Motion To Dismiss - Allonge
Motion To Dismiss - Allonge
Motion To Dismiss - Allonge
PLAINTIFF,
v.
DANIEL DYMINSKI,
DEFENDANT.
_________________________________________/
through the undersigned counsel MATTHEW D. WEIDNER and respectfully moves this Court
to DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE the above entitled civil action, pursuant to Rules 1.210(a) and
1.140(b)(6) Fla. R. Civ. P., and precedent case law, and in support thereof states:
FACTS
2. The named Plaintiff in this case is WELLS FARGO, N.A., AS TRUSTEE FOR OPTION
3. In its Complaint, the Plaintiff alleges that “[o]n August 25, 2006, [the Defendant],
executed and delivered a promissory note and a mortgage securing payment of same to SAND
4. SAND CANYON CORPORATION (hereinafter “Sand Canyon”) is not the named lender
One”).
5. Option One, however, has had its status as a California corporation suspended since 1990
“Exhibit A.” Therefore, the Record is devoid of any mention as to how Sand Canyon has come
6. Appearing in the Court File is a purported “allonge” which allegedly endorsed the
Mortgage and Note to the Plaintiff. However, when undersigned counsel examined the Court
File, this purported allonge was not affixed to the Promissory Note attached to the Plaintiff’s
Complaint nor, upon information and belief, is this purported allonge currently affixed to the
Promissory Note. Furthermore, the purported allonge was not dated or notarized.
7. There is ample blank space on the Promissory Note filed with the Plaintiff’s Complaint to
stamp an endorsement. This includes abundant space both below the Plaintiff’s alleged signature
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In ruling on a defendant’s motion to dismiss, a trial court is limited to the four corners of
the Complaint, and it must accept all the allegations in the Complaint as true. See Lutz Lake Fern
Rd. Neighborhood Groups, Inc. v. Hillsborough County, 779 So.2d 380, 383 (Fla. 2d DCA
2000). However, when a question has not been previously decided by a Florida court, the
decisions of a court of another state may be considered. Old Plantation Corp. v. Maule
Industries, Inc., 68 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1953). Such a decision, when on point, is regarded as
persuasive. Tonkovich v. South Florida Citrus Industries, Inc., 185 So. 2d 710 (Fla. 2d DCA
1966).
INTRODUCTION
There is a dearth of case law to which the Court could look to for guidance when
deciding matters dealing with allonges. A search on Westlaw reveals that the entire universe of
Florida cases, both in State and Federal courts, is two: Booker v. Sarasota, Inc., 707 So. 2d 886
(Fla 1st DCA 1998) and In re Canellas, 2010 WL 571808 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Feb. 9, 2010).
Moreover, a search of the word “allonge” on Westlaw for the entire American judicial system,
both State and Federal, reveals only 274 documents. It should be noted by the Court, however,
that the vast majority of these cases only mention allonges in passing, most often reciting the
Black’s Law Dictionary definition of an allonge in the footnote of the decision or simply making
reference to an allonge when reciting the facts of the case. Very few opinions, then, delve into
According to the only Florida appellate case which deals with these ancient documents,
which to write endorsements for which there is no room on the instrument itself. Such must be
so firmly affixed thereto as to become a part thereof.” Booker, 707 So. 2d at 886 (Fla 1st DCA
1998). See also U.S. Bank National Association v. Weigand, 2009 WL 1623764 (Conn. Super.
2009); P&B Properties I, LLC v. Owens, 1996 WL 111128 (Del. Super. 1996). Furthermore,
while “Florida’s Uniform Commercial Code does not specifically mention an allonge, [the Code]
notes that ‘for purposes of determining whether a signature is made on an instrument, a paper
affixed to the instrument is made part of the instrument.’ Fla. Stat. §673.2041(1) (1995).”
a. Legal Standards
Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.210(a) provides, in pertinent part, that “[e]very action may be prosecuted
in the name of the real party in interest, but a personal representative, administrator, guardian,
trustee of an express trust, a party with whom or in whose name a contract has been made for the
benefit of another, or a party expressly authorized by statute may sue in that person's own name
without joining the party for whose benefit the action is brought.”
Recently, the Second District held that Plaintiffs in foreclosure actions are required to
establish, through admissible evidence, that it held the note and mortgage in question and so had
standing to foreclose the mortgage before it would be entitled to summary judgment in its favor.
BAC Funding v. Jean-Jacques, 2010 WL 476641 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010). Furthermore, the Second
District held that whether such a Plaintiff does so through valid assignment, proof of purchase of
the debt, or evidence of an effective transfer, they are nevertheless required to prove that it
validly held the note and mortgage which it sought to foreclose. Id. In BAC Funding, the
Second District ultimately ruled that an incomplete, unsigned and unauthenticated assignment of
mortgage attached as an exhibit to the Plaintiff’s response to the Defendant’s motion to dismiss
did not constitute admissible evidence establishing the Plaintiff’s standing to foreclose on the
Additionally, the Bankruptcy Court of the Middle District of Florida recently denied a
movant’s motion for relief from stay so the movant could foreclose on real property owned by a
debtor, in part, because the movant did not establish that it was the real party in interest through a
valid allonge. In re Canellas, 2010 WL 571808 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Feb. 9, 2010). There, the
movant accompanied its motion with a mortgage and note which were endorsed to someone
other than itself. Some three months later, the movant filed an allonge with the Court which
purportedly endorsed to it the mortgage and the note. However, the allonge was not notarized
nor was it dated. The Court ultimately denied the movant’s motion and questioned the veracity
of the allonge because, amongst other reasons, the allonge was not: (1) dated; or (2) notarized.
b. Argument
Here, the Plaintiff has failed to provide any admissible evidence that it is entitled to
proceed in this action. The named lender according to the Plaintiff’s own Complaint is SAND
Option One, the actual named lender on the Mortgage and Note, has had its corporate status
suspended since 1990 and the Record is completely devoid of how Sand Canyon has come into
existence or how it can legally hold a mortgage or note. Furthermore, the purported allonge
which the Plaintiff alleges gives it the power to enforce the Mortgage and Note in question is not
dated nor is it notarized. Option One’s suspended corporate status, the unclear and undefined
existence of Sand Canyon, and the lack of a date or notarization on the purported allonge itself
are firm grounds for the Court to doubt the veracity of this document and, as an extension, the
WHEREFORE, because the Plaintiff failed to prosecute this cause in the name of the
II. Plaintiff’s Complaint Should be Dismissed for Failure to State a Cause of Action
Because the Purported Allonge was not Firmly Affixed to the Promissory Note
a. Legal Standards
Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.140(b)(6) provides, in pertinent part, that “the following defenses may be
made by motion at the option of the pleader…failure to state a cause of action.” In ruling on a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the trial court must assume that all
allegations in the complaint are true and decide whether the Plaintiff would be entitled to relief.
Carmona v. McKinley, Ittersagen, Gunderson & Berntsson, P.A., 952 So.2d 1273 (Fla. 2d DCA
2007). Nevertheless, as indicated in the Standard of Review discussion, supra, exhibits attached
to the Plaintiff’s complaint are part of the complaint, and where the allegations made in the
complaint do not agree with the exhibits attached, the exhibits control.
There is no Florida case on point which provides guidance as to how an allonge must be
Therefore, the Court may look to decisions of courts in other states for persuasive authority. To
begin, two reasons have been cited for the “firmly affixed” rule: (1) to prevent fraud; and (2) to
preserve a traceable chain of title. See Adams v. Madison Realty & Development, Inc., 853 F. 2d
163, 167 (3d Cir. 1988). A draft of the 1951 version of the UCC Article 3 included the comment
that “[t]he indorsement must be written on the instrument itself or an allonge, which, as defined
in Section _____, is a strip of paper so firmly pasted, stapled or otherwise affixed to the
instrument as to become part of it.” ALI, Comments & Notes to Tentative Draft No. 1 – Article
III 114 (1946), reprinted in 2 Elizabeth Slusser Kelly, Uniform Commercial Code Drafts 311,
424 (1984). More recently, however, courts have held that “stapling is the modern equivalent of
gluing or pasting.” Lamson v. Commercial Cred. Corp., 187 Colo. 382 (Colo. 1975). See also
Southwestern Resolution Corp. v. Watson, 964 S.W. 2d 262 (Texas 1997) (holding that an
allonge stapled to the back of a promissory note is valid so long as there is no room on the note
for endorsement, but affixed does not include paperclips.). Regardless of the exact method of
affixation, numerous cases have rejected endorsements made on separate sheets of paper loosely
inserted in a folder with the instrument and not physically attached in any way. See Town of
Freeport v. Ring, 1999 Me. 48 (Maine 1999); Adams v. Madison Realty & Development, Inc.,
853 F. 2d 163 (3d Cir. 1988); Big Builders, Inc. v. Israel, 709 A. 2d 74 (D.C. 1988).
b. Argument
Here, the Plaintiff’s purported allonge, as found in the Court File, is in no way so firmly
affixed to the Promissory Note as to give the Plaintiff the ability to raise a cause of action for
foreclosure of a mortgage and note which is made out to someone other than itself. Specifically,
when undersigned counsel examined the Court File, this purported allonge was not affixed to the
Promissory Note nor, upon information and belief, is this purported allonge currently affixed to
the Promissory Note. Because the purported allonge is not affixed to the Note, the twin aims of
affixation, namely to prevent fraud and to preserve a traceable chain of title, have expressly not
been met.
WHEREFORE, because the Plaintiff failed to state a cause of action upon which relief
can be granted within the four corners of the Complaint or in any other Pleading or Filing, the
a. Legal Standards
There is also no Florida case law which provides guidance on how to decide “No-Space
Tests”, or how to proceed when there is room on the instrument for an endorsement but an
allonge is nevertheless attached instead. However, numerous jurisdictions permit allonges only
where, because of multiple endorsements, no additional space for signatures remains on the
negotiable instrument. See Shepherd Mall St. Bank v. Johnson, 603 P. 2d 1115, 1118 (Okla.
1979); Tallahassee Bank & Trust Company v. Raines, 187 S.E. 2d 320, 321 (Ga. App. 1972);
James Talcott, Inc. v. Fred Ratowsky Assoc., Inc., 38 Pa. D. & C.2d 624 (Pa. Ct. of Common
Pleas 1965). But see Crosby v. Roub, 16 Wis. 616, 626-27 (Wis. 1863) (allonge permitted even
where space remains on note). Perhaps the seminal case which deals with the issue is Pribus v.
Bush, 118 Cal. App. 3d 1003 (Cal. App. 1981), which reasoned that
the law merchant rule [which permits the use of allonges only when there is no
room on the instrument itself]…was developed as a refinement of the basic rule
that an indorsement must be on the instrument itself. This basic rule must have
become impractical when strictly applied in certain multiple indorsement
situations, due to the finite amount of space on any given instrument. The allonge,
then, was apparently created to remedy the inconveniences of the basic rule, not
as an alternative method of indorsement. Id at 1008. Emphasis added.
The Pribus court ultimately decided that the majority view is to follow the law merchant rule and
only permit allonges when there is no physical space left on the instrument itself. Id.
b. Argument
8. Here, the allonge was improper because there is ample blank space on the Promissory
Note filed with the Plaintiff’s Complaint to stamp an endorsement. This includes abundant space
both below the Plaintiff’s alleged signature and on the back of the Note. Florida courts, in the
absence of a Florida case directly on point, should follow the majority rule which only allows the
use of an allonge when there is no room on the instrument itself for endorsement. Doing so
preserves the law merchant rule, an ancient principal of commercial law. Because the allonge
was improper, the Mortgage and the Note are endorsed to someone other than the Plaintiff, and
therefore the Plaintiff does not have the ability to raise the cause of action for foreclosure.
WHEREFORE, because the Plaintiff failed to state a cause of action upon which relief
can be granted within the four corners of the Complaint or in any other Pleading or Filing, the
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been furnished by
U.S. Mail on this ____ day of March, 2010 to PASCALE ACHILLE, Ben-Ezra & Katz, P.A.,
2901 Stirling Road, Suite 300, Fort Lauderdale, FL 33312.
By:__________________________
MATTHEW D. WEIDNER
Attorney for Defendant
1229 Central Avenue
St. Petersburg, FL 33705
(727) 894-3159
FBN: 0185957
v.
DANIEL DYMINSKI,
DEFENDANT.
________________________________________/
NOTICE OF DEPOSITION
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned attorney will take the deposition of:
upon oral examination before a Notary Public or an officer authorized by law to take depositions
in the State of Florida. The oral examination will continue from day to day until completed. The
deposition is being taken for the purpose of discovery, for use at trial, or for such other purposes
as are permitted under the Rules of Court or Applicable Statutes.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been furnished by
U.S. Mail on this ____ day of March, 2010 to PASCALE ACHILLE, Ben-Ezra & Katz, P.A.,
By:__________________________
MATTHEW D. WEIDNER
Attorney for Defendant
1229 Central Avenue
St. Petersburg, FL 33705
(727) 894-3159
FBN: 0185957
PLAINTIFF,
v.
DANIEL DYMINSKI,
DEFENDANT.
_________________________________________/
NOTICE OF PRODUCTION
YOU ARE NOTIFIED that after 10 days from the date of service of this notice, if
service is by delivery, or 15 days from the date of service, if service is by mail, and if no
objection is received from any party, the undersigned will issue or apply to the clerk of this court
for issuance of the attached subpoena directed to CONNIE SPLETT, who is not a party and
whose address is currently unknown, to produce the items listed at the time and place specified
in the subpoena.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been furnished by
U.S. Mail on this ____ day of March, 2010 to PASCALE ACHILLE, Ben-Ezra & Katz, P.A.,
2901 Stirling Road, Suite 300, Fort Lauderdale, FL 33312.
By:__________________________
MATTHEW D. WEIDNER
Attorney for Defendant
1229 Central Avenue
St. Petersburg, FL 33705
(727) 894-3159
FBN: 0185957
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT,
IN AND FOR PINELLAS COUNTY, FLORIDA
CIVIL DIVISION
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., AS TRUSTEE CASE NO. 08-018162-CI-11
FOR OPTION ONE MORTGAGE LOAN
TRUST 2007-CP1 ASSET-BACKED
CERTIFICATE SERIES 2007-CP1,
PLAINTIFF,
v.
DANIEL DYMINSKI,
DEFENDANT.
_________________________________________/
4. All employment records, including but not limited to timesheets, which exist
between CONNIE SPLETT and any employer who has employed CONNIE SPLETT two weeks
preceding and two weeks subsequent to the execution of the purported allonge at issue in this
case.
5. All records that purport to give CONNIE SPLETT the authority to sign or execute
any documents on behalf of any person or entity.
6. If you are a notary public, your notary public’s logs.
7. All documents, records, books, evidence or instructions that you reviewed or relied
upon in order to prepare the affidavit or assignment executed in this case.
If you fail to appear, you may be in contempt of court.
You are subpoenaed to appear by the following attorney, and unless excused from this
subpoena by this attorney or the court, you shall respond to this subpoena as directed.
Any minor subpoenaed for testimony shall have the right to be accompanied by a parent or
guardian at all times during the taking of testimony notwithstanding the invocation of the rule of
sequestration of section 90.616, Florida Statutes, except upon a showing that the presence of a
parent or guardian is likely to have a material, negative impact on the credibility or accuracy of
the minor’s testimony, or that the interests of the parent or guardian are in actual or potential
conflict with the interests of the minor.