People vs Panis

ISSUE: Whether or not Sections 29 and 30 are valid.

Facts:
HELD: The issue became moot and academic. It appears that during the
Four informations were filed in the Court of First Instance of Zambales pendency of this case in 2007, RA 9422 (An Act to Strengthen the
and Olongapo City alleging that Serapio Abug, private respondent Regulatory Functions of the POEA) was passed which repealed Sections
herein, “without first securing a license from the Ministry of Labor as 29 and 30 of RA 8042.
a holder of authority to operate a fee-charging employment agency,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally operate a private G.R. 167590
fee charging employment agency by charging fees and expenses (from) In this case, the Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI)
and promising employment in Saudi Arabia” to four separate questioned the validity of the following provisions of RA 8042:
individuals, in violation of Article 16 in relation to Article 39 of the
Labor Code. a. Section 6, which defines the term “illegal recruitment”. PASEI claims
that the definition by the law is vague as it fails to distinguish between
Abug filed a motion to quash on the ground that the informations did licensed and non-licensed recruiters;
not charge an offense because he was accused of illegally recruiting
only one person in each of the four informations. Under the proviso in b. Section 7, which penalizes violations against RA 8042 are
Article 13(b), he claimed, there would be illegal recruitment only unreasonable;
“whenever two or more persons are in any manner promised or
offered any employment for a fee. ” c. Section 9, which allows the victims of illegal recruitment to have the
option to either file the criminal case where he or she resides or at the
Issue: How Article 13(b) of the Labor Code, reading as follows, should place where the crime was committed. PASEI argues that this provision
be be interpreted: is void for being contrary to the Rules of Court.

(b) Recruitment and placement’ refers to any act of canvassing, d. Section 10, which provides that corporate officers and directors of a
enlisting, contracting, transporting, hiring, or procuring workers, and company found to be in violation of RA 8042 shall be themselves be
includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation or partnership for the
employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, aforesaid claims and damages.
That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for
a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged RTC Judge Jose Paneda of Quezon City agreed with PASEI and he
in recruitment and placement. declared the said provisions of RA 8042 as void. Secretary Sto. Tomas
petitioned for the annulment of the RTC judgment.
Held:
ISSUE: Whether or not Sections 6, 7, 9, and 10 of RA 8042 are void.
The proviso was intended neither to impose a condition on the basic HELD: No, they are valid provisions.
rule nor to provide an exception thereto but merely to create a
presumption. The presumption is that the individual or entity is a. Section 6: The law clearly and unambiguously distinguished between
engaged in recruitment and placement whenever he or it is dealing licensed and non-licensed recruiters. By its terms, persons who engage
with two or more persons to whom, in consideration of a fee, an offer in “canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or
or promise of employment is made in the course of the “canvassing, procuring workers” without the appropriate government license or
enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring (of) authority are guilty of illegal recruitment whether or not they commit
workers. ” the wrongful acts enumerated in that section. On the other hand,
recruiters who engage in the canvassing, enlisting, etc. of OFWs,
The number of persons dealt with is not an essential ingredient of the although with the appropriate government license or authority, are
act of recruitment and placement of workers. Any of the acts guilty of illegal recruitment only if they commit any of the wrongful
mentioned in the basic rule in Article 13(b) will constitute recruitment acts enumerated in Section 6.
and placement even if only one prospective worker is involved. The
proviso merely lays down a rule of evidence that where a fee is b. Section 7: The penalties are valid. Congress is well within its right to
collected in consideration of a promise or offer of employment to two prescribed the said penalties. Besides, it is not the duty of the courts
or more prospective workers, the individual or entity dealing with to inquire into the wisdom behind the law.
them shall be deemed to be engaged in the act of recruitment and
placement. The words “shall be deemed” create that presumption. c. Section 9: The Rules on Criminal Procedure, particularly Section
15(a) of Rule 110, itself, provides that the rule on venue when it comes
Patricia Sto. Tomas vs Rey Salac to criminal cases is subject to existing laws. Therefore, there is nothing
G.R. No. 152642 and G.R. No. 152710 arbitrary when Congress provided an alternative venue for violations
of a special penal law like RA 8042.
In G.R. No. 152642, in 2002, Rey Salac et al, who are recruiters
deploying workers abroad, sought to enjoin the Secretary of Labor, the d. Section 10: The liability of corporate officers and directors is not
POEA, and TESDA, from regulating the activities of private recruiters. automatic. To make them jointly and solidarily liable with their
Salac et al invoked Sections 29 and 30 of the Republic Act 8042 or the company, there must be a finding that they were remiss in directing
Migrant Workers Act which provides that recruitment agency in the the affairs of that company, such as sponsoring or tolerating the
Philippines shall be deregulated one year from the passage of the said conduct of illegal activities.
law; that 5 years thereafter, recruitment should be fully deregulated.
RA 8042 was passed in 1995, hence, Salac et al insisted that as early as
2000, the aforementioned government agencies should have stopped Sunace v NLRC
issuing memorandums and circulars regulating the recruitment of
workers abroad.
Jamer v NLRC
Hence, petitioner questioned the validity of Sections 29 and 30.
Complainants working for isetann were dismissed on the alleged petitioners to report the aforequoted shortages and overages to
ground of dishonesty in their work as Store Cashiers. Complainants management as soon as they arose resulted in the breach of the
found a shortage of around 15,000 but did not report immediately for fiduciary trust reposed in them by respondent company, thereby
they tried to find the cause. The complainants were asked to submit causing the latter to lose confidence in them. This warrants their
their written explanation, and finding these unsatisfactory, were dismissal.
dismissed.
Complainants aver that there are at least 6 people who had access to SSS v CA
the vault. To fault the cashiers for the shortage is not only unfair but
also illegal. Given that they have both been employed in isetann for
more than 10 years, they were not about to break their employer’s ANTONIO M. SERRANO VS. GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES, INC. AND
trust. MARLOW NAVIGATION CO., INC.
The labor arbiter, rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners. On GR No. 167614 – March 24, 2009
appeal, the decision was reiterated. Appealed again, this time, the
decision of the NLRC was in favor of the Private resps. Comp. FACTS:
Petitioner Antonio Serrano was hired by respondents under a POEA-
Issue: whether NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in finding approved contract of employment for 12 months, as Chief Officer.
that petitioners were validly dismissed on the ground of loss of trust
and confidence. On the date of his departure, Serrano was constrained to accept a
downgraded employment contract for the position of Second Officer
Held: Note: the petitioners failed to move for the reconsideration of with a lower monthly salary.
NLRC’s decision which warrants the outright dismissal of this case.
Certiorari will lie only if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy Respondents initially promised to make Serrano Chief Officer but did
and adequate remedy. In the case at bench, the plain and adequate not deliver. Hence, Serrano refused to stay on as second Officer and
remedy referred to is a motion for reconsideration. was repatriated to the Philippines on May 26, 1998, serving only two
(2) months and seven (7) days of his contract, leaving an unexpired
Petitioners asseverate that respondent NLRC committed a grave abuse portion of nine (9) months and twenty-three (23) days.
of discretion when it reversed the findings of facts of the Labor Arbiter
Serrano filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a Complaint against
Untenable respondents for constructive dismissal and for payment of his money
Firstly, errors of judgment, as distinguished from errors of jurisdiction, claims.
are not within the province of a special civil action for certiorari.
Secondly, a careful reading of the records of this case would readily The LA declared the petitioner’s dismissal illegal and awarded him an
show that there is any error by public respondent in its analysis of the amount representing his salary for three (3) months of the unexpired
facts and its evaluation of the evidence, it is not of such a degree as portion of the aforesaid contract of employment.
may be stigmatized as a grave abuse of discretion does not necessarily
follow just because there is a reversal by the NLRC of the decision of On appeal, the NLRC modified the LA decision and increased the award
the Labor Arbiter. Neither does the mere variance in the evidentiary to Serrano representing three (3) months’ salary. This decision was
assessment of the NLRC and that of the Labor Arbiter would, as a based on the provision of RA 8042, which was made into law on July
matter of course, so warrant another full review of the facts. The 15, 1995.
NLRCs decision, so long as it is not bereft of support from the records,
deserves respect from the Court. Serrano filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but this time he
questioned the constitutionality of the last clause in the 5th paragraph
Under the Labor Code, as amended, the requirements for the lawful of Section 10 of RA 8042, which reads:
dismissal of an employee by his employer are two-fold: the substantive
and the procedural. Not only must the dismissal be for a valid or Sec. 10. Money Claims. – x x x In case of termination of overseas
authorized cause as provided by law (Articles 282, 283 and 284, of the employment without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law
Labor Code, as amended), but the rudimentary requirements of due or contract, the workers shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of
process, basic of which are the opportunity to be heard and to defend his placement fee with interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum,
himself, must be observed before an employee may be dismissed. plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract
or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term,
Article 282 of the Labor Code, as amended, provides: whichever is less.
ART. 282. Termination by Employer.- An employer may terminate an The NLRC denied the Motion; hence, Serrano filed a Petition for
employment for any of the following causes: Certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA), reiterating the constitutional
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the challenge against the subject clause. The CA affirmed the NLRC ruling
lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his on the reduction of the applicable salary rate, but skirted the
work; constitutional issue raised by herein petitioner Serrano.
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him ISSUES:
by his employer or duly authorized representative;
(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the 1. Whether or not the subject clause violates Section 10, Article III of
person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his the Constitution on non-impairment of contracts;
duly authorized representative; and
(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing. (Italics supplied) 2. Whether or not the subject clause violate Section 1, Article III of the
Constitution, and Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII on
In the instant case, we find no difficulty in agreeing with the findings labor as a protected sector.
of the public respondent that the herein petitioners were guilty of acts
of dishonesty by incurring several occurrences of shortages in the HELD:
amounts of P15,353.78, P1,000.00, P450.00 and P70.00 which they On the first issue.
failed to turnover and account for/and in behalf of respondent Isetann.
From the foregoing premises, it is crystal clear that the failure of
The answer is in the negative. Petitioner’s claim that the subject clause subject clause has a discriminatory intent against, and an invidious
unduly interferes with the stipulations in his contract on the term of impact on, OFWs at two levels:
his employment and the fixed salary package he will receive is not
tenable. First, OFWs with employment contracts of less than one year vis-à-vis
OFWs with employment contracts of one year or more;
Section 10, Article III of the Constitution provides: No law impairing the
obligation of contracts shall be passed. Second, among OFWs with employment contracts of more than one
The non-impairment clause under Section 10, Article II is limited in year; and
application to laws about to be enacted that would in any way
derogate from existing acts or contracts by enlarging, abridging or in Third, OFWs vis-à-vis local workers with fixed-period employment;
any manner changing the intention of the parties thereto.
In sum, prior to R.A. No. 8042, OFWs and local workers with fixed-term
The enactment of R.A. No. 8042 in 1995 preceded the execution of the employment who were illegally discharged were treated alike in terms
employment contract between petitioner and respondents in 1998. of the computation of their money claims: they were uniformly
Hence, it cannot be argued that R.A. No. 8042, particularly the subject entitled to their salaries for the entire unexpired portions of their
clause, impaired the employment contract of the parties. Rather, when contracts. But with the enactment of R.A. No. 8042, specifically the
the parties executed their 1998 employment contract, they were adoption of the subject clause, illegally dismissed OFWs with an
deemed to have incorporated into it all the provisions of R.A. No. 8042. unexpired portion of one year or more in their employment contract
have since been differently treated in that their money claims are
But even if the Court were to disregard the timeline, the subject clause subject to a 3-month cap, whereas no such limitation is imposed on
may not be declared unconstitutional on the ground that it impinges local workers with fixed-term employment.
on the impairment clause, for the law was enacted in the exercise of
the police power of the State to regulate a business, profession or The Court concludes that the subject clause contains a suspect
calling, particularly the recruitment and deployment of OFWs, with the classification in that, in the computation of the monetary benefits of
noble end in view of ensuring respect for the dignity and well-being of fixed-term employees who are illegally discharged, it imposes a 3-
OFWs wherever they may be employed. month cap on the claim of OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year
or more in their contracts, but none on the claims of other OFWs or
On the second issue. local workers with fixed-term employment. The subject clause singles
The answer is in the affirmative. out one classification of OFWs and burdens it with a peculiar
disadvantage.
Section 1, Article III of the Constitution guarantees: No person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law nor There being a suspect classification involving a vulnerable sector
shall any person be denied the equal protection of the law. protected by the Constitution, the Court now subjects the
classification to a strict judicial scrutiny, and determines whether it
Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII accord all members of serves a compelling state interest through the least restrictive means.
the labor sector, without distinction as to place of deployment, full
protection of their rights and welfare. What constitutes compelling state interest is measured by the scale of
rights and powers arrayed in the Constitution and calibrated by
To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing history. It is akin to the paramount interest of the state for which some
constitutional provisions translate to economic security and parity: all individual liberties must give way, such as the public interest in
monetary benefits should be equally enjoyed by workers of similar safeguarding health or maintaining medical standards, or in
category, while all monetary obligations should be borne by them in maintaining access to information on matters of public concern.
equal degree; none should be denied the protection of the laws which
is enjoyed by, or spared the burden imposed on, others in like In the present case, the Court dug deep into the records but found no
circumstances. compelling state interest that the subject clause may possibly serve.

Such rights are not absolute but subject to the inherent power of In fine, the Government has failed to discharge its burden of proving
Congress to incorporate, when it sees fit, a system of classification into the existence of a compelling state interest that would justify the
its legislation; however, to be valid, the classification must comply with perpetuation of the discrimination against OFWs under the subject
these requirements: 1) it is based on substantial distinctions; 2) it is clause.
germane to the purposes of the law; 3) it is not limited to existing Assuming that, as advanced by the OSG, the purpose of the subject
conditions only; and 4) it applies equally to all members of the class. clause is to protect the employment of OFWs by mitigating the solidary
liability of placement agencies, such callous and cavalier rationale will
There are three levels of scrutiny at which the Court reviews the have to be rejected. There can never be a justification for any form of
constitutionality of a classification embodied in a law: a) the government action that alleviates the burden of one sector, but
deferential or rational basis scrutiny in which the challenged imposes the same burden on another sector, especially when the
classification needs only be shown to be rationally related to serving a favored sector is composed of private businesses such as placement
legitimate state interest; b) the middle-tier or intermediate scrutiny in agencies, while the disadvantaged sector is composed of OFWs whose
which the government must show that the challenged classification protection no less than the Constitution commands. The idea that
serves an important state interest and that the classification is at least private business interest can be elevated to the level of a compelling
substantially related to serving that interest; and c) strict judicial state interest is odious.
scrutiny in which a legislative classification which impermissibly
interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the Moreover, even if the purpose of the subject clause is to lessen the
peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed unconstitutional, solidary liability of placement agencies vis-a-vis their foreign principals,
and the burden is upon the government to prove that the classification there are mechanisms already in place that can be employed to
is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and that it is the achieve that purpose without infringing on the constitutional rights of
least restrictive means to protect such interest. OFWs.

Upon cursory reading, the subject clause appears facially neutral, for it The POEA Rules and Regulations Governing the Recruitment and
applies to all OFWs. However, a closer examination reveals that the Employment of Land-Based Overseas Workers, dated February 4,
2002, imposes administrative disciplinary measures on erring foreign clause "or for three months for every year of the unexpired term,
employers who default on their contractual obligations to migrant whichever is less" provided in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A.
workers and/or their Philippine agents. These disciplinary measures No. 8042.
range from temporary disqualification to preventive suspension. The
POEA Rules and Regulations Governing the Recruitment and Both parties filed their respective MRs which the CA denied. Thus, this
Employment of Seafarers, dated May 23, 2003, contains similar petition.
administrative disciplinary measures against erring foreign employers.
ISSUE:
Resort to these administrative measures is undoubtedly the less [1] Whether Section 10 of R.A. 8042, to the extent that it affords an
restrictive means of aiding local placement agencies in enforcing the illegally dismissed migrant worker the lesser benefit of "salaries for
solidary liability of their foreign principals. [the] unexpired portion of his employment contract for three (3)
months for every year of the unexpired term,whichever is less" is
Thus, the subject clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. constitutional;
8042 is violative of the right of petitioner and other OFWs to equal
protection. [2] Assuming that it is, whether the CA gravely erred in granting
petitioner only three (3) months backwages when his unexpired term
The subject clause “or for three months for every year of the unexpired of 9 months is far short of the "every year of the unexpired term"
term, whichever is less” in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of Republic threshold.
Act No. 8042 is DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
CLAUDIA S. YAP, Petitioner, v. THENAMARIS SHIPS MANAGEMENT HELD: The petition is impressed with merit.
and INTERMARE MARITIME AGENCIES, INC.,Respondents. We have previously declared that the clause "or for three months for
every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" is unconstitutional
FACTS: for being violative of the rights of (OFWs) to equal protection.
Moreover, the subject clause does not state any definitive
Petitioner was employed as an electrician of the vessel, M/T SEASCOUT governmental purpose, hence, it also violates petitioner's right to
by Intermare Maritime Agencies, Inc. in behalf of its principal, Vulture substantive due process.
Shipping Limited.The contract was for 12 months.On 23 August
2001,Yapboarded M/T SEASCOUT and commenced his job as Generally, an unconstitutional act is not a law. An exception to this is
electrician. However, on or about 08 November 2001, the vessel was the doctrine of operative fact applied when a declaration of
sold. unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who have
relied on the invalid law. This case should not be included in the
Yap received his seniority bonus, vacation bonus, extra bonus along exception. It was not the fault of petitioner that he lost his job due to
with the scrapping bonus.However, he insisted that he was entitled to an act of illegal dismissal committed by respondents.
the payment of the unexpired portion of his contract since he was
illegally dismissed from employment.He alleged that he opted for Also, we cannot subscribe to respondents postulation that the tanker
immediate transfer but none was made. allowance of US$130.00 should not be included in the computation of
the lump-sum salary. First, fair play, justice, and due process dictate
Respondents contended that Yap was not illegally dismissed.They that this Court cannot now, for the first time on appeal, pass upon this
further alleged that Yaps contract was validly terminated due to the question. Second, the allowance was encapsulated in the basic salary
sale of the vessel and no arrangement was made for Yaps transfer to clause.
Thenamaris other vessels. Meralco v. NLRC
G.R. No. 78763 July 12,1989, MEDIALDEA, J.
Thus, Yap brought the issue before the Labor Arbiter (LA) which ruled
that petitioner was illegally dismissed; that respondents acted in bad (Labor Standards: Proper Construction and Interpretation of labor
faith when they assured petitioner of re-embarkation but he was not Laws)
able to board; and that petitioner was entitled to his salaries for the
unexpired portion of his contract for a period of nine months FACTS
(US$12,870.00), P100,000 for moral damages, and P50,000 for Private resondent, Apolinario Signo was dismissed from work by
exemplary damages with 10% of the same for Attys fees. Meralco when it was found out that he breached the trust of thpe
company by making it appear that the residence of one applicant for
Respondents sought recourse from the NLRC which modified the an electric service is within the serviceable area of MEralco. The
award of salaries from that corresponding to nine months to only three applicant’s residence was installed with electrical services thru Signo’s
months (US$4,290.00) pursuant to Section 10 R.A. No. 8042. maneuver, however, due to the fault of the Power sales division, the
applicant-consumer was not billed for a year.
Respondents and petitioner both filed a Motion for Partial ISSUE
Reconsideration. Whether or not, the dismissal of Signo was a proper penalty for his
acts.
NLRC affirmed the finding of Illegal Dismissal and Bad Faith on the part RULING
of respondent. However, the NLRC reversed its earlier Decision, The Court affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter in finding that
holding that "there can be no choice to grant only 3 months salary for Dismissal was a drastic measure considering the length of service of to
every year of the unexpired term because there is no full year of the Company by Signo, which is 20 years, and the 2 awards he received
unexpired term which this can be applied." for honesty from the employer. He was ordered reinstated, thought
without backwages for he is not at all faultless.
Respondents filed an MR, which the NLRC denied. Undaunted, Further, it was held that in carrying out and interpreting the Labor
respondents filed a petition forcertiorariunder Rule 65 before the CA. Code's provisions and its implementing regulations, the workingman's
welfare should be the primordial and paramount consideration. This
The CA affirmed the findings and ruling of the LA and the NLRC. kind of interpretation gives meaning and substance to the liberal and
However, the CA ruled that the NLRC erred in sustaining the LAs compassionate spirit of the law as provided for in Article 4 of the New
interpretation of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042. The CA relied on the Labor Code which states that "all doubts in the implementation and
interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code including its complaint for lack of jurisdiction because the rule now is that the Civil
implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor" Service now covers only government-owned or controlled
BENJAMIN C. JUCO, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS corporations with original charters. Having been incorporated under
COMMISSION and NATIONAL HOUSING CORPORATION, respondents. the Corporation Law, its relations with its personnel are governed by
G.R. No. 98107 August 18, 1997 FACTS: Petitioner Benjamin C. Juco the Labor Code and come under the jurisdiction of the National Labor
was hired as project engineer of NHC (National Housing Corporation). Relations Commission. WHEREFORE, the decision of the NLRC in NLRC
On May 14, 1975, he was separated from the service for having been NCR-04-02036089 dated March 14, 1991 is hereby REVERSED and the
implicated in a crime of theft and/or malversation of public funds. Juco Decision of the Labor Arbiter dated May 21, 1990 is REINSTATED.
filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against NHC with the Department REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. COURT OF APPEALS and THE
of Labor. Labor Arbiter rendered a decision dismissing complaint on NATIONAL PARKS DEVELOPMENTSUPERVISORY ASSOCIATION &
the ground that NLRC had no jurisdiction over the case. Juco then THEIR MEMBERS
elevated the case to NLRC which rendered a decision reversing G.R. No. 87676. 20 December, 1989. First Division (Grino-Aquino, J.)
decision of Labor Arbiter. NHC appealed before this SC. Juco filed with Topic: Non-applicability of the Labor Code (Art. 6, LC)
CSC a complaint for illegal dismissal, with preliminary mandatory The Civil Service Law embraces all branches,subdivisions,
injunction. NHC moved for dismissal of complaint on the ground that instrumentalities and agencies of the Government, including GOCCs
CSC has no jurisdiction over case. CSC having no jurisdiction dismissed with original chapter, hence,employees thereof are civil service
the case. Subsequently, Juco filed with NLRC a complaint for illegal employees.
dismissal with prelim mandatory injunction. Labor Arbiter Manuel R. Facts
Caday rendered a decision declaring that Juco’s dismissal was illegal National Parks Development Committee (NPDC, for brevity) was
as there was evidence in the record that the criminal case against Juco originally created in 1963 under ExecutiveOrder No. 30, as the
was fabricated, prompting the trial court to dismiss the charges against Executive Committee for the development of Quezon Memorial,
him and ruled furthermore that Juco’s complaint filed was not Luneta and other nationalparks. The Committee was registered with
barred by prescription. NHC appealed before NLRC in which the the SEC as a non-stock and non-profit corporation.However, in 1987,
decision was later on reversed by the NLRC the decision of Labor due to failure to comply with SEC requirements (i.e. to submit General
Arbiter Caday on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. ISSUE Whether or Information Sheetand Financial Statements from 1981 to 1987; to
not, NLRC or CSC has jurisdiction over the case. HELD: The NLRC has register its Corporate Books; and to operate for a continuousperiod for
jurisdiction over the case. Article IX, Section 2 (1) of the 1987 at least 5 years since 1967) NPDC was attached to the Ministry of
Constitution provides: The civil service embraces all branches, Tourism. Pursuant thereto, CivilService Commission notified NPDC that
subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies of the Government, all appointments and other personnel actions shall be submitted to
including government owned and controlled corporations with original theformer.The Rizal Park Supervisory Employees Association was
charters. It was held in NASECO v NLRC that the Supreme Court organized, and it affiliated with the Trade Union of thePhilippines and
occasionally had to apply the present Constitution in deciding whether Allied Service (TUPAS, for brevity) under Certificate No. 1206.
or not the employees of NASECO are covered by the Civil Service Law However, NPDC entered into aseparate CBA with NPDCEA (TUPAS
or the Labor Code notwithstanding that the case arose at the time Local Chapter No. 967), and NPDCSA (TUPAS Chapter No. 1206) for
when the 1973 Constitution was still in effect. It was ruled that the aperiod of two (2) years. Pursuant thereto, these unions staged a strike
NLRC has jurisdiction over the employees of NASECO on the ground alleging unfair labor practices by NPDC.
that it is the 1987 Constitution that governs because it is the Contention of the NPDC:
Constitution in place at the time of the decision. Furthermore, the new The strike is illegal on ground that the strikers, being government
phrase "with original charter" means that government-owned and employees, thestrikers have no right to strike, although they may form
controlled corporations refer to corporations chartered by special law a union.
as distinguished from corporations organized under the Corporation Ruling of the Trial Court and CA:
Code. Thus, NASECO which had been organized under the general Complaint is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction,
incorporation statute and a subsidiary of the National Investment to wit:
Development Corporation, which in turn was a subsidiary of the (1) there exists anemployer-employee relationship between NPDC
Philippine National Bank, is excluded from the purview of the Civil and the strikers; (2) the acts complained of falls under par 5,Art. 217,
Service Commission. The National Housing Corporation is a in relation to Art. 265 of the Labor Code. Hence, the case properly falls
government owned corporation organized in 1959 in accordance with under the jurisdiction of DOLE.On appeal, CA affirmed the decision
Executive Order No. 399, otherwise known as the Uniform Charter of of the trial court.
Government Corporation, dated January 1, 1959. Its shares of stock Issue
are and have been one hundred percent (100%) owned by the WON the NPDC Employees are covered by the Civil Service Law.
Government from its incorporation under Act 1459, the former Ruling
corporation law. The government entities that own its shares of stock NPDC is a government agency, and its employees are covered by the
are the Government Service Insurance System, the Social Security Civil Service Rules and Regulations.Citing the case of
System, the Development Bank of the Philippines, the National Jesus P. Perlas vs. People of the Philippines (G.R. No. 84637-39)
Investment and Development Corporation and the People's Home site , NPDC remained under the Officeof the President despite an attempt
and Housing Corporation. Considering the fact that the NHA had been to transfer it to the Bureau of Forest Development, DENR in 1975.
incorporated under Act 1459, the former corporation law, it is but Further,since 1977 to 1981, the annual appropriations decrees listed
correct to say that it is a government-owned or controlled corporation NPDC as a regular government agency under theOffice of the
whose employees are subject to the provisions of the Labor Code. This President.Pursuant thereto, NPDC employees are allowed under the
observation is reiterated in the recent case of Trade Union of the 1987 Constitution to organize and join unions oftheir choice, that
Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) v. National Housing notwithstanding, there is as yet no law permitting them to strike.Anent
Corporation, where the Supreme Court held that the NHA is now the issue on WON the labor dispute is cognizable by DOLE, the Court
within the jurisdiction of the Department of Labor and Employment, it held that In case of a labor disputebetween the employees and the
being a government-owned and/or controlled corporation without an government,
original charter. Furthermore, it was also held that the workers or Section 15 of Executive Order No. 180
employees of the NHC (now NHA) undoubtedly have the right to form dated June 1, 1987 providesthat the Public Sector Labor- Management
unions or employee's organization and that there is no impediment to Council, not the Department of Labor and Employment, shall hearthe
the holding of a certification election among them as they are covered dispute.
by the Labor Code. Thus, the NLRC erred in dismissing petitioner's