REMEDIAL LAW REV. (ATTY. BRONDIAL) (3) Javellana is guilty of Forum Shopping?

RULES 7-10 Ruling

PARTS OF A PLEADING: Verification and Certification (RULE 7) (1) No, Priscilla’s submission is erroneous and cannot be sustained.

61. Alma Jose vs. Javellana First of all, the denial of Javellana’s motion for reconsideration left nothing more to be done by
the RTC because it confirmed the dismissal of Civil Case No. 79-M-97. It was clearly a final
Doctrine order, not an interlocutory one.
General Rule: The remedies of appeal and certiorari under Rule 65 are mutually exclusive and The test to ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is interlocutory or final is: does the
not alternative or cumulative. order or judgment leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the
case? If it does, the order or judgment is interlocutory; otherwise, it is final.
Exception: Where there is no danger of (1) multiplicity of suits upon one and the same cause of
action (appeal was for the continuity of first case and the petition for certiorari dealt with an Whether an order is final or interlocutory determines whether appeal is the correct remedy or
independent ground of alleged grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of not. A final order is appealable, to accord with the final judgment rule enunciated in Section 1,
jurisdiction on the part of the RTC) and (2) the unethical malpractice of shopping for a friendly Rule 41 of the Rules of Court to the effect that "appeal may be taken from a judgment or final
court or judge to ensure a favorable ruling or judgment after not getting it in the appeal. (appeal order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by
in this case not yet resolved) these Rules to be appealable; but the remedy from an interlocutory one is not an appeal but a
special civil action for certiorari.
Facts
An interlocutory order may be the subject of an appeal, but only after a judgment has been
Margarita Alma Jose sold in favor of respondent Javellana two parcels of land under a deed of rendered, with the ground for appealing the order being included in the appeal of the judgment
conditional sale. They agreed that the first installment shall be paid upon execution of the deed itself.
and that the second installment shall be paid upon registration of the title. The agreement also
provided that should Margarita be incapacitated by the time the land shall be registered, it is her (2) No, Javellana’s notice of appeal was timely filed pursuant to the fresh period rule.
son Juvenal and daughter Priscilla who would undertake to register the said land.
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to
Apparently, Margarita met her demise even before the registration of the said land and her son appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to
Juvenal, predeceased her without leaving any heir. Priscilla, now the sole surviving heir of file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing
Margarita, refused to comply with the agreement entered into by her mother and started a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.
introducing improvements to the land instead.
(3) No forum shopping was committed
Aggrieved, Javellana instituted a suit for specific performance, injunction and damages against
Prisicilla with the RTC. Forum shopping is the act of a party litigant against whom an adverse judgment has been
rendered in one forum seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in another forum, other
Priscilla filed a motion to dismiss raising prescription and failure to state a cause of action. Said than by appeal or the special civil action of certiorari, or the institution of two or more actions or
motion was initially denied but was eventually reversed after finding that Priscilla was not bound proceedings grounded on the same cause or supposition that one or the other court would make
to comply with the conditions set forth on an agreement wherein she was not a party. a favorable disposition. Forum shopping happens when, in the two or more pending cases, there
is identity of parties, identity of rights or causes of action, and identity of reliefs sought. Where
Javellana filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied. Thus, he filed a notice of appeal the elements of litis pendentia are present, and where a final judgment in one case will amount
and elevated the case to the CA. Pending the resolution of the said appeal, he likewise filed a to res judicata in the other, there is forum shopping.
petition for certiorari in the CA to assail the RTC orders dismissing his complaint. The CA ruled
against Javellana in his petition for certiorari but ruled in his favor in his notice of appeal. The unjustness exists because the appeal and the petition for certiorari actually sought different
objectives. In his appeal in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 68259, Javellana aimed to undo the RTC’s
Priscilla now questions the ruling of the CA contending that (1) the RTC order in her favor was erroneous dismissal of Civil Case No. 79-M-97 to clear the way for his judicial demand for
not appealable, (2) the notice of appeal had been filed belatedly by three days; and (3) Javellana specific performance to be tried and determined in due course by the RTC; but his petition for
was guilty of forum shopping for filing in the CA a petition for certiorari to assail the orders of the certiorari had the ostensible objective "to prevent (Priscilla) from developing the subject property
RTC that were the subject matter of his appeal pending in the CA. and from proceeding with the ejectment case until his appeal is finally resolved," as the CA
explicitly determined in its decision.
Issues
Nor were the dangers that the adoption of the judicial policy against forum shopping designed to
Whether or not
prevent or to eliminate attendant. The first danger, i.e., the multiplicity of suits upon one and the
(1) The RTC Order in favor of Priscilla was not appealable? same cause of action, would not materialize considering that the appeal was a continuity of Civil
Case No. 79-M-97, whereas C.A.-G.R. SP No. 60455 dealt with an independent ground of
(2) Javellana’s Notice of Appeal was filed out of time? alleged grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the
RTC. The second danger, i.e., the unethical malpractice of shopping for a friendly court or judge the CA, including the execution of a verification and certification against forum shopping therefor,
to ensure a favorable ruling or judgment after not getting it in the appeal, would not arise being acts necessary "to protect, sue, prosecute, defend and adopt whatever action necessary
because the CA had not yet decided C.A.-G.R. CV No. 68259 as of the filing of the petition for and proper" in relation to their rights over the subject properties.
certiorari.
Where the petitioners are immediate relatives, who share a common interest in the property
subject of the action, the fact that only one of the petitioners executed the verification or
certification of forum shopping will not deter the court from proceeding with the action.

The general rule is that the certificate of non-forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs
in a case and the signature of only one of them is insufficient. However, the Court has also
stressed that the rules on forum shopping were designed to promote and facilitate the orderly
administration of justice and thus should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to
62. Medado vs. Heirs of Antonio Consuing subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective. The rule of substantial compliance may be
availed of with respect to the contents of the certification. This is because the requirement of
Doctrine strict compliance with the provisions regarding the certification of non-forum shopping merely
underscores its mandatory nature in that the certification cannot be altogether dispensed with or
Facts its requirements completely disregarded. Thus, under justifiable circumstances, the Court has
relaxed the rule requiring the submission of such certification considering that although it is
Spouses Medado and Estate of consuming executed a Deed of Sale with assumption of obligatory, it is not jurisdictional.
Mortgage of property. Apparently, Spouses Medado failed to assume the estate’s loan with PNB.
Thus, the estate of Consuing offered them said lots to the government. Furthermore, we have consistently held that verification of a pleading is a formal, not a
jurisdictional, requirement intended to secure the assurance that the matters alleged in a
The Estate of Consuing instituted with the RTC an action for rescission and damages against pleading are true and correct. Thus, the court may simply order the correction of unverified
Spouses Medado for failure to comply with the condition of their agreement. pleadings or act on them and waive strict compliance with the rules. It is deemed substantially
complied with when one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the
Pending the said case, Land Bank issued in favor of the Estate of Consuing a certificate of complaint or petition signs the verification; and when matters alleged in the petition have been
deposit of cash as compensation for the lots. Spouses Medado filed an action for injunction to made in good faith or are true and correct.
restrain LBP from releasing the remaining amount of the VOS proceeds of the lots offered by the
Estate of Consing, and restraining the Estate of Consing from receiving these proceeds; and writ (2) Yes. there is forum shopping when the elements of litis pendentia are present, i.e., between
of mandatory injunction to compel LBP to release the remaining amount of the VOS to the actions pending before courts, there exist: (1) identity of parties, or at least such parties as
spouses. represent the same interests in both actions, (2) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for,
the relief being founded on the same facts, and (3) the identity of the two preceding particulars is
RTC granted the Injunction sought by Spousesw Medado and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful,
was issued. The writ was implemented 1 day before the hearing for the motion for amount to res judicata in the action under consideration; said requisites are also constitutive of
reconsideration filed by the heirs of Consuing. the requisites for auter action pendant or lis pendens.
The heirs of Consuing questioned the RTC’s order via a petition for certiorari with the CA raising Applying the foregoing, there was clearly a violation of the rule against forum shopping when
litis pendentia and forum shopping. The CA reversed the RTC’s order. Spouses Medado now Spouses Medado instituted Civil Case No. 797-C for injunction notwithstanding the pendency of
questions, among other matters, the authority of Soledad to sign the petition's certification of Civil Case No. 00-11320 for rescission of contract and damages.
non-forum shopping on behalf of her co-petitioners.
Civil Case No. 91-2069 actually involves an action for specific performance; it thus upholds the
Issues contract and assumes its validity. Civil Case No. 91-2192, on the other hand, is for the
nullification of the contract on the grounds of fraud and vitiated consent. While ostensibly the
Whether or not
cause of action in one is opposite to that in the other, in the final analysis, what is being
(1) the CA correctly admitted the petition for certiorari filed before it, notwithstanding alleged determined is the validity of the contract. Thus, the identity of rights asserted cannot be disputed.
deficiencies in its verification and certification against forum shopping? Howsoever viewed, it is beyond cavil that regardless of the decision that would be promulgated
in Civil Case No. 91-2069, the same would constitute res judicata on Civil Case No. 91-2192
(2) the rule against forum shopping was violated by the filing of the complaint for injunction and vice versa.
during the pendency of the action for rescission and damages?

Ruling

(1)Yes. Records show that Soledad signed the verification and certification against forum
shopping on behalf of her co-petitioners by virtue of a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) attached
to the petition filed with the CA. The authority of Soledad includes the filing of an appeal before
63. G.R. No. 172623 March 3, 2010 record to prove such authority. Atty. Tiu did not even bother to controvert Paler’s allegation of his
lack of authority. This renders the petition dismissible.
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, represented herein by its Secretary HON. ARTURO L.
TIU, Petitioner,
vs.
CELSO M. PALER,1 Respondent.

DOCTRINE: The established rule is that the certification of non-forum shopping must be
executed by the plaintiff or any of the principal parties and not by counsel.

FACTS: Celso M. Paler was a supervising legislative officer of the Commission on Appoints. He
filed a request for a vacation leave lasting for 74 working days, which was favorably
recommended by his immediate supervisor, the director of the Technical Support Service. By
virtue of this favorable recommendation, he went to the United States. Thereafter, the
Commission Chairman informed Paler that he was being dropped from the roll of employees due
to continuous absence without leave effective on indicated date on the letter.

Paler moved for reconsideration but was denied for being filed beyond the 15-day reglementary
period. Paler later appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC). The CSC reversed and set
aside the decision of the Commission Chairman. The Commission filed a motion for
reconsideration but it was denied by the CSC.

The Commissioner then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review under Rule 43. The
CA affirmed the decision of the CSC. A motion for reconsideration was also denied by the CA.
Hence, the Commissioner elevated the matter to the Supreme Court by a petition for review
under Rule 45.

In his comment, Paler questioned the authority of the Commission Secretary, Atty. Tiu, to file the
petition and sign the verification and certification of non-forum shopping in behalf of the
Commission Chairman.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Commission Secretary has the authority to sign the certification of
non-forum shopping in behalf of the Commission Chairman.

HELD: No, the Commission Secretary has no authority to sign certification of non-forum
shopping in behalf of the Commission Chairman.

With regard, however, to the certification of non-forum shopping, the established rule is that it
must be executed by the plaintiff or any of the principal parties and not by counsel.20 In this
case, Atty. Tiu failed to show that he was specifically authorized by the Chairman to sign the
certification of non-forum shopping, much less file the petition in his behalf. There is nothing on
64. G.R. Nos. 174365-66 February 4, 2015 petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense, as in this
case, the signature of only one of them in the certification against forum shopping substantially
ROMEO BASAN, DANILO DIZON, JAIME L. TUMABIAO, JR., ROBERTO DELA RAMA, JR., complies with the certification requirement. Thus, the fact that the petition was signed only by
RICKY S. NICOLAS, CRISPULO D. DONOR, GALO FALGUERA, and NATIONAL LABOR petitioner Basan does not necessarily result in its outright dismissal for it is more in accord with
RELATIONS COMMISSION, Petitioners, substantial justice to overlook petitioners’ procedural lapses. Indeed, the application of technical
vs. rules of procedure may be relaxed in labor cases to serve the demand of justice.
COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES,* Respondent.

DOCTRINE: The rule on verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has
ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the
verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true
and correct.

FACTS: The petitioners Basan et al., who were working as route helpers, filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal with money claims against respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, alleging
that respondent dismissed them without just cause and prior written notice required by law.

The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of petitioners and found that since they were performing
activities necessary and desirable to the usual business of petitioner for more than the period for
regularization, petitioners are considered as regular employees, and thus, their dismissal was
done contrary to law in the absence of just cause and prior written notice. The NLRC affirmed
the Labor Arbiter’s decision. Coca-cola then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA alleging
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC in finding that petitioners were regular
employees. The CA reserved the ruling of the NLRC. The petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration but was thereafter denied. Hence, this petition with the Supreme Court by way of
a petition for review under Rule 45.

Coca-cola contended in its comment that the petition should be denied due course for its
verification and certification of non-forum shopping was signed by only one of the petitioners.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition should be given due course even though its verification and
certification of non-forum shopping was signed by only one of the petitioners

HELD: Yes, the petition should be given due course.

We hold that while the general rule is that the verification and certification of non-forum shopping
must be signed by all the petitioners in a case, the signature of only one of them, petitioner
Basan in this case, appearing thereon may be deemed substantial compliance with the
procedural requirement. Jurisprudence is replete with rulings that the rule on verification is
deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of
the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the
petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct. Similarly, this Court has
consistently held that when under reasonable or justifiable circumstances, as when all the
65. Uy v. CA (G.R. No. 173186, September 16, 2015; Jardeleza, J.;3rd Division) absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective or the goal of all rules
of procedure which is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as possible."
Doctrine: As the general rule, non-compliance or a defect in the certification is not curable by its
subsequent submission or correction. However, there are cases where the Court exercised A certification against forum shopping is a peculiar and personal responsibility of the party, an
leniency and relaxed the rules on the ground of substantial compliance, the presence of special assurance given to the court or other tribunal that there are no other pending cases involving
circumstances or compelling reasons. basically the same parties, issues and causes of action. It must be executed by the party-
pleader, not by his counsel. If, however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-pleader
Facts: is unable to sign, he must execute a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) designating his counsel of
record to sign on his behalf.
a. Carmencita Naval-Sai acquired ownership of parcel of land from her brother. The land
was later subdivided into to two. Lot 1 was sold to Adil on installment basis. Adil failed Here, the original complaint contained a proper verification and certification against forum
to pay the amortization, forcing him to sell his unfinished building on the property to shopping duly signed by Carmencita as plaintiff. The verification and certification in the amended
spouses Omandac. complaint, on the other hand, was only signed by her counsel, Atty. Ela. However, Atty. Ela was
not authorized to sign on behalf of Carmencita Naval-Sai, as in fact, she assigned one Rodolfo
Florentino as agent. The court find, however, that the cautionary move found by the CA as the
reason for its substantial compliance is ineffectual because under the Rules of Civil Procedure,
b. Meanwhile, Carmencita borrowed money from Aniceto Uy and secured the 2 lots to
an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. For all intents and purposes,
guaranteed the payment of the loan. Thereafter, Carmencita learned that Ancenito Uy
therefore, the original complaint and its verification and certification ceased to exist. This,
filed a case for recovery of possession against the spouses Omandac before the RTC
notwithstanding, that in this case the Court find there was still substantial compliance with the
in Kidapawan City. RTC ruled in favor of Aniceto.
Rules.

c. Carmencita filed a Complaint for Annulment of Deed with Damages before the same
court of RTC in Kidapawan City against Anecito Uy on the ground that her signature in
the purported deed of sale was a forgery. Thereafter, Carmencita filed an amended
complaint and asserted that the subjects TCTs of the lots were already cancelled by
virtue of the deed of sale. Unlike the original complaint, however, the Amended
Complaint was not signed by Carmencita, but by her counsel.

d. Anecito in his answer raised special and affirmative defenses of, among others, non-
compliance with the requisite certification of non-forum shopping. He asserted that the
jurisdiction has never been acquired over the parties and the subject matter because
the certification against forum shoppping in the Amended Complaint was defective, for
having been merely signed by Carmencita’s counsel. The RTC dismissed the case.

e. CA set aside the order of the RTC and ruled that there was substantial compliance
with the requirement of verification and certification of non-forum shopping.

Issue: Whether or not to dismiss a petition on the ground that the certification was signed only by
counsel.

Ruling:

No. There was substantial compliance with the requirements on certification against forum
shopping. The Court find that the prima facie merits of the case serve as a special circumstance
or a compelling reason to relax the rules on certification against forum shopping.

As the general rule, non-compliance or a defect in the certification is not curable by its
subsequent submission or correction. However, there are cases where the Court exercised
leniency and relaxed the rules on the ground of substantial compliance, the presence of special
circumstances or compelling reasons. The rules on forum-shopping are designed to promote
and facilitate the orderly administration of justice and "should not be interpreted with such
66. Bandillon vs. La Filipina Uygonco Corporation (G.R. No. 202446, September 16, 2015, 2) As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not necessarily render
Peralta, J.; 3rd Division) the pleading fatally defective. The court may order its submission or correction or act on the
pleading if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rule may be
Facts: dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be served thereby.

a. A complaint was filed before the DOLE Region VI for violation of labor standard laws 3) Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge to
against the respondent La Filipina Uygongco Corporation (LFUC) by the petitioners swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and when
Bandillon, et. al., the truck drivers and employees of the respondent. matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct.

4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein,

unlike in verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or correction thereof,
b. The Regional Director of DOLE – VI found that there was no violation made by the unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of "substantial compliance" or presence of
respondent. The DOLE Secretary overturned the order of the DOLE-VI Regional "special circumstances or compelling reasons."
Director. The CA affirmed the decision of the DOLE Secretary. The case was
elevated to the SC but the same was dismissed and attained finality of judgment. 5) The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a
Thereafter, an entry of judgment was issued. case; otherwise, those who did not sign will be dropped as parties to the case. Under reasonable
or justifiable circumstances, however, as when all the plaintiffs or petitioners share a common
interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense, the signature of only one of
them in the certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the Rule.
c. The employees filed a motion for execution to enforce the DOLE Secretary decision.
The DOLE Region VI then issued a Writ of Execution, but LFUC filed a petition for 6) Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the party-pleader, not
certiorari and injunction with the CA to set aside the writ of execution. by his counsel. If, however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party- pleader is unable to
sign, he must execute a Special Power of Attorney designating his counsel of record to sign on
d. The CA rendered its decision remanding the case to DOLE VI Regional Director for re-
his behalf, x x x
computation of awards and reception of evidence of the parties on the ground that the
former arrived on its computation without any evidence from the parties. The
employees filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA's decision but the same was While Payda alone signed, per the SPA, the petition is neither invalid nor defective as LFUC
deniend. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari filed by the employees. alleges because, as for the verification requirement, Payda signed as one who has "ample
knowledge to swear to the truth of the petition's allegations," being himself a petitioner and the
employees' union president who personally knows the story and facts of the case; and as for the
e. Respondent LFUC alleges that several of the concerned employees did not sign the certification against forum shopping, Payda, as a co-employee of his co-petitioners, "shares a
Special Power of Attorney authorizing their union president and co-petitioner, Ronaldo common interest and invokes a common cause of action or defense" as the rest and, as their
C. Payda, to file petition, and to sign the verification and certification against forum attorney-in-fact tasked to initiate the action, he himself has the knowledge of whether or not he
shopping for such purpose, which allegedly rendered the said petition defective. has initiated similar actions or proceedings in different courts or agencies. Both already satisfy
the guidelines' requirements on when a lone signature of a petitioner substantially complies with
Issue: Whether or not the petition shall be dismissed on the ground that several employees the requirements for a valid verification and certification against forum shopping.
concerned did not sign the SPA authorizing their union president and co-petitioner Payda to file
the petition and to sign the verification and certification against forum shopping.

Ruling:

No. The Court held that Payda's lone signature and the SPA signed by most of the petitioners
already substantially comply with the requirements for a properly and validly filed petition.

Indeed, Payda alone signed the verification and certification against forum shopping - as the
person authorized in the SPA to do so - but instead of rendering the petition defective or invalid,
as it has previously ruled in Altres, et at. v. Empleo, et al. regards the same as already in
substantial compliance with the rules. In that case, it was held that in certain instances, the
signature of even just one person out of many petitioners in the verification and certification
against forum shopping can be deemed as enough to meet the requirements of the rules. In
sum, the Court laid down the guidelines as follows:

1) A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the requirement on or submission

of defective verification, and non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of defective
certification against forum shopping.
67. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs JESUS ARROJADO  The Court issued an En Banc Resolution, dated January 14, 2014 which amended
B.M. No. 1922 by repealing the phrase “Failure to disclose the required information
GR No. 207041 ; 9 NOVEMBER 2015 would cause the dismissal of the case and the expunction of the pleadings from the
records” and replacing it with “Failure to disclose the required information would
subject the counsel to appropriate penalty and disciplinary action.”
 Under the amendatory Resolution, the failure of a lawyer to indicate in his or her
 In light of the amendment, while the same was not yet in effect at the time the subject
pleadings the number and date of issue of his or her Mandatory Continuing Legal
information was filed, the more prudent and practical thing that the trial court should
Education (MCLE) Certificate of Compliance will no longer result in the dismissal of
have done was not to dismiss the Information but to simply require the investigating
the case and expunction of the pleadings from the records. Nonetheless, such failure
prosecutor to indicate therein the number and date of issue of her MCLE Certificate of
will subject the lawyer to the prescribed fine and/or disciplinary action.
Compliance.

Facts:

 This case involves an information which charged respondent, Arrojado, with the crime
of murder.

 Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the information on the ground that the
investigating prosecutor failed to indicate the number and date of issue of her
Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Certificate of Compliance, as required by BM
No 1922.

 Petitioner filed its opposition to the motion contending that the information sought to
be dismissed is sufficient in form and substance; the lack of proof of MCLE
compliance by the prosecutor who prepared and signed the information should not
prejudice the interest of the state and that an administrative edict cannot prevail over
substantive or procedural law by imposing additional requirements for sufficiency of
criminal information.

 RTC of Roxas City issued an order dismissing the information without prejudice.

 Respondent filed a petition for certiorari and/or mandamus assailing RTC order.

Issue:

WON the court erred in dismissing the Information for failure to indicate MCLE compliance
number and date

Held:

 No.

 Since the trial court’s dismissal of the subject Information was based on a clear and
categorical provision of a rule issued by this Court, the court a quo could not have
committed a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment nor did it exercise its
discretion in an arbitrary or despotic manner.

 Court agrees with the CA that the dismissal of the Information, without prejudice, did
not leave the prosecution without any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy. To
avoid undue delay in the disposition of the subject criminal case and to uphold the
parties’ respective rights to a speedy disposition of their case could have simply refiled
the information containing the required number and date of issue of MCLE.
68. POWERHOUSE STAFFBUILDERS INTERNATIONAL, INC. vs ROMELIA REY, ET AL.  In this case, the verification and certification attached to the petition before the CA was
signed by William C. Go, the President and General Manager of Powerhouse, one of
GR No. 190203 ; 7 NOVEMBER 2016 the officers enumerated in the foregoing recognized exception. While the petition was
not accompanied by a Secretary’s Certificate, his authority was ratified by the Board in
 The following officials or employees of the company can sign the verification and its Resolution adopted on October 24, 2007. Thus, even if he was not authorized to
certification without need of a board resolution: (1) the Chairperson of the Board of execute the Verification and Certification at the time of the filing of the Petition, the
Directors; (2) the President of a corporation; (3) the General Manager or Acting ratification by the board of directors retroactively confirms and affirms his authority and
General Manager; (4) Personnel Officer; and (5) an Employment Specialist in a labor gives us more reason to uphold that authority.
case.
 Nonetheless, petition must fail as the SC is not a trier of facts and the petitioner, in the
Facts:
guise of raising novel questions of law, is in reality seeking a review of the factual
findings.
 This case involves a complaint for illegal dismissal filed by respondents against
Powerhouse.

 Powerhouse hired respondents as operators for its Taiwan-based principal, Catcher

Technical Co., for a duration of 2 years.
69. HEIRS OF JOSEFINA GABRIEL VS. SECUNDINA CEBRERO, CELSO LAVINA AND
 8 months after their employment, respondents were informed that their working days MANUEL C. CHUA
would be reduced due to low orders and financial difficulties. A month after, G.R. NO. 222737 NOVEMBER 12, 2018
respondents were repatriated to the Philippines. Respondents filed complaints for
illegal dismissal against Powerhouse and Catcher. Doctrine: As to verification, non-compliance or a defect does not necessarily render the pleading
fatally defective. The court may order its submission or correction or act on the pleading if the
 Powerhouse maintained that respondents voluntarily gave up their jobs following their attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rule may be dispensed with in
rejection of Catcher’s proposal to reduce working days. order that the ends of justice may be served thereby. As to certification against forum shopping,
non-compliance therewith or a defect is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or
 Powerhouse moved to implead JRJ International as respondent on account of correction, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of “substantial compliance” or
alleged transfer of Catcher’s accreditation. Granted. presence of “special circumstances or compelling reasons”.
 LA held that respondents were illegally dismissed. The certification against forum shopping must be executed by the party-pleader, not by his
counsel. If, however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is unable to sign, he
 NLRC affirmed LA decision with modifications, absolving JEJ from liability as it was
must execute a Special Power of Attorney designating his counsel of record to sign on his
not privy to respondents’ deployment.
behalf.
 Powerhouse elevated matter to CA via petition for certiorari imputing grave abuse of Facts:SegundinaCebrero through her atty-in-fact RemediosMuyot, executed a real estate
discretion on part of NLRC mortgage over a property in Sampaloc Manila registered under the name of Cebrero’s late
husband VirgilioCebrero as security for the payment of P8M pursuant to an amicable settlement
 CA dismissed the petition for failure to comply with the 60-day period within which to
entered into by the parties in the case of annulment of revocation of donation. In said settlement,
file a petition for certiorari, and for its failure to comply with the requirements of
Josefina Gabriel recognized Cebrero’s absolute ownership of the property and relinquished all
certificate of forum shopping in its petition.
her claims over the property in consideration of the said P8M. Upon Cebrero’s failure to pay the
Issue: amount within the period, Gabriel filed an action for foreclosure. RTC ruled in her favor and
ordered Cebrero to pay the P8M.
WON Powerhouse substantially complied with the requirements of verification and certification
against forum shopping The sheriff initiated the proceedings and later on issued the Final Deed of Sale when Cebrero
failed to redeem the property. However, Gabriel had not registered the Final Deed of Sale since
Held: she disputed BIR’s estate tax assessment on the property. It was also during this time that she
discovered the registration of Absolute Sale executed by Celso Lavina, Cebrero’satty-in-fact,
 Yes purportedly conveying the entire property in favor of Progressive Trade & Services Enterprises
for and in consideration of P27M.
 In previous cases, we held that the following officials or employees of the company
can sign the verification and certification without need of a board resolution: (1) the Eduardo Caniza allegedly in behalf of Gabriel instituted a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of
Chairperson of the Board of Directors; (2) the President of a corporation; (3) the Sale and of TCT under Progressive, represented by its President and Chairman Manuel C.
General Manager or Acting General Manager; (4) Personnel Officer; and (5) an Chua.
Employment Specialist in a labor case.
In their Answer, respondents allege that Gabriel has no legal capacity to sue as she was
bedridden and confined at Makati Medical Center. The Complaint should be dismissed because
Caniza signed the verification and certification of the complaint without proper authority. Gabriel
died during the pendency of the case thus her heirs substituted her.

RTC ruled in favor of Gabriel holding the Deed of Absolute Sale and TCT null and void. On
appeal, CA reverse and set aside the decision of the RTC on the ground that there was no
Special Power of Attorney (SPA) attached to the complaint to substantiate Caniza’s authority to
sign the complaint and its verification and certification of non-forum shopping.

Issue: W/N CA erred when it reversed the decision of the RTC on the sole basis of mere
technicality that the verification and certification of non-forum shopping was not supported with
the Special Power of Attorney of Eduardo Caniza

Ruling:No.
ROC provides that the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the plaintiff or
principal party. The reason for this is that the plaintiff or the principal knows better than anyone,
whether a petition has previously been filed involving the same case or substantially the same
issues. If, for any reason, the principal party cannot sign the petition, the one signing on his
behalf must have been duly authorized.

The complaint filed before the RTC was filed in the name of Gabriel, however, it was Caniza who
executed the verification and certification of forum shopping alleging that he was Gabriel’s atty-
in-fact.

It was held that when an SPA was constituted precisely to authorize the agent to file and
prosecute suits on behalf of the principal, then it is such agent who has actual and personal
knowledge whether he or she has initiated similar actions or proceedings before various courts
on the same issue on the principal’s behalf.

However, there was no duly executed SPA appended to the complaint to prove Caniza’s
supposed authority to file and prosecute suits on behalf of Gabriel. The Court expounded that
the complaint filed for and in behalf of the plaintiff by one who is unauthorized to do so is not
deemed filed. An unauthorized complaint does not produce any legal effect. Hence, the court
should dismiss the complaint on the ground that it has no jurisdiction over the complaint and the
plaintiff.
C. ALLEGATIONS IN PLEADINGS (RULE 8) Issue: W/N CA committed an error in affirming the RTC by relying on the allegations in the
complaint for rescission

Ruling: Yes.
70. FERNANDO MEDICAL ENTERPRISES, INC. VS. WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY
PHILIPPINES, INC. WUP expressly admitted paragraphs no. 2, 3, 4, 5, 9 and 10 of the complaint. The admission
G.R. NO. 207970 related to the petitioner’s allegations on: (a) the four transactions for the delivery and installation
of various hospital equipment; (b) the total liability of the respondent; (c) the payments made by
Doctrine: The essential query in resolving a motion for judgment on the pleadings is whether or the respondents; (d) the balance still due to the petitioner; and (e) the execution of the February
not there are issues of fact generated by the pleadings. Whether issues of fact exist in a case or 11, 2009 agreement. The admission of the various agreements, especially the February 11,
not depends on how the defending party’s answer has dealt with the ultimate facts alleged in the 2009 agreement, significantly admitted the FME’s complaint. To recall, FME’s cause of action
complaint. The defending party’s answer either admits or denies the allegations of ultimate facts was based on the February 11, 2009 agreement, which was the actionable document in the
in the complaint or other initiatory pleading. The allegations of ultimate facts the answer admit, case. The complaint properly alleged the substance of the February 11, 2009 agreement, and
being undisputed, will not require evidence to establish the truth of such facts, but the allegations contained a copy thereof as an annex. Upon the express admission of the genuineness and due
of ultimate facts the answer properly denies, being disputed, will require evidence. execution of the February 11, 2009 agreement, judgment on the pleadings became proper.
Facts: Fernando Medical Enterprises Inc. delivered to and installed medical equipment and There is no need for proof of execution and authenticity with respect to documents the
supplies at the Wesleyan University Philippines, Inc.’s hospital under four contracts of different genuineness and due execution of which are admitted by the adverse party. With the
dates. According to FME, WUP only paid P67,357,683.23 of its total obligation of consequent admission engendered by petitioners’ failure to properly deny the Acknowledgment
P123,901,650.00, leaving unpaid sum of P54,654,195.54. However, FME represented by Rafael in their Answer, coupled with its proper authentication, identification and offer by the respondent,
Fernando and WUP represented by Guillermo Maglaya Sr., eneterd into an agreement whereby not to mention petitioners’ admissions in paragraphs 4 to 6 of their Answer that they are indeed
the former agreed to reduce its claim to only P50,400,000.00 and allowed the latter to pay the indebted to respondent, the Court believes that judgment may be had solely on the document,
adjusted obligation on installment basis within 36 months. and there is no need to present receipts and other documents to prove the claimed
indebtedness. The Acknowledgment, just as an ordinary acknowledgment receipt, is valid and
3 months later, WUP informed FME that its new administration had reviewed the contracts and binding between the parties who executed it, as a document evidencing the loan agreement they
found the same defective and rescissible due to economic prejudice or lesion; and that it was had entered into. The absence of rebutting evidence occasioned by petitioners’ waiver of their
consequently declining to recognize said agreement because of lack of approval by its Board of right to present evidence renders the Acknowledgment as the best evidence of the transactions
Trustees and for having been signed by Malaya whose term of office had expired. between the parties and the consequential indebtedness incurred. Indeed, the effect of the
admission is such that a prima facie case is made for the plaintiff which dispenses with the
FME sent a demand letter to WUP. Due to WUP’s failure to pay as demanded, FME filed its
necessity of evidence on his part and entitled him to a judgment on the pleadings unless a
complaint for sum of money in the RTC. WUP moved to dismiss the complaint on the following
special defense of new matter, such as payment, is interposed by the defendant.
grounds: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant; (b) improper venue; (c) litis
pendentia; and (d) forum shopping. In support of the ground of litis pendentia, it stated that it had WUp denied paragraphs no. 6, 7 and 8 of the complaint "for lack of knowledge or information
earlier filed a complaint for the rescission of the four contracts and of the February 11, 2009 sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity thereof, inasmuch as the alleged transactions
agreement in the RTC in Cabanatuan City; and that the resolution of that case would be were undertaken during the term of office of the past officers of defendant Wesleyan University-
determinative of FME’s action for collection. Philippines." The manner of denial is not effective as a specific denial because Paragraph no. 6
alleged that the WUP’s total obligation as of February 15, 2009 was P123,901,650.00, but its
After the RTC denied the motion to dismiss WUP filed its answer. It admitted paragraph nos.
balance thereafter became only P54,654,195.54 because it had since then paid P67,357,683.23
2,3,4 and 5 subject to the special and affirmative defenses pleaded, it denied paragraph nos.
to FME. Paragraph no. 7 stated that FME had agreed with WUP on February 11, 2009 to reduce
6,7, and 8 for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity
the balance to only P50,400,000.00, which the WUP would pay in 36 months through 36
thereof inasmuch as the alleged transactions were undertaken during the term of office of the
postdated checks of P1,400,000.00 each, which WUP then issued for the purpose. Paragraph
past officers of WUP, it admitted paragraph nos. 9 and 10 subject to the special and affirmative
no. 8 averred that after four of the checks totalling P5,600,000.00 were paid WUP stopped
defenses pleaded, and denied paragraph nos. 11 and 12 for being conclusions of law.
payment of the rest, rendering the entire obligation due and demandable pursuant to the
FME filed its reply to the answer and a Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings stating that February 11, 2009 agreement. Considering that paragraphs no. 6, 7 and 8 of the complaint
WUP had admitted the material allegations of its complaint and thus did not tender any issue as averred matters that WUP ought to know or could have easily known, the answer did not
to such allegations. WUP opposed the motion arguing that it had specifically denied the material specifically deny such material averments. It is settled that denials based on lack of knowledge
allegations. or information of matters clearly known to the pleader, or ought to be known to it, or could have
easily been known by it are insufficient, and constitute ineffective or sham denials.
RTC denied the motion on the ground that the allegations stated therein are evidentiary in
nature. The case was set for pre-trial considering that the issues had been joined. On certiorari,
CA ruled that WUP’s special and affirmative defenses are not of such character to avoid FME’s
claim. It affirmed RTC’s ruling and further noted that that a judgment on the pleadings would be
improper because the outstanding balance due to FME remained to be an issue in the face of
the allegations of WUP in its complaint for rescission in the RTC in Cabanatuan City.
71. GO TONG ELECTRICAL SUPPLY CO., INC. AND GEORGE C. GO, Petitioners, v. BPI o that at the time it was signed it was in words and figures exactly as set out
FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, INC., SUBSTITUTED BY PHILIPPINE INVESTMENT ONE [SPV- in the pleading of the party relying upon it
AMC], INC.,* Respondent.
o that the document was delivered
DOCTRINE
o that any formalities required by law, such as a seal, an acknowledgment, or
In order to deny the genuineness and due execution of an actionable document, the defendant revenue stamp, which it lacks, are waived by him; and
must declare under oath that he did not sign the document or that it is otherwise false or
fabricated and he must set forth what he claims to be the facts. o it effectively eliminated any defense relating to the authenticity and
due execution of the document, e.g., that the document was spurious,
The mere statement in their Answer that they "specifically deny" the pertinent allegations of the counterfeit, or of different import on its face as the one executed by the
Complaint does not constitute an effective specific denial parties; or that the signatures appearing thereon were forgeries; or that the
signatures were unauthorized
FACTS

 Go Tong Electrical had applied for and was granted financial assistance in the
principal amount of P40,491,051.65 by DBS Bank (BPI’s predecessor in interest)
secured by a promissory note and a comprehensive security agreement

 Upon default of petitioners, BPI demanded payment from petitioners, but to no avail
hence, BPI filed an action for collection of sum of money with the RTC of Makati

 In their Answer with Counterclaim, petitioners merely stated that they "specifically
deny" the allegations under the complaint. Of particular note is their denial of the
execution of the loan agreement, the PN, and the CSA for being self-serving and pure
conclusions intended to suit [respondent's] purposes.

 RTC ruled in favor of respondent, thereby ordering petitioners to jointly and severally
pay the former. The CA sustained the RTC's ruling in toto

ISSUE

WON the CA erred in upholding the RTC ruling

HELD

 NO. The CA is correct in holding that since petitioners, in their Answer, did not deny
under oath the genuineness and due execution of the PN and CSA, they are deemed
admitted under Section 8, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court.

 A reading of the Answer shows that petitioners failed to specifically deny the execution
of the Credit Agreement, PN, and CSA under the auspices of the above-quoted rule

 The mere statement in paragraph 4 of their Answer, i.e., that they "specifically deny"
the pertinent allegations of the Complaint "for being self-serving and pure conclusions
intended to suit plaintiffs purposes," does not constitute an effective specific denial as
contemplated by law.

 In order to deny the genuineness and due execution of an actionable document, the
defendant must declare under oath that he did not sign the document or that it is
otherwise false or fabricated and he must set forth what he claims to be the
facts.

 Admission of the genuineness and due execution of a document means:

o That the party whose signature it bears admits that he voluntarily signed the
document or it was signed by another for him and with his authority
72. BENGUET EXPLORATION, INC.,, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS, SWITZERLAND  It is equally true, however, that execution can only refer to the actual making and
GENERAL INSURANCE, CO., LTD., and SEAWOOD SHIPPING, INC., Respondents. delivery. It cannot preclude a defendant from introducing any defense on the merits
which does not contradict the execution of the instrument introduced in evidence.
DOCTRINE
 In this case, respondents presented evidence which casts doubt on the veracity of
When the law makes use of the phrase 'genuineness and due execution of the instrument' it these documents. Export Declaration No. 1131/85, prepared by petitioner, states that
means nothing more than that the instrument is not spurious, counterfeit, or of different import on the load had a gross weight of 2,050 wet metric tons. On the other hand, a report
its face from the one executed prepared by a disinterested third party showed a total of 2,451.630 wet metric tons
FACTS  Considering the discrepancies in the various documents showing the actual amount of
copper concentrates loaded and transported to Japan, whatever presumption of
 Petitioner Benguet filed separate complaints for damages against Seawood Shipping,
regularity in the transactions that might have risen from the genuineness and due
Inc. and Switzerland General Insurance, Co., Ltd. with the RTC of Makati. The two
execution of the Bill of Lading, Certificate of Weight, Certificate of Loading, and Mate's
cases were consolidated
Receipt was successfully rebutted by the evidence presented by respondent
 Switzerland Insurance filed a third-party complaint against Seawood Shipping, praying Switzerland Insurance which showed disparities in the actual weight of the cargo
that the latter be ordered to indemnify it for whatever might be adjudged against it in transported
favor of petitioner.

 Seawood Shipping was chartered by petitioner Benguet to transport copper

concentrates. The bill of lading stated that the cargo, consisting of 2,243.496 wet
metric tons of copper concentrates, was loaded on board and insured by Switzerland.
When the cargo was unloaded in Japan, however, Rogelio Lumibao, Benguet’s
employee, received a report stating that the cargo was 355 metric tons short of the
amount stated in the bill of lading.

 Benguet made a claim of the loss to Seawood Shipping and Switzerland Insurance
and made a formal demand for the value of the loss. As both Seawood Shipping and
Switzerland Insurance refused the demand, petitioner Benguet brought these cases
against Seawood Shipping and Switzerland Insurance.

 The RTC dismissed the complaint. The CA affirmed

 Petitioner contends that the genuineness and due execution of the documents
presented, i.e., Bill of Lading, Certificate of Loading, Certificate of Weight, Mate's
Receipt, were properly established by the testimony of its witness, and that as a result,
there is a prima facie presumption that their contents are true.

ISSUE

WON the CA erred in affirming the RTC

HELD

 NO. The admission of the due execution and genuineness of a document simply
means that "the party whose signature it bears admits that he signed it or that it was
signed by another for him with his authority; that at the time it was signed it was in
words and figures exactly as set out in the pleading of the party relying upon it; that
the document was delivered; and that any formal requisites required by law, such as a
seal, an acknowledgment, or revenue stamp, which it lacks, are waived by him.

 When the law makes use of the phrase 'genuineness and due execution of the
instrument' it means nothing more than that the instrument is not spurious, counterfeit,
or of different import on its face from the one executed
73. ASIAN CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. CA otherwise, would assert in another action, thus preventing multiplicity of suits. All the rights of the
parties concerned would then be adjudicated in one proceeding. This is a rule of procedure and
does not create a substantial right. Neither does it abridge, enlarge, or nullify the substantial
rights of any litigant. This right to file a third-party complaint against a third-party rests in the
DOCTRINE: The third-party complaint does not have to show with certainty that there will discretion of the trial court. The third-party complaint is actually independent of, separate and
be recovery against the third-party defendant, and it is sufficient that pleadings show possibility distinct from the plaintiff’s complaint, such that were it not for the rule, it would have to be filed
of recovery. separately from the original complaint.
A third-party complaint must allege facts which prima facie show that the The defendant may implead another as third-party defendant (a) on an allegation of
defendant is entitled to contribution, indemnity, subrogation or other relief from the third-party liability of the latter to the defendant for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief;
defendant. (b) on the ground of direct liability of the third-party defendant to the plaintiff; or (c) the liability of
the third-party defendant to both the plaintiff and the defendant. There must be a causal
connection between the claim of the plaintiff in his complaint and a claim for contribution,
FACTS: Monark (MEC) filed a complaint for sum of money with damages against Asian indemnity or other relief of the defendant against the third-party defendant.
Construction (ACDC), alleging that ACDC leased Caterpillar generator sets and Amida mobile
The third-party complaint does not have to show with certainty that there will be
floodlighting systems from MEC, but failed, despite demands, to pay the rentals therefor; that
recovery against the third-party defendant, and it is sufficient that pleadings show possibility of
various equipment from MEC were leased by ACDC for the latter’s power plant; and, that ACDC
recovery. In determining the sufficiency of the third-party complaint, the allegations in the original
also purchased and took custody of various equipment parts from MEC, which, despite
complaint and the third-party complaint must be examined. A third-party complaint must allege
demands, MEC failed to pay.
facts which prima facie show that the defendant is entitled to contribution, indemnity, subrogation
ACDC filed a motion to file and admit answer with third-party complaint against Becthel or other relief from the third-party defendant.
Overseas Corporation (Becthel). In its answer, ACDC admitted its indebtedness to MEC, but
In this case, the claims of the MEC against ACDC arose out of the contracts of lease
alleged the following special and affirmative defenses: that Becthel incurred an obligation with
and sale; such transactions are different and separate from those between Becthel and the
ACDC and refused to pay the overdue obligation; and that the equipment covered by the lease
ACDC as third-party plaintiff for the construction of the latter’s. The controversy between the
were all used in Becthel’s construction project.
ACDC and MEC on one hand, and that between the ACDC and Becthel on the other, are thus
MEC opposed the motion of ACDC to file a third-party complaint against Becthel on the ground entirely distinct from each other. There is no showing in the proposed third-party complaint that
that ACDC had already admitted its principal obligation to MEC; that the transaction between the MEC knew or approved the use of the leased equipment by the ACDC for the said project.
MEC and ACDC on one hand, and between ACDC and Becthel on the other, were independent Becthel cannot invoke any defense the ACDC had or may have against the claims of the MEC in
transactions. its complaint, because ACDC had admitted its liabilities to the MEC for the amount of
P5,075,335.86. The barefaced fact that the ACDC used the equipment it leased from MEC in
In addition, MEC filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging that there was no genuine issue connection with its project with Becthel does not provide a substantive basis for the filing of a
as to ACDC’s obligation to MEC. ACDC opposed the motion, alleging that there was a genuine third-party complaint against the latter. There is no causal connection between the claim of MEC
issue with respect to the amount being claimed by MEC, and that it had a third-party complaint for the rental and the balance of the purchase price of the equipment and parts sold and leased
against Becthel in connection with the reliefs sought against it which had to be litigated. In its to the ACDC, and the failure of Becthel to pay the balance of its account to ACDC after the
reply, MEC alleged that the demand of ACDC in its special and affirmative defenses partook the completion of the project.
nature of a negative pregnant, and that there was a need for the hearing on its claim for
damages.

RTC denied the motion of ACDC for leave to file a third-party complaint, and granted the motion
of MEC (which the RTC considered as a motion for a judgment on the pleadings). It ordered
ACDC to pay MEC the amount alleged.

CA affirmed the ruling, adding that since MEC prayed for judgment on the pleadings, it waived
its claim for damages other than the amount alleged; hence, there was no longer a genuine
issue to be resolved by the court. It also held that the transaction between ACDC and Becthel
did not arise out of the same transaction on which MEC’s claim was based.

ISSUE: Whether or not the third-party complaint should prosper

HELD: NO, the Supreme Court explained that the purpose of Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules
of Court is to permit a defendant to assert an independent claim against a third-party which he,
D. EFFECT OF FAILURE TO PLEAD (RULE 9) appear, then the plaintiff is allowed to present his evidence ex parte and the court shall render
judgment based on the evidence presented. Thus, the plaintiff is given the privilege to present
Waiver of defenses and objections; Default his evidence without objection from the defendant, the likelihood being that the court will decide
in favor of the plaintiff, the defendant having forfeited the opportunity to rebut or present its own
74. SALVADOR vs. RABAJA evidence.
DOCTRINE: Failure to attend the pre-trial conference does not result in the default of an There is no dispute that Spouses Salvador and their counsel failed to attend the pre-trial
absent party. Under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a defendant is only declared in default if conference set on February 4, 2005 despite proper notice. Spouses Salvador aver that their
he fails to file his Answer within the reglementary period. non-attendance was due to the fault of their counsel as he forgot to update his calendar. This
excuse smacks of carelessness, and indifference to the pre-trial stage. It simply cannot be
FACTS: The spouses Rolando and Herminia Salvador entered into a contract to sell
considered as a justifiable excuse by the Court. As a result of their inattentiveness, Spouses
agreement for a property with spouses Rogelio and Elizabeth Rabaja. Rosario Gonzales acts as
Salvador could no longer present any evidence in their favor. Spouses Rabaja, as plaintiffs,
Salvador’s agent. As such agent, Gonzales received the Rabajas’ payments to the Savadors.
were properly allowed by the RTC to present evidence ex parte against Spouses Salvador as
The payments have already reached 950,000 pesos but the Salvadors stated that they never
defendants. Considering that Gonzales as co-defendant was able to attend the pre-trial
received such payments, which eventually led the Rabajas to stop their payment. By reason of
conference, she was allowed to present her evidence. The RTC could only render judgment
the stoppage of the payment, the Salvadors gave to the Rabajas a notice to vacate the property
based on the evidence presented during the trial.
for non-payment of rentals. They also filed an ejectment suit against the Rabajas. The Rabajas
in turn filed an action for rescission of contract against the Salvadors.

The MeTC ruled in favor of Spouses Salvador finding that valid grounds existed for the eviction
of Spouses Rabaja from the subject property and ordering them to pay back rentals. Spouses
Rabaja appealed to the Regional Trial Court, which reversed the MeTC ruling in its March 1,
2005 decision. The CA ruled in favor of Spouses Salvador and reinstated the MeTC ruling
ejecting Spouses Rabaja. Not having been appealed, the CA decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 89259
became final and executory on May 12, 2006. Spouses Rabaja demanded the rescission of the
contract to sell praying that the amount of P950,000.00 they previously paid to Spouses
Salvador be returned to them. They likewise prayed that damages be awarded due to the
contractual breach committed by Spouses Salvador.

The pre-trial conference began but attempts to amicably settle the case were unsuccessful. It
was formally reset to February 4, 2005, but Spouses Salvador and their counsel failed to attend.
Consequently, the RTC issued the pre-trial order declaring Spouses Salvador in default and
allowing Spouses Rabaja to present their evidence ex parte against Spouses Salvador and
Gonzales to present evidence in her favor.

ISSUE: Whether or not Spouses Salvador can be declared in default for failure of their counsel
to attend the pre-trial.

Whether or not the allowance of the lower court to the Spouses Rabaja to present
their evidence ex parte was valid

HELD: The Supreme Court held that the failure to attend the pre-trial conference does not
result in the default of an absent party. Under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a defendant is
only declared in default if he fails to file his Answer within the reglementary period. On the other
hand, if a defendant fails to attend the pre-trial conference, the plaintiff can present his evidence
ex parte.

The Court further explained that “Failure to file a responsive pleading within
the reglementary period, and not failure to appear at the hearing, is the sole ground for an order
of default, except the failure to appear at a pre-trial conference wherein the effects of a default
on the part of the defendant are followed, that is, the plaintiff shall be allowed to present
evidence ex parte and a judgment based thereon may be rendered against defendant.” From the
foregoing, the failure of a party to appear at the pre-trial has indeed adverse consequences. If
the absent party is the plaintiff, then his case shall be dismissed. If it is the defendant who fails to
74. SALVADOR vs. RABAJA foregoing, the failure of a party to appear at the pre-trial has indeed adverse consequences. If
the absent party is the plaintiff, then his case shall be dismissed. If it is the defendant who fails to
appear, then the plaintiff is allowed to present his evidence ex parte and the court shall render
judgment based on the evidence presented. Thus, the plaintiff is given the privilege to present
DOCTRINE: Failure to attend the pre-trial conference does not result in the default of an his evidence without objection from the defendant, the likelihood being that the court will decide
absent party. Under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a defendant is only declared in default if in favor of the plaintiff, the defendant having forfeited the opportunity to rebut or present its own
he fails to file his Answer within the reglementary period. evidence.

There is no dispute that Spouses Salvador and their counsel failed to attend the pre-trial
conference set on February 4, 2005 despite proper notice. Spouses Salvador aver that their
FACTS: The spouses Rolando and Herminia Salvador entered into a contract to sell
non-attendance was due to the fault of their counsel as he forgot to update his calendar. This
agreement for a property with spouses Rogelio and Elizabeth Rabaja. Rosario Gonzales acts as
excuse smacks of carelessness, and indifference to the pre-trial stage. It simply cannot be
Salvador’s agent. As such agent, Gonzales received the Rabajas’ payments to the Savadors.
considered as a justifiable excuse by the Court. As a result of their inattentiveness, Spouses
The payments have already reached 950,000 pesos but the Salvadors stated that they never
Salvador could no longer present any evidence in their favor. Spouses Rabaja, as plaintiffs,
received such payments, which eventually led the Rabajas to stop their payment. By reason of
were properly allowed by the RTC to present evidence ex parte against Spouses Salvador as
the stoppage of the payment, the Salvadors gave to the Rabajas a notice to vacate the property
defendants. Considering that Gonzales as co-defendant was able to attend the pre-trial
for non-payment of rentals. They also filed an ejectment suit against the Rabajas. The Rabajas
conference, she was allowed to present her evidence. The RTC could only render judgment
in turn filed an action for rescission of contract against the Salvadors.
based on the evidence presented during the trial.
The MeTC ruled in favor of Spouses Salvador finding that valid grounds existed for the eviction
of Spouses Rabaja from the subject property and ordering them to pay back rentals. Spouses
Rabaja appealed to the Regional Trial Court, which reversed the MeTC ruling in its March 1,
2005 decision. The CA ruled in favor of Spouses Salvador and reinstated the MeTC ruling
ejecting Spouses Rabaja. Not having been appealed, the CA decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 89259
became final and executory on May 12, 2006. Spouses Rabaja demanded the rescission of the
contract to sell praying that the amount of P950,000.00 they previously paid to Spouses
Salvador be returned to them. They likewise prayed that damages be awarded due to the
contractual breach committed by Spouses Salvador.

The pre-trial conference began but attempts to amicably settle the case were unsuccessful. It
was formally reset to February 4, 2005, but Spouses Salvador and their counsel failed to attend.
Consequently, the RTC issued the pre-trial order declaring Spouses Salvador in default and
allowing Spouses Rabaja to present their evidence ex parte against Spouses Salvador and
Gonzales to present evidence in her favor.

ISSUE: Whether or not Spouses Salvador can be declared in default for failure of their counsel
to attend the pre-trial.

Whether or not the allowance of the lower court to the Spouses Rabaja to present
their evidence ex parte was valid

HELD: The Supreme Court held that the failure to attend the pre-trial conference
does not result in the default of an absent party. Under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a
defendant is only declared in default if he fails to file his Answer within the reglementary period.
On the other hand, if a defendant fails to attend the pre-trial conference, the plaintiff can present
his evidence ex parte.

The Court further explained that “Failure to file a responsive pleading within
the reglementary period, and not failure to appear at the hearing, is the sole ground for an order
of default, except the failure to appear at a pre-trial conference wherein the effects of a default
on the part of the defendant are followed, that is, the plaintiff shall be allowed to present
evidence ex parte and a judgment based thereon may be rendered against defendant.” From the
75. BANCO DE ORO-EPCI V TANSIPEK, G.R. NO. 181235 JULY 22, 2009 On 18 August 2006, the Court of Appeals issued the assailed Decision finding that it was an
error for the trial court to have acted on PCIBs motion to declare respondent Tansipek in default.
DOCTRINE: Law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal. The Court of Appeals thus remanded the case to the RTC for further proceedings.
More specifically, it means that whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal
rule of decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case, The Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration of PCIB in a Resolution dated 9
whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was January 2008.
predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS CAN REVERSE ITS DECISION
FACTS: J. O. Construction, Inc. (JOCI), a domestic corporation engaged in the construction HANDED DOWN EIGHT YEARS BEFORE
business in Cebu City, filed a complaint against PCIB in the RTC of Makati City. The Complaint
alleges that JOCI entered into a contract with Duty Free Philippines, Inc. for the construction of a
Duty Free Shop in Mandaue City. As actual construction went on, progress billings were made.
HELD: The court held stated that it cannot reverse its decision and furthermore stating that the
Payments were received by JOCI directly or through John Tansipek (Tansipek), its authorized
collector. Payments received by respondent Tansipek were initially remitted to JOCI. However, dismissal of the Petition for Certiorari assailing the denial of respondent Tansipeks Motion
payment through a PNB Check in the amount of P4,050,136.51 was not turned over to JOCI. constitutes a bar to the retrial of the same issue of default under the doctrine of the law of the
Instead, respondent Tansipek endorsed said check and deposited the same to his account in case.
PCIB, Greenhills, Metro Manila. PCIB allowed the said deposit, despite the fact that the check
was crossed for the deposit to payees account only, and despite the alleged lack of authority of
respondent Tansipek to endorse said check. PCIB refused to pay JOCI the full amount of the In People v. Pinuila,[9] we held that:
check despite demands made by the latter. JOCI prayed for the payment of the amount of the
check (P4,050,136.51), P500,000.00 in attorneys fees, P100,000.00 in expenses, P50,000.00
for costs of suit, and P500,000.00 in exemplary damages.
Law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal. More specifically,
PCIB filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint on the grounds that (1) an indispensable party was it means that whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule of decision
not impleaded, and (2) therein plaintiff JOCI had no cause of action against PCIB. The RTC between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct
denied PCIBs Motion to Dismiss. on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated
continue to be the facts of the case before the court.
PCIB filed its answer alleging as defenses that (1) JOCI had clothed Tansipek with authority to
act as its agent, and was therefore estopped from denying the same; (2) JOCI had no cause of
action against PCIB ; (3) failure to implead Tansipek rendered the proceedings taken after the
filing of the complaint void; (4) PCIBs act of accepting the deposit was fully justified by It may be stated as a rule of general application that, where the evidence on a second or
established bank practices; (5) JOCIs claim was barred by laches; and (6) the damages alleged succeeding appeal is substantially the same as that on the first or preceding appeal, all matters,
by JOCI were hypothetical and speculative. PCIB incorporated in said Answer its counterclaims questions, points, or issues adjudicated on the prior appeal are the law of the case on all
for exemplary damages in the amount of P400,000.00, and litigation expenses and attorneys subsequent appeals and will not be considered or readjudicated therein.
fees in the amount of P400,000.00.

PCIB likewise moved for leave of court to admit the former’s third-party complaint against
respondent Tansipek, alleging that Tansipek was a depositor at its Wilson Branch, San Juan. As a general rule a decision on a prior appeal of the same case is held to be the law of the case
Tansipek had presented to PCIB a signed copy of the Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of whether that decision is right or wrong, the remedy of the party deeming himself aggrieved being
Directors of JOCI stating that the checks payable to JOCI may be deposited to the account to seek a rehearing.
under their name maintained at PCIBank.

PCIB filed a Motion to Admit Amended Third-Party Complaint against Tansipek. The amendment
Questions necessarily involved in the decision on a former appeal will be regarded as the law of
consisted in the correction of the caption, so that PCIB appeared as Third-Party Plaintiff and
the case on a subsequent appeal, although the questions are not expressly treated in the
Tansipek as Third-Party Defendant.
opinion of the court, as the presumption is that all the facts in the case bearing on the point
Upon Motion, respondent Tansipek was granted time to file his Answer to the Third-Party decided have received due consideration whether all or none of them are mentioned in the
Complaint. He was, however, declared in default for failure to do so. The Motion to Reconsider opinion.
the Default Order was denied.

Tansipek filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals assailing the Default Order and
the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration. The Petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
47727. On 29 May 1998, the Court of Appeals dismissed the Petition for failure to attach the
assailed Orders. On 28 September 1998, the Court of Appeals denied respondent Tansipek's
Motion for Reconsideration for having been filed out of time.
76. BITTE v JONAS, G.R. NO. 212256, December 9, 2015 The rule is that “right to appeal from the judgment by default is not lost and can be done on
grounds that the amount of judgment is excessive or is different in kind from that prayed for, or
that the plaintiff failed to prove the material allegations of his complaint, or that the decision is
contrary to law.” If a party who has been declared in default on the basis of the decision having
DOCTRINE: Right to appeal from the judgment by default is not lost and can be done on been issued against the evidence or the law, that person cannot be denied the remedy and
grounds that the amount of judgment is excessive or is different in kind from that prayed for, or opportunity to assail the judgment in the appellate court. Despite being burdened by the
that the plaintiff failed to prove the material allegations of his complaint, or that the decision is circumstances of default, the petitioners may still use all other remedies available to question not
contrary to law. only the judgment of default but also the judgment on appeal before this Court. Those remedies
necessarily include an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

FACTS: In 1985, Rose Elsa Jonas authorized her mother Andrea Serrano thru SPA, to sell a
property located in Davao City. The property was mortgaged to Mindanao Development Bank
(MDB). In 1996, Cipriano Serrano (brother of Elsa Jonas, son of Andrea) offered the property for
sale to Spouses Bitte. In the same year, Jonas revoked the SPA. After the final negotiation, Elsa
Jonas withdrew from the transaction. Spouses Bitte filed a Complaint for Specific Performance
against Jonas, Andrea, and Cipriano to transfer the title over the property. In 1998, while the
case is pending, Andrea executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of Spouses Bitte. MDB
foreclosed the property for failure to pay the loan. Spouses Bitte were able to redeem the
property, then sold the same to Spouses Yap. In 1999, Spouses Jonas also filed a complaint for
Annulment of Deed of Absolute Sale against Spouses Bitte.

The two cases were consolidated in 2001. Spouses Bitte failed to attend the pre-trial. The
counsel for Spouses Bitte withdrew and a new one entered his appearance and filed a verified
motion for reconsideration. Spouses Bitte once again failed to appear in the pre-trial and were,
thus, declared non-suited. Jonas then presented her evidence her ex parte.

RTC ruled that the sale was valid and directed the Spouses Bitte to pay the balance. The CA
reversed the decision, and rendered the deed of sale null and void.

Spouses Jonas called the attention of the Court and contended that since the RTC has declared
the Spouses Bitte in default, they have already lost the legal personality to resort to this petition
before this Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Spouses Bitte have already lost the legal personality to resort to this
petition before this Court, as they were declared in default by the RTC.

HELD: No. Spouses Jonas claim that the door to any reliefs for Spouses Bitte, be it through the
motion for reconsideration or this subject petition, was closed by the finality and immutability of
the RTC declaration of their default. In other words, it is their stand that the petitioners do not
have the right to obtain recourse from this Court.

Spouses Jonas are mistaken.

D. FILING AND SERVICE OF PLEADINGS AND OTHE PAPERS (RULE 13) 78. LISAM ENTERPRISES, INC represented by LOLITA SORIANO vs BANCO DE ORO
UNIBANK INC, ET AL
77. Yujuico vs. United Resources Asset Management (G.R. No. 211113, June 29, 2015,
Perez, J; 1st Division) GR No. 143264 ; 23 April 2012

Facts: Amendments are generally favored.

a. STRADEC is a domestic corporation operating as a business development and  A responsive pleading having been filed, amendments to the complaint may,
invesmtent company. Several stockholders of STRADEC, including petitioner Yujuico therefore, be made only by leave of court and no longer as a matter of right.
executed Pledge Agreements whereby they pledged certain amount of their stocks in
favor of the Respondent United Resources Asset Management, Inc. (URAMI) to  Due to the changes made by the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, amendments may
secure the loan obligations of STRADEC. now substantially alter the cause of action or defense.

b. STRADEC had not been able to comply with its payment obligations to URAMI. In Facts:
2004, Yujuico filed before RTC Pasig City an injunction complaint to enjoin the sale of
public auction on the ground that Atty. Nethercott’s lack of authority to represent  This case involves a Complaint for Annulment of mortgage with prayer for TRO and PI
URAMI for any purpose. RTC did not act upon the complaint, and the public auction with damages filed by petitioners against respondents.
pushed through. RTC issued a writ of preliminary injuction preventing URAMI from
appropriating the stocks it purchased from sale  Petitioner Lolita Soriano alleged that she is a stockholder of Lisam Enterprises Inc and
a member of its Board of Directors, designated as Corporate Secretary.
c. More than a year later, Urami filed a motion for leave to file an answer. In its answer,
URAMI admitted that the auction was void and that it never authorized Atty. Nethercott  Petitioners also alleged that defendants Soriano falsified a board resolution and
to cause the sale thereof. Yujuico filed a motion for summary judgment since there is executed a real estate mortgage above the LEI’s property in favor of PCIB.
no longer any genuine issue left by reason of URAMI’s admission. The resolution was
 RTC issued a TRO then, after hearing, issued a writ of PI enjoining PCIB, now BDO,
deferred because of a TRO issued by the court.
from proceeding with the auction sale of subject property.
d. In 2009, URAMI changed counsel and subsequently filed an amended answer with
compulsory counterclaim with the RTC. URAMI still vouched for the dismissal of the  BDO filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of lack of legal capacity to sue, failure to
injunction complaint but reneged from its previous admissions under the original state cause of action, and litis pendencia.
answer. URAMI claimed that the auction sale was valid and that it duly authorized
 RTC dismissed petitioner’s complaint.
Atty. Nethercott to initiate such sale on its behalf.
 Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration. While waiting for the resolution of said
Issue: Whether or not the amended answer may be allowed even if it was filed more than a year
motion, petitioners also filed a Motion to Admit Amended Complaint amending
after the original answer has been submitted.
paragraph 13.
Ruling:
 RTC denied both the MR and the Motion to admit Amended Complaint holding that no
Yes. Rules of procedure allow a party in a civil action to amend his pleading as a matter of right, new argument had been raised by petitioners in their MR and that the Amended
so long as the pleading is amended only once and before a responsive pleading is served. Complaint can no longer be admitted because it absolutely changed petitioners’ cause
Otherwise, a party can only amend his pleading upon prior leave of court. of action.

Bona fide amendments to pleadings should be allowed in the interest of justice so that every Issue:
case may, so far as possible, be determined on its real facts and the multiplicity of suits thus be
WON petitioners’ amended complaint, filed after the order of dismissal but before its finality,
prevented. Hence, as long as it does not appear that the motion for leave was made with bad
should have been admitted by the court.
faith or with intent to delay the proceedings, courts are justified to grant leave and allow the filing
of an amended pleading. Once a court grants leave to file an amended pleading, the same Held:
becomes binding and will not be disturbed on appeal unless it appears that the court had
abused its discretion.  No.
Here, the mere fact that URAMI filed its motion for leave more than 2 years after the original  Lilian S. Soriano and the Estate of Leandro A. Soriano, Jr. already filed their Answer,
answer is also not reason enough in itself to discredit the amended answer as a sheer dilatory to petitioners’ complaint, and the claims being asserted were made against said
measure. Readily observable from the established facts is that the perceived delay between the parties. A responsive pleading having been filed, amendments to the complaint may,
filing of the motion for leave and the filing of the original answer is not purely attributable to therefore, be made only by leave of court and no longer as a matter of right.
URAMI. It must be remembered that some time after the original answer was filed, the Court
issued a temporary restraining order. Thus, even if it wanted to, URAMI really could not have  Amendments are generally favored, it would have been more fitting for the trial court
filed a motion for leave to file amended answer sooner than it already had. to extend such liberality towards petitioners by admitting the amended complaint
 which was filed before the order dismissing the original complaint became final and 79. G.R. No. 172623 March 3, 2010
executory. It is quite apparent that since trial proper had not yet even begun, allowing
the amendment would not have caused any delay. Moreover, doing so would have COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, represented herein by its Secretary HON. ARTURO L.
served the higher interest of justice as this would provide the best opportunity for the TIU, Petitioner,
issues among all parties to be thoroughly threshed out and the rights of all parties vs.
finally determined. CELSO M. PALER,1 Respondent.

 Hence, the Court overrules the trial court’s denial of the motion to admit the amended DOCTRINE: The established rule is that the certification of non-forum shopping must be
complaint, and orders the admission of the same. executed by the plaintiff or any of the principal parties and not by counsel.

 The requisites for filing a derivative suit are as follows: (a) the party bringing the suit
should be a shareholder as of time of the act or transaction complained of; (b) he has
FACTS: Celso M. Paler was a supervising legislative officer of the Commission on Appoints. He
tried to exhaust intra-corporate remedies; (c) the cause of action actually devolves on
filed a request for a vacation leave lasting for 74 working days, which was favorably
the corporation, the harm having been or being caused to the corporation and not to
recommended by his immediate supervisor, the director of the Technical Support Service. By
the particular stockholder bringing the suit.
virtue of this favorable recommendation, he went to the United States. Thereafter, the
 A reading of the amended complaint will reveal that all the foregoing requisites had Commission Chairman informed Paler that he was being dropped from the roll of employees due
been alleged therein. Hence, the amended complaint remedied the defect in the to continuous absence without leave effective on indicated date on the letter.
original complaint and now sufficiently states a cause of action.
Paler moved for reconsideration but was denied for being filed beyond the 15-day reglementary
period. Paler later appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC). The CSC reversed and set
 As to the contention of BDO that admitting the amended complaint after they pointed
aside the decision of the Commission Chairman. The Commission filed a motion for
out a defect in the original would be unfair to them, the Court held that they should
reconsideration but it was denied by the CSC.
have been well aware that due to changes by 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
amendments may now substantially alter the cause of action or defense. The Commissioner then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review under Rule 43. The
CA affirmed the decision of the CSC. A motion for reconsideration was also denied by the CA.
 It should not have been a surprise to them that petitioners would redress the defect in
Hence, the Commissioner elevated the matter to the Supreme Court by a petition for review
the original complaint by substantially amending the same, which course of action is
under Rule 45.
now allowed under the new rules.
In his comment, Paler questioned the authority of the Commission Secretary, Atty. Tiu, to file the
petition and sign the verification and certification of non-forum shopping in behalf of the
Issue as to forum shopping Commission Chairman.

 No forum shopping

 The Court also struck down the argument that there was forum shopping, ruling that ISSUE: Whether or not the Commission Secretary has the authority to sign the certification of
the issue of recovery of corporate assets and funds pending with the SEC is a totally non-forum shopping in behalf of the Commission Chairman.
different issue from the issue of the validity of the sale, so a decision in the SEC case
would not amount to res judicata in the case before the regular court. Thus, the Court
merely ordered the suspension of the proceedings before the RTC until the final HELD: No, the Commission Secretary has no authority to sign certification of non-forum
outcome of the SEC case. shopping in behalf of the Commission Chairman.

 There can also be no forum shopping, because there is no identity of issues. The With regard, however, to the certification of non-forum shopping, the established rule is that it
issue being threshed out in the SEC case is the due execution, authenticity or validity must be executed by the plaintiff or any of the principal parties and not by counsel.20 In this
of board resolutions and other documents used to facilitate the execution of the case, Atty. Tiu failed to show that he was specifically authorized by the Chairman to sign the
mortgage, while the issue in the case filed by petitioners with the RTC is the validity of certification of non-forum shopping, much less file the petition in his behalf. There is nothing on
the mortgage itself executed between the bank and the corporation, purportedly record to prove such authority. Atty. Tiu did not even bother to controvert Paler’s allegation of his
represented by the spouses Leandro and Lilian Soriano, the President and Treasurer lack of authority. This renders the petition dismissible.
of petitioner LEI, respectively.
80. Remington vs. CA 81. GEORGE PIDLIP P. PALILEO and JOSE DE LA CRUZ, Petitioners,
vs.
Doctrine PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK, Respondent.

Where some but not all the defendants have answered, the plaintiff may still amend its complaint DOCTRINE
once, as a matter of right, in respect to claims asserted solely against the non-answering
defendant, but not as to claims asserted against the other defendants. Service and filing of pleadings by courier service is a mode not provided in the Rules.

FACTS

Facts  In June 15, 2006, the RTC of General Santos rendered a decision in favor of George
Palileo et.al, as against Planters Dev Bank. Planters received a copy of the decision
Remington filed a complaint for sum of money and damages arising from breach of contract on July 17, 2006.
against Industrial Steels Ferro Trading as principal defendant and British Steel as Alternative
defendant. Industrial Steel and British Steel separately moved for the dismissal of the case  On July 31, 2006, PDB filed by private courier service – specifically LBC – an
raising failure to state a cause of action. Said motions were denied by the trial court. Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for New Trial, arguing therein that the trial
court’s Decision was based on speculation and inadmissible and selfserving pieces of
Industrial Steel filed its answer while British Steel filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition evidence
before the CA claiming that complainant failed to show that it had committed any act or
omission. The said complaint merely averred that British Steel and Ferro were just mere  Petitioners’ copy of the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for New Trial was
suppliers of Industrial Steel. likewise sent on July 31, 2006 by courier service through LBC, but in their address of
record – Tupi, South Cotabato – there was no LBC service at the time.
Remington now seeks to amend its complaint in order to state a cause of action against British
Steel. Remington maintains that it can amend the complaint as a matter of right because  On August 2, 2006, PDB filed with the RTC another copy of the Omnibus Motion for
respondent has not yet filed a responsive pleading thereto. Reconsideration and for New Trial via registered mail; another copy thereof was
simultaneously sent to petitioners by registered mail as well. Meanwhile, petitioners
moved for the execution of the Decision pending appeal.
Issue
 The RTC denied the MR and MNT of Planters and granted the motion for execution
Whether or not a complaint still be amended as a matter of right before an answer has been pending appeal. The RTC noted that Planters only set the motion for hearing on
filed, even if there was a pending proceeding for its dismissal before the higher court? August 18, 2006, 16 days after its filing. This is in violation of Rule 15 Sec 15 which
mandates that time and date of the hearing must not be later than ten (10) days after
the filing. Thus, the filing did not toll the reglementary period and the RTC’s decision
has lapsed into finality.
Ruling
 The CA initially affirmed the RTC but reversed itself. It ruled that PDB’s "tacit
Yes. Section 2, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that a pleading may be amended argument" that the "distances involved in the case at bench call for a relaxation of the
as a matter of right before a responsive pleading is served. Prior to the filing of an answer, the application of Section 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court" deserved consideration.
plaintiff has the absolute right to amend the complaint whether a new cause of action or change
in theory is introduced. ISSUE

Substantial amendment of the complaint is not allowed without leave of court after an answer WON the CA erred in granting Planter’s MR and MNT
has been served, because any material change in the allegations contained in the complaint
could prejudice the rights of the defendant who has already set up his defense in the answer. HELD

In such an event, the defendant has not presented any defense that can be altered or affected  YES. The proceedings in the instant case would have been greatly abbreviated if the
by the amendment of the complaint in accordance with Section 2 of Rule 10. Considerable court a quo and the CA did not overlook the fact that PDB’s Omnibus Motion for
leeway is thus given to the plaintiff to amend his complaint once, as a matter of right, prior to the Reconsideration and for New Trial was filed one day too late.
filing of an answer by the defendant. The right granted to the plaintiff under procedural law to
amend the complaint before an answer has been served is not precluded by the filing of a  The bank received a copy of the trial court’s June 15, 2006 Decision on July 17, 2006;
motion to dismiss or any other proceeding contesting its sufficiency. thus, it had 15 days – or up to August 1, 2006 – within which to file a notice of appeal,
motion for reconsideration, or a motion for new trial, pursuant to the Rules of Court.
Furthermore, amendment of pleadings is favored and should be liberally allowed in the Yet, it filed the omnibus motion for reconsideration and new trial only on August 2,
furtherance of justice in order to determine every case as far as possible on its merits without 2006.
regard to technicalities. The fact that the other defendants below has filed their answers to the
complaint does not bar petitioner’s right to amend the complaint as against respondent.
 Indeed, its filing or service of a copy thereof to petitioners by courier service cannot be
trivialized. Service and filing of pleadings by courier service is a mode not provided in
the Rules. This is not to mention that PDB sent a copy of its omnibus motion to an
address or area which was not covered by LBC courier service at the time. Realizing
its mistake, PDB re-filed and re-sent the omnibus motion by registered mail, which is
the proper mode of service under the circumstances. By then, however, the 15-day
period had expired.

 PDB’s Notice of Appeal, which was filed only on September 7, 2006, was tardy; it had
only up to August 1, 2006 within which to file the same. The trial court therefore acted
regularly in denying PDB’s notice of appeal.

 Since PDB’s Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for New Trial was filed late and
the 15-day period within which to appeal expired without PDB filing the requisite notice
of appeal, it follows that its right to appeal has been foreclosed; it may no longer
question the trial court’s Decision in any other manner.
HEIRS OF MIRANDA, SR. vs. MIRANDA, G.R. No. 179638, July 8, 2013 HELD:

DOCTRINE: An action for revival of a judgment cannot modify, alter, or reverse the original 1. The Notice of Appeal was belatedly filed.
judgment, which is already final and executory.
It is basic and elementary that a Notice of Appeal should be filed "within fifteen (15) days from
FACTS: In 1994, petitioners, all surnamed Miranda, representing themselves as notice of the judgment or final order appealed from." Under Section 3, Rule 13 of the Rules of
the heirs of Numeriano Miranda, Sr., filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Muntinlupa Court, pleadings may be filed in court either personally or by registered mail. In the first case, the
City, a Complaint for Annulment of Titles and Specific Performance, against date of filing is the date of receipt. In the second case, the date of mailing is the date of receipt.
the heirs of Pedro Miranda, the heir of Tranquilino Miranda, and the spouses respondent
Pablo Miranda and Aida Lorenzo.

After trial, the RTC, Branch 256, rendered a Decision upholding and sustaining the validiy of the In this case, however, the counsel for petitioners filed the Notice of Appeal via a private courier,
subject TCTs; ordering Pablo Miranda to indemnify ail other heirs of Numeriano Miranda, the a mode of filing not provided in the Rules. Though not prohibited by the Rules, we cannot
amount equivalent to 12/13 fair market value of the co-owned residential house, erected on the consider the filing of petitioners' Notice of Appeal via LBC timely filed. It is established
lot 826-A-3 covered by TCT No. 186013 corresponding to their shares, and for the said heirs to jurisprudence that "the date of delivery of pleadings to a private letter-forwarding agency is not to
divide among themselves the aforesaid amount; ordering plaintiffs Mirandas, and all persons be considered as the date of filing thereof in court;" instead, "the date of actual receipt by the
claiming rights under them to immediately vacate the abovementioned residential house and to court . . . is deemed the date of filing of that pleading." Records show that the Notice of Appeal
jointly and severally pay to the spouses Pablo and Aida Miranda a monthly rental of P2,000.00 was mailed on the 15th day and was received by the court on the 16th day or one day beyond
from the date of notice of the promulgation of this judgment up to the time that they have actually the reglementary period. Thus, the CA correctly ruled that the Notice of Appeal was filed out of
vacated the property; Proclaiming that ROGELIO MIRANDA is not the biological son or child by time.
nature of TRANQUILINO MIRANDA, and therefore is not entitled to inherit from the latter;
Declaring CORNELIO, NUMERIANO, JR., et al, as the lawful legal heirs of the deceased
TRANQUILINO MIRANDA and ordering them to partition among themselves the subject lot
2. The Decision dated August 30, 1999 is already final and executory.
registered in the name of TRANQUILINO MIRANDA; ordering all the abovenamed heirs to
commission the survey of Lot 826-A-1 or to authorize in writing, one of them to commission such An action for revival of judgment is a new and independent action. It is different and distinct from
survey, in order to avoid a chaotic situation similar to the case at bar. the original judgment sought to be revived or enforced. As such, a party aggrieved by a
decision of a court in an action for revival of judgment may appeal the decision, but only insofar
Should they not agree as to what particular portion shall belong to one another, they may agree
as the merits of the action for revival is concerned. The original judgment, which is already final
that it be allotted to one or two or several of them, who shall indemnify the others at a price
and executory, may no longer be reversed, altered, or modified.
agreed upon by all of them. Should they not agree as to whom shall the property be allotted, to
sell the property to a third person at [a] price agreed upon by a majority of all [of] them, and to In this case, petitioners assail the Decision dated August 30, 1999, which is the original
partition the proceeds of the sale. judgment sought to be revived or enforced by respondent. Considering that the said Decision
had already attained finality, petitioners may no longer question its correctness. As we have
On July 13, 2006, petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal via LBC, which was opposed by
said, only the merits of the action for revival may be appealed, not the merits of the original
respondent on the ground that the Decision dated August 30, 1999 has long become final and
judgment sought to be revived or enforced.
executory. Petitioners, in turn, moved for the transmittal of the original records of the case to the
CA, insisting that respondent's opposition is without merit. Finding the appeal barred by
prescription, the RTC denied the Notice of Appeal. Feeling aggrieved, petitioners filed a Petition
for Mandamus with the CA praying that their Notice of Appeal be given due course. However the 3. RTC has jurisdiction over the Petition for Revival of Judgment.
CA denied the Petition for Mandamus o the ground that the Notice of Appeal was filed out of
time. Petitioners moved for consideration but the same was denied by the CA. As to whether the RTC has jurisdiction, we rule in the affirmative. An action for revival of
judgment may be filed either "in the same court where said judgment was rendered or in the
place where the plaintiff or defendant resides, or in any other place designated by the statutes
which treat of the venue of actions in general." 47 In this case, respondent filed the Petition for
ISSUE/S: 1. Whether the appeal was perfected on time; Revival of Judgment in the same court which rendered the Decision dated August 30, 1999.
2. Whether the late (one day) filing was justified;

3. Whether an action for revival of judgment is appealable; 4. The appeal was not meritorious.
4. Whether the appeal is meritorious The petitioner lacks merit. All told, we find no error on the part of the CA in denying the Petition
and dismissing the appeal for having been filed out of time.