SECOND DIVISION

ALFREDO HILADO, LOPEZ G.R. No. 164108

SUGAR CORPORATION, FIRST
FARMERS HOLDING Present:
CORPORATION,
Petitioners, CARPIO MORALES, J.,*
Acting Chairperson,
TINGA,
VELASCO, JR.,
- versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,** and
BRION, JJ.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS, THE HONORABLE Promulgated:
AMOR A. REYES, Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court of Manila, May 8, 2009
Branch 21 and ADMINISTRATRIX
JULITA CAMPOS BENEDICTO,
Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

The well-known sugar magnate Roberto S. Benedicto died intestate on 15

May 2000. He was survived by his wife, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto
(administratrix Benedicto), and his only daughter, Francisca Benedicto-
Paulino.[1] At the time of his death, there were two pending civil cases against
Benedicto involving the petitioners. The first, Civil Case No. 95-9137, was then
pending with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 44, with
petitioner Alfredo Hilado as one of the plaintiffs therein. The second, Civil Case No.
11178, was then pending with the RTC of Bacolod City, Branch 44, with petitioners
Lopez Sugar Corporation and First Farmers Holding Corporation as one of the
plaintiffs therein.[2]
On 25 May 2000, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto filed with the RTC
of Manila a petition for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor, pursuant
to Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court. The petition was raffled to
Branch 21, presided by respondent Judge Amor A. Reyes. Said petition
acknowledged the value of the assets of the decedent to be P5 Million, net of
liabilities.[3] On 2 August 2000, the Manila RTC issued an order appointing private
respondent as administrator of the estate of her deceased husband, and issuing letters
of administration in her favor.[4] In January 2001, private respondent submitted an
Inventory of the Estate, Lists of Personal and Real Properties, and Liabilities of the
Estate of her deceased husband.[5] In the List of Liabilities attached to the inventory,
private respondent included as among the liabilities, the above-mentioned two
pending claims then being litigated before the Bacolod City courts.[6] Private
respondent stated that the amounts of liability corresponding to the two cases
as P136,045,772.50 for Civil Case No. 95-9137 and P35,198,697.40 for Civil Case
No. 11178.[7] Thereafter, the Manila RTC required private respondent to submit a
complete and updated inventory and appraisal report pertaining to the estate.[8]

On 24 September 2001, petitioners filed with the Manila RTC a

Manifestation/Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela,[9] praying that they be furnished with
copies of all processes and orders pertaining to the intestate proceedings. Private
respondent opposed the manifestation/motion, disputing the personality of
petitioners to intervene in the intestate proceedings of her husband. Even before the
Manila RTC acted on the manifestation/motion, petitioners filed an omnibus motion
praying that the Manila RTC set a deadline for the submission by private respondent
of the required inventory of the decedents estate.[10] Petitioners also filed other
pleadings or motions with the Manila RTC, alleging lapses on the part of private
respondent in her administration of the estate, and assailing the inventory that had
been submitted thus far as unverified, incomplete and inaccurate.

On 2 January 2002, the Manila RTC issued an order denying the

manifestation/motion, on the ground that petitioners are not interested parties within
the contemplation of the Rules of Court to intervene in the intestate
proceedings.[11] After the Manila RTC had denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration, a petition for certiorari was filed with the Court of Appeals. The
petition argued in general that petitioners had the right to intervene in the intestate
proceedings of Roberto Benedicto, the latter being the defendant in the civil cases
they lodged with the Bacolod RTC.

On 27 February 2004, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision [12] dismissing

the petition and declaring that the Manila RTC did not abuse its discretion in refusing
to allow petitioners to intervene in the intestate proceedings. The allowance or
disallowance of a motion to intervene, according to the appellate court, is addressed
to the sound discretion of the court. The Court of Appeals cited the fact that the
claims of petitioners against the decedent were in fact contingent or expectant, as
these were still pending litigation in separate proceedings before other courts.

Hence, the present petition. In essence, petitioners argue that the lower courts erred
in denying them the right to intervene in the intestate proceedings of the estate of
Roberto Benedicto. Interestingly, the rules of procedure they cite in support of their
argument is not the rule on intervention, but rather various other provisions of the
Rules on Special Proceedings.[13]

To recall, petitioners had sought three specific reliefs that were denied by the
courts a quo. First, they prayed that they be henceforth furnished copies of all
processes and orders issued by the intestate court as well as the pleadings filed by
administratrix Benedicto with the said court.[14] Second, they prayed that the
intestate court set a deadline for the submission by administratrix Benedicto to
submit a verified and complete inventory of the estate, and upon submission thereof,
order the inheritance tax appraisers of the Bureau of Internal Revenue to assist in the
appraisal of the fair market value of the same.[15] Third, petitioners moved that the
intestate court set a deadline for the submission by the administrator of her verified
annual account, and, upon submission thereof, set the date for her examination under
oath with respect thereto, with due notice to them and other parties interested in the
collation, preservation and disposition of the estate.[16]

The Court of Appeals chose to view the matter from a perspective solely informed
by the rule on intervention. We can readily agree with the Court of Appeals on that
point. Section 1 of Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that an
intervenor has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of
the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by
a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court x x x While
the language of Section 1, Rule 19 does not literally preclude petitioners from
intervening in the intestate proceedings, case law has consistently held that the legal
interest required of an intervenor must be actual and material, direct and
immediate, and not simply contingent and expectant.[17]

Nonetheless, it is not immediately evident that intervention under the Rules of Civil
Procedure necessarily comes into operation in special proceedings. The settlement
of estates of deceased persons fall within the rules of special proceedings under the
Rules of Court,[18] not the Rules on Civil Procedure. Section 2, Rule 72 further
provides that [i]n the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary
actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable to special proceedings.

We can readily conclude that notwithstanding Section 2 of Rule 72, intervention as

set forth under Rule 19 does not extend to creditors of a decedent whose credit is
based on a contingent claim. The definition of intervention under Rule 19 simply
does not accommodate contingent claims.

Yet, even as petitioners now contend before us that they have the right to intervene
in the intestate proceedings of Roberto Benedicto, the reliefs they had sought then
before the RTC, and also now before us, do not square with their recognition as
intervenors. In short, even if it were declared that petitioners have no right to
intervene in accordance with Rule 19, it would not necessarily mean the
disallowance of the reliefs they had sought before the RTC since the right to
intervene is not one of those reliefs.

To better put across what the ultimate disposition of this petition should be, let us
now turn our focus to the Rules on Special Proceedings.

In several instances, the Rules on Special Proceedings entitle any interested persons
or any persons interested in the estate to participate in varying capacities in the
testate or intestate proceedings. Petitioners cite these provisions before us, namely:
(1) Section 1, Rule 79, which recognizes the right of any person interested to oppose
the issuance of letters testamentary and to file a petition for administration; (2)
Section 3, Rule 79, which mandates the giving of notice of hearing on the petition
for letters of administration to the known heirs, creditors, and to any other persons
believed to have interest in the estate; (3) Section 1, Rule 76, which allows a person
interested in the estate to petition for the allowance of a will; (4) Section 6 of Rule
87, which allows an individual interested in the estate of the deceased to complain
to the court of the concealment, embezzlement, or conveyance of any asset of the
decedent, or of evidence of the decedents title or interest therein; (5) Section 10 of
Rule 85, which requires notice of the time and place of the examination and
allowance of the Administrators account to persons interested; (6) Section 7(b) of
Rule 89, which requires the court to give notice to the persons interested before it
may hear and grant a petition seeking the disposition or encumbrance of the
properties of the estate; and (7) Section 1, Rule 90, which allows any person
interested in the estate to petition for an order for the distribution of the residue of
the estate of the decedent, after all obligations are either satisfied or provided for.

Had the claims of petitioners against Benedicto been based on contract, whether
express or implied, then they should have filed their claim, even if contingent, under
the aegis of the notice to creditors to be issued by the court immediately after
granting letters of administration and published by the administrator immediately
after the issuance of such notice.[19] However, it appears that the claims against
Benedicto were based on tort, as they arose from his actions in connection with
Philsucom, Nasutra and Traders Royal Bank. Civil actions for tort or quasi-delict do
not fall within the class of claims to be filed under the notice to creditors required
under Rule 86.[20] These actions, being as they are civil, survive the death of the
decedent and may be commenced against the administrator pursuant to Section 1,
Rule 87. Indeed, the records indicate that the intestate estate of Benedicto, as
represented by its administrator, was successfully impleaded in Civil Case No.
11178, whereas the other civil case[21] was already pending review before this Court
at the time of Benedictos death.

Evidently, the merits of petitioners claims against Benedicto are to be settled in the
civil cases where they were raised, and not in the intestate proceedings. In the event
the claims for damages of petitioners are granted, they would have the right to
enforce the judgment against the estate. Yet until such time, to what extent may they
be allowed to participate in the intestate proceedings?

Petitioners place heavy reliance on our ruling in Dinglasan v. Ang Chia,[22] and it
does provide us with guidance on how to proceed. A brief narration of the facts
therein is in order. Dinglasan had filed an action for reconveyance and damages
against respondents, and during a hearing of the case, learned that the same trial
court was hearing the intestate proceedings of Lee Liong to whom Dinglasan had
sold the property years earlier. Dinglasan thus amended his complaint to implead
Ang Chia, administrator of the estate of her late husband. He likewise filed a verified
claim-in-intervention, manifesting the pendency of the civil case, praying that a co-
administrator be appointed, the bond of the administrator be increased, and that the
intestate proceedings not be closed until the civil case had been terminated. When
the trial court ordered the increase of the bond and took cognizance of the pending
civil case, the administrator moved to close the intestate proceedings, on the ground
that the heirs had already entered into an extrajudicial partition of the estate. The
trial court refused to close the intestate proceedings pending the termination of the
civil case, and the Court affirmed such action.

If the appellants filed a claim in intervention in the intestate

proceedings it was only pursuant to their desire to protect their
interests it appearing that the property in litigation is involved in said
proceedings and in fact is the only property of the estate left subject
of administration and distribution; and the court is justified in taking
cognizance of said civil case because of the unavoidable fact that
whatever is determined in said civil case will necessarily reflect and
have a far reaching consequence in the determination and
distribution of the estate. In so taking cognizance of civil case No. V-
331 the court does not assume general jurisdiction over the case but
merely makes of record its existence because of the close interrelation of
the two cases and cannot therefore be branded as having acted in excess
of its jurisdiction.

Appellants' claim that the lower court erred in holding in abeyance

the closing of the intestate proceedings pending determination of the
separate civil action for the reason that there is no rule or authority
justifying the extension of administration proceedings until after the
separate action pertaining to its general jurisdiction has been terminated,
 cannot be entertained. Section 1, Rule 88, of the Rules of Court, expressly
provides that "action to recover real or personal property from the estate
or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury
to person or property, real or personal, may be commenced against the
executor or administrator." What practical value would this provision
have if the action against the administrator cannot be prosecuted to its
termination simply because the heirs desire to close the intestate
proceedings without first taking any step to settle the ordinary civil case?
This rule is but a corollary to the ruling which declares that questions
concerning ownership of property alleged to be part of the estate but
claimed by another person should be determined in a separate action and
should be submitted to the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction.
These rules would be rendered nugatory if we are to hold that an intestate
proceedings can be closed by any time at the whim and caprice of the heirs
x x x[23] (Emphasis supplied) [Citations omitted]

It is not clear whether the claim-in-intervention filed by Dinglasan conformed to an

action-in-intervention under the Rules of Civil Procedure, but we can partake of the
spirit behind such pronouncement. Indeed, a few years later, the Court,
citing Dinglasan, stated: [t]he rulings of this court have always been to the effect
that in the special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person,
persons not heirs, intervening therein to protect their interests are allowed to do so
to protect the same, but not for a decision on their action.[24]

Petitioners interests in the estate of Benedicto may be inchoate interests, but they are
viable interests nonetheless. We are mindful that the Rules of Special Proceedings
allows not just creditors, but also any person interested or persons interested in the
estate various specified capacities to protect their respective interests in the estate.
Anybody with a contingent claim based on a pending action for quasi-delict against
a decedent may be reasonably concerned that by the time judgment is rendered in
their favor, the estate of the decedent would have already been distributed, or
diminished to the extent that the judgment could no longer be enforced against it.

In the same manner that the Rules on Special Proceedings do not provide a creditor
or any person interested in the estate, the right to participate in every aspect of the
testate or intestate proceedings, but instead provides for specific instances when such
persons may accordingly act in those proceedings, we deem that while there is no
general right to intervene on the part of the petitioners, they may be allowed to seek
certain prayers or reliefs from the intestate court not explicitly provided for under
the Rules, if the prayer or relief sought is necessary to protect their interest in the
estate, and there is no other modality under the Rules by which such interests can be
protected. It is under this standard that we assess the three prayers sought by
petitioners.

The first is that petitioners be furnished with copies of all processes and orders issued
in connection with the intestate proceedings, as well as the pleadings filed by the
administrator of the estate. There is no questioning as to the utility of such relief for
the petitioners. They would be duly alerted of the developments in the intestate
proceedings, including the status of the assets of the estate. Such a running account
would allow them to pursue the appropriate remedies should their interests be
compromised, such as the right, under Section 6, Rule 87, to complain to the intestate
court if property of the estate concealed, embezzled, or fraudulently conveyed.

At the same time, the fact that petitioners interests remain inchoate and contingent
counterbalances their ability to participate in the intestate proceedings. We are
mindful of respondents submission that if the Court were to entitle petitioners with
service of all processes and pleadings of the intestate court, then anybody claiming
to be a creditor, whether contingent or otherwise, would have the right to be
furnished such pleadings, no matter how wanting of merit the claim may be. Indeed,
to impose a precedent that would mandate the service of all court processes and
pleadings to anybody posing a claim to the estate, much less contingent claims,
would unduly complicate and burden the intestate proceedings, and would ultimately
offend the guiding principle of speedy and orderly disposition of cases.

Fortunately, there is a median that not only exists, but also has been recognized by
this Court, with respect to the petitioners herein, that addresses the core concern of
petitioners to be apprised of developments in the intestate proceedings. In Hilado v.
Judge Reyes,[25] the Court heard a petition for mandamus filed by the same
petitioners herein against the RTC judge, praying that they be allowed access to the
records of the intestate proceedings, which the respondent judge had denied from
them. Section 2 of Rule 135 came to fore, the provision stating that the records of
every court of justice shall be public records and shall be available for the inspection
of any interested person x x x. The Court ruled that petitioners were interested
persons entitled to access the court records in the intestate proceedings. We said:
Petitioners' stated main purpose for accessing the records tomonitor
prompt compliance with the Rules governing the preservation and proper
disposition of the assets of the estate, e.g., the completion and appraisal of
the Inventory and the submission by the Administratrix of an annual
accountingappears legitimate, for, as the plaintiffs in the complaints for
sum of money against Roberto Benedicto, et al., they have an interest over
the outcome of the settlement of his estate. They are in fact "interested
persons" under Rule 135, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court x x x[26]

Allowing creditors, contingent or otherwise, access to the records of the intestate

proceedings is an eminently preferable precedent than mandating the service of court
processes and pleadings upon them. In either case, the interest of the creditor in
seeing to it that the assets are being preserved and disposed of in accordance with
the rules will be duly satisfied. Acknowledging their right to access the records,
rather than entitling them to the service of every court order or pleading no matter
how relevant to their individual claim, will be less cumbersome on the intestate
court, the administrator and the heirs of the decedent, while providing a viable means
by which the interests of the creditors in the estate are preserved.

Nonetheless, in the instances that the Rules on Special Proceedings do require

notice to any or all interested parties the petitioners as interested parties will be
entitled to such notice. The instances when notice has to be given to interested parties
are provided in: (1) Sec. 10, Rule 85 in reference to the time and place of examining
and allowing the account of the executor or administrator; (2) Sec. 7(b) of Rule 89
concerning the petition to authorize the executor or administrator to sell personal
estate, or to sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber real estates; and; (3) Sec. 1, Rule
90 regarding the hearing for the application for an order for distribution of the estate
residue. After all, even the administratrix has acknowledged in her submitted
inventory, the existence of the pending cases filed by the petitioners.
We now turn to the remaining reliefs sought by petitioners; that a deadline be set for
the submission by administratrix Benedicto to submit a verified and complete
inventory of the estate, and upon submission thereof: the inheritance tax appraisers
of the Bureau of Internal Revenue be required to assist in the appraisal of the fair
market value of the same; and that the intestate court set a deadline for the
submission by the administratrix of her verified annual account, and, upon
submission thereof, set the date for her examination under oath with respect thereto,
with due notice to them and other parties interested in the collation, preservation and
disposition of the estate. We cannot grant said reliefs.

Section 1 of Rule 83 requires the administrator to return to the court a true inventory
and appraisal of all the real and personal estate of the deceased within three (3)
months from appointment, while Section 8 of Rule 85 requires the administrator
to render an account of his administration within one (1) year from receipt of the
letters testamentary or of administration. We do not doubt that there are reliefs
available to compel an administrator to perform either duty, but a person whose
claim against the estate is still contingent is not the party entitled to do so. Still, even
if the administrator did delay in the performance of these duties in the context of
dissipating the assets of the estate, there are protections enforced and available under
Rule 88 to protect the interests of those with contingent claims against the estate.

Concerning complaints against the general competence of the administrator,

the proper remedy is to seek the removal of the administrator in accordance with
Section 2, Rule 82. While the provision is silent as to who may seek with the court
the removal of the administrator, we do not doubt that a creditor, even a contingent
one, would have the personality to seek such relief. After all, the interest of the
creditor in the estate relates to the preservation of sufficient assets to answer for the
debt, and the general competence or good faith of the administrator is necessary to
fulfill such purpose.
All told, the ultimate disposition of the RTC and the Court of Appeals is correct.
Nonetheless, as we have explained, petitioners should not be deprived of their
prerogatives under the Rules on Special Proceedings as enunciated in this decision.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, subject to the qualification that

petitioners, as persons interested in the intestate estate of Roberto Benedicto, are
entitled to such notices and rights as provided for such interested persons in the Rules
on Settlement of Estates of Deceased Persons under the Rules on Special
Proceedings. No pronouncements as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-8409 December 28, 1956

In the Matter of the Intestate of the deceased Andres Eusebio. EUGENIO EUSEBIO, petitioner-
appellee,
vs.
AMANDA EUSEBIO, JUAN EUSEBIO, DELFIN EUSEBIO, VICENTE EUSEBIO, and CARLOS
EUSEBIO,oppositors-appellants.

Francisco M. Ramos and Valeriano Silva for appellee.

Filemon Cajator for appellants.

CONCEPCION, J.:

This case instituted on November 16, 1953, when Eugenio Eusebio filed with the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, a petition for his appointment as administrator of the estate of his father, Andres
Eusebio, who died on November 28, 1952, residing, according to said petition, in the City of Quezon.
On December 4, 1953, Amanda, Virginia, Juan, Delfin, Vicente and Carlos, all surnamed Eusebio,
objected to said petition, stating that they are illegitimate children of the deceased and that the latter
was domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga, and praying, therefore, that the case be dismissed
upon the ground that venue had been improperly filed. By an order, dated March 10, 1954, said
court overruled this objection and granted said petition. Hence, the case is before us on appeal
taken, from said order, by Amanda Eusebio, and her aforementioned sister and brothers.

The appeal hinges on the situs of the residence of Andres Eusebio on November 28, 1952, for Rule
75, section 1, of the Rules of Court, provides:

Where estate of deceased persons settled. — If the decedent is an inhabitant of the

Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizens or an alien, his will shall be proved, or
 letters of administration granted, and his estate, in the Court of First Instance in the province
in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the
Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the
place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a
suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want
of jurisdiction appears on the record.

It is not disputed that up to, at least, October 29, 1952, Andres Eusebio was, and had always been,
domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga, where he had his home, as well as some other properties.
Inasmuch as his heart was in bad condition and his son, Dr. Jesus Eusebio, who treated him,
resided at No. 41 P. Florentino St., Quezon City, on October 29, 1952, Andres Eusebio bought a
house and lot at 889-A España Extention, in said City (Exhibit 2). While transferring his belongings
to this house, soon thereafter, the decedent suffered a stroke (probably heart failure), for which
reason Dr. Eusebio took him to his (Dr. Eusebio's) aforementioned residence, where the decedent
remained until he was brought to the UST Hospital, in the City of Manila, sometimes before
November 26, 1952. On this date, he contracted marriage in articulo mortis with his common law
wife, Concepcion Villanueva, in said hospital. Two (2) days later, he died therein of "acute left
ventricular failure secondary to hypertensive heart disease", at the age of seventy-four (74) years
(Exhibit A). Consequently, he never stayed or even slept in said house at España Extention.

It being apparent from the foregoing that the domicile of origin of the decedent was San Fernando,
Pampanga, where he resided for over seventy (70) years, the presumption is that he retained such
domicile, and, hence, residence, in the absence of satisfactory proof to the contrary, for it is well-
settled that "a domicile once acquired is retained until a new domicile is gained" (Minor, Conflict of
Laws, p.70; Restatement of the Law on Conflict of Laws, p. 47; In re Estate of Johnson, 192 Iowa,
78). Under the circumstances surrounding the case at bar, if Andres Eusebio established another
domicile, it must have been one of choice, for which the following conditions are essential, namely:
(1) capacity to choose and freedom of choice; (2) physical presence at the place chosen; and (3)
intention to stay therein permanently (Minor, Conflict of Laws, pp. 109-110; Googrich, Conflict of
Laws, p. 169; Velilla vs. Posadas, 62 Phil., 624; Zuellig vs. Republic of the Philippines, 46 Off. Gaz.
Suppl. No. 11, p. 220). Admittedly, the decedent was juridically capable of choosing a domicile and
had been in Quezon City several days prior to his demise. Thus, the issue narrows down to whether
he intended to stay in that place permanently.

There is no direct evidence of such intent. Neither does the decedent appears to have manifested
his wish to live indefinitely in said city. His son, petitioner-appellee, who took the witness stand, did
not testify thereon, despite the allegation, in his answer to the aforemention, opposition of the
appellants herein, that "the deceased (had) decided to reside . . . for the rest of his life, in Quezon
City". Moreover, said appellee did not introduce the testimony of his legitimate full brother and son of
the decedent, Dr. Jesus Eusebio, upon whose advice, presumably, the house and lot at No. 889-A
España Extention was purchased, and who, therefore, might have cast some light on his
(decedent's) purpose in buying said property. This notwithstanding, the lower court held that the
decedent's intent to stay permanently in Quezon City is "manifest" from the acquisition of said
property and the transfer of his belonging thereto. This conclusion is untenable. lawphil.net

The aforementioned house and lot were bought by the decedent because he had been adviced to do
so "due to his illness", in the very words of herein appellee. It is not improbable — in fact, its is very
likely — that said advice was given and followed in order that the patient could be near his doctor
and have a more effective treatment. It is well settled that "domicile is not commonly changed by
presence in a place merely for one's own health", even if coupled with "knowledge that one will
never again be able, on account of illness, to return home." (The Conflict of Laws, by Beale, Vol. I,
pp. 172-173; see, also, Shenton vs. Abbott, Md., 15., A. 2d. 906; U.S. vs. Knight, D. C. Mont., 291
Fed. 129).

Again, the decedent did not part with, or alienate, his house in San Fernando, Pampanga. Moreover,
some of his children, who used to live with him in San Fernando, Pampanga, remained in that
municipality. Then, again, in the deed Exhibit 2, by virtue of which said property at No. 889-A
España Extention, Quezon City, was conveyed to him, on October 29, 1952, or less than a month
before his death, the decedent gave San Fernando, Pampanga, as his residence. Similarly, the "A"
and "B" residence certificates used by the decedent in aknowledging said Exhibit 2, before a notary
public, was issued in San Fernando, Pampanga. Lastly, the marriage contract Exhibit 1, signed by
the deceased when he was married, in articulo mortis, to Concepcion Villanueva, at the UST
Hospital, on November 26, 1952, or two (2) days prior to his demise, stated that his residence is San
Fernando, Pampanga. It is worthy of notice that Alfonso Eusebio, one of the legitimate full brothers
of the herein appellee, was a witness to said wedding, thus indicating that the children of the
deceased by his first marriage, including said appellee, were represented on that occasion and
would have objected to said statement about his residence, if it were false. Consequently, apart from
appellee's failure to prove satisfactory that the decedent had decided to establish his home in
Quezon City, the acts of the latter, shortly and immediately before his death, prove the contrary. At
any rate, the presumption in favor of the retention of the old domicile 1— which is particularly strong
when the domicile is one of the origin 2as San Fernando, Pampanga, evidently was, as regards said
decedent — has not been offset by the evidence of record.

The lower court, however, rejected said Exhibits 1 and 2, upon being offered in evidence, and
refused to entertain the same in the order appealed from. The reason therefor are deducible from its
resolution in rejecting said documents during the hearing of the incident at bar. The court then held:

Exihibits "1" and "2" are rejecting but the same may be attached to the records for whatever
action oppositors may want to take later on because until now the personality of the
oppositors has not been established whether or not they have a right to intervene in this
case, and the Court cannot pass upon this question as the oppositors refuse to submit to the
jurisdiction of this Court and they maintain that these proceedings should be dismissed. (P.
10, t. s. n.)

In short, the lower court believed that said documents should not be admitted in evidence before
appellants had established their "personality" to intervene in the case, referring seemingly to their
filiation. When appellants, however, sought, during said hearing, to establish their relation with the
deceased, as his alleged illegitimate children, His Honor, the trial Judge sustained appellee's
objection thereto stating:

Your stand until now is to question the jurisdiction of this Court, and it seems that you are
now trying to prove the status of your client; you are leading so that. The main point here is
your contention that the deceased was never a resident of Quezon City and that is why I
allowed you to cross-examine. If you are trying to establish the status of the oppositors, I will
sustain the objection, unless you want to submit to the jurisdiction of the Court. This is not
yet the time to declare who are persons who should inherit. (p. 1, t. s. n.)

Thus, the lower court refused to consider appellant's evidence on the domicile of the decedent,
because of their alleged lack of "personality", but, when tried to establish such "personality", they
were barred from doing so on account of the question of venue raised by him. We find ourselves
unable to sanction either the foregoing procedure adopted by the lower court or the inference it drew
from the circumstances surrounding the case.
To begin with, His Honor, the trial Judge had taken inconsistent positions. While, on the one hand,
he declared that appellants could not be permitted to introduce evidence on the residence of the
decedent, for they contested the jurisdiction of court, on the other hand, he held, in the order
appealed from, that, by cross-examining the appellee, said appellants had submitted themselves to
the authority of the court.

What is more, this conclusion is refuted by the record. At the beginning of the hearing, in the lower
court, appellants' counsel announced that he would take part therein "only to question the
jurisdiction, for the purpose of dismissing this proceeding," (p. 2, t.s.n.). During the cross-
examination of petitioner herein, said counsel tried to elicit the relation between the decedent and
the appellants. As, the appellee objected thereto, the court said, addressing appellants' counsel:
"Your stand until now is to question the jurisdiction of the court. . . . It you are trying to establish the
status of the oppositors, I will sustain the objection, unless you want to submit to the jurisdiction of
the court" (p. 7, t.s.n.). Thereupon, appellants' counsel refused to do so, stating: "I will insist on my
stand." Then, too, at the conclusion of the hearing, the court rejected Exhibits 1 and 2, for the reason
that appellants "refuse to submit to the jurisdiction of this court and they maintain that these
proceedings should be dismissed." Thus, appellants specially made of record that they
were not submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of the court, except for the
purpose only of assailing the same, and the court felt that appellants were not giving up their stand,
which was, and is, a fact.

At any rate, appellants were entitled to establish facts tending to prove, not only their right to object
to appellee's petition, but, also, that venue had been laid improperly. Such facts were: (a) their
alleged relationship with the decedent, 3 which, if true, entitle them to proceed him under the Civil
Code of the Philippines; and (b) his alleged residence is Pampanga. In other words, the lower court
should have admitted Exhibits 1 and 2 in evidence and given thereto the proper effect, in connection
with the issue under consideration.

Appellee, however, asks: "What will happen if this case be dismissed in the Court of First Instance of
Quezon City on the ground of lack of jurisdiction or improper venue?" In this connection, it appears
that on November 14, 1953, the Clerk of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga received a petition
of appellants herein, dated November 4, 1953, for the settlement of the "Intestate Estate of the late
Don Andres Eusebio". Attached to said petition was petition for the docketing thereof free charge,
pursuant to Rule 3, section 22, of the Rules of Court. The latter petition was granted by an order
dated November 16, 1953, which was received by the cashier of said court on November 17, 1953,
on which date the case was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 957. On December 14, 1953,
Jesus, Eugenio, Amando and Alfonso, all surnamed Eusebio (the children of the decedent by first
marriage, including petitioner herein), moved for the dismissal of said proceedings, owing to the
pendency of the present case, before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, since November 16, 1953.
This motion was granted in an order dated December 21, 1953, relying upon the above Rule 75,
section 1, of the Rules of Court, pursuant to which "the court first taking cognizance of the settlement
of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts."

Although said order is now final, it cannot affect the outcome of the case at bar. Said order did not
pass upon the question of domicile or residence of the decedent. Moreover, in granting the court first
taking cognizance of the case exclusive jurisdiction over the same, said provision of the Rules of
Court evidently refers to cases triable before two or more courts with concurrent jurisdiction. It could
not possibly have intended to deprive a competent court of the authority vested therein by law,
merely because a similar case had been previously filed before a court to which jurisdiction is denied
by law, for the same would then be defeated by the will of one of the parties. More specially, said
provision refers mainly to non-resident decedents who have properties in several provinces in the
Philippines, for the settlement of their respective estates may undertaken before the court of first
instance of either one of said provinces, not only because said courts then have concurrent
jurisdiction — and, hence, the one first taking cognizance of the case shall exclude the other courts
— but, also, because the statement to this effect in said section 1 of Rule 75 of the Rules of the
Court immediately follows the last part of the next preceding sentence, which deals with non-resident
decedents, whose estate may settled the court of first instance of any province in which they have
properties.lawphil.net

In view, however, of the last sentence of said section, providing that:

. . . The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the
decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceedings,
except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction
appears on the record.

if proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased resident are instituted in two or more
courts, and the question of venue is raised before the same, the court in which the first case was
filed shall have exclusive jurisdiction to decide said issue, and we so held in the case of Taciana
Vda. De Borja vs. Tan, L-7792 (July 27, 1955). Should it be decided, in the proceedings before the
said court, that venue had been improperly laid, the case pending therein should be dismissed and
the corresponding proceedings may, thereafter, be initiated in the proper court.

In conclusion, we find that the decedent was, at the time of his death, domiciled in San Fernando,
Pampanga; that the Court of First Instance of Rizal had no authority, therefore, to appoint an
administrator of the estate of the deceased, the venue having been laid improperly; and that it
should, accordingly, have sustained appellants' opposition and dismissed appellee's petition.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby reversed and appellee's petition is dismissed, with
costs against the appellee. It is so ordered.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. NO. 129242 January 16, 2001

PILAR S. VDA. DE MANALO, ANTONIO S. MANALO, ORLANDO S. MANALO, and ISABELITA

MANALO ,petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA (BRANCH 35),
PURITA S. JAYME, MILAGROS M. TERRE, BELEN M. ORILLANO, ROSALINA M. ACUIN,
ROMEO S. MANALO, ROBERTO S. MANALO, AMALIA MANALO and IMELDA
MANALO, respondents.

DE LEON, JR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioners Pilar S. Vda De Manalo, et. Al., seeking
to annul the Resolution 1 of the Court of Appeals 2 affirming the Orders 3 of the Regional Trial Court
and the Resolution 4 which denied petitioner' motion for reconsideration.

The antecedent facts 5 are as follows:

Troadio Manalo, a resident of 1996 Maria Clara Street, Sampaloc, Manila died intestate on February
14, 1992. He was survived by his wife, Pilar S. Manalo, and his eleven (11) children, namely: Purita
M. Jayme, Antonio Manalo, Milagros M. Terre, Belen M. Orillano, Isabelita Manalo, Rosalina M.
Acuin, Romeo Manalo, Roberto Manalo, Amalia Manalo, Orlando Manalo and Imelda Manalo, who
are all of legal age.
1âwphi1.nêt

At the time of his death on February 14, 1992, Troadio Manalo left several real properties located in
Manila and in the province of Tarlac including a business under the name and style Manalo's
Machine Shop with offices at No. 19 Calavite Street, La Loma, Quezon City and at NO. 45 General
Tinio Street, Arty Subdivision, Valenzuela, Metro Manila.

On November 26, 1992, herein respondents, who are eight (8) of the surviving children of the late
Troadio Manalo, namely; Purita, Milagros, Belen Rocalina, Romeo, Roberto, Amalia, and Imelda
filed a petition 6 with the respondent Regional Trial Court of Manila 7 of the judicial settlement of the
estate of their late father, Troadio Manalo, and for the appointment of their brother, Romeo Manalo,
as administrator thereof.

On December 15, 1992, the trial court issued an order setting the said petition for hearing on
February 11, 1993 and directing the publication of the order for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, and further directing service by registered mail of
the said order upon the heirs named in the petition at their respective addresses mentioned therein.

On February 11, 1993, the date set for hearing of the petition, the trial court issued an order
'declaring the whole world in default, except the government," and set the reception of evidence of
the petitioners therein on March 16, 1993. However, the trial court upon motion of set this order of
general default aside herein petitioners (oppositors therein) namely: Pilar S. Vda. De Manalo,
Antonio, Isabelita and Orlando who were granted then (10) days within which to file their opposition
to the petition.

Several pleadings were subsequently filed by herein petitioners, through counsel, culminating in the
filling of an Omnibus Motion8 on July 23, 1993 seeking; (1) to seat aside and reconsider the Order of
the trial court dated July 9, 1993 which denied the motion for additional extension of time file
opposition; (2) to set for preliminary hearing their affirmative defenses as grounds for dismissal of
the case; (3) to declare that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the
oppositors; and (4) for the immediate inhibition of the presiding judge.

On July 30, 1993, the trial court issued an order9 which resolved, thus:

A. To admit the so-called Opposition filed by counsel for the oppositors on July 20, 1993,
only for the purpose of considering the merits thereof;

B. To deny the prayer of the oppositors for a preliminary hearing of their affirmative defenses
as ground for the dismissal of this proceeding, said affirmative defenses being irrelevant and
immaterial to the purpose and issue of the present proceeding;

C. To declare that this court has acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the oppositors;

D. To deny the motion of the oppositors for the inhibition of this Presiding Judge;

E. To set the application of Romeo Manalo for appointment as regular administrator in the
intestate estate of the deceased Troadio Manalo for hearing on September 9, 1993 at 2:00
o'clock in the afternoon.
Herein petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the Court of
Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 39851, after the trial court in its Order 10 dated September
15, 1993. In their petition for improperly laid in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626; (2) the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over their persons; (3) the share of the surviving spouse was included in the
intestate proceedings; (4) there was absence of earnest efforts toward compromise among members
of the same family; and (5) no certification of non-forum shopping was attached to the petition.

Finding the contentions untenable, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari in its
Resolution11promulgated on September 30, 1996. On May 6, 1997 the motion for reconsideration of
the said resolution was likewise dismissed.12

The only issue raised by herein petitioners in the instant petition for review is whether or not the
respondent Court of Appeals erred in upholding the questioned orders of the respondent trial court
which denied their motion for the outright dismissal of the petition for judicial settlement of estate
despite the failure of the petitioners therein to aver that earnest efforts toward a compromise
involving members of the same family have been made prior to the filling of the petition but that the
same have failed.

Herein petitioners claim that the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 is actually an ordinary civil
action involving members of the same family. They point out that it contains certain averments,
which, according to them, are indicative of its adversarial nature, to wit:

X X X

Par. 7. One of the surviving sons, ANTONIO MANALO, since the death of his father,
TROADIO MANALO, had not made any settlement, judicial or extra-judicial of the properties
of the deceased father TROADIO MANALO.

Par. 8. xxx the said surviving son continued to manage and control the properties
aforementioned, without proper accounting, to his own benefit and advantage xxx.

X X X

Par. 12. That said ANTONIO MANALO is managing and controlling the estate of the
deceased TROADIO MANALO to his own advantage and to the damage and prejudice of the
herein petitioners and their co-heirs xxx.

X X X

Par. 14. For the protection of their rights and interests, petitioners were compelled to bring
this suit and were forced to litigate and incur expenses and will continue to incur expenses of
not less than, P250,000.00 and engaged the services of herein counsel committing to pay
P200,000.00 as and attorney's fees plus honorarium of P2,500.00 per appearance in court
xxx.13

Consequently, according to herein petitioners, the same should be dismissed under Rule 16, Section
1(j) of the Revised Rules of Court which provides that a motion to dismiss a complaint may be filed
on the ground that a condition precedent for filling the claim has not been complied with, that is, that
the petitioners therein failed to aver in the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626, that earnest efforts
toward a compromise have been made involving members of the same family prior to the filling of
the petition pursuant to Article 222 14 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The instant petition is not impressed with merit.

It is a fundamental rule that in the determination of the nature of an action or proceeding, the
averments15 and the character of the relief sought 16 in the complaint, or petition, as in the case at
bar, shall be controlling. A careful srutiny of the Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration,
Settlement and Distribution of Estatein SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 belies herein petitioners' claim that
the same is in the nature of an ordinary civil action. The said petition contains sufficient jurisdictional
facts required in a petition for the settlement of estate of a deceased person such as the fat of death
of the late Troadio Manalo on February 14, 1992, as well as his residence in the City of Manila at the
time of his said death. The fact of death of the decedent and of his residence within he country are
foundation facts upon which all the subsequent proceedings in the administration of the estate
rest.17 The petition is SP.PROC No. 92-63626 also contains an enumeration of the names of his
legal heirs including a tentative list of the properties left by the deceased which are sought to be
settled in the probate proceedings. In addition, the relief's prayed for in the said petition leave no
room for doubt as regard the intention of the petitioners therein (private respondents herein) to seek
judicial settlement of the estate of their deceased father, Troadio Manalo, to wit;

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed for of this Honorable Court:

a. That after due hearing, letters of administration be issued to petitioner ROMEO MANALO
for the administration of the estate of the deceased TROADIO MANALO upon the giving of a
bond in such reasonable sum that this Honorable Court may fix.

b. That after all the properties of the deceased TROADIO MANALO have been inventoried
and expenses and just debts, if any, have been paid and the legal heirs of the deceased fully
determined, that the said estate of TROADIO MANALO be settled and distributed among the
legal heirs all in accordance with law.

c. That the litigation expenses of these proceedings in the amount of P250,000.00 and
attorney's fees in the amount of P300,000.00 plus honorarium of P2,500.00 per appearance
in court in the hearing and trial of this case and costs of suit be taxed solely against
ANTONIO MANALO.18

Concededly, the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 contains certain averments which may be
typical of an ordinary civil action. Herein petitioners, as oppositors therein, took advantage of the
said defect in the petition and filed their so-called Opposition thereto which, as observed by the trial
court, is actually an Answer containing admissions and denials, special and affirmative defenses and
compulsory counterclaims for actual, moral and exemplary damages, plus attorney's fees and
costs 19 in an apparent effort to make out a case of an ordinary civil action and ultimately seek its
dismissal under Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Rules of Court vis-à-vis, Article 222 of civil of the Civil
Code.

It is our view that herein petitioners may not be allowed to defeat the purpose of the essentially valid
petition for the settlement of the estate of the late Troadio Manalo by raising matters that as
irrelevant and immaterial to the said petition. It must be emphasized that the trial court, siting as a
probate court, has limited and special jurisdiction 20and cannot hear and dispose of collateral matters
and issues which may be properly threshed out only in an ordinary civil action. In addition, the rule
has always been to the effect that the jurisdiction of a court, as well as the concomitant nature of an
action, is determined by the averments in the complaint and not by the defenses contained in the
answer. If it were otherwise, it would not be too difficult to have a case either thrown out of court or
its proceedings unduly delayed by simple strategem.21 So it should be in the instant petition for
settlement of estate.

Herein petitioners argue that even if the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 were to be considered
as a special proceeding for the settlement of estate of a deceased person, Rule 16, Section 1(j) of
the Rules of Court vis-à-visArticle 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines would nevertheless apply
as a ground for the dismissal of the same by virtue of ule 1, Section 2 of the Rules of Court which
provides that the 'rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their object and to assist the
parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and proceedings.'
Petitioners contend that the term "proceeding" is so broad that it must necessarily include special
proceedings.

The argument is misplaced. Herein petitioners may not validly take refuge under the provisions of
Rule 1, Section 2, of the Rules of Court to justify the invocation of Article 222 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines for the dismissal of the petition for settlement of the estate of the deceased Troadio
Manalo inasmuch as the latter provision is clear enough. To wit:

Art. 222. No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless it should
appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed,
subject to the limitations in Article 2035(underscoring supplied).22

The above-quoted provision of the law is applicable only to ordinary civil actions. This is clear from
the term 'suit' that it refers to an action by one person or persons against another or other in a court
of justice in which the plaintiff pursues the remedy which the law affords him for the redress of an
injury or the enforcement of a right, whether at law or in equity. 23 A civil action is thus an action filed
in a court of justice, whereby a party sues another for the enforcement of a right, or the prevention or
redress of a wrong.24 Besides, an excerpt form the Report of the Code Commission unmistakably
reveals the intention of the Code Commission to make that legal provision applicable only to civil
actions which are essentially adversarial and involve members of the same family, thus:

It is difficult to imagine a sadder and more tragic spectacle than a litigation between
members of the same family. It is necessary that every effort should be made toward a
compromise before litigation is allowed to breed hate and passion in the family. It is know
that lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper bitterness than stranger.25

It must be emphasized that the oppositors (herein petitioners) are not being sued in SP. PROC. No.
92-63626 for any cause of action as in fact no defendant was imploded therein. The Petition for
issuance of letters of Administration, Settlement and Distribution of Estate in SP. PROC. No. 92-
63626 is a special proceeding and, as such, it is a remedy whereby the petitioners therein seek to
establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. 26 the petitioners therein (private respondents herein)
merely seek to establish the fat of death of their father and subsequently to be duly recognized as
among the heirs of the said deceased so that they can validly exercise their right to participate in the
settlement and liquidation of the estate of the decedent consistent with the limited and special
jurisdiction of the probate court.
1âw phi 1.nêt

WHEREFORE, the petition in the above-entitled case, is DENIED for lack of merit, Costs against
petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION
 EUHILDA C. TABUADA, G.R. No. 168799
Petitioner,

Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
- versus - Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.

HON. J. CEDRICK O. RUIZ, as

Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 39, Iloilo City,
ERLINDA CALALIMAN- Promulgated:
LEDESMA and YOLANDA
CALALIMAN-TAGRIZA, June 27, 2008
Respondent.

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
petitioner assails the March 2, 2005 Order[1] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Iloilo City, Branch 39 in Special Proceedings (Sp. Proc.) No. 5198 and the May 20,
2005 Resolution[2] of the trial court denying the motion for the reconsideration of the
challenged order.

The very simple issue raised for our resolution in this case surfaced when the
parties in Sp. Proc. No. 5198 (the proceedings for the settlement of the intestate
estate of the late Jose and Paciencia Calaliman) manifested to the RTC their desire
to amicably settle the case. In light of the said manifestation, the trial court issued
the following Order[3] on December 6, 2004:

In view of the strong manifestation of the parties herein and their

respective counsel that they will be able to raise (sic) an amicable
settlement, finally, on or before 25 December 2004, the Court will no
longer be setting the pending incidents for hearing as the parties and their
counsel have assured this Court that they are going to submit a Motion for
Judgment Based On An Amicable Settlement on or before 25 December
2004.

Atty. Honorato Sayno Jr., Atty. Gregorio Rubias and Atty. Raul
Retiro are notified in open court.

Serve a copy of this Order to Atty. Rean Sy.

SO ORDERED.[4]

The RTC, however, on March 2, 2005, invoking Section 3,[5] Rule 17, of the
Rules of Court, terminated the proceedings on account of the parties failure to submit
the amicable settlement and to comply with the afore-quoted December 6, 2004
Order. The trial court, in the challenged order of even date, likewise denied all the
motions filed by the parties.[6]

Petitioner, the administratrix of the estate, and private respondents separately

moved for the reconsideration of the March 2, 2005 Order arguing, among others,
that the termination of the case was premature, there being yet no payment of the
debts and distribution of the estate, and that they had already prepared all the
necessary papers for the amicable settlement.[7] Despite the said pleas for
reconsideration, the trial court remained firm in its position to terminate the
proceedings; hence, in the assailed May 20, 2005 Resolution,[8] it affirmed its earlier
order. Dissatisfied, petitioner scuttles to this Court via Rule 45.[9]

The petition is granted.

 While a compromise agreement or an amicable settlement is very strongly
encouraged, the failure to consummate one does not warrant any procedural
sanction, much less provide an authority for the court to jettison the case.[10] Sp. Proc.
No. 5198 should not have been terminated or dismissed by the trial court on account
of the mere failure of the parties to submit the promised amicable settlement and/or
the Motion for Judgment Based On An Amicable Settlement. Given the non-
contentious nature of special proceedings[11] (which do not depend on the will of an
actor, but on a state or condition of things or persons not entirely within the control
of the parties interested), its dismissal should be ordered only in the extreme case
where the termination of the proceeding is the sole remedy consistent with equity
and justice, but not as a penalty for neglect of the parties therein.[12]

The third clause of Section 3, Rule 17, which authorizes the motu
propio dismissal of a case if the plaintiff fails to comply with the rules or
any order of the court,[13] cannot even be used to justify the convenient, though
erroneous, termination of the proceedings herein. An examination of the December
6, 2004 Order[14] readily reveals that the trial court neither required the submission
of the amicable settlement or the aforesaid Motion for Judgment, nor warned the
parties that should they fail to submit the compromise within the given period, their
case would be dismissed.[15] Hence, it cannot be categorized as an order requiring
compliance to the extent that its defiance becomes an affront to the court and the
rules. And even if it were worded in coercive language, the parties cannot be forced
to comply, for, as aforesaid, they are only strongly encouraged, but are not obligated,
to consummate a compromise. An order requiring submission of an amicable
settlement does not find support in our jurisprudence and is premised on an
erroneous interpretation and application of the law and rules.

Lastly, the Court notes that inconsiderate dismissals neither constitute a

panacea nor a solution to the congestion of court dockets. While they lend a
deceptive aura of efficiency to records of individual judges, they merely postpone
the ultimate reckoning between the parties. In the absence of clear lack of merit or
intention to delay, justice is better served by a brief continuance, trial on the merits,
and final disposition of the cases before the court.[16]
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review
on certiorari is GRANTED. The March 2, 2005 Order and the May 20, 2005
Resolution of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 39 in Sp. Proc. No.
5198 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the court of
origin for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 155555. August 16, 2005]

ISABEL P. PORTUGAL and JOSE DOUGLAS PORTUGAL

JR., petitioners, vs. LEONILA PORTUGAL-
BELTRAN, respondent.

DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Petitioners Isabel P. Portugal and her son, Jose Douglas Portugal Jr., assail
the September 24, 2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the
[1]

Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 124 which dismissed,
[2]

after trial, their complaint for annulment of title for failure to state a cause of
action and lack of jurisdiction.
From the records of the case are gathered the following
material allegations claims of the parties which they sought to prove
by testimonial and documentary evidence during the trial of the case:
On November 25, 1942, Jose Q. Portugal (Portugal) married Paz Lazo. [3]

On May 22, 1948, Portugal married petitioner Isabel de la Puerta. [4]

On September 13, 1949, petitioner Isabel gave birth to a boy whom she
named Jose Douglas Portugal Jr., her herein co-petitioner. [5]

On April 11, 1950, Paz gave birth to a girl, Aleli, later baptized as Leonila
[6]

Perpetua Aleli Portugal, herein respondent. [7]

 On May 16, 1968, Portugal and his four (4) siblings executed a Deed of
Extra-Judicial Partition and Waiver of Rights over the estate of their father,
[8]

Mariano Portugal, who died intestate on November 2, 1964. In the deed, [9]

Portugals siblings waived their rights, interests, and participation over a 155 sq.
m. parcel of land located in Caloocan in his favor. [10]

On January 2, 1970, the Registry of Deeds for Caloocan City issued

Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 34292 covering the Caloocan parcel of
land in the name of Jose Q. Portugal, married to Paz C. Lazo. [11]

On February 18, 1984, Paz died.

On April 21, 1985, Portugal died intestate.
On February 15, 1988, respondent executed an Affidavit of Adjudication by
Sole Heir of Estate of Deceased Person adjudicating to herself the Caloocan
[12]

parcel of land. TCT No. 34292/T-172 in Portugals name was subsequently

[13]

cancelled and in its stead TCT No. 159813 was issued by the Registry of
[14]

Deeds for Caloocan City on March 9, 1988 in the name of respondent, Leonila
Portugal-Beltran, married to Merardo M. Beltran, Jr.
Later getting wind of the death in 1985 of Portugal and still later of the 1988
transfer by respondent of the title to the Caloocan property in her name,
petitioners filed before the RTC of Caloocan City on July 23, 1996 a
complaint against respondent for annulment of the Affidavit of Adjudication
[15]

executed by her and the transfer certificate of title issued in her name.
In their complaint, petitioners alleged that respondent is not related
whatsoever to the deceased Portugal, hence, not entitled to inherit the
Caloocan parcel of land and that she perjured herself when she made false
representations in her Affidavit of Adjudication.
Petitioners accordingly prayed that respondents Affidavit of Adjudication
and the TCT in her name be declared void and that the Registry of Deeds for
Caloocan be ordered to cancel the TCT in respondents name and to issue in
its stead a new one in their (petitioners) name, and that actual, moral and
exemplary damages and attorneys fees and litigation expenses be awarded to
them.
Following respondents filing of her answer, the trial court issued a Pre-Trial
Order chronicling, among other things, the issues as follows:

a. Which of the two (2) marriages contracted by the deceased Jose Q. Portugal Sr., is
valid?
b. Which of the plaintiff . . . Jose Portugal Jr. and defendant Leonila P. Beltran is the
legal heir of the deceased Jose Q. Portugal Sr.?

c. Whether or not TCT No. 159813 was issued in due course and can still be contested
by plaintiffs.

d. Whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to their claims under the

complaint. (Underscoring supplied)
[16]

After trial, the trial court, by Decision of January 18, 2001, after giving an
[17]

account of the testimonies of the parties and their witnesses and of their
documentary evidence, without resolving the issues defined during pre-trial,
dismissed the case for lack of cause of action on the ground that petitioners
status and right as putative heirs had not been established before a probate
(sic) court, and lack of jurisdiction over the case, citing Heirs of Guido and
Isabel Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario. [18]

In relying on Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, the trial court held:

The Heirs of Yaptinchay case arose from facts not dissimilar to the case at bar.

xxx

In the instant case, plaintiffs presented a Marriage Contract, a Certificate of Live

Birth, pictures (sic) and testimonial evidence to establish their right as heirs of the
decedent. Thus, the preliminary act of having a status and right to the estate of the
decedent, was sought to be determined herein. However, the establishment of a
status, a right, or a particular fact is remedied through a special proceeding (Sec.
3(c), Rule 1, 1997 Rules of Court), not an ordinary civil action whereby a party sues
another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the protection or redress of a
wrong (ibid, a). The operative term in the former is to establish, while in the latter, it
is to enforce, a right. Their status and right as putative heirs of the decedent not having
been established, as yet, the Complaint failed to state a cause of action.

The court, not being a probate (sic) court, is without jurisdiction to rule on plaintiffs
cause to establish their status and right herein. Plaintiffs do not have the personality to
sue (Secs. 1 and 2, Rule 3, in relation to Secs. 1 and 2, Rule 2, supra). (Italics in the
[19]

original; emphasis and underscoring supplied).

Petitioners thereupon appealed to the Court of Appeals, questioning the trial

courts ratio decedendi in dismissing the case as diametrically opposed to this
Courts following ruling in Cario v. Cario, viz:
[20]
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may
be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a
previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second
marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from
legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous void. (Domingo v. Court of
Appeals, 226 SCRA 572, 579 [1993]) However, for purposes other than remarriage,
no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other
purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a
criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even
after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to
question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination
of the case. (Nial, et al. v. Bayadog, GR No. 13378, March 14, 2000). In such cases,
evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of
grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be
limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage
void. (Domingo v. Court of Appeals, supra) (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).

Conceding that the ruling in Cario was promulgated (in 2001) subsequent
to that of Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay (in 1999), the appellate court
found Cario to be inapplicable, however, to the case in this wise:

To be borne in mind is the fact that the main issue in the Cario case was
the validity of the two marriages contracted by the deceased SPO4 Santiago Cario,
whose death benefits was the bone of contention between the two women both named
Susan (viz., Susan Nicdao Cario and Susan Yee Cario) both of whom he married. It is
not disputed in said case that SPO4 S. Cario contracted two marriages with said two
women during his lifetime, and the only question was: which of these two marriages
was validly celebrated? The award of the death benefits of the deceased Cario was
thus, merely an incident to the question of which of the two marriages was valid.
Upon the other hand, the case at bench is of a different milieu. The main issue here is
the annulment of title to property. The only undisputed fact in this case is that the
deceased Jose Portugal, during his lifetime, owned a parcel of land covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-34292. However, here come two contending
parties, herein plaintiffs-appellants and defendant-appellee, both now insisting to be
the legal heir(s) of the decedent. x x x. The status and rights of the parties herein have
not, therefore, been definitively established, as yet. x x x. Necessarily and
naturally, such questions as to such status or right must be properly ventilated in an
appropriate special proceeding, not in an ordinary civil action, whereunder a party
sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the protection or redress
of a wrong. The institution of an ordinary civil suit for that purpose in the present case
is thus impermissible. For it is axiomatic that what the law prohibits or forbids
directly, it cannot permit or allow indirectly. To permit, or allow, a declaration of
heirship, or the establishment of the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child to be
determined in an ordinary civil action, not in an appropriate special proceeding
brought for that purpose, is thus to impinge upon this axiom. x x x (Emphasis in the
[21]

original, underscoring supplied).

The appellate court, by Decision of September 24, 2002, thus affirmed the
[22]

trial courts dismissal of the case.

Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari, faulting the appellate
[23]

court to have erred when

I.

. . . it affirmed the RTC decision dismissing the initiatory complaint as it failed to

state a cause of action.

II.

. . . (i) it applied the ruling in Heirs of Guido [and Isabel] Yaptingchay despite the
existence of a later and contrary ruling in Cario, and (ii) when the Honorable CA and
the lower court failed to render judgment based on the evidence presented relative
to the issues raised during pre-trial, . . . (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
[24]

Petitioners thus prayed as follows:

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Supreme Court that the

questioned CA decision be reversed, and a new one entered in accordance with the
prayers set forth in the instant complaint based on the above disquisition and evidence
adduced by petitioners in the court a quo.

IN THE ALTERNATIVE, should the Honorable Supreme Court find that the
pronouncements in Cario apply, a decision be entered remanding to the court a
quo the determination of the issues of which of the two marriages is valid, and the
determination of heirship and legitimacy of Jose Jr. and Leonila preparatory to the
determination of the annulment of title issued in the name of Leonila.

Other relief and remedy just and equitable in the premises are likewise prayed
for. (Underscoring supplied).
[25]

Petitioners, in the main, argue that the appellate court misapplied Heirs of
Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay and in effect encouraged multiplicity of suits which
is discouraged by this Court as a reading of Carioshows; that Cario allows
courts to pass on the determination of heirship and the legitimacy or illegitimacy
of a child so long as it is necessary to the determination of the case; and that
contrary to the appellate courts ruling, they had established their status as
compulsory heirs.
In the main, the issue in the present petition is whether petitioners have to
institute a special proceeding to determine their status as heirs before they can
pursue the case for annulment of respondents Affidavit of Adjudication and of
the TCT issued in her name.
In the above-cited case of Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, the [26]

therein petitioners executed on March 17, 1994 an extrajudicial settlement of

the estate of the deceased Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, owners-claimants of
the two lots mentioned therein. They later discovered on August 26, 1994 that
a portion, if not all, of the two lots had been titled in the name of the therein
respondent Golden Bay Realty and Development Corporation which in turn sold
portions thereof to the therein individual respondents. The therein
petitioners Heirs thus filed a complaint for annulment of titles. The therein
respondents moved to dismiss the case for failure of the therein petitioners
to, inter alia, state a cause of action and prove their status as heirs. The trial
court granted the motion to dismiss in this wise:

But the plaintiffs who claimed to be the legal heirs of the said Guido and Isabel
Yaptinchay have not shown any proof or even a semblance of itexcept the allegations
that they are the legal heirs of the aforementioned Yaptinchaysthat they have been
declared the legal heirs of the deceased couple. Now, the determination of who are
the legal heirs of the deceased couple must be made in the proper special proceedings
in court, and not in an ordinary suit for reconveyance of property. This must take
precedence over the action for reconveyance . . . (Italics in the original; underscoring
[27]

supplied).

On petition for certiorari by the Heirs, this Court, albeit holding that the petition
was an improper recourse, found that the trial court did not commit grave abuse
of discretion in dismissing the case. Citing Litam et al. v. Rivera and Solivio v.
[28]

Court of Appeals, this Court held that the declaration of heirship can be made
[29]

only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the
establishment of a status or right.
In the above-cited case of Litam, Gregorio Dy Tam instituted a special
[30]

proceeding for issuance of letters of administration before the then Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Rizal, alleging in his petition that he is the son of Rafael Litam
who died in Manila on January 10, 1951 and is survived by him and his therein
named seven (7) siblings who are children of the decedent by his marriage to
Sia Khin celebrated in China in 1911; that the decedent contracted in 1922 in
the Philippines another marriage with Marcosa Rivera; and that the decedent
left neither a will nor debt. Dy Tam thus prayed for the issuance of letters of
administration to Marcosa Rivera, the surviving spouse of the decedent. The
CFI granted the petition and issued letters of administration to, on Marcosas
request, her nephew Arminio Rivera.
While the special proceeding was pending, Dy Tam and his purported
siblings filed a civil case before the same court, against the estate of Rafael
Litam administrator Arminio Rivera and Remedios R. Espiritu, duly appointed
guardian of Marcosa. In their complaint, Dy Tam and his purported siblings
substantially reproduced the allegations made in his petition in the special
proceeding, with the addition of a list of properties allegedly acquired during the
marriage of the decedent and Marcosa.
Finding the issue raised in the civil case to be identical to some unresolved
incidents in the special proceeding, both were jointly heard by the trial court,
following which it rendered a decision in the civil case dismissing it,
declaring, inter alia, that the plaintiffs Dy Tam et al. are not the children of the
decedent whose only surviving heir is Marcosa.
On appeal to this Court by Dy Tam et al., one of the two issues raised for
determination was whether they are the legitimate children of Rafael Litam.
This Court, holding that the issue hinged on whether Rafael Litam and Sia
Khin were married in 1911, and whether Rafael Litam is the father of appellants
Dy Tam et al., found substantially correct the trial courts findings of fact and its
conclusion that, among other things, the birth certificates of Dy Tam et al. do
not establish the identity of the deceased Rafael Litam and the persons named
therein as father [and] it does not appear in the said certificates of birth that
Rafael Litam had in any manner intervened in the preparation and filing thereof;
and that [t]he other documentary evidence presented by [them] [is] entirely
immaterial and highly insufficient to prove the alleged marriage between the
deceased Rafael Litam and Sia Khin and [their] alleged status . . . as children
of said decedent.
This Court went on to opine in Litam, however, that the lower court should
not have declared, in the decision appealed from, that Marcosa is the only heir
of the decedent, for such declaration is improper in the [civil case], it being
within the exclusive competence of the court in [the] [s]pecial [p]roceeding.
In Solivio, also cited in Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, there was
[31]

a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased, who was
a soltero, filed before the RTC of Iloilo. In the special proceeding, Branch 23 of
said court declared as sole heir Celedonia Solivio, the decedents maternal aunt-
half sister of his mother. Concordia Javellana-Villanueva, the decedents
paternal aunt-sister of his father, moved to reconsider the courts order declaring
Celedonia Solivio as sole heir of the decedent, she claiming that she too was
an heir. The court denied the motion on the ground of tardiness. Instead of
appealing the denial of her motion, Concordia filed a civil case against
Celedonia before the same RTC, for partition, recovery of possession,
ownership and damages. The civil case was raffled to Branch 26 of the RTC,
which rendered judgment in favor of Concordia. On appeal by Celedonia, the
appellate court affirmed the said judgment.
On petition for review filed before this Court by Celedonia who posed,
among other issues, whether Branch 26 of the RTC of Iloilo had jurisdiction to
entertain [the civil action] for partition and recovery of Concordia Villanuevas
share of the estate of [the deceased] while the [estate] proceedings . . . were
still pending . . . in Branch 23 of the same court, this Court held that [i]n the
interest of orderly procedure and to avoid confusing and conflicting
dispositions of a decedents estate, a court should not interfere with
[estate] proceedings pending in a co-equal court, citing Guilas v. CFI Judge
of Pampanga. [32]

This Court, however, in Solivio, upon [c]onsidering that the estate

proceedings are still pending, but nonetheless [therein private respondent-
Concordia Villanueva] had lost her right to have herself declared as co-heir in
said proceedings, opted to proceed to discuss the merits of her claim in the
interest of justice, and declared her an heir of the decedent.
In Guilas cited in Solivio, a project of partition between an adopted
[33]

daughter, the therein petitioner Juanita Lopez Guilas (Juanita), and her
adoptive father was approved in the proceedings for the settlement of the
testate estate of the decedent-adoptive mother, following which the probate
court directed that the records of the case be archived.
Juanita subsequently filed a civil action against her adoptive father to annul
the project of partition on the ground of lesion, preterition and fraud, and prayed
that her adoptive father immediately deliver to her the two lots allocated to her
in the project of partition. She subsequently filed a motion in the testate estate
proceedings for her adoptive father to deliver to her, among other things, the
same two lots allotted to her.
After conducting pre-trial in the civil case, the trial court, noting the parties
agreement to suspend action or resolution on Juanitas motion in the testate
estate proceedings for the delivery to her of the two lots alloted to her until after
her complaint in the civil case had been decided, set said case for trial.
Juanita later filed in the civil case a motion to set aside the order setting it
for trial on the ground that in the amended complaint she, in the meantime, filed,
she acknowledged the partial legality and validity of the project of partition
insofar as she was allotted the two lots, the delivery of which she was seeking.
She thus posited in her motion to set aside the April 27, 1966 order setting the
civil case for hearing that there was no longer a prejudicial question to her
motion in the testate estate proceedings for the delivery to her of the actual
possession of the two lots. The trial court, by order of April 27, 1966, denied the
motion.
Juanita thereupon assailed the April 27, 1966 order before this Court.
The probate courts approval of the project of partition and directive that the
records of the case be sent to the archives notwithstanding, this Court held that
the testate estate proceedings had not been legally terminated as Juanitas
share under the project of partition had not been delivered to her. Explained this
Court:

As long as the order of the distribution of the estate has not been complied with, the
probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed and terminated (Siguiong vs. Tecson,
supra.); because a judicial partition is not final and conclusive and does not prevent
the heir from bringing an action to obtain his share, provided the prescriptive period
therefor has not elapse (Mari vs. Bonilla, 83 Phil., 137). The better practice, however,
for the heir who has not received his share, is to demand his share through a proper
motion in the same probate or administration proceedings, or for re-opening of
the probate or administrative proceedings if it had already been closed, and not
through an independent action, which would be tried by another court or Judge
which may thus reverse a decision or order of the probate o[r] intestate
court already final and executed and re-shuffle properties long ago distributed and
disposed of (Ramos vs. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. 730, 741-742; Timbol vs. Cano, supra,;
Jingco vs. Daluz, L-5107, April 24, 1953, 92 Phil. 1082; Roman Catholic vs.
Agustines, L-14710, March 29, 1960, 107 Phil., 455, 460-461). (Emphasis and
[34]

underscoring supplied).

This Court thus set aside the assailed April 27, 1966 order of the trial court
setting the civil case for hearing, but allowed the civil case to continue because
it involves no longer the two lots adjudicated to Juanita.
The common doctrine in Litam, Solivio and Guilas in which the adverse
parties are putative heirs to the estate of a decedent or parties to the special
proceedings for its settlement is that if the special proceedings are pending, or
if there are no special proceedings filed but there is, under the circumstances
of the case, a need to file one, then the determination of, among other issues,
heirship should be raised and settled in said special proceedings. Where
special proceedings had been instituted but had been finally closed and
terminated, however, or if a putative heir has lost the right to have himself
declared in the special proceedings as co-heir and he can no longer ask for its
re-opening, then an ordinary civil action can be filed for his declaration as heir
in order to bring about the annulment of the partition or distribution or
adjudication of a property or properties belonging to the estate of the deceased.
In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or wrongly that she was the
sole heir to Portugals estate, executed on February 15, 1988 the questioned
[35]

Affidavit of Adjudication under the second sentence of Rule 74, Section 1 of the
Revised Rules of Court. Said rule is an exception to the general rule that when
[36]

a person dies leaving a property, it should be judicially administered and the

competent court should appoint a qualified administrator, in the order
established in Sec. 6, Rule 78 in case the deceased left no will, or in case he
did, he failed to name an executor therein. [37]

Petitioners claim, however, to be the exclusive heirs of Portugal. A probate

or intestate court, no doubt, has jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of a
deceased.
It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the
intestate estate of Portugal is the Caloocan parcel of land, to still subject it,
[38]

under the circumstances of the case, to a special proceeding which could be

long, hence, not expeditious, just to establish the status of petitioners as heirs
is not only impractical; it is burdensome to the estate with the costs and
expenses of an administration proceeding. And it is superfluous in light of the
fact that the parties to the civil case subject of the present case, could and had
already in fact presented evidence before the trial court which assumed
jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it defined during pre-trial.
In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no
compelling reason to still subject Portugals estate to administration proceedings
since a determination of petitioners status as heirs could be achieved in the civil
case filed by petitioners, the trial court should proceed to evaluate the
[39]

evidence presented by the parties during the trial and render a decision thereon
upon the issues it defined during pre-trial, which bear repeating, to wit:

1. Which of the two (2) marriages contracted by the deceased Jose Q. Portugal, is
valid;
 2. Which of the plaintiff, Jose Portugal Jr. and defendant Leonila P. Beltran is the
legal heir of the deceased Jose Q. Portugal (Sr.);

3. Whether or not TCT No. 159813 was issued in due course and can still be
contested by plaintiffs;

4. Whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to their claim under the complaint. [40]

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed September

24, 2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE.
Let the records of the case be REMANDED to the trial court, Branch 124 of
the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, for it to evaluate the evidence
presented by the parties and render a decision on the above-enumerated
issues defined during the pre-trial.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-24742 October 26, 1973

ROSA CAYETANO CUENCO, petitioners,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DIVISION, MANUEL CUENCO, LOURDES
CUENCO, CONCEPCION CUENCO MANGUERRA, CARMEN CUENCO, CONSUELO CUENCO
REYES, and TERESITA CUENCO GONZALEZ, respondents.

Ambrosio Padilla Law Office for petitioner.

Jalandoni and Jamir for respondents.

TEEHANKEE, J.:

Petition for certiorari to review the decision of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 34104-R,
promulgated 21 November 1964, and its subsequent Resolution promulgated 8 July 1964 denying
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.

The pertinent facts which gave rise to the herein petition follow:
On 25 February 1964 Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died at the Manila Doctors' Hospital, Manila.
He was survived by his widow, the herein petitioner, and their two (2) minor sons, Mariano Jesus, Jr.
and Jesus Salvador, both surnamed Cuenco, all residing at 69 Pi y Margal St., Sta. Mesa Heights,
Quezon City, and by his children of the first marriage, respondents herein, namely, Manuel Cuenco,
Lourdes Cuenco, Concepcion Cuenco Manguera, Carmen Cuenco, Consuelo Cuenco Reyes and
Teresita Cuenco Gonzales, all of legal age and residing in Cebu.

On 5 March 1964, (the 9th day after the death of the late Senator)1 respondent Lourdes Cuenco filed
a Petition for Letters of Administration with the court of first instance of Cebu (Sp. Proc. No. 2433-R),
alleging among other things, that the late senator died intestate in Manila on 25 February 1964; that
he was a resident of Cebu at the time of his death; and that he left real and personal properties in
Cebu and Quezon City. On the same date, the Cebu court issued an order setting the petition for
hearing on 10 April 1964, directing that due notice be given to all the heirs and interested persons,
and ordering the requisite publication thereof at LA PRENSA, a newspaper of general circulation in
the City and Province of Cebu.

The aforesaid order, however, was later suspended and cancelled and a new and modified one
released on 13 March 1964, in view of the fact that the petition was to be heard at Branch II instead
of Branch I of the said Cebu court. On the same date, a third order was further issued stating that
respondent Lourdes Cuenco's petition for the appointment of a special administrator dated 4 March
1964 was not yet ready for the consideration of the said court, giving as reasons the following:

It will be premature for this Court to act thereon, it not having yet regularly acquired
jurisdiction to try this proceeding, the requisite publication of the notice of hearing not
yet having been complied with. Moreover, copies of the petition have not been
served on all of the heirs specified in the basic petition for the issuance of letters of
administration.2

In the meantime, or specifically on 12 March 1964, (a week after the filing of the Cebu petition)
herein petitioner Rosa Cayetano Cuenco filed a petition with the court of first instance of Rizal
(Quezon City) for the probate of the deceased's last will and testament and for the issuance of letters
testamentary in her favor, as the surviving widow and executrix in the said last will and testament.
The said proceeding was docketed as Special Proceeding No. Q-7898.

Having learned of the intestate proceeding in the Cebu court, petitioner Rosa Cayetano Cuenco filed
in said Cebu court an Opposition and Motion to Dismiss, dated 30 March 1964, as well as an
Opposition to Petition for Appointment of Special Administrator, dated 8 April 1964. On 10 April
1964, the Cebu court issued an order holding in abeyance its resolution on petitioner's motion to
dismiss "until after the Court of First Instance of Quezon City shall have acted on the petition
for probate of that document purporting to be the last will and testament of the deceased Don
Mariano Jesus Cuenco."3 Such order of the Cebu court deferring to the probate proceedings in the
Quezon City court was neither excepted to nor sought by respondents to be reconsidered or set
aside by the Cebu court nor did they challenge the same by certiorari or prohibition proceedings in
the appellate courts.

Instead, respondents filed in the Quezon City court an Opposition and Motion to Dismiss, dated 10
April 1964, opposing probate of the will and assailing the jurisdiction of the said Quezon City court to
entertain petitioner's petition for probate and for appointment as executrix in Sp. Proc. No. Q-7898 in
view of the alleged exclusive jurisdiction vested by her petition in the Cebu court in Sp. Proc. No.
2433-R. Said respondent prayed that Sp. Proc. No. Q-7898 be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction and/or improper venue.
In its order of 11 April 1964, the Quezon City court denied the motion to dismiss, giving as a principal
reason the "precedence of probate proceeding over an intestate proceeding."4 The said court further
found in said order that the residence of the late senator at the time of his death was at No. 69 Pi y
Margal, Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City. The pertinent portion of said order follows:

On the question of residence of the decedent, paragraph 5 of the opposition and

motion to dismiss reads as follows: "that since the decedent Don Mariano Jesus
Cuenco was a resident of the City of Cebu at the time of his death, the aforesaid
petition filed by Rosa Cayetano Cuenco on 12 March 1964 was not filed with the
proper Court (wrong venue) in view of the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 73 of the
New Rules of Court ...". From the aforequoted allegation, the Court is made to
understand that the oppositors do not mean to say that the decedent being a resident
of Cebu City when he died, the intestate proceedings in Cebu City should prevail
over the probate proceedings in Quezon City, because as stated above the probate
of the will should take precedence, but that the probate proceedings should be filed
in the Cebu City Court of First Instance. If the last proposition is the desire of the
oppositors as understood by this Court, that could not also be entertained as proper
because paragraph 1 of the petition for the probate of the will indicates that Don
Mariano Jesus Cuenco at the time of his death was a resident of Quezon City at 69
Pi y Margal. Annex A (Last Will and Testament of Mariano Jesus Cuenco) of the
petition for probate of the will shows that the decedent at the time when he executed
his Last Will clearly stated that he is a resident of 69 Pi y Margal, Sta. Mesa Heights,
Quezon City, and also of the City of Cebu. He made the former as his first choice
and the latter as his second choice of residence." If a party has two residences, the
one will be deemed or presumed to his domicile which he himself selects or
considers to be his home or which appears to be the center of his affairs. The
petitioner, in thus filing the instant petition before this Court, follows the first choice of
residence of the decedent and once this court acquires jurisdiction of the probate
proceeding it is to the exclusion of all others.5

Respondent Lourdes Cuenco's motion for reconsideration of the Quezon City court's said order of 11
April 1964 asserting its exclusive jurisdiction over the probate proceeding as deferred to by the Cebu
court was denied on 27 April 1964 and a second motion for reconsideration dated 20 May 1964 was
likewise denied.

On 11 May 1964, pursuant to its earlier order of 11 April 1964, the hearing for probate of the last will
of the decedent was called three times at half-hour intervals, but notwithstanding due notification
none of the oppositors appeared and the Quezon City court proceeded at 9:00 a.m. with the hearing
in their absence.

As per the order issued by it subsequently on 15 May 1964, the Quezon City court noted that
respondents-oppositors had opposed probate under their opposition and motion to dismiss on the
following grounds:

(a) That the will was not executed and attested as required by law;

(b) That the will was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the
part of the beneficiary or some other persons for his benefit;

(c) That the testator's signature was procured by fraud and/or that the testator acted
by mistake and did not intend that the instrument he signed should be his will at the
time he affixed his signature thereto.6
The Quezon City court further noted that the requisite publication of the notice of the hearing had
been duly complied with and that all the heirs had been duly notified of the hearing, and after
receiving the testimony of the three instrumental witnesses to the decedent's last will, namely Atty.
Florencio Albino, Dr. Guillermo A. Picache and Dr. Jose P. Ojeda, and of the notary public, Atty.
Braulio A. Arriola, Jr., who ratified the said last will, and the documentary evidence (such as the
decedent's residence certificates, income tax return, diplomatic passport, deed of donation) all
indicating that the decedent was a resident of 69 Pi y Margal St., Quezon City, as also affirmed by
him in his last will, the Quezon City court in its said order of 15 May 1964 admitted to probate the
late senator's last will and testament as having been "freely and voluntarily executed by the testator"
and "with all formalities of the law" and appointed petitioner-widow as executrix of his estate without
bond "following the desire of the testator" in his will as probated.

Instead of appealing from the Quezon City court's said order admitting the will to probate and
naming petitioner-widow as executrix thereof, respondents filed a special civil action of certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction with respondent Court of Appeals (docketed as case CA-G.R.
No. 34104-R) to bar the Rizal court from proceeding with case No. Q-7898.

On 21 November 1964, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of respondents (petitioners
therein) and against the herein petitioner, holding that:

Section 1, Rule 73, which fixes the venue in proceedings for the settlement of the
estate of a deceased person, covers both testate and intestate proceedings. Sp.
Proc. 2433-R of the Cebu CFI having been filed ahead, it is that court whose
jurisdiction was first invoked and which first attached. It is that court which can
properly and exclusively pass upon the factual issues of (1) whether the decedent left
or did not leave a valid will, and (2) whether or not the decedent was a resident of
Cebu at the time of his death.

Considering therefore that the first proceeding was instituted in the Cebu CFI
(Special Proceeding 2433-R), it follows that the said court must exercise jurisdiction
to the exclusion of the Rizal CFI, in which the petition for probate was filed by the
respondent Rosa Cayetano Cuenco (Special Proceeding Q-7898). The said
respondent should assert her rights within the framework of the proceeding in the
Cebu CFI, instead of invoking the jurisdiction of another court.

The respondents try to make capital of the fact that on March 13, 1964, Judge
Amador Gomez of the Cebu CFI, acting in Sp. Proc. 2433-R, stated that the petition
for appointment of special administrator was "not yet ready for the consideration of
the Court today. It would be premature for this Court to act thereon, it not having yet
regularly acquired jurisdiction to try this proceeding ... . " It is sufficient to state in this
connection that the said judge was certainly not referring to the court's jurisdiction
over the res, not to jurisdiction itself which is acquired from the moment a petition is
filed, but only to the exercise of jurisdiction in relation to the stage of the proceedings.
At all events, jurisdiction is conferred and determined by law and does not depend on
the pronouncements of a trial judge.

The dispositive part of respondent appellate court's judgment provided as follows:

ACCORDINGLY, the writ of prohibition will issue, commanding and directing the
respondent Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch IX, Quezon City, and the
respondent Judge Damaso B. Tengco to refrain perpetually from proceeding and
taking any action in Special Proceeding Q-7898 pending before the said respondent
 court. All orders heretofore issued and actions heretofore taken by said respondent
court and respondent Judge, therein and connected therewith, are hereby annulled.
The writ of injunction heretofore issued is hereby made permanent. No
pronouncement as to costs.

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a resolution of respondent Court of Appeals,
dated 8 July 1965; hence the herein petition for review on certiorari.

The principal and decisive issue at bar is, theretofore, whether the appellate court erred in law in
issuing the writ of prohibition against the Quezon City court ordering it to refrain perpetually from
proceeding with the testateproceedings and annulling and setting aside all its orders and actions,
particularly its admission to probate of the decedent's last will and testament and appointing
petitioner-widow as executrix thereof without bond in compliance with the testator's express wish in
his testament. This issue is tied up with the issue submitted to the appellate court, to wit, whether the
Quezon City court acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance
and assuming exclusive jurisdiction over the probate proceedings filed with it, in pursuance of the
Cebu court's order of 10 April 1964 expressly consenting in deference to the precedence of probate
over intestate proceedings that it (the Quezon City court) should first act "on the petition for probate
of the document purporting to be the last will and testament of the deceased Don Mariano Jesus
Cuenco" - which order of the Cebu court respondents never questioned nor challenged by
prohibition or certiorari proceedings and thus enabled the Quezon City court to proceed without any
impediment or obstruction, once it denied respondent Lourdes Cuenco's motion to dismiss the
probate proceeding for alleged lack of jurisdiction or improper venue, to proceed with the hearing of
the petition and to admit the will to probate upon having been satisfied as to its due execution and
authenticity.

The Court finds under the above-cited facts that the appellate court erred in law in issuing the writ of
prohibition against the Quezon City court from proceeding with the testate proceedings and annulling
and setting aside all its orders and actions, particularly its admission to probate of the deceased's
last will and testament and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof without bond pursuant to
the deceased testator's express wish, for the following considerations: —

1. The Judiciary Act7 concededly confers original jurisdiction upon all Courts of First Instance over
"all matter of probate, both of testate and intestate estates." On the other hand, Rule 73, section of
the Rules of Court lays down the rule of venue, as the very caption of the Rule indicates, and in
order to prevent conflict among the different courts which otherwise may properly assume
jurisdiction from doing so, the Rule specifies that "the court first taking cognizance of the settlement
of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts." The cited
Rule provides:

Section 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant

of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall
be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of
First Instance in the Province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is
an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of the province in which
he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.
The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence,
of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or
proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when
the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. (Rule 73)8
It is equally conceded that the residence of the deceased or the location of his estate is not an
element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely of venue. This was lucidly stated by the
late Chief Justice Moran in Sy Oa vs. Co Ho9 as follows:

We are not unaware of existing decisions to the effect that in probate cases the place
of residence of the deceased is regarded as a question of jurisdiction over the
subject-matter. But we decline to follow this view because of its mischievous
consequences. For instance, a probate case has been submitted in good faith to the
Court of First Instance of a province where the deceased had not resided. All the
parties, however, including all the creditors, have submitted themselves to the
jurisdiction of the court and the case is therein completely finished except for a claim
of a creditor who also voluntarily filed it with said court but on appeal from an adverse
decision raises for the first time in this Court the question of jurisdiction of the trial
court for lack of residence of the deceased in the province. If we consider such
question of residence as one affecting the jurisdiction of the trial court over the
subject-matter, the effect shall be that the whole proceedings including all
decisions on the different incidents which have arisen in court will have to
be annulled and the same case will have to be commenced
anew before another court of the same rank in another province. That this is
of mischievous effect in the prompt administration of justice is too obvious to require
comment. (Cf. Tanunchuan vs. Dy Buncio & Co., G.R. No. 48206, December 31,
1942) Furthermore, section 600 of Act No. 190, 10 providing that the estate of a
deceased person shall be settled in the province where he had last resided,
could not have been intended as defining the jurisdiction of the probate court over
the subject-matter, because such legal provision is contained in a law of procedure
dealing merely with procedural matters, and, as we have said time and again,
procedure is one thing and jurisdiction over the subject matter is another. (Attorney-
General vs. Manila Railroad Company, 20 Phil. 523.) The law of jurisdiction — Act
No. 136, 11Section 56, No. 5 — confers upon Courts of First Instance jurisdiction over
all probate cases independently of the place of residence of the deceased. Since,
however, there are many courts of First Instance in the Philippines, the Law of
Procedure, Act No. 190, section 600, fixes the venue or the place where each case
shall be brought. Thus, the place of residence of the deceased is not an element of
jurisdiction over the subject-matter but merely of venue. And it is upon this ground
that in the new Rules of Court the province where the estate of a deceased person
shall be settled is properly called "venue".

It should be noted that the Rule on venue does not state that the court with whom the estate or
intestate petition is first filed acquires exclusive jurisdiction.

The Rule precisely and deliberately provides that "the court first taking cognizance of the settlement
of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts."

A fair reading of the Rule — since it deals with venue and comity between courts of equal and co-
ordinate jurisdiction — indicates that the court with whom the petition is first filed, must also first take
cognizance of the settlement of the estate in order to exercise jurisdiction over it to the exclusion of
all other courts.

Conversely, such court, may upon learning that a petition for probate of the decedent's last will has
been presented in another court where the decedent obviously had his conjugal domicile and
resided with his surviving widow and their minor children, and that the allegation of
the intestate petition before it stating that the decedent died intestatemay be actually false,
may decline to take cognizance of the petition and hold the petition before it in abeyance, and
instead defer to the second court which has before it the petition for probate of the decedent's
alleged last will.

2. This exactly what the Cebu court did. Upon petitioner-widow's filing with it a motion to dismiss
Lourdes' intestate petition, it issued its order holding in abeyance its action on the dismissal motion
and deferred to the Quezon City court, awaiting its action on the petition for probate before that
court. Implicit in the Cebu court's order was that if the will was duly admitted to probate, by the
Quezon City court, then it would definitely decline to take cognizance of Lourdes' intestate petition
which would thereby be shown to be false and improper, and leave the exercise of jurisdiction to
the Quezon City court, to the exclusion of all other courts. Likewise by its act of deference, the Cebu
court left it to the Quezon City court to resolve the question between the parties whether the
decedent's residence at the time of his death was in Quezon City where he had his conjugal
domicile rather than in Cebu City as claimed by respondents. The Cebu court thus indicated that it
would decline to take cognizance of the intestate petition before it and instead defer to the Quezon
City court, unless the latter would make a negative finding as to the probate petition and the
residence of the decedent within its territory and venue.

3. Under these facts, the Cebu court could not be held to have acted without jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of jurisdiction in declining to take cognizance of the intestate petition and deferring to
the Quezon City court.

Necessarily, neither could the Quezon City court be deemed to have acted without jurisdiction in
taking cognizance of and acting on the probate petition since under Rule 73, section 1, the Cebu
court must first take cognizance over the estate of the decedent and must exercise jurisdiction to
exclude all other courts, which the Cebu court declined to do. Furthermore, as is undisputed, said
rule only lays down a rule of venue and the Quezon City court indisputably had at least equal and
coordinate jurisdiction over the estate.

Since the Quezon City court took cognizance over the probate petition before it and assumed
jurisdiction over the estate, with the consent and deference of the Cebu court, the Quezon City court
should be left now, by the same rule of venue of said Rule 73, to exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts.

Under the facts of the case and where respondents submitted to the Quezon City court
their opposition to probate of the will, but failed to appear at the scheduled hearing despite due
notice, the Quezon City court cannot be declared, as the appellate court did, to have acted without
jurisdiction in admitting to probate the decedent's will and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix
thereof in accordance with the testator's testamentary disposition.

4. The relatively recent case of Uriarte vs. Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental 12 with facts
analogous to the present case 13 is authority against respondent appellate court's questioned
decision.

In said case, the Court upheld the doctrine of precedence of probate proceedings over intestate
proceedings in this wise:

It can not be denied that a special proceeding intended to effect the distribution of the
estate of a deceased person, whether in accordance with the law on intestate
succession or in accordance with his will, is a "probate matter" or a proceeding for
the settlement of his estate. It is equally true, however, that in accordance with
settled jurisprudence in this jurisdiction, testate proceedings for the settlement of the
 estate of a deceased person take precedence over intestate proceedings for the
same purpose. Thus it has been held repeatedly that, if in the course of intestate
proceedings pending before a court of first instance it is found that the decedent had
left a last will, proceedings for the probate of the latter should replace the intestate
proceedings even if at that state an administrator had already been appointed, the
latter being required to render final account and turn over the estate in his
possession to the executor subsequently appointed. This however, is understood to
be without prejudice that should the alleged last will be rejected or is disapproved,
the proceeding shall continue as an intestacy. As already adverted to, this is a clear
indication that proceedings for the probate of a will enjoy priority over intestate
proceedings. 14

The Court likewise therein upheld the jurisdiction of the second court, (in this case, the Quezon City
court) although opining that certain considerations therein "would seem to support the view that
[therein respondent] should have submitted said will for probate to the Negros Court, [in this case,
the Cebu court] either in a separate special proceeding or in an appropriate motion for said purpose
filed in the already pending Special Proceeding No. 6344," 15 thus:

But the fact is that instead of the aforesaid will being presented for probate to the Negros Court,
Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed the petition for the purpose with the Manila Court. We can not accept
petitioner's contention in this regard that the latter court had no jurisdiction to consider said petition,
albeit we say that it was not the proper venuetherefor.

It is well settled in this jurisdiction that wrong venue is merely a waivable procedural
defect, and, in the light of the circumstances obtaining in the instant case, we are of
the opinion, and so hold, that petitioner has waived the right to raise such objection
or is precluded from doing so by laches. It is enough to consider in this connection
that petitioner knew of the existence of a will executed by Juan Uriarte y Goite since
December 19, 1961 when Higinio Uriarte filed his opposition to the initial petition filed
in Special Proceeding No. 6344; that petitioner likewise was served with notice of the
existence (presence) of the alleged last will in the Philippines and of the filing of the
petition for its probate with the Manila Court since August 28, 1962 when Juan
Uriarte Zamacona filed a motion for the dismissal of Special Proceeding No. 6344.
All these notwithstanding, it was only on April 15, 1963 that he filed with the Manila
Court in Special Proceeding No. 51396 an Omnibus motion asking for leave to
intervene and for the dismissal and annulment of all the proceedings had therein up
to that date; thus enabling the Manila Court not only to appoint an administrator with
the will annexed but also to admit said will to probate more than five months earlier,
or more specifically, on October 31, 1962. To allow him now to assail the exercise of
jurisdiction over the probate of the will by the Manila Court and the validity of all the
proceedings had in Special Proceeding No. 51396 would put a premium on his
negligence. Moreover, it must be remembered that this Court is not inclined to annul
proceedings regularly had in a lower court even if the latter was not the proper
venue therefor, if the net result would be to have the same proceedings repeated in
some other court of similar jurisdiction; more so in a case like the present where the
objection against said proceedings is raised too late. 16

5. Under Rule 73, section 1 itself, the Quezon City court's assumption of jurisdiction over the
decedent's estate on the basis of the will duly presented for probate by petitioner-widow and finding
that Quezon City was the first choiceof residence of the decedent, who had his conjugal home and
domicile therein — with the deference in comity duly given by the Cebu court — could not be
contested except by appeal from said court in the original case. The last paragraph of said Rule
expressly provides:
 ... The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence
of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or
proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the
want of jurisdiction appears on the record. (Rule 73)

The exception therein given, viz, "when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record" could
probably be properly invoked, had such deference in comity of the Cebu court to the Quezon City
court not appeared in the record, or had the record otherwise shown that the Cebu court had taken
cognizance of the petition before it and assumed jurisdiction.

6. On the question that Quezon City established to be the residence of the late senator, the
appellate court while recognizing that "the issue is a legitimate one" held in reliance on Borja vs.
Tan 17 that.

... The issue of residence comes within the competence of whichever court is
considered to prevail in the exercise jurisdiction - in this case, the Court of First
Instance of Cebu as held by this Court. Parenthetically, we note that the question of
the residence of the deceased is a serious one, requiring both factual and legal
resolution on the basis of ample evidence to be submitted in the ordinary course of
procedure in the first instance, particularly in view of the fact that the deceased was
better known as the Senator from Cebu and the will purporting to be his also gives
Cebu, besides Quezon City, as his residence. We reiterate that this matter requires
airing in the proper court, as so indicated in the leading and controlling case of Borja
vs. Hon. Bienvenido Tan, et al., G.R. L-7792, July 27, 1955.

In the case at bar, however, the Cebu court declined to take cognizance of the intestate petition first
filed with it and deferred to the testate proceedings filed with the Quezon City court and in effect
asked the Quezon City court to determine the residence of the decedent and whether he did leave a
last will and testament upon which would depend the proper venue of the estate proceedings, Cebu
or Quezon City. The Quezon City court having thus determined in effect for both courts — at the
behest and with the deference and consent of the Cebu court — that Quezon City was the actual
residence of the decedent who died testate and therefore the proper venue, the Borja ruling would
seem to have no applicability. It would not serve the practical ends of justice to still require the Cebu
court, if the Borja ruling is to be held applicable and as indicated in the decision under review, to
determine for itself the actual residence of the decedent (when the Quezon City court had already so
determined Quezon City as the actual residence at the Cebu court's behest and respondents have
not seriously questioned this factual finding based on documentary evidence) and if the Cebu court
should likewise determine Quezon City as the actual residence, or its contrary finding reversed on
appeal, only then to allow petitioner-widow after years of waiting and inaction to institute the
corresponding proceedings in Quezon City.

7. With more reason should the Quezon City proceedings be upheld when it is taken into
consideration that Rule 76, section 2 requires that the petition for allowance of a will must show: "(a)
the jurisdictional facts." Such "jurisdictional facts" in probate proceedings, as held by the Court
in Fernando vs. Crisostomo 18 " are the death of the decedent, his residence at the time of his death
in the province where the probate court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, his
having left his estate in such province."

This tallies with the established legal concept as restated by Moran that "(T)he probate of a will is a
proceeding in rem. The notice by publication as a pre-requisite to the allowance of a will, is a
constructive notice to the whole world, and when probate is granted, the judgment of the court
is binding upon everybody, even against the State. The probate of a will by a court having
jurisdiction thereof is conclusive as to its due execution and validity." 19 The Quezon City court acted
regularly within its jurisdiction (even if it were to be conceded that Quezon City was not the proper
venue notwithstanding the Cebu court's giving way and deferring to it,) in admitting the decedent's
last will to probate and naming petitioner-widow as executrix thereof. Hence, the Quezon city court's
action should not be set aside by a writ of prohibition for supposed lack of jurisdiction as per the
appellate court's appealed decision, and should instead be sustained in line with Uriarte, supra,
where the Court, in dismissing the certiorari petition challenging the Manila court's action admitting
the decedent's will to probate and distributing the estate in accordance therewith in
the second proceeding, held that "it must be remembered that this Court is not inclined to annul
proceedings regularly had in a lower court even if the latter was not the proper venue therefor, if the
net result would be to have the same proceedings repeated in some other court of similar
jurisdiction." As stressed by Chief Justice Moran in Sy Oa, supra, "the mischievous effect in the
administration of justice" of considering the question of residence as affecting the jurisdiction of the
trial court and annulling the whole proceedings only to start all over again the same proceedings
before another court of the same rank in another province "is too obvious to require comment."

8. If the question of jurisdiction were to be made to depend only on who of the decedent's relatives
gets first to file a petition for settlement of the decedent's estate, then the established jurisprudence
of the Court that Rule 73, section 1 provides only a rule of venue in order to preclude different courts
which may properly assume jurisdiction from doing so and creating conflicts between them to the
detriment of the administration of justice, and that venue is waivable, would be set at naught. As
between relatives who unfortunately do not see eye to eye, it would be converted into a race as to
who can file the petition faster in the court of his/her choice regardless of whether the decedent is
still in cuerpo presente and in disregard of the decedent's actual last domicile, the fact that he left a
last will and testament and the right of his surviving widow named as executrix thereof. Such dire
consequences were certainly not intended by the Rule nor would they be in consonance with public
policy and the orderly administration of justice.

9. It would finally be unjust and inequitable that petitioner-widow, who under all the applicable rules
of venue, and despite the fact that the Cebu court (where respondent Lourdes Cuenco had filed
an intestate petition in the Cebu court earlier by a week's time on 5 March 1964) deferred to the
Quezon City court where petitioner had within fifteen days (on March 12, 1964) after the decedent's
death (on February 25, 1964) timely filed the decedent's last will and petitioned for letters
testamentary and is admittedly entitled to preference in the administration of her husband's
estate, 20 would be compelled under the appealed decision to have to go all the way to Cebu and
submit anew the decedent's will there for probate either in a new proceeding or by asking that the
intestate proceedings be convertedinto a testate proceeding — when under the Rules, the
proper venue for the testate proceedings, as per the facts of record and as already affirmed by the
Quezon City court is Quezon City, where the decedent and petitioner-widow had their conjugal
domicile.

It would be an unfair imposition upon petitioner as the one named and entitled to be executrix of the
decedent's last will and settle his estate in accordance therewith, and a disregard of her rights under
the rule on venue and the law on jurisdiction to require her to spend much more time, money and
effort to have to go from Quezon City to the Cebu court everytime she has an important matter of the
estate to take up with the probate court.

It would doubly be an unfair imposition when it is considered that under Rule 73, section 2, 21 since
petitioner's marriage has been dissolved with the death of her husband, their community property
and conjugal estate have to be administered and liquidated in the estate proceedings of the
deceased spouse. Under the appealed decision, notwithstanding that petitioner resides in Quezon
City, and the proper venue of the testate proceeding was in Quezon City and the Quezon City court
properly took cognizance and exercised exclusive jurisdiction with the deference in comity and
consent of the Cebu court, such proper exercise of jurisdiction would be nullified and petitioner
would have to continually leave her residence in Quezon City and go to Cebu to settle and liquidate
even her own community property and conjugal estate with the decedent.

10. The Court therefore holds under the facts of record that the Cebu court did not act without
jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of discretion in declining to take cognizance of the intestate petition
and instead deferring to the testateproceedings filed just a week later by petitioner as surviving
widow and designated executrix of the decedent's last will, since the record before it (the petitioner's
opposition and motion to dismiss) showed the falsity of the allegation in the intestate petition that the
decedent had died without a will. It is noteworthy that respondents never challenged by certiorari or
prohibition proceedings the Cebu court's order of 10 April 1964 deferring to the probate proceedings
before the Quezon City court, thus leaving the latter free (pursuant to the Cebu court's order of
deference) to exercise jurisdiction and admit the decedent's will to probate.

For the same reasons, neither could the Quezon City court be held to have acted without jurisdiction
nor with grave abuse of discretion in admitting the decedent's will to probate and appointing
petitioner as executrix in accordance with its testamentary disposition, in the light of the settled
doctrine that the provisions of Rule 73, section 1 lay down only a rule of venue, not of jurisdiction.

Since respondents undisputedly failed to appeal from the Quezon City court's order of May 15, 1964
admitting the will to probate and appointing petitioner as executrix thereof, and said court
concededly has jurisdiction to issue said order, the said order of probate has long since become final
and can not be overturned in a special civic action of prohibition.

11. Finally, it should be noted that in the Supreme Court's exercise of its supervisory authority over
all inferior courts, 22 it may properly determine, as it has done in the case at bar,
that venue was properly assumed by and transferredto the Quezon City court and that it is the
interest of justice and in avoidance of needless delay that the Quezon City court's exercise of
jurisdiction over the testate estate of the decedent (with the due deference and consent of the Cebu
court) and its admission to probate of his last will and testament and appointment of petitioner-widow
as administratrix without bond in pursuance of the decedent's express will and all its orders and
actions taken in the testate proceedings before it be approved and authorized rather than to annul all
such proceedings regularly had and to repeat and duplicate the same proceedings before the Cebu
court only to revert once more to the Quezon City court should the Cebu court find that indeed and in
fact, as already determined by the Quezon City court on the strength of incontrovertible documentary
evidence of record, Quezon City was the conjugal residence of the decedent.

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered reversing the appealed decision and resolution of the
Court of Appeals and the petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction originally
filed by respondents with the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 34104-R) is ordered dismissed. No
costs.

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 127920. August 9, 2005]

EMILIO B. PACIOLES, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATOR AND
HEIR OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF MIGUELITA CHING-
PACIOLES, petitioner, vs. MIGUELA CHUATOCO-
CHING, respondent.

DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Oftentimes death brings peace only to the person who dies but not to the
people he leaves behind. For in death, a persons estate remains, providing a
fertile ground for discords that break the familial bonds. Before us is another
case that illustrates such reality. Here, a husband and a mother of the deceased
are locked in an acrimonious dispute over the estate of their loved one.
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Emilio B. Pacioles, Jr.,
herein petitioner, against Miguela Chuatoco-Ching, herein respondent,
assailing the Court of Appeals Decision dated September 25, 1996 and
[1]

Resolution dated January 27, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP No. 41571. The Appellate
[2] [3]

Court affirmed the Order dated January 17, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 99, Quezon City denyingpetitioners motion for partition and
distribution of the estate of his wife, Miguelita Ching-Pacioles; and his motion
for reconsideration.
The facts are undisputed.
On March 13, 1992, Miguelita died intestate, leaving real properties with an
estimated value of P10.5 million, stock investments worth P518,783.00, bank
deposits amounting to P6.54 million, and interests in certain businesses. She
was survived by her husband, petitioner herein, and their two minor children.
Consequently, on August 20, 1992, petitioner filed with the RTC a verified
petition for the settlement of Miguelitas estate. He prayed that (a) letters of
[4]

administration be issued in his name, and (b) that the net residue of the estate
be divided among the compulsory heirs.
Miguelitas mother, Miguela Chuatoco-Ching, herein respondent, filed an
opposition, specifically to petitioners prayer for the issuance of letters of
administration on the grounds that (a) petitioner is incompetent and unfit to
exercise the duties of an administrator; and (b) the bulk of Miguelitas estate is
composed of paraphernal properties. Respondent prayed that the letters of
administration be issued to her instead. Afterwards, she also filed a motion for
[5]

her appointment as special administratrix. [6]

 Petitioner moved to strike out respondents opposition, alleging that the latter
has no direct and material interest in the estate, she not being a compulsory
heir, and that he, being the surviving spouse, has the preferential right to be
appointed as administrator under the law. [7]

Respondent countered that she has direct and material interest in the estate
because she gave half of her inherited properties to Miguelita on condition that
both of them would undertake whatever business endeavor they decided
to, in the capacity of business partners. [8]

In her omnibus motion dated April 23, 1993, respondent nominated her
[9]

son Emmanuel Ching to act as special administrator.

On April 20, 1994, the intestate court issued an order appointing petitioner
and Emmanuel as joint regular administrators of the estate. Both were issued
[10]

letters of administration after taking their oath and posting the requisite bond.
Consequently, Notice to Creditors was published in the issues of the Manila
Standard on September 12, 19, and 26, 1994. However, no claims were filed
against the estate within the period set by the Revised Rules of Court.
Thereafter, petitioner submitted to the intestate court an inventory of
Miguelitas estate. Emmanuel did not submit an inventory.
[11]

On May 17, 1995, the intestate court declared petitioner and his two minor
children as the only compulsory heirs of Miguelita. [12]

On July 21, 1995, petitioner filed with the intestate court an omnibus
motion praying, among others, that an Order be issued directing
[13]

the: 1) payment of estate taxes; 2) partition and distribution of the estate

among the declared heirs; and 3) payment of attorneys fees.
Respondent opposed petitioners motion on the ground that the partition and
distribution of the estate is premature and precipitate, considering that there
is yet no determination whether the properties specified in the inventory are
conjugal, paraphernal or owned in a joint venture. Respondent claimed that
[14]

she owns the bulk of Miguelitas estate as an heir and co-owner. Thus, she
prayed that a hearing be scheduled.
On January 17, 1996, the intestate court allowed the payment of the
estate taxes and attorneys fees but denied petitioners prayer for partition and
distribution of the estate, holding that it is indeed premature. The intestate court
ratiocinated as follows:

On the partition and distribution of the deceaseds properties, among the declared
heirs, the Court finds the prayer of petitioner in this regard to be premature. Thus, a
hearing on oppositors claim as indicated in her opposition to the instant petition is
necessary to determine whether the properties listed in the amended complaint
filed by petitioner are entirely conjugal or the paraphernal properties of the
deceased, or a co-ownership between the oppositor and the petitioner in their
partnership venture.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in the

Resolution dated May 7, 1996.
Forthwith, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition
for certiorari seeking to annul and set aside the intestate courts Order dated
January 17, 1996 and Resolution dated May 7, 1996 which denied petitioners
prayer for partition and distribution of the estate for being premature, indicating
that it (intestate court) will first resolve respondents claim of ownership.
The Appellate Court dismissed the petition for certiorari, holding that in
issuing the challenged Order and Resolution, the intestate court did not commit
grave abuse of discretion.
The Appellate Court ruled:

Regarding the second issue raised, respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in entertaining private respondents unsupported claim of ownership against
the estate. In fact, there is no indication that the probate court has already made a
finding of title or ownership. It is inevitable that in probate proceedings, questions of
collation or of advancement are involved for these are matters which can be passed
upon in the course of the proceedings. The probate court in exercising its prerogative
to schedule a hearing, to inquire into the propriety of private respondents claim, is
being extremely cautious in determining the composition of the estate. This act is not
tainted with an iota of grave abuse of discretion.

Petitioner moved for a reconsideration but it was likewise denied. Hence,

this petition for review on certiorari anchored on the following assignments of
error:
I

RESPONDENT COURTS DECISION WHICH AFFIRMS THE INTESTATE

COURTS ORDER IS A GRAVE ERROR FOR BEING CONTRARY TO THE
SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE AND POLICY OF THE LAW THAT ESTATE
PROCEEDINGS MUST BE SETTLED EXPEDITIOUSLY.

II
RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN SUSTAINING THE
INTESTATE COURTS ORDER TO CONDUCT HEARING ON THE ISSUE OF
OWNERSHIP CLAIM AGAINST THE ESTATE, AS SAID FUNCTION IS
OUTSIDE AND BEYOND THE JURISDICTION OF THE INTESTATE COURT.

III

RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE INTESTATE

COURTS ORDER AND RESOLUTION NOTWITHSTANDING THAT
RESPONDENT CHINGS OWNERSHIP CLAIMS ARE CONFLICTING,
FRIVOLOUS AND BASELESS.

The fundamental issue for our resolution is: May a trial court, acting as an
intestate court, hear and pass upon questions of ownership involving properties
claimed to be part of the decedents estate?
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court either as an intestate
or a probate court relates only to matters having to do with the settlement of the
estate and probate of will of deceased persons but does not extend to the
determination of questions of ownership that arise during the
proceedings. The patent rationale for this rule is that such court exercises
[15]

special and limited jurisdiction.[16]

A well-recognized deviation to the rule is the principle that an intestate or a

probate court may hear and pass upon questions of ownership when its
purpose is to determine whether or not a property should be included in the
inventory. In such situations the adjudication is merely incidental and
provisional. Thus, in Pastor, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, we held:
[17]

x x x As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate

court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a
certain property should or should not be included in the inventory of estate
properties, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto, but such
determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in
a separate action to resolve title.

The Court of Appeals relied heavily on the above principle in sustaining the
jurisdiction of the intestate court to conduct a hearing on respondents
claim. Such reliance is misplaced. Under the said principle, the key
consideration is that the purpose of the intestate or probate court in hearing and
passing upon questions of ownership is merely to determine whether or not
a property should be included in the inventory. The facts of this case show
that such was not the purpose of the intestate court.
 First, the inventory was not disputed. In fact, in her Manifestation and
Opposition dated September 18, 1995, respondent expressly adopted the
[18]

inventory prepared by petitioner, thus:

6. She adopts the inventory submitted by the petitioner in his Amended

Compliance dated October 6, 1994, and filed only on November 4, 1994 not
October 5, 1995 as erroneously asserted in Par. 12 of the Omnibus Motion. Oppositor,
however, takes exception to the low valuation placed on the real estate properties and
reserves her right to submit a more accurate and realistic pricing on each.

Respondent could have opposed petitioners inventory and sought the

exclusion of the specific properties which she believed or considered to
be hers. But instead of doing so, she expressly adopted the inventory, taking
exception only to the low valuation placed on the real estate properties.
And second, Emmanuel, respondents son and representative in the
settlement of Miguelitas estate, did not submit his own inventory. His mandate,
as co-administrator, is to submit within three (3) months after his appointment
a true inventory and appraisal of all the real and personal estate of the deceased
which have come into his possession or knowledge. He could have [19]

submitted an inventory, excluding therefrom those properties which

respondent considered to be hers. The fact that he did not endeavor to
submit one shows that he acquiesced with petitioners inventory.
Obviously, respondents purpose here was not to obtain from the intestate
court a ruling of what properties should or should not be included in the
inventory. She wanted something else, i.e., to secure from the intestate court
a final determination of her claim of ownership over properties
comprising the bulk of Miguelitas estate. The intestate court went along with
respondent on this point as evident in its Resolution dated May 7, 1996, thus:
[20]

On petitioners motion for partition and distribution of the estate of the late Miguelita
Ching Pacioles, it is believed that since oppositor had interposed a claim against the
subject estate, the distribution thereof in favor of the heirs could not possibly be
implemented as there is still a need for appropriate proceedings to determine the
propriety of oppositors claim. It must be mentioned that if it is true that oppositor
owns the bulk of the properties, which she allegedly placed/registered in the name of
the deceased for convenience, Oppositor, therefore, has a material and direct interest
in the estate and hence, should be given her day in Court.

It is apparent from the foregoing Resolution that the purpose of the hearing
set by the intestate court was actually to determine the propriety of
oppositors (respondents) claim. According to the intestate court, if it is true
that the oppositor (respondent) owns the bulk of (Miguelitas)
properties, then it means that she has a material and direct interest in the
estate and, hence, she should be given her day in court. The intended day
in court or hearing is geared towards resolving the propriety of respondents
contention that she is the true owner of the bulk of Miguelitas estate.
Surely, we cannot be deluded by respondents ingenious attempt to secure
a proceeding for the purpose of resolving her blanket claim against Miguelitas
estate. Although, she made it appear that her only intent was to determine the
accuracy of petitioners inventory, however, a close review of the facts and the
pleadings reveals her real intention.
Clearly, the RTC, acting as an intestate court, had overstepped its
jurisdiction. Its proper course should have been to maintain a hands-off stance
on the matter. It is well-settled in this jurisdiction, sanctioned and reiterated in a
long line of decisions, that when a question arises as to ownership of property
alleged to be a part of the estate of the deceased person, but claimed by some
other person to be his property, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the
deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate, such
question cannot be determined in the course of an intestate or probate
proceedings. The intestate or probate court has no jurisdiction to
adjudicate such contentions, which must be submitted to the court in the
exercise of its general jurisdiction as a regional trial court. Jurisprudence
[21]

teaches us that:

[A] probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate

cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the
estate and which are claimed to belong to outside parties. All that the said court
could do as regards said properties is to determine whether they should or should not
be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the
administrator. If there is no dispute, well and good, but if there is, then the parties,
the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action
for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate
court cannot do so. [22]

Hence, respondents recourse is to file a separate action with a court of

general jurisdiction. The intestate court is not the appropriate forum for the
resolution of her adverse claim of ownership over properties ostensibly
belonging to Miguelita's estate.
Now, even assuming that the intestate court merely intended to make a
provisional or prima facie determination of the issue of ownership, still
respondents claim cannot prosper. It bears stressing that the bulk of Miguelitas
estate, as stated in petitioners inventory, comprises real estates covered by the
Torrens System which are registered either in the name of Miguelita alone or
with petitioner. As such, they are considered the owners of the properties
until their title is nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary action.
We find this Courts pronouncement in Bolisay vs. Alcid relevant, thus:
[23]

It does not matter that respondent-administratrix has evidence purporting to support

her claim of ownership, for, on the other hand, petitioners have a Torrens title in their
favor, which under the law is endowed with incontestability until after it has been set
aside in the manner indicated in the law itself, which, of course, does not include,
bringing up the matter as a mere incident in special proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of deceased persons. x x x

x x x In regard to such incident of inclusion or exclusion, We hold that if a property

covered by Torrens Title is involved, the presumptive conclusiveness of such title
should be given due weight, and in the absence of strong compelling evidence to the
contrary, the holder thereof should be considered as the owner of the property in
controversy until his title is nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary
action, particularly, when as in the case at bar, possession of the property itself is
in the persons named in the title. x x x

Corrolarily, P.D. 1529, otherwise known as, The Property Registration

Decree, proscribes collateral attack against Torrens Title, hence:

Section 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack.

A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered,

modified or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.

Significantly, a perusal of the records reveals that respondent failed to

present convincing evidence to bolster her bare assertion of ownership. We
quote her testimony, thus:
Q: I now direct your attention to paragraph (5) appearing on page 1 of this sworn
statement of yours which I quote: In accordance with the Chinese tradition and
culture in the distribution of properties to the legal heirs, we decided to give only a
token to our daughter Miguelita and leave the rest to our only son Emmanuel, with
the undertaking that being the son he will take full responsibility of the rest of the
family despite his marriage. Madame witness, do you recall having stated that in
your sworn statement?
A: Yes sir, but it was not carried out.
Q What was actually given to your daughter Miguelita is only a token, is that right?
 A: Not a token, sir, but one half of the share of the estate was given to Lita and the other
half was given to Emmanuel.
Q: What went to Emmanuel was also , is that right?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What makes up the one half share of Lita, if you recall?
A: What was given to her were all checks, sir, but I cannot remember any more the
amount.

xxxxxx

Q: Summing up your testimony, Madame, you cannot itemize the one half share
of the estate of Miguelita, is that right?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Was there any document covering this partition of the estate among you,
Emmanuel and Miguelita with respect to the estate of your late husband?
A: If I only knew that this will happen
Q: Samakatuwid po ay walang dokumento?
A: Wala po.[24]

She further testified as follows:

Q: Among the properties listed like the various parcels of land, stocks,
investments, bank accounts and deposits both here and abroad, interests and
participation in IFS Pharmaceuticals and Medical Supplies, Inc. and various
motor vehicles, per your pleasure, Madam Witness, how should these
properties be partitioned or what should be done with these properties?
According to you earlier, you are agreeable for the partition of the said
properties with Emil on a 50-50 basis, is that right?
A: Kung ano po ang sa akin, iyon ang dapat na bumalik sa akin, sir.
Q Halimbawa ay ano po iyon? Real estate properties, parcels of land located in
Pag-Asa, in Silangan, in San Lazaro, in Sta. Cruz, in San Francisco del Monte
and shares of stock. Alinsunod sa inyo, paano po ang dapat na partihan o
hatian ninyo ni Emil?
A: Kung ano ang sa akin

xxxxxx

Q Ang tanong ko po sa inyo ay ganito, ito po ba ang inyong iminungkahi kay Emil?
Ito po ba ang inyong paghahatian or hindi?
A: Iyo akin talaga na hindi nila pinaghirapan, sir.[25]

Unfortunately, respondent could not even specify which of the properties

listed in petitioners inventory belong to her. Neither could she present any
document to prove her claim of ownership. The consistently changing basis of
her claim did nothing to improve her posture. Initially, she insisted that the bulk
of Miguelitas estate is composed of paraphernal properties. Sensing that such
[26]

assertion could not strengthen her claim of ownership, she opted to change her
submission and declare that she and Miguelita were business partners and that
she gave to the latter most of her properties to be used in a joint business
venture. Respondent must have realized early on that if the properties listed in
[27]

petitioners inventory are paraphernal, then Miguelita had the absolute title and
ownership over them and upon her death, such properties would be vested to
her compulsory heirs, petitioner herein and their two minor children. [28]

At any rate, we must stress that our pronouncements herein cannot diminish
or deprive respondent of whatever rights or properties she believes or considers
to be rightfully hers. We reiterate that the question of ownership of properties
alleged to be part of the estate must be submitted to the Regional Trial Court in
the exercise of its general jurisdiction. [29]

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and

Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 41571 are hereby
REVERSED.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-27082 January 31, 1978

Intestate Estate of the Spouses Juan C. Pangilinan and Teresa Magtuba. FILOMENO COCA,
Administrator, PRIMA PANGILINAN, and HEIRS OF CONCEPCION PANGILINAN-YAMUTA,
namely, MARIA P. YAMUTA DE ATAY, EUSEBIO P. YAMUTA, and APOLINAR P.
YAMUTA, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
GUADALUPE PIZARRAS VDA. DE PANGILINAN, HEIRS OF FRANCISCO PANGILINAN,
namely, FRANCIS, ALGERIAN, BENJAMIN, PERLA and FRANCISCO, JR., all surnamed
PANGILINAN, and CRISPIN BORROMEO, oppositors-appellees.

G.R. No. L-29545 January 31, 1978

FILOMENO COCA, administrator-appellant,

vs.
CRISPIN BORROMEO and GUADALUPE PIZARRAS VDA. DE PANGILINAN and her
Children, claimants-appellees.

Casiano U. Laput and Lorenzo D. de Guzman for appellants.

Paulino A. Conol and Felicidario M. Batoy for appellees.

AQUINO, J.:

These two cases involve the question of whether the ownership of a parcel of land, whether
belonging to the deceased spouses or to their heirs, should be decided in the intestate proceeding or
in a separate action. Also in issue in these two cases is the liability of the decedents' estate for the
litigation expenses allegedly incurred in a case regarding that same land.

Being related cases, their adjudication in a single decision was allowed in this Court's resolution of
August 13, 1969.

The spouses Juan Pan and Teresa Magtuba died intestate in 1943 and 1948, respectively. They
possession a homestead, consisting of two parcels of land, located at Barrio Bunawan or
Mauswagon, Calamba, Misamis Occidental.

One parcel is Identified as Lot No. 1927. It has an area of 3.9791 hectares. It was covered by
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 10 of the registry of deeds of Oriental Misamis in the name of
Juan Pangilinan issued in 1927. It is now covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 86 (T-10) of the
registry of deeds of Misamis Occidental (p. 7, Appellees' brief in L-27082).

The other parcel is Identified as Lot No. 1112. It has an area of 18.0291 hectares. It is covered by
OCT No. P-8419 issued on November 21, 1961 in the name of the Heirs of Juan Pan , represented
by Concepcion Pan de Yamuta (p. 73, Record on Appeal in
L-27082).

According to Guadalupe Pizarras and her children, a third parcel, Lot No. 1920, with an area of eight
hectares which was surveyed in the name of Concepcion Pan and which adjoins Lots Nos. 1927 and
1112, also forms part of the estate of the deceased Pangilinan spouses (pp. 61-64, Record on
Appeal).

The Pangilinan spouses were survived by the following heirs: (1) Prima Pangilinan, (2) Maria,
Eusebio and Apolinar all surnamed Yamuta, the children of Concepcion Pangilinan Yamuta who
died in 1961, and (3) Francis, A Benjamin Perla and Francisco, Jr., all surnamed Pan the children of
Francisco Pan who died in 1948 and who was also survived by his widow, Guadalupe Pizarras. (It is
not clear whether Roseller, Demosthenes and Eliza, all surnamed Japay, were the children of the
deceased Helen Pangilinan, presumably a daughter of Francisco Pangilinan and Teresa Magtuba.
See pages 81-82, Record on Appeal).

Special Proceeding No. 508 of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental was instituted on
September 5, 1963 for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouses, Juan C. Pangilinan
and Teresa Magtuba.

On September 25, 1965 the administrator presented a project of partition wherein the combined
areas of Lots Nos. 1112 and 1927, or 22.0082 hectares, were partitioned as follows:

(a) To Crispin Borromeo as payment of his attorney's fees in Civil Case No. 560 or
CA-G.R. No. 6721-R, February 27, 1952, Crispin Labaria vs. Juan C. Pangilinan, in
accordance with the lower court's decision dated July 19, 1965 in Civil Case No.
2440. Borromeo vs. Coca (p. 11, Appellees' brief in L-27082), three hectares which
should be taken from Lot No. 1112 and designated as Lot No. 1112-A;
 (b) To the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan (Mrs. Pizarras and children), 5.3361
hectares taken from Lot No. 1112 and designated as Lot No. 1112-B;

(c) To Prima Pangilinan, 6.3361 hectares, taken from Lot No. 1112 and designated
as Lot No. 1112-C, and presumably a daughter of Francisco Pan 81-82, Record on
Appeal).

(d) To the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan, 7.3360 hectares, consisting of Lot No.
1927 and the remainder of Lot No. 1112, which remainder is designated as Lot No.
1112-D.

It was also provided in the project of partition that the sum of P5,088.50, as the alleged debt of the
estate to Concepcion Pan should be divided equally among the three sets of heirs, or P1,696.16 for
each set of heirs, and that Prima Pangilinan and the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan should pay that
amount to the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan.

The heirs of Francisco Pangilinan (Guadalupe Pizarras, et al.) opposed that project of partition. They
contended that the proposed partition contravened the lower court's order of December 6, 1963
which recognized the right of the heirs of Francisco Pan to a twelve-hectare portion of Lot No. 1112;
that Prima Pangilinan, who sold her share to Francisco Pan should be excluded from the partition;
that the total share of the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan in Lot No. 1112 is 12.6720 hectares, while
that of the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan is 6.3360 hectares, and that the claim of the heirs of
Concepcion Pangilinan for 115,088.50 had not been properly allowed.

The lower court in its order of October 2, 1965 directed the administrator to pay the debt of the
estate to the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan. It deferred action on the project of partition until the
ownership of the twelve hectares, which were claimed by the heirs of Francisco Pan and the six
hectares, which were claimed by Crispen Borromeo (eighteen hectares in all which were excluded
from the inventory in the court's order of December 6, 1963) is determined in an ordinary action.

On may 14,1966 the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan filed a supplemental opposition wherein they
asked that Lot No. 1920, with an area of eight hectares, which lot was surveyed at should be
included in the project of partition.

On August 31, 1966 the lower court, apparently acting on its own volition, tackled once more the
project of partition. After noting that no separate action had been filed to determine the ownership of
the twelve hectares, it issued an order approving the project of partition but excluding the twelve
hectares claimed by the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan.

That order on its face appears to be incomplete because, after excluding the twelve hectares, the
lower court did not bother to decide how the remainder should be partitioned and whether Prima
Pangilinan had a share in that remainder.

That is the order under appeal in L-27082 by Filomeno Coca as administrator, Prima Pangilinan and
the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan. However, the said appellants in their brief also assail the lower
court's order of December 6, 1963, excluding eighteen hectares from the inventory, which order was
sustained by the Court of Appeals in its decision in Atay vs. Catolico, CA-G.R. Nos. 33165-R, and
3426-R, May 14,1964, 5 CAR 1200. This Court refused to review that decision in its resolution of
July 29, 1964, in
L-23088-89, Atay vs. Court of Appeals.
The other incident involves the lower court's order of May 11, 1968 which directed that the claim of
the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan for reimbursement of litigation expenses (apart from the sum of
P1,459.49, as the value of the produce of the twelve hectares already mentioned, which was
appropriated by the special administrator), be referred to the clerk of court for reception of the
evidence.

In another order, also dated May 11, 1968, the lower court reiterated its order of October 2, 1965
that the administrator should pay the heirs of Concepcion Pan the. amount to be reimbursed to her
estate. The court further directed the administrator to account for the income of the estate, to recover
any amount due from the special administrator, and to pay the claim of Crispin Borromeo and the
amount due to the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan as directed in its order of August 31, 1966 and in
its approval of the accounting of the special administrator.

The administrator, Filomeno Coca, Prima Pangilinan and the heirs of Concepcion Pan also appealed
from those two orders dated May 11, 1968 (L-29545).

The appellant contend that the lower court, as a probate court, has no jurisdiction to decide the
ownership of the twelve-hectare portion of Lot No. 1112. On the other hand, the appellees" or the
heirs of Francisco Pangilinan counter that the lower court did not decide the ownership of the twelve
hectares when it ordered their exclusion from the project of partition. So, the problem is how the title
to the twelve hectares should be decided, whether in a separate action or in the intestate.
proceeding.

It should be clarified that whether a particular matter should be resolved by the Court of First
Instance in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited probate jurisdiction is in reality not a
jurisdictional question. In essence, it is a procedural question involving a mode of practice "which
may be waived" (Cunanan vs. Amparo, 80 Phil. 227, 232. Cf. Reyes vs. Diaz, 73 Phil. 484 re
jurisdiction over the issue).

As a general rule, the question as to title to property should not be passed upon in the estate or
intestate proceeding. That question should be ventilated in a separate action. (Lachenal vs. Salas, L-
42257, June 14, 1976, 71 SCRA 262, 266). That general rule has qualifications or exceptions
justified by expediency and convenience.

Thus, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or testate proceeding the
question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to its
final determination in a separate action Lachenal vs. Salas, supra).

Although generally, a probate court may not decide a question of title or ownership, yet if the
interested parties are all heirs or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties
consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of 'third parties are not
impaired, then the probate court is competent to decide the question of ownership (Pascual vs.
Pascual 73 Phil. 561; Alvarez vs. Espiritu, L-18833, August 14, 1965, 14 SCRA 892; Cunanan vs.
Amparo, supra; 3 Morans Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed., p. 4731).

We hold that the instant case may be treated as an exception to the general rule that questions of
title should be ventilated in a separate action.

Here, the probate court had already received evidence on the ownership of the twelve-hectare
portion during the hearing of the motion for its exclusion from title inventory The only interested
parties are the heirs who have all appeared in the intestate proceeding.
As pointed out by the appellees, they belong to the poor stratum of society. They should not be
forced to incur additional expenses (such as filing fees) by bringing a separate action to determine
the ownership of the twelve-hectare portion.

The just, expeditious and inexpensive solution is to require the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan to the in
the intestate, proceeding, Special Proceeding No. 568, a motion in the form of a complaint wherein
they should set forth their claim for the twelve hectares in question, stating the ultimate facts in
support of their claim, such as the partition made by Juan C. Pangilinan, their acquisition of the
share of Prima Pangilinan and the usufructuary rights of their parents, their long possession of the
said portion, their claim for the produce of the land, the expenses incurred by them in Civil Case No.
560, Labaria vs. Pangilinan, and their contention that Lot No. 1920 forms part of the estate of the
Pangilinan spouses.

Copies of that motion should be serves upon the administrator and upon Prima Pangilinan and the
heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan (who are all represented by the same lawyers). They should answer
the motion within fifteen days from service. In their answer the appellants should set forth the
ultimate facts and the defenses (such as the violation of section 118 of the Public Land Law) to
support their theory that Lot No. 1112 still forms part of the estate of the spouses Juan C. Pangilinan
and Teresa Magtuba and that the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan should bear one-third of the
expenses incurred by Concepcion Pan in Civil Case No. 560.

After the issues have been joined and in case no amicable settlement has been reached, the
probate court should receive evidence or, as indicated by the Court of Appeals in Atay vs.
Catolico, supra a full-dress hearing should be held.

Crispin Borromeo may set forth also his claim for the three hectares but only for the purpose of
deciding what portion of the estate should be given to him in satisfaction of his share. His claim for
the sum of P416 had already been adjudicated by the lower court in its order of August 31, 1966 (pp.
26- 27, Record on Appeal in L-29545). No appeal was interposed from that adjudication.

After trial the lower court's decision on the issues as to what constitutes the estate of the Pangilinan
spouses should include the partition thereof and should indicate what portion of the estate should be
allocated to Crispen Borromeo. If necessary, the validity of the donation or partition of Lot No. 1112,
made by Juan C. Pangilinan during his lifetime, should be passed upon.

Considering that the respective claims of the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan . and the heirs of
Concepcion Pangilinan for reimbursement of the litigation expenses allegedly incurred in Civil Case
No. 560 will be included in the trial, the two orders of the trial court dated May 11, 1968 regarding
those matters (L-29545) should not be enforced. They should be set aside.

WHEREFORE, (1) the lower court's amended order of August 31, 1966, excluding twelve hectares
from the partition of the estate of the deceased Pan spouses (L-27082) and (2) the two orders dated
May 11, 1968, regarding the claim of Guadalupe Pizarras and her children and the debt of the estate
to Concepcion Pangilinan (L-29545) are reversed and set aside.

A new trial should be held on those matters after the filing of the proper pleadings and in case no
amicable settlement is reached. The heirs of Francisco Pangilinan should file their motion within
thirty days from notice of the entry of judgment in this case.

The case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings in accordance with the guidelines
already set forth. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION

ANA JOYCE S. REYES, G.R. No. 167405

Petitioner,
Present:
Panganiban, C.J. (Chairperson),
- versus - Ynares-Santiago,
Austria-Martinez,
Callejo, Sr., and
Chico-Nazario, JJ.
HON. CESAR M. SOTERO, Presiding
Judge, RTC of Paniqui, Tarlac, Branch
67, ATTY. PAULINO SAGUYOD, the
Clerk of Court of Branch 67 of the RTC
at Paniqui, Tarlac in his capacity as
Special Administrator, CORAZON
CHICHIOCO, ANGELITO LISING,
ERLINDA ESPACIO, GONZALO Promulgated:
ZALZOS and ERNESTO LISING,
Respondents. February 16, 2006
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This petition for review seeks to modify the Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated May 14, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 74047 as well as the Resolution dated May
14, 2005 denying the motion for reconsideration. In the assailed judgment, the
Court of Appeals annulled and set aside the September 18, 2002 and November 12,
2002 Resolutions of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Paniqui, Tarlac, Branch 67 in
Spec. Proc. No. 204 but refrained from dismissing the petition for letters of
administration and settlement of estate on the ground that petitioner must first
prove that she was legally adopted by the decedent, Elena Lising.

On September 15, 1998, respondent Corazon L. Chichioco filed a petition for

the issuance of letters of administration and settlement of estate of the late
Elena Lising before the RTC of Paniqui, Tarlac, where it was docketed as Spec. Proc.
No. 204 and raffled to Branch 67. Chichioco claimed that she was the niece and heir
of Lising who died intestate on July 31, 1998. Named as co-heirs of Chichioco were
Rosario L. Zalzos, Florante Zalzos, Erlinda Lising, Manuel Lising, Evelyn Lising,
Josephine Lising, Alfredo Lising and respondents
Ernesto Lising and Erlinda Espacio.

According to Chichioco, the deceased left real properties located in the

municipalities of Ramos and Paniqui, Tarlac, as well as assorted pieces of jewelry
and money which were allegedly in the possession of petitioner Ana Joyce S. Reyes,
a grandniece of the deceased. Chichioco prayed that she be appointed
administrator of the estate, upon payment of a bond, pending settlement and
distribution of Lisings properties to the legal heirs.[1]

On November 6, 1998, petitioner Reyes filed an Opposition[2] to the petition,

claiming that she was an adopted child of Lising and the latters
husband, Serafin Delos Santos, who died on November 30, 1970. She asserted that
the petition should be dismissed and that the appointment of an administrator was
unnecessary, since she was the only heir of Lising who passed away without leaving
any debts. She further asserted that Chichioco is unfit to serve as administrator
of Lisings estate because of her antagonistic interests against the
decedent. Chichioco and her alleged co-heirs have questioned the decedents title
to a piece of real property which forms a large part of the estate.

On November 11, 1998, petitioner filed a Supplement to the Opposition[3] attaching

thereto the Certification[4] issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar
of Paniqui, Tarlac stating that on page 76, Book No. 01 of the Register of Court
Decrees, Reyes was adopted by Elena Lising and Serafin Delos Santos pursuant to a
decision rendered in Spec. Proc. No. 1410 by Judge Julian Lustre of the Court of
First Instance (CFI) of Tarlac, Branch 3, promulgated on December 21, 1968 and
duly registered with the Office of the Civil Registrar on January 29, 1969.
Petitioner also submitted a Certification[5] issued by the Clerk of Court of
the RTC-Tarlac City, stating that a judgment was rendered in Spec. Proc. No. 1410
on December 21, 1968 decreeing petitioners adoption by
Elena Lising and Serafin Delos Santos. She also presented a copy of Judicial Form
No. 43[6] indicating that the adoption decree was on file in the General Docket of
the RTC-Tarlac City, wherein the dispositive portion of the adoption decree was
recorded as follows:

In view of the foregoing, the court finds this petition a proper case
for adoption and therefore grants the same. Consequently, the Court
declares that henceforth, the child Ana Joyce C. Zalzos is freed from all
legal obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to her
natural parents Orlando Zalzos and May C. Castro, and is to all legal
intents and purposes the child of the
petitioners Serafin delos Santos and Elena Lising. [7]

Petitioner likewise submitted a Decree of Final Distribution[8] issued by the

Philippine Veterans Affairs Office (PVAO) showing that, upon the death
of Serafin Delos Santos, death benefits were paid to his widow, Elena Lising, and
his daughter, Ana Joyce Delos Santos, in accordance with pertinent provisions of
law.

On April 5, 1999, the RTC ordered respondents to submit documentary

evidence to prove the jurisdictional facts of the case and to comment on petitioners
opposition.[9] Only Rosario L. Zalsosappears to have filed a Comment/Reply
to Oppositors Opposition,[10] after which the RTC ordered the parties to submit
memoranda thereon.[11] On July 22, 1999, the case was deemed submitted for
resolution.[12]

Meanwhile, on June 30, 1999, Chichioco and her alleged co-heirs filed before the
Court of Appeals a petition for annulment of the adoption decree docketed as SP
No. 53457.[13] They claimed that no proceedings for the adoption of petitioner took
place in 1968 since the Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac and the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) had no records of the adoption case. Petitioners natural mother
supposedly connived with the court personnel to make it appear that petitioner
was adopted by the Delos Santos spouses and that the CFIs order for initial hearing
was published in a weekly newspaper which was not authorized to publish court
orders in special proceedings.

Upon motion of Chichioco, the RTC ordered on October 4, 1999, the suspension of
hearings in Spec. Proc. No. 204 pending the outcome of SP No.
53457.[14] Subsequently, however, the Court of Appeals dismissed[15] SP No. 53457
for failure to comply with the third paragraph of Section 4, Rule 47 of the Rules of
Court.[16] The said dismissal became final and executory on March 8, 2000.[17]

Thereafter, on August 22, 2000, petitioner filed a motion before the RTC praying
that the opposition to Spec. Proc. No. 204 be finally resolved and that the petition
be dismissed.[18] This was followed by an Urgent Ex Parte Motion[19] filed by
petitioner on October 17, 2000 praying for the immediate resolution of her
opposition.
 On November 16, 2000, respondents filed a Comment[20] to the opposition
stating that reasonable doubts have been cast on petitioners claim that she was
legally adopted due allegedly to certain badges of fraud. Respondents also
informed the RTC that they have filed a criminal complaint against petitioner before
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, Tarlac City, for alleged falsification of the
adoption decree and Judicial Form No. 43, docketed as I.S. No. 00-1016.

Subsequently, the RTC issued a Resolution[21] dated December 12,

2000 deferring resolution of petitioners opposition to Spec. Proc. No. 204, pending
the outcome of the criminal case filed against the latter. In the meantime, the
parties were enjoined from dissipating or disposing any or all of the properties
included in the estate of Elena Lising without order from this Court.
On December 13, 2000, Chichioco filed an Urgent Motion to Appoint Special
Administrator[22] before the RTC on the ground that there was yet no true
determination and appraisal of the decedents universal estate. It was prayed
therein that the Branch Clerk of Court, Atty. Paulino Saguyod, be appointed special
administrator as he was an experienced and able person in the management of
properties and is honest, impartial, competent and acceptable to the majority of
the interested parties.

In the meantime, the Provincial Prosecutor found probable cause to charge

petitioner with falsification of public documents per resolution dated January 5,
2001.[23] Petitioner thus appealed the said finding to the Office of the Regional State
Prosecutor.

On August 8, 2001, the RTC granted respondents motion for the appointment of a
special administrator and appointed its branch clerk of court,
Atty. Saguyod.[24] Petitioner moved for reconsideration on the grounds that the
branch clerk of court was disqualified from taking on the task of special
administrator, and that Atty. Saguyod was appointed without being required to file
a bond. Petitioner also reiterated that the petition should be dismissed because
she is the sole heir of the decedent.[25] However, the RTC denied petitioners motion
for reconsideration on November 5, 2001.[26]
On January 14, 2002, the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor reversed the
findings of the Provincial Prosecutor and dismissed the criminal complaint against
petitioner.[27] Undaunted, Chichiocofiled a petition for review before the
Department of Justice (DOJ).

Simultaneously, Chichioco and the other alleged co-heirs filed a motion before the
RTC to enjoin petitioner from conducting business in a property belonging to the
estate. Respondent Chichiocoalleged that petitioner converted the basement
of Lisings residence into a billiard hall without authority of the special
administrator.[28]

Acting on said motion, the RTC issued a resolution on September 18, 2002, the
dispositive part of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Oppositor Ana Joyce Reyes is hereby enjoined

from conducting business activity in any of the properties left by the
decedent. The Special Administrator is also empowered to take control
and possession of the listed personal and real properties of the decedent
and those that may be found to be owned or registered in the name of
the same.

SO ORDERED.[29]

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the above resolution which

was denied by the RTC on November 12, 2002. On even date, the DOJ also issued a
resolution dismissing respondent Chichiocos petition for review in the criminal
case.[30]
 Subsequently, petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari before the
Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 74047,[31] assailing the September 18,
2002 and November 12, 2002resolutions of the RTC. Petitioner alleged that said
resolutions were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in
excess of jurisdiction since as sole heir, she had the right to possess and use the
decedents property, title over which automatically passed on to her upon the
latters death. Moreover, the special administrator, Atty. Saguyod, had yet to file a
bond and submit an inventory of the decedents estate.
Additionally, petitioner insisted that Spec. Proc. No. 204 should be dismissed
since the dismissal by the Court of Appeals of SP No. 53457
constituted res judicata as to the former. There was likewise no valid challenge to
her adoption and she consequently remains to be the sole heir of the
decedent. Thus, she stressed that there was no need for the appointment of an
administrator or for the settlement proceedings.

In due course, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment[32] nullifying the

resolutions of the trial court. It held that the presiding judge, Judge Cesar
M. Sotero, gravely abused his discretion in appointing his branch clerk of court as
special administrator. Citing Balanay, Jr. v. Martinez,[33] the appellate court
reasoned that such act could engender a suspicion that Judge Sotero and his clerk
are in cahoots in milking the decedents estate. Moreover, Atty. Saguyod failed to
comply with the requirements of a bond and inventory and could not therefore
take control and possession of any of the decedents properties.

However, the appellate court refused to dismiss Spec. Proc. No. 204 since
the dismissal of SP No. 53457 was not a judgment on the merits and did not operate
as res judicata to the former. It was also incumbent upon petitioner to prove
before the trial court that she was indeed adopted by the Delos Santos spouses
since, according to the appellate court, imputations of irregularities permeating the
adoption decree render its authenticity under a cloud of doubt.
 Petitioners motion for reconsideration having been denied on March 15,
[34]
2005, hence this petition on the following assigned errors:

A. THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER HAD

TO PROVE THE VALIDITY OF HER ADOPTION DUE TO IMPUTATIONS
OF IRREGULARITIES IN VIEW OF SECTION 47 OF RULE 39.[35]

B. THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DISMISSAL IN

SP NO. 53457 WAS NOT A DISMISSAL ON THE MERITS.[36]

The petition is meritorious.

On the first assigned error, we agree with petitioner that she need not prove her
legal adoption by any evidence other than those which she had already presented
before the trial court. To recall, petitioner submitted a certification from the local
civil registrars office that the adoption decree was registered therein and also a
copy of Judicial Form No. 43 and a certification issued by the clerk of court that the
decree was on file in the General Docket of the RTC-Tarlac City. Both certifications
were issued under the seal of the issuing offices and were signed by the proper
officers. These are thus presumed to have been regularly issued as part of the
official duties that said public officers perform.[37]

It should be borne in mind that an adoption decree is a public

document[38] required by law to be entered into the public records, the official
repository of which, as well as all other judicial pronouncements affecting the
status of individuals, is the local civil registrars office as well as the court which
rendered the judgment.

Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance

of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein
stated.[39] As such, the certifications issued by the local civil registrar and the clerk
of court regarding details of petitioners adoption which are entered in the records
kept under their official custody, are prima facie evidence of the facts contained
therein. These certifications suffice as proof of the fact of petitioners adoption by
the Delos Santos spouses until contradicted or overcome by sufficient
evidence. Mere imputations of irregularities will not cast a cloud of doubt on the
adoption decree since the certifications and its contents are presumed valid until
proof to the contrary is offered.

In this regard, it must be pointed out that such contrary proof can be
presented only in a separate action brought principally for the purpose of nullifying
the adoption decree. The latter cannot be assailed collaterally in a proceeding for
the settlement of a decedents estate, as categorically held in Santos
v. Aranzanso.[40] Accordingly, respondents cannot assail in these proceedings the
validity of the adoption decree in order to defeat petitioners claim that she is the
sole heir of the decedent. Absent a categorical pronouncement in an appropriate
proceeding that the decree of adoption is void, the certifications regarding the
matter, as well as the facts stated therein, should be deemed legitimate, genuine
and real. Petitioners status as an adopted child of the decedent
remains unrebutted and no serious challenge has been brought against her
standing as such. Therefore, for as long as petitioners adoption is considered valid,
respondents cannot claim any interest in the decedents estate. For this reason, we
agree with petitioner that Spec. Proc. No. 204 should be dismissed.

As succinctly held in Santos v. Aranzanso:[41]

From all the foregoing it follows that respondents - x x x and those who,
like them x x x, claim an interest in the estate x x x as alleged first cousins,
cannot intervene, as such, in the settlement proceedings, in view of the
fact that in the order of intestate succession adopted children exclude
first cousins (Articles 979 and 1003, New Civil Code). The same holds true
as long as the adoption must be - as in the instant case - considered
valid. (Emphasis added)
 Petitioner, whose adoption is presumed to be valid, would necessarily
exclude respondents from inheriting from the decedent since they are mere
collateral relatives of the latter. To allow the proceedings below to continue would
serve no salutary purpose but to delay the resolution of the instant case. After all,
the dismissal of Spec. Proc. No. 204 is the logical consequence of our
pronouncement relative to the presumed validity of petitioners adoption.

Moreover, it must be stressed that all the evidence pertinent to the

resolution of the petitioners opposition, which is actually a motion to dismiss the
petition for letters of administration and settlement of the estate, is a matter of
record in the instant case. The same has in fact been submitted for resolution
before the RTC more than six years ago and is so far the only pending incident
before the RTC. The parties have likewise amply ventilated their positions on the
matter through their respective pleadings filed before the lower courts. No useful
purpose will thus be served if we let the RTC resolve the matter, only for its ruling
to be elevated again to the Court of Appeals and subsequently to this Court. The
remand of the case to the lower court for further reception of evidence is not
necessary where the Court is in a position to resolve the dispute based on the
evidence before it.[42] This is in keeping with the avowed purpose of the rules of
procedure which is to secure for the parties a just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of every action or proceeding.[43] Hence, since the grounds for the
dismissal of Spec. Proc. No. 204 are extant in the records and there is no cogent
reason to remand the case to the RTC, Spec. Proc. No. 204 should be dismissed.

Based on the foregoing, the Court sees no need to discuss petitioners second
assigned error.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Special Proceedings No. 204

pending before the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City, Branch 67 is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC

G.R. No. L-44602 November 28, 1938

MARIA CALMA, as administratrix of the testamentary proceedings of Fausta

Macasaquit, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
ESPERANZA TAÑEDO, assisted by her husband Felipe Mamaual, and BARTOLOME QUIZON,
Deputy Sheriff of Tarlac, defendants-appellees.

AVANCENA, C.J.:

The spouses Eulalio Calma and Fausta Macasaquit were the owners of the property described in the
complaint, being their conjugal property. They were also indebted to Esperanza Tañedo, chargeable
against the conjugal property, in the sums of P948.34 and P247, with interest thereon at 10 per cent
per annum. On October 10, 1933, Fausta Macasaquit died leaving a will wherein she appointed her
daughter, Maria Calma, as administratrix of her properties. Upon the commencement of the
corresponding probate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac, the said daughter, Maria
Calma, was appointed judicial administratrix of the properties of the deceased.

While these probate proceedings of the deceased Fausta Macasaquit were pending, Esperanza
Tanedo, on January 27, 1934, filed a complaint against Eulalio Calma for the recovery of the sums
of P948.34 and P247. The Court of First Instance of Tarlac rendered judgment for the payment of
this sum. In the execution of this judgment, despite the third party claim filed by Fausta Macasaquit,
the property described in the complaint was sold by the sheriff.

Maria Calma, as administratrix of the estate of Fausta Macasaquit, now brings this action and asks
that the sale made by the sheriff of the property described in the complaint be annulled and that the
estate of Fausta Macasaquit be declared the sole and absolute owner thereof. law phi 1.net

The court absolved the defendants from this complaint.

The probate proceedings of the deceased Fausta Macasaquit were instituted in accordance with Act
No. 3176 reading:

SEC. 685. When the marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or wife, the
community property shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the debts thereof
shall be paid, in the testamentary or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse, in
accordance with the provisions of this Code relative to the administration and liquidation and
partition proceeding, unless the parties, being all of age and legally capacitated, avail
themselves of the right granted to them by this Code of proceeding to an extrajudicial
partition and liquidation of said property.

In case it is necessary to sell any portion of said community property in order to pay the
outstanding debts and obligations of the same, such sale shall be made in the manner and
with the formalities established by this Code for the sale of the property of deceased
persons. Any sale, transfer, alienation or disposition of said property effected without said
formalities shall be null and void, except as regards the portion that belonged to the vendor
at the time the liquidation and partition was made.
Prior to this Act, the liquidation of conjugal property was made under section 685 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. Interpreting the scope of Act No. 3176, this court, in the case of Caragay vs. Urquiza (53
Phil., 72), said that the amendment introduced by this Act consists in authorizing the institution of
testate or intestate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased spouse or of an
ordinary action for the liquidation and partition of the property of a conjugal partnership. It should be
understood that these remedies are alternative, and not cumulative, in he sense that they cannot be
availed of at he same time, inasmuch as an anomalous and chaotic situation would result if conjugal
property were administered, liquidated and distributed at the same time in a testamentary
proceeding and in an ordinary action for liquidation and partition of property. Consequently, the
testamentary proceedings of Fausta Macasaquit having been instituted, the liquidation and partition
of the conjugal property by reason of her marriage to Eulalio Calma should be made in these
proceedings, to the exclusion of any other proceeding for the same purpose.

Interpreting this same Act No. 3176 in another decision, this court, in the case of Cruz vs. De
Jesus (52 Phil., 870) said that when the marriage is dissolved by the death of the wife, the legal
power of management of the husband ceases, passing to the administrator appointed by the court in
the testate or intestate proceedings instituted to that end if there be any debts to be paid. This
doctrine has been confirmed in the other case of Ona vs. De Gala (58 Phil., 881).

From the foregoing it follows that when Esperanza Tanedo brought suit against Eulalio Calma for the
payment of the sums of P948.34 and P247, which wee debts chargeable against the conjugal
property, the power of Eulalio Calma. legal administrator of the conjugal property while Fausta
Macasaquit was living, had ceased and passed to the administratrix Maria Calma appointed in the
testamentary proceedings of Fausta Macasaquit. Hence, this being an indebtedness chargeable
against conjugal property, no complaint for its payment can be brought against Eulalio Calma, who
had already ceased as administrator of the conjugal property; the claim for this amount had to be
filed in the testamentary proceedings of Fausta Macasaquit.

Having to be filed according to Act No. 3176 under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure
relative to the administration and liquidation of properties of deceased persons, it should be filed
before the committee on claims in said testamentary proceedings and, at all events, thereafter, by
appeal to the corresponding Court of First Instance, in an ordinary action against the judicial
administratrix.

On the other hand, he property described in the complaint is included among the inventoried
properties subject to the testamentary proceedings of Fausta Macasaquit because, belonging as it
does to the conjugal property, it should, under Act No. 3176, be included among the properties of the
testamentary proceedings.

We conclude that, Eulalio Calma having ceased as legal administrator of the conjugal property had
with his wife Fausta Macasaquit, no complaint can be brought against him for the recovery of an
indebtedness chargeable against said conjugal property, and that the action should be instituted in
the testamentary proceedings of the deceased Fausta Macasaquit in the manner provided by law, by
filing it first with the committee on claims.

Wherefore, we hold that the sale of the property described in the complaint, made by the sheriff in
execution of the judgment rendered against Eulalio Calma for the collection of the indebtedness
chargeable against the conjugal property, is void and said property should be deemed subject to the
testamentary proceedings of the deceased Fausta Macasaquit for all the purposes of that case.

The appealed judgment is reversed, without special pronouncement as to the costs. So ordered.
 EN BANC

G.R. No. L-2263 May 30, 1951

PAZ Y. OCAMPO, JOSEFA Y. OCAMPO, ISIDRO Y. OCAMPO, GIL Y. OCAMPO, MAURO Y.

OCAMPO, and VICENTE Y. OCAMPO, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
CONRADO POTENCIANO, VICTOR POTENCIANO and LOURDES POTENCIANO, defendants.
1VICTOR POTENCIANO and LOURDES POTENCIANO, defendants-appellants.

Salvador P. de Tangle for appellants.

Amado A. Yatco and Rosendo J. Tansinsin for appellees.

REYES, J.:

This is an appeal by certiorari form a decision of the Court of Appeals.

From the findings of fact of said court, which are conclusive for the purposes of this appeal, it
appears that on February 3, 1930, Edilberto Ocampo, married to Paz Yatco, executed a deed
purporting to convey to his relative, Conrado Potenciano, and the latter's wife, Rufina Reyes, by way
of sale with pacto de retro for the sum of P2,5000, a town a lot with a house as strong materials
standing thereon. On that same day, Ocampo signed another document, making it appear that, for
an annual rental of P300, which, as may be noted, is equivalent to 12 per cent of the purchase price,
the vendees were leasing to him the house and lot for the duration of the redemption period.

The property involved in the above transaction is located at the center of the poblacion of Biñan,
Laguna, and in the opinion of the Court of Appeals, worth between 20 and 25 pesos. Though
registered in the name of Ocampo alone, it in reality belonged to him and his wife as conjugal
property.

The period originally fixed for the repurchase was one year, "extendible to another year," but several
extensions were granted, with the vendor paying part of the principal in addition to interests. The last
extension granted was for year from February 3, 1937, and the period having elapsed without the
repurchase having been made, Potenciano, on January 24, 1939, filed with the register of deeds of
Laguna an affidavit for the consolidation of title, on the strength which the register of deeds issued
transfer certificate of title no. 18056 in the name of Potenciano and his wife. This, however, did not
close the avenue for settlement, for on February 28, 1939, with Edilberto Ocampo and Rufina Reyes
already dead, Potenciano gave Paz Yatco an option to repurchase the property for P2,500 within 5
years, and a lease thereon for the same period of time at annual rental of P300 which, as may again
be noted, is equivalent to 12 per cent of the purchase price. On or about February 7, 1944, Paz
Yatco sought to exercise the option by tendering to Potenciano at his clinic in Manila the sum of
P4,000 an amount sufficient to cover both principal and interest, and upon the tender being rejected,
deposited the money in court and brought an action in her own name and as judicial administratrix of
the estate of her deceased husband to compel Potenciano to accept it and to have the title to the
property reinstated in her name and that of her husband.

Intervening in the case, Potenciano's children, Victor and Lourdes, filed a cross-complaint, alleging
that the option to purchase granted by their father to plaintiff on February 28, 1939, was null and void
as to the share of their deceased mother Rufina Reyes in the property in litigation, which share
passed to them by right of inheritance, and that as to their father's share in the same property they,
the intervenors, were exercising the right of redemption accorded by law to co-owners of property
held in common, for which purpose they had already tendered him the sum of P1,250 on the fifth day
after they learned of said option through plaintiff's complaint. To meet these allegations, plaintiff
amended her complaint by including the intervenors as defendants and alleging, in effect, that
the pacto de retro sale in question was in reality a mortgage to secure a pre-existing debt, with the
rental contract thrown in to cover the stipulated interest of 12 per cent; that the option agreement for
the repurchase of the property within five years from February 28, 1939, and for the payment of
rental for that period in an amount equal to an annual interest of 12 per cent on the loan, was also
meant to be in reality an extension of the life of the mortgage; and that the tender of payment was
valid, the same having been made within the extended period. The Court of First Instance, after trial,
upheld these allegations and gave judgment in favor of the children of Edilberto Ocampo and Paz
Yatco, who had substituted the latter after her death.

When the case was elevated to the Court of Appeals, that court took a somewhat different view and
rendered judgment declaring:

(a) That contract Exhibit A entered into between Edilberto Ocampo and Conrado Potenciano
was one of mortgage, with interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum;

(b) That the "option to purchase" and the "contract of lease" (Exhibit E and E-1) were validly
executed by defendant Conrado Potenciano and binding upon the property in litigation;

(c) That appellants were not co-owners of said property, by inheritance of one-half of the
same from their deceased mother Rufina Reyes;

(d) That appellants were not entitled to exercise the right of legal redemption (retracto legal)
of the other half of the property belonging to their father Conrado Potenciano;

(e) That the late Paz Yatco exercised her option to purchase the property in litigation within
the time she had to do so;

(f) That the consignation of the P4,000 in Japanese military notes, made with the Clerk of the
Court of First Instance of Laguna in payment of the property in question, was in accordance
with the law and relieved the heirs of the spouses Ocampo-Yatco from paying anew said
purchase price;

(g) Ordering defendant Conrado Potenciano to execute the corresponding deed of

conveyance, sufficient in law to transfer the title of the property in litigation to the heirs of the
deceased spouses Edilberto Ocampo and Paz Yatco; and

(h) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Laguna to cancel transfer certificate of title No. 18056
(Exhibit 1) and issue in lieu thereof a new transfer certificate of title for said property in favor
of the heirs of the spouses Edilberto Ocampo and Paz Yatco, upon payment by appellees of
the corresponding fees and the registration in his office of the deed of conveyance
mentioned in the next preceding paragraph.

This judgment that is now before us for review.

First thing to be noted is that the Court of Appeals found and it is not disputed that the pacto de
retro sale made by Edilberto Ocampo in favor of Conrado Potenciano and his wife was in reality a
loan with security or an equitable mortgage, with simulated rental for interest. Such being the case,
the lenders had no right, through the unilateral declaration of one or both them, to consolidate title in
themselves over the property given as security. The consolidation of title effected by Potenciano in
this case was, therefore, null and void.

The Court of Appeals, however, held that the mortgage contract was superseded, through novation,
by the option agreement for the repurchase of the property mortgaged, and the appellants now
contend that this war error because Potenciano had no authority to enter into that agreement after
the death of his wife. To this contention we have to agree. The Court of Appeals erred in supposing
that the surviving spouse had such authority as de factoadministrator of the conjugal estate. As
pointed out by appellants, the decisions relied on by that court in support of its view are now
obsolete. Those decisions laid down the rule that, upon the dissolution of the marriage by the death
of the wife, the husband must liquidate the partnership affairs. But the procedure has been changed
by Act No. 3176 (approved on November 24, 1924), now section 2, Rule 75, of the Rules of Court,
which provides that when the marriage is dissolved by the death of either husband or wife, the
partnership affairs must be liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse
(Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 3rd ed., Vol. II, p. 324).

Furthermore, there is ground to believe that, as alleged by the appellees, the option agreement in
question was nothing more than mere extension of time for the payment of the mortgagee debt,
since in the mind of the parties the real transaction had between them was that of loan with security,
or equitable mortgage, though as is usual in these cases, it was given the form of sale with right to
repurchase.

It follows from the foregoing that at the time Paz Yatco made the tender of payment and consigned
the necessary amount in court, the said contract of loan with security was still in effect, and as the
tender was made in legal currency (Haw Pia vs. China Banking Corporation,* 45 O.G. [Supp. 9] 229),
the tender and consignation must be held to produce their legal effect, which is that of relieving the
debtor from liability. (Art. 1176, Civil Code; Limkako vs. Teodoro, 74 Phil., 313.)

Under this view of the case, it is not necessary to consider the claim of the appellants Victor
Potenciano and Lourdes Potenciano and that the Court of Appeals erred in not declaring them
owners of the property in question, they having inherited one-half of it from their mother and
acquired the other half from their father in the exercise of their right of legal redemption as co-
owners. As ownership in the property never passed to their parents, these appellants acquired
nothing.

Wherefore, with the modifications of the judgment below, let judgment be entered, declaring the
obligation evidenced by Exhibit "A", which is hereby held to be mere contract of loan with security or
equitable mortgage, already discharged, and ordering the Register of Deeds of Laguna to cancel
transfer certificate of title No. 18056 and to issue in lieu thereof a new certificate of title for said
property in favor of the heirs of the spouses Edilberto Ocampo and Paz Yatco upon payment of the
corresponding fees. With costs against the appellants.

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-40502 November 29, 1976

VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, and HONORABLE SEVERO A. MALVAR, Presiding Judge, Court of
First Instance of Laguna, Branch Vl, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, * PRECIOSA B. GARCIA and AGUSTINA B.
GARCIA, respondents.

G.R. No. L-42670 November 29, 1976

VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE ERNANI C. PAÑO, Presiding Judge of Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon
City, Branch XVIII, and PRECIOSA B. GARCIA, respondents.

Francisco Carreon for petitioners.

Augusto G. Gatmaytan for private respondents.

MARTIN, J.:

These two interrelated cases bring to Us the question of what the word "resides" in Section 1,
Rule 73 of the Revised Rules Of Court, referring to the situs of the settlement of the estate of
deceased persons, means. Additionally, the rule in the appointment of a special administrator
is sought to be reviewed.

On May 2, 1973, Virginia G. Fule filed with the Court of First Instance of Laguna, at Calamba,
presided over by Judge Severo A. Malvar, a petition for letters of administration, docketed as
Sp. Proc. No. 27-C, alleging, inter alia, "that on April 26, 1973, Amado G. Garcia, a property
owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the City of Manila, leaving real estate and
personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other places, within the jurisdiction of the
Honorable Court." At the same time, she moved
ex parte for her appointment as special administratrix over the estate. On even date, May 2,
1973, Judge Malvar granted the motion.

A motion for reconsideration was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on May 8, 1973, contending that
the order appointing Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix was issued without
jurisdiction, since no notice of the petition for letters of administration has been served upon
all persons interested in the estate; there has been no delay or cause for delay in the
proceedings for the appointment of a regular administrator as the surviving spouse of Amado
G. Garcia, she should be preferred in the appointment of a special administratrix; and,
Virginia G. Fule is a debtor of the estate of Amado G. Garcia. Preciosa B. Garcia, therefore,
prayed that she be appointed special administratrix of the estate, in lieu of Virginia G. Fule,
and as regular administratrix after due hearing.

While this reconsideration motion was pending resolution before the Court, Preciosa B.
Garcia filed on May 29, 1973 a motion to remove Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix
alleging, besides the jurisdictional ground raised in the motion for reconsideration of May 8,
1973 that her appointment was obtained through erroneous, misleading and/or incomplete
misrepresentations; that Virginia G. Fule has adverse interest against the estate; and that she
has shown herself unsuitable as administratrix and as officer of the court.
In the meantime, the notice of hearing of the petition for letters of administration filed by
Virginia G. Fule with the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, was published on May
17, 24, and 31, 1973, in the Bayanihan, a weekly publication of general circulation in Southern
Luzon.

On June 6, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia received a "Supplemental Petition for the Appointment of
Regular Administrator ' filed by Virginia G. Fule. This supplemental petition modified the
original petition in four aspects: (1) the allegation that during the lifetime of the deceased
Amado G. Garcia, he was elected as Constitutional Delegate for the First District of Laguna
and his last place of residence was at Calamba, Laguna; (2) the deletion of the names of
Preciosa B. Garcia and Agustina Garcia as legal heirs of Amado G. Garcia; (3) the allegation
that Carolina Carpio, who was simply listed as heir in the original petition, is the surviving
spouse of Amado G. Garcia and that she has expressly renounced her preferential right to
the administration of the estate in favor of Virginia G. Fule; and (4) that Virginia G. Fule be
appointed as the regular administratrix. The admission of this supplemental petition was
opposed by Preciosa B. Garcia for the reason, among others, that it attempts to confer
jurisdiction on the Court of First Instance of Laguna, of which the court was not possessed at
the beginning because the original petition was deficient.

On July 19, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed an opposition to the original and supplemental
petitions for letters of administration, raising the issues of jurisdiction, venue, lack of interest
of Virginia G. Fule in the estate of Amado G. Garcia, and disqualification of Virginia G Fule as
special administratrix.

An omnibus motion was filed by Virginia G. Fule on August 20, 1973, praying for authority to
take possession of properties of the decedent allegedly in the hands of third persons as well
as to secure cash advances from the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing
Association, Inc. Preciosa B. Garcia opposed the motion, calling attention to the limitation
made by Judge Malvar on the power of the special administratrix, viz., "to making an
inventory of the personal and real properties making up the state of the deceased."

However, by July 2, 1973, Judge Malvar and already issued an order, received by Preciosa B.
Garcia only on July 31, 1973, denying the motion of Preciosa B. Garcia to reconsider the
order of May 2, 1973, appointing Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix, and admitting the
supplementation petition of May 18,1973.

On August 31, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia moved to dismiss the petition, because (1)
jurisdiction over the petition or over the parties in interest has not been acquired by the
court; (2) venue was improperly laid; and (3) Virginia G. Fule is not a party in interest as she
is not entitled to inherit from the deceased Amado G. Garcia.

On September 28, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed a supplemental motion to substitute Virginia
G. Fule as special administratrix, reasoning that the said Virginia G. Fule admitted before
before the court that she is a full-blooded sister of Pablo G. Alcalde, an illegitimate son of
Andrea Alcalde, with whom the deceased Amado G. Garcia has no relation.

Three motions were filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on November 14, 1973, one, to enjoin the
special administratrix from taking possession of properties in the hands of third persons
which have not been determined as belonging to Amado G. Garcia; another, to remove the
special administratrix for acting outside her authority and against the interest of the estate;
and still another, filed in behalf of the minor Agustina B. Garcia, to dismiss the petition for
want of cause of action, jurisdiction, and improper venue.
On November 28, 1973, Judge Malvar resolved the pending omnibus motion of Virgina G.
Fule and the motion to dismiss filed by Preciosa B. Garcia. Resolving the motion to dismiss,
Judge Malvar ruled that the powers of the special administratrix are those provided for in
Section 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court, 1subject only to the previous qualification made by
the court that the administration of the properties subject of the marketing agreement with
the Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association should remain with the
latter; and that the special administratrix had already been authorized in a previous order of
August 20, 1973 to take custody and possession of all papers and certificates of title and
personal effects of the decedent with the Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing
Association, Inc. Ramon Mercado, of the Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing
Association, Inc., was ordered to deliver to Preciosa B. Garcia all certificates of title in her
name without any qualifying words like "married to Amado Garcia" does not appear.
Regarding the motion to dismiss, Judge Malvar ruled that the issue of jurisdiction had
already been resolved in the order of July 2, 1973, denying Preciosa B. Garcia's motion to
reconsider the appointment of Virginia G. Fule and admitting the supplemental petition, the
failure of Virginia G. Fule to allege in her original petition for letters of administration in the
place of residence of the decedent at the time of his death was cured. Judge Malvar further
held that Preciosa B. Garcia had submitted to the jurisdiction of the court and had waived her
objections thereto by praying to be appointed as special and regular administratrix of the
estate.

An omnibus motion was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on December 27, 1973 to clarify or
reconsider the foregoing order of Judge Malvar, in view of previous court order limiting the
authority of the special administratrix to the making of an inventory. Preciosa B. Garcia also
asked for the resolution of her motion to dismiss the petitions for lack of cause of action, and
also that filed in behalf of Agustina B. Garcia. Resolution of her motions to substitute and
remove the special administratrix was likewise prayed for.

On December 19, 1973, Judge Malvar issued two separate orders, the first, denying Preciosa
B. Garcia's motions to substitute and remove the special administratrix, and the second,
holding that the power allowed the special administratrix enables her to conduct and submit
an inventory of the assets of the estate.

On January 7, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia moved for reconsideration of the foregoing orders of
November 28, 1973 and December 19, 1973, insofar as they sustained or failed to rule on the
issues raised by her: (a) legal standing (cause of action) of Virginia G. Fule; (b) venue; (c)
jurisdiction; (d) appointment, qualification and removal of special administratrix; and (e)
delivery to the special administratrix of checks and papers and effects in the office of the
Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.

On March 27, 1973, Judge Malvar issued the first questioned order denying Preciosa B.
Garcia's motion for reconsideration of January 7, 1974. On July 19, 1974, Judge Malvar
issued the other three questioned orders: one, directing Ramon Mercado, of the Calamba
Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc., to furnish Virginia G. Fule, as special
administratrix, copy of the statement of accounts and final liquidation of sugar pool, as well
as to deliver to her the corresponding amount due the estate; another, directing Preciosa B.
Garcia to deliver to Virginia G. Fule two motor vehicles presumably belonging to the estate;
and another, directing Ramon Mercado to deliver to the court all certificates of title in his
possession in the name of Preciosa B. Garcia, whether qualified with the word "single" or
"married to Amado Garcia."
During the hearing of the various incidents of this case (Sp. Proc. 27-C) before Judge
Malvar, 2 Virginia G. Fule presented the death certificate of Amado G. Garcia showing that his
residence at the time of his death was Quezon City. On her part, Preciosa B. Garcia presented
the residence certificate of the decedent for 1973 showing that three months before his death
his residence was in Quezon City. Virginia G. Fule also testified that Amado G. Garcia was
residing in Calamba, Laguna at the time of his death, and that he was a delegate to the 1971
Constitutional Convention for the first district of Laguna.

On July 26, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia and Agustina B. Garcia commenced a special action for
certiorari and/or prohibition and preliminary injunction before the Court of Appeals, docketed
as CA-G.R. No. 03221-SP. primarily to annul the proceedings before Judge Malvar in Sp. Proc.
No. 27-C of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, or, in the alternative, to vacate the
questioned four orders of that court, viz., one dated March 27, 1974, denying their motion for
reconsideration of the order denying their motion to dismiss the criminal and supplemental
petitions on the issue, among others, of jurisdiction, and the three others, all dated July 19,
1974, directing the delivery of certain properties to the special administratrix, Virginia G. Fule,
and to the court.

On January 30, 1975, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment annulling the proceedings
before Judge Severo A. Malvar in Sp. Proc. 27-C of the Court of First Instance of Calamba,
Laguna, for lack of jurisdiction.

Denied of their motion for reconsideration on March 31, 1975, Virginia G. Fule forthwith
elevated the matter to Us on appeal by certiorari. The case was docketed as G.R. No. L-40502.

However, even before Virginia G. Fule could receive the decision of the Court of Appeals,
Preciosa B. Garcia had already filed on February 1, 1975 a petition for letters of
administration before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, docketed as
Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738, over the same intestate estate of Amado G. Garcia. On February 10,
1975, Preciosa B. Garcia urgently moved for her appointment as special administratrix of the
estate. Judge Vicente G. Ericta granted the motion and appointed Preciosa B. Garcia as
special administratrix upon a bond of P30,000.00. Preciosa B. Garcia qualified and assumed
the office.

For the first time, on February 14, 1975, Preciosa B. Garcia informed Judge Ericta of the
pendency of Sp. Proc. No. 27-C before Judge Malvar of the Court of First Instance of Laguna,
and the annulment of the proceedings therein by the Court of Appeals on January 30, 1975.
She manifested, however, her willingness to withdraw Sp. Proc. Q-19738 should the decision
of the Court of Appeals annulling the proceedings before the Court of First Instance of
Laguna in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C have not yet become final, it being the subject of a motion for
reconsideration.

On March 10, 1973, Judge Ericta ordered the suspension of the proceedings before his court
until Preciosa B. Garcia inform the court of the final outcome of the case pending before the
Court of Appeals. This notwithstanding, Preciosa B. Garcia filed on December 11, 1975, an
"Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations."

On December 13, 1975, Virginia G. Fule filed a "Special Appearance to Question Venue and
Jurisdiction" reiterating the grounds stated in the previous special appearance of March 3,
1975, and calling attention that the decision of the Court of Appeals and its resolution
denying the motion for reconsideration had been appealed to this Court; that the parties had
already filed their respective briefs; and that the case is still pending before the Court.
On December 17, 1975, Judge Ernani Cruz Pano, who succeeded Judge Ericta, issued an
order granting Preciosa B. Garcia's "Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations"
in that the payments were for the benefit of the estate and that there hangs a cloud of doubt
on the validity of the proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C of the Court of First Instance of
Laguna.

A compliance of this Order was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on January 12,1976.

On February 4,1974, VIRGINIA G. FULE instituted G.R. No. L-42670, a petition for certiorari
with temporary restraining order, to annul the proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738 and to
restrain Judge Ernani Cruz Paño from further acting in the case. A restraining order was
issued on February 9, 1976.

We dismiss the appeal in G.R. No. L-40502 and the petition for certiorari in G.R. No. L-
42670 for the reasons and considerations hereinafter stated.

1. Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: "If the decedent is an inhabitant
of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be
proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First
Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant
of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The
court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as
it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not
be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case,
or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record." With particular regard to letters of
administration, Section 2, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court demands that the petition
therefor should affirmatively show the existence of jurisdiction to make the appointment
sought, and should allege all the necessary facts, such as death, the name and last
residence of the decedent, the existence, and situs if need be, of assets, intestacy, where this
is relied upon, and the right of the person who seeks administration, as next of kin, creditor,
or otherwise, to be appointed. The fact of death of the intestate and his last residence within
the country are foundation facts upon which all subsequent proceedings in the
administration of the estate rest, and that if the intestate was not an inhabitant of the state at
the time of his death, and left no assets in the state, no jurisdiction is conferred on the court
to grant letters of administration. 3

The aforequoted Section 1, Rule 73 (formerly Rule 75, Section 1), specifically the clause "so far as it
depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of the estate," is in reality a
matter of venue, as the caption of the Rule indicates: "Settlement of Estate of Deceased
Persons. Venue and Processes. 4 It could not have been intended to define the jurisdiction over the
subject matter, because such legal provision is contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with
procedural matters. Procedure is one thing; jurisdiction over the subject matter is another. The
power or authority of the court over the subject matter "existed and was fixed before procedure in a
given cause began." That power or authority is not altered or changed by procedure, which simply
directs the manner in which the power or authority shall be fully and justly exercised. There are
cases though that if the power is not exercised conformably with the provisions of the procedural
law, purely, the court attempting to exercise it loses the power to exercise it legally. However, this
does not amount to a loss of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Rather, it means that the court may
thereby lose jurisdiction over the person or that the judgment may thereby be rendered defective for
lack of something essential to sustain it. The appearance of this provision in the procedural law at
once raises a strong presumption that it has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the court over the
subject matter. In plain words, it is just a matter of method, of convenience to the parties. 5

The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, confers upon Courts of First Instance jurisdiction over all
probate cases independently of the place of residence of the deceased. Because of the existence of
numerous Courts of First Instance in the country, the Rules of Court, however, purposedly fixes the
venue or the place where each case shall be brought. A fortiori, the place of residence of the
deceased in settlement of estates, probate of will, and issuance of letters of administration does not
constitute an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter. It is merely constitutive of venue. And it
is upon this reason that the Revised Rules of Court properly considers the province where the estate
of a deceased person shall be settled as "venue." 6

2. But, the far-ranging question is this: What does the term "resides" mean? Does it refer to the
actual residence or domicile of the decedent at the time of his death? We lay down the doctrinal rule
that the term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal
residence or domicile." This term "resides," like, the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and
should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is
employed. 7 In the application of venue statutes and rules — Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules
of Court is of such nature — residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the
statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the
technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but
as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same
meaning as the term "inhabitant." 8 In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its
popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or
place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular
sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or
domicile. 9Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while
domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile. 10 No
particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than
temporary. 11

3. Divergent claims are maintained by Virginia G. Fule and Preciosa B. Garcia on the residence of
the deceased Amado G. Garcia at the time of his death. In her original petition for letters of
administration before the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, Virginia G. Fule measely
stated "(t)hat on April 26,1973, Amado G. Garcia, a property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died
intestate in the City of Manila, leaving real estate and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and
in other places within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court." Preciosa B. Garcia assailed the
petition for failure to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement and improper laying of venue. For her, the
quoted statement avers no domicile or residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia. To say that as
"property owner of Calamba, Laguna," he also resides in Calamba, Laguna, is, according to her, non
sequitur. On the contrary, Preciosa B. Garcia claims that, as appearing in his death certificate
presented by Virginia G. Fule herself before the Calamba court and in other papers, the last
residence of Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City.
Parenthetically, in her amended petition, Virginia G. Fule categorically alleged that Amado G.
Garcia's "last place of residence was at Calamba, Laguna."

On this issue, We rule that the last place of residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia was at 11
Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City, and not at Calamba, Laguna. A death certificate
is admissible to prove the residence of the decedent at the time of his death. 12 As it is, the death
certificate of Amado G. Garcia, which was presented in evidence by Virginia G. Fule herself and also
by Preciosa B. Garcia, shows that his last place of residence was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel
Subdivision, Quezon City. Aside from this, the deceased's residence certificate for 1973 obtained
three months before his death; the Marketing Agreement and Power of Attorney dated November
12, 1971 turning over the administration of his two parcels of sugar land to the Calamba Sugar
Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.; the Deed of Donation dated January 8, 1973,
transferring part of his interest in certain parcels of land in Calamba, Laguna to Agustina B. Garcia;
and certificates of titles covering parcels of land in Calamba, Laguna, show in bold documents that
Amado G. Garcia's last place of residence was at Quezon City. Withal, the conclusion becomes
imperative that the venue for Virginia C. Fule's petition for letters of administration was improperly
laid in the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna. Nevertheless, the long-settled rule is that
objection to improper venue is subject to waiver. Section 4, Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court
states: "When improper venue is not objected to in a motion to dismiss, it is deemed waived." In the
case before Us the Court of Appeals had reason to hold that in asking to substitute Virginia G. Fule
as special administratrix, Preciosa B. Garcia did not necessarily waive her objection to the
jurisdiction or venue assumed by the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, but availed of a
mere practical resort to alternative remedy to assert her rights as surviving spouse, while insisting on
the enforcement of the Rule fixing the proper venue of the proceedings at the last residence of the
decedent.

4. Preciosa B. Garcia's challenge to Virginia G. Fule's appointment as special administratrix is

another issue of perplexity. Preciosa B. Garcia claims preference to the appointment as surviving
spouse. Section 1 of Rule 80 provides that "(w)hen there is delay in granting letters testamentary or
of administration by any cause including an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will, the
court may appoint a special administrator to take possession and charge of the estate of the
deceased until the questions causing the delay are decided and executors or administrators
appointed. 13 Formerly, the appointment of a special administrator was only proper when the
allowance or disallowance of a will is under appeal. The new Rules, however, broadened the basis
for appointment and such appointment is now allowed when there is delay in granting letters
testamentary or administration by any cause e.g., parties cannot agree among
themselves. 14 Nevertheless, the discretion to appoint a special administrator or not lies in the
probate court. 15 That, however, is no authority for the judge to become partial, or to make his
personal likes and dislikes prevail over, or his passions to rule, his judgment. Exercise of that
discretion must be based on reason, equity, justice and legal principle. There is no reason why the
same fundamental and legal principles governing the choice of a regular administrator should not be
taken into account in the appointment of a special administrator. 16 Nothing is wrong for the judge to
consider the order of preference in the appointment of a regular administrator in appointing a special
administrator. After all, the consideration that overrides all others in this respect is the beneficial
interest of the appointee in the estate of the decedent. 17 Under the law, the widow would have the
right of succession over a portion of the exclusive property of the decedent, besides her share in the
conjugal partnership. For such reason, she would have as such, if not more, interest in administering
the entire estate correctly than any other next of kin. The good or bad administration of a property
may affect rather the fruits than the naked ownership of a property. 18

Virginia G. Fule, however, disputes the status of Preciosa B. Garcia as the widow of the late Amado
G. Garcia. With equal force, Preciosa B. Garcia maintains that Virginia G. Fule has no relation
whatsoever with Amado G. Garcia, or that, she is a mere illegitimate sister of the latter, incapable of
any successional rights. 19 On this point, We rule that Preciosa B. Garcia is prima facie entitled to the
appointment of special administratrix. It needs be emphasized that in the issuance of such
appointment, which is but temporary and subsists only until a regular administrator is
appointed, 20 the appointing court does not determine who are entitled to share in the estate of the
decedent but who is entitled to the administration. The issue of heirship is one to be determined in
the decree of distribution, and the findings of the court on the relationship of the parties in the
administration as to be the basis of distribution. 21The preference of Preciosa B. Garcia is with
sufficient reason. In a Donation Inter Vivos executed by the deceased Amado G. Garcia on January
8, 1973 in favor of Agustina B. Garcia, he indicated therein that he is married to Preciosa B.
Garcia. 22 In his certificate of candidacy for the office of Delegate to the Constitutional Convention for
the First District of Laguna filed on September 1, 1970, he wrote therein the name of Preciosa B.
Banaticla as his spouse. 23 Faced with these documents and the presumption that a man and a
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage,
Preciosa B. Garcia can be reasonably believed to be the surviving spouse of the late Amado G.
Garcia. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. 24

5. Under these circumstances and the doctrine laid down in Cuenco vs. Court of Appeals, 25 this
Court under its supervisory authority over all inferior courts may properly decree that venue in the
instant case was properly assumed by and transferred to Quezon City and that it is in the interest of
justice and avoidance of needless delay that the Quezon City court's exercise of jurisdiction over the
settlement of the estate of the deceased Amado G. Garcia and the appointment of special
administratrix over the latter's estate be approved and authorized and the Court of First Instance of
Laguna be disauthorized from continuing with the case and instead be required to transfer all the
records thereof to the Court of First Instance of Quezon City for the continuation of the proceedings.

6. Accordingly, the Order of Judge Ernani Cruz Pano of December 17, 1975, granting the "Urgent
Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations" filed by Preciosa B. Garcia in Sp. Proc. No. Q-
19738, subject matter of G.R. No. L-42670, and ordering the Canlubang Sugar Estate to deliver to
her as special administratrix the sum of P48,874.70 for payment of the sum of estate obligations is
hereby upheld.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petitions of petitioner Virginia Garcia Fule in G.R. No. L-40502
and in G.R. No. L42670 are hereby denied, with costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.