ELECTION LAW: CASE DIGEST

JULY 16, 2019

SUBMITTED BY:

ADA HYASMIN DALIAN

ALEXA DANIELE DAYANGHIRANG
JENNICA GYRL DELFIN
JONATHAN JR. HERMINO
JOSEPH ARTFEL LAZO
MIKAEL MAMARIL
HECTOR DOMINIC SISTUAL
ELECTIONS LAW

GENERAL PROVISIONS

EDUARDO T. RODRIGUEZ V COMELEC, BIENVENIDO O. MARQUEZ, JR.

G.R. No. 120099 July 24, 1996

Facts:
Petitioner Eduardo T. Rodriguez and private respondent Bienvenido O. Marquez Jr.
(Rodriguez and Marquez, for brevity) were protagonists for the gubernatorial post of Quezon
Province in the May 1992 elections. Rodriguez won and was proclaimed duly-elected
governor. Marquez challenged Rodriguez’ victory via petition for quo warranto before the
COMELEC, alleging that the latter has a pending case in LA, hence, a fugitive from justice
and thus disqualified for the elective position.
Marquez Decision defined the term “fugitive from justice”, which includes not only those
who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being charged,
flee to avoid prosecution. This definition truly finds support from jurisprudence (. . .), and it
may be so conceded as expressing the general and ordinary connotation of the term
In previous case, the issue of whether or not Rodriguez is a “fugitive from justice” under the
definition thus given was not passed upon by the Court. That task was to devolve on the
COMELEC upon remand of the case to it, with the directive to proceed therewith with
dispatch conformably with the MARQUEZ Decision.
Rodriguez and Marquez renewed their rivalry for the same position of governor. This time,
Marquez challenged Rodriguez’ candidacy via petition for disqualification before the
COMELEC, based principally on the same allegation that Rodriguez is a “fugitive from
justice.”
The COMELEC, allegedly having kept in mind the MARQUEZ Decision definition of “fugitive
from justice”, found Rodriguez to be one. At any rate, Rodriguez again emerged as the
victorious candidate in the May 8, 1995 election for the position of governor.
Marquez filed urgent motions to suspend Rodriguez’ proclamation which the COMELEC
granted.

Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC decision suspending Rodriguez is valid?

Held: No The definition thus indicates that the intent to evade is the compelling factor that
animates one’s flight from a particular jurisdiction. And obviously, there can only be an
intent to evade prosecution or punishment when there is knowledge by the fleeing subject of
an already instituted indictment, or of a promulgated judgment of conviction.
To elaborate, the same parties (Rodriguez and Marquez) and issue (whether or not Rodriguez
is a “fugitive from justice”) are involved in the MARQUEZ Decision and the instant petition.
The MARQUEZ Decision was an appeal (the Marquez’ quo warranto petition before the
COMELEC). The instant petition is also an appeal although the COMELEC resolved the
latter jointly (Marquez’ petition for the disqualification of Rodriguez). Therefore, what was
irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule in the MARQUEZ Decision must govern
the instant petition. And we specifically refer to the concept of “fugitive from justice” as
defined in the main opinion in the MARQUEZ Decision, which highlights the significance of
an intent to evade but which Marquez and the COMELEC, with their proposed expanded
definition, seem to trivialize or undermine.
To re-define “fugitive from justice” would only foment instability in our jurisprudence when
hardly has the ink dried in the MARQUEZ Decision.
To summarize, the term “fugitive from justice” as a ground for the disqualification or
ineligibility of a person seeking to run for any elective local petition under Section 40(e) of
the Local Government Code, should be understood according to the definition given in the
MARQUEZ Decision
A “fugitive from justice” includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid
punishment but likewise those who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution.
Intent to evade on the part of a candidate must therefore be established by proof that there
has already been a conviction or at least, a charge has already been filed, at the time of
flight.
Not being a “fugitive from justice” under this definition, Rodriguez cannot be denied the
Quezon Province gubernatorial post.
ANGOBUNG VS. COMELEC, DE ALBAN

FACTS:

Ricardo Angobung and Atty. Aurora S. De Alban ran for the position of Mayor in the
Municipality of Tumauini in Isabela in the 1995 local elections. Angobung won garnering
55% of all the votes cast. In September 1996, Alban filed “at her own instance” a “Petition
for Recall” with the Local Election Registrar in Tumauini. The petition was forwarded to the
Regional Office and to the Main office for approval.
COMELEC en banc issued Resolution N. 96-2951 which:
a. Approved the Petition for Recall;
b. Setting a date for the signing of petition by the rest of the registered voters of
Tumauini; and
c. Should it be signed by at least 25% of the total number of registered voters,
scheduling of recall election on December 2, 1996.
Petitioner files a petition for certiorari and attacked the resolution for being unconstitutional
and therefor invalid. His contentions were that the resolution:
a. scheduled the recall election within one (1) year from the May 12, 1997 Barangay
Elections – in violation of one –year bar on recall elections.
b. approved the Petition for Recall albeit same was signed by just one person – in
violation of the statutory 25% minimum requirement as to the number of signatures
supporting and petition for recall.

ISSUE:
WON the date of recall election was barred by May 12, 1997 Barangay Elections.
WON the recall proceedings was validly initiate.

RULING:
NO, the date of recall election cannot be said to be barred by the May 12, 1997 Barangay
Elections. The approaching regular local election must be one where the position of the
official to be recalled, is to be actually contested and filled by the electorate.
NO, the SC stated that Sec 29(d) of the LGC of 1991, provides, in effect, that a petition of at
least 25% of the total number registered voters, not by one person only, may validly initiate
recall proceedings.
The initiatory recall petition may not yet contain the signatures of at least 25% of the total
number of registered voters, but it must at least contain the names of at least 25% of the
total number of registered voters in whose behalf only one person may sign the petition in
the meantime.
In this case, the petition does not bear the names of all other citizens of Tumauini who have
reportedly become anxious to oust petitioner from the post of mayor.
The recall must be pursued by the people, not just by one disgruntled loser in the elections
or a small percentage of disenchanted electors.
SANIDAD VS COMELEC
73 scra 333

NOTE: Referendum – A direct vote in which an entire electorate(all people in a country or a

particular group in an area) is invited to vote on a particular proposal, which may result
into a new law. (similar to a plebicite)

FACTS:
Sept 2, 1976, Pres. Marcos issued PD 991; calling for a national referendum on Oct 1976 to
resolve among other things the issues of martial law

20days later, he issued another decree, PD 1031 amending PD 991 repealing sec 4 of PD
991 and declaring the provision of PD 229 providing for the manner of voting and canvass
votes applicable in national referendum-plebiscite and subsequently issued PD 1033 stating
the questions to be submitted to the people in the referendum

The COMELEC was vested with the exclusive supervision and control of the Oct 1976
National Referendum-Plebiscite
Sept. 27, 1976 Father and Son Sanidad are seeking to prohibit the COMELEC from holding
and conducting the referendum plebiscite on Oct 16. and to declare the PD 991 and 1033
w/o force and effect as the propose amendments to the Constitution as well as PD
1031,insofar as it directs the Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and
conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on October 16, 1976

And contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the
incumbent president to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new
Constitution

Sol. Gen maintains that the petitioners have no standing to sue, the issue raised is political
in nature, beyond judicial cognizance of the court and during the transition period only the
incumbent President has the authority to exercise constituent power

Issue:
Whether the President may call upon a referendum for the amendment of the Constitution.

Held:
Section 1 of Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution on Amendments ordains that "(1) Any
amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by the National Assembly
upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members, or by a constitutional convention. (2) The
National Assembly may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members, call a constitutional
convention or, by a majority vote of all its Members, submit the question of calling such a
convention to the electorate in an election."Section 2 thereof provides that "Any amendment
to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast
in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than three months a after the approval of such
amendment or revision." In the present period of transition, the interim National Assembly
instituted in the Transitory Provisions is conferred with that amending power. Section 15 of
the Transitory Provisions reads "The interim National Assembly, upon special call by the
interim Prime Minister, may, by a majority vote of all its Members, propose amendments to
this Constitution. Such amendments shall take effect when ratified in accordance with
Article Sixteen hereof." There are, therefore, two periods contemplated in the constitutional
life of the nation, i.e., period of normalcy and period of transition. In times of normalcy, the
amending process may be initiated by the proposals of the (1) regular National Assembly
upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or (2) by a Constitutional Convention called
by a vote of two-thirds of all the Members of the National Assembly. However the calling of a
Constitutional Convention may be submitted to the electorate in an election voted upon by a
majority vote of all the members of the National Assembly. In times of transition,
amendments may be proposed by a majority vote of all the Members of the interim National
Assembly upon special call by the interim Prime Minister. The Court in Aquino v.
COMELEC, had already settled that the incumbent President is vested with that prerogative
of discretion as to when he shall initially convene the interim National Assembly. The
Constitutional Convention intended to leave to the President the determination of the time
when he shall initially convene the interim National Assembly, consistent with the prevailing
conditions of peace and order in the country. When the Delegates to the Constitutional
Convention voted on the Transitory Provisions, they were aware of the fact that under the
same, the incumbent President was given the discretion as to when he could convene the
interim National Assembly. The President's decision to defer the convening of the interim
National Assembly soon found support from the people themselves. In the plebiscite of
January 10-15, 1973, at which the ratification of the 1973Constitution was submitted, the
people voted against the convening of the interim National Assembly. In the referendum of
24 July 1973, the Citizens Assemblies ("bagangays") reiterated their sovereign will to
withhold the convening of the interim National Assembly. Again, in the referendum of 27
February 1975, the proposed question of whether the interim National Assembly shall be
initially convened was eliminated, because some of the members of Congress and delegates
of the Constitutional Convention, who were deemed automatically members of the interim
National

Assembly, were against its inclusion since in that referendum of January, 1973 the people
had already resolved against it. In sensu striciore, when the legislative arm of the state
undertakes the proposals of amendment to a Constitution, that body is not in the usual
function of lawmaking. It is not legislating when engaged in the amending process. Rather,
it is exercising a peculiar power bestowed upon it by the fundamental charter itself. In the
Philippines, that power is provided for in Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution (for the
regular National Assembly) or in Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions (for the interim
National Assembly). While ordinarily it is the business of the legislating body to legislate for
the nation by virtue of constitutional conferment, amending of the Constitution is not
legislative in character. In political science a distinction is made between constitutional
content of an organic character and that of a legislative character. The distinction,however,
is one of policy, not of law. Such being the case, approval of the President of any proposed
amendment is a misnomer. The prerogative of the President to approve or disapprove
applies only to the ordinary cases of legislation. The President has nothing to do with
proposition or adoption of amendments to the Constitution

SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY V. COMELEC, ET. AL.

G.R. NO. 125416 (SEPTEMBER 26, 1996) EN BANC

FACTS: On March 13, 1992, Congress enacted RA. 7227 (The Bases Conversion and
Development Act of 1992), which created the Subic Economic Zone. RA 7227 likewise
created SBMA to implement the declared national policy of converting the Subic military
reservation into alternative productive uses.

On November 24, 1992, the American navy turned over the Subic military reservation to the
Philippines government. Immediately,petitioner commenced the implementation of its task,
particularly the preservation of the sea-ports, airport, buildings, houses and other
installations left by the American navy.

On April 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan passed Pambayang Kapasyahan
Bilang 10, Serye 1993, expressing therein its absolute concurrence, as required by said Sec.
12 of RA 7227, to join the Subic Special Economic Zone and submitted such to the Office of
the President.

On May 24, 1993, respondents Garcia filed a petition with the Sangguniang Bayan of
Morong to annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg.10, Serye 1993.

The petition prayed for the following: a) to nullify PambayangKapasyang Blg. 10 for Morong
to join the Subic Special Economi Zone,b) to allow Morong to join provided conditions are
met.

The Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong acted upon the petition by promulgating Pambayang
Kapasyahan Blg. 18, Serye 1993, requesting Congress of the Philippines so amend certain
provisions of RA 7227.

Not satisfied, respondents resorted to their power initiative under the LGC of 1991.

On July 6, 1993, COMELEC denied the petition for local initiative on the ground that the
subject thereof was merely a resolution and not an ordinance.

On February 1, 1995, the President issued Proclamation No. 532 defining the metes and
bounds of the SSEZ including therein the portion of the former naval base within the
territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Morong.

On June 18, 19956, respondent Comelec issued Resolution No. 2845and 2848, adopting a
"Calendar of Activities for local referendum and providing for "the rules and guidelines to
govern the conduct of the referendum.

On July 10, 1996, SBMA instituted a petition for certiorari contesting the validity of
Resolution No. 2848 alleging that public respondent is intent on proceeding with a local
initiative that proposes an amendment of a national law.

ISSUE: 1. WON Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Resolution

No. 2848 which governs the conduct of the referendum proposing to annul or repeal
Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10

2. WON the questioned local initiative covers a subject within the powersof the people of
Morong to enact; i.e., whether such initiative "seeks the amendment of a national law."

RULING:
1. YES. COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion.

FIRST. The process started by private respondents was an INITIATIVE but respondent
Comelec made preparations for a REFERENDUM only.

In fact, in the body of the Resolution as reproduced in the footnote below,the word
"referendum" is repeated at least 27 times, but "initiative" is not mentioned at all. The
Comelec labeled the exercise as a "Referendum"; the counting of votes was entrusted to a
"Referendum Committee"; the documents were called "referendum returns"; the canvassers,
"Referendum Board of Canvassers" and the ballots themselves bore the
description"referendum". To repeat, not once was the word "initiative" used in said body of
Resolution No. 2848. And yet, this exercise is unquestionably an INITIATIVE.

As defined, Initiative is the power of the people to propose bills and laws,and to enact or
reject them at the polls independent of the legislative assembly. On the other hand,
referendum is the right reserved to the people to adopt or reject any act or measure which
has been passed by a legislative body and which in most cases would without action on the
part of electors become a law.

In initiative and referendum, the Comelec exercises administration and supervision of the
process itself, akin to its powers over the conduct of elections. These law-making powers
belong to the people, hence the respondent Commission cannot control or change the
substance or the content of legislation.
Maruhom vs. Commission on Elections

Facts:

Petitioner Jamela Salic Maruhom was a mayoralty candidate in the Municipality of

Marantao, Lanao del Sur.Her opponent, re-electionist Mayor Abinal filed before the
COMELEC a Petition for Disqualification against Maruhom, which alleged that she was a
double registrant.

The COMELEC First Division found that Maruhom had two subsisting registrations, one in
Marawi, and another in Marantao and subsequently ordered the deletion of Maruhom’s
name from the list of official candidates for municipal mayor of Marantao. Aggrieved,
Maruhom filed the instant Petition for Certiorari, under Rule 64 of the Revised Rules of
Court; imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of COMELEC, for the Comelec had no
jurisdiction to declare null and void her registration as a registered voter of Marantao, Lanao
el Sur and to declare her as a double registrant.

Issue:

Does COMELEC acquired jurisdiction over cases involving false representation of

material fact?

Held:

Yes.
Under Section 78 of the OEC, a false representation of material fact in the COC is a
ground for the denial or cancellation of the COC. The false representation must pertain to a
material fact that affects the right of the candidate to run for the election for which he filed
his COC. Such material fact refers to a candidate’s eligibility or qualification for elective
office like citizenship, residence or status as a registered voter. Aside from the requirement
of materiality, the false representation must consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead,
misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. In other words,
it must be made with the intention to deceive the electorate as to the would-be candidate’s
qualifications for public office. It is settled that the COMELEC has jurisdiction over a
petition filed under Section 78 of the OEC. In the exercise of such jurisdiction, it is within
the competence of the COMELEC to determine whether false representation as to material
facts was made in the COC. If the candidate states a material representation in the COC
that is false, the COMELEC is empowered to deny due course to or cancel the COC. The
person whose COC is denied due course or cancelled under Section 78 of the OEC is not
treated as a candidate at all, as if such person never filed a COC.

Given Maruhom’s double registration in Marawi and Marantao, then COMELEC

should determine which registration was valid and which one was null. COMELEC could not
consider both registrations valid because it would then give rise to the anomalous situation
where Maruhom could vote in two precincts at the same time. This would be a dangerous
precedent that would open the floodgates to massive election cheating and fraud. This was
precisely the situation that the COMELEC intended to address when it issued its Minute
Resolution No. 00-1513 on 25 July 2000, seven years prior to the 14 May 2007 elections in
which Maruhom intended to run. To foster honesty and credibility in the registration of
voters, so as to avoid the padding of vote registration, COMELEC laid down the rule in
Minute Resolution No. 00-1513 that while the first registration of any voter subsists, any
subsequent registration thereto is void ab initio. Following the clear and plain words of
Minute Resolution No. 00-1513, therefore, Maruhom’s earlier registration in Marawi is
deemed valid, while her subsequent registration in Marantao is void ab initio. Accordingly,
Maruhom cannot be considered a registered voter in Marantao and, thus, she made a false
representation in her COC when she claimed to be one.
G.R. No. 106270-73 February 10, 1994
SULTAN MOHAMAD L. MITMUG, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF LUMBA-
BAYABAO, LANAO DEL SUR, and DATU GAMBAI DAGALANGIT, respondents.

FACTS:

The turnout of voters during the 11 May 1992 election in Lumba-Bayabao, Lanao del Sur,
was abnormally low. As a result, several petitions were filed seeking the declaration of
failure of election in precincts where less than 25% of the electorate managed to cast their
votes. But a special election was ordered in precincts where no voting actually took place.
The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) ruled that for as long as the precincts functioned
and conducted actual voting during election day, low voter turnout would not justify a
declaration of failure of election. We are now called upon to review this ruling.Petitioner
SULTAN MOHAMAD L. MITMUG and private respondent DATU GAMBAI DAGALANGIT were
among the candidates for the mayoralty position of Lumba-Bayabao during the 11 may
1992 election. There were sixty-seven (67) precincts in the municipality.
As was heretofore stated, voter turnout was rather low, particularly in forty-nine (49)
precincts where the average voter turnout was 22.26%, i.e., only 2,330 out of 9,830
registered voters therein cast their votes. Five (5) of these precincts did not conduct actual
voting at all.
Consequently, COMELEC ordered the holding of a special election on 30 May 1992 in
the five (5) precincts which failed to function during election day. On 30 July 1992
another special election was held for a sixth precinct.
In the interim, petitioner filed a petition seeking the annulment of the special election
conducted on 30 May 1992 alleging various irregularities such as the alteration, tampering
and substitution of ballots. But on 13 July 1992, COMELEC considered the petition moot
since the votes in the subject precincts were already counted.3
Other petitions seeking the declaration of failure of election in some or all precincts of
Lumba-Bayabao were also filed with COMELEC by other mayoralty candidates
On 8 July 1992, petitioner filed a motion to intervene in these four (4) petitions. 12 But
COMELEC treated the same as a motion for reconsideration and promptly denied it
considering that under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure such motion was a prohibited
pleading.
Thereafter, a new board of Election Inspectors was formed to conduct the special election set
for 25 July 1992. Petitioner impugned the creation of this Board. Nevertheless, on 30 July
1992, the new Board convened and began the canvassing of votes. Finally, on 31 July 1992,
private respondent was proclaimed the duly elected Mayor of Lumba-Bayabao, Lanao del
Sur.
On 3 August 1992, petitioner instituted the instant proceedings seeking the declaration of
failure of election in forty-nine (49) precincts where less than a quarter of the electorate were
able to cast their votes. He also prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to
enjoin private respondent from assuming office.
On 10 August 1992, petitioner lodged an election protest with the Regional trial Court of
Lanao del Sur disputing the result not only of some but all the precincts of Lumba-Bayabao,
del Sur. 14
Respondents, on the other hand, assert that with the filing of an election protest, petitioner
is already deemed to have abandoned the instant petition.It may be noted that when
petitioner filed his election protest with the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Sur, he
informed the trial court of the pendency of these proceedings. Paragraph 3 of his protest
states "[T]hat on August 3, 1992, your protestant filed a Petition for Certiorari with the
Supreme Court . . . docketed as G.R. No. 106270 assailing the validity of the proclamation
of the herein protestee. . . ." Evidently, petitioner did not intend to abandon his recourse
with this Court. On the contrary, he intended to pursue it. Where only an election protest ex
abundante ad cautela is filed, the Court retains jurisdiction to hear the petition seeking to
annul an election.
ISSUE:
whether respondent COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in denying motu proprio and without due notice and hearing the petitions
seeking to declare a failure of election in some or all of the precincts in Lumba-Bayabao,
Lanao del Sur.
CONTENTION OF PETITIONER:

Petitioner argues he has meritorious grounds in support thereto, viz., the massive
disenfranchisement of voters due to alleged terrorism and unlawful clustering of precincts,
which COMELEC should have at least heard before rendering its judgment.

SUPREME COURT’S RULING:

No, COMELEC did not commit any abuse of discretion, much less grave, in denying the
petitions outright. There was no basis for the petitions since the facts alleged therein did not
constitute sufficient grounds to warrant the relief sought.
Incidentally, a petition to annul an election is not a pre-proclamation controversy.
Consequently, the proclamation of a winning candidate together with his subsequent
assumption of office is not an impediment to the prosecution of the case to its logical
conclusion.
Under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, within twenty-four (24) hours from the filing of a
verified petition to declare a failure to elect, notices to all interested parties indicating
therein the date of hearing should be served through the fastest means available. 18 The
hearing of the case will also be summary in nature.
Based on the foregoing, the clear intent of the law is that a petition of this nature must be
acted upon with dispatch only after hearing thereon shall have been conducted. Since
COMELEC denied the other petitions which sought to include forty-three (43) more
precincts in a special election without conducting any hearing, it would appear then that
there indeed might have been grave abuse of discretion in denying the petitions.
However, a closer examination of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, particularly Sec. 2,
Rule 26, thereof which was lifted from Sec. 6, B.P. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus
Election Code of the Philippines, indicates otherwise. It reads —
Sec. 2. Failure of election. — If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism,
fraud or other analogous causes the election in any precinct has not been held
on the date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the
closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the
transmission of the election returns or in the custody of canvass thereof, such
election results in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases the failure or
suspension of election would affect the result of the election, the Commission
shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any interested party and after due
notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election not held,
suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to
the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to
elect but not later than thirty (30) days after the cessation of the cause of such
postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.
Before COMELEC can act on a verified petition seeking to declare a failure of election, two
(2) conditions must concur:

G. first, no voting has taken place in the precinct or precincts on the date fixed by law
or, even if there was voting, the election nevertheless results in failure to elect; and,
H. second, the votes not cast would affect the result of the election.

In the case before us, it is indubitable that the votes not cast will definitely affect the
outcome of the election. But, the first requisite is missing, i.e., that no actual voting
took place, or even if there is, the results thereon will be tantamount to a failure to
elect. Since actual voting and election by the registered voters in the questioned precincts
have taken place, the results thereof cannot be disregarded and excluded.
COMELEC therefore did not commit any abuse of discretion, much less grave, in denying
the petitions outright. There was no basis for the petitions since the facts alleged therein did
not constitute sufficient grounds to warrant the relief sought. For, the language of the law
expressly requires the concurrence of these conditions to justify the calling of a special
election.
Indeed, the fact that a verified petition is filed does not automatically mean that a hearing
on the case will be held before COMELEC will act on it. The verified petition must still show
on its face that the conditions to declare a failure to elect are present. In the absence
thereof, the petition must be denied outright.
Considering that there is no concurrence of the two (2) conditions in the petitions
seeking to declare failure of election in forty-three (43) more, precincts, there is no
more need to receive evidence on alleged election irregularities.
Instead, the question of whether there have been terrorism and other irregularities is better
ventilated in an election contest. These irregularities may not as a rule be invoked to declare
a failure of election and to disenfranchise the electorate through the misdeeds of a relative
few. 24 Otherwise, elections will never be carried out with the resultant disenfranchisement
of innocent voters as losers will always cry fraud and terrorism.
There can be failure of election in a political unit only if the will of the majority has been
defiled and cannot be ascertained. But, if it can be determined, it must be accorded respect.
After all, there is no provision in our election laws which requires that a majority of
registered voters must cast their votes. All the law requires is that a winning candidate must
be elected by a plurality of valid votes, regardless of the actual number of ballots
cast. 25 Thus, even if less than 25% of the electorate in the questioned precincts cast their
votes, the same must still be respected. There is prima facie showing that private respondent
was elected through a plurality of valid votes of a valid constituency.
SUNGA V COMELEC 288 SCRA 76

FACTS:

Petitioner Manuel C. Sunga was one of the candidates for the position of Mayor in the
Municipality of Iguig,Province of Cagayan, in the 8 May 1995 elections. Private respondent
Ferdinand B. Trinidad, then incumbent mayor, was a candidate for re-election in the same
municipality.Sunga filed with the COMELEC a complaint on 22 April 1995. The case came
to the attention of this Commission on 26 April 1995 in a form of letter from petitioner
accusing respondent of utilizing government properties in his campaign and praying for the
latter's immediate disqualification. Another letter dated 7 May 1995 and addressed to the
COMELEC Regional Director of Region II (without paying the docket fee), reiterated
petitioner's prayer while alleging that respondent and his men committed acts of terrorism
and violated the gun ban. Finally, on 11 May 1995, an Amended Petition was filed with the
Clerk of Court of the Commission containing substantially the same allegations as the
previous letters but supported by affidavits and other documentary evidence.Trinidad, on
the other hand, opted not to submit any evidence at all. Meanwhile, the election results
showed that Trinidad garnered the highest number of votes, while Sunga trailed second. On
10 May 1995 Sunga moved for the suspension of the proclamation of Trinidad. However,
notwithstanding the motion, Trinidad was proclaimed the elected mayor, prompting Sunga
to file another motion to suspend the effects of the proclamation. Both motions were not
acted upon by the COMELEC 2nd Division and thereafter dismissed the case.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion for dismissing the
disqualification case.
Whether or not Sunga should be proclaimed as the Mayor.

HELD:
YES, COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion for dismissing the disqualification
case. The Amended Petition retroacted to such earlier dates of the letter of complaint, an
amendment which merely supplements and amplifies facts originally alleged in the
complaint relates back to the date of the commencement of the action and is not barred by
the statute of limitations which expired after the service of the original complaint.Before
final judgment If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an
election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in
such election the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the
action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor,may,
during the pendency thereof, order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate
whenever the evidence of guilt is strong. (Sec. 6, RA 6646) A candidate guilty of election
offenses would be undeservedly rewarded, instead of punished, by the dismissal of the
disqualification case against him simply because the investigating body was unable, for any
reason caused upon it, to determine before the election if the offenses were indeed
committed by the candidate sought to be disqualified. All that the erring aspirant would
need to do is to employ delaying tactics so that the disqualification case based on the
commission of election offenses would not be decided before the election. This scenario is
productive of more fraud which certainly is not the main intent and purpose of the law.The
purpose of a disqualification proceeding is to prevent the candidate from running or, if
elected, from serving,or to prosecute him for violation of election laws. The fact that a
candidate has been proclaimed and had assumed the position to which he was elected does
not divest the COMELEC of authority and jurisdiction to continue the hearing and
eventually decide the disqualification. The COMELEC should not dismiss the case simply
because the respondent has been proclaimed.(Also, the fact that no docket fee was initially
paid is not fatal. The Procedural defect as cured by the subsequent payment of the docket
fee.)

NO, Sunga should not be proclaimed as the Mayor notwithstanding the fact that the
disqualification case may proceed. The wreath of victory cannot be transferred from the
disqualified winner to the repudiated loser because the law then as now only authorizes a
declaration of election in favor of the person who has obtained a plurality of votes to be
declared elected. If the winner is ineligible, the candidate who got the highest number of
votes cannot be proclaimed elected as he did not get the majority or plurality of the votes
(Note that Trinidad was not yet declared disqualified before election). As provided in Sec. 44,
RA No. 7160 and echoed in Art. 83 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local
Government Code of 1991, the language of the law is clear, explicit and unequivocal,
accordingly, in the event that Trinidad is adjudged to be disqualified, a permanent vacancy
will be created for failure of the elected mayor to qualify for the said office. In such
eventuality, the duly elected vice-mayor shall succeed as provided by law.
PENERA V COMELEC

FACTS:
Rosalinda Penera and Edgar Andanar were candidates for mayor of the Municipality of
Sta.Monica, Surigao del Norte in the last May 2007 elections. The former filed her certificate
of candidacy on the day before the prescribed campaign period. When she went to the
COMELEC Office for filing she was accompanied by her partymates. Thereafter, they had a
motorcade which consisted of two trucks and ten motorcycles running around the
municipality convincing the residents to vote for her and the other candidates of their
political party. Due to this, Andanar filed a petition against her alleging premature
campaigning as provided in the Omnibus Election Code Section 80 which says: “Election or
partisan political activity outside campaign period.--- It shall be unlawful for any person,
whether or not a voter or candidate, or for any party, or association of persons, to engage in
an election campaign or partisan political activity except during the campaign period.” She
argued that she is not guilty since she was not yet a candidate at that time and the
campaign period has not yet started when the motorcade was conducted. While the petition
was pending in the COMELEC, she was voted as mayor and took her office thereafter. The
COMELEC Second Division decided in favor of the complainant and found her guilty of
premature campaigning. Likewise, when she appealed in the COMELEC En Banc, the
previous decision was affirmed. Subsequently, she filed with the Supreme Court which
decided against her. It held that the conduct of the motorcade is a form of election campaign
or partisan political activity, falling under Section 79(b)(2) of the Omnibus Election Code
which says: “[h]olding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other
similar assemblies, for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or
propaganda for or against a candidate[.]” Furthermore, it was held that she should vacate
the position. Now, she comes for a motion for reconsideration using the same arguments.

ISSUE:
Is petitioner guilty of premature campaigning?

RULING:
No. Any act is lawful unless expressly declared unlawful by law. It is enough that Congress
stated that “any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only
upon the start of the campaign period.” So, it is lawful if done before the start of the
campaign period. This plain language of the law need not be construed further. Moreover,
on the day of the motorcade, she was not yet a candidate for.
In Lanot v. COMELEC, the court held that a person who files a certificate of candidacy is
not a candidate until the start of the campaign period. Thus, the essential elements for
violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code are: (1) a person engages in an election
campaign or partisan political activity; (2) the act is designed to promote the election or
defeat of a particular candidate or candidates; (3) the act is done outside the campaign
period.The Decision rationalizes that a candidate who commits premature campaigning can
be disqualified or prosecuted only after the start of the campaign period. This is not what
the law says. What the law says is "any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate
shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period." The plain meaning of this
provision is that the effective date when partisan political acts become unlawful as to a
candidate is when the campaign period starts. Before the start of the campaign period, the
same partisan political acts are lawful.
PETRONILA S. RULLODA, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC)and
others

G. R. XXNo. 154198 - January 20, 2003

FACTS:
In the barangay elections of July 15, 2002, Romeo N. Rulloda and Remegio L. Placido
were the contending candidates for Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas, San Jacinto,
Pangasinan. On June 22, 2002, Romeo suffered a heart attack and passed away.
His widow, petitioner Petronila "Betty" wrote a letter to the Commission on Elections
seeking permission to run as candidate for Barangay Chairman. Petitioners request was
supported by the Appeal-Petition containing several signatures of people purporting to be
members of the electorate of Barangay Sto. Tomas.
On July 14, 2002, Election Officer Ludivico L. Asuncion issued a directive to the
Chairman and Members of the Barangay Board of Canvassers: read the same as it is written
but add the words "NOT COUNTED" like "BETTY NOT COUNTED" or "RULLODA NOT
COUNTED". Petitioner garnered 516 votes while respondent Remegio Placido received 290
votes. Despite this, the Board of Canvassers proclaimed Placido as the Barangay Chairman.
Petitioner learned that the Commission issued Resolution No. 4801. Section 9 of the
same – “There shall be no substitution of candidates for barangay and sangguniang
kabataan officials”. Petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari, seeking to annul
Section 9 of Resolution No. 4801 and Resolution No. 5217.

ISSUE:
WON substitution is allowed in barangay SK elections.

RULING:
Yes, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution No. 5217 of the
Commission on Elections, insofar as it denied due course to petitioner’s certificate of
candidacy, is declared NULL and VOID. The proclamation of respondent Remegio L. Placido
as Barangay Chairman is SET ASIDE, and the Board of Canvassers is ORDERED to
proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Barangay Chairman.
Election means the choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote;
embodiment of the popular will, the expression of the sovereign power of the people.
Respondents base their argument on Section 77 of the Omnibus Elections Code on
Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal of another. Private respondent
argues that inasmuch as the barangay election is non-partisan, there can be no
substitution because there is no political party from which to designate the substitute.
However, it is well-settled that in case of doubt, political laws must be so construed as to
give life and spirit to the popular mandate freely expressed through the ballot. Contrary to
respondents claim, the absence of a specific provision governing substitution of candidates
in barangay elections cannot be inferred as a prohibition against said substitution.
G.R. No. 166046. March 23, 2006.*

MARGARITO C. SULIGUIN, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE

MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF NAGCARLAN, LAGUNA, and ECELSON C.
SUMAGUE,

FACTS:

Petitioner Suliguin was one of the candidates of the Sangguniang Bayan of Nagclaran,
Laguna during the May 2004 elections. At 6pm respondent Municipal Board of
Canvassers(MBOC) convened to canvass the votes for all the condidates Petitioner received
6,605 votes while respondent Ecelson Sumague received 6.647 votes. However the
statement of votes (1A-19A) Sumague received only 644 votes whien in fact it was 844 votes.
MBOC failed to notice the discrepancy and proclaimed the winning candidates at around
7pm May 13, 2004. Peititoner proclaimed the 8 th of the candidates with a vote of 6,605
votes.

Sumague requested for a recomputation of the votes received by him and Suliguin via
Letter. MBOC summoned Suliguin and Sumague to a conference, upon review, MBOC
discovered that if failed to credit respondent Sumague 200 votes. Which could have helped
him take the 8th Sangguniang Bayan Member of Nagclaran, Laguna instead of Suliguin.

May 2004, MBOC filed before the COMELEC a “petition for correct enteries made in the
statement of votes” for councilor. Attributing the error to extreme physical and mental
fatigue experienced by the members during the elections. Meanwhile, Petitioner took his
oath to office.

On July 2004, The COMELEC issued a resolution granting petition of MBOC. The
commission nullified the proclamation of the Petitioner as 8 th member of the Sanggunian,
Petitioner moved to reconsider the resolution but the COMELEC denied the motion.

Petitioner argues that pursuant to Sections 35,9 36(c) and (f)10 of Comelec Resolution No.
6669 (General Instructions for Municipal/City/Provincial and District Boards of Canvassers
in Connection with the May 10, 2004 Elections), the MBOC should not have entertained the
letter-request of respondent Sumague as it was filed only on May 17, 2004, or four (4) days
after the canvassing of votes was terminated and after he (petitioner) was proclaimed winner
as the 8th Sangguniang Bayan member of Nagcarlan, Laguna. Furthermore, respondent
Sumague never entered any objection during the proceedings of the canvassing of votes. The
MBOC itself filed the "Petition to Correct Entries Made in the Statement of Votes" before the
Comelec only on May 26, 2004, 13 days after the canvassing of votes was terminated.
Petitioner maintains that the Comelec should have denied the petition, since according to
the Revised Comelec Rules, it should have been filed not later than five (5) days following
the date of the proclamation.
Petitioner likewise questions the personality of the MBOC itself to file the petition before the
Comelec. He further argues that upon the proclamation of the winning candidates in the
election, the MBOC adjourns sine die and becomes functus officio.(mandate has expired due
to the accomplishment of its purpose)
ISSUE

whether or not respondent Comelec erred in granting the petition of the MBOC to nullify
petitioner’s proclamation as the 8th member of the Sangguniang Bayan in Nagcarlan,
Laguna

HELD: NO

The petition is bereft of merit.

In an election case, the Comelec is mandated to ascertain by all means within its command
who the real candidate elected by the electorate is. The Court frowns upon any
interpretation of the law or the rules that would hinder in any way not only the free and
intelligent casting of the votes in an election but also the correct ascertainment of the
results. In the case at bar, the simple mathematical procedure of adding the total number of
votes garnered by respondent Sumague as appearing in the Statement of Votes submitted to
the Comelec would readily reveal the result that he has forty-two (42) votes more than
petitioner. Such result would, in effect, dislodge petitioner from said post, and entitle
respondent Sumague to occupy the eighth and last seat of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Nagcarlan, Laguna. Petitioner himself never disputed the discrepancy in the total number of
votes garnered by respondent Sumague, and instead questioned the personality of the
MBOC to file the petition and insisted that such petition was not filed on time.
Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 1 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure explicitly provide that such
rules may be "liberally construed" in the interest of justice. Indeed, the Comelec has the
discretion to liberally construe its rules and, at the same time, suspend the rules or any
portion thereof in the interest of justice.14 Disputes in the outcome of elections involve
public interest; as such, technicalities and procedural barriers should not be allowed to
stand if they constitute an obstacle to the determination of the true will of the electorate in
the choice of their elective officials. Laws governing such disputes must be liberally
construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officials may not be
defeated by mere technical objections

What is involved in the present petition is the correction of a manifest error in reflecting the
actual total number of votes for a particular candidate. Section 32, subparagraph 5 of
Comelec Resolution No. 6669 includes mistake in the addition of the votes of any candidate
as a manifest error.16 As correctly cited by the Comelec,17 a manifest clerical error is "one
that is visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding and is apparent from the papers to
the eye of the appraiser and collector, and does not include an error which may, by evidence
dehors the record be shown to have been committed."
BINCE, JR. V. COMELEC G.R. NOS. 111624—25 MARCH 9, 1995

FACTS:

Bince and Macu were Sangguniang Panlalawigan candidates in Pangasinan during the 1992
elections. During the canvassing of the COCs for the 10 municipalities of the 6 th District,
Micu objected to the inclusion of the COC of San Quintin, claiming that it contained false
statements. Micu later secured a resolution from the COMELEC directing the Provincial
Board of Canvassers the correct number of votes from the municipality of San Quintin.
Meanwhile, Micu filed several petitions for correction of the Statements of Votes (SOVs) for
alleged errors in other municipalities of the 6 th district (Tayug and San Miguel). Note that the
errors were committed by the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBCs).
However, after canvassing the COCs for the 10 municipalities, it turns out Bince garnered
27,370 votes against Micu’s 27,369 or a margin of 1 vote. Bince was not yet proclaimed at
this time because of the absence of authority from the COMELEC. On June 29, the
COMELEC en banc promulgated a resolution directing the PBC to continue with the
provincial canvass and proclaim the winning candidates. On June 24, the PBC acted on
Micu’s petitions for correction of the SOVs for Tayug and San Miguel. Bince appealed,
claiming that the PBC had no jurisdiction. Subsequently the PBC filed a petition with the
COMELEC seeking a definitive ruling as to who should be proclaimed. Apparently, if the
corrections for the SOVs of Tayug and SM were to be included, Emiliano Micu would gain
plurality by 72 votes. The COMELEC resolved the PBC to proclaim the winning candidate on
the basis of the completed and corrected Certificates of Canvass. However on July 21, Bince
was proclaimed winner. Micu filed an Urgent Motion for Contempt and to Annul
Proclamation, and Amended Urgent Petition for Contempt and Annul Proclamation, alleging
that the PBC defied the directive of the COMELEC. The COMELEC held the officers who
proclaimed Bince in contempt, and directed the PBC to proclaim the true winner. The case
later turned to the legality of the PBC’s granting of the petition for the correction of the
Tayug and SM SOVs. Micu claims that his petitions for correction were valid under Section
6, Rule 27 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Eventually, Bince’s proclamation was
affirmed, but on Micu’s MFR to the en banc, was set aside and declared null and void. Bince
appealed to the SC in a special civil action for certiorari.

ISSUE:

WON the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in nullifying Bince’s proclamation.

HELD:

No, COMELEC acted within its jurisdiction

Respondent COMELEC did not act with grave abuse of disctetion in annulling the
proclamation of petitioner Alfonso Bince, Jr. and in directing the Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Pangasinan to order the MBCs of Tayug and San Miguel to make the
necessary corrections in the SOVs and COCs.
Nullification was justified as the basis was a mathematical error committed by the MBCs in
the computation of votes. The COMELEC cannot be faulted for subsequently annulling the
proclamation of petitioner Bince on account of a mathematical error in addition, committed
by the MBCs.
AGUILAR VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

FACTS:

In the October 2007 barangay elections, petitioner Aguilar won the chairmanship of Brgy.
Bansarvil 1, Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte, over private respondent Insoy by a margin of one
vote. Not conceding his defeat, Insoy timely instituted a protest in the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) of Kapatagan.

On April 17, 2008, the MTC rendered its Decision2 finding Insoy, who, during the revision
garnered 265 votes as against Aguilar’s 264 votes, as the duly elected punong barangay. The
trial court consequently nullified the proclamation of Aguilar and directed him to vacate the
office.

Aggrieved, Aguilar filed on April 21, 2008 his notice of appeal and paid to the trial court the
appeal fee of P1,000.00 in accordance with Rule 14, Sections 8 and 9 of the recently
promulgated A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC or the Rules of Procedure in Election Contests Before the
Courts Involving Elective Municipal and Barangay Officials.

COMELEC issued an order that the payment of appeal is P3,000.00 and not P1,000.00.
Failure to pay the correct appeal fee is a ground for dismissal.

Aguilar filed a motion for reconsideration. Here, COMELEC again deny the motion by
Aguilar for failure to pay the motion fee of P700.

Aguilar filed another motion for reconsideration, contending, among others, that the order
was null and void because it was issued in violation of the rule that motions for
reconsideration should be resolved by the COMELEC en banc.

Issue:

Does the COMELEC en banc has the jurisdiction involving cases of Motion to reconsider the
decision made by COMELEC division?

Held:

Yes. Readily discernable is that the challenged September 4 and October 6, 2008 Orders
were issued not by the COMELEC en banc but by one of its divisions, the First Division.
Settled is the rule that it is the decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC en banc which, in
accordance with Article IX-A, Section 7 of the Constitution, may be brought to this Court on
certiorari. But this rule should not apply when a division of the COMELEC arrogates unto
itself, and deprives the en banc of the authority to rule on a motion for reconsideration, as
in this case. Further, the rule is not ironclad; it admits of exceptions as when the decision
or resolution sought to be set aside, even if it were merely a Division action, is an absolute
nullity.

The invalidity of the September 4 and October 6, 2008 Orders arises from the very fact that
they were issued by a division of the COMELEC. The Constitution explicitly establishes, in
Article IX-C, Section 3, the procedure for the resolution of election cases by the COMELEC,
thus: Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall
promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including
pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in
division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the
Commission en banc.

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the order dismissing his appeal was not resolved
by the COMELEC en banc, but by the COMELEC First Division, in obvious violation of the
provisions of the Constitution and the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Stated differently, the
division, after dismissing petitioner’s appeal, arrogated unto itself the en banc’s function of
resolving petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. In Soriano, Jr. v. Commission on Elections,
520 SCRA 88 (2007), we emphasized the rule that a motion to reconsider a decision,
resolution, order or ruling of a COMELEC division, except with regard to interlocutory
orders, shall be elevated to the COMELEC en banc. Here, there is no doubt that the order
dismissing the appeal is not merely an interlocutory, but a final order. It was, therefore,
incumbent upon the Presiding Commissioner of the COMELEC First Division to certify the
case to the COMELEC en banc within two days from notification of the filing of the motion.
G.R. No. 129783 December 22, 1997
MARCELINO C. LIBANAN, petitioner,
vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and JOSE T.
RAMIREZ, respondents.

Petitioner Libanan seasonably filed an election protest before the HRET claiming,
among other things, that the 08th May 1995 elections in Eastern Samar were marred by
massive electoral irregularities perpetrated or instigated by respondent Ramirez, as well as
his leaders and followers, in the twenty-three (23) municipalities of the lone district of
Eastern Samar with the aid, in various instances, of peace officers supposedly charged with
maintaining an orderly and honest election.
Petitioner contested seventy-nine (79) precincts in five (5) municipalities. He also
maintained that the election returns and/or ballots in certain precincts were tampered with,
substituted, or systematically marked in favor of respondent Ramirez. Libanan prayed that,
after due proceedings, the HRET should issue an order to annul the election and
proclamation of Ramirez and to thereafter so proclaim petitioner as the duly elected
Representative of the Lone District of Eastern Samar.
In his answer and counter-protest, with a petition for preliminary hearing on the
special and affirmative defenses, respondent Ramirez denied the charges. He counter-
protested the results of the elections in certain precincts where, he claimed, Libanan
engaged in massive vote buying, lansadera, terrorism and tearing of the list of voters to
disenfranchise voters therein listed. Accordingly, he prayed, inter alia, for the dismissal of
the protest and the confirmation of his election as the duly elected representative of the
Lone District of Eastern Samar.
The evidence and the issues submitted by the parties for consideration by the HRET
related mainly to the proper appreciation of the ballots objected to, or claimed by, the
parties during the revision. No evidence was presented in support of the other allegations of
the protest (like the alleged tampering of election returns) and of the counter-protest (such
as the alleged tearing of some of the pages of the computerized list of voters to
disenfranchise legitimate voters and the use of goons to terrorize and compel voters to vote
for Libanan), nor were these issues discussed in the memoranda of the parties. The HRET
thus concentrated, such as can be rightly expected, its attention to the basic appreciation of
ballots.2
The particular matter focused in this petition deals with what petitioner claims to be
spurious ballots; on this score, the HRET has explained:
No spurious ballot was found in this case. For a ballot to be rejected for being
spurious, the ballot must not have any of the following authenticating marks: a) the
COMELEC watermark; b) the signatures or initial of the BEI Chairman at the back of
the ballot; and c) red and blue fibers. In the present case, all the ballots examined by
the Tribunal had COMELEC watermarks.
The Tribunal did not adopt protestant's submission in his Memorandum that the
absence of thumbmark or BEI Chairman's signature at the back of the ballot
rendered the ballot spurious.
Petitioner Libanan moved for a reconsideration of the decision of the HRET arguing, among
other grounds,5 that the absence of the BEI Chairman's signature at the back of the ballots
could not but indicate that the ballots were not those issued to the voters during the
elections. He averred that the law would require the Chairman of the BEI to authenticate or
sign the ballot before issuing it to the voter.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the absence of the signature of the Chairman of the BEI in the ballots
render the ballots spurious.
2. Whether or not HRET has jusrisdiction over the election protest

CONTENTION OF LIBANAN:

I. Petitioner Libanan contends that the three hundred eleven (311) ballots (265 of which
have been for private respondent Ramirez) without the signature of the Chairman of
the BEI, but which had the COMELEC water-marks and/or colored fibers, should be
invalidated. It is the position of petitioner that the purpose of the law in requiring the
BEI Chairman to affix his signature at the back of the ballot when he issues it to the
voter is "to authenticate" the ballot and, absent that signature, the ballot must be
considered spurious.

SUPREME COURT’S RULING

1. . Whether or not the absence of the signature of the Chairman of the BEI in the
ballots render the ballots spurious.
Answer: No, the absence of the signature of the Chairman of the BEI in the ballots did not
render the ballots spurious.
The pertinent provision of the law, Section 24 of R.A. No. 7166, provides:
Sec. 24. Signature of Chairman at the back of Every Ballot. — In every case before
delivering an official ballot to the voter, the Chairman of the Board of Election
Inspector shall, in the presence of the voter, affix his signature at the back thereof.
Failure to authenticate shall be noted in the minutes of the Board of Election
Inspectors and shall constitute an election offense punishable under Section 263 and
264 of the Omnibus Election Code.
There is really nothing in the above law to the effect that a ballot which is not so
authenticated shall thereby be deemed spurious.
The law merely renders the BEI Chairman accountable for such failure. The courts may not,
in the guise of interpretation, enlarge the scope of a statute and embrace situations neither
provided nor intended by the lawmakers. Where the words and phrases of a statute are not
obscure and ambiguous, the meaning and intention of the legislature should be determined
from the language employed, and where there is no ambiguity in the words, there should be
no room for construction.
As so aptly observed by the Solicitor-General, House Bill ("HB") No. 34811 (which later
become R.A. No. 7166), approved by the House of Representatives on third reading, was a
consolidation of different bills. Two of the bills consolidated and considered in drafting H.B.
No. 34811 were H.B. 34639 and H.B. No. 34660. Section 22 of the two latter bills provided
that:
In every case before delivering an official ballot to the voter, the chairman of the
Board of Election Inspectors shall, in the presence of the voter, affix his signature at
the back thereof. Any ballot which is not so authenticated shall be deemed spurious.
Failure to so authenticate shall constitute an election offense. 17
During the deliberation of the Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms, held on 08
August 1991, the members agreed to delete the phrase "Any ballot which is not so
authenticated shall be deemed spurious." Pertinent portions of the transcript of
stenographic notes ("TSN") taken during the Meeting of the Committee on Suffrage and
Electoral Reforms.
Thus the final draft, which was later to become R.A. No. 7166, no longer included the
provision "Any ballot not so authenticated shall be deemed spurious." The intention of
the legislature even then was quite evident.
The reliance on Bautista vs. Castro by petitioner, is misdirected. It must be stressed that
B.P. Blg. 222, otherwise known as the "Barangay Election Act of 1982," approved on 25
March 1982, itself categorically expresses that it shall only be "applicable to the election of
barangay officials." Section 14 of B.P. Blg. 222 and its implementing rule in Section 36 of
COMELEC Resolution No. 1539
The difference in the rules may not be too difficult to discern. The stringent requirements in
B.P. Blg. 222 should be justifiable considering that the official barangay ballots would be
provided by the city or municipality concerned with the COMELEC merely prescribing their
size and color.
Thus, the official ballots in B.P. Blg. 222, being supplied and furnished by the local
government themselves, the possibility of the ballots being easily counterfeited might
not have been discounted. The absence of authenticating marks prescribed by
law, i.e., the signature of the chairman of the Board of Election Tellers at the back of
the ballot, could have well been really thought of to be fatal to the validity of the
ballot.
Section 24 of R.A. No. 7166, upon the other hand, contains no similar stringent
provisions such as that seen in Section 36(f) of COMELEC Resolution No. 1539. The
pertinent part in Resolution No. 2676 on the requirement of the signature of the chairman is
found in Section 73 thereof which merely provides:
Sec. 73. Signature of chairman at the back of every ballot. — In every case, the
chairman of the board shall, in the presence of the voter, authenticate every
ballot by affixing his signature at the back thereof before delivering it to the
voter. FAILURE TO SO AUTHENTICATE SHALL BE NOTED IN THE MINUTES
OF THE BOARD AND SHALL CONSTITUTE AN ELECTION OFFENSE.
Again, in Resolution No. 2738, promulgated by the COMELEC on 03 January 1995, which
implemented, among other election laws, R.A. No. 7166 (that governed the election for
Members of the House of Representatives held on 08 May 1995), the relevant provision is in
Section 13 which itself has only stated:
Sec. 13. Authentication of the ballot. — Before delivering a ballot to the voter,
the chairman of the board shall, in the presence of the voter, affix his
signature at the back thereof.
It would appear evident that the ruling in Bautista vs. Castro was prompted because of the
express declaration in Section 36(f) of COMELEC Resolution No. 1539, implementing
Section 14 of B.P. Blg. 222, that: "Any ballot returned to the chairman . . . which does not
bear the signature of the chairman . . . shall be considered as spoiled . . . and shall not be
counted." This Court thus stated in Bautista:
 The law (Sec 14 of B.P. Blg. 222,) and the rules implementing it (Sec. 36 of
Comelec Res. No. 1539) leave no room for interpretation. The absence of the
signature of the Chairman of the Board of Election Tellers in the ballot given to
a voter as a required by law and the rules as proof of the authenticity of said
ballot is fatal. This requirement is mandatory for the validity of the said ballot.
It should be noteworthy that in an unsigned 03rd April 1990 resolution, in "Jolly
Fernandez vs. COMELEC," the Court en banc had the opportunity to debunk the
argument that all ballots not signed at the back thereof by the Chairman and the Poll
Clerk were to be considered spurious for non-compliance with Section 15 of R.A. No.
6646, i.e., "The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987," reading as follows:
Sec. 15. — Signature of Chairman and Poll Clerk at the Back of Every Ballot.
— In addition to the preliminary acts before the voting as enumerated in
Section 191 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, the chairman and the poll clerk of
the board of election inspector shall affix their signatures at the back of each
and every official ballot to be used during the voting. A certification to that
effect must be entered in the minutes of the voting.
The Court declared:
The cardinal objective in the appreciation of the ballots is to discover and give
effect to the intention of the voter. That intention would be nullified by the
strict interpretation of the said section as suggested by the petitioner for it
would result in the invalidation of the ballot even if duly accomplished by the
voter, and simply because of an omission not imputable to him but to the
election officials. The citizen cannot be deprived of his constitutional right of
suffrage on the specious ground that other persons were negligent in
performing their own duty, which in the case at bar was purely ministerial and
technical, by no means mandatory but a mere antecedent measure intended to
authenticate the ballot. A contrary ruling would place a premium on official
ineptness
and make it possible for a small group of functionaries, by their negligence —
or, worse, their deliberate inaction — to frustrate the will of the electorate. 27
Petitioner Libanan suggests that the Court might apply the "ruling" of respondent
HRET in the case of Yap vs.Calalay (HRET Case No. 95-026). He states that "it is the
HRET itself, ironically, that deals the coup de graceto its ruling HRET Case No. 95-
020." The "ruling" cited by petitioner is actually a "Confidential
Memorandum,"28 dated 28 April 1997, from a certain Atty. Emmanuel Mapili
addressed to "PA Committees in HRET Case No. 95-026 (Yap vs. Calalay)" which has
for its subject "(n)ew rulings to be followed in the appreciation of ballots in HRET
Case No. 95-026 (Yap vs. Calalay) and other concerns." Petitioner Libanan quotes the
pertinent portion of the said Memorandum, viz:
WHEREFORE, the Tribunal Resolved that the following rules and guidelines on
the appreciation of ballots shall be given effect in the resolution of this case
and shall be applied prospectively to other pending cases:
1. The absence of the signature of the BEI Chairman at the back
of the ballot shall nullify the same and all the votes therein shall
not be counted in favor of any candidate.29
Reliance by petitioner on this alleged "ruling", obviously deserves scant consideration.
What should, instead, be given weight is the consistent rule laid down by the
HRET that a ballot is considered valid and genuine for as long as it bears any
one of these authenticating marks, to wit: (a) the COMELEC watermark, or (b)
the signature or initials, or thumbprint of the Chairman of the BEI; and, (c) in
those cases where the COMELEC watermarks are blurred or not readily apparent
to the naked eye, the presence of red and blue fibers in the ballots. 30 It is only
when none of these marks appears extant that the ballot can be considered
spurious and subject to rejection.
2. Whether or not HRET has jusrisdiction over the election protest
ANS: YES, HRET has jusrisdiction over the election protest
The Constitutions mandates that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and the
Senate Electoral Tribunal shall each, respectively, be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of their respective members. 7 In Lazatin
vs. HRET ,8 the Court has observed that —
The use of the word "sole" emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction
conferred. The exercise of the power by the Electoral Commission under the 1935
Constitution has been described as "intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if
it had remained originally in the legislature." Earlier this grant of power to the
legislature was characterized by Justice Malcolm as "full, clear and complete." Under
the amended 1935 Constitution, the power was unqualifiedly reposed upon the
Electoral Tribunal and it remained as full, clear and complete as that previously
granted the Legislature and the Electoral Commission. The same may be said with
regard to the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunals under the 1987 Constitution.
The Court has stressed that ". . . so long as the Constitution grants the HRET the power to
be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the House of Representatives, any final action taken by the HRET on a matter
within its jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not be reviewed by this Court . . . the power granted
to the Electoral Tribunal . . . excludes the exercise of any authority on the part of this Court
that would in any wise restrict it or curtail it or even affect the same."
The Court did recognize, of course, its power of judicial review in exceptional cases.
In Robles vs. HRET ,10 the Court has explained that while the judgments of the Tribunal are
beyond judicial interference, the Court may do so, however, but only, "in the exercise of this
Court's so-called extraordinary jurisdiction, . . . upon a determination that the Tribunal's
decision or resolution was rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion or paraphrasing Morrero, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and
improvident use by the Tribunal of its power as constitutes a denial of due process of law, or
upon a demonstration of a very clear unmitigated error, manifestly constituting such grave
abuse of discretion that there has to be remedy for such abuse."
In the old, but still relevant, case of Morrero vs. Bocar, the Court has ruled that the power of
the Electoral Commission "is beyond judicial interference except, in any event, upon a clear
showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of power as will constitute a denial of due
process." The Court does not, to paraphrase it in Co vs.HRET,12 venture into the perilous
area of the correcting perceived errors of independent branches of the Government; it comes
in only when it has to vindicate a denial of due process or correct an abuse of discretion so
grave or glaring that no less than the Constitution itself calls for remedial action.
PUNZALAN V. COMELEC GR. No. 126669, April 27 1998

DOCTRINE:

Laws and statutes governing election contests especially appreciation of ballots must be
liberally construed to the end that the will of the electorate in the choice of public officials
may not be defeated by technical infiinfirmities.

FACTS:

Danilo Manalastas, Ferdinand Meneses and Ernesto Punzalan were among the four (4) candidates for
mayor of the municipality of Mexico, Pampanga during the May 8, 1995 elections. On May 24, 1995, the
Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) proclaimed Ferdinand Meneses as the duly elected mayor.
DaniloManalastas and Ernesto Punzalan filed an election protest before the Regional Trial Court of San
Fernando, Pampanga. After hearing the election protests, the trial court rendered judgment on September
23, 1996declaring Punzalan as the duly elected mayor. Thereafter, Meneses filed a notice of appeal from
the a fore said decision On December 8, 1997, the COMELEC promulgated a resolution setting aside the
trial court’s decision and affirming the proclamation of Meneses by the MBC as the duly elected mayor of
Mexico, Pampanga.Punzalan filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid resolution. Punzalan
maintains that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in declaring as valid the ballots
credited to Meneses which did not bear the signature of the BEI chairman at the back thereof, invoking
the ruling of the Supreme Court in Bautista v.Castro wherein it was held that the absence of the signature
of the BEI chairman in the ballot given to a voteras required by law and the rules as proof of the
authenticity of said ballot is fatal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the ballots without the BEI Chairman’s signature are valid.

RULING:

A ballot without BEI chairman’s signature at the back is valid. While Section 24
of Republic Act No.7166, otherwise known as “An Act Providing For Synchronized National and Local
Elections and For Electoral Reforms,” requires the BEI chairman to affix his signature at the back of the
ballot, the mere failure to do so does not invalidate the same although it may constitute an election offense
imputable to said BEI chairman. Nowhere in said provision does it state that the votes contained therein
shall be nullified. It is a well-settled rule that the failure of the BEI chairman or any of the members of the
board to comply with their mandated administrative responsibility, i.e., signing, authenticating and thumb
marking of ballots, should not penalize the voter with disenfranchisement, thereby frustrating the will of
the people.
PENA V HRET

FACTS:

Petitioner and the private respondent (Alfredo E. Abueg) were contenders as a Member of the
House of Representatives representing the Second District of the province of Palawan in the
May 8, 1995 elections. On May 12, 195, upon canvassing the votes cast, the Provincial
Board of Canvassers of Palawan proclaimed the private respondent as the winner.

On May 22, 1995, the instant petition was filed with the HRET, wherein the petitioner,
averred the elections in the precincts of the Second District of Palawan were tainted with
massive fraud, widespread vote-buying, intimidation and terrorism and other serious
irregularities committed before, during and after the voting, and during the counting of
votes and the preparation of election returns and certificates of canvass which affected the
results of the election.

Private respondent moved to dismiss the case since the petitioner did not specifically allege
the precincts where said irregularities were present. HRET stated that the Protestant
failed to specify which are the 700 precincts, out of the said 743 precincts, that are included
in his protest; he even failed to allege the municipalities where the protested precincts are
located. Worse, the body of the Petition does not even mention the 700 precincts. Reference
to them is made only in the Prayer. These omissions prevent Protestee from being apprised
of the issues which he has to meet and make it virtually impossible for the Tribunal to
determine which ballot boxes have to be collected. HRET also held that this scattershot
allegation is not allowed in election contests and that “it is necessary to make a precise
indication of the precincts protested and a specification of the claimed offenses to have been
committed by the parties.

ISSUE:

Whether the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to having acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the
election protest of petitioner.

RULING:

No. Petitioner makes no specific mention of the precincts where widespread election, fraud
and irregularities occurred. This is a fatal omission, as it goes into the very substance of
the protest. Under Section 21 of the Revised Rules of Procedure of HRET, insufficiency in
form and substance of the petition constitutes aground for the immediate dismissal of the
Petition.

The prescription that the petition must be sufficient in form and substance means that the
petition must be more than merely rhetorical. If the allegations contained therein are
unsupported by even the faintest whisper of authority in fact and law, then there is no other
course than to dismiss the petition, otherwise, the assumptions of an elected public official
may, and will always be held up by petitions of this sort by the losing candidate.

Admittedly, the rule is well-established that the power to annul an election should be
exercised with the greatest care as it involves the free and fair expression of the popular will.
It is only in extreme cases of fraud and under circumstances which demonstrate to the
fullest degree a fundamental and wanton disregard of the law that elections are annulled,
and then only when it becomes impossible to take any other step.

This Court’s jurisdiction to review decisions and orders of electoral tribunals operates only
upon a showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the tribunal. Only where such a
grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the electoral
tribunal’s judgment. There is such showing in the present petition.