Nizar Chaari Harrisson2012
Nizar Chaari Harrisson2012
Nizar Chaari Harrisson2012
1–24
by
Denis HARRISSON∗ and Nizar CHAARI
Université du Québec à Montréal, Canada
and
Mariline COMEAU-VALLÉE
HÉC Montréal, Canada
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Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA, MA 02148, USA
2 DENIS HARRISSON, NIZAR CHAARI AND MARILINE COMEAU-VALLÉE
L’article examine l’alliance entre une firme de service public et un consortium formé
d’associations de défenses des droits des consommateurs. Le projet consiste à developer
des moyens pour aider les clients à faible revenu dans une situation de recouvrement.
Il s’agit de proposer des modalités de paiement qui tiennent compte de leur situation
financière. La collaboration interorganisationnelle est une façon d’accroı̂tre les capacités
des organisations par une mise en commun des compétences, des ressources et des
connaissances, afin de résoudre des problèmes sociaux. Nous analysons le processus de
construction de cette innovation sociale aux travers les arrangements pris dans les trois
dimensions institutionnelles: cognitive, normative et régulatoire. L’étude de cas montre
que la légitimité de l’arrangement repose sur la considération des valeurs de solidarité et
d’équité. Le processus d’innovation repose sur la connaissance et l’accès à des ressources
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fondés sur l’expertise des acteurs. L’entente se consolide lorsque diffusée sous forme de
procédures qui deviennent des routines oganisationnelles.
1 Introduction
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Organizational structures are aligned with cultural and cognitive belief systems
and the normative and regulatory arrangement which prevail in a given community
(Baum and Rao 2004). Organizations survive via this arrangement which is coherent
with the institutional environment (Campbell 2004, Lawrence and Suddaby 2006). Their
constituents are engaged in activities requiring resources to which they can have access
only if they manage to agree on the means of allocation (Meyer and Rowan 1977).
This constitutes the legitimacy of the agreement (Scott 2001, DiMaggio and Powell
1991; Selznick 1996, Douglas 2004). But how is this legitimacy constructed? And how
is it transformed? The most enduring effects of social action can be felt through the
consequences for organizations as represented by changes in their practices, orientations
and policies (Haveman et al. 2007) or in their organizational forms (Swaminathan and
Wade, 2001; Rao, 2009). Such change is truly the ultimate consequence of a partnership
agreement and takes the form of new scripts, norms and operating rules guiding the
way organizations deal with the problems they face. The core of institution is being
composed of three dimensions: cognitive, normative and regulative (Scott 2001: 134).
These dimensions assure the stability and the sense of social life. Institutions become
taken for granted arrangements through which individuals interact without queries for
its validity. If an institution has to be transformed, it means that those dimensions have
to be reconsidered.
First, the cognitive dimension implies taking into account institutional arrange-
ment taken for granted in terms of the use and pertinence of organizational forms
and practices. According to Suchman (1995), this is the most powerful and influential
dimension of organizations, since, as it is deeply rooted and often not conscious,
transforming it requires a slow and intense process. It is through this dimension that
actors acquire models to regulate their perceptions. We will examine this institutional
dimension by analyzing the way actors introduce new values into the underlying
conception of reality, which is often different for a company and for an association,
and how the resulting logic of action is included in the innovation process (Lounsbury
and Glynn 2007, Reay and Hinings 2009). To innovate, it is also necessary to transform
values and to free oneself from preconceived ideas, to reconcile these to such a degree
as to allow for openness to cooperative agreements on concrete forms of intervention for
the public interest. Innovation can be better understood as a source of information and
knowledge that can grow only if they are shared (Osterlund and Carlisle 2005). To reach
this stage, however, ideas that are taken for granted must be broken down.
Second, the normative dimension is characterized by the adoption of organiza-
tional structures, forms and practices by individual and collective actors with recognized
and credible expertise (Scott 1998). These actors enable the systems to run smoothly
by continuously adjusting their commitments to those of others, based on the desire
to maintain the relationship. Several studies on the innovation process have shown
how essential the presence of certain individuals has been in terms of their ability
to move from one universe to the other (Callon 1992, Alter 2003, Van de Ven and
Angle 2000, Harrisson and Klein 2007). These ‘boundary spanners’ possess skills
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and attitudes which make them essential players who act as entrepreneurs capable
of avoiding, circumventing or transforming rules in order to open a passageway to the
new universe by proposing new rules or adapting existing ones (Campbell 2004, Hiatt
et al. 2009, Battilana et al. 2009). They stabilize for a period of time the evolutive
process of innovation by developing norms for governing meetings and discussions
within the networks. One part of our analysis will focus on these players who act as
real entrepreneurs.
Third, the regulatory dimension is the one that makes possible the production,
monitoring and sanctioning of activities by powerful actors such as the state and the
corporation that possess the power and ability to define organizational practices in
acceptable forms. This dimension is the target of social movements (Zald and McCarthy
1977, McAdam and Scott 2005) because it is the locus of change that also brings
transformations to the other two dimensions. The regulatory dimension best represents
the idea of the restrictive institution based on the model of clear rules and explicit
control mechanisms. However, even in this rigid system of rules, conformity is unstable.
Nevertheless, an innovation endures only if it leads to a sustainable system regulated
by rules. What is important is to agree on the rules. The firm uses its organization, with
its hierarchical leadership, to diffuse the new rules on which the ‘boundary spanners’
have agreed, rules that are legitimized through a constant and iterative interplay
between the three dimensions. The process of creating new rules is, however, not linear
since unanticipated effects are always possible. In the final section, we will examine
how innovative agreements are translated into rules. Thus, associations are vectors of
important changes in organizations since they strive to de-legitimize practices deemed
to be unacceptable. This provides opportunities to create other organizational forms
which slip in through cracks in the systems (Zald et al. 2005). Partnership is one of
these forms.
In brief, institutions acquire a ‘repertoire’ of solutions which are based on
principles used by the actors to recombine the arrangements. Fragments of existing
institutions are thus re-assembled by a coalition of actors. Hybrid models are
created, and routines are revamped in order to serve new objectives and produce
jointly constructed outcomes. Lastly, new institutions borrow the order, meaning and
legitimacy from past institutions and involve an evolutionary process of rearrangements
(Scott 2001, Campbell 2004).
How can these new relations be structured and stabilized? If there is little
engagement from corporations with civil society, this also means that there are few
precedents that can form the basis of patterns or routines to be followed. On the
contrary, these patterns must be created. Our hypothesis is that these new relations
are transformed by a process which engages organizational actors who possess the
cognitive and organizational capacities to transform the institutional link by working
simultaneously on three dimensions: cognitive, normative and regulatory.
3 Methodology
The information that was essential to this project was collected and compared
in several ways. We first gathered relevant documents from the company and
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2 Working Group was the term used by the individuals interviewed to refer to this innovative
project involving the company and the associations. The full name of the project is the ‘Working
Group on low-income households experiencing payment difficulties’.
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The next section of the article is divided into four parts. First, we will present
the outcome of the innovation process which led to a solution created by the Working
Group members, a solution that was legitimized and diffused throughout the entire
organization and the Associations. We will also set out the context in which this
innovation was developed. Then, we will focus on the process involved in the creation
of this innovation. This section follows the approach presented in the previous section,
according to which the actors sought to transform their relationship under the cognitive
dimensions by working on the values that could change the source of legitimacy of
their actions; the normative dimension brings into play the actors of innovation and the
transitions from an arena of organized action to a framework of action to be created and
coded; the regulatory dimension shows the mode of governance of the Working Group
as well as the making of rules and their diffusion to a wider context.
During the 1990s, Hydro-Québec and the Consumer Associations were in conflict
over the issue of low-income households in a collection situation. The Associations found
the company’s practices towards those most in need to be unacceptable. According to the
Associations’ representatives, Hydro-Québec’s policies at the time were oriented towards
profitability without taking into account the type of customer or the consequences of its
collection practices which had tightened up at the expense of those most in need.3 Hydro-
Québec could interrupt the delivery of electricity 12 months per year.4 The Associations’
representatives could not make headway with Hydro-Québec leaders in their attempts
to negotiate a debt relief scheme for low-income households. The campaign conducted
against the public corporation’s policies was relayed by the media which acted as
messengers of those most in need, putting out headlines such as ‘Poor Customers: Hydro
tightens the screw too hard. Consumer Associations suspend their negotiations with the
corporation’ (Le Soleil, 1 April 1999) (our trans.). Next, the Associations turned to the
political class in order to raise their awareness of the problem and encourage them to
deal with it.
At the time, the absolute profit strategy advocated by Hydro-Québec was not
working. Many low-income customers could not pay their bill in full and coercive
measures were not leading to results. The public corporation therefore decided to form an
alliance with pressure groups and thus turn them into partners. Its own analyses showed
losses that were impossible to recover, not to mention the great effort and energy devoted
to combating the representations made by the Associations. This partnership turned out
to be fruitful, with an agreement being reached in early 2000. This agreement contained
3 A study commissioned by the Working Group showed that in Quebec, electricity constituted
the main source of energy for 70% of residences. On average, households spent 3% of their income
on electricity, whereas this figure stood at 7% for low-income households. Proportionally, it thus
cost more for the latter.
4 From 1993 onwards, as a result of the death of a customer whose power had been cut off
during winter, Hydro-Québec adopted an internal directive stipulating that there would be no
interruption in service delivery for residential customers between December 1 and April 1. The
practice of not interrupting the delivery of electricity in winter became regulated following the
Distributor’s request to include it in the Conditions of Electricity Service in the early 2000s.
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two aspects: (a) potential solutions and agreements with the Consumer Associations;
(b) payment arrangements for low-income customers which allowed them to spread out
their debt over a 48-month period interest free, including personalized arrangements
for those who could not respect the terms of the arrangement, going as far as reducing
or even wiping out the debt or reducing the cost of current consumption. According to
the preliminary results of studies, the success rate of special repayment arrangements
was approximately 50%, which meant that a number of low-income households still
experienced payment difficulties even after arrangements had been applied, involving
an estimated total of approximately 40 000 customers (HQD internal document).
Fifty percent (50%) of customers in a heavy collection situation were low-income
households, whereas these customers made up only 7% of total households in 2006
(Joanis and Godbout 2009: 66).5
This alliance yielded conclusive results and matters improved to such an extent
that a Coalition representative said a few years later: ‘We now believe in the good will
of Hydro-Québec . . . There’s been a markedly positive improvement, both on the ground
and in terms of the way things are developing.’ (Coalition of Consumer Associations)
(our trans.).
Already in 2000, the public corporation outlined in its strategic plan its intention
to devote real effort towards providing payment support for low-income customers, while
adopting a more humane and flexible approach towards these customers. In accordance
with its sustainable development culture, the corporation has since stipulated that it
will act in partnership with communities and offer collection services that are adapted
to low-income customers. (Hydro-Québec, Sustainable Development Action Plan 2009–
2013).
Studies requested by the parties to the Working Group showed that the precarious
living conditions of vulnerable customers called for a degree of flexibility in payment
methods, that the very limited income of a large part of these customers did not allow
them to make full payments, and that the psychosocial aspects of individuals in poverty
increased their vulnerability in terms of respecting payment arrangements.
As a public corporation that accomplishes its mission by acting as a socially and
economically responsible distributor, Hydro-Québec had to seek to bring losses under
control and to reduce the number of complaints and interruptions in service. Moreover,
consumer protection was organized around consumer rights advocacy through various
activities, including non-partisan political action supported, in particular, by activities
involving representation and training on budget consultation provided to the population.
The Associations wished to offer continuous service which would take into account the
capacity to pay of very low income households along with an energy efficiency program
so as to reduce the gap in energy expenditure between the social groups. For the
Associations, the distributors’ business practice would have to be adjusted accordingly.
5 These authors observed, from 1976 to 2007, an increase in inequalities regarding market
income before governmental transfers and tax advantages. Thus, the state acts as an important
mediator in income equilibrium by aiming to reduce the gap between the richest and the poorest
in the population (Joanis and Godbout 2009). An internal study commissioned by the Working
Group showed that low-income households made up 18% of households in 2004 (Rapport SEPA
2004). According to Statistics Canada, the low-income threshold is not considered to be a poverty
threshold. The latter is more subjective and has continually been subject to controversy.
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During the 1980s and 1990s, the social, economic and political context was
favorable for developing a partnership between employers, unions and community
associations, as consecrated at the 1996 Socio-Economic Summit. This wider context
made it possible to harmonize the Working Group agreements with the government
action plan on combating poverty and social exclusion. Of course, the role of the state
should certainly not be overlooked. Moreover, a media campaign (April 1999) prompted
the public corporation to work with the Consumer Associations. The regulatory
framework changed and the institutions adjusted accordingly, offering new possibilities.
But what was the process that led to the creation of a network of innovators
made up of HQD executives and advisors and the Associations’ advisors? How did the
agreement emerge from meetings between these individuals, who managed to relay the
arrangements to their respective constituents and gain their approval in order to offer
innovative collection services to a category of customers with particular characteristics?
We will examine three particular aspects of this process: the values held by stakeholders,
which reveal the cognitive aspect of the institutions, the knowledge possessed by the
actors, which reveals the normative aspect, and the changes made in the rules which
show the regulatory aspect of the innovative process.
4.1 Values
The theme of values was central to the agreement. Alliances between organizations
that produce and distribute a service while making a profit have values that rival those
advocated by non-profit associations. If an alliance between these two opposing parties
was to be achieved, it meant that a degree of compatibility between their values was
necessary. That is, compatibility between values as opposed to the sharing of values.
A public corporation relies on the market for its dominant values while associations
coordinate their values through social justice. Moreover, in a plural and mixed economy,
several types of organization co-exist based on the recognition of the complementarity
of their activities (Defourny 2001, Lévesque 2007). Three main values are thus put
forward: democracy, solidarity and education.
Associations are defined first by their desire to participate in and influence
democratic life. They thus opt for a better sharing of information and knowledge
on consumption among citizens and public and private decision-makers. Consumer
Associations fight for improved living conditions for consumers in economic, social
and political terms by promoting values of social justice and solidarity, in particular,
in the face of market irregularities. As a result, they address the need to reduce
gaps between the living conditions of different socio-economic classes. This implies
considering the other as one’s fellow citizen and helping him/her when necessary (Blais
2007: 53). Citizens are associated through the duty of solidarity, the very foundations of
‘distributive justice.’ It is based on this principle, high on the scale of social values, that
the Associations formulate their orientations. Their actions are aimed first at the state
as a regulator which must take action to reduce social differences. Nevertheless, their
actions are also aimed at corporations whose practices tend not to treat customers as
citizens of a democratic society which seeks to narrow the gaps in living conditions
between people. The public company faces a particular challenge given that it is
situated between the precepts of the democratic state, which seeks to offer production
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The strongest resistance nevertheless came from within the company where
executives were against such an arrangement. The expertise and the survey supported
the argument that solidarity should have priority over economic profitability in
defending the interests of customers who were most in need. However, this argument
needed to be deepened further still and based on robust and unshakeable foundations.
The actors thus constructed the main argument that electricity is an ‘essential service’
without which the most basic living conditions are altered. This argument was used to
legitimize the agreement by introducing a higher value into the ongoing discussions.
The corporation and the Associations were thus able to pursue their creative efforts in
seeking payment arrangements that would be appropriate for this type of customer.
It was the public interest which mattered and electricity became a common good –
for low-income earners only, since, for the rest of the population, the concern of
profitability prevailed. Moreover, it was demonstrated that, with the new collection
services for low-income households, the impact of the rates was neutral. This new
arrangement brought the market closer to the public interest, at least as it served the
agreement in an evolutionary process. Especially, it allowed the corporation to break
with the unidimensional market-based rationality as the only source of legitimacy. The
conception of electricity as an essential service was the outcome of Hydro-Quebec’s
cooperation with the Associations which linked up two very different universes.
This transformation of a market good into a common good was an analogy used
by the actors in referring to a value higher than the transformed good. This was the
key condition for the innovation process, and refers to the cognitive dimension of the
institutions, that which allowed the actors to transform the framework for interpreting
the reality. The actors did not create new values, they only mixed them together into a
‘new combination.’ To achieve this, meetings between innovative actors were necessary.
Who were these actors? This is the subject of the following section: the normative
aspect.
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very knowledgeable about the institutions; others, about the regulatory framework;
others still, about the type of customers and the problems they faced; others were capable
of constructing links, seeing the overall picture and being at the centre of gatherings;
others had access to resources which could be pooled together. The individuals who
were initially chosen believed above all that it was possible to arrive at an original
solution without knowing the outcome in advance. They were able to work in a culture
of diversity, since they had the ability to express their opinion, listen to other people’s
opinions, and seek to reconcile contrary opinions. They were patient and constructive
and, especially, they did not bear the stigma of past behaviors that were deemed to
be inappropriate. Thus, organizational skills, relational skills and technical skills were
present.
Organizational skills: Above all, these actors knew their organization and its mission,
and they knew how to work within certain parameters. In this case, creativity and
initiative consisted in opening new paths but within an already relatively marked out
territory. In fact, even before coming into contact with the Working Group members,
these individuals were selected above all for their knowledge of their organization.
Since they would have to present the results of the Working Group’s discussions to
their respective constituents, it was important to entrust the mandates to actors who
knew best how to deal with members in their own organization, whether leaders or
employees, advisors or members of Associations. Once a decision was arrived at in the
Working Group, it had to be approved by other authorities. The work thus did not end
at the doorstep of the Working Group’s meetings. The actors sometimes had to approach
individuals who were strongly prejudiced against the relevance of any partnership
between organizations and the Associations, which were viewed as adversaries, or
against working with customers who did not always enjoy the respect they were entitled
to. Only actors with a detailed knowledge of their organizations would be able to convince
or persuade their respective contituents, and, if needed, skillfully use organizational
rules to clear the obstacles in their way and gain approval for a decision made by the
Working Group.
Relational skills: These innovators interpreted and reconciled the two contradictory
representation models based on the well-known traditional role and the new role to be
constructed. Participating in the alliance did not consist in adopting a role other than
one’s own, but rather in understanding the other without nevertheless putting oneself in
a position of cognitive dissonance. It involved acting out one’s role in complementarity
with others and in respect of others, while being convinced that the contribution of
each would be beneficial for the alliance. These innovative actors gained an improved
ability to play their role as it became enriched with new knowledge from continous
exchanges between the different stakeholders. Thus, it can be maintained that if their
role remained identical to what it had been before the Working Group experiment,
each actor present remained authentic and loyal to his/her constituents first. This role
was nevertheless reconstructed in light of new knowledge which led to more accurate
decision making, expressed in clearer terms. The identities of these organizational actors
were partly reconstructed; however, at no time were they marked with ambiguity or
ambivalence towards the organization to which they belonged. This was a prerequisite
for trust that the individuals with whom they entered into a relationship in the context
of the Working Group would in turn develop. They were credible negotiating partners.
The actors were well aware of the perimeter of cooperation and, with experience, they
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managed to play skillfully with the fluidity of the boundaries. Thus, an equilibrium
between the traditional role and the ‘new role’ gradually emerged, and incompatible
and irreconcilable expectations were avoided. The Working Group members learned to
express their opinions and reveal their strategy based on others’ expectations. A new
‘role-set’ was constructed with the constituents and the new partners.
Technical skills: The Working Group members possessed expertise and know-how that
was specific to the files in question. It was thus important that this technical knowledge
be complementary. Advisors at Hydro-Québec knew how to set up a collection file, others
were knowledgeable about questions relating to electricity costs, and others possessed
knowledge on the programming of services. On the other hand, the Associations’ advisors
were skilled at defending low-income customers. The latter were quite well versed in
the situation of those in extreme indebtedness since they regularly dealt with people in
this situation and possessed detailed information on poverty as it was experienced on a
daily basis. This knowledge helped to clarify the image brought out by official statistics.
The innovators behind the Working Group had an analytical knowledge of the collection
files. When necessary, it was possible to bring in individuals who knew the files even
more thoroughly. This was a key element, especially at the beginning of the process
when it was important to choose the right individuals to initiate the Working Group’s
activities.
The institutions were identity sources for the actors who, in this respect, played
pre-defined roles, whereas the innovation context provided an opening for new values
to be presented and rejected. The qualities displayed by the actors in private outside
their official role enabled them to understand the other world. These meetings provided
opportunities to upgrade the knowledge acquired over the course of numerous informal
interactions.6 This tacit knowledge was presented to the constituents in order to change
the usual relational universe. It resulted from the actors continuously seeking to
establish coherence with their social environment. These innovators thus made choices
based on the newly promoted values (cooperating with the adversary, joint decision-
making, accountability, understanding others, compromise) while remaining aware of
those associated with the traditional context from which they were seeking to break away
(high-conflict relations, exercising a power relationship, mobilizing members, taking a
unilateral position). The innovators justified their action by recognizing that it would be
in the public interest for the new organizational configuration – an alliance made up of
partners working in an innovation network conceived for the constituents – to be fair and
effective. They also referred to the collective good. They put together arguments based
on the values, issues and goals of their respective organizations that served to legitimize
this organizational innovation. However, there was opposition since other arguments
which revealed another form of legitimacy were also brought up by those constituents
who wished to rely on the existing system of rules and who feared a shift away from the
mission. The innovators had to take this into account by continuously going back and
forth between the old world and the new.
This process also involved knowing the role of the other, the limits of the other’s
interventions, skills and knowledge on the subject. Nobody at Hydro-Québec had
6 The leaders of each party knew each other. They had interacted with each other on many
occasions during the confrontation period. They were thus able to better assimilate the knowledge
brought by others since they did not have to constantly assess the others’ reputation.
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expertise in the area of poverty, nor the legitimacy needed to support a discourse on the
public interest. Thus, forming an alliance with advisors from the Consumer Associations
enabled the leaders and employees at Hydro-Québec to fill in these knowledge gaps,
since it involved teaming up with individuals who dealt with low-income households on
a daily basis, who represented and were knowledgeable about the economic constraints
but also the culture, habits and behaviours of those most in need, and who were thus
able to provide a more global and complete portrait of poverty. For the Associations’
advisors, this was a form of recognition of their expertise on the subject. Moreover,
since the files were treated in a confidential manner, Hydro-Québec employees did not
possess information on the financial situation of the customers; they knew only the
collection situation. It was the Associations’ advisors who knew the whole situation.
The relationship was thus based on trust because the files of customers experiencing
payment difficulties were handled in a situation of asymmetric information. This is
why the alliance became permanent. It does not merely involve creating new payment
arrangements, but also ensuring that cases are treated fairly based on complete
information. Nevertheless, in some cases, the alliance can be done without given that,
since 2006, the Associations have not been involved in the operations as Hydro-Québec
employees have been collecting the information themselves.
Thus, the new organizational practices were constructed by individual and
collective actors who mapped out the path between the old and the new order. Lastly,
the Working Group members and their respective organizations also had to take care of
replacing members who had been there for a long time and make sure that the knowledge
would be transferred. This newly mapped out path had to be sustainable. A last and
essential dimension of the process was thus the regulatory dimension which led the new
organizational form to adopt a system of enabling rules governing the participants. This
will be explained in the next section.
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The Working Group itself was also an outcome. In fact, it signified that the
partners favoured a new way of working by exchanging information, data, knowledge
and expertise on collection and the phenomenon of poverty experienced over an extended
period. This opened the way towards a better knowledge of the parties’ willingness to deal
with complex problems and find appropriate solutions to them. Moreover, the Working
Group on debt collection also demonstrated that it was possible for adversaries to agree
when the problem was circumscribed and the solutions proposed were regulated by the
Working Group members so that they did not spill over onto uncontrollable aspects of
the problem. This way of working also demonstrated that such a process could take place
in a harmonious way while reducing the sources of tensions between the parties. This
problem-solving model could also be used by other actors who want to undertake similar
courses of action. Thus, Hydro-Québec used this model by favouring cooperation in at
least one other working group on low-income households. Furthermore, the Associations
would like to use this model with other creditors in the public sector, but also in the
private sector, although in the latter case, the slope will be harder to climb.
difficulties by asking them a number of additional questions about their income so that
they can effectively refer them to personalized collection services, if needed. This new
orientation is leading to new behaviour on the part of these employees under stress,
and hardly encourages the latter to take more time with a customer who has particular
requirements.
The Associations have been hardly hit by the new economic situation and would
like, as in 1999, to launch a media campaign but they are wondering what impact it
would have. They feel that solidarity between citizens has been weakened and that the
poorest are suffering the consequences. The middle class is more indebted and is licking
its wounds from the financial crisis in 2008. Thus, it would not take kindly to news that
Hydro-Québec is helping those most in need. The context is no longer the same as it was
10 years ago since citizens have withdrawn into their own concerns.
However, within the company, the agreement is solid. Links have not been broken
and the monthly meetings still take place. ‘The relationship has been established and
it is strong’, said one Hydro-Québec manager. The question nevertheless remains: ‘How
can it be continued?’ Over time, the partnership has been consolidated, but it is being
undermined by external factors. Senior management’s support is an essential base in
terms of resisting these assaults. The agreement is not sufficiently established within
the organization since it has not reached the higher level of institutionalization which
would allow it to become deeply rooted. Nonetheless, this agreement is similar to what
Lawrence, Hardy and Phillips coined as a proto-institution (2002), This means that this
arrangement has the potential to become eventually an institution.
5 Conclusion
This article has shown how an intersectoral partnership was created between a
corporation and Consumer Associations staging rival actors who created new social
practices. This change was analyzed as a social innovation altering organizational
activities through the transformation of institutional rules. Our research highlights
the importance of the legitimacy of the new agreement based on the transformation
of three dimensions set in the institutionalist theory (Scott 1998). First, by recombining
the values of fairness and solidarity, the service produced and distributed by the
company was recognized as being an ‘essential service’ (cognitive aspect). Second, the
innovation process was rooted in the exchange of knowledge and access to resources
based on the expertise of rival actors who had to diffuse it to others (normative aspect).
Together, they succeeded in creating an innovative cooperation practice. Third, the
agreement moved beyond the experimental framework when it was diffused throughout
the organization and the Associations as a newly learned procedure that became an
organizational routine (regulatory aspect). At the theoretical level, we have suggested
that these dimensions are interrelated. Social innovation must be able to enter all
dimensions.
Second, our research has shown that despite different values and logics upheld by
the actors, it is possible to innovate through cooperation activities driven by pragmatism
without betraying the core value and the identity of the organizations. This requires a
multi-level collaboration between innovators able to build bridges between different
networks.
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