University of Negros Occidental-Recoletos

# 51 Lizares Avenue, Bacolod City, Philippines 6100

School of law

CASES ON SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS

INVOLVING FAMILY CODE PROVISIONS

AM 02-11-10-SC: Rules on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and

Annulment of Voidable Marriages
1. Nature of the Case Rayray vs Chae Kyung Lee, 18 SCRA 450
2. Non application of “Unclean Hands Doctrine” Chi Ming Tsoi vs CA, 266 SCRA 334
3. Imprescriptibility of action or defense Heirs of Romana Injugtiro vs Casals,
GR No.134718, August 20, 2001
4. Psychological incapacity Republic vs De Gracia, GR No171557, Feb. 12, 2014
Mendoza vs Republic GR No.157649, Nov 12, 2012
Republic vs Dagdag, GR No.109975, Feb 09, 2001
Marcos vs Marcos, GR No. 135490, Oct. 19, 2000
5. Active Participation of Provincial/ City Prosecutor Sin vs Sin, GR No137590, March 26, 2001
Tolentino vs Villanueva, 556 SCRA 1
6. No valid compromise on another Mendoza vs CA 19 SCRA 756

AM 02-11-11-SC: Rule on Legal Separation

1. Abandonment as a ground Dela Cruz vs Dela Cruz, GR No. L-19565, January 30, 1968
2. Nature of action purely personal Lapus vs Eufemio, 43 SCRA 177
3. Cooling Period Pacete vs Carianga, 231 SCRA 321
4. Designation of Parent to exercise Parental Authority Cang vs CA, 296 SCRA 128

Rule 101 Proceedings of hospitalization of Insane Person

1. Chin Ah Foo vs Concepcion, 54 Phil 775
2. People of the Philippines vs DUNGO, GR No.89420, July 31, 1991

Submitted to : Atty. JAPHET MASCULINO

Submitted by : Johanna D. Abanilla, MBA

Antonio B. Efren, Jr.
Chambeline Gasataya
Christine Navarra

Date submitted : 28 March 2019

LAZARO RAYRAY vs CHAE KYUNG LEE
G.R. NO. 18176, October 26, 1966
PONENTE: CONCEPCION, C.J.

“A court has jurisdiction over the res, in an action for annulment of marriage,
provided, at least, one of the parties is domiciled in, or a national of, the forum.”

FACTS:

Lazaro Rayray married Chae Kyung Lee in 1952 in Pusan, Korea. Before
the marriage, Lee was able to secure a marriage license which is a requirement in Korea
prior to marrying. They lived together until 1955. Rayray however later found out that Lee
had previously lived with 2 Americans and a Korean. Lee answered by saying that it is not
unusual in Korea for a woman to have more than one partner and that it is legally permissive
for them to do so and that there is no legal impediment to her marriage with
Rayray. Eventually they pursued their separate way.

Plaintiff Lazaro Rayray seeks the annulment of his marriage to defendant Chae
Kyung Lee. Inasmuch as, the latter's whereabouts is unknown; summons was served by
publication, as provided in the Rules of Court. Thereafter, plaintiff moved that defendant be
declared in default, she not having filed an answer, and that a date be set for the reception
of his evidence.

In due course, thereafter, the lower court decision was rendered dismissing plaintiff's
complaint, without costs, upon the ground: (1) that the court could not nullify a marriage
contracted abroad; and (2) that the facts proven do not warrant the relief prayed for. A
reconsideration of this decision having been denied, plaintiff appealed to the Court of
Appeals, which certified the case to the Supreme Court, the jurisdiction of the lower court
being in issue in the appeal.

The court a quo found that it had no jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of plaintiff's
marriage to the defendant, it having been solemnized in Seoul, Korea. Said conclusion is
erroneous. In order that a given case could be validly decided by a court of justice, it must
have jurisdiction over (1) the subject-matter of the litigation; (2) the person of the parties
therein; and (3) in actions in rem or quasi-in-rem, the res.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the subject was subject to the jurisdiction before Philippine trial
courts?
HELD:

The prevailing rule is, accordingly, that a court has jurisdiction over the res, in an
action for annulment of marriage, provided, at least, one of the parties is domiciled in, or a
national of, the forum. Since plaintiff is a Filipino, domiciled in the Philippines, it follows that
the lower court had jurisdiction over the res, in addition to its jurisdiction over the subject-
matter and the parties. In other words, it could validly inquire into the legality of the marriage
between the parties herein.

The lower court is correct in ruling that Rayray’s evidence is not sufficient to render
his marriage with Lee null and void. Rayray said that the police clearance secured by Lee is
meant to allow her to marry after her subsequent cohabitation/s with the other men – which
are considered bigamous in Philippine law. The SC ruled that the police clearance is wanting
for it lacks the signature of the person who prepared it and there is no
competent document to establish the identity of the same. Also, through Rayray himself, Lee
averred that it is ok in Korea for a person who cohabited with other men before to marry
another man. This is an indication that Lee herself is aware that if it were a
previous marriage that is concerned then that could be a legal impediment to any
subsequent marriage.

Rayray cannot be given credence in claiming that his consent could have been
otherwise altered had he known all these facts prior to the marriage because he would lie to
every opportunity given him by the Court so as to suit his case.

Thus, petition is DENIED with the cost against the plaintiff-appellant.

CHI MING TSOI vs. COURT OF APPEALS, GINA LAO-TSOI
GR NO. 119190, January 16, 1997

FACTS:
1. Chi Ming Tsoi married Gina on May 22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral, Intramuros, Manila
as evidenced by their marriage contract. After the celebration they had a reception and
then proceeded to the house of the Chi Ming Tsoi’s mother.

2. There they slept together on the same bed in the same room for the first night of their
married life.

Gina’s version:
o That contrary to her expectations that as newlyweds they were supposed to
enjoy making love that night of their marriage

o Chi Ming Tsoi however just went to bed, slept on one side and then turned his
back and went to sleep. There was no sexual intercourse between them that
night.

o The same thing happened on the second, third and fourth nights.

o In an effort to have their honey moon in a private place where they can enjoy
together during their first week as husband and wife they went to Baguio City.
But they did so together with Chi Ming Tsoi’s mother, uncle and nephew as
they were all invited by her husband.

o There was no sexual intercourse between them for four days in Baguio since
Chi Ming Tsoi avoided her by taking a long walk during siesta time or by just
sleeping on a rocking chair located at the living room.

o They slept together in the same room and on the same bed since May 22,
1988 (day of their marriage) until March 15, 1989 (ten months). But during this
period there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between them.

o Gina claims that she did not even see her husband’s private parts nor did he
see hers.

o Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr.

Eufemio Macalalag. Results were that Gina is healthy, normal and still a virgin
while Chi Ming Tsoi’s examination was kept confidential up to this time.

o Gina claims that her husband is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not
show his penis. She said she had observed him using an eyebrow pencil and
sometimes the cleansing cream of his mother.
 o She also said her husband only married her to acquire or maintain his
residency status here in the country and to publicly maintain the appearance
of a normal man

Chi Ming Tsoi’s version:

o Claims that if their marriage shall be annulled by reason of psychological
incapacity, the fault lies with Gina.

o He does not want their marriage annulled for reasons of (1) that he loves her
very much (2) that he has no defect on his part and he is physically and
psychologically capable (3) since the relationship is still very young and if there
is any differences between the two of them, it can still be reconciled and that
according to him, if either one of them has some incapabilities, there is no
certainty that this will not be cured.

o Chi Ming Tsoi admitted that since his marriage to Gina there was no sexual
contact between them. But, the reason for this, according to the defendant,
was that everytime he wants to have sexual intercourse with his wife, she
always avoided him and whenever he caresses her private parts, she always
removed his hands.

3. RTC: Annulled the marriage due to psychological incapacity

4. CA: Affirmed RTC’s ruling

ISSUE:
Whether or not Chi Ming Tsoi is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage?

RULING:
YES. The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the trial court and Court of
Appeals in rendering as VOID the marriage entered into by Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina on
May 22, 1988. No costs.
 The Supreme Court held that the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual
intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity.

o If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or

her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant,
 Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity
than to stubborn refusal.

o Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity.

 One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is “to procreate
children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual
cooperation is the basic end of marriage.”

 Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness
of the marriage.

o In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties
to fulfill this marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.

 While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together,
observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, the sanction therefore is actually the
“spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate
or court order (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno, 120 Phil. 1298).

 Love is useless unless it is shared with another.

o Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say

“I could not have cared less.”
o This is so because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self.
o The egoist has nothing but himself.

 In the natural order, it is sexual intimacy that brings spouses wholeness and oneness.

o Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation.

o It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the
continuation of family relations.
HEIRS OF INGJUG-TIRO VS. SPOUSES CASALS
G.R. No. 134718. August 20, 2001

FACTS:

A 5,354-square meter parcel of land is at the epicentrum of the controversy. Originally

titled in the name of MamertoIngjug, the property is located in the former Municipality of
Opon, Province of Cebu (now Marigondon, Lapu-Lapu City). The claimants are the
descendants of Mamerto Ingjug on one hand who allege that they have been deprived of
their successional rights through fraud and misrepresentation, and a group of vendees on
the other hand claiming to have acquired the property for value and in good faith.

The case filed by the descendants of Mamerto Ingjug was dismissed by the trial court
on the ground of prescription and laches. The dismissal was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. During the Second World War, or some sixty (60) years ago, Mamerto Ingjug died
leaving behind the subject parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. RO-
0376 in his name as owner in fee simple.

Upon his death title thereto devolved upon his five (5) children, namely, Romana,
Francisco, Francisca, Luisa and Maria, all surnamed Ingjug. On 9 July 1965, or more than
two (2) decades later, Luisa, Maria, one Eufemio Ingjug, and Guillerma Ingjug Fuentes-
Pagubo, daughter of Francisca, sold the disputed land to herein respondents, the spouses
Leon V. Casals and Lilia C. Casals, the spouses Carlos L. Climaco and Lydia R. Climaco,
the spouses Jose L. Climaco, Jr. and Blanquita C. Climaco, and Consuelo L. Climaco.

The vendors allegedly represented to the vendees that the property was inherited by
them from the late Mamerto Ingjug, and that they were his only surviving heirs. The sale was
evidenced by a Deed of Sale of Unregistered Land and an Extrajudicial Settlement and
Confirmation of Sale executed by the vendors in favor of the vendees.

ISSUE:

WON petitioners' right to institute a complaint for partition and reconveyance is

effectively barred by prescription and laches.

HELD:

A cursory reading of the complaint, however, reveals that the action filed by
petitioners was for partition, recovery of ownership and possession, declaration of nullity of
a deed of sale of unregistered land and extrajudicial settlement and confirmation of sale.
 Petitioners' causes of action are premised on their claim that: (a) the Deed of Sale of
Unregistered Land is void and of no effect since their respective shares in the inheritance
were included in the sale without their knowledge and consent, and one of the vendor-
signatories therein, Eufemio Ingjug (Eufemio Tiro, husband of Romana Ingjug), was not even
a direct and compulsory heir of the decedent; and (b) the Extrajudicial Settlement and
Confirmation of Sale is simulated and therefore null and void ab initio, as it was purportedly
executed in 1967 by, among others, Eufemio Tiro who was not an heir, and by Francisco
Ingjug who died in 1963.

Also, the prayer in the same complaint expressly asks that all those transactions be
declared null and void. In other words, it is the nullity of the deeds of sale and the extrajudicial
settlement and confirmation of the sale which is the basic hypothesis upon which the instant
civil action rests.

Thus, it appears that we are dealing here not with simple voidable contracts tainted
with fraud, but with contracts that are altogether null and void ab initio. The property should
have been divided equally among them, but prior to its partition these heirs of Mamerto
Ingjug owned the property in common. It follows then that Luisa, Maria and Guillerma
(daughter of Francisca) and Eufemio Ingjug could not, by themselves, validly dispose of the
entire litigated property to the exclusion of and without the knowledge and consent of the
other heirs since Luisa, Maria, Guillerma and Eufemio are not the exclusive owners thereof.
More so in the case of Eufemio, who is claimed to be a total stranger to and therefore has
no legal interest whatsoever in the inherited property not being a direct heir.

It is essential that the vendors be the owners of the property sold otherwise they
cannot dispose that which does not belong to them. Without any evidence on record relating
to these points, this Court cannot affix its imprimatur to the peremptory dismissal of the
complaint in light of the pleas of petitioners for their just share in the inheritance and for the
partition of their common predecessor's estate. Indeed, it is but fair and just that, without
prejudging the issues, the parties be allowed to substantiate their respective claims and
defenses in a full-blown trial, and secure a ruling on all the issues presented in their
respective pleadings.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of

Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the case is REMANDED to the RTC-Br. 27,
Lapu-Lapu City, for trial and judgment.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RODOLFO O. DE GRACIA
G.R. No. 171557, February 12, 2014

FACTS:

1. Rodolfo and Natividad were married at the Parish of St. Vincent Ferrer in Salug,
Zamboanga del Norte. (February 15, 1969).

2. They lived in Dapaon, Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte and have two children (Ma.
Reynilda; August 20, 1969 and Ma. Rizza; January 15, 1972).

3. Rodolfo filed a verified complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC
(December 28, 1998) alleging that Natividad was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with her essential marital obligations.

4. Rodolfo testified that he and Natividad were students at the Barangay High School of
Sindangan and he was forced to marry her barely 3 months into their courtship in light
of her accidental pregnancy. He was 21 and she was 18.

5. He had no stable job and merely worked in the gambling cockpits as “kristo” and
“bangkero sa hantak.”

6. He decided to join and train with the army but Natividad left their conjugal home and
sold their house without his consent. Natividad moved to Dipolog City where she lived
with a certain Engineer Terez, and bore him a child. Natividad contracted a second
marriage with another man named Antonio Mondarez.

7. Rodolfo was left to take care of Ma. Reynilda and Ma. Rizza and he exerted earnest
efforts to save their marriage however proved futile because of Natividad’s
psychological incapacity that appeared to be incurable.

8. Dr. Zalsos (psychiatrist) stated that both Rodolfo and Natividad were psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations, finding that both parties
suffered from “utter emotional immaturity”.

9. Dr. Zalsos also observed that Natividad lacked the willful cooperation of being a wife
and a mother to her two daughters. Similarly, Rodolfo failed to perform his obligations
as a husband, adding too that he sired a son with another woman. The mental
condition of both parties already existed at the time of the celebration of marriage,
although it only manifested after.

10. OSG filed an opposition to the complaint; the acts committed by Natividad did not
demonstrate psychological incapacity as contemplated by law; mere grounds for legal
separation under the Family Code.
 11. RTC: Marriage between Rodolfo and Natividad void on the ground of psychological
incapacity. It relied on the findings and testimony of Dr. Zalsos.

12. CA: affirmed the ruling of the RTC

ISSUE:

W/N Natividad is psychologically incapacitated?

HELD:

 Psychological incapacity,” as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36 of the

Family Code, should refer to no less than a mental – not merely physical – incapacity
that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.

 Psychological incapacity-most serious cases of personality disorders clearly

demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage.

 Santos vs CA: (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence (c) incurability

 Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility could not be equated with psychological

incapacity as it was not shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered
personality which make her completely unable to discharge the essential marital
obligations of the marital state, not merely due to her youth, immaturity or sexual
promiscuity.

 Dr. Zalsos does not explain in reasonable detail how Natividad’s condition could be
characterized as grave, deeply–rooted, and incurable within the parameters of
psychological incapacity jurisprudence.

 Dr. Zalsos failed to identify in her report the root cause of Natividad’s condition and
to show that it existed at the time of the parties’ marriage. Neither was the gravity or
seriousness of Natividad’s behavior in relation to her failure to perform the essential
marital obligations sufficiently described in Dr. Zalsos’s report.
MENDOZA V. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 157854, November, 12 2012

DOCTRINE:
The office of the Solicitor General (OSG) is required to actively participate in all stages
of the proceedings and to require the OSG to appear as counsel for the State in the capacity
of a defensor vinculi (i.e, defender of the marital band) to oppose petitions for, and to appeal
judgments in favor of, declarations of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code,
thereby ensuring that only the meritorious cases for the declaration of nullity of marriages
based on psychological incapacity-those sufficiently evidenced.

Even if the expert opinions of psychologists are not sine qua non in the granting of
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, the actual medical examination is to be
dispensed with only if the totality of evidence presented is enough to support a finding of
psychological incapacity. What is essential is the “presence of evidence that can adequately
establish the party’s psychological condition.”

FACTS:

 Anabelle and Dominic met in 1989 upon his return to the country from his employment
in Papua New Guinea.

 Arabelle and Dominic Mendoza got married while Arabelle was eight months
pregnant. They lived together but depended on their parents for financial support.
Arabelle had different jobs to support the needs of the family.

 When Dominic got employed for Toyota in Bel-Air Makati in 1994, he spent his first
salary celebrating with his friends. September of the same year, Arabelle found out
of Dominic’s illicit relationship with Zaida, his co-employee. Communication between
them became rare and they started sleeping in separate rooms.

 In November 1995, Dominic gave her a car as a birthday present only to find out that
he did not pay for it, forcing her to rely on her father-in-law for the payment of the car.
Dominic eventually got fired from his job because of he ran away with P164,000
belonging to his employer. He was charged with estafa. Petitioner also found out that
he swindled many of his clients some of them threatening her and their family.

 On October 15, 1997, Dominic abandoned the conjugal abode because petitioner
asked him for “time and space to think things over.” A month later, she refused his
attempt at reconciliation, causing him to threaten to commit suicide. She and her
family immediately left the house to live in another place concealed from him.
  On August 5, 1998, petitioner filed in the RTC her petition for the declaration of the
nullity of her marriage with Dominic based on his psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Family Code. The RTC found that all the characteristics of
psychological incapacity which are gravity, antecedence and incurability, were
attendant, establishing Dominic’s psychological incapacity.

 The Republic appealed to the CA, arguing that there was no showing that Dominic’s
personality traits either constituted psychological incapacity existing at the time of the
marriage or were of the nature contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code; that
the testimony of the expert witness was not conclusive upon the court, and that the
real reason for the parties’ separation had been their frequent quarrels over financial
matters and the criminal cases brought against Dominic. CA reversed the decision of
RTC. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not psychological incapacity of Dominic was established, and thus their
marriage is null and void. -NO

HELD/RATIO:

The appeal has no merit. The CA correctly indicated that the ill-feelings that the petitioner
harbored against Dominic furnished the basis to doubt the findings of the expert witness;
that such findings were one-sided and that he did not participate in the proceedings. The
findings and conclusions on his psychological profile were solely based on the self-serving
testimonial descriptions of him by the petitioner and her witnesses. The court finds the totality
of evidence adduced by the petitioner insufficient to prove that Dominic was psychologically
unfit. Accordingly, the RTC’s findings that Dominic’s psychological incapacity was
characterized by gravity, antecedence and incurability could not stand scrutiny. His alleged
immaturity, deceitfulness and lack of remorse did not necessarily constitute psychological
incapacity. The court denies the petition for certiorari and affirms that decision of the Court
of Appeals.

Findings of Dr. Samson were one-sided, because Dominic was not himself subjected to
an actual psychiatric evaluation by petitioner’s expert. He also did not participate in the
proceedings. And that the findings and conclusions on his psychological profile by her expert
were solely based the testimonies of the petitioner.
Republic of the Philippines vs. Erlinda Matias Dagdag
G.R. No. 109975. February 9, 2001

FACTS:

Erlinda Matias married Avelino Parangan Dagdag and begot two children. Avelino
would disappear for months without explanation and attend to drinking sprees with friends
and return home drunk when with the family; forced his wife to have sexual intercourse and
if she resisted, would inflict injure to the latter. He left his family again and never heard of
him. Erlinda was constrained to look for a job to fend for themselves. Erlinda then learned
that Avelino was imprisoned for some crime, and that he escaped from jail who remains at-
large at date.Erlinda filed for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.

The trial court rendered a decision declaring the marriage void under Artcile 36 of the
Family Code. The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals raising that the lower
court erred in declaring the apellee's marriage to Avelino Dagdag null and void on the ground
of psychological incapacity of the latter, pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code, the
psychological incapacity of the nature contemplated by the law not having been proven to
exist. However, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court

ISSUE:

Whether or not immaturity and irresponsibility, habitual alcoholic, and a fugitive from
justice constitutes psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code to declare
the marriage null and void.

RULING:

No. The ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina case is reiterated herein in
which the Court laid down the following GUIDELINES in the interpretation and application of
Article 36 of the Family Code:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.
 (3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the
celebration” of the marriage.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically

permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative
only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68

up to 71 of the Family Codeas regards the husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of

the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.

BRENDA B. MARCOS vs. WILSON G. MARCOS

G.R. No. 136490, October 19, 2000

FACTS:
Brenda and Wilson got married twice and out of their marriage, five (5) children were
born. After the downfall of President Marcos, Wilson left his post in the military service in
1987 and then engaged in different business ventures that did not however prosper. As a
wife, Brenda always urged him to look for work so that their children would see him, instead
of her, as the head of the family and a good provider. Due to his failure to engage in any
gainful employment for six (6) years, they would often quarrel and as a consequence, he
would hit and beat her. He would even force her to have sex with him despite her weariness.
He would also inflict physical harm on their children for a slight mistake and was so severe
in the way he chastised them. Thus, for several times during their cohabitation, he would
leave their house. In 1992, they were already living separately.
 Meanwhile, Brenda has been financially stable with her business. On October 16,
1994, they had a bitter quarrel and as they were already living separately, Brenda did not
want him to stay in their house anymore. On that day, when she saw him in their house, she
was so angry that she lambasted him. He then turned violent, inflicting physical harm on her
and even on her mother who came to her aid. The following day, October 17, 1994, she and
their children left the house and sought refuge in her sister's house.

Thereafter, Brenda filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of their marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code. Brenda submitted herself to psychologist, while Wilson did
not.
The RTC ruled for the nullity of their marriage, while on appeal, the CA reversed RTC’s
decision on the ground that Wilson did not submit himself to psychological evaluation as
held in the Molina case. Hence, this case was filed by Brenda.

ISSUE:

WON psychological evaluation of the parties to a petition for declaration of nullity of

marriage under Artivle 36 is a condition precedent to a finding of pshychological incapacity?

LAW:
Article 36, Family Code. “A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only
after its solemnization”

DECISION:
No. A personal medical examination is not a conditio sine qua non to a finding of
psychological incapacity. The Molina guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements
earlier mandated by the Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals: "psychological incapacity must
be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." The foregoing
guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically
incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically identified." What is
important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party's psychological
condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need
not be resorted to. However, Brenda’s Petition was still denied by the Supreme Court and
upheld the CA in ruling for the validity of their marriage on the ground that Psychological
incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be established by the
totality of evidence presented, which was absent in this case.
FLORENCE MALCAMPO-SIN, Petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPP T. SIN, Respondent.
G.R. No. 137590, March 26, 2001

FACTS:

Florence, the petitioner, was married with Philipp, a Portuguese citizen in January
1987. Florence filed in September 1994, a complaint for the declaration of nullity of their
marriage. Trial ensued and the parties presented their respective documentary and
testimonial evidence. In June 1995, trial court dismissed Florence’s petition and throughout
its trial, the State did not participate in the proceedings. While Fiscal Jabson filed with the
court a manifestation dated November 1994 stating the he found no collusion between the
parties, he did not actively participated therein. Other than having appearance at certain
hearings, nothing more was heard of him.

ISSUE:

Whether the declaration of nullity may be declared even with the absence of the
participation of the State in the proceedings.

HELD:
Article 48 of the Family Code states that “in all cases of annulment or declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned
to it to appear on behalf of the state to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties
and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. The trial court should have
ordered the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor-General to appear as counsel for
the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification briefly stating his reasons for his agreement or opposition as the case may be,
to the petition. The records are bereft of an evidence that the State participated in the
prosecution of the case, thus, the case is remanded for proper trial.
ROMULO TOLENTINO, Petitioner
vs.
HELEN VILLANUEVA and HONORABLE CORAZON JULIANO AGRAVA, Judge of the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations, Respondents.
G.R. No. L-23264, March 15, 1974

FACTS:

Romulo Tolentino filed a suit for annulment of his marriage to Helen Villanueva.
However, despite the fact that Helen was served with summons and copy of the complaint,
Helen failed to file a responsive pleading, for which reason Romulo filed a motion to declare
her in default and to set the date for the presentation of his evidence.

Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila declared Helen in default, but,
pursuant to the provision of Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, referred
the case to the City Fiscal for investigation to determine whether collusion exists between
the parties.

Romulo submitted to the City Fiscal only a copy of his complaint.

The Fiscal issued a subpoena to Romulo’s counsel requiring him to bring Romulo
with him as well as copies of other documents in connection with the annulment case.

However, Romulo’s counsel informed the fiscal that he could not comply with the
subpoena for it will unnecessarily expose his evidence.

In a motion, Romulo’s counsel prayed to set the date for the reception of his evidence
on the ground that the City Fiscal had not submitted a report of his findings despite the lapse
of sixty (60) days when he submitted to the City Fiscal a copy of the complaint.

Respondent Judge denied the aforesaid motion of Romulo unless he submits himself
for interrogation by the City Fiscal to enable the latter to report whether or not there is
collusion between the parties.

Respondent Judge dismissed the complaint in view of the fact that Romulo is not
willing to submit himself for interrogation by the City Fiscal pursuant to the provisions of
Article 101 of the Civil Code.

Romulo filed a petition to annul said order and to compel the respondent Judge to
receive his evidence.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the order of the respondent judge dismissing the complaint due to the
fact that the plaintiff is not willing to submit himself for interrogation by the City Fiscal is valid.

HELD:
YES, the order of the respondent judge is valid.
Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code of the Philippines expressly prohibit the rendition
of a decision in suits for annulment of marriage and legal separation based on a stipulation
of facts or by confession of judgment and direct that in case of non-appearance of defendant,
the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not collusion between
the parties exists, and if none, said prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State to
prevent fabrication of evidence for the plaintiff.
Institutions of marriage and of the family are sacred and therefore are as much the
concern of the State as of the spouses. The State and the public have vital interest in the
maintenance and preservation of these social institutions against desecration by collusion
between the parties or by fabricated evidence.
The prohibition against annulling of a marriage based on the stipulation of facts or by
confession of judgment or by non-appearance of the defendant stresses the fact that
marriage is more than a mere contract between the parties; and for this reason, when the
defendant fails to appear, the law enjoins the court to direct the prosecuting officer to
intervene for the State in order to preserve the integrity and sanctity of the marital bonds.
CECILIO MENDOZA, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and LUISA DELA ROSA MENDOZA,
Respondents.
G.R. No. L-23102, April 24, 1967,19 SCRA 756

FACTS:

In the complaint, private respondent, Luisa De La Rosa Mendoza averred that she
was married to Cecilio Mendoza on 2 September 1953, that they lived together as husband
and wife until14 July 1954, when the husband departed for the United States to further his
studies and practice his profession. Since then, defendant Mendoza, without justifiable
cause or reason deliberately abandoned and neglected plaintiff and despite repeated
demands by plaintiff, defendant has failed and refused, and still fails and refuses, to provide
for the maintenance and support of plaintiff, who is allegedly to be pregnant, sickly and
without any source of revenue, while defendant (now petitioner) is employed in a hospital in
the United States.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the case at bar is covered under Article 151 where earnest efforts to
wardcompromise should first be made prior the filing of the petition, and invoking Article 222
of the New Civil Code of the Philippines.

RULING:

Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines requires that before a suit between
members of the same family (in this case between husband and wife) is filed or maintained,
it must appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, and the only way
to make it so appear when the suit is filed is by a proper averment to that effect in the
complaint. Since the law forbids a suit being initiated filed or maintained unless such efforts
at compromise appear, the showing that efforts in question were made is a condition
precedent to the existence of the cause of action. It follows that the failure of the complaint
to plead that plaintiff previously tried in earnest to reach a settlement out of court renders it
assailable for lack of cause of action and it may be so attacked at any stage of the case
even on appeal.

While the Supreme Court agree that position represents a correct statement of the
general rule on the matter, we are nevertheless constrained to hold that the Court of Appeals
and the Court of First Instance committed no error in refusing to dismiss the complaint, for
on its face, the same involved a claim for future support that under Article 2035 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines cannot be subject of a valid compromise, and is, therefore, outside
the sphere of application of Article 222 of the Code upon which petitioner relies. This
appears form the last proviso of said Article 222, future support.
Estrella dela Cruz vs Severino dela Cruz
GR No. L-19565, 30 January 1968
En Banc
Ponente: Castro, J.

Doctrine: Abandonment as a ground

FACTS OF THE CASE:

The plaintiff and the defendant were married in Bacolod City. Six children were born
to them. During their coveture they acquired parcels of land and engaged in various business
ventures.

The plaintiff averred that the defendant started living in Manila although he
occasionally returned to Bacolod City sleeping in his office at the Philippine Textboard
Factory in Mandalagan, instead of in the conjugal home, although he paid short visits. She
began to suspect the existence of ilicit relations between her husband and Nenita.

The defendant denied having abandoned his wife and children. He stayed in manila
to manage their expanding business. From the time he started living separately in
Mandalagan up to the filing of the complaint, the plaintiff furnished him food and took care
of his laundry. This declaration was not rebutted by the plaintiff. He has never failed to give
them financial support. He finance the education of children. While in Bacolod City, he never
failed to visit his family, particularly the children.

The Trial Court rendered judgment ordering separation and division of the conjugal
assets. From this judgment, the defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals which certified
the case to Us.

ISSUE OF THE CASE:

Whether the separation of the defendant from the plaintiff constitute abandonment in
law that would justify a separation of the conjugal partnership properties.

RULING OF THE COURT:

We have made a searching scrutiny of the record and it is considered view that the
defendant is not guilty of abandonment of his wife. To entitle her to any remedies under Art.
178 NCC, there must be real abandonment, and not mere separation.
 The concept of abandonment is Art.178 may be established in relation to the
alternative remedies granted to the wife when she has been abandoned by the husband
namely, receivership, administration by her, or separation of property, all of which are
designed: 1.) To protect the conjugal assets from waste and dissipation rendered imminent
by the husband’s continued absence from the conjugal abode, and 2.) To assure the wife of
a ready and steady source of support.

Therefore, physical separation alone is not the full meaning of the term abandonment
if the husband, despite his voluntary departure from the society of his spouse, neither
neglects the management of the conjugal partnership nor ceases to give support to his wife.

The word “abandon”, when referring to desertion of a wife by a husband, has been
defined the act of a husband voluntarily leaving his wife with intention to forsake her entirely,
never to return to her, and never to resume his marital duties towards her, or to claim his
marital rights; such neglect as either leaves the wife destitute of the common necessaries of
life, or would leave her destitute but for charity of others.

As used in Art.178, it is clear that to constitute abandonment for the wife by the
husband there must be absolute cessation of marital relations and duties and rights, with
the intention of perpetual separation.

In the case at bar, we believe that the defendant did not intend to leave his wife and
children permanently. The record conclusively shows that he continued to give support to
his family despite his absence from the conjugal home. The fact that the defendant never
ceased to give support to his wife and children negates any intent on his part not to return
to the conjugal abode.

If there is only physical separation between spouses, engendered by the husband’s

leaving the conjugal abode, but the husband continues to manage the conjugal properties
with the zeal, industry, and efficiency as he did prior to the separation, and religiously give
support to his wife and children, as in the case at bar, we are not disposed to grant the wife
petition for separation of property.

Accordingly, the judgment a quo, insofar as it decrees separation of the conjugal

properties, is reversed and set aside.
Carmen Lapuz Sy, represented by her substitute Macario Lapuz vs Eufemio S.
Eufemio alias Eufemio Sy uy
43 SCRA 177, GR No. L-30977, 31 January 1972
En Banc
Ponente: Reyes, JBL, J.

NATURE OF THE CASE:

A Petition filed after the effectivity of RA 5440 for review by certiorari of an Order of
the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila, dismissing said case for Legal
Separation on the ground that the death of the plaintiff, Carmen O. Lapuz, which occurred
during the pendency of the case, abated the cause of action as well as the action itself.

FACTS OF THE CASE:

Carmen filed a Petition for Legal Separation against Eufemio, alleging that she was
abandoned by her husband and cohabitate with a Chinese woman, and praying that her
husband should be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership.

Respondent Eufemio alleged affirmative defenses and counter-claimed for the

declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage with Carmen on the ground of his prior and
subsisting marriage with Ngo Hiok.
But before the trial could be completed, Carmen died in a vehicular accident.

Eufemio moved to dismiss the petition for Legal Separation on the gorund that the
death of Carmen abated the action for Legal Separation.

Counsel for Carmen moved to substitute Carmen by her father.

The Court issued the Order under review, dismissing the case stating that the
substitution has to be resolved on the question of whether the plaintiff’s cause of action has
survived, which the court resolved in the negative.
ISSUE OF THE CASE:

Whether the death of the plaintiff before the final decree, in an action for Legal
Separation, abate the action. If it does, whether the abatement also apply if the action
involves property rights.

RULING OF THE COURT:

An action for Legal Separation is purely personal. Being personal in character, it

follows that the death of one party to the action causes the death of the action itself – “Actio
Personalis Moritur Cum”.

A review of the resulting changes in property relations between spouses shows that
they are solely the effect of the decree of Legal Separation; hence, they cannot survive the
death of the plaintiff if it occurs prior to the decree.

If death supervenes during the pendency of the action, no decree can be forthcoming,
death producing a more radical and definitive separation; and the expected consequential
rights and claims would necessarily remain unborn.

As to the petition of Eufemio for a declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage with
Carmen, such action became moot and academic upon the death of the latter. Any property
rights acquired could be resolved and determined in a proper action for partition.

Accordingly, the appealed judgment of the Manila Court of Juvenile and Domestic
Relations is affirmed. No special pronouncement as to costs.
Enrico L. Pacete, Clarita dela Concepcion, Emelda Pacete, Evelina Pacete, Eduardo
Pacete vs Hon. Glicerio Cariaga, Jr, Concepcion Alanis-Pacete
231 SCRA, GR No. L-53880, 17 March 1994
Third Division
Ponente; Vitug, J.

Doctrine: Coolling-off period

NATURE FO THE CASE:

Petition for certiorari whether the CFI (now RTC) gravely abused its discretion in
denying petitioner’s motion for extention of time to file their answer, in declaring petiitoners
in default and in rendering its decision which decreed the Legal Separation and held null
and void ab initio the marriage of Enrico Pacete to Clareta dela Concepcion.

FACTS OF THE CASE:

Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of the marriage
between her husband Enrico Pacete and Clarita dela Concepcion, as well as for Legal
Separation (bwtween Alanis and Pacete), accounting and separation of property. She
averred that: 1.) She was married to pacete and they had a child; 2.) Pacete subsequently
contracted a second marriage with Clarita; and 3.) Reconciliation between her and pacete
was impossible since he evidently preferred to continue living with Clarita.

The defendants filed a motion for an extension of time to file an answer.

The court denied the motion on the ground that it was filed after the original period
given, as first extension had expired.

The plaintiff thereupon filed a motion to declare the defendants in default.

The court granted the motion to declare the defendants in default and ordered the
issuance of a Decree of Legal Separation of Marriage between Concepcion Alanis and
Enrico Pacete.
ISSUE OF THE CASE:

Whether the CFI (now RTC) gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioner’s
motion for extension of time to file their answer, in declaring petitioners in default and in
rendering its decision which decreed the Legal Separation and held null and void ab initio
the marriage of Enrico Pacete to Clarita dela Concepcion.

RULING OF THE COURT:

Art. 101 NCC provides: “No decree of Legal Separation shall be promulgated upon a
stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment.

In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting
attorney to inquire whether or not a collusion between the parties exists. If there is no
collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to take care that the
evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated.

The policy of Art. 101, calling for the intervention of the state attorneys in case of an
uncontested proceedings for Legal Separation (and for annulment of marriage, under
Art.88), is to emphasize that marriage is more than a mere contract, that it is a social
institution in which the state is vitally interested, so that its continuation of interruption cannot
be made to depend upon the parties themselves.

Art. 103 CC (now Art.58 of the Family Code), further mandates that an action for
Legal Separation must “in no case be tried before 6 months shall have elapse since the filing
of the petition”, obviously in order to provide the parties a “cooling off” period. In this interim,
the court shall takes steps toward getting the parties to reconcile.

The significance of the above substantive provisions is further underscored by the

inclusion of the provisions in S6 R18 Rules of Court, which states that: No defaults in actions
for annulment of marriage or for “Legal Separation. If the defendant in an action for
annulment of marriage or for legal Separation fails to answer, the court shall order the
prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties exists,
and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence
submitted is not fabricated.

Wherefore, the petition for certiorari is hereby denied, and the proceedings, including
the Decision appealed from, are Nullified and Set Aside. No costs.
Herbert Cang vs Court of Appeals, Spouses Clavano
GR No. 105308, 25 September 1998
Third Division
Ponente; Romero, J.

Doctrine: Designation of Parent to exercise parental authority.

NATURE OF THE CASE:

Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the
Decree of Adoption issued by the RTC of Cebu City in Special Proceedings “In the Matter
of the Petition for Adoption of the minors Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony, Spouses
Clavano”.

FACTS OF THE CASE:

Petitioner Herbert Kang and Anna Marie Clavano begot 3 children. Upon learning of
her husband’s alleged illicit liason, Anna Marie filed a petition for Legal Separation.

Petitioner then left for the US where he sought from Anna Marie before the Court of
Nevada. Said court issued the Divorce Decree, and grant custody of the 3 minor children to
Anna Marie, reserving “rights of visitation at all reasonable times and places” to petitioner.
While in the US, petitioner remitted to the Philippines for his children’s expenses.

Meanwhile, private respondents Spouses Clavano, brother and sister-in-law of Anna

Marie, filed Special Proceedings for the adoption of the 3 minor Cang children.

Upon learning of the petitioner for adoption, petitioner immediately returned to

Philippines and filed an opposition. Pending resolution of the petition for adoption, petitioner
moved to reacquire custody over his children alleging that Anna Marie had transferred to the
US thereby leaving custody of their children to Spouses Clavano.

The RTC Brancg 19 issued an order finding Anna Maarie relinquished custody over
the children, therefore, such custody be transferred to the father.

The RTC Branch 14 issued a Decree of Adoption. Petitoner was morally unfit to be
the father of his children, and Herbert Cang has abandoned his children, and abandonment
of a child by its parent is commonly specified by statute as a ground for dispensing with his
consent to its adoption.
ISSUE OF THE CASE:

1. Whether the minor children be legally adopted without the written consent of a natural
parent on the ground that the latter has abandoned them.

2. Whether the petition for adoption was fatally defective as it did not have his written
consent as a natural father.

RULING OF THE COURT:

Notwithstanding the amendments to the law, the written consent of the natural parent
to the adoption has remained a requisite for its validity. Notably such requirements is also
embodied in R99 RoC:

S3. Consent to Adoption. There shall be filed with the petition a written
consent to the adoption signed by the child, if 14 years of age or over and not
incompetent, and by the child’s spouse, if any, and by each of its known living
parents who is not insane or hopelessly intemperate or has not abandoned the
child, or if the child is in custody of an orphan asylum, children’s home, or
benevolent society or person, by the proper officer or officers of such asylum,
home or society, or by such persons; but if the child is illegitimate and has not
been recognized, the consent of its father to the adoption shall not be required.

In the instant case, only the affidavit of consent of the natural mother was attached to
the petition for adoption. Petitioner’s consent, as the natural father is lacking. Nonetheless,
the petition sufficiently alleged that fact of abandonment of minors for adoption by natural
father. However, in cases where the father opposes the adoption primarily because his
consent thereto was not sought, the matter of whether he had abandoned his child becomes
a proper issue for determination. The issue of abandonment by the oppositor natural parent
is a preliminary issue that an adoption court must first confront.

This court finds both the lower court and the Court of Appeals failed to appreciate
facts and circumstances that should have elicited a different conclusion on the issue of
whether the petitioner has so abandoned his children, thereby making his consent to the
adoption unnecessary.

In its ordinary sense, the word “abandon” means to forsake entirely, to forsake or
renounce utterly. In reference to abandonment of a child by his parent, the act of
abandonment imports “any conduct of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego
all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child”. It means “neglect or refusal
to perform the natural and legal obligations of care and support which parents owe their
children”.
 In the instant case, records disclose that petitioner’s conduct did not manifest a
settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his
children as to constitute abandonment. Physical estrangement alone, without financial and
moral desertion, is not tantamount to abandonment. While admittedly, petitioner was
physically absent as he was then in the US, he was not remiss in his natural and legal
obligations of love, care, and support for his children. He maintained regular communication
with his wife and children through letters and telephone. He used to send packages by mail
and catered to their whims.

While parental authority may be waived, as in law it may be subject to a compromise,

there was no factual finding in the legal separation case that petitioner was such an
irresponsible person that he should be deprived of custody of his children or that there are
grounds under the law that could deprive him of parental authority. In fact, in the legal
separation case, the court thereafter ordered the transfer of custody over the children from
Anna Marrie back to petitioner. The order was not implemented because of Anna Marie’s
motion for reconsideration thereon.

Keith, Charmaine, and Joseph Anthony have all grown up. For sure, they shall be
endowed with the discretion to lead lives independent of their parents. This is not to state
that this case has been rendered moot and academic, for their welfare and best interests
regarding their adoption, must be determined as of the time that the petition for adoption
was filed. Said petition must be denied as it was filed without the required consent of their
father who, by law and under the facts of the case at bar, has not abandoned them.

Wherefore, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby granted. The
questioned decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals and the RTC are set aside
thereby denying the petition for adoption.
CHIN AH FOO and YEE SHEE vs. PEDRO CONCEPCION
G.R. No. L-33281 | March 31, 1930

DOCTRINE: A judge has no unilateral power to release an insane person he committed to an institution

FACTS:
- On November 15, 1927, one Chan Sam (alias Chin Ah Woo), was charged with the
murder of Chin Ah Kim.

- CFI decision: the accused is acquitted. However, he is required to be committed for

treatment in San Lazaro Hospital, in accordance with article 8 of the Penal Code, with
the admonition that the accused be not permitted to leave the said institution without
first obtaining the permission of the court.

- In compliance with this order, Chan Sam was confined for approximately two years
in San Lazaro Hospital. During this period, efforts to obtain his release were made by
his wife and father-in-law to have him proceed to Hongkong.

- The wife and children of the victim opposed, and contended that Chan Sam was still
insane, and that he had made threats that if he ever obtained his liberty he would kill
the wife and the children of the deceased and probably other members of his own
family who were living in Hongkong.

- Doctors Domingo and De los Angeles examined the mental condition of Chan Sam.
After a report had been submitted, counsel for the oppositors challenged the
jurisdiction of the court.

- However, the respondent judge Concepcion sustained the court's right to make an
order in the premises and allowed Chan Sam to leave the San Lazaro Hospital to be
taken to Hongkong.

- Judge Concepcion used Article 8 of the Penal Code as basis in issuing his order of
release. It provides that among those exempt from criminal liability are:
1. An imbecile or lunatic, unless the latter has acted during the lucid interval.
When the imbecile or lunatic has committed an act which the law defines as a
grave felony, the court shall order his confinement in one of the asylums
established for persons thus afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to leave
without first obtaining the permission of the same court.

- Petitioners argue that Section 1048 of the Administrative Code has superseded or
supplemented article 8 of the Penal Code, provides as to the discharge of a patient
from custody from a hospital for the insane. It reads:
When in the opinion of the Director of Health any patient in any Government
hospital or other place for the insane is temporarily or permanently cured, or
may be released without danger, he may discharge such patient, and shall
notify the Judge of the Court of First Instance who ordered the commitment, in
case the patient is confined by order of the court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a judge has authority to unilaterally discharge an insane person he
has committed in a hospital or asylum.

RULING/RATIO:
NO. Judge Concepcion erred an examination of article 8, paragraph 1, of the Penal
Code discloses that the permission of the court who orders the confinement of one accused
of a grave felony in an insane asylum is a prerequisite for obtaining release from the
institution. The respondent judge has based his action in this case on this provision of the
law. On the other hand, section 1048 of the Administrative Code grants to the Director of
Health authority to say when a patient may be discharged from an insane asylum.
- Implied repeal of provisions of law is frowned upon. It is likewise a canon of statutory
construction that when two portions of the law can be construed so that both can
stand together, this should be done.
- In this respect, the court believes that the authority of the courts can be sustained in
cases where the courts take action, while the authority of the Director of Health can
be sustained in other cases not falling within the jurisdiction of the courts. This latter
construction is reinforced by that portion of section 1048 of the Administrative Code
which requires the Director of Health to notify the Judge of First Instance who ordered
the commitment, in case the patient is confined by order of the court.

- The following represents our deductions and conclusions. Article 8 of the Penal Code
has not been impliedly repealed by section 1048 of the Administrative Code.
Article 8 of the Penal Code and section 1048 of the Administrative Code can
be construed so that both can stand together. Considering article 8 of the Penal Code
as in force and construing this article and section 1048 of the Administrative Code, we
think that the Attorney-General was right in expressing the opinion that the Director of
Health was without power to release, without proper judicial authority, any person
confined by order of the court in an asylum pursuant to the provisions of article 8 of the
Penal Code.

- We think also that the converse proposition is equally tenable, and is that any person
confined by order of the court in an asylum in accordance with article 8 of the Penal
Code cannot be discharged from custody in an insane asylum until the views of the
Director of Health have been ascertained as to whether or not the person is
temporarily or permanently cured or may be released without danger.

- In other words, the powers of the courts and the Director of Health are complementary
each with the other. As a practical observation, it may further be said that it is well to
adopt all reasonable precautions to ascertain if a person confined in an asylum as
insane should be permitted to leave the asylum, and this can best be accomplished
through the joint efforts of the courts and the Director of Health in proper cases.

- Judge Concepcion acted patiently and cautiously in the matters which came before
him, yet he exceeded his authority when he issued his orders of December 26, 1929,
and March 17, 1930, without first having before him the opinion of the Director of
Health.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ROSALINO DUNGO, Accused-Appellant.
G.R. No. 89420, July 31, 1991

FACTS:
On March 16, 1987 between 2:00 and 3:00pm, the accused went to Mrs. Sigua's
office at the Department of Agrarian Reform, Apalit, Pampanga. After a brief talk, the
accused drew a knife from the envelope he was carrying and stabbed Mrs. Sigua several
times. After which he departed from the office with blood stained clothes, carrying a bloodied
bladed weapon. The autopsy report revealed that the victim sustained 14 wounds, 5 of which
were fatal.
The accused, in defense of him, tried to show that he was insane at the time of the
commission of the offense.
The defense first presented the testimony of Andrea Dungo, the wife of the accused.
According to her, her husband had been engaged in farming up to 1982 when he went to
Lebanon for six (6) months. Later, in December 1983, her husband again left for Saudi
Arabia and worked as welder. Her husband did not finish his two-year contract because he
got sick. Upon his arrival, he underwent medical treatment. He was confined for one week
at the Macabali Clinic. Thereafter he had his monthly check-up. Because of his sickness, he
was not able to resume his farming. Two weeks prior to March 16, 1987, she noticed her
husband to be in deep thought always; maltreating their children when he was not used to it
before; demanding another payment from his customers even if the latter had paid; chasing
any child when their children quarreled with other children. Thereafter, he went back to the
store. When Andrea followed him to the store, he was no longer there. She got worried as
he was not in his proper mind. She looked for him. She returned home only when she was
informed that her husband had arrived. While on her way home, she heard from people the
words "mesaksak" and "menaksak" (translated as "stabbing" and "has stabbed"). She saw
her husband in her parents-in-law's house with people milling around, including the
barangay officials. She instinctively asked her husband why he did such act, but he replied,
"That is the only cure for my ailment. I have a cancer in my heart." Her husband further said
that if he would not be able to kill the victim in a number of days, he would die, and that he
chose to live longer even in jail. The testimony on the statements of her husband was
corroborated by their neighbor Thelma Santos who heard their conversation. Turning to the
barangay official, her husband exclaimed, "here is my wallet, you surrender me." However,
the barangay official did not bother to get the wallet from him. That same day the accused
went to Manila.
Dra. Sylvia Santiago and Dr. Nicanor Echavez of the National Center for Mental
Health testified that the accused was confined in the mental hospital, as per order of the trial
court dated August 17, 1987, on August 25, 1987. Based on the reports of their staff, they
concluded that Rosalino Dungo was psychotic or insane long before, during and after the
commission of the alleged crime and that his insanity was classified under organic mental
disorder secondary to cerebro-vascular accident or stroke.

ISSUE: Whether the accused was insane during the commission of the crime charged.
RULING:

No. For insanity to relieve the person of criminal liability, it is necessary that there be
a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that he acts without or the least
discernment and that there be complete absence or deprivation of the freedom of the will.
One who suffers from insanity at the time of the commission of the offense charged
cannot in a legal sense entertain a criminal intent and cannot be held criminally responsible
for his acts. His unlawful act is the product of a mental disease or a mental defect. In order
that insanity may relieve a person from criminal responsibility, it is necessary that there be
a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is, that the accused be
deprived of cognition; that he acts without the least discernment; that there is complete
absence or deprivation of the freedom of the will. (People v. Puno, 105 SCRA 151)
It is difficult to distinguish sanity from insanity. There is no definite defined border
between sanity and insanity. Under foreign jurisdiction, there are three major criteria in
determining the existence of insanity, namely: delusion test, irresistible impulse test, and the
right and wrong test. Insane delusion is manifested by a false belief for which there is no
reasonable basis and which would be incredible under the given circumstances to the same
person if he is of compos mentis. Under the delusion test, an insane person believes in a
state of things, the existence of which no rational person would believe. A person acts under
an irresistible impulse when, by reason of duress or mental disease, he has lost the power
to choose between right and wrong, to avoid the act in question, his free agency being at
the time destroyed. Under the right and wrong test, a person is insane when he suffers from
such perverted condition of the mental and moral faculties as to render him incapable of
distinguishing between right and wrong.
Under Philippine jurisdiction, there's no definite test or criterion for insanity. However,
the definition of insanity under Sec 1039 of the Revised Administrative Code can be applied.
In essence, it states that insanity is evinced by a deranged and perverted condition of the
mental faculties, which is manifested in language or conduct. An insane person has no full
and clear understanding of the nature and consequence of his act.
Evidence of insanity must refer to the mental condition at the very time of doing the
act. However, it is also permissible to receive evidence of his mental condition for a
reasonable period before and after the time of the act in question. The vagaries of the mind
can only be known by outward acts.
It is not usual for an insane person to confront a specified person who may have
wronged him. But in the case at hand, the accused was able to Mrs. Sigua. From this, it can
be inferred that the accused was aware of his acts. This also established that the accused
has lucid intervals. Moreover, Dr. Echavez testified to the effect that the appellant could have
been aware of the nature of his act at the time he committed it when he shouted (during
laboratory examination) that he killed Mrs. Sigua. This statement makes it highly doubtful
that the accused was insane when he committed the act.

The fact that the accused was carrying an envelope where he hid the fatal weapon,
that he ran away from the scene of the incident after he stabbed the victim several times,
that he fled to Manila to evade arrest, indicate that he was conscious and knew the
consequences of his acts in stabbing the victim.