Francisco vs.

House of Representatives (2003)

GR NO.160621

TOPIC: Exercise of Jurisdiction; Judicial Review

FACTS:

On June 2, 2003, an impeachment complaint (1st impeachment complaint) was

filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. and 7
Associate Justices for “culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of public trust
and other high crimes”.

On October 22, 2003, the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss the
complaint for being insufficient in substance, although it was sufficient in form.

On October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to
dismiss the complaint or 4 months and 3 weeks since the filing thereof, a 2nd
impeachment complaint was filed with the House’s Secretary General by
Representatives Teodoro, Jr. and Funtabella against Chief Justice Hilario Davide,
founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry "to conduct an investigation,
in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).”

The 2nd impeachment complaint was accompanied by a “Resolution of

Endorsement/ Impeachment” signed by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the
House of Representatives.

Due to the events that took place, several instant petitions were filed against the
House of Representatives, mostly contending that the filing of the 2nd impeachment
complaint is unconstitutional as it violates Article XI Section 5 of the Constitution
that “no impeachment proceedings shall be INITIATED against the same official
more than once within a period of one year”; and that sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of
the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the 12th Congress are
unconstitutional as well.

a) Petitioner’s Arguments (Francisco – Won)

Petitioner Atty. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., alleging that he has a duty as a member
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to use all available legal remedies to stop an
unconstitutional impeachment, that the issues raised in his petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus are of transcendental importance, and that he "himself
was a victim of the capricious and arbitrary changes in the Rules of Procedure in
Impeachment Proceedings introduced by the 12th Congress," posits that his right to
bring an impeachment complaint against then Ombudsman Aniano Desierto had been
violated due to the capricious and arbitrary changes in the House Impeachment Rules
adopted and approved on November 28, 2001 by the House of Representatives.
 He furthermore prays that (1) Rule V, Sections 16 and 17 and Rule III, Sections
5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 thereof be declared unconstitutional; (2) this Court issue a writ of
mandamus directing respondents House of Representatives et. al. to comply with
Article IX, Section 3 (2), (3) and (5) of the Constitution, to return the second
impeachment complaint and/or strike it off the records of the House of
Representatives, and to promulgate rules which are consistent with the Constitution;
and (3) this Court permanently enjoin respondent House of Representatives from
proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.

b) Respondent’s Argument’s (Agrava - Lost)

The House of Representatives argues that sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the

House Impeachment Rules do not violate Section 3 (5) of Article XI of the present
Constitution, contending that the term " initiate" does not mean "to file", and
concludes that the one year bar prohibiting the initiation of impeachment proceedings
against the same officials could not have been violated as the impeachment complaint
against Chief Justice Davide and the 7 Associate Justices had not been initiated as the
House of Representatives, acting as the collective body, has yet to act on it.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the SC can exercise the power of judicial review to determine the validity
of the second impeachment complaint.

RULING:

The petition is granted.

Rule:

Judicial Review

The Court’s power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the
government in Article VIII, section 1 of the 1987 Constitution.

SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in
such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government.
 Judicial review is an integral component of the delicate system of checks and
balances which, together with the corollary principle of separation of powers, forms
the bedrock of our republican form of government and insures that its vast powers
are utilized only for the benefit of the people for which it serves.

When the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert
any superiority over the other departments; rather, it only asserts the solemn and
sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to check the other departments in
the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and
legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.
The power of judicial review includes the power of review over justiciable
issues in impeachment proceedings.

Essential Requisites

The courts' power of judicial review is subject to several limitations. In order for
the courts to exercise its judicial review power, the following requisites must be
established:

(1) an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;

(2) the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must
have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct
injury as a result of its enforcement;

(3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible

opportunity; and

(4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

Standing

When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the

constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. When the proceeding
involves the assertion of a public right, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the
requirement of personal interest.

In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public
funds are illegally disbursed, or that public money is being deflected to any improper
purpose, or that there is a wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an
invalid or unconstitutional law. It is not sufficient that he has merely a general
interest common to all members of the public. At all events, courts are vested with
discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's suit should be entertained.

In this case, the Court opts to grant standing to most of the petitioners, given their
allegation that any impending transmittal to the Senate of the Articles of
Impeachment and the ensuing trial of the Chief Justice will necessarily involve the
expenditure of public funds.

As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of any official

action which he claims infringes his prerogatives as a legislator. Indeed, a member
of the House of Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives,
powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in his office.

While an association has legal personality to represent its members, especially

when it is composed of substantial taxpayers and the outcome will affect their vital
interests, the mere invocation by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or any member
of the legal profession of the duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more,
although undoubtedly true, does not suffice to clothe it with standing. Its interest is
too general. It is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry.

However, a reading of the petitions shows that it has advanced constitutional

issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty
and weight as precedents. It, therefore, behooves this Court to relax the rules on
standing and to resolve the issues presented by it.

When dealing with class suits filed in behalf of all citizens, persons intervening
must be sufficiently numerous to fully protect the interests of all concerned to enable
the court to deal properly with all interests involved in the suit, for a judgment in a
class suit, whether favorable or unfavorable to the class, is, under the res judicata
principle, binding on all members of the class whether or not they were before the
court.

Where it clearly appears that not all interests can be sufficiently represented is
shown by the divergent issues raised in the numerous petitions before this Court, G.R.
No. 160365 as a class suit ought to fail. However, since petitioners additionally allege
standing as citizens and taxpayers, their petition will stand.

Ripeness and Prematurity

In Tan v. Macapagal,95 this Court, through Chief Justice Fernando, held that for a case
to be considered ripe for adjudication, "it is a prerequisite that something had by then
been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the
picture."96 Only then may the courts pass on the validity of what was done, if and
when the latter is challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding.
The instant petitions raise in the main the issue of the validity of the filing of the
second impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice in accordance with the
House Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress, the constitutionality of
which is questioned. The questioned acts having been carried out, i.e., the second
impeachment complaint had been filed with the House of Representatives and the
2001 Rules have already been already promulgated and enforced, the prerequisite that
the alleged unconstitutional act should be accomplished and performed before suit,
as Tan v. Macapagal holds, has been complied with.

Justiciability

From the record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it is

clear that judicial power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be
abdicated by the mere political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion hastened
to clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with
"truly political questions." From this clarification it is gathered that there are two
species of political questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those which "are
not truly political questions."

In our jurisdiction, the determination of a truly political question from a non-

justiciable political question lies in the answer to the question of whether there are
constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political
bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or
instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits. This Court shall
thus now apply this standard to the present controversy.

Lis mota

Intervenors' position is echoed by Justice Maambong who opined that for Section
3 (4), Article XI of the Constitution to apply, there should be 76 or more
representatives who signed and verified the second impeachment complaint
as complainants, signed and verified the signatories to a resolution of impeachment.
Justice Maambong likewise asserted that the Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least one-third of the members of the House
of Representatives as endorsers is not the resolution of impeachment contemplated by
the Constitution, such resolution of endorsement being necessary only from at least
one Member whenever a citizen files a verified impeachment complaint.

While the foregoing issue, as argued by intervenors Macalintal and Quadra, does
indeed limit the scope of the constitutional issues to the provisions on impeachment,
more compelling considerations militate against its adoption as the lis mota or crux of
the present controversy. Chief among this is the fact that only Attorneys Macalintal
and Quadra, intervenors in G.R. No. 160262, have raised this issue as a ground for
invalidating the second impeachment complaint. Thus, to adopt this additional ground
as the basis for deciding the instant consolidated petitions would not only render for
naught the efforts of the original petitioners in G.R. No. 160262, but the efforts
presented by the other petitioners as well.

Again, the decision to discard the resolution of this issue as unnecessary for the
determination of the instant cases is made easier by the fact that said intervenors
Macalintal and Quadra have joined in the petition of Candelaria, et. al., adopting the
latter's arguments and issues as their own. Consequently, they are not unduly
prejudiced by this Court's decision.

In sum, this Court holds that the two remaining issues, inextricably linked as they
are, constitute the very lis mota of the instant controversy: (1) whether Sections 15
and 16 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress are
unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the
Constitution; and (2) whether, as a result thereof, the second impeachment complaint
is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.

Judicial Restraint

Senator Pimentel urges this Court to exercise judicial restraint on the ground that
the Senate, sitting as an impeachment court, has the sole power to try and decide all
cases of impeachment. Again, this Court reiterates that the power of judicial review
includes the power of review over justiciable issues in impeachment proceedings. On
the other hand, respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. argue that "[t]here is a moral
compulsion for the Court to not assume jurisdiction over the impeachment because all
the Members thereof are subject to impeachment."

The exercise of judicial restraint over justiciable issues is not an option before
this Court. Adjudication may not be declined, because this Court is not legally
disqualified. Nor can jurisdiction be renounced as there is no other tribunal to which
the controversy may be referred." Otherwise, this Court would be shirking from its
duty vested under Art. VIII, Sec. 1(2) of the Constitution. More than being clothed
with authority thus, this Court is duty-bound to take cognizance of the instant
petitions.127 In the august words of amicus curiae Father Bernas, "jurisdiction is not
just a power; it is a solemn duty which may not be renounced. To renounce it, even if
it is vexatious, would be a dereliction of duty."

Even in cases where it is an interested party, the Court under our system of
government cannot inhibit itself and must rule upon the challenge because no other
office has the authority to do so. On the occasion that this Court had been an
interested party to the controversy before it, it has acted upon the matter "not with
officiousness but in the discharge of an unavoidable duty and, as always, with
detachment and fairness." After all, "by [his] appointment to the office, the public has
laid on [a member of the judiciary] their confidence that [he] is mentally and morally
fit to pass upon the merits of their varied contentions. For this reason, they expect
[him] to be fearless in [his] pursuit to render justice, to be unafraid to displease any
person, interest or power and to be equipped with a moral fiber strong enough to resist
the temptations lurking in [his] office."

The duty to exercise the power of adjudication regardless of interest had already
been settled in the case of Abbas v. Senate Electoral Tribunal. In that case, the
petitioners filed with the respondent Senate Electoral Tribunal a Motion for
Disqualification or Inhibition of the Senators-Members thereof from the hearing and
resolution of SET Case No. 002-87 on the ground that all of them were interested
parties to said case as respondents therein. This would have reduced the Tribunal's
membership to only its three Justices-Members whose disqualification was not
sought, leaving them to decide the matter.

Initiate

The word "initiate" as it twice appears in Article XI (3) and (5) of the
Constitution means to file the complaint and take initial action on it."Initiate" of
course is understood by ordinary men to mean, as dictionaries do: to begin, to
commence, or set going.

According to Father Bernas, an amicus curiae, an impeachment proceeding is

not a single act. It is a complexus of acts consisting of a beginning, a middle and an
end.

The beginning or the initiation is the filing of the complaint and its referral to
the Committee on Justice. The middle consists of those deliberative moments
leading to the formulation of the articles of impeachment. The end is the
transmittal of the articles of impeachment to the Senate.

An impeachment case is the legal controversy that must be decided by the

Senate. The Constitution provides that the House, by a vote of one-third of all its
members, can bring a case to the Senate. It is in that sense that the House has
"exclusive power" to initiate all cases of impeachment. No other body can do it.
However, before a decision is made to initiate a case in the Senate, a "proceeding"
must be followed to arrive at a conclusion. A proceeding must be "initiated."

An impeachment proceeding takes place not in the Senate but in the

House and consists of several steps:

(1) the filing of a verified complaint either by a Member of the House of

Representatives or by a private citizen endorsed by a Member of the House of
the Representatives;

(2) the processing of this complaint by the proper Committee which may
either reject the complaint or uphold it;

(3) whether the resolution of the Committee rejects or upholds the

complaint, the resolution must be forwarded to the House for further
processing; and

(4) the processing of the same complaint by the House of Representatives

which either affirms a favorable resolution of the Committee or overrides a
contrary resolution by a vote of one-third of all the members.
 (5) If at least one third of all the Members upholds the complaint, Articles of
Impeachment are prepared and transmitted to the Senate. It is at this point that the
House "initiates an impeachment case." It is at this point that an impeachable
public official is successfully impeached. That is, he or she is successfully
charged with an impeachment "case" before the Senate as impeachment court.

Father Bernas further explains: The "impeachment proceeding" is not initiated

when the complaint is transmitted to the Senate for trial because that is the end of the
House proceeding and the beginning of another proceeding, namely the trial. Neither
is the "impeachment proceeding" initiated when the House deliberates on the
resolution passed on to it by the Committee, because something prior to that has
already been done. The action of the House is already a further step in the proceeding,
not its initiation or beginning. Rather, the impeachment proceeding is initiated or
begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on
Justice for action. This is the initiating step which triggers the series of steps that
follow. He concludes that when Section 3 (5) says, "No impeachment proceeding
shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one
year," it means that no second verified complaint may be accepted and referred to the
Committee on Justice for action.

Therefore, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former
President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr., along with 7 Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee
on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by
Representatives Teodoro, Jr. and Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23,
2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment
proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.

Conclusion:

Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment

Proceedings which were approved by the House of Representatives on November 28,
2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C.
Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General
of the House of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5,
section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.