.
They often receive equal or better billing than UW—which is as much as the
name implies; a form of warfare, distinct formal war, and frankly one that
has been much derided over the course of my career often within the special
forces community itself, as well as the special operations community at large,
but being effectively put into practice today by the Russians, the Iranians,
and Maxwell will tell you, even the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. If we miss
the kind of war we are fighting, we risk failure.
And of course, we still haven’t decided if civil affairs are truly special
operations. Right? And the mission or discipline, which shall not be named,
operating under the cover of Japanese soup, suffers from not being lethal,
therefore not sexy, and almost always is some other agency to do, but they
don’t seem to be doing it well, as we are repeatedly being told that in the case
of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. We are losing the influence, informa-
tion—dare I say—psychological war. So, the missions aren’t helpful either;
and that they may be in law just means its bad law. What might be a more
appropriate question is whether or not there isn’t, perhaps, an American
way of war using Russell Wiley’s term from his book, the SOF edition, or
an American way of irregular warfare.
When I was at the United States Army Special Operations Command
(USASOC), the approach we took was to lay claim to a part of the operational
spectrum, but then we also went after the very fundamental thing of Army
operational design, and again, that caused a little bit of a tremor in the foun-
dations out at Leavenworth, but I think we were largely successful because
what I learned was and what I would tell you is that when you are right, you
are right, and they can’t refute the logic. We oftentimes don’t engage in the
conversation because we are afraid of the reaction, perhaps, from an orga-
nization or an institution that we might have to be beholden to in some way,
in this case, the U.S. Army. Sometimes you have to take on the orthodoxy.
14
Cleveland: Symposium Remarks
And I think we came up with some SOF operational design tenets. I think
13 went to 11 that I think might have been helpful. Maybe that’s part of the
solution. Again, I will leave it to you here to really start working your way
through, but regardless, either theory, way of war, or operational design,
whatever you want to call it, some fundamentals about what constitutes
special operations as Jim mentioned and articulated earlier. What bounds
it is necessary today, and it is necessary today more than ever.
The rise of SOF from being a footnote to the main effort means that we
have responsibilities to more fully develop our operational art so it can be
burnished, improved, taught widely, practiced, then critiqued, and changed.
In fact, you kind of have to ask yourself: We have a joint special operations
university here, but what the heck are we teaching? All things should stem
from the fundamental contribution that SOF makes to the nation, so we
have to start writing sheet music and quit playing by ear, right? As much as
we love playing by ear, right? It is all jazz. I can remember when I was down
on the team: “We don’t need no stinking operations plan.” Now things have
changed a lot.
It still needs to be our jazz, but we have to recognize that we have lot
more players in the orchestra now, and we have to lead that orchestra. That
means that we have to educate men and women in the business on the broad-
est tenets of what constitutes special operations. You know, our network to
defeat a network mantra, or if you look at the collection of agencies that it
takes in order to conduct our form of UW that former deputy commander
of USSOCOM, Lieutenant General John Mulholland (U.S. Army, Retired)
practiced with the Northern Alliance; a huge number of agencies come to
that dance.
All of those players need to be able to read their part of the sheet music.
Well, somebody has got to write it. So such a theory can help lay out spe-
cial operations options also and better calibrate expectations on the part of
policymakers. We can’t lose the character of who we are in the process of
supersizing up, but we can’t avoid doing so. We owe it to the nation, and we
owe it to those coming up through the ranks behind us.
I fear that we lose our character. I mean I don’t want to become too con-
ventional. We have to hold on to what makes us who we are, and I am afraid
we already attempt, in somewhat of an attempt because of these wars, to
put so many forces on the battlefield doing very similar sorts of things that
we, perhaps, unintentionally homogenize SOF almost too much. Now, I am
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JSOU Report 17 -6
going to fight the urge to say that it’s about time that we got around to this
task or to ask, “Hey! Where have you been for 30 years?” I mean because
really looking back on it that is half the time that it took the Army, which
waited 60 years (from 1952-2012) to require our SOF to put in the cannon
and Army doctrine SOF document. So, I mean you are twice as good as the
Army. Right?
The opportunity was afforded because men like Lieutenant General
Bennet Sacolick (U.S. Army, Retired), then commander of the U.S. Army
John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School and then Chief of Staff
of the Army, and General Ray Odierno (U.S. Army, Retired)—a very expe-
rienced field commander—gave us that opportunity. While doctrine is not
theory, in order to develop what became U.S. special forces doctrine or our
Army version of it, we made some assumptions on what might constitute a
start toward special operations theory. We started with the battlefield effects
and the objectives of special operation units, our task to achieve, and prin-
ciple methods used to achieve these effects.
We took the step further and said, “What is missing from the inventory
of things that we have in our kit bag that we need to create to do better those
things which is too often what we fail to do.” Too often the starting point
is what is extant versus what is needed. It is applying what you have today
versus figuring out what is needed for today and tomorrow, and whatever
that discussion should hinge on, it should be beyond the foundational theory
that supports what special operations provide the nation.
But simply, we have two main efforts, and two main effects rather, that
we had to achieve. And one was to achieve U.S. and partner nation objec-
tives primarily through the use of indigenous forces, or indigenous mass if
you will, or to conduct unilateral raids to achieve specific U.S. objectives.
We gave them names. They weren’t very popular, but that was a great thing
about being a three-star in charge of the Army segment of the business with
a chief of staff that was supportive.
We wrote them into doctrine as special warfare to describe that collec-
tion of activities from foreign internal defense to UW and surgical strikes
to talk about this very, very hyper-conventional, high-end capability to con-
duct raids, not to say that they are always just unilateral. There are variants
of everything between those two, if you will, goal posts. So while they are
controversial in my view, they better delineated the results we needed.
16
Cleveland: Symposium Remarks
Now, for the surgical strike piece, the latter of the two, Admiral McRa-
ven's work (Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and
Practice) at Naval Postgraduate School, I think, is some of the best thinking
out there in terms of the tactical level outlining how speed and surprise can
locally offset mass and fires. Admiral McRaven’s operative theory constitutes
today’s special operations, but its principles apply not only to SOF. If you
think about it, those principles apply to any raiding force.
Those operations also are well understood by conventional commanders.
Because in fact, it is very much related to what they do for a living, which is a
challenge for SOF theory investigators. Now, how blurry is the line between
SOF and the conventional raiding capabilities? For the former, of the indig-
enous centric war fighting capability though, there is no clear U.S.-authored
theory on supporting the indigenous war fighting.
There are, of course, great works, some of them written by panelists that
you are going to have on insurgency, counterinsurgency, resistance, and revo-
lution. The concepts and doctrines on the development, manipulation, and
employment of indigenous mass, fires, etc. or indigenous special operations
with the use of resistance groups is, in my view, pretty thin, and certainly
very thin inside of the Department of Defense (DOD).
As a result, views on how the U.S. and third parties can approach the use
of indigenous groups to achieve our objectives, their objectives—it is hard
for us to recognize and reconcile the idea that it may not be our campaign,
but one we are advising or helping. It’s difficult. That’s foreign. How you do
that is different than being the guy in charge. It takes a different set of skills.
We need to recognize those differences.
So, I commend everybody on the USASOC Assessing Revolutionary and
Insurgent Strategies project because I know [Retired Colonel] Dave Maxwell
will. I think it is really a great ongoing effort to look at resistance, rebel-
lion, and insurgency. The question is what you do about it and how you do
it and that’s up to the practitioners and the leaders in the business. They
need to help you, the academics, but it’s your responsibility. The lack of a
well-articulated theory for this side of SOF hasn’t prevented us though from
trying. I mean, witness the number of missions we have been under building
partner nation capacity. Conventional and SOF units doing that, or training
and equip programs—the latter being especially concerning in that some
leaders are promoting training and education as a viable option—for instance
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JSOU Report 17 -6
base that education on? And that’s what I think this theory or this foun-
dational underpinning of a holistic SOF, this idea between the indigenous
centric war fighting and the hyper-conventional raid, bringing those two
halves together at the campaign level to say this is what a SOF campaign
looks like, and then educating leaders as they move up the chain to be able
to command those campaigns, which are very complex.
Now, if you think about UW, it’s the orchestration of subversive efforts,
of sabotage, of confidence targets, knowing when to increase the tempo of
certain operations, knowing when to pull back, having the discipline to
wait when forces in the field aren’t ready. It takes somebody that frankly
understands all that to orchestrate it properly. The second challenge will be
not to confuse, as I said before, current structures or units as capabilities
that are required.
The second challenge, a unified theory of special operations, will be dif-
ficult. It is not unlike finding Einstein’s unified field theory in physics, right?
Anybody know what that is? There’s got to be a few closet physicists out there.
This idea of squaring gravity and electromagnetism, but they haven’t done it
yet. So this idea of actually building something that encompasses both parts
of what SOF consists of, it’s going to be hard. I hope easier than the unified
field theory is, but it will be a challenge.
The third challenge will be to organize yourself to conduct the inquiry
over the long haul, to be able to resist the challenge, overcome the challenge.
Now, witness the resistance to the gray zone, or earlier, the SOF International
Security Assistance Force Joint Command (IJC) business. Right? Now, I
am not saying that they don’t all deserve to be resistant. There needs to be
a robust debate about it, but when you promulgate this theory, or whatever
you are going to come up with, it is going to be controversial. It will draw
fire because in the Washington, D.C., area, it will be seen as another SOF
end run. And you have to have leaders that are prepared to defend it. They’ll
have to know what it is, and you’ll have to be able to explain it to them. It
will have to stand on its own, you know, the global SOF network. The SOF
IJC made all the sense in the world, but why was it immediately attacked?
The fourth challenge will be reconciling the tactical, operational, and
strategic; the theory needs to account for all three. It is obvious that cer-
tain tactical events, Bin Laden’s raid for example, had a strategic effect, but
what is most absent in my mind in special operations’ approach, are special
20
Cleveland: Symposium Remarks
and we were arrogant enough to say, “Hey, we are going to give you the 100
best of our guys and just put them on top of the corps.” And, of course, with
the Army, it was like, “Oh!” So our approach was, I think, poor, and frankly,
I think we missed an opportunity.
Second observation is that outsiders sometimes see us best. You have
assembled a great group of people here to take on these questions. Use them.
Start at the fundamentals and fight through the temptation to retrofit the
theory to today’s reality. We can do better for the nation. Keep an active and
ongoing dialogue with academics, thinkers, technologists, your components;
task the components to be part of the discussion, to be active in it.
It should be vigorous. It should be ongoing and continuous. Each sym-
posium should punctuate the ongoing discussions, not be the place in which
you come to actually grapple with and capture the best you can and then
head off to the next course. I am not saying that just about special mission
units. I am saying that about the business that is SOF. So, use these academ-
ics, thinkers, technologists, your components, and joint force commanders
who see us in the field. And remember that they are doing so using us in the
field absent of a whole lot of formal education or training on what special
operations really does in the broadest sense.
My third observation is that we in SOF are reluctant to lay claim to pri-
macy in any portion of the confidence spectrum … I saw this with the push-
back on the human domain. No one could argue the points on the concept,
but resistance became overwhelming when realization set in that it would
require a change in the status quo. Somebody was going to be perceived as a
loser. The Marine Corps caught on very early and basically gave it the Heis-
man, but it gave SOF its domain, and while nobody owns the domain, the
one in which SOF operates principally is, in my view, the human domain.
And, again, the community has to grapple with the idea, either take it on
or not take it on, but again, your place, its place, SOF place, it’s rise to promise
has a reason, and that reason is tied to the changes on the battlefield. And
the changes on the battlefield appear to me, again, this DOD school educated
guy, is basically the reemergence of this new space that we are having to fight
in. And our tools that we used to fight in that space before had become less
relevant. You can’t pick up everybody from a certain population, move them
into a containment area, and declare everything outside of that containment
area a free-fire zone. That is not acceptable to this nation anymore. So, this
nation needs different tools.
22
Cleveland: Symposium Remarks
You represent those tools. That’s the rationale behind your rise to promi-
nence, selective targeting and using indigenous forces to solve their own
problems. So it is SOF’ domain in my view, again, maybe that’s not the right
view, but take on and figure out where your place is. Again, in my view, we
had primacy there because we were the maneuver force of choice in that
space.
My two cautions relate to the fact that SOF have to do a better job bring-
ing this community together. Firstly, we are still living, in my view, with the
sins of our fathers, you know, as early as Delta versus Blue Light, that kind of
stuff. At some point, special operation officers and noncommissioned officers
must undergo, again, this indoctrination educational process that teaches
them to be practitioners and leaders in the entirety of special operations.
The problem being evident, as I indicated, is at the TSOC level where
commanders have no experience with supporting indigenous war fighting
or special warfare, to use the Army term basically, are for the first time given
those commands. That’s not fair to them. It’s not fair to the staff, and frankly
it could be, in my view, very damaging not for any purposeful reason. We
just need to have an education process that at some point, I mean that’s with
the conventional unit, that’s what the Army, the Navy, and the other Services
do. That’s with special mission units.
My second caution is the pendulum will inevitably swing away from SOF.
We have been hearing whispers now for quite a while about the chatter of
SOF or USSOCOM fatigue. That SOF has not suffered the same fate that
it did after Vietnam or even post-Desert Storm when I had a reduction in
force in my own group when I was at United States Army Forces Command.
I called my buddies saying, “Hey! Man, I am looking at your file, you need
to consider getting out.” We took a one-third cut just like everybody else.
The fact that we are not going through that is based on basically the
battlefield out there and a mature USSOCOM helping them defend the equi-
ties and the interest, but this never-ending war is going to come to some kind
of conclusion at some point, and you can bet that the pendulum is going
to swing back the other way. This foundational theory, this understanding
of what the nation needs from the operations community articulated in
theory is to help you get through those kinds of times of change when the
pendulum swings back.
And you have got a tremendous number of laboratories ongoing right
now around the world. You can test your ideas on theory against those
23
JSOU Report 17 -6
laboratories or whatever you want to call it. Use that experience that is going
on daily out there.
Lastly, the promise. Even though this is hard, it is an incredibly important
endeavor. The promise is that if you do this right, if you set the conditions,
you have basically the promise of solving a whole host of chronic problems
that I have lived with my entire time in this
The promise is that if you business. The problem of SOF and conven-
do this right, if you set tional. You know, it’s going on again.
the conditions, you have FORSCOM wants to take command of all
basically the promise of the SOF that come into theater. It has no staff
solving a whole host of officers or understanding of how to use that
chronic problems that I capacity when it’s given to them, and in fact,
have lived with my entire may not have the dominance of force on the
time in this business. field, but still wants a stake in it. So, a good
foundation, again, deep thinking, an articula-
tion put down in writing of a theory, of an American way of irregular warfare
has a promise of solving a lot of these problems. The nation needs world class
capabilities in both. I applaud the effort and I hope that you are successful.
So, what are special operations? How blurry should the lines between
special operations and conventional operations, or military and civilian
special operations be? What constitutes a SOF campaign? Is there such a
thing? How does special operations differ? What are the characteristics of
these differences? National theater, direct/indirect, what is the proper way
to capture and bin special operations?
Is the assumption that special operations missions are so closely related
that specialization isn’t required as much as it used to be, stratifying then
instead vertically based on proficiency as opposed to by function? I obviously
have a decided opinion on that, and certainly you could come down on a
different side of that question. A sound and agreed upon SOF theory should
set the predicate to help answer this host of questions. It’s hard, but it needs
to be done. I wish you the best of luck, and remember, you damn well need
to be successful because successful SOF pay pensions too.
24
Baratto: A Symbiotic Relationship
F or some time now, there has been ongoing controversy about the value
and purpose of a special operations theory. It has been argued to be of
questionable value, at best, since there are sufficient theories that address
warfare as a strategic phenomenon with special operations and Special Oper-
ations Forces (SOF) as lesser-included cases that do not warrant their own
“special theory.” Dr. James Kiras [Air University], in an article presented at
a Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) 2016 special operations theory
symposium, offered a number of reasons why a unified, or synoptic special
operations theory is not needed and goes even further to opine that doing so
might even be dangerous.1 He proposed that special operations theory might
be confused with, or mistaken for special operations doctrine.2 This chap-
ter contributes to the dialectic
by presenting an opposing view The chapter attempts to demonstrate
that failure to continue pursuit that the relationship between theory
of special operations theory and doctrine is interdependent and
would be negligent on the part symbiotic in nature whereby both
of U.S. Special Operations Com- benefit from the relationship.
mand (USSOCOM), the special
operations community, and JSOU in particular. The chapter attempts to dem-
onstrate that the relationship between theory and doctrine is interdependent
Major General David J. Baratto (U.S. Army, Retired) graduated from the
United States Military Academy in 1964 and was commissioned in the infan-
try. He served as Commanding General of Southern European Task Force,
finished his military career in the Central Intelligence Agency as director of
military affairs with 32 years of service (predominantly in special operations),
and retired in December 1995. He completed his public service with 10-plus
years as a research analyst for the Institute of Defense Analyses specializing
in interagency operations, personnel recovery, and special operations.
25
JSOU Report 17 -6
and symbiotic in nature whereby both benefit from the relationship. Theory
can be used to enhance inquiry, investigation, and understanding of special
operations. Tested and refined through continued observation and exper-
imentation, it can assist in the development and enhancement of special
operations doctrine.
About Doctrine
Cultural Differences
Perhaps the ambiguity and paradox of the definition itself is a partial expla-
nation why different services place different values on doctrine. Once, in an
orientation briefing to the author, given by a spokesperson of a prominent
three-letter agency, the briefer referred to doctrine as the “D” word. It was
followed with an admonition that it should not be used internal to the orga-
nization for fear that it might conjure up a need to codify practices. Recent
senior level retirees at the JSOU theory symposium in 2016 also expressed
26
Baratto: A Symbiotic Relationship
variations of the same view. Some services take doctrine seriously, others
merely entertain doctrine as a necessary bureaucratic evil. At the joint level,
it is embedded into the force structure analysis process through the doctrine,
organization, training, material, leadership and education, personnel, facili-
ties, and policy5 model. The reality is that the joint force in 2020 is about 80
percent established today or already programmed. Hence, the only way to
make significant and adaptive changes to our force structure is one of two
ways: 1) by making changes in the other 20 percent, or 2) by making changes
in the nonmaterial domains of doctrine, organization, training, material,
leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy—namely doctrine,
training, leadership, and policy. It is no coincidence that doctrine writ large
is considered the engine of change, since doctrine is the driving requirement
for what is to be done.
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JSOU Report 17 -6
About Theory
Definitions of Theory
Numerous definitions of theory exist depending on the context and the
nature of the discipline under discussion. Without diving too far into the
technical or esoteric, and more than adequate for the purposes of this chap-
ter, the Oxford definition will suffice: “A supposition or a system of ideas
intended to explain something, especially one based on general principles
independent of the thing to be explained.”11 One can trace the etymology of
the term and take delight in contemplating and debating an interesting vari-
ety of peculiar and arcane definitions, but such a venture would only serve
to entertain the reader, not necessarily illuminate a better understanding of
theory as it applies herein. What follows are rather generic descriptions and
examples of theory and how theory may be used by the layman to enhance
inquiry, investigation, and understanding of a particular phenomenon.
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Baratto: A Symbiotic Relationship
Scientific Theory
The University of California, Berkley, defines a theory as “a broad, natural
explanation for a wide range of phenomena. Theories are concise, coherent,
systematic, predictive, and broadly applicable, often integrating and general-
izing many hypotheses.”13
Any scientific theory must be based on a careful and rational examina-
tion of the facts. Facts and theories are two different things. In the scientific
method, there is a clear distinction between facts that can be observed and/
or measured, and theories—scientists’ explanations and interpretations of
the facts. Theories are the result of a tested hypothesis. While hypotheses
are ideas, theories explain the findings of the testing of those ideas. Theories
can be improved or modified as more information is gathered so that the
accuracy of the prediction becomes greater over time.14
Social Theory
Broadly speaking, social theories are analytical frameworks or paradigms
used to examine social phenomena. Social theory encompasses ideas about
how societies change and develop, about methods of explaining social behav-
ior, about power and social structure, gender and ethnicity, modernity and
civilization, religion, morality, and numerous other concepts. According to
Harrington, a noted modern sociologist, social theorists do not view sociol-
ogy, or the ‘human sciences,’ as a science per se in that they see definite limits
to the extent that scientific method can be applied. Social theories cannot
be subsumed under general principles of regular cause and effect relation-
ships the way physical elements are classified by natural scientists, through
repeatable experiments.15
Social theory transcends the observable and repeatable, but remains
essential to greater understanding. Human sciences “study meanings, values,
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JSOU Report 17 -6
Military Theory
Military theories, especially since the influence of Clausewitz in the nine-
teenth century, attempt to encapsulate the complex cultural, political and
economic relationships between societies and the conflicts they create.19
30
Baratto: A Symbiotic Relationship
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JSOU Report 17 -6
Similarities
Both attempt to describe the “how” of a particular event or activity, and
both identify underlying principles governing the activity. Although both
mandate empirical testing for accuracy and truth, doctrine assumes a higher
32
Baratto: A Symbiotic Relationship
standard of rigorous testing. In that sense, theory benefits from its sym-
biotic relationship to doctrine. Both can be descriptive, anticipatory, and
prescriptive.
Differences
The doctrinal process is lengthy and bureaucratic.26 Typically it takes about
two to five years to get a substantial change published. In addition, the coor-
dination process is often convoluted resulting in a “watering down” of the
originally intended message. Controversial thoughts are sure to bog the
process down even further, resulting in delays and the probability that the
thought will be stricken entirely. Doctrine requires a fair amount of institu-
tional capital not only as a result of its several year developmental process,
but also as a result of its interface with and required attachment to other
main line processes.27 Military doctrine evolves primarily from practice; it
codifies best practices and goes beyond being prescriptive by purporting to
be authoritative.
Theory, on the other hand, can be easily created and just as easily dis-
carded, or simply ignored. Contributors to theory can come from all walks
of life and disciplines adding depth and breadth to discussions and impor-
tant dialectic processes that are considered to be essential to the develop-
ment of sound theory. Several theories might exist for any given activity
or organization, but doctrine is expected to codify ‘best practices’ in more
restrictive pragmatic fields. Accordingly, not all practices and certainly not
all innovative ideas are presented. Controversial ideas are not likely to make
it to final doctrinal publication. Doctrine is rooted in military knowledge
and developed primarily by military doctrine writers in a collegial setting
of shared views thus bounding out, at least to a certain extent, widely diver-
gent views and free thought. In this setting, collaboration and compromise
reign supreme—not dialectics that might illuminate ambiguities extant in
the real world.
Complementary Aspects
Perhaps the best example of how theory and doctrine can complement each
other is to peruse chapter I of Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed
Forces of the United States, 25 March 2013. In a recent revision, an entire
Section A on theory was added to the beginning of chapter I. The chapter
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JSOU Report 17 -6
34
Baratto: A Symbiotic Relationship
35
JSOU Report 17 -6
of fields to co-create a context for theory and test it. JSOU provides an ideal
crucible for the distillation of ideas into theory. From there, given the appro-
priate scrutiny, a handoff to the doctrine writers could be relatively seamless
and efficient.
36
Baratto: A Symbiotic Relationship
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JSOU Report 17 -6
Endnotes
1. James D. Kiras, “A Theory of Special Operations: “These Ideas Are Dangerous,”
Special Operations Journal 1, no. 2 (2015): 75–88.
2. For the sake of brevity, the term “doctrine” in this chapter will be referring to
military doctrine, not the many other applications where the term doctrine could
be applied, as well.
3. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated
Terms (Washington, D.C.: Joint Staff, March 2017), 125.
4. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CJCSM 5120.01A, Joint Doctrine Develop-
ment Process (Washington, D.C., Joint Staff, 29 December 2014), B-12. Figure
1 portrays 11 milestones over a period of 17.5 months as the Notional Joint
Doctrine Development and Revision Timeline. Keep in mind that notional and
actual typically will vary significantly.
5. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CJCSI 3170.01I, Joint Capabilities Integra-
tion and Development System (JCIDS) (Washington, D.C., Joint Staff, 23 January
2015). In the Joint Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS), recent
issuances expand this by adding a second P, which refers to “policy.”
6. Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Concepts Division, Capstone Concept for Joint Opera-
tions: Joint Force 2020 (Washington, D.C., Joint Staff, 10 September 2012).
7. Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Concepts Division, Joint Operating Environment 2035:
The Joint Force in a Contested and Disorderly World (Washington, D.C., Joint
Staff, 14 July 2016).
8. Deployable Training Division, Joint Staff J7, Insights and Best Practices Focus
Paper: Design and Planning, 1st ed. (Suffolk, VA: Joint Staff J7, July 2013).
9. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation
Planning (Washington, D.C., Joint Staff, 11 August 2011), III-1–III-46.
10. Joint Staff J-7, Joint and Coalition Warfighting, Planner’s Handbook for Opera-
tional Design (Suffolk, VA: Joint Staff J7), 7 October 2011, I-3.
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Baratto: A Symbiotic Relationship
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JSOU Report 17 -6
40
Spulak: Epistemology, Paradigms, and the Future
Dr. Robert Spulak Jr. is a JSOU Senior Fellow and the principal point of con-
tact for special operations at Sandia National Laboratories. For more than 20
years, he has invested significant time with special operations components
and spent five weeks with a special operations task force in Afghanistan.
41
JSOU Report 17 -6
theories are offered that can be explored to see if they have the power to
explain.
The second section of this chapter, “Paradigms,” discusses the charac-
teristics of research as a community endeavor. In a scientific community, a
wide variety of theories get sorted by those that work the best. This collec-
tion of theories (and other accepted methods of practice) has been labeled a
‘paradigm.’ All observations are interpreted by some kind of theory, even if
it is our own personal theory of how the world functions. Paradigms arise
for a community to reconcile varying points of view and develop a common
understanding.
The final section of this chapter, “The Future of Special Operations
Theory,” discusses the emerging community of practitioners of special opera-
tions theory. We are in the pre-paradigm stage of this discussion, where
no personal theory is allowed to dominate observations or how they are
interpreted. As the community develops, we will likely see the emergence
of a paradigm that guides what questions are important, how we approach
answering those questions, and whether the answers make sense. Some tenta-
tive observations about the future are presented in this section, including the
need for scholarship (e.g., explicitness in presenting a theory) and the likely
primacy of the interpretive approach. Possible progress toward a paradigm is
illustrated by examples of how published special operations theories indeed
used explicitness and the explanatory-interpretive approach. There is an
emerging discipline of special operations theory and it is unlikely there will
be one theory of special operations, rather multiple theories about special
operations within a future paradigm.
With this introduction as your guide we will begin with epistemology,
the study of how we actually know something, so we can understand the
creation of special operations theories.
Epistemology
We want to know about special operations. How do we know something?
Philosophers and scientists have been debating this topic for thousands of
years starting with the Greeks (or before).1 Epistemology is the study of how
to know things, and in epistemology the Traditional Analysis of Knowledge
says that knowledge is justified true belief.2 Justification means that you
have enough information to be highly reasonable in believing something,
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Spulak: Epistemology, Paradigms, and the Future
whether it is true or not. True means that it corresponds to the facts. Finally,
the justification itself must not depend upon one or more falsehoods. The
fun and philosophy begin when we debate whether a justification is highly
reasonable or whether a belief corresponds to the facts.
The Standard View of knowledge states that “People have a great deal
of knowledge of the world around them, including some knowledge of the
past, their current surroundings, the future, morality, mathematics, and so
on,” and “some of our main sources of knowledge are perception, memory,
introspection, testimony, and rational insight.”3 So, epistemology is about
how people ‘know’ things, not about the things themselves.4 (And we know
a lot about special operations based on observation, direct experience of
operations, testimony including, e.g., after-action reports, etc.)
But knowing a collection of specific things is not enough. For example,
we want to inform decisions that leaders might make in providing the right
resources for the future and in planning and executing operations. We want
to know how the specific things we know about special operations can be
extended or organized to be used for those purposes. We want to have a
‘justified true belief’ about special operations in situations where we have
not yet had experience, or observations, or reports. Put another way, we want
to inform our expectations.
We call this knowledge that informs our expectations ‘theory.’ Many
people are most familiar with theory in a physical or natural scientific con-
text. Scientific theory has been very successful in producing practical results
extrapolated to new situations. For example, quantum mechanics led to solid
state physics that led to semiconductors that led to high definition televi-
sion. Yet, how do we develop a justified true belief in a scientific theory? Can
that process help us understand how to inform expectations about special
operations?
Nobel Laureate Richard Feynman succinctly explained testing a scientific
theory: “If it disagrees with experiment it’s wrong. In that simple sentence is
the key to science. It doesn’t make any difference how beautiful your guess
is, it doesn’t make any difference how smart you are, who made the guess,
or what his name is, if it disagrees with experiment it is wrong. That’s all
there is to it.”5
Karl Popper makes the point in more detail (but not necessarily better)
using the language of philosophy:
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JSOU Report 17 -6
From a new idea, put up tentatively, and not yet justified in any
way—an anticipation, a hypothesis, a theoretical system, or what
you will – conclusions are drawn by logical deduction. We may if
we like distinguish four different lines along which the testing of a
theory could be carried out. First there is the logical comparison of
the conclusions among themselves, by which the internal consistency
of the system is tested. Second, there is the investigation of the logical
form of the theory, with the object of determining whether it has
the character of empirical or scientific theory, or whether it is, for
example, tautological. Thirdly there is the comparison with other
theories, chiefly with the aim of determining whether the theory
would constitute a scientific advance should it survive our tests.
And finally, there is the testing of the theory by way of empirical
application of the conclusions that can be derived from it.6
This seems easy enough. The goal is to simplify the situation to the point
where we can solve it mathematically and make an accurate measurement
while eliminating or minimizing all the complications (errors) of the real
world. The power of this approach is illustrated by quantum electrodynam-
ics, which predicts the magnetic moment of the electron to 11 decimal places.
Experiments agree with the theory until the last decimal place.7 That’s the
same accuracy as knowing the distance from Los Angeles to New York to
within the thickness of a human hair. But if a valid measurement disagreed
with quantum electrodynamics we would have to reexamine the theory.
In addition, physics is reductionist. We assume that we can take the prob-
lem apart into simple pieces that we can actually solve, solve those pieces
exactly, and then put the answers together to get the bigger solution. So,
for example, when calculating the trajectory of a sniper’s bullet, we have to
account for range, muzzle velocity, ballistic performance of the bullet, spin
drift, shooting angle, the rotation of the Earth, altitude, humidity, tempera-
ture, atmospheric pressure, and wind. In practice, the ballistic calculator
you may have as an app on your iPhone can calculate each of these effects
(predictions of theories) separately, then add up the answers. We can then
measure the impact point to make sure we did it right.
But Special Operations Forces (SOF) are not electrons or bullets. We don’t
have a predictive theory of human behavior that we can test. For example,
suppose you want to know how dedicated a terrorist is to their cause so
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Spulak: Epistemology, Paradigms, and the Future
you can predict whether they would actually pull the trigger. You can’t see
dedication inside the terrorist. The only thing you can observe is how they
behave. A given level of dedication may result in different behaviors in dif-
ferent people. Some dedicated terrorists may be very vocal in supporting the
cause while others silently await their opportunity to strike. And a given
behavior may have more than one explanation. The vocal terrorist may be
overcompensating for their lack of dedication while the silent one may be
internalizing their doubts. What is seen and is interpreted depends, to a
very large degree, on what you are looking for and what you are willing to
accept as evidence.
The philosophical basis for experimentally-based testing of theories that
works so well for physics is known as positivism. Positivism asserts that
knowledge is derived from what we perceive. “The central position of posi-
tivism as a philosophy of knowledge is that experience is the foundation of
knowledge.”8 That is, reasonable justification is based on what we take in
with our senses. But philosophers dispute whether all knowledge is derived
this way. In general, they claim there are four basic sources of knowledge:
“perception, memory, consciousness (sometimes called introspection), and
reason (sometimes called intuition).”9 And, interestingly, it is difficult to
describe how, even in the positivistic (scientific) model, one comes up with
the initial guess at a theory to be tested.10
Special operations theory will be more about people, and what they do
belongs more in the realm of social science than physics. This is true for
theories of special operations describing the activities of people (both kinetic
and non-kinetic) in the larger context of the social activity of conflict, as
well as theories of SOF as groups of people. As described in the terrorist
example above, it is difficult to see, or observe, the things you might want
to measure with people. Some social scientists are positivists because they
look at questions that can be examined this way. Psychologists often research
using prediction, experiments, and falsifiability. Even so, I would claim that
the results are often fuzzier than in physics because you can’t make truly
reproducible experiments. An electron is an electron is an electron that you
can put in an identical apparatus, but even with perfect sampling technique
you can’t replicate the exact same set of people with the exact same histories
and put them in the exact same circumstances.
Other social scientists, especially those such as anthropologists who
study groups of people, are generally not positivists.11 These social scientists
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JSOU Report 17 -6
have pretty much made peace with the idea that theory, to them, doesn’t
mean the same as theory to a physical scientist. They are still interested in
understanding human behavior, but use other approaches. One approach
is the humanist-interpretive approach.12 Human interactions are not just
based on behaviors that can be observed, but on meanings that cannot be
observed, such as in the terrorist example. One has to explore these mean-
ings by examining them in different ways and offering different interpreta-
tions that make sense. Since SOF are a special case of military forces where
the human dimension reigns supreme, it is this approach that can lead to
understanding.
An example of the humanist-interpretive approach is “whether King Lear
is to be pitied or admired as a pathetic leader or as a successful one.”13 This
may not seem to have much relevance to special operations (like assessing
the motivation of a terrorist would, for example) but Paul Lieber published a
2016 Joint Special Operations University occasional paper entitled Rethinking
Special Operations Leadership: Process, Persuasion, Pre-existing, and Person-
ality.14 Leadership is an issue of great interest to special operations. And since
leadership has a meaning that cannot be directly observed, and each specific
behavior that is observed can be interpreted
Carefully examining either positively or negatively for ‘leadership,’
special operations leader- a strictly positivist approach cannot illumi-
ship and producing many nate what we mean by leadership. “Carefully
possible answers leads to examining the question of Lear, however, and
insights about what we producing many possible answers, leads to
mean by leadership for insight about the human condition.”15 Care-
special operations. fully examining special operations leadership
and producing many possible answers leads to
insights about what we mean by leadership for special operations.
According to epistemology, developing knowledge implies a theoretical
component to determine whether a belief is highly reasonable and whether
it corresponds to the facts. As we will soon see below, even descriptive obser-
vations are theory-laden. Everyone has a personal theory or theories of spe-
cial operations. What we are looking for—having noted the limitations of
using a natural science approach—is a social science of special operations. In
addition, science itself (whether natural science or social science) is a com-
munity endeavor. Organizing understanding into a coherent whole instead
46
Spulak: Epistemology, Paradigms, and the Future
Paradigms
The English word ‘paradigm,’ from the Greek word paradeigma, originally
meant an exemplar or a standard model to use as an example—the very best
example of something.16 Thomas Kuhn, in The Structure of Scientific Revolu-
tions,17 used the word paradigm to describe the structure of science itself and
thus changed the meaning of the word forever.
Kuhn claimed to be looking at science from a historical point of view
and discussed paradigms as historical facts. He discovered that what he
called paradigms emerge as people organize themselves into scientific com-
munities. “By choosing it (the term paradigm), I mean to suggest that some
accepted examples of actual scientific practice – examples of which include
law, theory, application, and instrumentation together – provide examples
from which spring particular coherent traditions of scientific research.”18
According to George Ritzer, this new meaning of paradigm “is a funda-
mental image of the subject matter within a science. It serves to define what
should be studied, what questions should be asked, and what rules should be
followed in interpreting the answers obtained. The paradigm is the broadest
unit of consensus within a science and serves to differentiate one scientific
community (or sub-community) from another.”19
Are these kinds of paradigms necessary, or are they merely traditions
or historical artifacts? What if we had no tradition or consensus of what
data to collect? What questions should be asked, or what rules should be
followed in interpreting the answers? One example of such an exercise may
be what is called ‘big data.’ Big data collects vast amounts of information
and tests for correlations or patterns.20 Once a number of correlations are
identified, researchers can try to explain them and perform experiments to
see whether the explanations make sense. Unfortunately, there are usually
a great many correlations, many of them spurious, and far too numerous
to have the time to investigate thoroughly. Unlike looking for your car keys
under the streetlight instead of where you lost them, David Sarewitz in The
New Atlantis said, “ big data is like looking all over the world for your keys
because you can—even if you don’t know what they look like or where you
might have dropped them or whether they actually fit your lock.”21
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JSOU Report 17 -6
But in fact, the data that is chosen to be collected for big data is actually
the result of someone’s theory of what is important, that is, what plausible
explanation they think already exists. For example, scooping up all the tweets
on Twitter for a day means that someone believes that tweets contain useful
information and that a particular day’s worth of tweets is important. All
observations, including the ones in some big database, are what is called
“theory-laden.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy explains it this way:
All observation involves both perception and cognition. That is,
one does not make an observation passively, but rather is actively
engaged in distinguishing the phenomenon being observed from
surrounding sensory data. Therefore, observations are affected
by one’s underlying understanding of the way in which the world
functions, and that understanding may influence what is perceived,
noticed, or deemed worthy of consideration. In this sense, it can be
argued that all observation is theory-laden.22
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Spulak: Epistemology, Paradigms, and the Future
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JSOU Report 17 -6
but combined add to the whole. There is unlikely to be one theory of special
operations. There will be multiple theories about special operations within
a future paradigm.
Endnotes
1. Some more recent famous contributors include Isaac Newton, John Locke, Vol-
taire, Ernst Mach, and Friedrich von Hayek. Also see: H. Russell Bernard, Social
Research Methods (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, Inc., 2013), 2–26.
2. Richard Feldman, Epistemology, Foundations of Philosophy (Upper Saddle River,
NJ: Prentice Hall, 2003), 15–16.
3. Ibid., 170.
4. Ibid. And, since it is philosophy, there are also alternative positions besides the
traditional analysis of knowledge and the standard view.
5. Richard Feynman, “The Scientific Method” (lecture, Cornell University, 1964),
accessed 20 December 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OL6-x0modwY.
6. Karl R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (Mansfield Centre, CT: Martino
Publishing, 2014), 32–33.
7. Richard P. Feynman, QED: The Strange Theory of Light and Matter (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), 7.
8. Bernard, Social Research Methods, 17.
9. Robert Audi, “The Sources of Knowledge,” in The Oxford Handbook of Epistemol-
ogy, Paul K. Moser, ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, Inc., 2002), 72.
10. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, 31.
11. Bernard, Social Research Methods, 17.
12. Ibid., 21.
13. Ibid., 22.
14. Paul S. Lieber, Rethinking Special Operations Leadership: Process, Persuasion,
Pre-existing, and Personality (Tampa, FL: JSOU Press, 2016).
15. Bernard, Social Research Methods, 22.
16. Ian Hacking, introduction to The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, by Thomas
S. Kuhn (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 2012), xix.
17. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, ibid.
18. Ibid., 11.
19. George Ritzer, Sociology: A Multi-paradigm Science (Boston: Allyn & Bacon,
Inc., 1975), 157.
20. “The Big Data Conundrum: How to Define It?” Emerging Technology from the
arXiv, MIT Technology Review, 3 October 2013, accessed 1 February 2017, https://
www.technologyreview.com/s/519851/the-big-data-conundrum-how-to-define-it/.
There is no consensus on the definition of ‘big data.’ One attempt at a definition
52
Spulak: Epistemology, Paradigms, and the Future
in this article is: “Big data is a term describing the storage and analysis of large
and or complex data sets using a series of techniques including, but not limited
to: NoSQL, MapReduce and machine learning.”
21. Daniel Sarewitz, “Saving Science,” The New Atlantis, Spring/Summer 2016, 32,
http://www.thenewatlantis.com/docLib/20160816_TNA49Sarewitz.pdf.
22. James Bogen, “Theory and Observation in Science,” Edward N. Zalta, ed., The Stan-
ford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edition), accessed December 20, 2016,
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/science-theory-observation/.
23. Thomas S. Kuhn, “The Route to Normal Science,” chap. II in The Structure of
Scientific Revolutions (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 2012).
24. Ibid., 48.
25. Ibid., 10–11.
26. Ibid., 24.
27. Ibid., 59. Lord Kelvin famously pronounced Wilhelm Roentgen’s discovery of
x-rays to be a hoax.
28. Hacking, introduction to The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, xxiii.
29. William H. McRaven, Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare:
Theory and Practice (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1995).
30. James D. Kiras, Special Operations and Strategy: From World War II to the War
on Terrorism (New York: Routledge, 2006).
31. Robert G. Spulak Jr., A Theory of Special Operations: The Origin, Qualities, and
Use of SOF (Hurlburt Field, FL: JSOU Press, October 2007), https://jsou.libguides.
com/ld.php?content_id=2876965; Robert G. Spulak Jr., Innovate or Die: Innova-
tion and Technology for Special Operations (Tampa, FL: JSOU Press, December
2010).
32. Jessica Glicken Turnley, Cross-Cultural Competence and Small Groups: Why SOF
are the way SOF are (Tampa, FL: JSOU Press, 2011); Jessica Glicken Turnley,
Retaining a Precarious Value as Special Operations Go Mainstream (Hurlburt
Field, FL: JSOU Press, February 2008).
33. Harry R. Yarger, 21st Century SOF: Toward an American Theory of Special Opera-
tions (Tampa, FL: JSOU Press, April 2013).
34. William Knarr, Jessica Glicken Turnley, Dona J. Stewart, Rich Rubright, and
Jason Quirin, Special Operations Forces Mixed-Gender Elite Teams (Tampa, FL:
JSOU Press, June 2014).
35. Colin S. Gray, Tactical Operations for Strategic Effect: The Challenge of Currency
Conversion (Tampa, FL: JSOU Press, November 2015).
36. Richard Shultz, Military Innovation in War: It Takes a Learning Organization,
A Case Study of Task Force 714 in Iraq (Tampa, FL: JSOU Press, July 2016).
37. Lieber, Rethinking Special Operations Leadership: Process, Persuasion, Pre-existing,
and Personality.
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JSOU Report 17 -6
38. One part of the astrophysics paradigm is that what we observe in the laboratory
we can apply to the stars.
39. Homepage, SORA: Special Operations Research Association, accessed 22 Decem-
ber 2016, http://www.specopsjournal.org/home.html.
40. John M. Collins, “U.S. Special Operations - Personal Opinions,” Small Wars
Journal, 13 December 2008, accessed 22 December 2016, http://smallwarsjournal.
com/blog/journal/docs-temp/148-collins.pdf.
41. Turnley, Retaining a Precarious Value.
42. According to Turnley, this reluctance to explicitly state the core value is what
makes the quality of its people a precarious value for SOF.
43. Spulak Jr., A Theory of Special Operations, 1.
44. McRaven, Spec Ops.
45. Carl von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege (On War), trans. and ed. Michael Howard and
Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 119–120.
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Horn: A Function of Understanding SOF Power
What is Theory?
Initially, it is important to articulate what is meant by theory. In its sim-
plest form, theory refers to “a supposition or system of ideas explaining
something,” or in other words, “the principles on which a subject of study
is based.”2 Military theory, then, provides the framework for understand-
ing the foundation, nature, character, and conduct of warfare, as well as its
relationship with society. More specifically, a theory of SOF and/or special
operations would describe the nature, character, and characteristics of SOF
Colonel Bernd Horn (Canadian Armed Forces, Retired), Ph.D., has held key
command and staff appointments in the Canadian Armed Forces including
deputy commander of the Canadian Special Operations Forces Command,
commanding officer of the 1st Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment and
Officer Commanding 3 Commando, and the Canadian Airborne Regiment.
He is currently the command historian for the CANSOFCOM Education and
Research Centre, and a JSOU Senior Fellow. Horn is also an adjunct profes-
sor of the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, University of Calgary, as
well as an adjunct history professor at the Royal Military College of Canada.
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Horn: A Function of Understanding SOF Power
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JSOU Report 17 -6
By 1756, Major General Shirley ordered Major Robert Rogers, who had
begun to make forays behind the French lines to great success, to raise a
60-man, independent ranger company separate from both the provincial and
regular units. As such, it was titled “His Majesty’s Independent Company
(later Companies) of American Rangers.”
Importantly, for the creation and maintenance of the special raiding
and scouting capabilities, it required specific political and military deci-
sion makers who could see beyond their cultural and organizational biases,
if not blinders. They would need to understand the strategic utility of a
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Horn: A Function of Understanding SOF Power
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JSOU Report 17 -6
strike out from a position of seeming impotence. And so, special units were
raised to cover for weakness, as well as to meet specific needs that conven-
tional forces were seen as too unwieldy or poorly trained to accomplish.
Throughout their short existence during WWII, SOF selection, training,
and roles, as well as their tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) were
evolved and refined. Although the mainstream military still railed against
their existence, the few key champions who understood their value allowed
SOF to make an impressive contribution to the war effort. SOF, through the
execution of special operations:
• bought the Allies time to rebuild through offensive action;
• tied down Axis troops in defensive tasks and caused attrition of the
enemy war effort (i.e., raids, sabotage, and subversion);
• psychologically dislocated the enemy;
• raised secret armies and resistance movements;
• shaped the battlefield for conventional force operations; and
• conducted strategic strikes.14
In fact, one Allied report noted, “the dividends paid by introducing small
parties of well trained and thoroughly disciplined regular troops to operate
effectively behind the enemy lines can be out of all proportion to the num-
bers involved.”15 Regardless of SOF’ proven track record of success and stra-
tegic utility throughout the war, virtually all special operations organizations
were disbanded at its end. It was not a question of a lack of theory for SOF
or special operations, but rather philosophical and organizational culture
biases of the mainstream military. Even for the champions that remained,
the cost of fighting to preserve capability (once the crisis was over) seemed
not worth the fight.
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Horn: A Function of Understanding SOF Power
SOF, when employed correctly, had a “comparatively low cost in lives set
against results achieved.”17 Moreover, frugal bureaucrats realized that SOF
provided an inexpensive means of waging war against insurgents in distant
places, often largely on their own. Once again, understanding and belief
in the strategic utility of SOF, particularly during periods of crisis, led to
its creation, maintenance, and employment. Institutional enmity, however,
ensured its marginalization within the larger military establishment.18
Still, key political and military decision makers’ understanding of SOF’
strategic utility has allowed SOF to break the artificial barriers and margin-
alization by the greater military institution. The absence of an established
and endorsed theory or doctrine played no role. For example, against huge
institutional resistance, in May 1961, President John F. Kennedy announced
to a joint session of Congress: “I am directing the Secretary of Defense to
expand rapidly and substantially … the orientation of existing forces for
the conduct of … unconventional wars. In addition, our special forces and
unconventional warfare units will be increased and reoriented.”19 Kennedy
understood the strategic utility of SOF in the savage wars of peace in the
post-war era.
Ironically, and despite their pushback, conventional military decision
makers also comprehended the value of SOF/special operations. When the
complexities of the Vietnam conflict (e.g., terrain, population, locating the
enemy, interdicting supply lines) confounded conventional military com-
manders, they were quick to create new SOF units or expand existing ones to
address the requirements. SOF could carry out such unique tasks as uncon-
ventional warfare, long-range reconnaissance, interdiction, and riverine
operations in politically restrictive and environmentally hostile theatres of
operation. For example, the U.S. Special Forces (SF), or “Green Berets,” were
dramatically increased in size and undertook such programs as the Strategic
Hamlet Program and later became responsible for the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA)-funded Civil Irregular Defense Group program which largely
involved raising local defense forces capable of defending their villages. How-
ever, SF also undertook activities such as improving agricultural practices,
improving sanitation and water supply, as well as building and occupying
fortified camps from which fighting patrols by SF and Civil Irregular Defense
Group soldiers could be mounted.20 In addition, Navy SEALs were created
in 1962, as was the Studies and Observation Group in 1964, as well as 13
long range reconnaissance companies in 1965, which were four years later
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Horn: A Function of Understanding SOF Power
the problem.26 Despite this new evolution, for the mainstream military, SOF
were simply seen as taking on another niche, designer task, one not yet fully
recognized as a mainstream military function.
Importantly, the pattern continued. SOF and special operations—based
on historical practice, evolution, and record of performance—were identi-
fied as capable of taking on the new task. The absence of theory or doctrine
did not stop its employment. Key personalities who understood and sup-
ported SOF’ strategic utility were able to push to attain the necessary levels
of approval. The same transpired even after the tragic failure at Desert One in
Iran (i.e., the failed rescue attempt of the American hostages held at the U.S.
embassy in Tehran) in 1980 (which was laid at the feet of American SOF) and
the lackluster performance of the United States Special Operations Forces
during Operation Urgent Fury, the invasion of Grenada.27
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means of striking back swiftly and effectively. The rapid deployment of CIA
operatives and 316 SF soldiers working with Northern Alliance, combined
with Joint Terminal Air Controllers and precision air, resulted in the rout
of al-Qaeda and their Taliban sponsors in only 49 days (from the inser-
tion of the first American SF teams to the fall of Kandahar).31 This success
prompted analysts, decision makers, and scholars to refer to SOF as the
“force of choice.”32 Subsequent persistent wars against terrorists and their
networks in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Philippines, the Sahel, the Horn of Africa,
to list a few of the problem areas, cemented the strategic utility of SOF and
the exercise of special operations.
Importantly, SOF organizations, their TTP, and employment continued
to grow and expand. Again, employment and investment of SOF was not a
function of elaborate theory or refined doctrine. Rather, it was a function
of senior political and military decision makers understanding the strategic
utility of SOF—specifically SOF power.
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Horn: A Function of Understanding SOF Power
well as expand the option space for political and/or military decision makers
to achieve desired outcomes.
Importantly, throughout their evolution, SOF have responded quickly,
adaptively, and with agility to changing circumstances and threats. Their
strategic utility to political and military decision makers, and their abil-
ity to assist with the protection and projection of the national interest has
made SOF a “force of choice,” which in turn is a manifestation of “SOF
power.” In essence, the concept of SOF power represents three fundamental
components:
1. Capability—the ability to deploy specially selected, intelligent, inno-
vative, risk accepting, adaptive, highly-trained individuals capable of
performing a wide spectrum of tasks, from precision kinetic actions
(e.g. direct action) to non-kinetic operations (e.g. military assistance)
in any environment or circumstance;
2. Effect—the ability for SOF to act as a military instrument delivering a
precision kinetic effect to achieve a military objective(s), or as a foreign
policy tool by providing assistance to allied or friendly nations; and
3. Cost—the small footprint and low visibility of SOF allow for relatively
low costs in both fiscal expenditure for operations and in terms of
commitment. SOF team(s) or task force(s) represents a relatively small
commitment and is generally not interpreted by national publics as
“boots on the ground.” As such, it is easier to tailor host nation com-
mitment expectations and it is easier to withdraw forces should the
situation become tenuous or undesirable. Furthermore, the likelihood
of high casualties is minimized, which often acts as a lightning rod
for criticism, further action, or commitment.
It is therefore the ability of political and military decision makers to
understand SOF power that has, in essence, operationalized the formally
unstated “theory.” Specifically, decision makers who understand SOF power
have come to realize that SOF furnish:
1. High readiness, low profile, task-tailored special operations task force
and/or SOF teams that can be deployed rapidly, over long distances,
and provide tailored proportional responses to a myriad of different
situations;
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Horn: A Function of Understanding SOF Power
Endnotes
Canadian Special Operation Forces Command. An Overview (Ottawa: Department
1.
of National Defence, 2008), 7, http://www.cansofcom.forces.gc.ca/pub/doc/ove-
ape-eng.pdf. For the purpose of this chapter the Canadian doctrinal definition
of SOF will be utilized, specifically: “Special Operation Forces are organizations
containing specially selected personnel that are organized, equipped and trained
to conduct high-risk, high value special operations to achieve military, political,
economic or informational objectives by using special and unique operational
methodologies in hostile, denied or politically sensitive areas to achieve desired
tactical, operational and/or strategic effects in times of peace, conflict or war.”
Special Operations Forces Reference Manual, 4th ed. (Tampa, FL: JSOU Press,
June 2015), A8. Similarly, special operations are defined as: “Operations requir-
ing unique modes of employment, tactical techniques, equipment and training
often conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments and
characterized by one or more of the following: time sensitive, clandestine, low
visibility, conducted with and/or through indigenous forces, requiring regional
expertise, and/or a high degree of risk.
2. Katherine Barber, ed., Canadian Oxford Dictionary, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Oxford
University Press, 2004), 1613.
3. See: Joe Osborne, “Advancing a Strategic Theory of Special Operations,” Small
Wars Journal, 13 May 2016, accessed 14 May 2016, http://smallwarsjournal.com/
jrnl/art/advancing-a-strategic-theory-of-special-operations; and Milan Vego,
“On Military Theory,” Joint Force Quarterly (JFQ) 62 (3rd quarter 2011): 60.
4. Carl von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege (On War), trans. and ed. Michael Howard and
Peter Paret (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993), 163.
5. William H. McRaven, Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare:
Theory and Practice (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1995); James D. Kiras, Special
Operations and Strategy: From World War II to the War on Terrorism (New York:
Routledge, 2006); Robert G. Spulak Jr., A Theory of Special Operations: The Origin,
Qualities, and Use of SOF (Hurlburt Field, FL: JSOU Press, October 2007), https://
jsou.libguides.com/ld.php?content_id=2876965. Some effort has been made to
develop a theory. McRaven’s case studies focused solely on stronghold break-
in and he laid out the concept of “relative superiority”—namely, the ability of
SOF to gain a temporary decisive advantage even over a larger or well-defended
enemy force. From his case studies, he derived the key principles of surprise;
speed; purpose; security; repetition; and simplicity. Kiras postulated that the
cumulative effect of numerous disparate special operations, in conjunction
with conventional forces, was working toward a common goal of attrition of
an adversary’s key moral and material resources. Finally, Spulak argued special
operations were missions undertaken to accomplish strategic objectives when
the use of conventional forces would create unacceptable risks due to Clause-
witzian friction. Although all are excellent works in their own right, none are
considered adequate to provide the necessary comprehensive theory for SOF or
special operations.
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JSOU Report 17 -6
6. Bernd Horn, “La Petite Guerre: A Strategy of Survival,” in The Canadian Way of
War: Serving the National Interest, ed. Bernd Horn (Toronto: Dundurn Press,
2006), 21–56; and Bernd Horn, “Only for the Strong of Heart: Ranging and the
Practice of la Petite Guerre During the Struggle for North America,” in Show No
Fear: Daring Actions in Canadian Military History, ed. Bernd Horn (Toronto:
Dundurn Press, 2008), 17–64.
7. C.P. Stacey, Quebec, 1759: The Siege and the Battle, ed. Donald Graves (Toronto:
Robin Brass Studio, reprint 2002), 33.
8. H.R. Casgrain, ed., Lettres et Pièces Militaires: Instructions, Ordres, Mémoires,
Plans de Campagne et de Défense 1756–1760 (Québec: L.J. Demers & Frére, 1891),
45; Martin L. Nicolai, “A Different Kind of Courage: The French Military and the
Canadian Irregular Soldier during the Seven Years’ War,” Canadian Historical
Review 70, no. 1 (1989): 59–64.
9. The promotion and appointment was the result of Montcalm’s victory at Ticond-
eroga in 1758. He then decided to pull back from the frontier and concentrate his
defenses at Montreal and Quebec, believing that he could defeat the superior Brit-
ish forces from an entrenched defensive position as he had done at Ticonderoga.
10. M. Pouchot, Memoirs on the Late War in North America between France and
England (1781; repr., Youngstown, NY: Old Fort Niagara Association, Inc., 1994),
242. La petite guerre is, in essence, small-scale irregular warfare. The literal
translation is “small war.” European understanding of “petite guerre” was war-
fare “carried on by a light party, commanded by an expert partisan ... separated
from the army, to secure the camp or a march; to reconnoiter the enemy or the
country; to seize their posts, convoys and escorts; to plant ambuscades, and to
put in practice every stratagem for surprising or disturbing the enemy.”
11. John R. Cuneo, Robert Rogers of the Rangers (New York: Oxford University Press,
1959), 33.
12. Colonel Bernd Horn, “Strength Born From Weakness: The Establishment of the
Raiding Concept and the British Commandos,” Canadian Military Journal, 6,
no. 3 (Autumn 2005): 59–68.
13. Hilary St. George Saunders, The Green Beret: The Story of the Commandos,
1940–1945 (London: Michael Joseph, 1949); Louis Mountbatten, Combined
Operations. The Official Story of the Commandos (New York: The Macmillan
Company, 1943); Brigadier T.B.L. Churchill, “The Value of Commandos,” Royal
United Services Institute (RUSI) 65, no. 577, February 1950, 85.
14. For a sampling of SOF achievements, see: Colonel Bernd Horn, “Reckoning: The
Value of SOE in the Second World War,” chap. 10 in A Most Ungentlemanly Way
of War: The SOE and the Canadian Connection (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2016);
McRaven, Spec Ops; James Ladd, Commandos and Rangers of World War II (New
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1978); and Max Boot, Invisible Armies: An Epic History
of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the Present (New York: Liveright
Publishing Corporation, 2013), 313–317.
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in fact they existed, which inevitably led to a diminution of the overall standard
of individuals serving in those units. In theatre, the SOF culture of lax discipline
and deportment, as well as ‘unconventional’ tactics, exacerbated by the type of
inexperienced, and often immature, individuals who were now serving in SOF,
created difficulties. Rightly or wrongly, the reputation of SOF suffered. They
became viewed by the conventional military, as well as by much of the public,
as largely a collection of ill-disciplined cowboys, and soldiers of questionable
quality and planning ability, who were running amok without adequate control
mechanisms.
24. Adams, US Special Operations Forces in Action, 70, 148.
25. Peter Harclerode, Secret Soldiers: Special Forces in the War Against Terrorism
(London: Cassell & Co., 2000); Christopher Dobson and Ronald Payne, The Ter-
rorists: Their Weapons, Leaders and Tactics, 2nd ed. (New York: Facts on File,
1982); and Marquis, Unconventional Warfare, 62–65.
26. Major-General Ulrich Wegener, “The Evolution of Grenzschutzgruppe (GSG)
9 And the Lessons of ‘Operation Magic Fire’ in Mogadishu,” chap. 7 in Force of
Choice: Perspectives on Special Operations Forces, eds. Bernd Horn, J. Paul de
B. Taillon, and David Last (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2004);
David Miller, Special Forces: The Men, the Weapons and the Operations (London:
Salamander Books, 2002), 18–73; Charlie A. Beckwith and Donald Knox, Delta
Force: A Memoir by the Founder of the U.S. Military’s Most Secretive Special-
Operations Unit (New York: Dell, 1983); and Leroy Thompson, The Rescuers. The
World’s Top Anti-Terrorist Units (Boulder, CO: Paladin Press, 1986).
27. Beckwith and Knox, Delta Force, 216–262; Adams, 163–167; Marquis, Unconven-
tional Warfare, 69–73; and Colonel John T. Carney, Jr., and Benjamin F. Schem-
mer, No Room for Error: The Covert Operations of America’s Special Tactics Units
from Iran to Afghanistan (New York: Presidio Press, 2003), 84–100.
28. USSOCOM History and Research Office, United States Special Operations Com-
mand History, 3rd ed. (Tampa, FL: Department of Defense, 1999), 3-16; Marquis,
Unconventional Warfare, 69–226; Department of Defense, United States Special
Operations Forces: Posture Statement 2000 (Washington, D.C.: Department of
Defense, 2000), 11–14; and Tom Clancy and John Gresham, Special Forces: A
Guided Tour of U.S. Army Special Forces (New York: Berkley Books, 2001), 10–27.
29. USSOCOM History and Research Office, United States Special Operations Com-
mand History, 42–44; William Rosenau, Special Operations Forces and Elusive
Enemy Ground Targets. Lesson from Vietnam and the Persian Gulf War (Santa
Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), 42; B.J. Schemmer, “Special Ops Teams Found 29
Scuds Ready to Barrage Israel 24 Hours Before Ceasefire,” Armed Forces Journal
International, July 1991, 36; Mark Thompson, Azadeh Moaveni, Matt Rees, and
Aharon Klein, “Iraq: The Great Scud Hunt,” Time, 23 December 2002, 34; and
Cameron Spence, Sabre Squadron (London: Michael Joseph, 1997).
30. USSOCOM History and Research Office, United States Special Operations
Command History, 44–69; Carney and Schemmer, No Room for Error, 245–282;
72
Horn: A Function of Understanding SOF Power
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Homiak: The Value in a Theory of Special Warfare
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of special operations can provide both military and civilian leaders with a
common departure point from which to understand how special operations
may be used and what these operations might achieve. Second, having a
theory will prove beneficial to SOF practitioners by enabling them to have a
set of principles upon which they can anticipate specific actions and counter-
actions among both enemies and partners. Inspiration for this chapter came
from the opening remarks made by Lieutenant General Charlie Cleveland
(U.S. Army, Retired), former commander of United States Army Special
Operations Command (USASOC), at the Joint Special Operations University
symposium. General Cleveland, an advocate for a SOF-specific theory put
forth that “theory has use in that it provides policymakers with a blueprint
demonstrating what may be within the realm of the possible.”4
Building off of General Cleveland’s comments, this chapter will begin
by looking at the role played by theory, briefly review existing work on spe-
cial operations theory to frame the state of the field of special operations
research, and provide insight on what having a theory might mean for the
field and the SOF enterprise. The second part of the chapter will provide an
example of how theory might benefit special operations. To that end, it will
draw heavily from the recent work of Marsh, Lieutenant Colonel (retired)
Mike Kenny, and Major Nathanael Joslyn who, although stopping short of
recommending a unified theory, advocate for multiple, connected theories
of special operations.5 They see this method as the best way to move forward,
while managing the diversity inherent in special operations.
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78
Homiak: The Value in a Theory of Special Warfare
The fourth task of theory is to connect or link with other fields of study
or the wider world in general. “Connecting” places theory within much
broader context and speaks to its accessibility for those outside of the field in
question. Identifying where a specific theory fits within the broader scheme
of knowledge and understanding the role it performs in relation to other
theories enables one to evaluate its relevance as part of a larger whole. The
relevance provided by the “connect” function contributes to shared under-
standing by using other theories to provide context and make the theory in
question more accessible.
The fifth, and last, task of theory is its ability to help anticipate future con-
cepts, trends, and capabilities. That said, Winton qualifies theory’s predictive
ability, reserving it primarily for the realm of the natural sciences. Like many
within the social sciences, Winton recognizes that human behavior is of
such complexity as to make prediction a bridge too far in most cases.12 Win-
ton’s view is similar to that of noted international relations theorist Kenneth
Waltz. Waltz too had little confidence in theory’s ability to predict real world
outcomes, but nonetheless considered theory useful in predicting discrete
behaviors.13 Similarly, Winton takes the position that theory can provide
the conceptual foundation for future modes of warfare and capabilities that,
although currently beyond our grasp, might one day be realized. The fact
that theory invariably falls short in its ability to predict human behavior in
no way compromises its overall utility. At the risk of borrowing too heavily
from the field of international relations, theory, if it does nothing else, allows
us to expand our understanding of special operations research and enhances
our ability to act and think effectively on the topic.14
Finally, and before launching directly into the argument, a brief explana-
tion of differences in terminology between words like ‘special operations’
and ‘special warfare’ is warranted, and will benefit the understanding of
the lay reader. Although some of these terms may appear interchangeable,
there is distinction and nuance in their use. This paper deals with special
operations as a subset of military operations, the extraordinary nature of
which distinguishes them from conventional operations.15 While having
previously established that the quality of being extraordinary is static, the
nature of special operations in practice change over time. It is therefore,
plausible that future special operations will expand beyond these categories,
but they are sufficient for the present argument. Next, we will introduce
the terms ‘special warfare’ and ‘surgical strike’—both terms are admittedly
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JSOU Report 17 -6
U.S. Army centric—as two broad categories that encompass the majority of
contemporary special operations.
The first term is ‘special warfare’ which comprises the family of opera-
tions that involve working through, with, and by indigenous forces. Special
warfare occurs on a continuum ranging from the peacetime training of for-
eign forces to active involvement in counterinsurgency, and, at the far end,
unconventional warfare (UW). The advice and assistance provided to the
French resistance in 1944 by American and British commandos falls squarely
within this category.16 UW refers to U.S. support to a resistance movement
in a foreign country, the aim of which is to overthrow the government.
As it is doctrinally conceived, UW generally entails the lengthy process of
building infrastructure to expand and develop local resistance into a force
able to take the field and win against a conventional opponent.17 The second
category, ‘surgical strike,’ covers the operations that come to mind when
one thinks of “commando” operations like the 1942 raid by U.S. Marine
Raiders on Japanese-held Makin Island and the 2003 rescue of Army Private
Jessica Lynch. More precise, doctrinal definitions for special warfare, UW,
and surgical strike will be provided as the argument unfolds, but a working
understanding of the differences is necessary and suffices for the present.
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Homiak: The Value in a Theory of Special Warfare
preferred tool with which to address challenges in the 21st century, Yarger
advises that theory can play an influencing role in ensuring that SOF are
both resourced for success and employed wisely.20
When one considers that SOF struggled for their place within the conven-
tional military establishment for much of their existence, it is understandable
that a great deal of the earlier “theoretical” work focuses on defining the
nature of SOF and special operations, especially in relation to the conven-
tional force “other.”21 This early work was often intended by those within the
SOF community to prevent what they saw as misuse of a poorly understood
asset by the larger, conventional military. However, more relevant to the
purposes of this essay are theories that explain why and how special opera-
tions achieves its effects or those that place special operations within larger
theories of warfare. Kiras’ 2006 work entitled Special Operations and Strategy
does exactly this; it nests special operations within Clausewitzian theory and
argues that such operations, in conjunction with conventional operations,
achieve their effects through the moral and material erosion of an opponent’s
psychological resolve.22 Rich Rubright offers his own theory of special opera-
tions, “special operations are extraordinary operations to achieve a specific
effect.”23 In Rubright’s words, the theory “is broad by intention so that it
covers all of special operations and is applicable through time; in essence,
unbound and serving solely as an explanatory tool for the phenomenon
of special operations.”24 Rubright’s theory appeals because of its simplicity
and applicability. While it explains the phenomena of special operations
better than other existing theories, its lack of mission specificity—arguably
one of the theory’s main strengths—may disadvantage its use as a tool to
demonstrate what special operations might achieve in a particular context.
To distill a theory with enough substance to connect both military and
policy spheres, we must look at sub-theories under the broader heading of
special operations. This is exactly the route proposed by Marsh, Lieutenant
Colonel (retired) Mike Kenny, and Nathanael Joslyn in their 2015 article
“SO What?: The Value of Scientific Inquiry and Theory Building in Special
Operations Research.” After establishing the requirement for a scientifi-
cally rigorous theory within special operations, the authors point out that
the nature of special operations is variable.25 This variability occurs across
the range of special operations missions amounts to “quite distinct (though
interrelated) phenomena,” making it difficult for one single theory to cover
them all. Therefore, Marsh, et al., advocate for several theories to cover the
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JSOU Report 17 -6
82
Homiak: The Value in a Theory of Special Warfare
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JSOU Report 17 -6
war.35 While Joslyn praises the durability of U.S. thinking on guerrilla war-
fare, he critiques the simplified manner in which many of the ideas in Mao’s
theory of people’s war were absorbed into U.S. special operations thinking
and what he considers to be a lack of intellectual scrutiny of the model itself.36
His critique includes the fact that U.S. institutional models of insurgency
have historically taken a simplified approach when looking at indigenous
populations, overlooking the religious, cultural, and even economic varia-
tions present in any large group of people that provide multiple avenues of
engagement.37 Russia’s exploitation of ethnic fault lines in Georgia and South
Ossetia in the run-up to the 2008 Russo-Georgian War and again in Eastern
Ukraine in 2014 are examples of how a state or group can capitalize on a
deeper cultural and societal awareness.38 Notwithstanding the limitations
of the U.S. military’s interpretation of Mao’s theory, there is inherent virtue
in updating, or at least revalidating, a theory that has its origin in 1950s and
60s thought.
Despite the ability of Tilly’s theory to describe the dynamics of modern
contention better and more fully than current U.S. military thinking on
special warfare, the question of how one puts theory into practice remains.
Joslyn, for one, recognizes the chal-
lenges involved in operationalizing Particularly as it applies to
theory, especially one that originated special warfare, theory acts
in academia outside of the military. He as a mechanism for creating
recommends further study as to whether a shared vision between the
a theory of contentious politics can serve military, other governmental
as the foundation for future approaches departments and agencies,
to special warfare.39 Particularly as it and those who craft policy.
applies to special warfare, theory acts
as a mechanism for creating a shared vision between the military, other
governmental departments and agencies, and those who craft policy. This
is theory fulfilling its tasks to define and explain.
Conclusion
When weighing policy options, it is difficult to conceive of an instance in
which one wouldn’t desire complete understanding of the problem along
with the promise of an optimal solution. It is in this precise space that
we would look to capitalize on General Cleveland’s view of theory and its
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JSOU Report 17 -6
potential utility to special operations. Theory may very well open the aper-
ture on courses of action that, for lack of a shared vision, would otherwise
remain misunderstood and far from the light of day, never to receive serious
consideration. As policymakers gain a better understanding of what special
operations can achieve, the result might be to demystify and clarify special
warfare; bringing it closer to the mainstream thinking, and increasing its
viability as a realistic policy option. Insofar as we are able to move toward
realizing such goals, theory will have proved its value to special operations.
Endnotes
1. Richard W. Rubright, A Unified Theory for Special Operations (Tampa, FL: JSOU
Press, 2017), 7.
2. Ibid., 36.
3. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, rev. ed., ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter
Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 89.
4. Charles T. Cleveland, “Opening Remarks: Strategy and Theory” (remarks,
Special Operations Theory, Summer 2016 Symposium, Joint Special Operations
University, Tampa, FL, 30 August 2016).
5. Christopher Marsh, Mike Kenny, and Nathanael Joslyn, “SO What? The Value of
Scientific Inquiry and Theory Building in Special Operations Research,” Special
Operations Journal 1, no. 2 (2015): 95, accessed 4 November 2016, http://dx.doi.
org/10.1080/23296151.2015.1062678.
6. James D. Kiras, “A Theory of Special Operations: ‘These Ideas Are Dangerous,’”
Special Operations Journal 1, no. 2 (2015): 77, accessed 13 November 2016, http://
dx.doi.org/10.1080/23296151.2015.1062677.
7. “Theory,” Merriam-Webster.com, accessed 15 November 2016, http://www.mer-
riamwebster.com/dictionary/theory.
8. Harold R. Winton, “An Imperfect Jewel: Military Theory and the Military Profes-
sion,” Journal of Strategic Studies 34, no. 6 (December 2011): 854–856, accessed
14 November 2016, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2011.583389.
9. The decision to lead with theory’s explanatory role was made because “explana-
tion,” more so than Winton’s other functions, appears as the logical function of
theory and what the layperson would expect to encounter first.
10. Winton, “An Imperfect Jewel,” 855–856.
11. Ibid, 854–856.
12. Ibid, 856.
13. Kenneth N. Waltz, Realism and International Politics (New York: Routledge,
2008), 44–45.
14. Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal, “Between Utopia and Reality: The
Practical Discourses of International Relations,” in The Oxford Handbook of
86
Homiak: The Value in a Theory of Special Warfare
International Relations, eds. Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2008), 25.
15. Rubright, A Unified Theory for Special Operations, 29.
16. David W. Hogan, Jr., U.S. Army Special Operations in World War II (Washington,
D.C.: Center of Military History, Department of the Army, 1992), 49.
17. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-05, Special Operations (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 2014), II-8.
18. Robert G. Spulak Jr., A Theory of Special Operations: The Origin, Qualities, and
Use of SOF (Hurlburt Field, FL: JSOU Press, October 2007), 39, accessed 2 August
2015, https://jsou.libguides.com/ld.php?content_id=2876965.
19. Harry R. Yarger, 21st Century SOF: Toward an American Theory of Special Opera-
tions (Tampa, FL: JSOU Press, April 2013).
20. Ibid., 75.
21. Elliot A. Cohen, Commandos and Politicians: Elite Military Units in Modern
Democracies (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Center for International
Affairs, 1978), 88.
22. James D. Kiras, Special Operations and Strategy: From World War II to the War
on Terrorism (New York: Routledge, 2006), 80.
23. Rubright, A Unified Theory of Special Operations, 7.
24. Ibid., 2.
25. Christopher Marsh, Mike Kenny, and Nathanael Joslyn, “SO What? The Value of
Scientific Inquiry and Theory Building in Special Operations Research,” Special
Operations Journal 1, no. 2 (2015): 95, accessed 4 November 2016, http://dx.doi.
org/10.1080/23296151.2015.1062678.
26. Ibid., 96; and Department of the Army, ADRP 3-05, Special Operations (Wash-
ington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, August 2012), 8.
27. Department of the Army, ADRP 3-05, Special Operations, 8–9.
28. Homer W. Harkins, “What Is Old Is New Again: The Reemergence of Special
Warfare,” Special Operations Journal 1, no. 2 (2015): 116, accessed 7 November
2016, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23296151.2015.1096687.
29. Ibid., 9.
30. Ibid., 115.
31. Mark Mazzetti and Eric Schmitt, “Obama’s ‘Boots on the Ground’: U.S. Special
Forces Are Sent to Tackle Global Threats,” New York Times, 27 December 2015,
accessed 28 December 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/28/world/mid-
dleeast/more-and-more-special-forces-become-obamas-military-answer.html.
32. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Plan-
ning (Washington, D.C.: Joint Staff, 11 August 2011), III-39, accessed 9 November
2016, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp5_0.pdf.
33. Marsh et al., “SO What?” 97.
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34. Ibid.
35. Nathanael E. Joslyn, Past and Present Theory for Special Warfare Operational Art:
People’s War and Contentious Politics (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Com-
mand and General Staff College School of Advanced Military Studies, 2015), 6,
12, accessed 7 November 2016, http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/singleitem/
collection/p4013coll3/id/3327/rec/3.
36. Ibid., 24–26.
37. Ibid., 27–29.
38. Kyle Oliver Kendall, “Using their own people against them: Russia’s exploitation
of ethnicity in Georgia and Ukraine” (Master’s thesis, U.S. Naval Postgraduate
School, 2015), 2–3, accessed 2 December 2016, http://hdl.handle.net/10945/47981.
39. Joslyn, Past and Present Theory, 49.
88
Müller: Civil Context for SOF Theory
Kurt E. Müller
Dr. Kurt E. Müller earned his Ph.D. from Rutgers University, is a senior
research fellow in the Center for Complex Operations of the National
Defense University, and completed a 31-year military career, the latter half
of which was in Civil Affairs. He followed that career with several years in
the futures directorate (J-9) of USSOCOM, and then four years with the
Department of State, primarily in the Civilian Response Corps, and then
the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations. His research focuses
on interagency responses to foreign-policy challenges.
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JSOU Report 17 -6
Strategic Impact
One aspect of SOF lore and argument for SOF utility needs some examina-
tion before turning to this broader context. Spulak opens his Joint Special
Operations University monograph with a characterization of special opera-
tions as “missions to accomplish strategic objectives where the use of conven-
tional forces would create unacceptable risks due to Clausewitzian friction.”4
Citing Dr. James Kiras's [Air University] dissertation on special operations
and strategy, Spulak extends Kiras’s view that special operations “enable
conventional operations and/or resolve economically politico-military prob-
lems at the operational or strategic level that are difficult or impossible to
accomplish with conventional forces alone” by asking why special operations
don’t have strategic roles of their own.5 Thus, both Kiras and Spulak accept
the proposition that SOF emphasize accomplishing strategic objectives. Does
the historic record validate this assertion? If not, in what ways does the lore
differ from the record and what is the impact of that difference?
Admiral McRaven’s primary concern is not whether the operation pur-
sued a Clausewitzian center of gravity that would result in strategic impact.
He concentrates on analyzing the cases to derive principles to improve the
chances of success and then looks for conformity or divergence from those
principles. Admiral McRaven provides a succinct definition of success that he
applies to most of the cases he studied. He writes, “[i]n wartime the success
of an operation is judged almost solely on the achievement of the objectives.”6
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JSOU Report 17 -6
But the objectives he considers are the immediate tactical ones rather than
the intended strategic impact. Thus, he can conclude that most of the cases
he examined succeeded.
This focus also allows Admiral McRaven to conclude that the Son Tay
raid to recover American prisoners of war (POWs) in Vietnam, Operation
Kingpin, “is the best modern-day example of a successful special operation
and should be considered textbook material for future missions.”7 If one’s
focus is on the intended outcome, the fact that there were no POWs in the
compound means the mission failed to meet its objective. As he notes, the
public reaction to war escalation and the press indictment of the intelligence
community for failing to verify the continuing presence of POWs in the
compound both had an impact on public attitudes.8 The lack of public sup-
port of course violates the Clausewitzian trinity of people, army, and public,
which has been known to American military readers since Army Colonel
Harry Summers published his immensely influential study, On Strategy: The
Vietnam War in Context.9
The focus on military tasks without linkage to political objectives is not at
all unusual, even among some who evoke Clausewitz as a theoretical mentor.
In a work that looks back at the 1991 Gulf War (Operation Desert Storm) to
determine whether the technical advantage U.S. and coalition forces enjoyed
over the Iraqi Army required reassessing Clausewitz’s concept of friction,
Barry Watts concludes:
[T]here was no shortage of friction at any level—tactical, operational,
strategic, or even political. Indeed, close examination of Desert
Storm suggests that frictional impediments experienced by the
winning side were not appreciably different in scope or magnitude
than they were for the Germans during their lightning conquest of
France and the Low Countries in May 1940.10
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who identified issues across sectors of Iraqi society. Although the project
did not produce a blueprint for transition that either Lieutenant General Jay
Garner (U.S. Army, Retired) or Ambassador Bremer could pick up and seek
to implement, it did present a broad background on each of these sectors and
identified both desired outcomes and pitfalls to avoid.17
State Department personnel indeed saw the need for expertise from
other federal agencies if Iraq was to become stable. The fate of this State
Department project is a benchmark that advocates for reform of the national-
security structure use to call for changes in structure and process. The Wash-
ington Post journalist Bob Woodward writes that National Security Advisor
Stephen Hadley saw the question of stability broadly: “It wasn’t just achieving
stability—political or otherwise. The president wanted to achieve democracy.
So Hadley realized they needed a comprehensive postwar plan.”18
In the early stages of the civilian surge, there was considerable public
criticism regarding the inability of the State Department to deploy personnel
to hardship posts, first Iraq, then Afghanistan.19 Criticism came from the
DOD as well, which had to fill civilian positions in Provincial Reconstruc-
tion Teams with military personnel. A New York Times reporter interviewed
Admiral Edmund Giambastiani, then Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and
quoted him as saying, “[w]e send out orders, we execute orders, we deploy
our military, and guess what happens? They turn up and do their job.”20
Missing in this description is any perception of the differences in career
patterns, employment modes, and support structures between military
and civilian personnel. Even the DOD encountered substantial difficulties
deploying its civilian staff. The term-hire option, typical for the United States
Agency for International Development, which most frequently uses imple-
menting partners (contractors), became routine through various mecha-
nisms for other agencies as well.21 This option was common in the DOD’s
experience of filling positions through the Civilian Expeditionary Work-
force, though the pattern was to use term-hires (typically of one-year dura-
tion) in the early stages of the program and gradually transition to career
employees. But the impact on the careers of volunteers was not sanguine:
approximately one third of career civilians who deployed lost their positions
when they returned to their previous stations.22
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JSOU Report 17 -6
96
Müller: Civil Context for SOF Theory
Conclusion
To return to the departure point of this discussion—the strategic impact
of special operations—one can conclude that the best example of a special
operation that truly had a strategic impact is the Entebbe hostage rescue. The
narrow objective was self-contained in that its accomplishment concluded
the crisis. As this exploration has shown, for strategic impact, the desired
outcome must be clear, and this outcome is not the province of a specific
agency so much as it is a U.S. government goal. In the absence of both multia-
gency perspectives and an office that seeks to integrate agency analyses, it is
unlikely that any given agency will develop a sufficient operational picture to
propose a holistic response to meet the national policy goal. Whereas a good
number of senior executives in the foreign policy arena have embraced the
notion that unstable states can harbor threats to the security of the United
States, its friends, and allies, the defense-sector response of building partner
capacity addresses only part of the challenge. If conducted with sensitivity
toward multiagency analysis, the low profile typical of special operations
offers options that do not currently exist elsewhere in the U.S. government.
To demonstrate utility across the spectrum of conflict, the SOF community
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Müller: Civil Context for SOF Theory
Endnotes
1. William H. McRaven, Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare:
Theory and Practice (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1996).
2. Robert G. Spulak Jr., A Theory of Special Operations: The Origin, Qualities, and
Use of SOF (Hurlburt Field, FL: JSOU Press, 2007), 4, https://jsou.libguides.com/
ld.php?content_id=2876965.
3. McRaven, Spec Ops, 1.
4. Spulak Jr., A Theory of Special Operations, 1.
5. Spulak Jr., citing James Kiras, “Rendering the Mortal Blow Easier: Special Opera-
tions and the Nature of Strategy” (Ph.D. diss., University of Reading, July 2004),
8–9.
6. McRaven, Spec Ops, 142.
7. Ibid., 318.
8. The comparison with Operation Eiche, the Mussolini rescue, is striking in that
Mussolini had been moved several times and intelligence reports conflicted, but
the planners got it right.
9. Harry G. Summers, Jr., On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context (Carlisle Bar-
racks, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 1981).
10. Barry D. Watts, Clausewitzian Friction and Future War, rev. ed. (Washington, D.C.:
Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 2004), 2.
11. Michael J. Mazarr, Jeffrey Shaffer, and Benjamin Ederington, “The Military
Technical Revolution: A Structural Framework,” Final Report of the CSIS Study
Group on MTR (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Stud-
ies, March 1993), 58.
12. Abtheilung für Kriegsgeschichte der Großen Generalstab, Moltkes Militärische
Werke II: Die Thätigkeit als Chef des Generalstabes der Armee in Frieden [War
History Section, Great General Staff, Moltke’s Military Works II: The Activity as
Chief of Staff of the Army in Peacetime (Berlin: Mittler, 1900), 67–164, esp. 74.
The reference is to peacetime reflections on the 1866 war against Austria.
13. For an excellent overview of the predecessor efforts to address interagency edu-
cation, see John W. Yaeger, “Developing National Security Professionals,” Joint
Force Quarterly 49 (2nd Quarter 2008): 115–120.
14. “Policy Guidance: U.S. Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations,”
Presidential Decision Directive 56, May 1997.
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JSOU Report 17 -6
15. Hans Binnendijk and Stuart E. Johnson, eds., Transforming for Reconstruction
and Stabilization Operations (Washington, D.C.: NDU Press, 2004).
16. James A. Baker III et al., The Iraq Study Group Report (New York: Vintage Books,
2006), 93.
17. Economy and Infrastructure (Public Finance) Working Group, Future of Iraq
Project: Overview (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 2005 [date of
unclassified release], originally compiled 12 May 2003), as posted on the National
Security Archive, a project of George Washington University, http://nsarchive.
gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB198/.
18. Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack: The Definitive Account of the Decision to Invade
Iraq (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004), 281. For various critiques of the
national security process in general, and the disjuncture between State and
Defense regarding Iraq, see Michèle A. Flournoy and Shawn W. Brimley, Stra-
tegic Planning for U.S. National Security: A Project Solarium for the 21st Century
(Princeton: Princeton Project on National Security, n.d.); Paul David Miller,
“The Contemporary Presidency: Organizing the National Security Council: I
Like Ike’s,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 43, no. 3 (September 2013), 592–606;
and Samantha Power, Chasing the Flame: Sergio Vieira de Mello and the Fight to
Save the World (New York: Penguin Press, 2008).
19. Harry W. Kopp and Charles A. Gillespie, Career Diplomacy: Life and Work in
the U.S. Foreign Service (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2011).
20. Helene Cooper, “Few Veteran Diplomats Accept Mission to Iraq,” New York Times,
8 February 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/learning/students/pop/articles/08diplo.
html.
21. Center for Complex Operations, Civilian Expeditionary Capabilities after a
Decade of War, report to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Policy)/Office
of Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations (Washington, D.C.: National
Defense University Center for Complex Operations, 2013).
22. Michael Davies and Kurt Müller, “The Civilian Expeditionary Workforce as
a Revolution in Defense Culture,” Center for Complex Operations, National
Defense University, September 26, 2014, 131,155.
23. Bernard T. Carreau, “Domestic Agencies, Civilian Reserves, and the Intelligence
Community,” in Civilian Surge: Key to Complex Operations, eds. Hans Binnendijk
and Patrick M. Cronin (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press,
2009), 137, table 7-1.
24. Will Irwin, A Comprehensive and Proactive Approach to Unconventional Warfare
(Tampa, FL: JSOU Press, 2016).
25. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1963), 77.
26. Michael T. Flynn, James Sisco, and David C. Ellis, “‘Left of Bang’: The Value of
Sociocultural Analysis in Today’s Environment,” Prism 3, no. 4 (September 2012),
13–21.
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Müller: Civil Context for SOF Theory
27. Note, however, that the State Department maintains numerous small embassies
with very limited multi-agency capabilities.
28. Dennis Blair, Ronald Neumann, and Eric Olson, “Fixing Fragile States,” The
National Interest 133 (September–October 2014), 11–20.
29. Christopher Paul et al., What Works Best When Building Partner Capacity and
Under What Circumstances? (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2013), 17.
30. Kurt E. Müller, “Interagency Qualifications to Address Fragility, or Rethinking
Civil Affairs,” InterAgency Journal 7, no. 1 (Spring 2016), 14–27.
31. Stanley McChrystal and Gideon Rose, “Generation Kill: A Conversation With
Stanley McChrystal,” Foreign Affairs 92, no. 2 (March/April 2013), 2–8, https://
www.foreignaffairs.com/interviews/2013-02-11/generation-kill.
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Searle: Outside the Box
E very book, article, and movie about special operations includes at least
an implied theory of special operations. However, all this theorizing has
produced myriad competing theories rather than a consensus theory. The
most common flaw in these theories is that they start from each author’s ideal
special operation, and then attempt to connect all other special operations
to that ideal. That approach breaks down because there is no consensus on
what defines an ideal special operation.
For example, Admiral William McRaven (U.S. Navy, Retired), in his book
Spec Ops, Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice,
treats direct action raids as the ideal special operation, and claims that other
types of special operations are closely related to direct action.1 Hy Rothstein
disagrees. For Rothstein, the direct action raids that Admiral McRaven stud-
ies are more like “hyperconventional” operations than special operations.2
Rothstein believes the real special operations are things like psychological
operations and support to foreign resistance forces trying to overthrow a
government or drive out an occupying army.3 Yet another approach used, for
example, by Robert Spulak Jr., is to start with the troops who conduct special
operations—Special Operations Forces (SOF)—and work backwards from
Adapted from JSOU Report 17-4, Outside the Box: A New General Theory
of Special Operations by Tom Searle, a publication of the Joint Special
Operations University Press.
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Special Operations
Special Operations
outside the conventional box. Figure 1 depicts this relationship, with con-
ventional operations in the center surrounded on all sides by various types
of special operations outside the box.
The ‘special operations’ outside the conventional box include all special
operations activities listed in Title 10 U.S. Code § 167 (direct action, strategic
reconnaissance, unconventional warfare (UW), foreign internal defense
(FID), civil affairs (CA), military information support operations (MISO),
counterterrorism (CT), humanitarian assistance, theater search and rescue,
and such other activities as may be specified by the President or the Secre-
tary of Defense), but are not limited to that list.6 Special operations likewise
include all special operations core activities listed in Joint Publication 3-05
(direct action, special reconnaissance, countering weapons of mass destruc-
tion, counterterrorism (CT), UW, FID, security force assistance, hostage
rescue and recovery, counterinsurgency (COIN), foreign humanitarian assis-
tance, military information operations, and CA operations, and other such
activities as may be specified by the President and/or Secretary of Defense),
but are not limited by this list either.7 The current (2011) edition of U.S. Spe-
cial Operations Command Publication 1, Doctrine for Special Operations,
provides yet another unique list, this time broken down into Core Opera-
tions and Core Activities, and including many items not found in the other
two lists.8 Together, the fact that: a) all three lists are in effect; b) they differ
from one another and; c) the lists often include escape clauses about “other
activities” that are not listed, suggests no list of special operations could be
complete. Still, this poses no problems for our definition since a negative
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definition can include a large number of cases (i.e., conventional may include
a small number of similar cases but not conventional will include a vast array
of potentially dissimilar items).
Figure 1 suggests that the field of special operations extends indefinitely
in all directions away from the conventional box, but there is a limit. The
scope of special operations we are considering is limited by the authorities
given to the military. (In the United States, these authorities are given to the
Department of Defense (DOD) by the U.S. Congress.) For U.S. purposes, a
large circle around the conventional box represents the full range of opera-
tions the military is authorized to conduct. As depicted in figure 2, this large
circle representing all military operations contains a box in the center rep-
resenting conventional operations. Everything inside the circle, but outside
the box, is a special operation.
Civilian and military leaders of U.S. DOD, with guidance from Congress
and the President, allocate resources based on national strategic goals and
expectations about the future. They define conventional operations as the
ones that the DOD will focus its resources on, and the DOD puts the vast
majority of its resources into CF, to conduct conventional operations. But
figure 2 is a reminder that emphasizing conventional operations does not
eliminate DOD’s other responsibilities.
Special Operations
Conventional
Operations
Figure 2. Special operations are inside the large circle containing all military
operations but outside the conventional operations box.
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Searle: Outside the Box
also recognize that SOF create options and opportunities that would not
otherwise exist and insure the nation against adversaries who confront us
in a manner that makes conventional operations inappropriate.
Special
DOJ Operations
Country X
Conventional
Operations All DoD
CIA Responsibilities
and Authorities
DOS Etc.
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Searle: Outside the Box
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JSOU Report 17 -6
Special Operations
FID
* Conventional CA
COIN Operations
PSYOP UW
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Searle: Outside the Box
Special Operations
FID
Conventional CA
COIN Operations
UW
MISO
Figure 5. The situation at the height of the Iraq War with the conventional opera-
tions box expanding to include parts of CA, MISO, COIN, and FID, but not UW.
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Conclusion
The outside the box theory of special operations starts from a definition
of what special operations are not: special operations are not conventional
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Searle: Outside the Box
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Endnotes
1. William McRaven, Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory
and Practice (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1996).
2. Hy S. Rothstein, Afghanistan & the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2006), 102.
3. Ibid.
4. Robert G. Spulak Jr., A Theory of Special Operations: The Origin, Qualities, and
Use of SOF (Hurlburt Field, FL: JSOU Press, October 2007).
5. Author’s notes on: Admiral (retired) Eric Olson, “Importance of Special Opera-
tions to National Power (keynote speech, Special Operations Theory, Summer
2016 Symposium, Joint Special Operations University, Tampa, FL, 31 Aug. 2016).
6. Title 10-Armed Forces, 10 U.S.C. § 167, Unified combatant command for special
operations forces, accessed 1 Feb 2017, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-
2011-title10/pdf/USCODE-2011-title10-subtitleA-partI-chap6-sec167.pdf.
7. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-05, Special Operations (U.S. Joint
Chiefs of Staff, July 2014), II-1–II-18.
8. United States Special Operations Command, USSOCOM Publication 1, Doctrine
for Special Operations (Tampa, FL: USSOCOM, 5 August 2011), 20–28. The
core operations are: counter weapons of mass destruction, counterinsurgency,
counterterrorism, foreign internal defense, stability operations, support to major
operations and campaigns, and unconventional warfare. The core activities are:
civil affairs operations, direct action, hostage rescue and recovery, interdiction of
offensive weapons of mass destruction, military information support operations,
preparation of the environment, security force assistance, special reconnaissance,
SOF combat support and combat service support.
9. The author is reminded of his role in training and advising a heavy-mech task
force in the Royal Saudi Army during Operation DESERT SHIELD and Opera-
tion DESERT STORM. The initial mission of the task force, before large coalition
conventional forces arrived in the kingdom, was ‘delay defense,’ and that was
what we helped them train for. As coalition forces built up, the mission changed
to deliberate defense. Later still, it changed to deliberate attack through minefields
and prepared defenses. The repeated changes of mission meant that the task force
never achieved the level of proficiency it could have achieved if we had trained
for just one mission the entire time.
10. Quoted in: Micah Zenko, “100% Right 0% of the Time: Why the U.S. military
can’t predict the next war,” Foreign Policy 16 October 2012, accessed 8 December
2015, http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/10/16/100-right-0-of-the-time/. Mr. Zenko
also includes similar quotes from Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Com-
mander, U.S. Central Command General James Mattis, and other prominent
DOD leaders.
11. General Joseph L. Votel, Commander, United States Special Operations Com-
mand, statement regarding “Special Operations Forces in an Evolving Threat
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Searle: Outside the Box
Environment: A Review of the Fiscal Year 2017 Budget Request for U.S. Special
Operations Command” ( House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on
Emerging Threats and Capabilities, Washington, D.C., 1 March 2016); and “About
the Department of Defense (DOD),” U.S. Department of Defense, accessed 3 May
2016, http://www.defense.gov/About-DoD. For example, USSOCOM contains
about 4 percent of U.S. active duty military personnel (56,000 out of 1.3 million
in DOD), less than 1 percent of the DOD civilian work force (6,600 out of 742,000
in DOD), and less than 1 percent of National Guard and Reserve personnel (7,400
out of 826,000 in DOD).
12. The most complete account of what SOF did to facilitate the liberation of Afghani-
stan from the Taliban is: Charles Briscoe et al., Weapon of Choice: U.S. Army
Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies
Institute Press, 2003).
13. For a good introduction to how Russia has kept its aggression against Ukraine
below the level of conventional warfare, see: “Little Green Men”: a primer on
Modern Russian Unconventional Warfare, Ukraine 2013–2014 (Fort Bragg, NC:
United States Army Special Operations Command, 2015).
14. USSOCOM History Office, United States Special Operations Command History:
1987–2007, (MacDill AFB, FL: USSOCOM History Office, 2008), 5–7.
15. Robert G. Spulak Jr., A Theory of Special Operations: The Origin, Qualities, and
Use of SOF.
16. United States Special Operations Command, USSOCOM Pub 1: Special Opera-
tions in Peace and War, 25 January 1996, pp. 3-2, 3-3.
17. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-05, Special Operations (U.S. Joint
Chiefs of Staff, July 2014), xi. Shortly after Vietnam, the term “foreign internal
defense,” or FID, was invented to describe COIN when the term was being
expunged from official Army doctrine post-Vietnam.
18. For a conventional officer calling for a rush back to the old definition of con-
ventional operations, see Daniel P. Bolger, Why We Lost (New York: Houghton
Mifflin, 2014).
19. Sergeant Benjamin Kibbey, “Advise and Assist Brigade: A familiar unit with a
new mission in Iraq,” U.S. Army Public Affairs, 25 August 2010, accessed 22
Dec 2016, https://www.army.mil/article/44206/advise-and-assist-brigade-a-
familiar-unit-with-a-new-mission-in-iraq.
117
Spencer: The Future is Now
Emily Spencer
Introduction
Dr. Emily Spencer is the director of research and education at the Canadian
Special Operations Forces Command Education and Research Centre. She
holds a doctoral degree in war studies from the Royal Military College of
Canada and has authored, co-authored and edited numerous books, chap-
ters, and articles on the contemporary military operating environment. Her
research focuses on the importance of cultural knowledge to succeed in the
contemporary operating environment, as well as the role the media plays in
shaping and understanding world events. Spencer is an adjunct professor at
Norwich University and a Joint Special Operations University Senior Fellow.
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helping raise the level of consistency, are more evidence based, and tend to
be broad in scope.4
Specifically, military theory explains how to conduct and win a war. For
military practitioners, doctrine takes theory from the realm of thought into
the realm of action. As such, a prerequisite for good doctrine is generally
good theory.
The issue of whether special operations and/or SOF need a theory hinges
on what level of military theory is required for optimal employment. Ulti-
mately, the issue becomes how micro is too micro and vice versa (how macro
is too macro)? Are SOF and special operations sufficiently unique from other
environments to require their own theories? Or can an effective understand-
ing of special operations and SOF be found in military theory at-large, or
within land, sea, or air theories?
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Spencer: The Future is Now
SOF Theory
Indeed, an important element for ensuring special operations achieve its
desired effect is to make sure the appropriate people are conducting the
operations. As such, this chapter now moves from a discussion of missions
to one of people, or SOF. Again, a good place to begin is with a definition.
The Canadian definition of SOF is:
Special Operation Forces are organizations containing specially
selected personnel that are organized, equipped, trained and edu-
cated to conduct high-risk, high value special operations to achieve
military, political, economic or informational objectives by using
special and unique operational methodologies in hostile, denied
or politically sensitive areas to achieve desired tactical, operational
and/or strategic effects in times of peace, conflict or war.7
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Spencer: The Future is Now
Endnotes
1. The following chapter is based on a presentation prepared for the Special Opera-
tions Theory, summer 2016 Symposium, held 30–31 August 2016 at Joint Special
Operations University. Specifically, I was asked to argue in the affirmative on a
panel titled “Do We Need a Theory at All?”
2. Notably, this overview is an extremely simplified version and used only as an
analogy, not as a scientific explanation.
3. See, for example: Bernd Horn, “‘Avenging Angels’: The Ascent of SOF as the Force
of Choice in the New Security Environment,” in Colonel Bernd Horn and Major
Tony Balasevicius, eds., Casting Light on the Shadows: Canadian Perspectives on
Special Operations Forces (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2007), 160–161.
4. Adapted from: Mark L. Mitchell & Janina M. Jolley, Research Design Explained,
8th ed. (Belmont, CA: Wadsorth, 2010).
5. Carl von Clausewitz, as cited in: Antulio J. Echevarria II, “Clausewitz: Toward a
Theory of Applied Strategy,” Defense Analysis 11, no. 3, 1995, 229–240, accessed 13
December 2016, http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/Echevarria/APSTRAT1.htm.
6. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-05, Special Operations (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 2014), I-1.
Canadian Special Operation Forces Command. An Overview (Ottawa: Department
7.
of National Defence, 2008), 7, http://www.cansofcom.forces.gc.ca/pub/doc/ove-ape-
eng.pdf.
126
Kiras: Do We Even Need a Theory?
James Kiras
O ver the last two decades, special operations and the forces that con-
duct them, shifted from ancillary roles into a cornerstone of national
security policy in responding to the challenges of terrorism. Policymakers
are attracted to special operations for three main reasons: they are effective
in accomplishing missions with a high degree of success; they are efficient in
that they achieve disproportionate results relative to the amount of resources
committed; and, they minimize political risk for decision makers. The shift
from conventional force actions to special operations is evident in recent
casualty figures. According to Dave Philipps, over the last twelve months
Special Operations Forces (SOF) “have died in greater numbers than con-
ventional troops—a first” as “the Pentagon, hesitant to put conventional
troops on the ground, has come to depend almost entirely on small groups
of elite warriors.”2
The growth in utility and use of special operations was accompanied by
expansion in force numbers and organization. Such expansion is not limited
to the United States. Other nations, such as Canada and Russia, created spe-
cific special operations command headquarters and reorganized their forces
to ensure special operations can be sustained and conducted as effectively as
possible. Within nations with relatively small armed forces such as Sweden
and Denmark, special operations were elevated to the level of an armed
service comparable to their respective army, navy, or air force.3
Given their increased visibility and prominence in defense and national
security, there remain calls to create a specific theory for special operations.
Dr. James Kiras is an associate professor at the School of Advanced Air and
Space Studies at Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, and a Joint Special
Operations University Senior Fellow. He earned his doctorate in politics and
European studies from the University of Reading in the UK in 2004 under
the direction of Colin S. Gray. His current research interests include the
civil-military implications of contemporary special operations use.
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Theory
Theory, in a general sense, consists of a supposition or hypothesis intended
to explain actions or behavior based on systematic exploration of its nature
through a series of codified, related propositions, backed by sufficient analy-
sis and evidence. Theory should reduce complex phenomena down to an
elegantly simple, abstract explanation. There are several ways to parse theory.
One category of theory, military theory, explores as its central phenomenon
war or armed conflict. Armed conflict involves the use or the threat of use of
violence to impose one’s will against a dynamic, adaptive opponent seeking
to deny it this goal and impose their own will upon it. Given the range of
actors in contemporary irregular warfare, the current debate within military
theory is whether this central assumption about opponents and imposition of
will is still valid.4 Most military theories, however, start from the assumption
that war, in its most abstract form, is a rational undertaking for a political
purpose and involves a dynamic between competing wills. In other words,
the nature of armed struggle remains a reflection of, and is heavily influ-
enced, by human nature.
To paraphrase George Orwell, not all theories are created equal but some
are more equal than others. This statement is especially true for military
theory, including any theory of special operations. Harold Winton, Profes-
sor Emeritus of the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, provided
an exceptionally useful and informative method for evaluating military
theory. Winton suggests that the sufficiency of military theory should be
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JSOU Report 17 -6
and planning, as a result, borrows heavily from the concepts and terms used
by prescriptive authors. For example, three domain-specific but enduring
prescriptive theories of victory, by Jomini, Alfred Thayer Mahan, and Guilio
Douhet, place exclusive weight on massing forces at the decisive point to
achieve success in battle.15 To be fair, Clausewitz mentions the importance
of doing so but does not elevate this suggestion to the level of the central
proposition of his theory. According to Jomini, Mahan, and Douhet, the
battle at the decisive point leads to decisive victory. Prescriptive theories
place a premium on simplifying the process of battle, identifying causal
mechanisms for success, and suggesting how specific means used in par-
ticular ways will lead to desired outcomes.
Prescriptive approaches to theory often mask an ulterior motive, namely
advocacy. Such theories advocate for investment in capabilities or inde-
pendent services. The means of such capabilities or independent services,
linked to decisive battle, have the potential to determine national welfare
or survival. Failure to invest in such means, so the line of reasoning goes,
puts a specific armed service or a nation at a competitive disadvantage at
best, or vulnerable to their technologically superior opponents at worst.
For Mahan, once the decisive battle was fought, a grand fleet comprised of
capital ships was linked directly to command of the sea and its unfettered
exploitation.16 For Douhet, given the importance of popular will and domes-
tic support to wars in which nations mobilize resources against one another,
grinding through military resources is costly and wasteful. Through the
domain and vast expanse of the air, fighting forces could be avoided and the
source of national will and support, the population, could be attacked and
influenced directly by a grand fleet of battleplanes.17 Although the central
propositions of both theories were invalidated by subsequent experience,
Mahan and Douhet remain popular as sources of inspiration and emula-
tion. For example, in countries such as Russia and the People’s Republic of
China, armed service leaders attempt to justify their expansion while others
employ logic of both authors to advocate for growth in the prestige, status,
budget, or independence of nuclear weapons and space forces. The power
and persuasiveness of advocative theory rests on its simplicity: it promises
a favorable and decisive outcomes via technologically advanced means, and
at a greatly reduced price.
A last purpose of theory, to integrate, also has economy at its root. Put
simply, integrative theory is the polar opposite of advocative in how it
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to buy strategic time and space but also to wrest the initiative from
an adversary;
• They have strategic utility primarily by providing national security
leaders and commanders with appealing economy of force options,
because of their high degree of success, with immediate results, rela-
tive to other military options;20 and
• Their use conforms to, and is shaped by, the orientation of strategy
and policy, and should be tailored to meet the unique policy demands
of the era.21
The sum of these qualities and characteristics is that special operations
are useful tools for political and military leaders because they appear to
address immediate problems successfully and economically.22
The preceding definition is necessary but ultimately insufficient, as the
key distinction is between conventional and that which is not. To expand the
definition somewhat, and to cut to the heart of the matter, special operations
are discrete actions that are extra-normative in their preparation, planning,
execution, and effect. There is an established set of norms of warfare and spe-
cial operations operate on their fringes. Such operations blur the distinctions,
or operate in the gray zones, between war and peace, moral and immoral,
legal and illegal, or systemic and anti-systemic, as recent scholarship sug-
gests.23 As context changes—norms, opponents, technology, and meth-
ods—so do special operations. Therefore, special operations are relativistic
in nature, and their distinctiveness is a function of the prevailing norm and
behaviors. At the risk of being overly simplistic, the special characteristics of
such operations change over time; what used to be special is now the norm.
There is a relationship between special operations relativism, scale, and
enabling function. Because of their limited scale, any inquiry into special
operations must acknowledge they are operational and strategic enablers.
Special operations, by definition, cannot be conducted in sufficient mass to
achieve independently decisive effects relative to the problem sets against
which they are used. To attempt to develop sufficient mass risks turning what
is unique into the mundane. It puts at risk the unique knowledge, abilities,
and skills of selected and highly trained individuals capable of conducting
them. Put in different terms and regardless how vigorous the application,
special operations alone cannot defeat terrorism or insurgency. Such opera-
tions can devastate terrorist groups, sometimes with great success, as the
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most special, or more unique than the others, as well as which roles and
missions are the most important.
The net effect of bureaucratic politics as represented by USSOCOM, and
the organizational dynamics of the special operations components, will be a
subjective quest for a theory that demonstrates the unequivocal uniqueness
of special operations at the expense of objective, critical inquiry. Critical
inquiry characteristic of descriptive theory seeks to answer different ques-
tions from aspirational and prescriptive ones, such as why a phenomenon
occurs (its nature) and so what (or its implications). Such inquiry must chal-
lenge prevailing assumptions that operators and the special operations com-
munity take as matters of faith, and should be prepared to turn over every
rock in the process. In other words, for a special operations theory to be
sufficient, it should strive to meet and pass with flying colors Winton’s five
criteria for sufficiency, not merely seek to stagger across the finish line to
serve institutional agendas.
The foundation of critical inquiry has a keystone of submitting cher-
ished notions and core beliefs to scrutiny. For example, the special opera-
tions community accepts a current assertion about the misuse of special
operations based on a number of precedents during WWII, Vietnam, and
the Gulf War.32 The implication from history is that conventional minds
do not sufficiently understand the more subtle approach and nuances of
special operations. Is this misuse still the case? Other questions driving
critical inquiry relate to roles and missions, which are often at the core of
a special operations organization’s identity and culture. For example, the
unconventional warfare mission is central to the identity of special opera-
tions generally and Army Special Forces specifically. The mission, however,
is not as unique as the ones Central Intelligence Agency paramilitary forces
can conduct, ones often with greater operational and legal flexibility but on
a much smaller scale. In addition, the special operations community does
not have a satisfactory understanding of the overall strategic or operational
effectiveness to ascertain how often UW succeeded or failed.
Other avenues of critical inquiry are likely to ask even more heretical
questions. For example and given globalization and the role of social media,
if a theory is to connect and anticipate, what will UW look like in the future?
More to the point, who is better suited under these conditions to “Free the
Oppressed” (motto of Army Special Forces) in the future? Should it be can-
didates selected and screened for physical toughness who can grow beards
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Kiras: Do We Even Need a Theory?
and integrate into tribal structures? Or pale and callow youths whose skills
are mental dexterity, computer aptitude, and an ability to influence social
networks virtually? A more challenging question for special operations stra-
tegically, which runs counter to its culture, is when should special opera-
tions not be used—under what circumstance and condition are they not the
answer? The point is sufficient theory requires asking and providing answers
to questions based on roads of inquiry that may seem uncomfortable or
unnecessary to operators, organizations, and the broader special operations
community. Such questions are likely to cause a closing of ranks if they are
asked by those outside the community, individuals who have not passed
through the crucible of special operations selection, and whose qualifications
and motivations may be looked upon with suspicion.
Conclusion
The sufficiency of any theory is a function of the purpose it is designed to
serve. The type of theory the special operations community is most likely
to value and embrace is prescriptive and/or aspirational. Prescriptive theory
provides answers to pragmatic questions such as: what should be done dif-
ferently, or in what way, to achieve victory or improve tactical performance.
From the operator’s perspective, a theory that does not have direct applica-
tion has no value. Given that the distinct attributes of special operations
change over time, a theory that answers ‘what’ or ‘how’ questions is likely
to have marginal utility and questionable longevity.
The more dangerous purpose of theory, however, is aspirational. A theory
that reflects organizational ambitions is likely to gloss over or ignore ques-
tions that provide deeper insight in the nature and future direction of special
operations. In the quest to enhance the reputation and stature of special
operations, it instead caters to institutional requirements and cherished mis-
sions and myths. Starting points for any theory of special operations must
accept that they are useful strategic enablers first and foremost, do not exist
in a vacuum, and allow others to perform more effectively.
Put simply, if the special operations community wants theory badly
enough, it will get bad or insufficient theory at best, or a shallow and dysfunc-
tional collection of organizational aphorisms at worst. Theory that describes
and is designed to facilitate critical inquiry, one that acts as a guiding light
for current study and future judgment, requires time to develop and must
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Kiras: Do We Even Need a Theory?
Endnotes
1. This chapter draws upon, but differs from, an earlier published work on this
subject. See James D. Kiras, “A Theory of Special Operations: ‘These Ideas Are
Dangerous,’” Special Operations Journal 1, no. 2 (2015): 75–88.
2. Dave Philipps, “Special Operations Troops Top Casualty List as U.S. Relies More
on Elite Forces,” New York Times, 4 February 2017, accessed 4 February 2017,
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/04/us/navy-seal-william-ryan-owens-dead-
yemen.html?_r=0.
3. Gitte Højstrup Christensen, ed., Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Special Opera-
tions Forces (Copenhagen: Royal Danish Defence College, 2017); and Gunilla
Eriksson and Ulrica Pettersson, eds., Special Operations from a Small State
Perspective: Future Security Challenges (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017).
4. Emile Simpson, War from the Ground Up: Twenty-First Century Combat as Politics
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 54–75.
5. Harold R. Winton, “An Imperfect Jewel: Military Theory and the Military Pro-
fession,” Journal of Strategic Studies 34, no. 6 (December 2011): 855–857.
6. Harold Winton, “An Imperfect Jewel: Military Theory and the Military Profes-
sion” (paper delivered at the Society of Military History, May 2004), 2.
7. Winton, “An Imperfect Jewel,” 2011, 855.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid., 856.
10. Colin S. Gray, The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice (New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2010), 22–27.
11. William McRaven, Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory
and Practice (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1995).
12. Carl von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege (On War), trans. and ed. Michael Howard and
Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984).
13. Simpson, War from the Ground Up.
14. Baron Antoine-Henri De Jomini, The Art of War, Captain G.H. Mendell and
Lieutenant W.P. Craighill, trans. (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1971); and
J.F.C. Fuller, The Foundations of the Science of War (London: Hutchinson & Co.,
Ltd., 1926).
15. Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660–1783
(Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1890); and Giulio Douhet, The Command of the
Air, Dino Ferrari, trans. (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1983).
16. Mahan, Influence of Sea Power.
17. Douhet, The Command of the Air.
18. Julian Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (London: Brassey’s Defence
Publishers, 1988); and J.C. Slessor, Air Power and Armies, (1936; repr., Tuscaloosa:
University of Alabama Press, 2009).
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19. James D. Kiras, Special Operations and Strategy: From World War II to the War
on Terrorism (New York: Routledge, 2006), 5. The original parentheses contained
the term “conventional” to describe forces, which limited the scope of the original
inquiry.
20. Colin S. Gray, Explorations in Strategy (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1996).
21. Kiras, Special Operations and Strategy, 112–113; and Colin S. Gray, “Handfuls of
Heroes on Desperate Ventures: When Do Special Operations Succeed?” Param-
eters (Spring 1999): 3.
22. James D. Kiras, “A Theory of Special Operations: ‘These Ideas Are Dangerous,’”
Special Operations Journal 1, no. 2 (2015): 83, accessed 13 November 2016, http://
dx.doi.org/10.1080/23296151.2015.1062677.
23. Phillip Lohaus, “Special Operations Forces in the Gray Zone: An Operational
Framework for Using Special Operations Forces in the Space Between War and
Peace,” Special Operations Journal 2, no. 2 (Fall 2016): 75–91; and Anton Asklund
Johnsen and Gitte Højstrup Christensen, “Clarifying the Antisystemic Elements
of Special Operations: A Conceptual Inquiry,” Special Operations Journal 2, no.
2 (Fall 2016): 106–123.
24. General Stanley McChrystal, My Share of the Task: A Memoir (New York, NY:
Portfolio Penguin, 2013); and Richard Shultz, Military Innovation in War: It
Takes a Learning Organization, A Case Study of Task Force 714 in Iraq (Tampa,
FL: JSOU Press, July 2016).
25. Colin S. Gray, Tactical Operations for Strategic Effect: The Challenge of Currency
Conversion (Tampa, FL: JSOU Press, November 2015).
26. Raymond T. Odierno, James F. Amos, and William H. McRaven, Strategic Land-
power: Winning the Clash of Wills (Washington, D.C.: Strategic Landpower Task
Force, 2013), accessed 13 February 2017, http://www.tradoc.army.mil/FrontPage-
Content/Docs/Strategic%20Landpower%20White%20Paper.pdf; and Joint Chiefs
of Staff, Joint Concepts for Human Aspects of Military Operations (JC-HAMO)
(Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 19 October 2016), accessed 13 February
2017, http://nsiteam.com/social/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/20161019-Joint-
Concept-for-Human-Aspects-of-Military-Operations-Signed-by-VCJCS.pdf.
27. Kiras, Special Operations and Strategy; and Richard Rubright, “The U.S. Strategic
Paradox, Third-Party Proxies, and Special Operations Forces,” Special Operations
Journal 2, no. 2 (Fall 2016): 135–145.
28. Gray, The Strategy Bridge, 65–70.
29. Edward N. Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace, rev. and enl. ed.,
(Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2002); Everett Carl Dolman, Pure Strategy:
Power and Principle in the Space and Information Age (New York: Frank Cass,
2005); Harry R. Yarger, Strategy and the National Security Professional: Strategic
Thinking and Strategy Formulation in the 21st Century (Westport, CT: Praeger
Security International, 2008); and Gray, The Strategy Bridge.
142
Kiras: Do We Even Need a Theory?
143
Wong-Diaz: POTUS and Special Operations
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JSOU Report 17 -6
Theorizing
Concurrent with the rise of SOF is the search for its theoretical underpin-
nings. Joe Osborne notes the emphasis on qualitative, non-randomized his-
torical case analyses susceptible to selection bias, like former USSOCOM
Commander Admiral McRaven’s study of direct action raids, also a dearth
of quantitative studies applying the scientific method with variable analy-
sis and testable hypotheses. To promote the latter, Osborne presented four
propositions, but did not identify and operationalize the relevant variables
and the nature of their relationships.10
At the 2016 Joint Special Operations University symposium on special
operations theory, subject matter experts and participants addressed the
status and pros and cons of special operations theories. Viewpoints ranged
from support for an integrated general theory of special operations,11 an
American theory of special operations,12 to a more modest argument for
improved doctrine and codification of lessons learned.13 This chapter, after
briefly noting two useful theoretical works from peers, concludes by discuss-
ing the role of the President of the United States (POTUS) in the SOF theory
development process—an often overlooked role.
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Wong-Diaz: POTUS and Special Operations
Two Viewpoints
Robert G. Spulak Jr., featured in this volume, published a qualitative model
of an integrated theory of the origin, qualities, and use of SOF.14
Special operations are missions to accomplish strategic objectives
where the use of conventional forces would create unacceptable
risks due to Clausewitzian friction. Overcoming these risks requires
special operations forces that directly address the ultimate sources
of friction through qualities that are the result of the distribution
of attitudes of SOF personnel.15
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JSOU Report 17 -6
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Wong-Diaz: POTUS and Special Operations
“the underlying nature of war will not change. War will continue to
be driven by Clausewitz’s primary trinity of violence, chance, and
reason. Fog and friction will remain a constant element in conflict,
and must never be assumed away. What will change, however, is the
character of war—how it is fought.”29
To fight terrorism after 9/11, the argument goes, the United States turned
to SOF because of their unique suitability to engage in hybrid conflicts due
to their diverse capabilities—agility, precision, discretion, and adaptability to
local conditions.30 Paradoxically, according to Bartles, SOF’ adversaries and
peer competitors resorted to indirect and asymmetric methods in response
to the so-called new western way of war.31 Russia’s “Gerasimov Doctrine”
presents a new way of conducting war by emphasizing nonmilitary means
where warfare is started by persistent and subtle information operations
before any official acknowledgment:
This new form of warfare makes it more difficult to distinguish the
lines between strategic, operational, and tactical military objectives.
All state assets are theoretically enlisted into the fight. Business,
economic, information and even religious assets work in concert
with security and military forces to attain the political objectives.32
In March 2014, Gerasimov’s doctrine was put into practice leading to the
annexation of Crimea and conflict in Eastern Ukraine. The description of
this response to the “Western way of war” closely resembles an application
of the decades old Chinese theory of unrestricted warfare on steroids.33
A second set of explanations focuses on the relationship between domes-
tic factors and the rise of SOF. It is argued that the United States and other
industrial democracies shrunk their security budgets due to the growing
number of casualties on both sides of a conflict. This is due to humanitar-
ian concerns, also technological advances in intelligence-gathering, and
advanced guided munitions that changed the character of warfare from
mass-on-mass confrontations to precision strikes. The use of SOF provides
policymakers in a reduced budget environment with a less costly, small foot-
print, highly lethal instrument of war.34 Furthermore, in addition to profes-
sional competence and unique capabilities, SOF provide greater discretion
and deniability.35
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JSOU Report 17 -6
While not mutually exclusive, the above sets of explanations are insuf-
ficient to account for the fast growth and importance of SOF. A third com-
plementary explanation exists that combines both viewpoints within an
organizational theory approach. In brief, the argument is made that the huge
growth of SOF in the industrial democracies is the outcome of the actions
of military organizational entrepreneurs—boosters, mentors, sponsors, or
promoters—who in concert with influential backers have identified the needs
of militaries and marketed SOF as uniquely suited to meet those needs.36
The great value of SOF is that they are “specialized generalists,” local
level integrators that link between the tactical, operational, and
strategic levels of action in ways that may enhance the autonomy
of the military. SOF are therefore hybrid forms of organizational
response to environmental pressures: to reduce risk, to manage the
links between the armed forces and external environments and to
integrate specialties.37
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Wong-Diaz: POTUS and Special Operations
and Syria would not have been able to capture territory in that country or
in Syria.
“I go back to the work we did in 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010 and we
got it to a place that was really good. Violence was low, the economy
was growing, politics looked like it was heading in the right direc-
tion. Odierno also sounded the alarm on the massive cuts Obama
has made to the number of army troops. They are expected to fall
to 450,000 … down from 570,000 in 2010. With Russia becoming
more hostile and ISIS recruiting a record number of new members,
this is hardly the time for America to scale back the military.”43
About two years later, during the first President George W. Bush admin-
istration, the 9/11 terrorist attacks took place. Since that time, the U.S. has
been fighting a “long war” against Islamic terrorism while undergoing a
military drawdown and a comparable increase in the numbers, funding, and
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Wong-Diaz: POTUS and Special Operations
Defense Ashton Carter and other SOF sponsors, mentors, and boosters (i.e.,
Congressional committees and military contractors) support his vision for
a command committed to a ‘left of bang’ approach, one where SOF focus
on anticipatory special operations. For General Thomas, “Left of bang is
less a technological approach than a people-access approach: being there
ahead of time, having relationships there ahead of time, identifying prob-
lems before they become crises, developing that partner capacity, prior, not
after a response.”53 Left of bang apparently is the indirect action approach
in Phase 0, consistent with the Obama doctrine (one of several principles)
of fighting special warfare “by, with, and through” local forces.54 It aims to
rebalance USSOCOM’s emphasis on kinetic operations by seeking actionable
intelligence to provide early warning to eliminate threats.
This chapter highlights challenging questions and issues that could be
considered by special operations theory builders. Much work lies ahead.
There is a need for a parsimonious, lessons-learned work to guide policymak-
ers and practitioners on this important subject. It is the author’s hope that
others will continue to refine and sustain their efforts on this topic.
Endnotes
1. Colin Gray, Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare (London: Weidenfeld &
Nicolson, 2005), 252; see also: Andrew Bacevich, “Tomgram: Andrew Bacev-
ich, The Golden Age of Special Operations,” TomDispatch.com, 29 May 2012,
http://www.tomdispatch.com/blog/175547/tomgram%3A_andrew_bacevich%
2C_the_golden_age_of_special_operations.
2. Howard Altman, “Gen.Votel takes over Socom command,” TBO.com, 28 August
2014, http://www.tbo.com/list/military-news/gen-votel-takes-over-socom-com-
mand-20140828/; and Nick Turse, “The Golden Age of Black Ops.” HuffPost, 22
March 2015, accessed 9 January 2017, http://m.huffpost.com/us/entry/6507142.
3. Andrew Feickert, U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues
for Congress, Congressional Research Service report 7-5700 (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 6 January 2017), 1.
4. Eitan Shamir and Eyal Ben-Ari, “The Rise of Special Operations Forces: Gener-
alized Specialization, Boundary Spanning and Military Autonomy,” Journal of
Strategic Studies, 9 August 2016, accessed 16 September 2016, http://dx.doi.org/
10.1080/01402390.2016.1209656.
5. Jim Thomas and Chris Dougherty, Beyond the Ramparts: The Future of U.S. Spe-
cial Operations Forces, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA)
(Washington, D.C.: CSBA, 2013), 3.
6. Ibid.
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Wong-Diaz: POTUS and Special Operations
7. Patrick Tucker, “America’s New Special Operations Commander Wants to Predict the
Future,” Defense One, 25 May 2016, http://www.defenseone.com/threats/2016/05/
americas-new-special-operations-commander-wants-predict-future/128583/.
8. Joe Osborne, “Advancing a Strategic Theory of Special Operations,”
Small Wars Journal, 13 May 2016, http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/
advancing-a-strategic-theory-of-special-operations.
9. Sean D. Naylor, “Support grows for standing up an unconventional warfare
command,” Armed Forces Journal, 1 September 2007, http://armedforcesjournal.
com/support-grows-for-standing-up-an-unconventional-warfare-command/.
10. Joe Osborne, “Advancing a Strategic Theory.”
11. Robert G. Spulak Jr., A Theory of Special Operations: The Origins, Qualities , and
Use of SOF (Hurlburt Field, FL: JSOU Press, October 2007).
12. Harry R. Yarger, 21st Century SOF: Toward an American Theory of Special Opera-
tions (Tampa, FL: JSOU Press, April 2013).
13. General Charles Cleveland (keynote address, Special Operations Theory, Summer
2016 Symposium, Joint Special Operations University, Tampa, FL, 30–31 August
2016).
14. Spulak Jr., A Theory of Special Operations, 2007.
15. Robert G. Spulak Jr., “A Theory of Special Operations: The Origin, Qualities, and
Use of SOF,” Military Technology, Special Issue 2009, 23.
16. Ibid., 24.
17. Spulak Jr., A Theory of Special Operations, 2007, 21.
18. Ibid., 38.
19. Ibid., 1; and James D. Kiras, Special Operations and Strategy: From World War
II to the War on Terrorism (New York: Routledge, 2006).
20. Spulak Jr., A Theory of Special Operations, JSOU Press, 2007, 13; and Jessica
Glicken Turnley, Retaining a Precarious Value as Special Operations Go Main-
stream (Hurlburt Field, FL: JSOU Press, 2008).
21. Yarger, 21st Century SOF.
22. Ibid., 45.
23. Ibid., 4.
24. Christian Leuprecht and H. Christian Breede, Beyond the Movies: The Value
Proposition of Canada’s Special Operations Forces (Ottawa, Ontario: CDA Insti-
tute/Macdonald-Laurier Institute, December 2016), 1.
25. Ibid., 5.
26. Ibid., 6.
27. Steven P. Bucci, “The Importance of Special Operations Forces Today and
Going Forward,” 2015 Index of U.S. Military Strength, The Heritage Foundation,
accessed 30 December 2016, http://index.heritage.org/military/2015/important-
essays-analysis/importance-special-operations-forces-today-going-forward/;
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JSOU Report 17 -6
William Bradley, “Revelation of Special Forces Misuse Points Up the Need for A
Hard Assessment of the Long Wars,” HuffPost, 9 June 2015, accessed 11 January
2017, http://m.huffpost.com/us/entry/7545476.
28. Shamir and Ben-Ari, “The Rise of Special Operations Forces,” 12.
29. T.X. Hammes, “The Changing Character of War,” The Journal of International
Security Affairs, no. 26 (Spring/Summer 2014): 66–71.
30. Shamir and Ben-Ari, “The Rise of Special Operations Forces,” 12.
31. Charles K. Bartles, “Russia’s Indirect and Asymmetric Methods as a Response to
the New Western Way of War,” Special Operations Journal 2, no. 1 (1 June 2016),
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23296151.2016.1134964.
32. Ibid., 5.
33. Francisco Wong-Diaz, Retooling for the Future (Tampa, FL: JSOU Press, May
2013).
34. Christopher Gelpi, Peter D. Feaver, and Jason Reifler, Paying the Human Costs of
War: American Public Opinion and Casualties in Military Conflicts (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009).
35. John Arquilla, “The New Rules of War: How to Fight Smaller, Cheaper, Smarter,”
Foreign Policy, March/April 2010, http://foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/02/22/
the_new_rules_of_war?page=0.4; Shamir and Ben-Ari, “The Rise of Special
Operations Forces,” 13.
36. Shamir and Ben-Ari, “The Rise of Special Operations Forces,” 29.
37. Ibid.
38. President Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Farewell Radio and Television Address
to the American People, January 17, 1961” in The Public Papers of the Presi-
dents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower: 1960–61 (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961), 1035–1040, http://name.umdl.umich.
edu/4728424.1960.001.
39. Stephen Dycus, William C. Banks, and Peter Raven-Hansen, “Appendix: Constitu-
tion of the United States” in Counterterrorism Law (New York: Aspen Publishers,
2007), 757–763.
40. Dycus, Banks, and Raven-Hansen, Counterterrorism Law, 41.
41. Jeremy D. Crisp, “Green Berets honor President Kennedy in ceremony,” Inside
the Army News, 18 November 2011.
42. Sarah Pruitt, “History in the Headlines: U.S. Special Ops: 6 Things You
Should Know,” History.com, 13 January 2016, http://www.history.com/news/
6-things-you-might-not-know-about-u-s-special-operations-forces.
43. Thomas, “BREAKING: Army General Exposes Barack Obama in a BIG WAY
After Resigning,” The Political Insider, 23 July 2015, http://thepoliticalinsider.com/
breaking-army-general-exposes-barack-obama-in-a-big-way-after-resigning/.
44. Governor George W. Bush, “A Distinctly American Internationalism” (speech,
Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, CA, 19 November 1999).
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Wong-Diaz: POTUS and Special Operations
45. Ibid.
46. Bucci, “The Importance of Special Operations Forces”; Bradley, “Revelation of
Special Forces Misuse.”
47. Greg Jaffe, “Rumsfeld Aims To Elevate Role Of Special Forces,” Wall Street Journal,
18 February 2006, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB114020280689677176\; Leslie
Larson, “Donald Rumsfeld: A ‘trained ape’ has better foreign policy skills than
Obama,” New York Daily News, 25 March 2014, http://www.nydailynews.com/
news/politics/donald-rumsfeld-slams-obama-foreign-policy-article-1.1732895.
48. Jaffe, “Rumsfeld Aims To Elevate Role Of Special Forces.”
49. Mark R. Shulman, Lead Me, Follow Me, or Get Out of My Way: Rethinking and
Refining the Civil-Military Relationship (Carlisle, PA: United States Army War
College Strategic Studies Institute, September 2012).
50. Wesley Morgan, “The shadowy JSOC general expected to be the next
leader of America’s special operations forces,” Washington Post, 7 January
2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/01/07/
lt-gen-tony-thomas-the-shadow-soldier-tapped-to-lead-americas-
commandos/?utm_term=.3dbad7731688.
51. For an interesting narrative of the period, see Michael Morell with Bill Harlow,
The Great War of Our Time: CIA’s Fight Against Terrorism—from al Qa’ida to
ISIS (New York: Twelve/Hachette Book Group, 2015).
52. Tucker, “America’s New Special Operations Commander.”
53. Ibid. The term “left of bang” commonly refers to situational and tactical aware-
ness to identify, preempt, and prevent threats.
54. Kevin Baron, “SPECIAL REPORT: The Military Loves the Obama Doc-
trine. Can It Survive Trump?” Defense One, 15 January 2017, http://www.
defenseone.com/ideas/2017/01/special-report-military-loves-obama-doctrine
-can-it-survive-trump/134609/.
157
Yarger: Building Depth and Avoiding Prescription
Dr. Rich Yarger is a Senior Fellow at the Joint Special Operations University.
Following retirement from the U.S. Army he served as a faculty member and
department chair at the U.S. Army War College.
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Yarger: Building Depth and Avoiding Prescription
all those who are part of or interface with SOF. Specifically, an accepted SOF
theory, even with debate on specific premises or principles, can:
• Provide a basis for better internal SOF discussions and deliberations.
• Offer better external interfaces with policymakers, conventional mili-
tary, and partner nations.
• Better inform decision making at all levels.
• Improve education about and within SOF.
• Improve doctrine.
• Propose a theoretical basis for resource justification.
Nonetheless, the concern over confining SOF thinking within a theoreti-
cal box is valid; any theory should avoid being excessively prescriptive or
vague (to facilitate comprehensive understanding).5
Propitiously, understanding what questions the current and future envi-
ronments portend for special operations/SOF informs theory’s content and
expression. That is, identifying what questions modern war or society poses
for SOF can help theorists better express or illustrate a proposed theory’s
premises. Considering such questions may also help illustrate the intent
of the theory’s premises, and with it add depth to special operations/SOF
theoretical perspectives (albeit if not overly prescriptive while doing so).
For example, in examining the history and research available on special
operations/SOF, there are obvious tensions between special operations/SOF
and the American body politic, conventional military, and global body poli-
tic. These tensions affect special operations/SOF in many ways to include
appropriate roles and activities—i.e., the boundaries and consequences for
SOF in violating them.
Natural tensions exist between special operations and SOF and
the greater American political system and conventional military.
Americans for the most part are opposed to unconventional conflicts
and any form of elitism. Such conflicts do not adhere to Americans’
preferences for conduct of a decisive war and raise political ques-
tions and moral issues for which the right answers are unclear and
potentially controversial. As a result of who they are and what they
are asked to do, SOF are different. The differences engender a degree
of exclusiveness and commitment essential to sustaining a ready
force, and that is even admired as part of an American subculture.
However, exclusiveness and elitism run counter to America’s greater
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Yarger: Building Depth and Avoiding Prescription
How best can SOF understand its own internal and external precari-
ousness? What can other theoretical frameworks tell us about precarious
organizations, notably how to lead, manage, and sustain them? How does
such ‘precariousness’ interrelate with other premises? What other theoretical
constructs can contribute to a specific SOF understanding/paradigm? How
can this knowledge be supported with evidence and illustrations that lead
to a fuller understanding of special operations/SOF at large?
Another contemporary question is: What is the nature of special opera-
tions/SOF strategic value? Additionally, what is the need for SOF strategic
acumen (understanding) and how must it be learned? Some thoughts:
• Special operations and SOF are applicable at all the levels of war and
interaction—strategic, operational, and tactical.10
• Special operations represent a distinct military capability of strategic
value to national security.11
• Special operations have strategic utility.12
• Special operations and SOF’s relative value increase as direct strategic
utility is approached.13
My concern here is multifold. First, how can theory inform about special
operations/SOF’ strategic utility? Second, how do we explain this to ourselves
and others? And third, what insights can theory contribute toward develop-
ing the strategic acumen needed to maximize SOF strategic utility? Further
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development of this subject would validate these premises and also lead to
a better understanding.
Another related question is what does social theory—or other para-
digms—suggest to better understand gender and/or other diversity roles in
special operations?
Special operations benefit from diversity within SOF and among
enablers. Diversity is a positive virtue in SOF. It potentially brings
more nuanced competencies and insights to bear on special opera-
tions mission planning, rehearsal, and conduct. It also provides a
similar enrichment to activities related to preparation for war. For
similar reasons, SOF value and special operations benefit from diver-
sity among and within enablers. Different enablers bring different
perspectives and capabilities to an operation, generating ideas and
options for consideration. However, diversity can also be a source
of multiple frictions, and value added versus tensions is always a
matter of consideration for SOF leaders.14
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Yarger: Building Depth and Avoiding Prescription
“Political violence” and “third party conflicts” are evolving and becom-
ing more complex; they may have surpassed our past military paradigms.
What is needed is a new look, a SOF specific one that adds new theoretical
depth to SOF understanding.
One last question: What theory can inform SOF on how to anticipate
and deal with change?
Special operations and SOF exist on the cutting edge of change and con-
tinuity in the security environment.17
The concern expressed in the question is that we are living in a period of
great change. There is plenty of research out there dealing with change of all
types. Are there paradigms available, however, that will enable SOF—or the
military more generally—to better understand the nature of change and the
use of national power? In exploring this, do any of these existing theories
possess specific, named applicability to SOF and with it new depth and clar-
ity in understanding the relation of special operations/SOF to change? If so,
such a special operations/SOF theory should first recognize the relationship
among change, special operations, and SOF, and substantiate it with evidence
and illustrate it as appropriate for proper understanding.
While concerns and examples herein are just illustrative, each premise
and others can be further developed from a theoretical perspective. In doing
so, they can be appropriately articulated, and illustrated in such a manner
that builds depth and understanding in a much needed special operations/
SOF theory, one that improves future leaders’ perspectives and special opera-
tions/SOF performance. Past works should be considered in any further
theory development, but most importantly, any effort must achieve its under-
standing without being so prescriptive that it becomes doctrine or so general
that it is meaningless. Theory’s rightful role is education and its focus is to
inform decision making, doctrine, and operations.
Endnotes
1. Carl von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege (On War), trans. and ed. Michael Howard and
Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 141.
2. Harry R. Yarger, 21st Century SOF: Toward an American Theory of Special Opera-
tions (Tampa, FL: JSOU Press, April 2013). For other examples of recent theory,
see William H. McRaven, Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare:
Theory and Practice (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1996); Robert G. Spulak Jr., A
Theory of Special Operations: The Origin, Qualities, and Uses of SOF (Hurlburt
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Field, FL: JSOU Press, 2007); Jessica Glicken Turnley, Cross-Cultural Competence
and Small Groups: Why SOF are the way SOF are (Tampa, FL: JSOU Press, 2011);
and Jessica Glicken Turnley, Retaining a Precarious Value as Special Operations
Go Mainstream (Hurlburt Field, FL: JSOU Press, February 2008).
3. Ibid., 3.
4. “Do We Need a Theory at All?” (panel discussion, Special Operations Theory,
Summer 2016 Symposium, Joint Special Operations University, MacDill Air
Force Base, FL, 31 August 2016).
5. Yarger, 21st Century SOF, 52. This author recognized this dilemma by identify-
ing and developing a premise in theory that states: “Special Operations and SOF
evolve over time according to strategic context.”
6. Ibid., 52.
7. Ibid., 51.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid., 61–62. Quote is found in: Frank R. Barnett, B. Hugh Tovar, and Richard
H. Shultz, eds., Special Operations in US Strategy (Washington, D.C.: National
Defense University Press, 1984), 5.
10. Ibid., 52–53.
11. Ibid., 48–49.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid., 54–55.
14. Ibid., 58.
15. Ibid., 52.
16. Ibid., 55.
17. Ibid., 50–51.
166
Lieber: Looking Ahead
Dr. Paul Lieber is a Resident Senior Fellow at the Joint Special Operations
University. Prior to that he served as the command writer for the United
States Special Operations Command, and as strategic communications advi-
sor to the commander of Special Operations Command-Australia.
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where theories mature alongside ideas and paradigms. Ergo, falling in love
with a particular theory for the sake of said theory leaves those individuals
in the knowledge rearview mirror. A social/natural science theory’s goal
is to explain outcomes; it should never drive them, let alone indefinitely.
Reflecting on the bigger question above: Can or should a social/natural sci-
ence definition of theory be used to explain special operations? And more
importantly, what is the utility in doing so?
Yes, and that depends. Much like social/natural science, to do so would
require sorting individual areas of special operations into unique theoretical
constructs. While theories can be correlated—obviously no special opera-
tions or scientific phenomena exists in total isolation—each one is intended
to be mutually exclusive for the purpose of testing. Otherwise, there is no
way to confidently state that a particular theory is producing a particular
result, or lack thereof.
To create its own mutually exclusive theory would require the special
operations community to determine the boundaries of said theory. Mean-
ing, firm agreement on a core mission set for special operations/SOF, also on
outcomes considered inherently special operations. This agreement only gets
muddied by debate on where conventional and special operations capabilities
should begin and end, apt to intensify thanks to evolved concepts on how
to define an ‘adversary’ or ‘conflict.’ Throwing international partners into
the mix only further complicates matters. Should theory and capability be
defined solely by U.S. models or under a global SOF network concept?
Globally defined or otherwise—and if there’s any hope for a social/natural
science theory emerging—the special operations community can no longer
amorphously define itself by conducting any and every mission deemed
‘special,’ or those that conventional forces cannot execute. This definition—
while a point of pride for the community—is arguably doing itself a dis-
service in the longer term. Not only does this generality inhibit creating a
social/natural science compatible theory, it likewise leaves the community
vulnerable to excess risk by reactively adjusting as unprecedented, ‘special’
challenges emerge.
Tangibly, this broadly termed ‘special’ definition creates an uncomfort-
able dichotomy between mission and funding/authorities. Logistically, spe-
cial operations capability is reasonably determined by current and prior
needs for the force; authorities, funding, and capabilities follow in suit.
At present, however, special operations is tasked with accomplishing the
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Lieber: Looking Ahead
being joint, can logically borrow from theory literally battle-tested in other
services, and with it determine fit within a special operations context.
So, where do we go from here? Regardless of one’s opinion on the role
and place of special operations theory, Lieutenant General Charles Cleveland
(U.S. Army, Retired) perhaps said it best in that it is an important endeavor
to pursue (either special operations specific, or as an offshoot of the Services).
Related, and echoing Major General David Baratto (U.S. Army, Retired),
we must actively close the gap between theory and doctrine if either is to
remain relevant and, more importantly, current. Conversations on what is
or isn’t theory, are unimportant in lieu of the utility of a theory to a greater
strategic picture.
In doing so, it’s key to put this edited volume and related symposium
into perspective. While opinions are convincingly presented, no single one
should stand alone as the means to define and value special operations or
SOF theory. Robert Spulak is on the right path in placing paradigms, not
theories, as the end goal. Likewise, Bernd Horn in arguing for operational-
izing theory to empower those who rely most on special operations to best
fund and employ them. As Colonel Homiak posited, any theory for special
operations should educate those tasked with understanding it.
Arguably the greatest achievement of this research endeavor is recogni-
tion that, even as the force of choice, special operations cannot do it alone.
Ergo, any theory that includes them must also account for Kurt Müller’s
position that the interagency plays a significant role in special operations
success, most notably—as Francisco Wong-Diaz reasons—the U.S. President
as its commander in chief. Thus, a special operations theory must account
for both domestic and international partners, to include recognition of the
key activities Tom Searle details that require such collaboration and reach.
Whether it’s a unique or service-driven definition, Emily Spencer and
James Kiras will agree that any theory exploration for special operations
must be rigorously tested. Today’s enemies will be different than tomorrow’s,
and no theory should ever be problem centric. Rich Yarger’s ‘strategic value’
litmus test for theory is one that should be applied, regardless of definition.
If it doesn’t check this box, it is not ready for consideration.
Most importantly and beyond this volume, conversations must tran-
scend arguments of the utility of theory and/or where definitions should
begin and end. Similarly, abandon hope of determining any sort of theory
thanks to seemingly invulnerable enemies who do not value sovereignty or
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Lieber: Looking Ahead
international law. War has, and always will be a part of human existence
as will the need for special operations—which by definition, purpose, and
theory—are capable of challenging traditional definitions and approaches
to conflict.
171
Acronym List
Acronym List
CA civil affairs
CF conventional forces
COIN counterinsurgency
CSOSR Center for Special Operations Studies and Research
DOD Department of Defense
FID foreign internal defense
IJC International Security Assistance Force Joint Command
JSOU Joint Special Operations University
MFP major force program
MISO military information support operations
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSPD National Security Presidential Directives
POTUS President of the United States
POW prisoner of war
PSYOP psychological operations
SF special forces
SOF Special Operations Forces
SOTF Special Operations Task Force
TSOC Theater Special Operations Command
TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures
USASOC United States Army Special Operations Command
USSOCOM United States Special Operations Command
UW unconventional warfare
173