Philippine Association of Service Exporters Inc.

Vs.
Drilon
GR. No. 81958 June 30, 1988

FACTS:
Petitioner, Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino
workers, male and female for overseas employment. It challenges the constitutional validity of Dept.
Order No. 1 (1998) of DOLE entitled “Guidelines Governing the Temporary Suspension of Deployment of
Filipino Domestic and Household Workers.” It claims that such order is a discrimination against males and
females. The Order does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with
similar skills, and that it is in violation of the right to travel, it also being an invalid exercise of the
lawmaking power. Further, PASEI invokes Sec 3 of Art 13 of the Constitution, providing for worker
participation in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be
provided by law. Thereafter the Solicitor General on behalf of DOLE submitting to the validity of the
challenged guidelines involving the police power of the State and informed the court that the respondent
has lifted the deployment ban in some states where there exists bilateral agreement with the Philippines
and existing mechanism providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of the
Filipino workers.

ISSUE:
Whether the Department Order No. 1 in nature of the police power is valid under the Constitution.

RULING:
Police Power has been defined as the “state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with
personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare.” As defined, it consists of an
imposition of restraint upon liberty of property, in order to foster the common good. It is not capable of
an exact definition but has been purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive
embrace.
The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be nullified. There is
no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to female contract workers, but it does not
thereby make an undue discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that equality before the law
under the constitution does not import a perfect identity of rights among men and women. It admits of
classifications, provided that such classification rest on substantial distinctions: they are germane to the
purpose of the law: they are not confined to existing conditions: and they apply equality to all members
of the same class.
The court is satisfied that the classification made the preference for female worker’s rest on substantial
distinction.
Philippine Airlines Inc.
Vs.
Alberto Santos, Jr.
Gr No. 77875 February 4, 1993

FACTS:
This was an instant petition for certiorari to set aside the decision of NLRC setting aside the suspension of
the complaints and directing Philippine Airline to pay complainants their salaries. Individual respondents
were port stewards of catering sub-department on the passenger services department of petitioner. Their
salaries were deducted due to the mishandling of company’s properties which the respondents resented.
On August 27, 1984, represented by the union, individual respondents made a formal notice regarding
the deductions thru Mr. Abad, Manager for care taking who was on vacation leave but no action was
taken. They then filed a formal grievance pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement. On his return,
Mr. Abad on December 7, 1984, he informed the grievant and scheduled meeting. Thereafter, the
individual respondents refused to do ramp inventory thinking that since there was no action taken by Mr.
Abad five days after they filed the petition, it shall be resolved in their favor. But Mr. Abad denied the
petition and suspended individual respondents. He also pointed out that it was only proper that
employees were charged for the mishandling of company’s property.
Private respondents filed a complaint for illegal suspension to the labor arbiter. The decision was ruled in
favor of the petitioner and the complaint was set aside. The labor arbiter’s decision was appealed to the
respondent commission who rendered decision setting aside the labor arbiter’s order of dismissal.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.

ISSUE:
Whether public respondent NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
on resolving in favor of individual respondents who believed that inaction on the petition they filed for
grievance would be resolved in their favor in accordance to their collective bargaining agreement?

RULING:
The petition hinges on the interpretation of Sec. 2, Art. IV of the PAL-PALEA Collective Bargaining
Agreement about the processing of grievances. Petitioner submits that since the grievance machinery
was made for both labor and management, employees are duty-bound to thresh out first all the remedies
before the management and give them opportunity to act on it. But due to the absence of Mr. Abad the
grievance was not acted upon. The court held that the employees should not bear the dire effects of Mr.
Abad’s absence. The management should have had someone else to look after the grievance during his
absence. Under the policy of social justice, the law bends over backward to accommodate the interests of
the working class on the humane justification that those with less privileges in life should have more
privileges in law. Petition was denied and the assailed decision of NLRC was affirmed.
Philippine Education Company Inc.
Vs.
Union of the Philippines Education Employees
Gr. No. L-13778 April 29, 1960

FACTS:
Ernesto Carpio and other employees of the company, members of the Union of the Philippine Education
Employees joined a strike. After the labor dispute was settled, the Industrial Court ordered the
reinstatement of Carpio for the reason that a criminal complaint had been filed against him for theft of
magazines all allegedly belonging to the company. However, on appeal, Carpio was acquitted. Since
Carpio had been acquitted, the Industrial Court agreed that he was entitled to reinstatement, though
without receiving his backpay.

ISSUE:
Whether the acquittal of an employee, especially on the ground of reasonable doubt, in a criminal case
for theft involving articles and merchandise belonging to his employer, entitles said employee to
reinstatement.

RULING:
The relation of employer and employee, specially where the employee has access to the employer's
property in the form of articles and merchandise for sale, necessarily involves trust and confidence. If said
merchandise are lost and said loss is reasonably attributed to said employee, and he is charged with theft,
even if he is acquitted of the form of articles and merchandise for sale, necessarily involves trust and
confidence. If said merchandise are lost and said loss is reasonably attributed to said employee, and he is
charged with theft, even if he is acquitted of the charge on reasonable doubt, when the employer has lost
its confidence in him, it would be highly unfair to require said employer to continue employing him or to
reinstate him, for in that case the former might find it necessary for its protection to employ another
person to watch and keep an eye on him. In the present case, Carpio was refused reinstatement not
because of any union affiliation or activity or because the company has been guilty of any unfair labor
practice. As already stated, Carpio was convicted in the Municipal Court and although he was acquitted
on reasonable doubt in the Court of First Instance, the company had ample reason to distrust him.
Pacific Mills Inc.
Vs.
Zenaida Alonzo
Gr. No. 78090 July 26. 1991

FACTS:
Zenaida Alonzo was employed as a ring frame operator in Pacipic Mills, Inc. She was terminated due to the incident
that happened on September 22, 1982 when she challenged Ernesto Tamondong, the company inspector in a fight
and assaulted him. On September 30, 1982, Alonzo was given memo terminating her on the various grounds:
poor work, habitual absences and tardiness, wasting time, insubordination and gross disrespect. There was no complaint or
hearing prior to the dismissal. The management considered it unnecessary since there is a provision in the company rules and
relations that “fighting or attempting to inflict harm to another employee will render the aggressor to outright dismissal”. The
company was only to present evidence when Alonzo instituted complaint for illegal dismissal (and non-
payment of proportionate 13th month pay. The Labor Arbiter found that Alonzo had indeed verbally abused
and struck Tamondong. However, the arbiter held that Alonzo was entitled relief because the penalty
imposed was harsh and severe and the company failed to investigate the complaint before the dismissal. The
arbiter ordered Pacific Mills her reinstatement without the loss of seniority rights and to pay her back wages. On appeal, NLRC
sustained the judgment but limited the award of back wages only to 3 years. Pacific Mills instituted special civil
action of certiorari praying for nullification of the judgment of NLRC having been rendered with grave
abuse of discretion.

ISSUE:
Whether the dismissal of an employee for just and reasonable cause but without prior due process
should be maintained.

Ruling:
The court held that while it is true that Alonzo was not afforded due process prior to her removal, her
continuance in the service is inimical to her employer’s interest. Petitioner proved that the termination of
Zenaida was justified because of the violations she committed against the company’s rules and
regulations. And citing San Miguel Corp. Vs. NLRC, “the law in protecting the rights of the laborer
authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of the employer”. And the reinstatement of the
employee would be unjust and oppressive on the part of the employer. The petition is granted and the
challenged decision of the respondent Commission dated March 23, 1987 and that of the Labor Arbiter
thereby affirmed, are Nullified and set aside. However, the petitioner is ordered to pay private
respondent a proportionate part of the 13th month pay due her, amounting to P351.00 as well as to
indemnify her in the sum of P1000.00.
DIVISION

[ GR No. L-58176, Mar 23, 1984 ]

RUTH JIMENEZ v. EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION +

DECISION

213 Phil. 334

MAKASIAR, Acting C.J.:

This is a petition to review the decision of respondent Employees Compensation Commission (ECC) dated
August 20, 1981 (Annex "A", Decision, pp. 10-12, rec.) in ECC Case No. 1587, which affirmed the decision
of respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), denying petitioner's claim for death benefits
under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended.
The undisputed facts are as follows:
Petitioner is the widow of the late Alfredo Jimenez, who joined the government service in June, 1969 as a
constable in the Philippine Constabulary (p. 2, rec.).
After rendering service for one year, he was promoted to the rank of constable second class. On
December 16, 1974, he was again promoted to the rank of sergeant (p. 26, rec.).
Sometime in April, 1976, he and his wife boarded a bus from Tuguegarao, Cagayan, to Anulung, Cagayan.
While on their way, Sgt. Jimenez, who was seated on the left side of the bus, fell down from the bus
because of the sudden stop of the vehicle. As a result, he was confined at the Cagayan Provincial Hospital
for about one (1) week, and thereafter, released (comment of respondent ECC, pp. 25-36, rec.). He was
again confined for further treatment from November 7, 1978 to May 16, 1979 at the AFP Medical Center
in Quezon City.
While on duty with the 111th PC Company, Tuguegarao, Cagayan, he was assigned as security to one Dr.
Emilio Cordero of Anulung, Cagayan (ECC rec., Proceedings of the PC Regional Board, June 6, 1980). In
compliance with his duty, he always accompanied the doctor wherever the latter went (p. 26, rec.).
On November 7, 1978, the deceased was again confined at the Cagayan Provincial Hospital and then
transferred to the AFP V. Luna Medical Center at Quezon City for further treatment. He complained of
off-and-on back pains, associated with occasional cough and also the swelling of the right forearm. The
doctors found a mass growth on his right forearm, which grew to the size of 3 by 2 inches, hard and
associated with pain, which the doctors diagnosed as "aortic aneurysm, medrastinal tumor" (p. 27, rec.).
His condition improved somewhat after treatment and he was released on May 16, 1979. He was advised
to have complete rest and to continue medication. He was then given light duty inside the barracks of
their company. Unfortunately, his ailment continued and became more serious.
On May 12, 1980, he died in his house at Anulung, Cagayan, at about 9:00 o'clock in the evening. He was
barely 35 years old at the time of his death.
The cause of death, as found by the doctors, is "bronchogenic carcinoma" which is a malignant tumor of
the lungs.
On June 6, 1980, an administrative hearing was conducted before the PC Regional Board. It was their
official findings that the subject enlisted man "died in line of duty"; that the deceased was a PC member
of the 111th PC Company at Tuguegarao, Cagayan; that he died due to "bronchogenic CA"; and that he
"died not as a result of his misconduct and did not violate any provisions of the Articles of War" (ECC rec.,
Proceedings of the PC Regional Board, June 6, 1980).
The Board recommended "that all benefits due to or become due subject EP be paid and settled to his
legal heirs" (ECC rec., Proceedings of the PC Regional Board, June 6, 1980). Thus, as per records of the
GSIS, petitioner was paid benefits due to her deceased husband under Republic Act. No. 610 (Comment
of respondent ECC, p. 27, rec.).
Nevertheless, petitioner filed a claim for death benefits under PD No. 626, as amended with the
respondent GSIS. Said claim was denied by the GSIS on the ground that her husband's death is not
compensable "for the reason that the injury/sickness that caused his death is not due to the
circumstances of the employment or in the performance of the duties and responsibilities of said
employment" (Letter of denial by the GSIS dated July 14, 1980, ECC rec.).
The said decision was affirmed by respondent Employees Compensation Commission in its decision dated
August 21, 1981, stating among others:
"xx xx xx.
"After an exhausted (sic) study of the evidences (sic) on record and the applicable law on the case, we
conclude that the law has been properly applied by the respondent System. x x x.
"Bronchogenic carcinoma, medical authorities disclose, is the most common form of malignancy in males
reaching a peak between the fifth and seventh decades and accounting for one in four male cancer
deaths. The sex incidence is at least 5 to 1, male to female. Extensive statistical analysis by medical
authorities have confirmed the relationship between lung cancer and cigarette smoking. Other factors
that may have potential roles are exposure to ionizing radiation, exposure to chromates, metallic iron and
iron oxides, arsenic, nickel, beryllium and asbestos (Harrison's Principles of Internal Medicine by Wintrobe,
et al., 7th Edition, p. 1322).
"Although Presidential Decree. No. 626, as amended was envisioned to give relief to workingmen, who
sustain an injury or contract an ailment in the course of employment and that to best attain its lofty
objective, a liberal interpretation of the law should pervade in its implementation, this precept, however,
may not be invoked as not even a slight causal link between the development of the ailment and the
decedent's (sic) duties and working conditions as a PC sergeant could be deduced from the records of this
case. The respondent System's ruling that appellant's claim does not fall within the beneficiant provisions
of Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, and therefore the same should be denied, is in full harmony
with the law and the facts obtaining herein.
"xx xx xx=" (Decision, pp. 10-12, rec.).
On September 28, 1981, petitioner, assisted by counsel, filed the instant petition, the only pertinent issue
being whether or not her husband's death from bronchogenic carcinoma is compensable under the law.
The petitioner contends that her husband's death is compensable and that respondent Commission erred
in not taking into consideration the uncontroverted circumstance that when the deceased entered into
the Philippine Constabulary, he was found to be physically and mentally healthy. She further contends
that as a soldier, her husband's work has always been in the field where exposure to the elements, dust
and dirt, fatigue and lack of sleep and rest was the rule rather than the exception. The nature of work of a
soldier being to protect life and property of citizens, he was subject to call at any time of day or night.
Furthermore, he was even assigned as security to one Emilio Cordero and always accompanied the latter
wherever he went. Exposed to these circumstances for several years, the deceased's physical constitution
began to deteriorate, which eventually resulted to his death from bronchogenic carcinoma (Petition, pp.
2-9, rec.).
On the other hand, respondent Commission maintains that while the deceased soldier may have been
exposed to elements of dust and dirt and condition of lack of rest and continued fatigue by virtue of his
duties to protect the life and property of the citizens, such conditions have no causal relation to his
contraction of bronchogenic carcinoma. It is also the opinion of the respondent that since there is
evidence of the deceased to be a smoker, "the late Sgt. Jimenez may have indulged heavily in smoking
and drinking, not merely 'occasionally'. And it has been demonstrated medically that the more cigarettes
a person smokes, the greater the risk of developing lung cancer" (Memorandum, p. 62, rec.). In short, the
respondent alleges that the deceased was responsible to a large degree for his having contracted
bronchogenic carcinoma that led to his demise.
WE find the petitioner's claim meritorious.
Primary carcinoma of the lung is the most common fatal cancer and its frequency is increasing (The
Merck Manual, 13th Edition, p. 647). Admittedly, cancer of the lungs (bronchogenic carcinoma) is one of
those borderline cases where a study of the circumstances of the case is mandated to fully appreciate
whether the nature of the work of the deceased increased the possibility of contracting such an ailment.
In the case of Laron vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission (73 SCRA 90), WE held, citing Schmidt's
Attorney's Dictionary of Medicine, 165 Sup. 143; Beerman vs. Public Service Coordinated Transport, 191 A
297, 299; Words and Phrases, 6 Permanent Edition 61, "The English word 'cancer' means 'crab'; in the
medical sense, it refers to a malignant, usually fatal, tumor or growth." Findings of fact by the respondent
points out that bronchogenic carcinoma is a malignant tumor of the lungs. WE have ruled in the case of
Dator vs. Employees Compensation Commission (111 SCRA 634, L-57416, January 30, 1982) that "(U)ntil
now, the cause of cancer is not known." Indeed, the respondent has provided an opening through which
petitioner can pursue and did pursue the possibility that the deceased's ailment could have been caused
by the working conditions while employed with the Philippine Constabulary.
Respondents maintain that the deceased was a smoker and the logical conclusion is that the cause of the
fatal lung cancer could only be smoking which cannot in any way be justified as work-connected.
However, medical authorities support the conclusion that up to now, the etiology or cause of cancer of
the lungs is still largely unknown as provided for in the following:
"Although the etiology of cancer in humans cannot yet be explained at the molecular level, it is clear that
genetic composition of the host is important in cancer induction. Related immunologic factors may
predispose the host to a putative carcinogen. There is some evidence that viruses may play a role in the
neoplastic process. In addition, both environmental and therapeutic agents have been identified as
carcinogens" (Harrison, Principles of Internal Medicine, 9th Edition, 1980, p. 1584).
"Considerable attention has been directed to the potential role of air pollution, exposure to ionizing
radiation and numerous occupational hazards, including exposure to chromates, metallic iron and iron
oxides, arsenic, nickel, beryllium and asbestos" (Harrison, Ibid., p. 1259).
"The lungs are the site of origin of primary benign and malignant tumors and receive metastases from
many other organs and tissues. Specific causes have not been established but a strong dose-related
statistical association exists between cigarette smoking and squamous cell and undifferentiated small
(oat) cell bronchogenic carcinomas. There is suggestive evidence that prolonged exposure to air pollution
promotes lung neoplasms" (The Merck Manual, 13th Edition, p. 647).
"What emerges from such concepts is the belief that cancers in man do not appear suddenly 'out of the
blue'. x x Moreover, there need not be a single etiology or pathogenesis. Many influences may be at work
during the evolution of the lesion and many pathways may be involved. Indeed, the term cancer embrace
a multiplicity of diseases of diverse origins" (Robbins, Pathologic Basis of Disease, 2nd Edition, 1979, p.
185, italics supplied).
WE cannot deny the fact that the causes of the illness of the deceased are still unknown and may
embrace such diverse origins which even the medical sciences cannot tell with reasonable certainty.
Indeed, scientists attending the World Genetic Congress in New Delhi, India, have warned that about
25,000 chemicals used around the world could potentially cause cancer, and Lawrence Fishbein of the
U.S. National Center for Toxilogical Research pointed out that humans were daily exposed to literally
hundreds of chemical agents via air, food, medication, both in their industrial home and environments
(Evening Post, December 16, 1983, p. 3, cols. 2-3).
The theory of increased risk is applicable in the instant case. WE had the occasion to interpret the theory
of increased risk in the case of Cristobal vs. Employees Compensation Commission (103 SCRA, 336-337, L-
49280, February 26, 1981):
"To establish compensability under the said theory, the claimant must show proof of work-connection.
Impliedly, the degree of proof required is merely substantial evidence, which means 'such relevant
evidence to support a decision' (Ang Tibay v. The Court of Industrial Relations and National Labor Union,
Inc., 69 Phil. 635) or clear and convincing evidence. In this connection, it must be pointed out that the
strict rules of evidence are not applicable in claims for compensation. Respondents however insist on
evidence which would establish direct causal relation between the disease rectal cancer and the
employment of the deceased. Such a strict requirement which even medical experts cannot support
considering the uncertainty of the nature of the disease would negate the principle of the liberality in the
matter of evidence. Apparently, what the law merely requires is a reasonable work-connection and not a
direct causal relation. This kind of interpretation gives meaning and substance to the liberal and
compassionate spirit of the law as embodied in Article 4 of the new Labor Code which states that 'all
doubts in the implementation of the provisions of this Code, including its implementing rules and
regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor.'
"x x x As the agents charged by the law to implement the social justice guarantee secured by both 1935
and 1973 Constitutions, respondents should adopt a more liberal attitude in deciding claims for
compensation especially when there is some basis in the facts inferring a work-connection. This should
not be confused with the presumption of compensability and theory of aggravation under the Workmen's
Compensation Act. While these doctrines may have been abandoned under the New Labor Code (the
constitutionality of such abrogation may still be challenged), it is significant that the liberality of the law,
in general, still subsists. x x x" (italics supplied).
The sweeping conclusion of the respondent Employees Compensation Commission to the effect that the
cause of the bronchogenic carcinoma of the deceased was due to his being a smoker and not in any
manner connected with his work as a soldier, is not in accordance with medical authorities nor with the
facts on record. No certitude can arise from a position of uncertainty.
WE are dealing with possibilities and medical authorities have given credence to the stand of the
petitioner that her husband developed bronchogenic carcinoma while working as a soldier with the
Philippine Constabulary. The records show that when the deceased enlisted with the Philippine
Constabulary in 1969, he was found to be physically and mentally healthy. A soldier's life is a hard one. As
a soldier assigned to field duty, exposure to the elements, dust and dirt, fatigue and lack of sleep and rest
is a common occurrence. Exposure to chemicals while handling ammunition and firearms cannot be
discounted. WE take also fact that he became the security of one Dr. Emilio Cordero of Anulung, Cagayan,
and he always accompanied the doctor wherever the latter went (p. 26, rec.). Such assignment invariably
involved irregular working hours, exposure to different working conditions, and body fatigue, not to
mention psychological stress and other similar factors which influenced the evolution of his ailment.
WE held in the case of San Valentin vs. Employees Compensation Commission (118 SCRA 160) that:
"xx xx xx.
"In compensation cases, strict rules of evidence are not applicable. A reasonable work-connection is all
that is required or that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions."
In the case of Dator vs. Employees Compensation Commission (L-57416, January 30, 1982), WE held the
death of Wenifreda Dator, a librarian for 15 years, caused by bronchogenic carcinoma compensable.
Being a librarian, "she was exposed to dusty books and other deleterious substances in the library under
unsanitary conditions" (Ibid., 632). WE do not see any reason to depart from the ruling in the said case,
considering that a soldier's duties and environment are more hazardous.
This is in line with the avowed policy of the State as mandated by the Constitution (Article II, Section 9)
and restated in the new Labor Code (Article 4), to give maximum aid and protection to labor.
WHEREFORE, THE DECISION APPEALED FROM IS HEREBY SET ASIDE AND THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE
INSURANCE SYSTEM IS HEREBY ORDERED
1. TO PAY THE PETITIONER THE SUM OF TWELVE THOUSAND (P12,000.00) PESOS AS DEATH BENEFITS;
2. TO REIMBURSE THE PETITIONER'S MEDICAL AND HOSPITAL EXPENSES DULY SUPPORTED BY PROPER
RECEIPTS; AND
3. TO PAY THE PETITIONER THE SUM OF ONE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED (P1,200.00) PESOS FOR BURIAL
EXPENSES.
SO ORDERED.
Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro and Escolin, JJ., concur.
Aquino, J., he dissents. Bronchogenic carcinoma was not work-connected. The ECC did not err in denying
death benefits.
 [ G.R. No. L-7636, June 27, 1955 ]

ASIA STEEL CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND ISMAEL
CARBAJOSA, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION
BENGZON, J.:
Petition to review the order of the Workmen's Compensation Commission approving the award of its
referee in favor of the laborer Ismael Carbajosa, against his employer Asia Steel Corporation.
It appears that on April 16, 1951, while working in said Corporation's steel factory in Grace Park, Manila,
Carbajosa tapped the belt of a running machine to tighten it, but his hand was caught accidentally by the
belt, he stumbled down and his two feet were so seriously injured, they had to be amputated at the
Chinese General Hospital where he was rushed immediately after the mishap. Hospitalization were paid
by the corporation.
Thereafter Carbajosa claimed for compensation. The referee, having found that he was employed as
apprentice, and that the accident arose out of employment, required the Asia Steel Corporation to
indemnify in the total sum of two thousand two hundred forty six pesos and forty centavos (P2,246.40)
and to pay the costs.
The instant petition for review rests on two major propositions: (1) Ismael Carbajosa was not an
employee or laborer and (2) the accident was "occasioned by" his "own fault and negligence".
This second issue, however, was not tendered in the Corporation's motion to dismiss, Annex B, filed with
Workmen's Compensation Commission, and neither the referee nor the Commission made findings on
such question of negligence. Anyway it is no excuse for the employer: it merely reduces the
compensation. (Art. 1711 New Civil Code.) Nevertheless, on close examination the contention turn out to
be founded on the reasoning that being a stranger in the premises -not an employee- Carbajosa had no
right, and therefore was careless, to touch the machines of the factory. (p. 27 Record.)
Hence this revision may be limited to the simple question whether the petitioner had given employment
to Carbajosa.
According to the Commission,
"x x x the claimant, a native of Negros Occidental, came to Manila on March 31, 1951, to look for a job.
On April 5, 1951, he met an aquaintance, Pablo Sesia, whose aid sought in the matter of securing
employment. Sesia, who was employed in the Asia Steel Corporation as a mechanic, promised to take
Carbajosa to his employer.
Upon previous arrangement with Sesia, therefore, Carbajosa went to respondent's nail factory at Grace
Park, Caloocan, Rizal, on April 9, 1951. Sesia introduced the claimant to Mr. Kim, in charge of the factory.
During the interview, Kim told the claimant that he, (Kim) would take up the matter with the manager,
and Carbajosa would know the manager's decision as soon as he (the claimant) returned. The next
morning, the claimant came back to the factory and was told by Kim to begin working as an apprentice. It
was further agreed that claimant's wage would be determined upon the arrival of materials which the
manager ordered from Japan. The claimant assumed work on the same day, doing odd jobs under the
direction of Sesia.
It also appears that Kim lived in the factory. Pablo Sesia was also lodging in the factory and permission
was secured from Kim in order that the claimant might live in the factory with Sesia.
On April 16, 1951, hardly a week since the claimant began working in the factory, while he was tightening
the belt of one of the machines, his hand was caught by the running belt. The force of the moving belt
caused claimant to lose his balance. He was dragged to the other end of the machine. His feet were
smashed by the iron shaft and he was pinned under the machine itself."x x x
Under the laws we are bound to accept these findings; and must disregard petitioner's arguments
disputing them[1]. But this does not necessarily dispose of the matter, because ther remains the legal
proposition extensively discussed by counsel for petitioner that Kim's acts could not bind the corporation,
since only the President, Yu Kong Tiong, was authorized by its by-laws to hire employees for the
manufacturing establishment.
The Commission found that Yu Kong Tiong was the president of the corporation and Sy Te the manager;
but Yu Kong Tiong was permitted actually to manage its affairs, (it being a "family" corporation) by
remote control from his office in Manila thru Kim who was "in charge" of the factory in Caloocan. It also
declared that Kim was allowed by Yu Kong Tiong to employ Carbajosa as apprentice. (p. 52 Record.)
From such circumstances, the conclusion flows inevitably that Carbajosa was, at the time of the
occurence, an employee of the petitioning corporation.
Of course it is undeniable that as president and manager Yu Kong Tiong could legally employ, by himself,
manual laborers to work in the factory[2]. And there is nothing to prevent him from employing Carbajosa,
thru his agent Kim, as the latter did. In fact it may even be held that in default of proof establishing Yu
Kong Tiong's assent to the employment, inasmuch as Kim the person actually in charge of the factory
represented to Carbajosa that he was authorized by the manager to engage his (Carbajosa's) services,
there was apparent authority of Kim, sufficiently ample to create the relationship of employer and
employee for the purposes of the Workmen's Compensation Law.
"It may be stated as a general rule that anagent, who with authority express, implied, apparent or actual,
employs help for the benefit of his principal's business, therby creates the relationship of employer and
employee between such help and his principal." (Schneider, Workmen's Compensation (Permanent Ed.)
Vol. I p. 617, citing many cases.)
"It has been held: that where a driver, employed to solicit sales of beer and make delivery, was permitted
to employ helpers, a helper who was injured while in the performance of his duty was entitled to
compensation from brewery; that an expert, hired by a factory owner to supervise the installation of
machinery, who hired assistants, paid by the owner, one of such assistants being injured while so
engaged was entitled to compensation from the factory owner; that workmen hired by an agent of the
company, which took over the logging work of an independent contractor, became the employees of the
company." (Schneider, op. cit. p. 619.)
Needless to say, the existence of employer-employee relationship is the jurisdictional foundation without
which an indemnity is unauthorized. Schneider p. 569-570.) It is often difficult of determination, because
purposely made so by employers bent on evading liability under the Compensation Acts. Hence, if the
object of the law is to be accomplished with a liberal construction[3], the creation of the relationship
should not be adjudged strictly in accordance with technical legal rules, but rather according to the
actualities and realities of industrial or business practice. A laborer is told to work for the establishment
by the person-in-charge, who in turn represented he had consulted with the manager. If the by-laws of
the corporation had provided that no laborer may be hired unless with the written consent of the board
of directors, would it be consonant with justice to deny such laborer compensation for injuries, upon the
ground of lack of written authority? If so, a loophole has thereby been created in the Workmen's
Compensation Law. That is perhaps the reason why apparent authority has been considered enough,
what with the principles of estoppel lending persuasive support. (Schneider op. cit. Vol. I p. 623.)
A parallel situation arose in Flores et al. v. La Compañia Maritima, 32 O. Gaz. No. 21 pp. 406-407. The
heirs of Graciano Paninsoro demanded compensation because he died by reason of injuries received
while working on the ship "Albay" belonging to and operated by the Compañia Maritima, a corporation.
The facts were;
"About the last week of the month of October, 1929, the defendant's boat, Albay, dropped anchor in the
port of Cebu where the captain thereof, through a contractor or agent, recruited laborers who were to
board the ship for the purpose of unloading her cargo upon arrival at the next port of call, Davao, and
loading cargo for various ports of call on her return trip. Among those laborers was the appellant Eusebia
Flores' husband, Graciano Paninsoro, who was earning a daily wage of P1.50 including subsistence."
The defendant contended on appeal that Paninsoro was not its employee. This Court held,
"There is not a least shadow of a doubt that the deceased was a laborer in the legal sense. He had been
recruited by order of the captain of the ship and he was engage in a task of unloading the ship's cargo at
the time of the accident. There can be no dispute that this kind of work is included in the business in
which the appellee is engaged. That the deceased had been recruited or engaged by a contractor is of no
moment because the latter, for purposes of the law, was in turn, represented the appellee." (Flores et al.
v. La Compañia Maritima, 32 O. Gaz. No. 21 pp. 406-407.)
It should be observed in the above litigation that neither the board of directors nor the President nor the
manager of the defendant corporation had hired the laborer Paninsoro. It was the captain of the ship,
thru an agent, that employed him. Now then, in this case as the person-in-charge of the factory (Kim)
hired Carbajosa, the contract of employment should be upheld.
There is further circumstance, implying ratification of the employment, that the acting manager of the
corporation Atty. Mercado directed the payment by the corporation of Carbajosa's hospital expenses,
amounting to P2,000.00. Mercado's explanation that he did it out of pity, was not, and could not be
accepted since the Asia Steel Corporation is not a charitable institution.
In view of the foregoing, and the petitioner not having questioned the amount of compensation, the
order of the Commission, should be , as it is hereby, affirmed with costs. So ordered.
Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, and Reyes, J.B.L., JJ., concur.

[1]
Sec. 46 Act No. 3428 as amended by Rep. Act 772. Rule 44 sec.2.
[2]
Yu Chuck v. Kong Li Po, 46 Phil. 608
[3]
Vergara v. Pampanga Bus Co. 62 Phil. 820; Francisco v. Consing 62 Phil. 354; Ramos v. Poblete 73 Phil.
241.