19) CHINA NATIONAL MACHINERY & EQUIPMENT CORP V.

SANTAMARIA (2012)

FACTS:

On September 2002, petitioner China National Machinery & Equiment Corp.

(CNMEG) entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with North Luzon
Railways Corp (Northrail) to conduct a feasibility study on a construction of a railway line
from Manila to La Union (Northrail Project).

Subsequently, Export Import Bank of China (EXIM Bank) and Department of

Finance entered into a MOU whereby China will extend a preferred buyer’s credit to the
Philippines to finance the Northrail Project. EXIM is to loan DOF $400 million payable in
20 years with a 5-year grace period at the rate of 3% per annum. In December 2003,
Northrail and CNMEG executed a contract for the construction of Phase I of the Northrail
Project. The contract price was pegged at $421,050,000. The Philippine Government then
obtained a loan from EXIM for $400,000 to finance the project;

Respondents, filed a complaint for annulment of contract, alleging that the contract
was void for being:

a. Contrary to the Constitution

b. Government Procurement Reform Act (RA 9184)
c. Government Auditing Code (PD 1445)
d. Administrative Code

ISSUES:

1. WON CNMEG is entitled to immunity

2. WON the contract agreement is an executive agreement

HELD:

FIRST ISSUE:
No. CNMEG is engaged in proprietary activity.
Theories on Sovereign Immunity: According to the classical or absolute theory, a
sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a respondent in the courts of another
sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is
recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard
to private acts or acts jure gestionis. Since the Philippines adheres to the restrictive
theory, it is crucial to ascertain the legal nature of the act involved–whether the entity
claiming immunity performs governmental, as opposed to proprietary, functions.

The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise
out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or
economic affairs.
SECOND ISSUE:

Article 2(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention) defines
a treaty as follows: An international agreement concluded between States in written form
and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or
more related instruments and whatever its particular designation.

An executive agreement is similar to a treaty, except that the former (a) does not
require legislative concurrence; (b) is usually less formal; and (c) deals with a narrower
range of subject matters. To be considered an executive agreement, the following three
requisites provided under the Vienna Convention must nevertheless concur: (a) the
agreement must be between states; (b) it must be written; and (c) it must governed by
international law. The first and the third requisites do not obtain in the case at bar.

20) ARIGO VS. SWIFT (G.R. NO. 206501, 16 SEPTEMBER 2014)

Arigo vs. Swift

G.R. No. 206501, September 16, 2014

Facts:

The name “Tubbataha” came from the Samal (seafaring people of southern Philippines)
language which means “long reef exposed at low tide.” Tubbataha is composed of two
huge coral atolls – the north atoll and the south atoll – and the Jessie Beazley Reef, a
smaller coral structure about 20 kilometers north of the atolls. The reefs of Tubbataha
and Jessie Beazley are considered part of Cagayancillo, a remote island municipality of
Palawan.

In 1988, Tubbataha was declared a National Marine Park by virtue of Proclamation No.
306 issued by President Corazon C. Aquino on August 11, 1988. Located in the middle
of Central Sulu Sea, 150 kilometers southeast of Puerto Princesa City, Tubbataha lies at
the heart of the Coral Triangle, the global center of marine biodiversity.

In 1993, Tubbataha was inscribed by the United Nations Educational Scientific and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) as a World Heritage Site. It was recognized as one of
the Philippines’ oldest ecosystems, containing excellent examples of pristine reefs and a
high diversity of marine life. The 97,030-hectare protected marine park is also an
important habitat for internationally threatened and endangered marine species.
UNESCO cited Tubbataha’s outstanding universal value as an important and significant
natural habitat for in situ conservation of biological diversity; an example representing
significant on-going ecological and biological processes; and an area of exceptional
natural beauty and aesthetic importance.

On April 6, 2010, Congress passed Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10067, otherwise known as
the “Tubbataha Reefs Natural Park (TRNP) Act of 2009” “to ensure the protection and
conservation of the globally significant economic, biological, sociocultural, educational
and scientific values of the Tubbataha Reefs into perpetuity for the enjoyment of present
and future generations.” Under the “no-take” policy, entry into the waters of TRNP is
strictly regulated and many human activities are prohibited and penalized or fined,
including fishing, gathering, destroying and disturbing the resources within the TRNP. The
law likewise created the Tubbataha Protected Area Management Board (TPAMB) which
shall be the sole policy-making and permit granting body of the TRNP.

The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the US Navy. In

December 2012, the US Embassy in the Philippines requested diplomatic clearance for
the said vessel “to enter and exit the territorial waters of the Philippines and to arrive at
the port of Subic Bay for the purpose of routine ship replenishment, maintenance, and
crew liberty.” On January 6, 2013, the ship left Sasebo, Japan for Subic Bay, arriving on
January 13, 2013 after a brief stop for fuel in Okinawa, Japan.

On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next port of call in
Makassar, Indonesia. On January 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m. while transiting the Sulu Sea, the
ship ran aground on the northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs, about 80
miles east southeast of Palawan. No cine was injured in the incident, and there have been
no reports of leaking fuel or oil.

On January 20, 2013, U.S. 7th Fleet Commander, Vice Admiral Scott Swift, expressed
regret for the incident in a press statement. Likewise, US Ambassador to the Philippines
Harry K. Thomas, Jr., in a meeting at the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) on February
4, “reiterated his regrets over the grounding incident and assured Foreign Affairs
Secretary Albert F. del Rosario that the United States will provide appropriate
compensation for damage to the reef caused by the ship.” By March 30, 2013, the US
Navy-led salvage team had finished removing the last piece of the grounded ship from
the coral reef.

Issue: Whether or not immunity from suits can be invoked within territorial waters.

Held: Yes. During the deliberations, Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio took the
position that the conduct of the US in this case, when its warship entered a restricted area
in violation of R.A. No. 10067 and caused damage to the TRNP reef system, brings the
matter within the ambit of Article 31 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS). He explained that while historically, warships enjoy sovereign immunity
from suit as extensions of their flag State, Art. 31 of the UNCLOS creates an exception
to this rule in cases where they fail to comply with the rules and regulations of the coastal
State regarding passage through the latter’s internal waters and the territorial sea.
According to Justice Carpio, although the US to date has not ratified the UNCLOS, as a
matter of long-standing policy the US considers itself bound by customary international
rules on the “traditional uses of the oceans” as codified in UNCLOS, as can be gleaned
from previous declarations by former Presidents Reagan and Clinton, and the US
judiciary in the case of United States v. Royal Caribbean Cruise Lines, Ltd. The
international law of the sea is generally defined as “a body of treaty rules arid customary
norms governing the uses of the sea, the exploitation of its resources, and the exercise
of jurisdiction over maritime regimes. It is a branch of public international law, regulating
the relations of states with respect to the uses of the oceans.” The UNCLOS is a
multilateral treaty which was opened for signature on December 10, 1982 at Montego
Bay, Jamaica. It was ratified by the Philippines in 1984 but came into force on November
16, 1994 upon the submission of the 60th ratification. The UNCLOS is a product of
international negotiation that seeks to balance State sovereignty (mare clausum) and the
principle of freedom of the high seas (mare liberum). The freedom to use the world’s
marine waters is one of the oldest customary principles of international law. The UNCLOS
gives to the coastal State sovereign rights in varying degrees over the different zones of
the sea which are: 1) internal waters, 2) territorial sea, 3) contiguous zone, 4) exclusive
economic zone, and 5) the high seas. It also gives coastal States more or less jurisdiction
over foreign vessels depending on where the vessel is located. Insofar as the internal
waters and territorial sea is concerned, the Coastal State exercises sovereignty, subject
to the UNCLOS and other rules of international law. Such sovereignty extends to the air
space over the territorial sea as well as to its bed and subsoil. In the case of warships, as
pointed out by Justice Carpio, they continue to enjoy sovereign immunity subject to the
following exceptions:

21.) G.R. No. 91649 May 14, 1991Basco vs. PAGCOR

H.B. Basco & Associates for petitioners Valmonte Law Offices collaborating counsel for
petitioners Aguirre, Laborte and Capule for respondent PAGCOR .

Facts:

• The Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) was created by virtue
of P.D. 1067-A dated January 1, 1977 and was granted a franchise under P.D. 1067-B
also dated January 1, 1977"to establish, operate and maintain gambling casinos on land
or water within the territorial jurisdictionof the Philippines."

•P e t i t i o n e r s f i l e d a n i n s t a n t p e t i t i o n s e e k i n g t o a n n u l t h e P h i l i p p i n e A
m u s e m e n t a n d G a m i n g Corporation (PAGCOR) Charter — PD 1869, because it is
allegedly contrary to morals, public policyand order

• Petitioners claim that P.D. 1869 constitutes a waiver of the right of the City of Manila to
impose taxesa n d l e g a l f e e s ; t h a t t h e e x e m p t i o n c l a u s e i n P . D . 1 8 6 9 i s i n
v i o l a t i o n o f t h e p r i n c i p l e o f l o c a l autonomy.
Section 13 par. (2) of P.D. 1869 exempts PAGCOR, as the franchise holder from paying
any"tax of any kind or form, income or otherwise, as well as fees, charges or levies of
whatever nature, whether National or Local."

Issue:

•Does the local Government of Manila have the power to impose taxes on PAGCOR?
Held:

• No, the court rules that The City government of Manila has no power to impose taxes
on PAGCOR.
Reason:

• The principle of Local autonomy does not make local governments sovereign
within the state; the principle of local autonomy within the constitution simply means
decentralization. It cannot be an “Imperium in imperio” it can only act intra sovereign, or
as an arm of the National Government.

• PAGCOR has a dual role, to operate and to regulate gambling casinos. The latter role
is governmental, wh i c h p l a c e s i t i n t h e c a t e g o r y of an agency
o r i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y o f t h e G o v e r n m e n t . B e i n g a n instrumentality of the
Government, PAGCOR should be and actually is exempt from local taxes.

•The power of local government to "impose taxes and fees" is always subject to
"limitations" which Congress may provide by law. Since PD 1869 remains an "operative"
law until "amended, repealed or revoked" (Sec. 3, Art. XVIII, 1987 Constitution), its
"exemption clause" remains as an exception to the exercise of the power of local
governments to impose taxes and fees. It cannot therefore be violative but rather
is consistent with the principle of local autonomy. Note: other issues were raised in the
case, such as if whether the petitioners have standing in filing the case, but to make the
digest fit into one page I just included the issue which focused that was in accordance to
the outline. Please do read the case in its original when you have the time since there are
explanations to its nature which are not included in this digest.

22.) KILOSBAYAN VS. MORATO

G.R. NO. 118910. July 30, 1993

KILOSBAYAN, INCORPORATED, JOVITO R. SALONGA, CIRILO A. RIGOS, ERME
CAMBA, EMILIO C. CAPULONG, JR., JOSE T. APOLO, EPHRAIM TENDERO,
FERNANDO SANTIAGO, JOSE ABCEDE, CHRISTINE TAN, RAFAEL G. FERNANDO,
RAOUL V. VICTORINO, JOSE CUNANAN, QUINTIN S. DOROMAL, SEN. FREDDIE
WEBB, SEN. WIGBERTO TAÑADA, REP. JOKER P. ARROYO, petitioners,
vs.
MANUEL L. MORATO, in his capacity as Chairman of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes
Office, and the PHILIPPINE GAMING MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, respondents.

Facts:
GR 113375 (KIlosbayan vs. Guingona) held invalidity of the contract between Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the privately owned Philippine Gaming
Management Corporation (PGMC) for the operation of a nationwide on-line lottery
system. The contract violated the provision in the PCSO Charter which prohibits PCSO
from holding and conducting lotteries through a collaboration, association, or joint
venture.
Both parties again signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) for online lottery
equipment and accessories on January 25, 1995.

The agreement are as follow:

1. Rental is 4.3% of gross amount of ticket sales by PCSO at which in no case
be less than an annual rental computed at P35,000 per terminal in
commercial operation.
2. Rent is computed bi-weekly.
3. Term is 8 years.
4. PCSO is to employ its own personnel and responsible for the facilities.
5. Upon expiration of term, PCSO can purchase the equipment at P25M.

Kilosbayan again filed a petition to declare amended ELA invalid because:

1. It is the same as the old contract of lease.
2. It is still violative of PCSO’s charter.
3. It is violative of the law regarding public bidding. It has not been approved
by the President and it is not most advantageous to the government.

PCSO and PGMC filed separate comments:

1. ELA is a different lease contract with none of the vestiges in the prior
contract.
2. ELA is not subject to public bidding because it fell in the exception provided
in EO No. 301.
3. Power to determine if ELA is advantageous vests in the Board of Directors
of PCSO.
4. Lack of funds. PCSO cannot purchase its own online lottery equipment.
5. Petitioners seek to further their moral crusade.
6. Petitioners do not have a legal standing because they were not parties to the
contract.

Issues:
Whether or not petitioner Kilosbayan, Incorporated has a legal standing to sue.
Whether or not the ELA between PCSO and PGMC in operating an online lottery is valid.

Rulings:
In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:
Petitioners do not have a legal standing to sue.
STARE DECISIS cannot apply. The previous ruling sustaining the standing of the
petitioners is a departure from the settled rulings on real parties in interest because no
constitutional issues were actually involved.
LAW OF THE CASE (opinion delivered on a former appeal) cannot also apply. Since the
present case is not the same one litigated by the parties before in Kilosbayan vs.
Guingona, Jr., the ruling cannot be in any sense be regarded as “the law of this case”.
The parties are the same but the cases are not.
RULE ON “CONCLUSIVENESS OF JUDGMENT” cannot still apply. An issue actually
and directly passed upon and determine in a former suit cannot again be drawn in
question in any future action between the same parties involving a different cause of
action. But the rule does not apply to issues of law at least when substantially unrelated
claims are involved. When the second proceeding involves an instrument or transaction
identical with, but in a form separable from the one dealt with in the first proceeding, the
Court is free in the second proceeding to make an independent examination of the legal
matters at issue.
Since ELA is a different contract, the previous decision does not preclude determination
of the petitioner’s standing.
Standing is a concept in constitutional law and here no constitutional question is actually
involved. The more appropriate issue is whether the petitioners are ‘real parties of
interest’.
Question of contract of law: The real parties are those who are parties to the agreement
or are bound either principally or are prejudiced in their rights with respect to one of the
contracting parties and can show the detriment which would positively result to them from
the contract.
Petitioners do not have such present substantial interest. Questions to the nature or
validity of public contracts maybe made before COA or before the Ombudsman.
Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) is valid.
It is different with the prior lease agreement: PCSO now bears all losses because the
operation of the system is completely in its hands.
Fixing the rental rate to a minimum is a matter of business judgment and the Court is not
inclined to review.
Rental rate is within the 15% net receipts fixed by law as a maximum. (4.3% of gross
receipt is discussed in the dissenting opinion of Feliciano, J.)
In the contract, it stated that the parties can change their agreement. Petitioners state
that this would allow PGMC to control and operate the on-line lottery system. The Court
held that the claim is speculative. In any case, in the construction of statutes, the
resumption is that in making contracts, the government has acted in good faith. The
doctrine that the possibility of abuse is not a reason for denying power.
It was held in Kilosbayan Vs. Guingona that PCSO does not have the power to enter into
any contract which would involve it in any form of “collaboration, association, or joint
venture” for the holding of sweepstakes activities. This only mentions that PCSO is
prohibited from investing in any activities that would compete in their own activities.
It is claimed that ELA is a joint venture agreement which does not compete with their
own activities. The Court held that is also based on speculation. Evidence is needed to
show that the transfer of technology would involve the PCSO and its personnel in
prohibited association with the PGMC.
O. 301 (on law of public bidding) applies only to contracts for the purchase of supplies,
materials and equipment and not on the contracts of lease. Public bidding for leases are
only for privately-owned buildings or spaces for government use or of government
owned buildings or spaces for private use.

Petitioners have no standing. ELA is a valid lease contract. The motion for
reconsideration of petitioners is DENIED with finality.
23) Tañada vs Angara 272 SCRA 18

Facts:

On April 15, 1994, the Philippine Government represented by its Secretary of the
Department of Trade and Industry signed the Final Act binding the Philippine Government
to submit to its respective competent authorities the WTO (World Trade Organization)
Agreements to seek approval for such. On December 14, 1994, Resolution No. 97 was
adopted by the Philippine Senate to ratify the WTO Agreement.
This is a petition assailing the constitutionality of the WTO agreement as it violates Sec
19, Article II, providing for the development of a self-reliant and independent national
economy, and Sections 10 and 12, Article XII, providing for the “Filipino first” policy.

Issue:

Whether or not the Resolution No. 97 ratifying the WTO Agreement is unconstitutional

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled the Resolution No. 97 is not unconstitutional. While the
constitution mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at
the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on
the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino interests only against
foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. In other words, the Constitution
did not intend to pursue an isolationalist policy. Furthermore, the constitutional policy of
a “self-reliant and independent national economy” does not necessarily rule out the entry
of foreign investments, goods and services. It contemplates neither “economic seclusion”
nor “mendicancy in the international community.”
The Senate, after deliberation and voting, gave its consent to the WTO Agreement
thereby making it “a part of the law of the land”. The Supreme Court gave due respect to
an equal department in government. It presumes its actions as regular and done in good
faith unless there is convincing proof and persuasive agreements to the contrary. As a
result, the ratification of the WTO Agreement limits or restricts the absoluteness of
sovereignty. A treaty engagement is not a mere obligation but creates a legally binding
obligation on the parties. A state which has contracted valid international obligations is
bound to make its legislations such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the
fulfillment of the obligations undertaken.
24) CASE DIGEST: Estrada Vs Escritor A.M. No. P-02-1651 June 22, 2006
(Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 00-1021-P) ALEJANDRO ESTRADA, Complainant, vs.
SOLEDAD S. ESCRITOR, Respondent.

FACTS: Complainant Alejandro Estrada wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, Jr., requesting
for an investigation of rumors that respondent Soledad Escritor, court interpreter, is living
with a man not her husband. They allegedly have a child of eighteen to twenty years old.
Estrada is not personally related either to Escritor or her partner. Nevertheless, he filed
the charge against Escritor as he believes that she is committing an immoral act that
tarnishes the image of the court, thus she should not be allowed to remain employed
therein as it might appear that the court condones her act. Respondent Escritor testified
that when she entered the judiciary in 1999, she was already a widow, her husband
having died in 1998. She admitted that she has been living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr.
without the benefit of marriage for twenty years and that they have a son. But as a
member of the religious sect known as the Jehovah's Witnesses and the Watch Tower
and Bible Tract Society, their conjugal arrangement is in conformity with their religious
beliefs. In fact, after ten years of living together, she executed on July 28, 1991 a
"Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness," insofar as the congregation is concerned, there is
nothing immoral about the conjugal arrangement between Escritor and Quilapio and they
remain members in good standing in the congregation.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the administrative charge
of "gross and immoral conduct."

HELD: The two streams of jurisprudence - separationist or accommodationist - are

anchored on a different reading of the "wall of separation." Separationist - This approach
erects an absolute barrier to formal interdependence of religion and state. Religious
institutions could not receive aid, whether direct or indirect, from the state. Nor could the
state adjust its secular programs to alleviate burdens the programs placed on believers.
the strict neutrality or separationist view is largely used by the Court, showing the Court’s
tendency to press relentlessly towards a more secular society Accommodationist -
Benevolent neutrality thus recognizes that religion plays an important role in the public
life of the United States as shown by many traditional government practices which An
accommodationist holds that it is good public policy, and sometimes constitutionally
required, for the state to make conscious and deliberate efforts to avoid interference with
religious freedom. On the other hand, the strict neutrality adherent believes that it is good
public policy, and also constitutionally required, for the government to avoid religion-
specific policy even at the cost of inhibiting religious exercise first, the accommodationist
interpretation is most consistent with the language of the First Amendment. Second, the
accommodationist position best achieves the purposes of the First Amendment. Third,
the accommodationist interpretation is particularly necessary to protect adherents of
minority religions from the inevitable effects of majoritarianism, which include ignorance
and indifference and overt hostility to the minority Fourth, the accommodationist position
is practical as it is a commonsensical way to deal with the various needs and beliefs of
different faiths in a pluralistic nation. The "compelling state interest" test is proper where
conduct is involved for the whole gamut of human conduct has different effects on the
state’s interests: some effects may be immediate and short-term while others delayed
and far-reaching. A test that would protect the interests of the state in preventing a
substantive evil, whether immediate or delayed, is therefore necessary in applying the
test, the first inquiry is whether respondent’s right to religious freedom has been
burdened. There is no doubt that choosing between keeping her employment and
abandoning her religious belief and practice and family on the one hand, and giving up
her employment and keeping her religious practice and family on the other hand, puts a
burden on her free exercise of religion The second step is to ascertain respondent’s
sincerity in her religious belief. Respondent appears to be sincere in her religious belief
and practice and is not merely using the "Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness" to avoid
punishment for immorality. She did not secure the Declaration only after entering the
judiciary where the moral standards are strict and defined, much less only after an
administrative case for immorality was filed against her Indeed, it is inappropriate for the
complainant, a private person, to present evidence on the compelling interest of the state.
The burden of evidence should be discharged by the proper agency of the government
which is the Office of the Solicitor General. To properly settle the issue in the case at bar,
the government should be given the opportunity to demonstrate the compelling state
interest it seeks to uphold in opposing the respondent’s stance that her conjugal
arrangement is not immoral and punishable as it comes within the scope of free exercise
protection.

25) REPUBLIC V. GALANG

G.R. No. 168335, [June 6, 2011]

FACTS:
In March 1994, Nestor and Juvy contracted marriage in Pampanga and thereafter they
resided in the house of the Nestor’s father. Nestor worked as an artist-illustrator while
Juvy stayed at home. They had one child, Christopher.
In August 1999, Nestor filed with the RTC a petition for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage with Juvy, under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended. He alleged that
Juvy was psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of marriage,
as she was a kleptomaniac and a swindler; that Juvy suffers from “mental deficiency,
innate immaturity, distorted discernment and total lack of care, love and affection [towards
him and their] child.” He posited that Juvy’s incapacity was “extremely serious” and
“appears to be incurable.”
Having found no collusion between the parties, the case was set for trial. In his testimony,
Nestor alleged that he was the one who prepared their breakfast because Juvy did not
want to wake up early; Juvy often left their child to their neighbors’ care; and Christopher
almost got lost in the market when Juvy brought him there. He added that Juvy stole
his ATM card and falsified his signature to encash the check representing Nestor’s
father’s pension. He, likewise, stated that he caught Juvy playing “mahjong” and “kuwaho”
three (3) times. Finally, he testified that Juvy borrowed money from their relatives on the
pretense that their son was confined in a hospital.
Nestor presented Anna Liza Guiang, a psychologist, who testified that she conducted a
psychological test on Nestor. In her Psychological Report, the psychologist made the
following findings:
Psychological Test conducted on client Nestor Galang resembles an emotionally-
matured individual. He is well-adjusted to the problem he meets, and enable to throw-off
major irritations but manifest[s] a very low frustration tolerance which means he has a
little ability to endure anxiety and the client manifests suppressed feelings and emotions
which resulted to unbearable emotional pain, depression and lack of self-esteem and
gained emotional tensions caused by his wife’s behavior.
The incapacity of the defendant is manifested [in] such a manner that the defendant-wife:
(1) being very irresponsible and very lazy and doesn’t manifest any sense of
responsibility; (2) her involvement in gambling activities such as mahjong and kuwaho;
(3) being an estafador which exhibits her behavioral and personality disorders; (4) her
neglect and show no care attitude towards her husband and child; (5) her immature and
rigid behavior; (6) her lack of initiative to change and above all, the fact that she is unable
to perform her marital obligations as a loving, responsible and caring wife to her family.
There are just few reasons to believe that the defendant is suffering from incapacitated
mind and such incapacity appears to be incorrigible.
The RTC nullified the parties’ marriage in its decision of January 22, 2001. The RTC
Judge, relying on the Santos Case, stated in the decision that the psychological
incapacity of respondent to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage can
be characterized by (a) gravity because the subject cannot carry out the normal and
ordinary duties of marriage and family shouldered by any average couple existing under
ordinary circumstances of life
and work; (b) antecedence, because the root cause of the trouble can be traced to the
history of the subject before marriage although its overt manifestations appear over after
the wedding; and (c) incurability, if treatments required exceed the ordinary means or
subject, or involve time and expense beyond the reach of the subject – are all obtaining
in this case.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, affirmed the RTC decision in toto.

ISSUE:
Whether there is basis to nullify the respondent’s marriage to Juvy on the ground that at
the time of the celebration of the marriage, Juvy suffered from psychological incapacity
that prevented her from complying with her essential marital obligations.

HELD:
None. The Supreme Court held that the totality of Nestor’s evidence – his testimonies
and the psychologist, and the psychological report and evaluation – insufficient to prove
Juvy’s psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.
26) GARCIA v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
G.R. No. 198554
July 30, 2012
677 SCRA 750

FACTS: Garcia, tried by the Special General Court Martial NR 2, was charged with and
convicted of violation of the 96th Article of War (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and
Gentleman) and violation of the 97th Article of War (Conduct Prejudicial to Good Order
and Military Discipline) for failing to disclose all his assets in his Sworn Statement of
Assets and Liabilities and Net worth for the year 2003 as required by RA 3019, as
amended in relation to RA 6713.

Garcia, among others, argued that the confirmation issued by the OP directing his two-
year detention in a penitentiary had already been fully served following his preventive
confinement subject to Article 29 of the RPC (Revised Penal Code). He was released on
December 16, 2010 after a preventive confinement for six years and two months. He was
initially confined at his quarters at Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo before he was
transferred to the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP)
Detention Center, and latter to the Camp Crame Custodial Detention Center.

Hence, on September 16, 2011, or a week after the OP confirmed the sentence of the
court martial against him, Garcia was arrested and detained and continues to be detained,
for 2 years, at the maximum security compound of the National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa.
The OP stated that Art 29 of the RPC is not applicable in Military Courts for it is separate
and distinct from ordinary courts.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: (1) Whether or not Article 29 of the RPC is applicable in Military Courts; and (2)
Whether or not the application of Article 29 of the RPC in the Articles of War is in
accordance with the Equal Protection Clause of the 1987 Constitution

RULING: (1) The Court ruled that applying the provisions of Article 29 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC) (Period of preventive imprisonment deducted from time of
imprisonment), the time within which the petitioner was under preventive confinement
should be credited to the sentence confirmed by the Office of the President, subject to
the conditions set forth by the same law.

The Court held that “the General Court Martial is a court within the strictest sense of the
word and acts as a criminal court.” As such, certain provisions of the RPC, insofar as
those that are not provided in the Articles of War and the Manual for Courts-Martial, can
be supplementary. “Absent any provision as to the application of a criminal concept in the
implementation and execution of the General Court Martial’s decision, the provisions of
the Revised Penal Code, specifically Article 29 should be applied. In fact, the deduction
of petitioner’s (Garcia) period of confinement to his sentence has been recommended in
the Staff Judge Advocate Review.”
(2) The Court further held that the application of Article 29 of the RPC in the Articles of
War is in accordance with the Equal Protection Clause of the 1987 Constitution. “The
concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may
not draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a
legitimate governmental objective.

It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things
without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined
according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits
classification,” held the Court.

27) ABAKADA Guro Party List v Purisima G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008
FACTS:

This petition for prohibition seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and
enforcing Republic Act (RA) 9335

(Attrition Act of 2005).RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability
and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC).
The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed
their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation
of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board
(Board). It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six
months of service, regardless of employment status2.

Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the
constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax reform legislation. They
contend that, by establishing a system of rewards and incentives, the law "transform[s]
the officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty hunters"
as they will do their best only in consideration of such rewards. Petitioners also assail the
creation of a congressional oversight committee on the ground that it violates the doctrine
of separation of powers, for it permits legislative participation in the implementation and
enforcement of the law.

ISSUE:
WON the joint congressional committee is valid and constitutional

HELD:
No. It is unconstitutional. In the case of Macalintal, in the discussion of J. Puno, the power
of oversight embraces all activities undertaken by Congress to enhance its understanding
of and influence over the implementation of legislation it has enacted. Clearly, oversight
concerns post-enactment
measures undertaken by Congress: (a) to monitor bureaucratic compliance with program
objectives, (b) to determine whether agencies are properly administered, (c) to eliminate
executive waste and dishonesty, (d) to prevent executive usurpation of legislative
authority, and (d) to assess executive conformity with the congressional perception of
public interest.
The power of oversight has been held to be intrinsic in the grant of legislative power itself
and integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic system of government.
With this backdrop, it is clear that congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per se
, meaning, it neither necessarily constitutes an encroachment on the executive power to
implement laws nor undermines the constitutional separation of powers. Rather, it is
integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic system of government. It
may in fact even enhance the separation of powers as it prevents the over-accumulation
of power in the executive branch.
However, to forestall the danger of congressional encroachment "beyond the legislative
sphere," the Constitution imposes two basic and related constraints on Congress. It may
not vest itself, any of its committees or its members with either executive or judicial power.

And, when it exercises its legislative power, it must follow the "single, finely wrought and
exhaustively considered, procedures" specified under the Constitution including the
procedure for enactment of laws and presentment. Thus, any post-enactment
congressional measure such as this should be limited to scrutiny and investigation. In
particular, congressional oversight must be confined to the following:
(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress' power of appropriation and the budget hearing
s conducted in connection withit, its power to ask heads of departments to appear before
and be heard by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments and
its power of confirmation and
(2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of
Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.
Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by
the Constitution. Legislative vetoes fall in this class.
Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an administrative
agency to present the proposed implementing rules and regulations of a law to Congress
which, by itself or through a committee formed by it, retains a "right" or "power" to approve
or disapprove such regulations before they take effect. As such, a legislative veto in the
form of a congressional oversight committee is in the form of an inward-turning delegation
designed to attach a congressional leash (other than through scrutiny and investigation)
to an agency to which Congress has by law initially delegated broad powers. It radically
changes the design or structure of the Constitution's diagram of power as it entrusts to
Congress a direct role in enforcing, applying or implementing its own laws.