Petitioner Vs Vs Respondent: Third Division
Petitioner Vs Vs Respondent: Third Division
Petitioner Vs Vs Respondent: Third Division
DECISION
PERALTA J :
PERALTA, p
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court which seeks to review, reverse and set-aside the Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA), dated May 30, 2005, and its Resolution 2 dated January 10, 2006 in the case
entitled Indophil Textile Mills, Inc. v. Hon. Rolando R. Velasco and Engr. Salvador Adviento ,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 83099.
The facts are not disputed.
Petitioner Indophil Textile Mills, Inc. is a domestic corporation engaged in the
business of manufacturing thread for weaving. 3 On August 21, 1990, petitioner hired
respondent Engr. Salvador Adviento as Civil Engineer to maintain its facilities in Lambakin,
Marilao, Bulacan. 4
On August 7, 2002, respondent consulted a physician due to recurring weakness
and dizziness. 5 Few days later, he was diagnosed with Chronic Poly Sinusitis, and
thereafter, with moderate, severe and persistent Allergic Rhinitis. 6 Accordingly,
respondent was advised by his doctor to totally avoid house dust mite and textile dust as
it will transmute into health problems. 7
Distressed, respondent led a complaint against petitioner with the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), San Fernando, Pampanga, for alleged illegal
dismissal and for the payment of backwages, separation pay, actual damages and
attorney's fees. The said case, docketed as NLRC Case No. RAB-III-05-5834-03, is still
pending resolution with the NLRC at the time the instant petition was filed. 8
Subsequently, respondent led another Complaint 9 with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Aparri, Cagayan, alleging that he contracted such occupational disease by reason
of the gross negligence of petitioner to provide him with a safe, healthy and workable
environment.
In his Complaint, respondent alleged that as part of his job description, he conducts
regular maintenance check on petitioner's facilities including its dye house area, which is
very hot and emits foul chemical odor with no adequate safety measures introduced by
petitioner. 10 According to respondent, the air washer dampers and all roof exhaust vests
are blown into open air, carrying dust thereto. 11 Concerned, respondent recommended to
management to place roof insulation to minimize, if not, eradicate the health hazards
attendant in the work place. 12 However, said recommendation was turned down by
management due to high cost. 13 IDCScA
In reply, petitioner led a Motion to Dismiss 22 on the ground that: (1) the RTC has
no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint because the same falls under the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter (LA) under Article 217 (a) (4) of the
Labor Code; and (2) there is another action pending with the Regional Arbitration Branch III
of the NLRC in San Fernando City, Pampanga, involving the same parties for the same
cause.
On December 29, 2003, the RTC issued a Resolution 23 denying the aforesaid Motion
and sustaining its jurisdiction over the instant case. It held that petitioner's alleged failure
to provide its employees with a safe, healthy and workable environment is an act of
negligence, a case of quasi-delict. As such, it is not within the jurisdiction of the LA under
Article 217 of the Labor Code. On the matter of dismissal based on lis pendencia, the RTC
ruled that the complaint before the NLRC has a different cause of action which is for illegal
dismissal and prayer for backwages, actual damages, attorney's fees and separation pay
due to illegal dismissal while in the present case, the cause of action is for quasi-delict. 24
The fallo of the Resolution is quoted below:
WHEREFORE,
WHEREFORE nding the motion to dismiss to be without merit, the Court
denies the motion to dismiss.
SO ORDERED . 25
On February 9, 2004, petitioner led a motion for reconsideration thereto, which was
likewise denied in an Order issued on even date.
Expectedly, petitioner then led a Petition for Certiorari with the CA on the ground
that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in upholding that it has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint
despite the broad and clear terms of Article 217 of the Labor Code, as amended. 26
After the submission by the parties of their respective Memoranda, the CA rendered
a Decision 27 dated May 30, 2005 dismissing petitioner's Petition for lack of merit, the
dispositive portion of which states: HAaScT
SO ORDERED . 28
From the aforesaid Decision, petitioner led a Motion for Reconsideration which
was nevertheless denied for lack of merit in the CA's Resolution 29 dated January 10, 2006.
Hence, petitioner interposed the instant petition upon the solitary ground that "THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY
NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND WITH APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE
SUPREME COURT". 30 Simply, the issue presented before us is whether or not the RTC has
jurisdiction over the subject matter of respondent's complaint praying for moral damages,
exemplary damages, compensatory damages, anchored on petitioner's alleged gross
negligence in failing to provide a safe and healthy working environment for respondent.
The delineation between the jurisdiction of regular courts and labor courts over
cases involving workers and their employers has always been a matter of dispute. 31 It is
up to the Courts to lay the line after careful scrutiny of the factual milieu of each case.
Here, we find that jurisdiction rests on the regular courts.
In its attempt to overturn the assailed Decision and Resolution of the CA, petitioner
argues that respondent's claim for damages is anchored on the alleged gross negligence
of petitioner as an employer to provide its employees, including herein respondent, with a
safe, healthy and workable environment; hence, it arose from an employer-employee
relationship. 32 The fact of respondent's employment with petitioner as a civil engineer is a
necessary element of his cause of action because without the same, respondent cannot
claim to have a right to a safe, healthy and workable environment. 33 Thus, exclusive
jurisdiction over the same should be vested in the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC pursuant to
Article 217 (a) (4) of the Labor Code of the Philippines (Labor Code), as amended. 34 HaAIES
2. Termination disputes;
Similarly, we ruled in the recent case of Portillo v. Rudolf Lietz, Inc . 41 that not all
disputes between an employer and his employees fall within the jurisdiction of the labor
tribunals such that when the claim for damages is grounded on the "wanton failure and
refusal" without just cause of an employee to report for duty despite repeated notices
served upon him of the disapproval of his application for leave of absence, the same falls
within the purview of Civil Law, to wit:
As early as Singapore Airlines Limited v. Paño , we established that not
all disputes between an employer and his employee(s) fall within the
jurisdiction of the labor tribunals . We differentiated between abandonment
per se and the manner and consequent effects of such abandonment and ruled
that the first, is a labor case, while the second, is a civil law case.
HSacEI
Upon the facts and issues involved, jurisdiction over the present
controversy must be held to belong to the civil Courts . While seemingly
petitioner's claim for damages arises from employer-employee relations, and the
latest amendment to Article 217 of the Labor Code under PD No. 1691 and BP
Blg. 130 provides that all other claims arising from employer-employee
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relationship are cognizable by Labor Arbiters [citation omitted], in essence,
petitioner's claim for damages is grounded on the "wanton failure and
refusal" without just cause of private respondent Cruz to report for duty
despite repeated notices served upon him of the disapproval of his
application for leave of absence without pay. This, coupled with the
further averment that Cruz "maliciously and with bad faith" violated the
terms and conditions of the conversion training course agreement to
the damage of petitioner removes the present controversy from the
coverage of the Labor
Lab or Code
Code and brings it within the purview of Civil
Law .
Clearly, the complaint was anchored not on the abandonment per se by
private respondent Cruz of his job — as the latter was not required in the
Complaint to report back to work — but on the manner and consequent
effects of such abandonment of work translated in terms of the
damages which petitioner had to suffer . . . . . 42
Indeed, jurisprudence has evolved the rule that claims for damages under Article
217 (a) (4) of the Labor Code, to be cognizable by the LA, must have a reasonable causal
connection with any of the claims provided for in that article. 43 Only if there is such a
connection with the other claims can a claim for damages be considered as arising from
employer-employee relations. 44
In the case at bench, we find that such connection is nil.
True, the maintenance of a safe and healthy workplace is ordinarily a subject of labor
cases. More, the acts complained of appear to constitute matters involving employee-
employer relations since respondent used to be the Civil Engineer of petitioner. However, it
should be stressed that respondent's claim for damages is speci cally grounded on
petitioner's gross negligence to provide a safe, healthy and workable environment for its
employees — a case of quasi-delict. This is easily ascertained from a plain and cursory
reading of the Complaint, 45 which enumerates the acts and/or omissions of petitioner
relative to the conditions in the workplace, to wit: IaHDcT
1. Petitioner's textile mills have excessive flying textile dust and waste in its
operations and no effort was exerted by petitioner to minimize or
totally eradicate it;
2. Petitioner failed to provide adequate and sufficient dust suction facilities;
3. Textile machines are cleaned with air compressors aggravating the dusty
work place;
4. Petitioner has no physician specializing in respiratory-related illness
considering it is a textile company;
5. Petitioner has no device to detect the presence or density of dust which is
airborne;
6. The chemical and color room are not equipped with proper safety
chemical nose mask; and SHacCD
7. The power and boiler plant emit too much smoke with solid particles
blown to the air from the smoke stack of the power plant emitting a
brown rust color which engulfs the entire compound. 46
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In addition, respondent alleged that despite his earnest efforts to suggest to
management to place roof insulation to minimize, if not, eradicate the health hazards
attendant in the workplace, the same was not heeded. 47
It is a basic tenet that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined upon the
allegations made in the complaint, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to
recover upon the claim asserted therein, which is a matter resolved only after and as a
result of a trial. 48 Neither can jurisdiction of a court be made to depend upon the defenses
made by a defendant in his answer or motion to dismiss. 49 In this case, a perusal of the
complaint would reveal that the subject matter is one of claim for damages arising from
quasi-delict, which is within the ambit of the regular court's jurisdiction.
The pertinent provision of Article 2176 of the Civil Code which governs quasi-delict
provides that: cHESAD
It also bears stressing that respondent is not praying for any relief under the Labor
Code of the Philippines. He neither claims for reinstatement nor backwages or separation
pay resulting from an illegal termination. The cause of action herein pertains to the
consequence of petitioner's omission which led to a work-related disease suffered by
respondent, causing harm or damage to his person. Such cause of action is within the
realm of Civil Law, and jurisdiction over the controversy belongs to the regular courts. 56
Our ruling in Portillo, is instructive, thus:
There is no causal connection between private respondent's claim for
damages and the respondent employers' claim for damages for the alleged
"Goodwill Clause" violation. Portillo's claim for unpaid salaries did not have
anything to do with her alleged violation of the employment contract as, in fact,
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her separation from employment is not "rooted" in the alleged contractual
violation. She resigned from her employment. She was not dismissed. Portillo's
entitlement to the unpaid salaries is not even contested. Indeed, Lietz Inc.'s
argument about legal compensation necessarily admits that it owes the money
claimed by Portillo. 57 HEIcDT
Further, it cannot be gainsaid that the claim for damages occurred after the
employer-employee relationship of petitioner and respondent has ceased. Given that
respondent no longer demands for any relief under the Labor Code as well as the rules and
regulations pertinent thereto, Article 217 (a) (4) of the Labor Code is inapplicable to the
instant case, as emphatically held in Portillo, to wit:
It is clear, therefore, that while Portillo's claim for unpaid salaries is a
money claim that arises out of or in connection with an employer-employee
relationship, Lietz Inc.'s claim against Portillo Portillo for violation of the
goodwill clause is a money claim based on an act done after the
cessation of the employment relationship. And, while the jurisdiction
over Portillo's
Portillo's claim is vested in the labor arbiter, the jurisdiction over
Lietz Inc.'s claim rests on the regular courts . Thus: DaACIH
As it is, petitioner does not ask for any relief under the
La bor Code.
Code. It merely seeks to recover damages based on the
parties' contract of employment as redress for respondent's
breach thereof. Such cause of action is within the realm of Civil
Law, and jurisdiction over the controversy belongs to the regular
courts. More so must this be in the present case, what with the
reality that the stipulation refers to the post-employment relations
of the parties . 58
Where the resolution of the dispute requires expertise, not in labor management
relations nor in wage structures and other terms and conditions of employment, but rather
in the application of the general civil law, such claim falls outside the area of competence
of expertise ordinarily ascribed to the LA and the NLRC. 59 ICcDaA
Footnotes
* Designated Acting Member, per Special Order No. 1691 dated May 22, 2014, in view of the
vacancy in the Third Division.
1. Penned by Associate Justice Vicente Q. Roxas, with Associate Justices Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr.
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