NATALIA CARPENA OPULENCIA, Petitioner, vs.

COURT OF
APPEALS, ALADIN SIMUNDAC and MIGUEL OLIVAN, Respondents.
Aladin Simundac and Miguel Oliven alleged that [herein petitioner] Natalia Carpena Opulencia executed
in their favor a CONTRACT TO SELL Lot 2125 of the Sta. Rosa Estate

that plaintiffs paid a downpayment of P300,000.00 but defendant, despite demands, failed to comply
with her obligations under the contract.

In her traverse, [petitioner] admitted the execution of the contract in favor of plaintiffs and receipt of
P300,000.00 as downpayment. However, she put forward the following affirmative defenses: that the
property subject of the contract formed part of the Estate of Demetrio Carpena (petitioners father), in
respect of which a petition for probate was filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Bian, Laguna;
that at the time the contract was executed, the parties were aware of the pendency of the probate
proceeding; that the contract to sell was not approved by the probate court; that realizing the nullity of
the contract [petitioner] had offered to return the downpayment received from [private respondents],
but the latter refused to accept it;

[petitioner], instead of submitting her evidence, filed a Demurrer to Evidence. In essence, defendant
maintained that the contract to sell was null and void for want of approval by the probate court. She
further argued that the contract was subject to a suspensive condition, which was the probate of the
will of defendants father Demetrio Carpena.

Whether or not the Contract to Sell dated 03 February 1989

In a nutshell, petitioner contends that where the estate of the deceased person is already the subject of
a testate or intestate proceeding, the administrator cannot enter into any transaction involving it
without prior approval of the Probate Court.9 She maintains that the Contract to Sell is void because it
was not approved by the probate court, as required by Section 7, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 7. Regulations for granting authority to sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber estate. The court
having jurisdiction of the estate of the deceased may authorize the executor or administrator to sell,
mortgage, or otherwise encumber real estate, in cases provided by these rules and when it appears
necessary or beneficial, under the following regulations:

xxx
Insisting that the above rule should apply to this case, petitioner argues that the stipulations in the
Contract to Sell require her to act in her capacity as an executrix or administratrix. She avers that her
obligation to eject tenants pertains to the administratrix or executrix, the estate being the landlord of
the said tenants.10 Likewise demonstrating that she entered into the contract in her capacity as
executor is the stipulation that she must effect the conversion of subject land from irrigated rice land to
residential land and secure the necessary clearances from government offices. Petitioner alleges that
these obligations can be undertaken only by an executor or administrator of an estate, and not by an
heir.11cräläwvirtualibräry

The Court is not persuaded. As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, Section 7 of Rule 89 of the Rules
of Court is not applicable, because petitioner entered into the Contract to Sell in her capacity as an
heiress, not as an executrix or administratrix of the estate. In the contract, she represented herself as
the lawful owner and seller of the subject parcel of land.12 She also explained the reason for the sale to
be difficulties in her living conditions and consequent need of cash.13 These representations clearly
evince that she was not acting on behalf of the estate under probate when she entered into the
Contract to Sell. Accordingly, the jurisprudence cited by petitioner has no application to the instant case.

We emphasize that hereditary rights are vested in the heir or heirs from the moment of the decedents
death.14 Petitioner, therefore, became the owner of her hereditary share the moment her father died.
Thus, the lack of judicial approval does not invalidate the Contract to Sell, because the petitioner has the
substantive right to sell the whole or a part of her share in the estate of her late father.

Administration of the Estate Not Prejudiced by the Contract to Sell

Petitioner further contends that [t]o sanction the sale at this stage would bring about a partial
distribution of the decedents estate pending the final termination of the testate proceedings.17 This
becomes all the more significant in the light of the trial courts finding, as stated in its Order dated
August 20, 1997, that the legitime of one of the heirs has been impaired.18cräläwvirtualibräry

Petitioners contention is not convincing. The Contract to Sell stipulates that petitioners offer to sell is
contingent on the complete clearance of the court on the Last Will Testament of her father.19
Consequently, although the Contract to Sell was perfected between the petitioner and private
respondents during the pendency of the probate proceedings, the consummation of the sale or the
transfer of ownership over the parcel of land to the private respondents is subject to the full payment of
the purchase price and to the termination and outcome of the testate proceedings. Therefore, there is
no basis for petitioners apprehension that the Contract to Sell may result in a premature partition and
distribution of the properties of the estate. Indeed, it is settled that the sale made by an heir of his share
in an inheritance, subject to the pending administration, in no wise stands in the way of such
administration.20