AMPATUAN v.

PUNO

FACTS:
On November 24, 2009, the day after the gruesome massacre of 57 men and women, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
issued Proclamation 1946, placing “the Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato under a state of
emergency.” She directed the AFP and the PNP “to undertake such measures as may be allowed by the Constitution and by law to
prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence” in the named places. Under AO 273, she also delegated to the DILG the
supervision of the ARMM.
The petitioners claimed that the President’s issuances encroached the ARMM’s autonomy, that it constitutes an invalid exercise of
emergency powers, and that the President had no factual basis for declaring a state of emergency, especially in the Province of
Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato, where no critical violent incidents occurred. They want Proc. 1946 and AO 273 be declared
unconstitutional.
The respondents, however, said that its purpose was not to deprive the ARMM of its autonomy, but to restore peace and order in
subject places. It is pursuant to her “calling out” power as Commander-in-Chief. The determination of the need to exercise this
power rests solely on her wisdom.
The President merely delegated her supervisory powers over the ARMM to the DILG Secretary who was her alter ego any way. The
delegation was necessary to facilitate the investigation of the mass killings

ISSUE:
WON President Arroyo invalidly exercised emergency powers when she called out the AFP and the PNP to prevent and suppress all
incidents of lawless violence in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City
HELD: NO. The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency in the three places mentioned. And she
did not act pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that authorized her to exercise extraordinary powers. The calling out of the
armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in such places is a power that the Constitution directly vests in the President.
She did not need a congressional authority to exercise the same.
ISSUE (2): WON there is factual basis on the calling out of the Armed Forces.
HELD: Yes. The President’s call on the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence springs from the power vested in her
under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution. While it is true that the Court may inquire into the factual bases for the President’s
exercise of the above power, unless it is shown that such determination was attended by grave abuse of discretion, the Court will
accord respect to the President’s judgment.
Randolf David vs President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
489 SCRA 160 – Political Law – The Executive Branch – Presidential Proclamation 1017 – Take Care Clause – Take Over Power –
Calling Out Power
Bill of Rights - Freedom of Speech – Overbreadth

In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the discovery of a plan (Oplan Hackle I) to assassinate the
president, then president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) issued Presidential Proclamation 1017 (PP1017) and is to be implemented
by General Order No. 5 (GO 5). The said law was aimed to suppress lawlessness and the connivance of extremists to bring down the
government.
Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the same time revoked all permits issued for rallies and
other public organization/meeting. Notwithstanding the cancellation of their rally permit, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) head Randolf
David proceeded to rally which led to his arrest.
Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is the editor, was raided by the CIDG and they seized and confiscated anti-
GMA articles and write ups. Later still, another known anti-GMA news agency (Malaya) was raided and seized. On the same day,
Beltran of Anakpawis, was also arrested. His arrest was however grounded on a warrant of arrest issued way back in 1985 for his
actions against Marcos. His supporters cannot visit him in jail because of the current imposition of PP 1017 and GO 5.
In March, GMA issued PP 1021 which declared that the state of national emergency ceased to exist. David and some opposition
Congressmen averred that PP1017 is unconstitutional for it has no factual basis and it cannot be validly declared by the president for
such power is reposed in Congress. Also such declaration is actually a declaration of martial law. Olivares-Cacho also averred that
the emergency contemplated in the Constitution are those of natural calamities and that such is an overbreadth. Petitioners claim
that PP 1017 is an overbreadth because it encroaches upon protected and unprotected rights. The Sol-Gen argued that the issue has
become moot and academic by reason of the lifting of PP 1017 by virtue of the declaration of PP 1021. The Sol-Gen averred that PP
1017 is within the president’s calling out power, take care power and take over power.

ISSUE: Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional.

HELD: PP 1017 and its implementing GO are partly constitutional and partly unconstitutional.
The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by reason of the lifting of the questioned PP. It is still in fact operative
because there are parties still affected due to the alleged violation of the said PP. Hence, the SC can take cognition of the case at bar.
The SC ruled that PP 1017 is constitutional in part and at the same time some provisions of which are unconstitutional. The SC ruled
in the following way;
Resolution by the SC on the Factual Basis of its declaration
The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has no factual basis in issuing PP 1017 and GO 5. A reading of the Solicitor
General’s Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017,
with supporting reports forming part of the records. Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the
Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the reproving statements from the
communist leaders. There was also the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security Group of the Philippine Army showing the
growing alliance between the NPA and the military. Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary
allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid. Indeed, judging the
seriousness of the incidents, GMA was not expected to simply fold her arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she
believed was lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. However, the exercise of such power or duty must not stifle liberty.
Resolution by the SC on the Overbreadth Theory
First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing ‘on their faces’ statutes in free speech cases.
The 7 consolidated cases at bar are not primarily ‘freedom of speech’ cases. Also, a plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not
primarily directed to speech or even speech-related conduct. It is actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of
lawless violence. Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law that ‘reflects legitimate state
interest in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct.’ Undoubtedly, lawless violence,
insurrection and rebellion are considered ‘harmful’ and ‘constitutionally unprotected conduct.’ Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are
entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only ‘spoken words’ and again, that ‘overbreadth
claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to
protected conduct.’ Here, the incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which
is manifestly subject to state regulation.
Resolution by the SC on the Calling Out Power Doctrine
On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA declared PP 1017. The SC considered the President’s ‘calling-out’ power as a
discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed that ‘this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was
exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. The
SC ruled that GMA has validly declared PP 1017 for the Constitution grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a ‘sequence’ of
graduated powers. From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial Law. The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that
‘whenever it becomes necessary,’ the President may call the armed forces ‘to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion.’ And such criterion has been met.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Care Doctrine
Pursuant to the 2nd sentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution (He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.) the president
declared PP 1017. David et al averred that PP 1017 however violated Sec 1, Art 6 of the Constitution for it arrogated legislative
power to the President. Such power is vested in Congress. They assail the clause ‘to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all
decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction.’ The SC noted that such provision is similar to
the power that granted former President Marcos legislative powers (as provided in PP 1081). The SC ruled that the assailed PP 1017
is unconstitutional insofar as it grants GMA the authority to promulgate ‘decrees.’ Legislative power is peculiarly within the province
of the Legislature. Sec 1, Article 6 categorically states that ‘[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines
which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.’ To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state
of emergency can justify GMA’[s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees. The president can only “take care” of the carrying
out of laws but cannot create or enact laws.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Over Power Doctrine
The president cannot validly order the taking over of private corporations or institutions such as the Daily Tribune without any
authority from Congress. On the other hand, the word emergency contemplated in the constitution is not limited to natural
calamities but rather it also includes rebellion. The SC made a distinction; the president can declare the state of national emergency
but her exercise of emergency powers does not come automatically after it for such exercise needs authority from Congress. The
authority from Congress must be based on the following:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.
Resolution by the SC on the Issue that PP 1017 is a Martial Law Declaration
The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law declaration and is not tantamount to it. It is a valid exercise of the calling out power of
the president by the president.
Felix Barcelon vs Colonel Baker of the Philippine Constabulary
Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ Habeas Corpus as a Political Question being a Prerogative by the President

In the early 1900’s in Batangas, Barcelon was detained by orders of Baker. Barcelon’s lawyers petitioned before the court for a writ
of habeas corpus demanding Barcelon and Thompson, one of his men, to explain why Barcelon was detained. They alleged that
there is no legal authority behind Barcelon’s arrest and it was w/o due process. The Atty-Gen averred that Baker et al acted only
pursuant to the Gov-Gen’s resolution in 1905 which suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Cavite and Batangas (Sec
5 of The Philippine Bill). Barcelon argued that there is no rebellion or invasion or insurrection during his arrest hence he should be
set free.

ISSUE: Whether or not Barcelon was arrested w/ due process.

HELD: The SC held that the issue is a political question. Only the president can determine the existence of the grounds specified in
the Constitution for the suspension o the privilege o the writ of habeas corpus. This power is discretionary and therefore not
justiciable. The president has superior competence to assess the peace and order condition of the country. Hence, the
determination held by the president (GG) of the Philippines of the existence of any of the grounds prescribed by the Constitution for
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus should be conclusive upon the courts. The justification was that the
president (GG), with all the intelligence sources available to him as commander-in-chief, was in a better position than the SC to
ascertain the real state of peace and order in the country.

Marcelo Montenegro vs Castañeda

Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ Habeas Corpus as a Political Question being a Prerogative by the President

In October 1950, Montenegro’s son was arrested by military agents. Three days after the arrest, PP 210 was proclaimed suspending
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Montenegro then filed before the court to have his son be set free for his arrest was w/o
cause and that the said PP should not be applied retroactively to his son for it would then constitute a violation of the constitutional
prohibition against bill of attainders. Montenegro then filed a petition for the writ of habeas corpus demanding the detainers to
bring his son’s body and explain his detention. Castaňeda et al argued that the court has no judicial authority over the matter
invoking the PP and the previous ruling in Barcelon vs Baker.

ISSUE: Whether or not Montenegro’s petition should be granted.

HELD: As ruled by the SC in the Barcelon case, Montenegro’s petition is likewise denied. The constitutional authority of the President
to suspend in case of imminent danger of invasion, insurrection or rebellion under Article 7 may not correctly be placed in doubt.

Teodosio Lansang et al vs Brig-Gen Garcia

Abandonment of the Doctrine Held in the Barcelon Case & the Montenegro Case
Due to the throwing of two hand grenades in a Liberal Party caucus in 1971 causing the death of 8 people, Marcos issued PP 889
which suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Marcos urged that there is a need to curtail the growth of Maoist
groups. Subsequently, Lansang et al were invited by the PC headed by Garcia for interrogation and investigation. Lansang et al
questioned the validity of the suspension of the writ averring that the suspension does not meet the constitutional requisites.

ISSUE: Whether or not the suspension is constitutional.

HELD: The doctrine established in Barcelon and Montenegro was subsequently abandoned in this case where the SC declared that it
had the power to inquire into the factual basis of the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus by Marcos in Aug 1971
and to annul the same if no legal ground could be established. Accordingly, hearings were conducted to receive evidence on this
matter, including two closed-door sessions in which relevant classified information was divulged by the government to the members
of the SC and 3 selected lawyers of the petitioners. In the end, after satisfying itself that there was actually a massive and systematic
Communist-oriented campaign to overthrow the government by force, as claimed by Marcos, the SC unanimously decided to uphold
the suspension of the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus.
 Josefina Garcia-Padilla vs Minister of Defense Juan Ponce Enrile et al
Reversal of the Lansang Doctrine & Reinstatement of the Montenegro Doctrine
In July 1982, Sabino Padilla, together w/ 8 others who were having a conference in a house in Bayombong, NV, were arrested by
members of the PC. The raid of the house was authorized by a search warrant issued by Judge Sayo. Josefina, mother of Sabino,
opposed the arrest averring that no warrant of arrest was issued but rather it was just a warrant of arrest hence the arrest of her son
and the others was w/o just cause. Sabino and companions together with 4 others were later transferred to a facility only the PCs
know. Josefina petitioned the court for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.

ISSUE: Whether or not the arrests done against Sabino et al is valid.

HELD: In a complete about face, the SC decision in the Lansang Case was reversed and the ruling in theBarcelon Case &
the Montenegro Case was again reinstated. The questioned power of the president to suspend the privilege of the WoHC was once
again held as discretionary in the president. The SC again reiterated that the suspension of the writ was a political question to be
resolved solely by the president. It was also noted that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus must, indeed,
carry with it the suspension of the right to bail, if the government’s campaign to suppress the rebellion is to be enhanced and
rendered effective. If the right to bail may be demanded during the continuance of the rebellion, and those arrested, captured and
detained in the course thereof will be released, they would, without the least doubt, rejoin their comrades in the field thereby
jeopardizing the success of government efforts to bring to an end the invasion, rebellion or insurrection.

NOTE: This ruling was abrogated by Sec 18, Art 7 of the 1987 Constitution which expressly constitutionalized the Lansang Doctrine.
Note as well that under Art 3 (Sec 13) of the Constitution it is stated that “the right to bail shall not be impaired even if the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.”

Horacio Morales Jr vs Minister of Defense Juan Ponce Enrile et al

Habeas Corpus – The Right to Bail
In April 1982, Morales and some others were arrested while driving a motor vehicle in Laong-Laan St, QC. They were charged in CFI
Rizal for rebellion punishable under the RPC. Morales alleged that they were arrested without any warrant of arrest; that their
constitutional rights were violated, among them the right to counsel, the right to remain silent, the right to a speedy and public trial,
and the right to bail. Respondents countered that the group of Morales were already under surveillance for some time before they
were arrested and that the warrantless arrest done is valid and at the same time the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was
already suspended.

ISSUE: Whether or not Morales et al can post bail.

HELD: Normally, rebellion being a non-capital offense is bailable. But because the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus remains
suspended “with respect to persons at present detained as well as other who may hereafter be similarly detained for the crimes of
insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and for all other crimes and offenses committed
by them in furtherance of or on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith,” the natural consequence is
that the right to bail for the commission of anyone of the said offenses is also suspended. To hold otherwise would defeat the very
purpose of the suspension. Therefore, where the offense for which the detainee was arrested is anyone of the said offenses he has
no right to bail even after the charges are filed in court. The crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such
crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct attacks on the life of
the State. Just as an individual has right to self-defense when his life is endangered, so does the State. The suspension of the
privilege of the writ is to enable the State to hold in preventive imprisonment pending investigation and trial those persons who plot
against it and commit acts that endanger the State’s very existence. For this measure of self-defense to be effective, the right to bail
must also be deemed suspended with respect to these offenses. However, there is a difference between preventive and punitive
imprisonment. Where the filing of charges in court or the trial of such charges already filed becomes protracted without any
justifiable reason, the detention becomes punitive in character and the detainee regains his right to freedom. Quite notable in this
case however is that the 2nd division of the SC reiterated the Lansang Doctrine as opposed to what they ruled in the Garcia-Padilla
Case.
 Olaguer vs Military Commission
Habeas Corpus
In 1979, Olaguer and some others were detained by military personnel and they were placed in Camp Bagong Diwa. Logauer and his
group are all civilians. They were charged with (1) unlawful possession of explosives and incendiary devices; (2) conspiracy to
assassinate President and Mrs. Marcos; (3) conspiracy to assassinate cabinet members Juan Ponce Enrile, Francisco Tatad and
Vicente Paterno; (4) conspiracy to assassinate Messrs. Arturo Tangco, Jose Roño and Onofre Corpus; (5) arson of nine buildings; (6)
attempted murder of Messrs. Leonardo Perez, Teodoro Valencia and Generals Romeo Espino and Fabian Ver; and (7) conspiracy and
proposal to commit rebellion, and inciting to rebellion. On August 19, 1980, the petitioners went to the SC and filed the instant
Petition for prohibition and habeas corpus.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus be granted.

HELD: The petition for habeas corpus has become moot and academic because by the time the case reached the SC Olaguer and his
companions were already released from military confinement. “When the release of the persons in whose behalf the application for
a writ of habeas corpus was filed is effected, the Petition for the issuance of the writ becomes moot and academic. 18 Inasmuch as
the herein petitioners have been released from their confinement in military detention centers, the instant Petitions for the issuance
of a writ of habeas corpus should be dismissed for having become moot and academic.” But the military court created to try the case
of Olaguer (and the decision it rendered) still continues to subsist.
ISSUE2: The issue is then shifted to: Whether or not a military tribunal has the jurisdiction to try civilians while the civil courts are
open and functioning.
HELD: The SC nullified for lack of jurisdiction all decisions rendered by the military courts or tribunals during the period of martial
law in all cases involving civilian defendants. A military commission or tribunal cannot try and exercise jurisdiction, even during the
period of martial law, over civilians for offenses allegedly committed by them as long as the civil courts are open and functioning,
and that any judgment rendered by such body relating to a civilian is null and void for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the military
tribunal concerned.

Rolando Abadilla vs Gen. Fidel Ramos

Habeas Corpus
Col. Abadilla was the head of the group that seized GMA 7 in 1987. A subsequent mutiny was done in Fort Bonifacio. The act was
infamously known as the Black Saturday Revolt. The mutiny failed and Abadilla was later detained. Ramos, the then Chief of Staff,
issued an order dropping the name of Abadilla from roll of regular officers in the military. Later, Susan, the wife of Abadilla, filed a
petition for the issuance of the WoHC together with their minor children. They questioned the validity of Abadilla’s detention. It was
alleged that when Col Abadilla was dropped from the rolls of officers effective May 9, 1987, he became a civilian and as such, the
order for his arrest and confinement is null and void because he was no longer subject to military law. His detention is illegal
because he is not charged with any criminal offense, either before a civil court or a court-martial

ISSUE: Whether or not the detention of Abadila is legal.

HELD: The fact that Colonel Abadilla was dropped from the rolls of officers cannot and should not lead to the conclusion that he is
now beyond the jurisdiction of the military authorities. If such a conclusion were to prevail, his very own refusal to clear his name
and protect his honor before his superior officers in the manner prescribed for and expected from a ranking military officer would be
his shield against prosecution in the first place. His refusal to report for duty or to surrender when ordered arrested, which led to his
name being dropped from the roll of regular officers of the military, cannot thereby render him beyond the jurisdiction of the
military courts for offenses he committed while still in the military service. Military jurisdiction had fully attached on Colonel Abadilla
inasmuch as proceedings were initiated against him before the termination of his service in the military. The record of the case
discloses that Col Abadilla has been charged by the military authorities for violation of Article of War (Mutiny or Sedition) which is a
serious offense, and the corresponding charge sheets have been prepared against him. The detention of Col Abadilla under the
circumstances obtaining in this case is not illegal. For this reason, the petition for habeas corpus should be dismissed for lack of
merit.
Juan Ponce Enrile vs Judge Salazar
Habeas Corpus – Right to Bail – Rebellion – SC Cannot Change Law

In February 1990, Sen Enrile was arrested. He was charged together with Mr. & Mrs. Panlilio, and Honasan for the crime of rebellion
with murder and multiple frustrated murder which allegedly occurred during their failed coup attempt. Enrile was then brought to
Camp Karingal. Enrile later filed for the habeas corpus alleging that the crime being charged against him is nonexistent. That he was
charged with a criminal offense in an information for which no complaint was initially filed or preliminary investigation was
conducted, hence was denied due process; denied his right to bail; and arrested and detained on the strength of a warrant issued
without the judge who issued it first having personally determined the existence of probable cause.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court should affirm the Hernandez ruling.

HELD: Enrile filed for habeas corpus because he was denied bail although ordinarily a charge of rebellion would entitle one for bail.
The crime of rebellion charged against him however is complexed with murder and multiple frustrated murders – the intention of
the prosecution was to make rebellion in its most serious form so as to make the penalty thereof in the maximum. The SC ruled that
there is no such crime as Rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder. What Enrile et al can be charged of would be Simple
Rebellion because other crimes such as murder or all those that may be necessary to the commission of rebellion is absorbed hence
he should be entitiled for bail. The SC however noted that a petition for habeas corpus was not the proper remedy so as to avail of
bail. The proper step that should have been taken was for Enrile to file a petition to be admitted for bail. He should have exhausted
all other efforts before petitioning for habeas corpus. The Hernandez ruling is still valid. All other crimes committed in carrying out
rebellion are deemed absorbed. The SC noted, however, that there may be a need to modify the rebellion law. Considering that the
essence of rebellion has been lost and that it is being used by a lo t of opportunists to attempt to grab power.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS JUDGE DONATO & RODOLFO SALAS

Habeas Corpus – Right to Bail – Rebellion

Salas aka NPA’s “Ka Bilog” was arrested and was charged for rebellion. He was charged together with the spouses Concepcion. Salas,
together with his co-accused later filed a petition for the WoHC. A conference was held thereafter to hear each party’s side. It was
later agreed upon by both parties that Salas will withdraw his petition for the WoHC and that he will remain in custody for the
continued investigation of the case and that he will face trial. The SC then, basing on the stipulations of the parties, held to dismiss
the habeas corpus case filed by Salas. But later on, Salas filed to be admitted for bail and Judge Donato approved his application for
bail. Judge Donato did not bother hearing the side of the prosecution. The prosecution argued that Salas is estopped from filing bail
because he has waived his right to bail when he withdrew his petition or habeas corpus as a sign of agreement that he will be held in
custody.

ISSUE: Whether or not Salas can still validly file for bail.

HELD: The SC ruled that Salas did waive his right to bail when he withdrew his petition for the issuance of the WoHC. The contention
of the defense that Salas merely agreed to be in custody and that the same does not constitute a waiver of his right to bail is not
tenable. His waiver to such right is justified by his act of withdrawing his petition for WoHC.

Aquino vs Minister of Defense Juan Ponce Enrile

Martial Law – Habeas Corpus – Power of the President to Order Arrests

Enrile (then Minister of National Defense), pursuant to the order of Marcos issued and ordered the arrest of a number of individuals
including Benigno Aquino Jr even without any charge against them. Hence, Aquino and some others filed for habeas corpus against
Juan Ponce Enrile. Enrile’s answer contained a common and special affirmative defense that the arrest is valid pursuant to Marcos’
declaration of Martial Law.

ISSUE: Whether or not Aquino’s detention is legal in accordance to the declaration of Martial Law.

HELD: The Constitution provides that in case of invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or imminent danger against the state, when
public safety requires it, the President may suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part
therein under Martial Law. In the case at bar, the state of rebellion plaguing the country has not yet disappeared, therefore, there is
a clear and imminent danger against the state. The arrest is then a valid exercise pursuant to the President’s order.
Benigno Aquino Jr. vs Military Commission No. 2, Chief of Staff, Chief Justice et al
Martial Law – Open Court Theory – Military Courts

In September 1972, after the declaration of Martial Law, Ninoy was arrested and was placed under custody. He was brought Fort
Bonifacio. He filed for the issuance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus which was denied by the SC. Ninoy then questioned the validity of
such denial and the declaration of martial law; at the same time he questioned the authority of the military court [No. 2] created
[pursuant to GO 2-A] to try him and his other companions. He was being charged for illegal possession of firearms, ammunition and
explosives. He was also being charged for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act and for murder. All were filed before the military
court. Ninoy argued that the military court has no jurisdiction or civilian courts are still operational.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ninoy can be validly charged before the military court.

HELD: The SC upheld the power of the president to create military tribunals or military courts which are authorized to try not only
military personnel but also civilians even at that time civil courts were open and functioning. The SC basically rejected the “open
court’ theory observed in the USA.

Roque Gumaua vs Maj. Gen. Romeo Espino

Martial Law as Valid Declaration– Military Courts – Constitutional Allowance

In 1972, a Chinaman was kidnapped by allegedly the group of a certain Sgt. Cordova. Gumaua, an ex – PC aided Cordova as he even
sheltered them in his sari-sari store. After surveillance, Gumaua’s house was raided and he was arrested. Since martial law is being
imposed at that time, Gumaua was held under the custody and trial of the military court [No. 2]. Gumaua then petitioned for
prohibition and mandamus with restraining order and preliminary injunction against Major General Romeo Espino as Chief of Staff
of the AFP and Military Commission No. 2, challenging the validity of the creation and jurisdiction over him as a civilian of
respondent Military Commission No. 2. He filed for habeas corpus and averred that (a) military tribunals cannot try civilians if civil
courts are open; (b) the President cannot deprive the civil courts of their jurisdiction to try criminal cases involving civilians; (c) as a
civilian, he is entitled even during Martial Law to his constitutional right to counsel during the preliminary investigation, to be
subject to the jurisdiction of the courts only upon his arrest or voluntary submission.

ISSUE: Whether or not Gumaua can be validly tried before the military court.

HELD: The SC first and foremost affirmed that the declaration of martial law is valid. The 1973 Constitution has been validly ratified
by the sovereign people and is now in full force and effect. Proclamation No. 1081 placing the entire country under martial law is
valid. That the proclamation of martial law automatically suspends the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus. That the President of
the Philippines, “as Commander-in-Chief and as enforcer or administrator of martial law, . . . can promulgate proclamations, orders
and decrees during the period of martial law essential to the security and preservation of the Republic, to the defense of the political
and social liberties of the people, and to the institution of reforms to prevent the resurgence of rebellion or insurrection or secession
or the threat thereof as well as to meet the impact of a worldwide recession, inflation or economic crisis which presently threatens
all nations including highly developed countries . . .” . That the President of the Philippines, as legislator during the period of martial
law, can legally create military commissions or courts martial to try, not only members of the armed forces, but also civilian
offenders, for specified offenses including kidnapping.
And finally, there is likewise ample proof that Sgt. Aguinaldo Cordova and Sgt. Barbelonio Casipi, co-accused of petitioners in the
kidnapping charge, belonged to the armed forces at the time of the commission of the crime, in much the same way that the
evidence demonstrates that petitioner Gumaua himself is a retired PC non-commissioned officer. Consequently, the trial of
petitioners Gumaua and Halasan before the respondent Military Commission No. 2, along with the two other accused who are
members of the Armed Forces is valid under General Orders Nos. 8.
Valentino Legaspi vs Minister of Finance
Other Options Available to the President Aside from Declaring Martial Law – Amendment No. 6

In 1982, after the lifting of Martial Law, Legaspi, then incumbent member of the interim Batasang Pambansa, petitioned to declare
Presidential Decree 1840 “granting tax amnesty and filing of statement of assets and liabilities and some other purposes”
unconstitutional. He argued that said decree was promulgated despite the fact that under the Constitution ‘(T)he Legislative power
shall be vested in a Batasang Pambansa’ (Sec. 1, Article VIII) and the President may grant amnesty only ‘with concurrence of the
Batasang Pambansa. In this case, there was no concurrence given by the IBP. Legaspi averred that since Martial Law is already lifted,
the president can no longer arbitrarily enact laws. At the same time, Legaspi averred that Amendment No. 6, which provides
legislative powers to Marcos, is invalid because that is no longer allowed after the lifting of the ML.

ISSUE: What are the possible options available to the president other than declaring martial law.

HELD: SC ruled PD 1840 to be valid. SC declared it must be emphatically made clear that explicitly the power that Amendment No. 6
vests upon the “President (Prime Minister)” are to be exercised only on two specified occasions, namely, (1) “when in (his judgment)
a grave emergency exists or there is a threat or imminence thereof” and (2) “whenever the interim Batasang Pambansa or the
regular National Assembly (now regular Batasang Pambansa) fails or is unable to act adequately on any matter for any reason that in
his judgment requires immediate action.” The power is to “issue necessary decrees, orders, or letters of instruction which shall form
part of the law of the land.” As the tenor of the amendment readily imparts, such power may be exercised even when the Batasan is
in session. Obviously, therefore, it is a power that is in the nature of the other powers which the Constitution directly confers upon
the President or allows to be delegated to him by the Batasan in times of crises and emergencies.
The SC also noted that Amendment No. 6 is a measure seen by the president to avoid declaring another martial law. There are also
other options that the president can recourse to; they are:
(a) emergency powers expressly delegated by the Batasan;
(b) call of the armed forces, who otherwise are supposed to be in the barracks;
(c) suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and
(d) martial law [being the last]
President must first exercise emergency powers as may be provided by the legislature. When it fails, it cannot be adequate when
lawless violence becomes generalized and public safety is in jeopardy, hence the need to call out the armed forces. And when such
situation still aggravates to the point of requiring the preventive incarceration or detention of certain leaders or over active
elements, it becomes inevitable to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Should matters really go out of hand even
after the putting into effect of the measures aforementioned, under the constitution, without Amendment No. 6, the only recourse
would be to proclaim martial law. But inasmuch as martial law is an extreme measure that carries with it repressive and restrictive
elements unpopular to liberty loving and democratically minded sectors of the country, it is but natural to think of it only as a very
last resort. Again, this is to avoid the necessity of resorting to the proclamation of martial law that Amendment No. 6 was conceived.
Paraphrasing President Marcos himself, martial law is the law of the gun, that implies coercion and an active and direct role in the
government by the military. Thus, the virtue of Amendment No. 6 is that such undesirable features of martial law do not have to
accompany the exercise of the power thereby conferred on the Executive. To be sure, the calling out of the armed forces and the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, which are concomitants of martial law, may be left out or need not be
resorted to when the President acts by virtue of such power. It is, therefore, evident that it is grossly erroneous to say that
Amendment No. 6 is in reality no less than disguised martial law.
Norberto Jimenez & Loreto Barrioquinto vs Fernandez
Amnesty Compared w/ Pardon – Admission Not Needed in Amnesty

Jimenez and Barrioquinto were charged for murder for the killings they made during the war. The case was proceeded against
Jimenez because Barrioquinto was nowhere to be found. Jimenez was then sentenced to life imprisonment. Before the period for
perfecting an appeal had expired, the defendant Jimenez became aware of Proclamation No. 8, which grants amnesty in favor of all
persons who may be charged with an act penalized under the RPC in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or against persons
aiding in the war efforts of the enemy. Barrioquinto learned about the proclamation and he surfaced in order to invoke amnesty as
well. However, Commissioner Fernandez of the 14th Amnesty Commission refused to process the amnesty request of the two
accused because the two refused to admit to the crime as charged. Jimenez & Barrioquinto in fact said that a certain Tolentino was
the one who committed the crime being charged to them.

ISSUE: Whether or not admission of guilt is necessary in amnesty.

HELD: Pardon is granted by the President and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned,
because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the President with the concurrence of Congress, and it
is a public act of which the courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is granted to
classes of persons or communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or after the institution of the criminal
prosecution and sometimes after conviction. Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense
of which he has been convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does “nor work the
restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the
pardon,” and it “in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence” (art 36,
RPC). While amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the
offense with which he is charged that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed
no offense.
In order to entitle a person to the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation, it is not necessary that he should, as a condition precedent
or sine qua non, admit having committed the criminal act or offense with which he is charged, and allege the amnesty as a defense;
it is sufficient that the evidence, either of the complainant or the accused, shows that the offense committed comes within the
terms of said Amnesty Proclamation. Hence, it is not correct to say that “invocation of the benefits of amnesty is in the nature of a
plea of confession and avoidance.” Although the accused does not confess the imputation against him, he may be declared by the
courts or the Amnesty Commissions entitled to the benefits of the amnesty. For, whether or not he admits or confesses having
committed the offense with which he is charged, the Commissions should, if necessary or requested by the interested party, conduct
summary hearing of the witnesses both for the complainants and the accused, on whether he has committed the offense in
furtherance of the resistance to the enemy, or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy, and decide whether he is
entitled to the benefits of amnesty and to be “regarded as a patriot or hero who have rendered invaluable services to the nation,” or
not, in accordance with the terms of the Amnesty Proclamation. Since the Amnesty Proclamation is a public act, the courts as well as
the Amnesty Commissions created thereby should take notice of the terms of said Proclamation and apply the benefits granted
therein to cases coming within their province or jurisdiction, whether pleaded or claimed by the person charged with such offenses
or not, if the evidence presented shows that the accused is entitled to said benefits.
Gaudencio Vera et al vs People of the Philippines
Amnesty – Reversal of the Doctrine Held in the Barrioquinto Case

Vera, together with 92 others were charged for the crime of kidnapping with murder done against a certain Lozaňes. The said crime
was committed allegedly to aid the Japanese occupation. During the hearing, none of the petitioners-defendants admitted having
committed the crime charged. In fact, Gaudencio Vera, the only defendant who took the witness stand, instead of admitting the
killing of the deceased Lozañes, categorically denied it. Hence, the Amnesty Commission held that it could not take cognizance of the
case, on the ground that the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation, could be invoked only by defendants in a criminal case who,
admitting the commission of the crime, plead that said commission was in pursuance of the resistance movement and perpetrated
against persons who aided the enemy during the Japanese occupation. Consequently, the Commission ordered that the case be
remanded to the court of origin for trial.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused can avail of amnesty sans admission of guilt.

HELD: It is rank inconsistency for appellant to justify an act, or seek forgiveness for an act which, according to him, he has not
committed. Amnesty presupposes the commission of a crime, and when an accused maintains that he has not committed a crime,
he cannot have any use for amnesty. Where an amnesty proclamation imposes certain conditions, as in this case, it is incumbent
upon the accused to prove the existence of such conditions. The invocation of amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession and
avoidance, which means that the pleader admits the allegations against him but disclaims liability therefor on account of intervening
facts which, if proved, would bring the crime charged within the scope of the amnesty proclamation. The present rule requires a
previous admission of guilt since a person would not need the benefit of amnesty unless he was, to begin with, guilty of the offense
covered by the proclamation.

Miguel Cristobal vs Alejo Labrador & Teofilo Santos

Pardon – Restoration of Civil & Political Rights
Santos was convicted of the crime of estafa. He was given pardon by the president but even prior to his pardon he was already
holding the position as the municipality president of Malabon notwithstanding his conviction. Cristobal, on the other hand, averred
that Santos should be excluded from the list of electors in Malabon because he was already convicted of final judgment “for any
crime against property”. This is pursuant to CA 357 of the New Election Code. The lower court presided by Labrador ruled that
Santos is exempt from the provision of the law by virtue of the pardon restoring the respondent to his “full civil and political rights,
except that with respect to the right to hold public office or employment, he will be eligible for appointment only to positions which
are clerical or manual in nature and involving no money or property responsibility.”

ISSUE: Whether or not Santos should not be excluded as an elector.

HELD: It should be observed that there are two limitations upon the exercise of this constitutional prerogative by the Chief
Executive, namely: (a) that the power be exercised after conviction; and (b) that such power does not extend cases of impeachment.
Subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative action.
It must remain where the sovereign authority has placed it and must be exercised by the highest authority to whom it is entrusted.
An absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed, but removes all disabilities resulting from the conviction. In the present
case, the disability is the result of conviction without which there would be no basis for disqualification from voting. Imprisonment is
not the only punishment which the law imposes upon those who violate its command. There are accessory and resultant disabilities,
and the pardoning power likewise extends to such disabilities. When granted after the term of imprisonment has expired, absolute
pardon removes all that is left of the consequences f conviction. In the present case, while the pardon extended to respondent
Santos is conditional in the sense that “he will be eligible for appointment only to positions which a e clerical or manual in nature
involving no money or property responsibility,” it is absolute insofar as it “restores the respondent to full civil and political rights.
Upon other hand, the suggestion that the disqualification imposed in par (b) of sec 94 of CA 357, does not fall within the purview of
the pardoning power of the president, would lead to the impairment of the pardoning power of the president, not contemplated in
the Constitution, and would lead furthermore to the result that there would be no way of restoring the political privilege in a case of
this nature except through legislative action.
People of the Philippines vs Benedicto Jose
Conditional Pardon – How it works after a change of sovereign

Jose was charged for violating Act 65 in 1944. Act 65 was an act of the Nat’l Assembly of RP while the Japanese were still occupying
the country. After serving 6 months or in April 1944, Jose was granted a conditional pardon – the simple condition was for him not to
violate any other Penal Laws of RP. Later he committed a crime of qualified theft. The Fiscal then went on to file an additional charge
against Jose for violating the conditions of the pardon granted him. Jose argued that he did not violate the pardon conditions at all
because there is no pardon at all. The pardon granted him is inoperative because the law he violated before was a political law
which was abrogated when the US army took over the country as proclaimed by MacArthur in Oct 1944.

ISSUE: Whether the defendant can now be prosecuted for having allegedly violated the conditional pardon granted by the President
of the so-called Republic of the Philippines.

HELD: The SC held that Jose cannot be prosecuted criminally for a violation of the conditional pardon granted by the President of the
so-called RP (during the Jap Occupation), for the following reasons: Because, without necessity of discussing and determining the
intrinsic validity of the conditional pardon, as an act done by the President of the so-called RP, after the restoration of the
Commonwealth Government, no elaborate argument is required to show that the effectivity of a conditional pardon depends on
that of the sentence which inflicts upon a defendant the punishment inflicted by the sentence ceases to be of any effect in so far as
the individual upon whom it is bestowed is concerned, for the latter cannot be required to serve a void sentence of penalty imposed
on him, even without such pardon.

Florencio Pelobello vs Gregorio Palatino

Absolute Pardon

Palatino was the mayor elect of Torrijos, Marinduque. Pelobello filed a quo warranto proceeding alleging that Palatino is no longer
qualified to hold office because he was already convicted before and was even imprisoned. Because of such conviction and
imprisonment, Peleobello averred that Palatino is already barred from voting and being voted upon. Palatino also invoked par (a),
sec 94 of the Election Code which supports his contention.

ISSUE: Whether or not Palatino is eligible for public office.

HELD: Yes, Palatino was granted a conditional pardon by the then Gov-Gen but such pardon was converted into an absolute pardon
by President Quezon who succeeded the Gov-Gen. The pardon was already after Palatino’s election but prior to him assuming office.
The SC then held that since there is an absolute pardon, all the former disabilities imposed and attached to the prior conviction had
been removed and that Palatino is therefore eligible for the public office in question.
People of the Philippines vs Eugenio Pasilan
Amnesty – when cannot be invoked – new trial

Pasilan was a former guerilla fighting against the Japanese. In 1944, while cleaning his gun outside the house of one Justina Miguel, a
certain Ciriaco Abarra passed by. Pasilan ordered Abarra to wait for him. Abarra waited and after cleaning his gun, Pasilan
interrogated Abarra. Abarra was alleged to be supporting the Japanese cause and he was one of the persons who accompanied the
Japanese troops in raiding the barrio where Pasilan lived. After interrogating, Pasilan inflicted upon Abarra 2 stab wounds on
Abarra’s chest. Abarra run away towards the river. Ten days later, the decaying body of Abarra was found. About 10 years after the
incident, Morales, an agent, was sent to the barrio to investigate crimes committed during the war. He conducted some
investigation and was also able to have Miguel testify against Pasilan and he later found Pasilan to be guilty for the murder of
Abarra. On July 29, 1964, Pasilan moved for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence which allegedly would reverse
the decision of the lower court. Alleged as newly discovered evidence are sworn statement attesting to Justina Miguel’s recantation.
Pasilan likewise seeks to avail of Proclamation No. 8 by President Roxas granting amnesty to persons who during the war committed
any act penalized under the RPC in furtherance of the resistance against the enemy or against person aiding in the war efforts of the
enemy.

ISSUE: Whether or not Pasilan is eligible to be admitted for amnesty.

HELD: Not every recantation of a witness entitles the accused to a new trial. Otherwise, the power to grant a new trial would rest
not in the courts but in the witnesses who have testified against the accused. Recanting testimony, furthermore, is exceedingly
unreliable. Since Justina Miguel’s alleged recantation has already been passed upon by the trial court, new trial is uncalled for.
Neither can the additional ground of amnesty entitle appellant to a new trial. In the first place, Proclamation No. 8 of President
Roxas is not a newly discovered evidence, for it was already known when the case was tried. Secondly, availing of the benefits
granted by the amnesty proclamation would be inconsistent with the plea of not guilty which appellant entered upon his
arraignment. Amnesty presupposes the commission of a crime, and when the accused maintains that he has not committed a crime,
he cannot avail of amnesty.

Legaspi vs Minister of Finance

Amnesty Does not Need Concurrence from Congress if the President Acts Pursuant to His Power to Legislate

In 1982, after the lifting of Martial Law, Legaspi, then incumbent member of the interim Batasang Pambansa, petitioned to declare
Presidential Decree 1840 “granting tax amnesty and filing of statement of assets and liabilities and some other purposes”
unconstitutional. He argued that said decree was promulgated despite the fact that under the Constitution ‘(T)he Legislative power
shall be vested in a Batasang Pambansa’ (Sec. 1, Article VIII) and the President may grant amnesty only ‘with concurrence of the
Batasang Pambansa. In this case, there was no concurrence given by the IBP. Legaspi averred that since Martial Law is already lifted,
the president can no longer arbitrarily enact laws. At the same time, Legaspi averred that Amendment No. 6, which provides
legislative powers to Marcos, is invalid because that is no longer allowed after the lifting of the ML.

ISSUE: Whether or not Marcos can validly grant tax amnesties w/o the concurrence of the Batasan Pambansa.

HELD: SC ruled PD 1840 to be valid. Legaspi argued that PD 1840 is invalid for it did not enjoy the concurrence of the Batasan. He
relies on Article 7, Sec 11 of the Constitution which provides that -
‘The President may, except in cases of impeachment, grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, remit fines and forfeitures and
with the concurrence of the Batasang Pambansa, grant amnesty.’
The SC noted that Article 7, sec. 11, applies only when the President is exercising his power of executive clemency. In the case at bar,
PD 1840 was issued pursuant to his power to legislate under Amendment No. 6. It ought to be indubitable that when the President
acts as legislator as in the case at bar, he does not need the concurrence of the Batasan. Rather, he exercises concurrent authority
vested by the Constitution.”
Salvacion Monsanto vs Deputy Exec Sec Fulgencio Factoran
Pardon Does not Extinguish Civil Liabilities & It is Prospective

Monsanto was the Asst Treasurer of Calbayug City. She was charged for the crime of Estafa through Falsification of Public
Documents. She was found guilty and was sentenced to jail. She was however granted pardon by Marcos. She then wrote a letter to
the Minister of Finance for her to be reinstated to her former position since it was still vacant. She was also requesting for back pays.
The Minister of Finance referred the issue to the Office of the President and Factoran denied Monsanto’s request averring that
Monsanto must first seek appointment and that the pardon does not reinstate her former position. Also, Monsanto avers that by
reason of the pardon, she should no longer be compelled to answer for the civil liabilities brought about by her acts.

ISSUE: Whether or not Monsanto should be reinstated to her former post.

HELD: A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for the past. It affords no relief for what has been
suffered by the offender. It does not impose upon the government any obligation to make reparation for what has been suffered.
“Since the offense has been established by judicial proceedings, that which has been done or suffered while they were in force is
presumed to have been rightfully done and justly suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be required.” This would explain why
petitioner, though pardoned, cannot be entitled to receive backpay for lost earnings and benefits. On the other hand, civil liability
arising from crime is governed by the RPC. It subsists notwithstanding service of sentence, or for any reason the sentence is not
served by pardon, amnesty or commutation of sentence. Petitioner’s civil liability may only be extinguished by the same causes
recognized in the Civil Code, namely: payment, loss of the thing due, remission of the debt, merger of the rights of creditor and
debtor, compensation and novation.

Rodolfo Llamas vs Exec Sec Orbos & Mariano Ocampo III

Pardon – Applicable to Administrative Cases

Ocampo III was the governor of Tarlac Province. Llamas together with some other complainants filed an administrative case against
Ocampo III for alleged acts constituting graft and corruption. Ocampo III was found guilty. He was suspended for office for 90 days
hence his vice governor, Llamas, assumed office. In not less than 30 days however, Ocampo III returned with an AO showing that he
was pardoned hence he can resume office without completing the 90 day suspension imposed upon him.

ISSUE: Whether or not pardon is applicable to administrative cases.

HELD: The SC held that pardon is applicable to Administrative cases. The SC does not clearly see any valid and convincing reason why
the President cannot grant executive clemency in administrative cases. It is a considered view that if the President can grant
reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, with much more reason can she grant
executive clemency in administrative cases, which are clearly less serious than criminal offenses.
Wilfredo Torres vs Hon. Neptali Gonzales
152 SCRA 272 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Pardon – Not Subject to Judicial Review/Scrutiny

In 1978, Wilfredo Torres was convicted of estafa. In 1979, he was pardoned by the president with the condition that he shall not
violate any penal laws again. In 1982, Torres was charged with multiple crimes of estafa. In 1986, then Chairman of the Board of
Paroles Neptali Gonzales petitioned for the cancellation of Torres’ pardon. Hence, the president cancelled the pardon. Torres
appealed the issue before the Supreme Court averring that the Executive Department erred in convicting him for violating the
conditions of his pardon because the estafa charges against him were not yet final and executory as they were still on appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary before Torres can be validly rearrested and
recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon and accordingly to serve the balance of his original sentence.

HELD: The SC affirmed the following:

1. The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional pardon are purely executive acts which
are not subject to judicial scrutiny.
2. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon, and the proper consequences of such breach, may be
either a purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or it may be a
judicial act consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a conditional pardon under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code.
Where the President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of
a subsequent crime is necessary, much less conviction therefor by final judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be
recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon.
3. Because due process is not semper et ubique judicial process, and because the conditionally pardoned convict had already been
accorded judicial due process in his trial and conviction for the offense for which he was conditionally pardoned, Section 64 (i) of the
Revised Administrative Code is not afflicted with a constitutional vice.
In proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who is alleged to have breached the conditions of his
pardon, the Executive Department has two options: (i) to proceed against him under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative
Code; or (ii) to proceed against him under Article 159 of the RPC which imposes the penalty of prision correccional, minimum period,
upon a convict who “having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shall violate any of the conditions of such
pardon.” Here, the President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code.
That choice is an exercise of the President’s executive prerogative and is not subject to judicial scrutiny.

MALACAÑAN PALACE
MANILA
BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES
PROCLAMATION NO. 80

GRANTING AMNESTY IN FAVOR OF ALL PERSONS WHO, IN THE FURTHERANCE OF THEIR POLITICAL BELIEFS, MAY HAVE COMMITTED ACTS PENALIZED BY EXISTING LAWS

WHEREAS, certain persons or group/s of persons continue to oppose the government;

WHEREAS, these persons may have committed an act or acts in violation of existing laws in furtherance of their political beliefs;
WHEREAS, it is in the interest of the nation to forgive these individuals and forego their prosecution in order that all may be reunited and peace and order established in our
land, and so that they can contribute their energy and talents to the achievement of political and social reforms within the framework of the laws and democracy;
WHEREAS, the unity of the Filipino people is necessary so that the nation can recover from the ravages of dictatorships; cdt
NOW, THEREFORE, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by Section 6, Art. XVIII, of the 1987 Constitution, do hereby
declare and proclaim full and complete amnesty in favor of all persons who have or may have committed any act penalized under existing laws in furtherance of their political
beliefs and who, not being in the custody of, or charged by, undergoing investigation by, the authorities of the present administration, as of the date, the 28th of February 1987,
and for six months thereafter, return their own free will to the fold of the law for the following crimes: treason; conspiracy or proposal to commit the crime of treason;
misprision of treason; espionage; rebellion or insurrection; conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion or insurrection; inciting to rebellion or insurrection; sedition; conspiracy
to commit sedition; inciting to sedition; illegal assemblies; illegal associations; direct assault; indirect assault; resistance and disobedience to a person in authority or agents of
such person or persons; subversion; and illegal possession of firearms and explosives. This shall not, however, apply to crimes or acts committed from purely personal motives or
outside of the foregoing enumerations.
It is further declared that in order to determine those persons who may come within the terms of this amnesty, an Amnesty Committee is hereby created in each province or city
composed of the Provincial/City Citizens Attorney, as Chairman, and four members, namely: the AFP Judge Advocate designated by the Secretary of National Defense, the
Provincial/City Secretary, an IBP representative designated by the Provincial/City IBP Chapter and the fourth to be chosen by the Chairman and the herein three named
members, which shall examine the facts and circumstances surrounding each case. The Committee shall decide each case within ten (10) working days from receipt of the
application, and upon finding that it falls within the terms of this Proclamation, it shall so declare and the amnesty shall immediately be effective as to said person. Should the
Amnesty Committee fail to make its decision within the given ten day period, such inaction shall be construed as an automatic grant of amnesty in favor of the applicant
concerned. casia
Any person who desires to avail of the amnesty provided herein may, at anytime within six (6) months from date of issuance of this Proclamation, file an application for amnesty
with the Bayanihan Center organized in each province or city. The Bayanihan Center immediately forward the application to the Amnesty Committee, which shall then evaluate
and pass upon the application in accordance with the Guidelines that may be issued by the National Reconciliation and Development Council to implement this Proclamation
and shall make the necessary decision in each particular case.
This Proclamation take effect immediately.
DONE in the City of Manila, this 28th day of February, in the year of Our Lord, Nineteen Hundred and Eighty-Seven.
(Sgd.) CORAZON C. AQUINO
Suzette Nicolas vs Alberto Romulo
578 SCRA 438 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Ratification of a Treaty – Validity of the Visiting Forces Agreement
**This case is consolidated with Salonga vs Daniel Smith & BAYAN vs Gloria Arroyo

On the 1st of November 2005, Daniel Smith committed the crime of rape against Nicole. He was convicted of the said crime and was
ordered by the court to suffer imprisonment. Smith was a US serviceman convicted of a crime against our penal laws and the crime
was committed within the country’s jurisdiction. But pursuant to the VFA, a treaty between the US and Philippines, the US embassy
was granted custody over Smith. Nicole, together with the other petitioners appealed before the SC assailing the validity of the VFA.
Their contention is that the VFA was not ratified by the US senate in the same way our senate ratified the VFA.

ISSUE: Is the VFA void and unconstitutional & whether or not it is self-executing.

HELD: The VFA is a self-executing Agreement because the parties intend its provisions to be enforceable, precisely because the VFA
is intended to carry out obligations and undertakings under the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty. As a matter of fact, the VFA has been
implemented and executed, with the US faithfully complying with its obligation to produce Smith before the court during the trial.
The VFA is covered by implementing legislation inasmuch as it is the very purpose and intent of the US Congress that executive
agreements registered under this Act within 60 days from their ratification be immediately implemented. The SC noted that the VFA
is not like other treaties that need implementing legislation such as the Vienna Convention. As regards the implementation of the
RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty, military aid or assistance has been given under it and this can only be done through implementing
legislation. The VFA itself is another form of implementation of its provisions.

Ramon Gonzales vs Rufino Hechanova

9 SCRA 230 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Treaty vs Executive Agreements – Statutes Can Repeal Executive Agreements

During the term of President Diosdado Macapagal, he entered into two executive agreements with Vietnam and Burma for the
importation of rice without complying with the requisite of securing a certification from the National Economic Council showing that
there is a shortage in cereals or rice. Hence, the then Executive Secretary, Rufino Hechanova, authorized the importation of 67,000
tons of rice from abroad to the detriment of our local planters. Ramon Gonzales, then president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters
Association assailed the executive agreements. Gonzales averred that Hechanova is without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction”,
because Republic Act 3452 prohibits the importation of rice and corn by “the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government
agency.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3452 prevails over the 2 executive agreements entered into by Macapagal.

HELD: Yes. Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted by Congress. The former may not
interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of the latter, except in the exercise of his veto power. He may not defeat
legislative enactments that have acquired the status of laws, by indirectly repealing the same through an executive agreement
providing for the performance of the very act prohibited by said laws. In the event of conflict between a treaty and a statute, the
one which is latest in point of time shall prevail, is not applicable to the case at bar, Hechanova not only admits, but, also, insists that
the contracts adverted to are not treaties. No such justification can be given as regards executive agreements not authorized by
previous legislation, without completely upsetting the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances
which are fundamental in our constitutional set up.
As regards the question whether an executive or an international agreement may be invalidated by our courts, suffice it to say that
the Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled it in the affirmative, by providing that the SC may not be deprived “of its
jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal,certiorari, or writ of error, as the law or the rules of court may
provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts in “All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law,
ordinance, or executive order or regulation is in question”. In other words, our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty,
not only when it conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress.
Tan Sin vs The Deportation Board
104 Phil. 868 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Executive Order – Power to Deport an Undesirable Alien

Tan Sin was a Chinese residing in Pasay. In December 1953, he was convicted of the crime of estafa. He was sentenced to jail. When
he finished serving his sentence, he learned that an order to detain him was issued by the Deportation Board because apparently, a
special prosecutor filed with the Deportation Board an action to deport Tan Sin because by reason of the crime he had committed,
he became an undesirable alien. The Deportation Board after hearing, recommended to the President of the Philippines that Tan Sin
be deported. In his defense, Tan Sin averred that he cannot be deported by the Deportation Board (an entity under the executive
department) or by the President because only Congress has the absolute and inherent power to deport aliens.

ISSUE: Whether or not Tans Sin can be deported by the President.

HELD: Yes. The power to deport aliens is lodged in the President. As an act of state, it is vested in the Executive by virtue of his office,
subject only to the regulations prescribed in Sec 69 of the Revised Administrative Code or to such future legislation as may be
promulgated on the subject. There is no provision in the Constitution nor act of the legislature defining the power, as it is evident
that it is the intention of the law to grant to the Chief Executive full discretion to determine whether an alien’s residence in the
country is so undesirable as to affect or injure the security, welfare or interest of the state. The adjudication of facts upon which
deportation is predicated also devolves on the Chief Executive whose decision is final and executory.

Commissioner of Customs & Collector of Customs vs Eastern Sea Trading

3 SCRA 351 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Treaties vs Executive Agreements
Eastern Sea Trading (EST) was a shipping company which imports from Japan onion and garlic into the Philippines. In 1956, the
Commissioner of Customs ordered the seizure and forfeiture of the import goods because EST was not able to comply with Central
Bank Circulars 44 and 45. The said circulars were pursuant to Executive Order 328. On the other hand, EO 328 was the implementing
law of the Trades and Financial Agreements, an executive agreement, entered into between the Philippines and Japan. The said
executive agreement states, among others, that all import transactions between Japan and the Philippines should be invoiced in
dollar. In this case, the said items imported by EST from Japan were not invoiced in dollar.
EST questioned the validity of the said EO averring that the executive agreement that the EO was implementing was never concurred
upon by the Senate. The issue was elevated to the Court of Tax Appeals and the latter ruled in favor of EST. The Commissioner
appealed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Executive Agreement is subject to the concurrence by the Senate.

HELD: No, Executive Agreements are not like treaties which are subject to the concurrence of at least 2/3 of the members of the
Senate. Agreements concluded by the President which fall short of treaties are commonly referred to as executive agreements and
are no less common in our scheme of government than are the more formal instruments — treaties and conventions. They
sometimes take the form of exchanges of notes and at other times that of more formal documents denominated ‘agreements’ or
‘protocols’.
The point where ordinary correspondence between this and other governments ends and agreements — whether denominated
executive agreements or exchanges of notes or otherwise — begin, may sometimes be difficult of ready ascertainment. It would be
useless to undertake to discuss here the large variety of executive agreements as such, concluded from time to time. Hundreds of
executive agreements, other than those entered into under the trade- agreements act, have been negotiated with foreign
governments. . . . It would seem to be sufficient, in order to show that the trade agreements under the act of 1934 are not
anomalous in character, that they are not treaties, and that they have abundant precedent in our history, to refer to certain classes
of agreements heretofore entered into by the Executive without the approval of the Senate.
They cover such subjects as the inspection of vessels, navigation dues, income tax on shipping profits, the admission of civil aircraft,
customs matters, and commercial relations generally, international claims, postal matters, the registration of trade-marks and
copyrights, etc. Some of them were concluded not by specific congressional authorization but in conformity with policies declared in
acts of Congress with respect to the general subject matter, such as tariff acts; while still others, particularly those with respect to
the settlement of claims against foreign governments, were concluded independently of any legislation.
Lao Ichong vs Jaime Hernandez
Constitutional Law – Treaties May Be Superseded by Municipal Laws in the Exercise of Police Power

Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman who entered the country to take advantage of business opportunities herein abound (then) –
particularly in the retail business. For some time he and his fellow Chinese businessmen enjoyed a “monopoly” in the local market in
Pasay. Until in June 1954 when Congress passed the RA 1180 or the Retail Trade Nationalization Act the purpose of which is to
reserve to Filipinos the right to engage in the retail business. Ichong then petitioned for the nullification of the said Act on the
ground that it contravened several treaties concluded by the RP which, according to him, violates the equal protection clause (pacta
sund servanda). He said that as a Chinese businessman engaged in the business here in the country who helps in the income
generation of the country he should be given equal opportunity.

ISSUE: Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted principles.

HELD: Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case, there is no conflict at all between the raised
generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection of the law clause “does not demand absolute equality amongst
residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges
conferred and liabilities enforced”; and, that the equal protection clause “is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those
persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a
distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.”
For the sake of argument, even if it would be assumed that a treaty would be in conflict with a statute then the statute must be
upheld because it represented an exercise of the police power which, being inherent could not be bargained away or surrendered
through the medium of a treaty. Hence, Ichong can no longer assert his right to operate his market stalls in the Pasay city market.

» Ernesto Hidalgo vs President Ferdinand Marcos

80 SCRA 538 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – President’s Immunity From Suit

In December 1977, a referendum was scheduled to be held. The purpose of which was to merge the office of the Prime Minister and the Office of
the President. At that time, Marcos was serving as the president and at the same time he was wielding legislative powers. The referendum was to
ask the people whether or not they still want Marcos to serve as the president (and at the same time Prime Minister) after an interim Batasan
Pambansa will be organized. Ernesto Hidalgo filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus before the Supreme Court to enjoin COMELEC and the
president from proceeding with the said referendum as he averred that the referendum will effectively amend the C0nstitution, which he says is
unconstitutional and improper.

ISSUE: Whether or not the president can be sued and compelled through a mandamus by the SC.

HELD: The Supreme Court did not pass upon the issue of the suability of the Presisent in thsi case considering that the COMELEC, the body tasked
to implement the referendum, was impleaded.
The SC however ruled that the referendum is valid and that the same will merely ask the people if they want Marcos to stay in power or not and
that the referendum will not amend the Constitution as Hidalgo avers.

Section 7. The President shall be immune from suit during his tenure. (1973)

Maximo Soliven vs Ramon Makasiar

167 SCRA 393 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – President’s Immunity From Suit – Must Be Invoked by the President

Luis Beltran is among the petitioners in this case. He, together with others, was charged with libel by the then president Corzaon Aquino. Cory
herself filed a complaint-affidavit against him and others. Makasiar averred that Cory cannot file a complaint affidavit because this would defeat
her immunity from suit. He grounded his contention on the principle that a president cannot be sued. However, if a president would sue then the
president would allow herself to be placed under the court’s jurisdiction and conversely she would be consenting to be sued back. Also, considering
the functions of a president, the president may not be able to appear in court to be a witness for herself thus she may be liable for contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not such immunity can be invoked by Beltran, a person other than the president.
HELD: No. The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and
functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all
of the office-holder’s time, also demands undivided attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by
any other person in the President’s behalf. Thus, an accused like Beltran et al, in a criminal case in which the President is the complainant cannot
raise the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may shed the
protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the court’s jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the
President’s prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person.