Sanchez Et Al., 2015
Sanchez Et Al., 2015
Sanchez Et Al., 2015
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Scientometrics (2015) 102:1921–1950
DOI 10.1007/s11192-014-1495-0
A. M. Sánchez-Riofrı́o (&)
Universidad Espı́ritu Santo - Ecuador, Office 1.2, Edificio F, Campus de Samborondón, Km. 2.5 vı́a La
Puntilla, Samborondón, Ecuador
e-mail: [email protected]
L. Á. Guerras-Martı́n
Universidad Rey Juan Carlos, Office 010, Edificio Departamental I, Campus de Vicalvaro, Paseo De
Artilleros, s/n, 28032 Madrid, Spain
e-mail: [email protected]
F. J. Forcadell
Universidad Rey Juan Carlos, Office 290, Edificio Departamental I, Campus de Vicalvaro, Paseo De
Artilleros, s/n, 28032 Madrid, Spain
e-mail: [email protected]
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1922 Scientometrics (2015) 102:1921–1950
Introduction
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Scientometrics (2015) 102:1921–1950 1923
conducted for the first time. This analysis also covers documents that cite those references
for the purpose of identifying the origins and evolution of BPR research.
The paper is organised as follows: the next section outlines the bibliometric methods
used to analyse both the bibliographic references and citing documents in BPR. The next
section discusses the findings and how they are related to the current literature on
restructuring. Finally, the conclusions focus on the paper’s more salient contributions.
Methodology
The description of the methodological process is based on five key steps: (1) the selection
of the unit of analysis; (2) a co-citation analysis; (3) a social network analysis; (4) a
bibliographic coupling analysis; and (5) a factor analysis.
Two citation-based methods of mapping scientific literature in intellectual fields have
dominated bibliometrics over the past five decades: co-citation analysis and bibliographic
coupling (Vogel and Guettel 2013). In the same way, factor analysis and network analysis
are two of the top methodologies applied by social sciences when academics want to
analyse or graph scientific literature (Neely 2005; Cornelius et al. 2006; Schildt et al. 2006;
Ma et al. 2008; McMillan 2008; Pilkington and Meredith 2009; Pinillos 2011). We use
these standard methodologies in social sciences as a way to offer a more comprehensive
perspective of the field.
That is why, bibliographic references will be studied through a co-citation and social
network analysis, and the citing documents will be considered through bibliographic
coupling and factor analysis. Based on the classification made by the Journal of Citation
Report (JCR), all the papers reviewed here are classified according to the journal in which
they appeared. In other words, they are grouped under the headings of management,
economics, and finance, in line with the category to which the journal belongs in the JCR.
As for books, they have been classified according to their content based on the criteria of
the authors.
Step 1: Selection of the unit of analysis scientific papers are chosen as the unit of
analysis here because they are considered to be ‘‘certified knowledge’’ (Ramos-Rodrı́guez
and Ruiz-Navarro 2004). The selection of the articles analysed has involved two basic
search processes: (a) use of the special issue (vol. 14 Summer 1993) of the Strategic
Management Journal (SMJ), which as far as we know is the only management publication
devoted entirely to corporate restructuring; and (b) use of specific keywords. Both searches
were performed using the Web of Science database (WoS).
Step 1.1: Selection of keywords the first search involves taking seven papers in the
special issue directly linked to BPR, examining their content in terms of title, abstract and
keywords. Furthermore, we selected the following BPR-related keywords: corporate
restructuring, portfolio restructuring, asset restructuring, divestiture, refocusing, recon-
figuration, and asset sale(s).
Step 1.2: Search for papers in WoS the search then uses the WoS to find all those articles
citing one or more of the seven papers mentioned in the SMJ through the end of 2012. The
results have been filtered by selecting the following fields: business, management, and
business finance, as well as by selecting the following types of documents: articles,
reviews, and proceedings.
The second search is based on the keyword defined in the previous step, with the search
being completed by matching with the keywords diversification and restructuring.
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1924 Scientometrics (2015) 102:1921–1950
Afterwards, we combined the two searches and discarded any repeated papers and
grammatical mistakes.
Step 1.3: Choosing papers with one or more of the keywords a final screening is made to
confirm that all these papers are BPR-related. A check is made to ensure that at least one of
the aforementioned keywords appears in the paper’s title, abstract or list of keywords.
Altogether, this process provides 377 citing documents directly related to BPR published
between 1993 and 2012, with a total of 18,133 bibliographic references to 11,243 different
scholarly works.
Step 2: Co-citation analysis the bibliographic references are examined through a co-
citation analysis. The analysis of co-citation means the number of times two papers have
been referred to simultaneously by the citing documents. It may therefore be deduced that
the more often two papers are cited together, the more closely related they are with one
another in terms of their contribution to the topic in question. This measure of proximity is
the one used here thanks to a bibliometric analysis using BibExcel software (Persson et al.
2009).1 This allows the intellectual structure of an academic field to be identified through
the identification of its seminal works (Ramos-Rodrı́guez and Ruiz-Navarro 2004).
Step 3: Network analysis a social network analysis is conducted in order to understand
how these works are related to one another (Pinillos 2011).
Step 3.1: Calculating the centrality of each literature reference We have used social
network analysis techniques to identify the degree of centrality of each work involved in
the network. The criterion for positioning the papers is the measure of centrality: closeness-
input, as we know both the bibliographic references (documents cited) and the citing
documents. It involves an agent’s proximity, or closeness, to all the other agents that make
up the network. A value is calculated in each case that ranges between 0.00 and 1.00,
depending on the number of co-citations received. Accordingly, the references with the
highest number of co-citations will be those recording the highest degree of centrality.
Each value represents a node’s contribution to the network, whereby the closer the figure is
to 1.00, the greater the work’s importance in the network.
Step 3.2: Classifying the papers according to their degree of centrality given that the
values of the degree of centrality obtained for each paper fall within the 0.00–1.00 range,
they have been stratified into three segments or thresholds. The first threshold contains
those papers that belong to the network’s periphery, recording values for the degree of
centrality of between 0.00 and 0.33. The works belonging to the network’s semi-periphery
are placed within the second threshold, with their degree of centrality ranging from 0.34 to
0.67. Finally, the third threshold contains those works that lie at the heart of the network,
with degrees of centrality ranging between 0.68 and 1.00 (Ronda-Pupo and Guerras-Martı́n
2010).
Step 3.3: Graphical depiction the results of the centrality analysis are graphically
depicted using the Pajek software package (De Nooy et al. 2005). The decision was made
to depict the 50 works with the highest degree of centrality graphically (cited sample).
Furthermore, with a view to analysing the change in the intellectual structure of BPR, the
period of analysis was divided into four stages, with each one lasting five years:
1993–1997, 1998–2002, 2003–2007 and 2008–2012. A further decision involved depicting
the 30 bibliographic references with the highest degree of centrality in each stage. This
meant singling out the key works, their interactions, the research teams behind the study of
BPR and the subject’s development over the four stages.
1
Bibexcel is now available at https://bibliometrie.univie.ac.at/bibexcel/.
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Scientometrics (2015) 102:1921–1950 1925
Step 4: Bibliographic coupling this refers to the case when two articles cite a third one
in their literature references; in other words, when two documents share at least one
citation. Bibliographic coupling is a measure of association between two citing documents
(see Fig. 1). The strength of the coupling is gauged by the number of references that
coincide within the citing publications. In other words, the number of citations received
over the course of time will not have a bearing on the choice. The results are therefore
independent of the moment at which the analysis is conducted (Vogel and Guettel 2013).
In addition, the documents that contain the citations are obviously more recent than the
references they cite. Thus, bibliographic coupling, by referring to more up-to-date publi-
cations (citing documents), reinforces the emphasis that the network analysis places on
older documents (cited references), thereby providing a broad temporal perspective on a
specific field (Vogel and Guettel 2013). The empirical evidence confirms that these two
methods produce different results, complementing rather than replacing each other (Jar-
neving 2005).
Following the methodology applied by Vogel and Guettel (2013), we have established a
minimum number of couplings between documents, considering solely those documents on
or above these thresholds. In the end, the selection has involved those documents with a
minimum of 16 couplings with at least one other document. This procedure reduces the
number of documents analysed from 377 to the 97 most interrelated ones.
Step 5: Factor analysis a factor analysis is then conducted on the 97 articles selected
(citing sample). The correlation matrix was calculated for the chosen references, the
diagonal was replaced by the mean and, following the methodology applied in several
works (White and McCain 1998; Ramos-Rodrı́guez and Ruiz-Navarro 2008; Nerur et al.
2008), the decision was made to use factor analysis with varimax rotation. Coinciding with
the analysis of the bibliographic references, the period under study was divided into four
stages in order to identify current trends and the advance of the research front in the
literature on BPR. The number of documents does not exceed one hundred; so the only
limitation is that the articles have at least one shared reference. Thus, the first stage
involves analysing 78 of the 91 citing documents. The second stage analyses 86 of the 98
articles. The third and fourth stages review 73 of 79 and 105 of 109 articles, respectively,
for the factor analysis. Figure 2 shows the design of the methodology applied in this
research.
This section presents the results obtained according to the methodological arrangement
described above. The first part will therefore analyse the literature on BPR through the
cited sample by examining the network for the entire period studied (1993–2012). The
second part will then make an analysis of the citing sample for the same period through a
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1926 Scientometrics (2015) 102:1921–1950
Analysis of the most interrelated citing Analysis of the references with the highest degree
documents in 1993-2012 of centrality.
(97 articles) (50 references)
Analysis of the documents for each stage 1993- Analysis of the references with the highest degree
1997: 78 articles, 1998-2002: 86, 2003-2007: 73 of centrality in each stage
and 2008-2012: 105 articles (30 references per stage)
Interpretation of results
Fig. 3 Intellectual structure of research into BPR over the 1993–2012 period
factor analysis. The last part will present the changes in the intellectual structure and the
evolution of the research into BPR by considering the cited and citing samples across the
different stages by combining both analyses.
Each node in Fig. 3 represents one of the 50 bibliographic references chosen for their
higher degree of centrality (see Appendix 1). The first aspect to be noted is that each
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Scientometrics (2015) 102:1921–1950 1927
document’s degree of centrality appears between square brackets followed by the article’s
references.
Regarding the network structure, it is polycentric with several works (6) with a cen-
trality equal to or greater than 0.55. There is a single work at the graphic’s core, 45 works
in the semi-periphery and four on the periphery. The works that are closely related to
others occupy a central position in the network, whereas those that are loosely related tend
to appear on the periphery (White and McCain 1998). Considering that centrality measures
a node’s contribution depending on its positioning in the network (Borgatti 2005), a more
thorough analysis is to be made of those works with a higher degree of centrality in each
discipline.
It can also be seen that only six of the 50 works have been published in book form. This
finding contrasts with the research into strategic management conducted by Ramos-Rod-
rı́guez and Ruiz-Navarro (2004), who reported that 18 of the 20 most cited references are
books, and only two are articles, occupying positions 11 and 12 in the overall ranking.
There are two possible reasons for this difference; first, research into BPR is much more
specific and specialised than research into strategic management, which means there are
not as many books specialising in the topic. Second, the temporal variable is important, as
scholarship is increasingly based on articles in journals rather than on books (Usdiken and
Pasadeos 1995).
A general overview of the network (Fig. 3) reveals three major blocks identified by
three different colours, representing the three main thematic areas or schools underpinning
the structure of BPR: economics, management and finance. This leads to the identification
of 23 (46 %) works in management, 15 (30 %) in economics, and 12 (24 %) in finance.
Considering all the scholarly items in the network, the main topics are corporate gover-
nance (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Fama 1980; Amihud and Lev 1981; Fama and Jensen
1983; Jensen 1986; Morck et al. 1988, 1990; Jensen and Murphy 1990) and diversification
(Jacquemin and Berry 1979; Palepu 1985; Hill and Hoskisson 1987; Porter 1987; Hos-
kisson and Hitt 1988; Williams et al. 1988; Baysinger and Hoskisson 1989; Bhide 1990;
Chatterjee and Wernerfelt 1991; Hoskisson et al. 1993). Corporate governance and
diversification are two of the precedents that Johnson (1996) identifies for corporate
refocusing. Similarly, this coincides with the graph by Furrer et al. (2008: 9), which closely
links these subjects to restructuring.
The most striking aspect when observing the network in Fig. 3 is the high number of
economics articles that appear (15, or 30 % of the total), even though no search has been
made in the citing documents for specifically economics-related articles. On the other
hand, it should be noted that economics-based articles do not deal specifically with
restructuring. Furthermore, the economics sub-network is not very dense, as the articles
have very little relationship with one another. By contrast, they do have an intensive
relationship with both management-related and financial articles. These findings highlight
the role that economics plays in the intellectual structure of BPR, which is none other than
to provide the conceptual platform or theoretical tool for its study from these disciplines.
The relationships between management works and works related to economics are
grouped into four focal points: transaction costs theory (Williamson 1975, 1985), agency
theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Jensen 1986), the resource-based view (RBV) of the
firm (Penrose 1959), and evolutionary economics (Nelson and Winter 1982). These four
approaches are considered to be significant in the study by Ramos-Rodrı́guez and Ruiz-
Navarro (2004) on the intellectual structure of research into strategic management. This is
consistent with the origin of the study of BPR within the field of management.
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1928 Scientometrics (2015) 102:1921–1950
Nevertheless, in the case of finance, the connection with economics is established largely
through agency theory, which is also used to connect the fields of finance and management.
This preponderance of agency theory as a conceptual cornerstone is reinforced by the
fact that topping the ranking, not only in economics but in all of the bibliographic refer-
ences, is the work by Jensen (1986). This article links the subject of agency theory—an
approach used extensively in the field of management—with finance. The main theme here
is the discussion of a firm’s optimum size and the cash payment of shareholders. In
addition, the author explains why diversification programmes are more likely to cause
losses than acquisitions in the same business line or settlements arising from PTOs (public
tender offer). Other leading works in economics also study the matter of corporate gov-
ernance, paying special attention to the agency issue (Fama 1980; Amihud and Lev 1981;
Fama and Jensen 1983; Jensen and Murphy 1990).
Taking second place in the economics ranking are two works by Williamson (1975;
1985) that develop the transaction cost theory for explaining a firm’s limits. Third place
goes to Penrose (1959), which many scholars in the field of strategic management consider
to be the seminal work that provided the intellectual grounding for the RBV, alongside the
works on evolutionary economics (Nelson and Winter 1982) with which that approach is
clearly identified.
The management area is the largest sub-network, as it contains the most items (23
works, or 46 %). Furthermore, it is also the densest of the three, as it has more inter-
connections across the works in this field, as well as with works in other disciplines in both
economics and finance. Together with its diverse conceptual grounding, this testifies to its
multidisciplinary nature. First place in the ranking goes to the work by Hoskisson and
Johnson (1992) on corporate restructuring and strategic change. This is followed by
Markides (1992) about the ramifications of corporate refocus. Next up is the work by
Hoskisson and Turk (1990), which also addresses corporate restructuring. The bulk of the
works in this discipline associate diversification with corporate restructuring, and highlight
the benefits of reducing and/or specialising the scope of a firm’s operations.
In the case of finance, it is clearly the least dense sub-network, with hardly any inter-
connections within it. Nevertheless, the four works with the highest centrality in this
discipline (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Jensen and Ruback 1983; Jain 1985; Morck et al.
1990) have multiple ties with numerous management works. The remainder of the articles
in finance connect above all with economics. In the field of finance, most of the works are
related to agency theory (Jensen 1986). The two works with the highest centrality are by
Jain (1985) and Jensen and Meckling (1976). The former corresponds to the impact sell-
offs have on shareholder wealth, and the latter develops a theory on corporate governance
by integrating aspects of agency theory, ownership rights and the theory of finance. Like
the works in economics, most of the output deals with corporate governance.
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Scientometrics (2015) 102:1921–1950 1929
Most of the works in the first factor have been published in a management journal. This
factor covers two different research topics: divestiture and corporate governance. The main
topic in this factor is divestiture, with works that conduct a thorough review of its modes,
precedents, mechanisms and outcomes (Haynes et al. 2002; Villalonga and McGahan
2005; Brauer 2006; Decker and Mellewigt 2007; Bergh et al. 2008; Moschieri and Mair
2008; Bergh and Lim 2008; Brauer 2009; Lee and Madhavan 2010; Decker and Mellewigt
2012; Brauer and Wiersema 2012).
The second major topic deals with issues related to corporate governance, such as the
instruments for improving governance structures, internal control mechanisms, and suit-
able incentives to ensure top managers work in favour of shareholders and not out of
personal interest (Sanders 2001; Bigley and Wiersema 2002; Hayward and Shimizu 2006;
Fulghieri and Hodrick 2006; Park and Kim 2008; Wu and Delios 2009; Miller et al. 2010;
Abor et al. 2011; Wu et al. 2011).
In short, BPR with a strategic approach indicates that the main circumstances leading to
BPR are inappropriate corporate governance and a deficient diversification strategy
(Hoskisson et al. 1994; Johnson 1996). Furthermore, the main method used for BPR is
divestiture or the sale of assets. The main goals of BPR are efficient mechanisms for
internal firm control (Hitt et al. 1996; Seward and Walsh 1996), corporate refocus and,
occasionally, better financial performance (Bowman et al. 1999).
The second factor concentrates the main outcome of BPR with a financial approach.
Highlights here are those works that study the main outcome of BPR, namely, improve-
ment in a firm’s financial performance. The topic with the highest factor loadings is firm
performance due to the sale of assets and greater corporate refocusing (John and Ofek
1995; Allen et al. 1995; Daley et al. 1997; Desai and Jain 1999; Nanda and Narayanan
1999; Berger and Ofek 1999; Maksimovic and Phillips 2001; Clubb and Stouraitis 2002;
Datta et al. 2003; Bates 2005; Lee and Lin 2008; Warusawitharana 2008). Generally
speaking, performance is measured by the increase in a firm’s market value after
announcing the sale of an asset or on the back of an improved operating performance.
The third factor is also corporate governance, albeit with special attention paid to firm
control (Zuckerman 2000; Chatterjee et al. 2003; Toms and Wright 2005). It is basically
posited that the market for firm control could improve the efficacy of corporate governance
rules and lead to the greater accountability of top managers as regards investors.
A comparison between these results and the network analysis for the bibliographic
references informs the following premises: first, in both analyses corporate governance is a
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key topic in the study of BPR. This is also associated with the importance given to agency
theory for the study of this phenomenon, and the fact that the work by Jensen (1986) stands
at the heart of the network. This confirms that the contributions made by economics are
used as the theoretical platform for developing the literature on BPR.
Second, the precedents for BPR appear both in network analysis and in factor analysis,
thereby revealing that in general terms the literature on BPR has focused on studying its
background and results, with the literature largely ignoring the study of the actual process
of restructuring, as well as, for example, the most practical tools for analysing the business
portfolio (Untiedt et al. 2012). An attempt is thus made to answer questions such as ‘‘why
do firms restructure?’’ and ‘‘what is the purpose of restructuring?’’.
Figure 4 shows the composition of the 31 works with the highest degree of centrality.
Two special issues have been published on BPR, one in the discipline of management
(Strategic Management Journal, 1993, vol. 14, no. 1) and the other in finance (Journal of
2
In both the first and the third stages, 31 and 33 works are chosen, respectively, given that they recorded the
same degree of centrality as the thirtieth reference.
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Scientometrics (2015) 102:1921–1950 1931
Financial Economics, 1995, vol. 37, no. 1). Many of the most frequently cited works in
subsequent stages belong to these monographs.
The network corresponding to this first stage is very similar to the overall network in
terms of its characteristics: preponderance of the field of management and economics as
the conceptual grounding for the works on management and finance. The main difference
with the overall network is that the core in this stage is shared by the disciplines of
economics and management. Thus, of the nine works that constitute the core of this stage,
two adopt an economic approach (Williamson 1985; Jensen 1986), and the remaining
seven have a strategic perspective (Palepu 1985; Hill and Hoskisson 1987; Hoskisson and
Hitt 1988; Baysinger and Hoskisson 1989; Hoskisson and Turk 1990; Markides 1992;
Hoskisson and Johnson 1992). The main topics are agency conflicts and diversification
strategy, which inform the study of BPR, that is, the main precursors of a restructuring
decision (Johnson 1996).
In this first stage, the field of management clearly takes centre stage with 61 % of the
works, with seven of them in the core, as we have already seen. This is perhaps the most
dynamic stage in this field in the study of BPR, and more or less coincides with the time of
greatest scientific output according to the work by Furrer et al. (2008). Moreover, it is a
very dense sub-network with numerous relationships within its own field, albeit also with
significant relationships with the other disciplines. Once again, this is an indication of its
more eclectic and multidisciplinary nature. Among its more significant works, and because
of their high degree of centrality, special mention should be made of the contributions
made by Hill and Hoskisson (1987), Hoskisson and Turk (1990) and Palepu (1985), who
conducted empirical studies designed to explore the effects of diversification strategies on
the performance of multiproduct firms.
In this stage, and within the economics discipline, the graph reveals the key role played
by the works by Jensen (1986) on agency theory, and by Williamson (1975; 1985) on
transaction costs. Indeed, the work by Jensen (1986) has the highest degree of centrality
(0.86), which implies that almost all the nodes on the network are going to interrelate with
it. This highlights what has already been observed for the overall network in the sense that
economics provides the conceptual grounding for the other disciplines and plays a medi-
ating role between them. In turn, finance is barely present over these years (only five
works). Finally, there are no interrelations within the works on finance, and they are
connected solely with other disciplines. This reveals that when the discipline of finance
began publishing on BPR it still did not have its own theoretical corpus, so it borrowed
from the contributions made by both management and economics.
Regarding factor analysis, the most significant factor identified in this stage has a
strategic focus, as most of the articles have been published in a management journal. The
main topic is corporate restructuring (Johnson et al. 1993; Singh 1993; Bowman and Singh
1993; Bethel and Liebeskind 1993; Gibbs 1993; Hurry 1993; Robins 1993; Markides 1995;
Lei and Hitt 1995; Robbie and Wright 1995; Peel 1995; Wiersema 1995; Hatfield et al.
1996; Chang 1996; Filatotchev et al. 1996). This factor presents the precursors, ramifi-
cations and multidimensionality of this strategy.
The second and third factors are made up mostly of works with a financial focus. The
works that have been published in financial journals could be labelled as dealing with
corporate governance. Special attention is paid here to the compensation of top manage-
ment and management changes designed to correct mistaken prior decisions. The main
interest of the third factor involves the financial issues a firm faces when there is a shortfall
between its available liquid assets and its current payment obligations (John 1993a, b;
Opler 1993; Smith 1993; John 1993a, b; Bartov 1993; Franks and Torous 1994).
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Table 2 Explained variance by stages
No. Label Focus No. of docs Initial Eigen- Values Sum of the saturations to the square of the rotation
Stage 1: 1993–1997
1 Corporate restructuring Management 39 30.329 28.599 36.666 36.666
2 Corporate governance Finance 24 19.650 16.754 21.480 58.146
3 Financial issues Finance 8 4.219 6.809 8.729 66.875
4 Organisational issues Management 7 2.260 4.294 5.506 72.380
Stage 2: 1998–2002
1 Performance Finance 47 39.943 33.740 39.233 39.233
2 Capabilities. competencies and RBV Management 22 22.113 17.595 20.460 59.692
3 Corporate governance Management 13 3.670 13.335 15.506 75.198
4 Company- industry applications Management 4 2.635 3.691 4.291 79.490
Stage 3: 2003–2007
1 Performance Finance 38 34.532 30.467 41.736 41.736
2 Refocus Management 30 17.922 21.597 29.585 71.321
3 Corporate governance Both 5 5.126 5.515 7.555 78.877
Stage 4: 2008–2012
1 Financial issues Finance 65 44.912 43.352 41.288 41.288
2 Divestiture Management 28 22.088 22.112 21.059 62.347
3 Corporate governance Finance 12 8.014 9.550 9.095 71.442
Scientometrics (2015) 102:1921–1950
Scientometrics (2015) 102:1921–1950 1933
Figure 5 shows the composition of the 30 works with the highest degree of centrality.
Overall, the network strikes a greater balance between the disciplines involved: manage-
ment (37 % of works), finance (40 %) and economics (23 %). This balance is also
apparent, as there are no works of such dominance as in the preceding stage. In other
words, the network’s core has disappeared, and all the works are positioned in the semi-
periphery. By looking at the networks for the first three stages, we may consider this
second one to be a transition stage.
This second stage upholds the interest that works accord to the agency approach
(Amihud and Lev 1981; Aron 1988; Denis et al. 1997) and transaction costs (Williamson
1975). Yet there now appears a new theoretical perspective that is closely linked to the
discipline of management, namely, the RBV, which provides three works. Two of these
constitute the veritable conceptual grounding for the new focus: Wernerfelt (1984) and
Barney (1991). The former pioneered the RBV, while the latter advanced towards a model
for identifying the characteristics of strategic resources, and therefore towards the defi-
nition of those aspects that constitute a source of competitive advantage. The third major
work with this approach is a specific piece on divestiture and the RBV (Bergh 1995), and
may be considered the first work that applies the RBV to the study of BPR.
This emergence of the RBV as a new theoretical perspective for the study of BPR
coincides in time with the interest shown as of the mid 1990s in studying corporate strategy
according to that approach (Ramos-Rodrı́guez and Ruiz-Navarro 2004). As regards the
relationships with economics, there is a certain decrease in the weight of agency theory
within the field of management, although the relationship with transaction costs theory
remains through the works by Williamson (1975).
The field of finance increases in weight both in terms of the number of works and as
regards their degree of centrality. The loss of currency of agency theory within the field of
management is offset by the considerable importance it has in the discipline of finance. It
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may also be noted that besides the increase in the number of works compared to the prior
stage, for the first time there is a specific sub-network involving finance in which works
have major interrelationships with each other, which is in contrast to the prior stage in
which financial works were isolated from one another and related solely to those in other
disciplines.
Finally, economics maintains a mediating role, with links to the other two disciplines.
Elsewhere, the economics sub-network is weakened, with very few relationships between
the works it contains. In contrast to the previous stage, the only work that is cited together
with management works is the one by Williamson (1975), although collaboration with
finance is reinforced.
The factor analysis reveals that the documents in this stage are founded on sundry
theoretical bases such as, for example, agency theory, transaction costs, the RBV and
dynamic capabilities. This constitutes a sea change as regards the previous stage: the first
factor -which explains the greater amount of information in this stage—no longer has a
strategic focus, but a financial one instead. This is the case even though the majority of the
citing documents in this stage (57 %) were published in a management journal. This
finding confirms the change in trend observed in the network analysis. Although scientific
output in the field of management continues to be high, it is gradually decreasing, as is its
influence in the study of BPR.
The first factor with a financial focus is centred on the main outcome of BPR: an
improvement in firm performance (Bethel et al. 1998; Kim 1998; Nohel and Tarhan 1998;
Slovin and Sushka 1998; Desai and Jain 1999; Krishnaswami and Subramaniam 1999; Vijh
1999; Berger and Ofek 1999; Nanda and Narayanan 1999; Gillan et al. 2000; Denis and
Kruse 2000; Maksimovic and Phillips 2001; Kaiser and Stouraitis 2001; Hulburt et al.
2002; Clubb and Stouraitis 2002). Above all, the articles pursue an empirical review of the
effect that divestitures, equity carve-outs, mergers and acquisitions have on a firm’s
performance.
We have labelled the second factor, with a strategic focus, as capabilities, competencies,
and the RBV because it especially analyses these aspects associated with firm strategy
(Chen et al. 1998; Galunic and Rodan 1998; Krause et al. 2000; Majumdar 2000; Karim
and Mitchell 2000; Capron et al. 2001; Drazin and Rao 2002). As was the case in the
network analysis, the RBV begins to appear in this stage, ultimately becoming dominant
within the scope of firm strategy.
Figure 6 shows the composition of the 33 works with the greater degree of centrality in this
stage, revealing a main network consisting of 27 works and three additional graphs, each
consisting of two works. The main network has 21 financial references, five economic ones
and a single management one, while each one of the additional graphs belongs to finance,
economics and management separately. Furthermore, the network in this stage does not
have a core either, although there is a clearly defined periphery of 18 works.
The above results may be interpreted as indicating that the three disciplines that were
previously fully interrelated and ‘‘borrowed’’ contributions off one another are more
independent in this stage in the development of their own research. This is a trend that had
already begun in the prior stage, and now intensifies in this one. The main topics in this
stage are the sale of assets and its positive impact on performance (John and Ofek 1995)
and the negative relationship between diversification and firm performance, or the discount
effect (Miles and Rosenfeld 1983; Hite and Owers 1983; Alexander et al. 1984; Jain 1985;
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Scientometrics (2015) 102:1921–1950 1935
Klein 1986; Hite et al. 1987; Ravenscraft 1987; Markides 1992; Brown et al. 1994; Lang
and Stulz 1994; Comment and Jarrell 1995; Lang et al. 1995; Berger and Ofek 1995;
Servaes 1996; Daley et al. 1997; Desai and Jain 1999; Graham et al. 2002). In our view, the
scholarly literature in this stage seeks to foster corporate refocusing in a firm, highlighting
its benefits, as well as the disadvantages of diversification. It is worth noting that this stage
and the following one are marked by the evolution of the global economy following the
onset of the 2008 financial crisis.
This context may explain the major surge in the discipline of finance, which becomes
the network’s protagonist, continuing the trend that began in the previous stage. The field
of economics now takes a second position, and although it still interrelates with the
discipline of finance, and always according to agency theory, there is no longer any
interrelationship with management. At this point, economics is no longer the bridge that
links these two disciplines.
The case of management needs to be considered separately. Having fallen from its
dominant position in the first stage, in this third stage it now plays a marginal role in the
research network on BPR. Indeed, only three works survive in this stage, with low degrees
of centrality and clearly positioned in the network’s periphery. Furthermore, they appear to
be almost isolated, with hardly any interrelationships between each other or with other
disciplines. This decline in management is once again consistent with the lower interest
generated by works on restructuring in strategic management over the 2001–2005 period,
according to data by Furrer et al. (2008). It may be posited, in short, that the literature’s
attention is focused on the relationship between diversification and performance, with the
so-called ‘‘discount effect’’ at the heart of the debate. In other words, BPR as a strategy
loses importance in this stage.
According to the results of the factor analysis, the documents in this stage are founded
on sundry theoretical bases, mainly agency theory, organisational behaviour and financial
theories. In this stage, as in the previous one, the first item in the factor analysis has a
financial focus. Most of the works in this first factor have been published in a financial
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1936 Scientometrics (2015) 102:1921–1950
journal. Two topics have been identified that are studied according to this approach:
financial performance (Datta et al. 2003; Hughes et al. 2003; DeLong 2003; Boone et al.
2003; Veld and Veld-Merkoulova 2004; Perry and Shivdasani 2005; Meschi 2005; McNeil
and Moore 2005; Hovakimian and Titman 2006) and the different methods for BPR
(Dittmar and Shivdasani 2003; Stouraitis 2003; Osano 2004; Bates 2005; Rondi and
Vannoni 2005; Slovin et al. 2005; Powell and Yawson 2005). The following are some of
the methods studied with a financial focus for modifying a firm’s scope: divestitures, sell-
offs, spin-offs, takeovers and equity carve-outs.
The second factor includes works published mainly in a management journal. This
factor includes several topics, the first of which is corporate refocusing. A review is made
here of the background to this refocus and its consequences. In addition, the aim is to show
that the sale of a firm’s business unit does not necessarily mean failure, but rather a new
beginning for the corporation (Hoskisson et al. 2004; Morrow et al. 2004; Hoskisson et al.
2005; Meyer 2006; Decker and Mellewigt 2007). The second one involves the methods
used to restructure the business portfolio (Hoskisson et al. 2004; Morrow et al. 2004;
Hoskisson et al. 2005; Meyer 2006; Decker and Mellewigt 2007). The following are among
the methods studied with a strategic focus for modifying a firm’s scope: divestitures and
takeovers.
It is important to mention that although most of the citing documents in the second and
third stages are published in management journals, the most cited references appearing in
the network are largely financial. A possible explanation is that the greater presence of
management articles in the citing sample leads to a greater dispersion of the most cited
references. On the other hand, while there are fewer financial citing documents, with an
emerging financial theoretical base, they are more likely to refer to the same works; thus,
most of the citations received are obtained by financial references.
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Scientometrics (2015) 102:1921–1950 1937
Figure 7 shows the composition of the 30 works with the higher degree of centrality in this
stage. The network’s structure is very similar to the one for the third stage, albeit with two
key differences. First, the field of management accounts for more works than economics,
and second, all the works, without exception, are interrelated within the network, with the
separate graphs (islands) in the previous stage disappearing.
The preponderance of finance in the study of BPR is upheld, in a way that is similar to
the previous stage. It could be said that the financial focus begins in stage 1 as an emerging
field that ‘‘borrows’’ ideas from other disciplines, whereas in this last stage it now has its
own research corpus and prevails in the intellectual grounding of the research into BPR.
This prevalence of finance is understandable, as the publications in the last stage can be
linked to 2008 financial crisis.
The field of management makes a slight resurgence around the role of resources in
restructuring (Bergh 1995), and economics works have almost disappeared. Only two
works survive: on agency theory (Jensen 1986) and the negative impact diversification has
on performance (Lang and Stulz 1994).
The disciplines of management and finance have gone some way to creating their own
network, and are linked only by two works on agency theory (Lang et al. 1995) and
resources (Bergh 1995). This may mean that each discipline has finally evolved separately,
and the works in management and finance interrelate mainly within their own discipline.
The works published in a management journal are going to cite works published in journals
with a similar focus. The same occurs with financial works. This progressive distancing
was already apparent in the previous stage and was also reflected in the network because it
does not have a core and most of the works are in the semi-periphery.
Most of the works in this stage have a financial focus, according to the results forth-
coming from the factor analysis. The first factor has been labelled as financial issues
because for the most part it features topics related to capital structure (Eisfeldt and
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1938 Scientometrics (2015) 102:1921–1950
Rampini 2008; Flor 2008; Mase 2008; Doukas and Kan 2008; Dittmann et al. 2008; Hege
et al. 2009), debt management (Renneboog and Szilagyi 2008; Champagne and Kryza-
nowski 2008; Denis 2011) and the volatile financial environment (Lee and Lin 2008;
Eckbo and Thorburn 2008; Kang et al. 2010; Desai and Savickas 2010; Zhou et al. 2011).
In our view, this factor relates BPR to financial restructuring (Warusawitharana 2008;
Hillier et al. 2009; Owen et al. 2010; Colak 2010; Anjos 2010; Jain et al. 2011; Subr-
amaniam et al. 2011; Mak et al. 2011; Maksimovic et al. 2011; Bernile et al. 2012). In this
stage, these matters are also especially significant in business practices, as many firms have
had to modify their business portfolio and restructure their debt in order to boost perfor-
mance (Pathak et al. 2013).
The second factor has a strategic focus, with divestitures being the most salient topic
(Moschieri and Mair 2008; Bergh and Lim 2008; Bergh et al. 2008; Brauer 2009; Lee and
Madhavan 2010; Wu et al. 2011; Moschieri and Mair 2011; Brauer and Wiersema 2012).
Above all, a review is made of the main characteristics of divestitures and their positive
effects on the bottom line.
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Scientometrics (2015) 102:1921–1950 1939
recession, 2008–2012, divestitures, their implementation and their outcomes are topics that
are addressed more thoroughly by scholars studying BPR.
Elsewhere, the literature on BPR with a financial focus begins in the first stage by
reviewing some of the background to restructuring: inadequate corporate governance and
the financial difficulties restructured firms have to deal with. Subsequently, in the second
and third stages, scholars in this field focus on the main outcome of this strategy: better
financial performance. In the final stage, several financial issues stand out around BPR
strategy, which is in some way consistent with the crisis scenario that begins in 2008, and
which has been referred to in the management approach.
The theories that have provided the foundations for the works of both a strategic and a
financial focus are as follows: agency, transaction costs and the RBV. Agency theory and
different financial approaches, related to the discount of diversification, financial markets
and performance, prevail in the articles published in financial journals, while agency
theory, transaction costs and the RBV prevail in the articles published in management
journals.
Conclusions
A review paper usually focuses on either the most cited bibliographic references (Ramos-
Rodrı́guez and Ruiz-Navarro 2004; Di Stefano et al. 2010; Pinillos 2011) or the citing
documents in a specific field (Vogel and Guettel 2013). Works that apply bibliometric
techniques commonly focus in one of these approaches. In our paper we wanted to offer a
comprehensive review and that is the reason we focus on both perspectives in order to draw
a path from tradition (intellectual structure) to present research (front).
Moreover, we not only revised the total period 1993–2012 but we also revised its four
different stages (the total period divided by 5 years). In this way, we established a dynamic
perspective and we identified some changes in the intellectual structure of BPR and the
evolution of its research front. We believe, a comparative and integrating analysis of citing
and cited documents is conducted for the first time, at least in the management field. The
final value-added result is to identify the origins and evolution of BPR research.
Within the field of BPR, it is noted that diversification strategy, corporate governance
and the search for improved firm performance are the point of departure for its study. The
reason for this is that there cannot be BPR unless a firm has first diversified and because the
diversification strategy may trigger conflicts between the agents with growth objectives
(most often top management) and value creation (of greater interest to shareholders)
(Markides 1992; Johnson 1996).
An analysis of the changes in the intellectual structure reveals how the disciplines of
management and economics initially dominated the intellectual base in BPR. Today,
however, the literature on BPR largely bases its contributions on a more financial
approach. This situation may be due to the global financial crisis, as well as to the growing
concern in industrialised nations over issues related to corporate governance prompted by
the numerous corporate scandals that have come to light since the beginning of the century.
Nevertheless, none of the four disciplines has disappeared over the four stages, and the
literature on BPR is fuelled by the contributions made by the three schools, albeit with a
different weighting and significance in each stage.
Our analysis reveals a certain parallelism with bibliometric works in strategic man-
agement. For example, the work of Ramos-Rodrı́guez and Ruiz-Navarro (2004) identifies
economics as one of the roots of this discipline. Furthermore, it is consistent with the
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central role played by economic matters in firms. In addition, the influence of the RBV in
the mid-1990s coincides with its application for the study of BPR. In the citing documents,
moreover, the level of interest in research into BPR is in agreement with the work by
Furrer et al. (2008). This may mean that despite the unquestionable contribution made by
different disciplines, strategic management has played an important and constant role over
time with the literature on BPR.
The research into BPR has evolved from very general topics to much more specific ones.
Over time, the discipline of finance has gained interest in the research into BPR. In addition,
scholars are showing more interest in undertaking empirical studies than conceptual ones,
which may be indicative of growing maturity in the study of BPR, as mentioned earlier.
In other matters, the origin of the study of BPR stems from three roots arising from
economics, management and finance. The role and influence of these three disciplines
evolve across the different stages identified in the analysis. The main theoretical approa-
ches informing the study of BPR are as follows: agency theory, transaction costs eco-
nomics, and RBV. The first two of these have been used mainly for the study of corporate
governance, divestitures and over-diversification (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Hoskisson
et al. 1999; Moschieri and Mair 2008). The RBV has been used to explain corporate
refocus and portfolio organisation based on the best resources and capabilities available in
the firm (Montgomery et al. 1984; Markides 1992; Bergh 1995).
The overall network and the different stages reveal that the discipline of finance is
related above all to agency theory. Nevertheless, in the overall network and in the first and
second stages, strategic management is more closely related to the transaction costs eco-
nomics, while in the last stage it is related solely to agency theory. It may be concluded that
agency theory is the point where the studies with a financial and strategic focus meet. It
may be the case that the topics addressed by agency theory, which combine corporate
governance and incentives, are also linked to firm theory (Jensen 2000), and may explain
this common arena for both approaches. It may furthermore be argued that, to a certain
extent within management, the RBV includes the approaches of the transaction costs
economics insofar as it seeks to explain a firm’s boundaries in some way (Foss et al. 1995).
Furthermore, the analysis of such limitations is one of the components of firm theory
(Holmstrom and Tirole 1989). In other words, the combination of agency theory, RBV and
finance observed in the fourth stage may be a sign of maturity in the field of research into
BPR, as well as of their contribution to the development of a broader subject, as is strategic
management. All this involves the challenge it entails for management to respond, from
BPR perspective, to the problematic issues posed for the firms by the 2008 financial crisis.
Looking to the future in BPR research, we share the view held by Untiedt et al. (2012)
that there is a lack of studies on the tools required for analysing a business portfolio. For
the most part, the studies do not provide an in-depth analysis of the mechanisms used by
top management to choose the business in which to divest. In addition, more research is
needed to explain why different firms, facing similar conditions (e.g., poor performances),
reach different decisions on how and when to restructure. Finally, there is a need to
conduct further studies that conceptualise the empirical research in order to build and
reinforce the theory on BPR strategy.
Looking to the future in Scientometric research, the interaction of different bibliometric
and statistical methodologies would be necessary to evaluate different periods of any field
of study. In this scenario, it should be able to provide a broad temporal perspective on a
specific field combining old and more up-to-date publications. As time goes by, due to the
increase in the output of scientific papers and the strict requirements of researchers, any
review of the literature would pose major challenges.
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Acknowledgments The authors wish to thank Wolfgang Glänzel, editor in chief of the journal Sciento-
metrics and two anonymous referees for their constructive comments and suggestions on this paper. We also
want to thank Guillermo Armando Ronda-Pupo for his helpful suggestions. This paper has been supported by
Projects ECO2012-36775 and ECO2012-31358 from the Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (Spain).
Appendix 1: 50 Most cited bibliographic references selected for the whole period
(1993–2012)
0.86 Jensen (1986) 0.64 Comment and 0.56 John and Ofek 0.64 Lang et al.
Jarrell (1995) (1995) (1995)
0.73 Hill and 0.57 John and Ofek 0.51 Jensen (1986) 0.56 Berger and
Hoskisson (1995) Ofek (1995)
(1987)
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1942 Scientometrics (2015) 102:1921–1950
0.73 Hoskisson and 0.56 Berger and 0.48 Berger and 0.55 Jensen (1986)
Turk (1990) Ofek (1995) Ofek (1995)
0.71 Palepu (1985) 0.56 Williamson 0.43 Lang and 0.51 Comment and
(1975) Stultz (1994) Jarrell (1995)
0.71 Williamson 0.48 Palepu (1985) 0.42 Hite et al. 0.51 John and Ofek
(1985) (1987) (1995)
0.70 Hoskisson and 0.48 Denis et al. 0.41 Lang et al. 0.48 Berger and Ofek
Hitt (1988) (1997) (1995) (1999)
0.70 Hoskisson and 0.48 Markides 0.39 Jain (1985) 0.46 Bergh (1995)
Johnson (1992)
(1992)
0.70 Markides (1992) 0.47 Amihud and 0.38 Graham et al. 0.46 Maksimovic and
Lev (1981) (2002) Phillips (2001)
0.68 Baysinger and 0.47 Lang and Stultz 0.38 Amihud and 0.45 Shleifer and Vishny
Hoskisson (1994) Lev (1981) (1992)
(1989)
0.67 Duhaime and 0.46 Hite et al. 0.37 Daley et al. 0.42 Desai and Jain
Grant (1984) (1987) (1997) (1999)
0.67 Jain (1985) 0.46 Shleifer and 0.37 Servaes (1996) 0.42 Hite et al. (1987)
Vishny
(1992)
0.64 Williams et al. 0.45 Cusatis et al. 0.37 Denis et al. 0.41 Schlingemann et al.
(1988) (1993) (1997) (2002)
0.63 Hill and Snell 0.44 Hoskisson and 0.36 Alexander 0.41 Jain (1985)
(1989) Johnson et al. (1984)
(1992)
0.61 Kosnik (1990) 0.41 Rumelt (1974) 0.36 Comment and 0.40 Dittmar and
Jarrell Shivdasani (2003)
(1995)
0.63 Williamson 0.40 Bhide (1990) 0.34 Morck et al. 0.40 Krishnaswami and
(1975) (1988) Subramaniam
(1999)
0.59 Roll (1986) 0.40 Jensen and 0.32 Kaplan and 0.40 Lang and Stultz
Murphy Weisbach (1994)
(1990) (1992)
0.59 Jensen and 0.40 Jensen (1993) 0.32 Jensen and 0.39 Graham et al. (2002)
Meckling Meckling
(1976) (1976)
0.57 Hill and Snell 0.40 Morck et al. 0.32 Ravenscraft 0.36 Campa and Kedia
(1988) (1990) (1987) (2002)
0.54 Montgomery 0.40 Aron (1988) 0.32 Shleifer and 0.36 Denis et al. (1997)
et al. (1984) Vishny
(1989)
0.53 Hoskisson et al. 0.40 Boot (1992) 0.32 Jensen (1993) 0.36 Lins and Servaes
(1993) (1999)
0.51 Hitt et al. (1990) 0.40 Matsusaka 0.31 Scharfstein 0.36 Rajan et al. (2000)
(1993) and Stein
(2000)
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Scientometrics (2015) 102:1921–1950 1943
0.49 Hermalin and 0.40 Slovin et al. 0.31 Stein (1997) 0.36 Servaes (1996)
Weisbach (1995)
(1988)
0.49 Weisbach (1988) 0.37 Singh and 0.31 White (1980) 0.36 Jensen and
Montgomery Meckling
(1987) (1976)
0.48 Morck et al. 0.37 Barney (1991) 0.28 Brown et al. 0.36 Jensen (1993)
(1990) (1994)
0.48 Baysinger and 0.37 Wernerfelt 0.28 Klein (1986) 0.36 Maksimovic and
Hoskisson (1984) Phillips (2002)
(1990)
0.47 Amihud and Lev 0.37 Hoskisson and 0.26 Desai and Jain 0.33 Hoskisson et al.
(1981) Turk (1990) (1999) (1994)
0.47 Bhagat et al. 0.37 Markides (1995) 0.25 Markides 0.33 Johnson (1996)
(1990) (1992)
0.47 Fama and Jensen 0.36 Bergh (1995) 0.06 Johnson et al. 0.33 Hitt et al. (1996)
(1983) (1993)
0.47 Lehn and Poulsen 0.36 Hoskisson et al. 0.06 Hoskisson 0.33 Markides (1992)
(1989) (1994) (1994)
0.42 Cochran et al. 0.35 Shleifer and 0.06 Hite and 0.26 Hoskisson and
(1985) Vishny (1991) Owers Johnson (1992)
Montgomery (1983)
(1982) Miles and
Rosenfeld
(1983)
Teece (1982)
Penrose (1959)
The articles were selected according to the highest degree of centrality. For the whole list of references, the
reader can contact to the corresponding author
a
In both the first and the third stages, 31 and 33 works are chosen, respectively, given that they recorded the
same degree of centrality as the thirtieth reference
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