Macariola v.

Asuncion, 114 SCRA 77, May 31, 1982

(En Banc), J. Makasiar

Facts: When the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 rendered by respondent Hon. Judge Elias B. Asuncion of Court of First
Instance of Leyte became final on June 8, 1863 for lack of an appeal, a project of partition was submitted to him which
he later approved in an Order dated October 23, 1963. Among the parties thereto was complainant Bernardita R.
Macariola.

One of the properties mentioned in the project of partition was Lot 1184. This lot according to the decision rendered by
Judge Asuncion was adjudicated to the plaintiffs Reyes in equal shares subdividing Lot 1184 into five lots denominated as
Lot 1184-A to 1184-E.

On July 31, 1964 Lot 1184-E was sold to Dr. Arcadio Galapon who later sold a portion of Lot 1184-E to Judge Asuncion
and his wife Victoria Asuncion. Thereafter spouses Asuncion and spouses Galapon conveyed their respective shares and
interests in Lot 1184-E to the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc. wherein Judge Asuncion was the
president.

Macariola then filed an instant complaint on August 9, 1968 docketed as Civil Case No. 4234 in the CFI of Leyte against
Judge Asuncion with "acts unbecoming a judge" alleging that Judge Asuncion in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot
1184-E violated Article 1491 par. 5 of the New Civil Code, Art. 14, pars. 1 and 5 of the Code of Commerce, Sec. 3 par. H
of R.A. 3019, Sec. 12 Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules and Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics.

On November 2, 1970, Judge Jose Nepomuceno of the CFI of Leyte rendered a decision dismissing the complaints against
Judge Asuncion.

After the investigation, report and recommendation conducted by Justice Cecilia Munoz Palma of the Court of Appeals,
she recommended on her decision dated March 27, 1971 that Judge Asuncion be exonerated.

Issue: Does Judge Asuncion, now Associate Justice of Court of Appeals violated any law in acquiring by purchase a
parcel of Lot 1184-E which he previously decided in a Civil Case No. 3010 and his engagement in business by joining a
private corporation during his incumbency as a judge of the CFI of Leyte constitute an "act unbecoming of a judge"?

Ruling: No. The respondent Judge Asuncion's actuation does not constitute of an "act unbecoming of a judge." But he is
reminded to be more discreet in his private and business activities.

SC ruled that the prohibition in Article 1491 par. 5 of the New Civil Code applies only to operate, the sale or assignment
of the property during the pendency of the litigation involving the property. Respondent judge purchased a portion of Lot
1184-E on March 6, 1965, the in Civil Case No. 3010 which he rendered on June 8, 1963 was already final because none
of the parties therein filed an appeal within the reglementary period. Hence, the lot in question was no longer subject to
litigation. Furthermore, Judge Asuncion did not buy the lot in question directly from the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010
but from Dr. Arcadio Galapon who earlier purchased Lot1184-E from the plaintiffs Reyes after the finality of the decision
in Civil Case No. 3010.

SC stated that upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the US and later on from the US to the Republic of the
Philippines, Article 14 of Code of Commerce must be deemed to have been abrogated because where there is change of
sovereignty, the political laws of the former sovereign, whether compatible or not with those of the new sovereign, are
automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign. There appears no
enabling or affirmative act that continued the effectivity of the aforestated provision of the Code of Commerce,
consequently, Art. 14 of the Code of Commerce has no legal and binding effect and cannot apply to the respondent Judge
Asuncion.

Respondent Judge cannot also be held liable to par. H, Section 3 of R.A. 3019 because the business of the corporation in
which respondent participated had obviously no relation or connection with his judicial office.

SC stated that respondent judge and his wife deserve the commendation for their immediate withdrawal from the firm 22
days after its incorporation realizing that their interest contravenes the Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics.

SANTIAGO v COMELEC G.R. No. 127325

Summarized by Catherine Pedrosa, Sophia Sy, Albert Amparo
Atty. Jesus Delfin filed with COMELEC a “Petition to Amend the
Constitution, to Lift Term Limits on Elective Officials, by People’s
initiative”, granted under Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the Constitution.
COMELEC issued an Order directing Delfin to publish the petition, and
notice of hearing and, setting the case for hearing. Petitioners herein
thus filed a petition for prohibition against respondent, arguing that
the said Constitutional provision can only be implemented by a law to
be passed by Congress, and such implementing provisions cannot be
found in RA 6735.
Important People: Petitioners: Miriam Defensor-Santiago, Alexander
Padilla, Maria Isabel Ongpin; Respondents: Comelec, Atty. Jesus
Delfin; Petitioner-Intervenor: Raul S. Roco
FACTS: (In order of chronological events)
1. Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with COMELEC a “Petition to Amend the
Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People’s
Initiative.” (A.K.A. Delfin Petition)
It proposed to amend Sec. 4 and 7 of Art. VI, Sec. 4 of VII, and
Sec. 8 of Art. X of the Constitution and REMOVE the term limit of 6
years for Senators, 2 years for the House of Representatives and 6
years for the President.
2. In the Delfin Petition they asked COMELEC for an order to:
a. Fix time and date of signature gathering
b. Cause the publication of said order and attached Petition for
Initiative on the 1987 Constitution
c. Instruct Municipal Election Registrars to assist Delfin and his
volunteers, in establishing signing stations.
3. COMELEC issued the order to:
a. Cause, at the expense of Delfin, the publication of petition and
attached Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution and
Notice of Hearing in 3 daily newspapers of general circulation.
b. Set the case for hearing on December 12, 1996.
4. At the hearing: Atty. Delfin and Atty. Quadra represented PIRMA
against the intervenors Senator Roco and others representing IBP,
DIK, LABAN
5. After hearing the arguments of each party, COMELEC directed Delfin
and oppositors to file their memoranda within 5 days.
6. On December 18, 1996, Santiago and other petitioners filed a
special civil action for prohibition to the Supreme Court.
7. Court required the respondents to comment on the petition and
issued a Temporary Restraining Order on the COMELEC and Delfin from
proceeding any further.
ISSUE(s):
1. Whether it is proper for the Supreme Court to take cognizance of
the petition when there is a pending case before the COMELEC.
2. Whether R.A. No. 6735, entitled An Act Providing for a System of
Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor, was
intended to include or cover initiative on amendments to the
Constitution; and if so, whether the Act, as worded, adequately covers
such initiative.
3. Whether that portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 regarding
the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution is valid.
4. Whether the COMELEC can take cognizance of, or has jurisdiction
over, a petition solely intended to obtain an order (a) fixing the time
and dates for signature gathering; (b) instructing municipal election
officers to assist Delfin's movement and volunteers in establishing
signature stations; and (c) directing or causing the publication of, inter
alia, the unsigned proposed Petition for Initiative on the 1987
Constitution.
HOLDING:
1. YES PETITION IS GRANTED.
COMELEC’s grave abuse of discretion in refusing to dismiss or
failure to act on Roco’s motion to dismiss, rendered ripe and viable
the instant petition (for prohibition) under Section 2 of Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court.
2. R.A. No. 6735 DECLARED INADEQUATE TO COVER THE SYSTEM OF
INITIATIVE ON AMENDEMENTS TO CONSTITUTION due to the
following reasons:
a. Under Section 2 of R.A. No. 6735, the people are not accorded
the power to “directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in
whole or in part, the Constitution” through the system of
initiative as they can only do so with respect to “laws,
ordinances, or resolutions.”
b. While the Act provides for subtitles for National Initiative &
Referendum (Subtitle II) and Local Initiative & Referendum
(Subtitle III), it could have provided for a subtitle for Initiative
on the Constitution as the right of people to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution is far more important than the
initiative on national and local laws.
c. Upon the other hand, as to initiative on amendments to the
Constitution, R.A. No. 6735, in all of its twenty-three sections,
merely (a) mentions, the word Constitution in Section 2; (b)
defines initiative on the Constitution and includes it in the
enumeration of the three systems of initiative in Section 3; (c)
speaks of plebiscite as the process by which the proposition in an
initiative on the Constitution may be approved or rejected by the
people; (d) reiterates the constitutional requirements as to the
number of voters who should sign the petition; and (e) provides
for the date of effectivity of the approved proposition.
There was, therefore, an obvious downgrading of the more
important or the paramount system of initiative. R.A. No. 6735
thus delivered a humiliating blow to the system of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution by merely paying it a reluctant
lip service.
3. THOSE PARTS OF COMELEC Resolutions No. 2300 of the
Commission on Elections prescribing rules and regulations on the
conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitution DECLARED
VOID.
Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is
concerned, R.A. No. 6735 miserably failed to satisfy both
requirements in subordinate legislation. The delegation of the power
to the COMELEC is then invalid. It logically follows that the
COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to
implement the exercise of the right of the people to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative.
4. COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION IN ENTERTAINING THE DELFIN PETITION.
Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under R.A. No.
6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, it cannot be entertained or
given cognizance of by the COMELEC. The latter knew that the petition
does not fall under any of the actions or proceedings under the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure or under Resolution No. 2300, for which
reason it did not assign to the petition a docket number. That petition
was nothing more than a mere scrap of paper, which should not have
been dignified by the Order of 6 December 1996, the hearing on 12
December 1996, and the order directing Delfin and the oppositors to
file their memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying it, the COMELEC
acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and merely
wasted its time, energy, and resources.
VERDICT: Petition granted. RA 6735 declared inadequate to cover the
system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution. Parts of
Comelec Resolution No. 2300 prescribing rules on the conduct of
initiative or amendments to the Constitution declared void. Comelec
ordered to dismiss the Delfin Petition.
DISSENT: (Puno)
RA 6735 sufficiently implements the right of the people to initiate
amendments to the Constitution through initiative. The law must be
interpreted as it was intended, and it is clear that the intent of RA
6735 is to implement the people’s initiative to amend the Constitution.
Once intent is ascertained, it must be enforced even if it may not be
consistent with the strict letter of the law. Accordingly, Comelec
Resolution No. 2300 cannot be assailed as infirmed as RA 6735
expressly delegates the commission the power to promulgate rules
necessary to carry out the said act.

Lambino vs COMELEC G.R. No. 174153 - Case Digest

FACTS:

On 25 August 2006, Lambino et al filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative
petition to change the 1987 Constitution under Section 5(b) and (c)2 and Section 73 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the
Initiative and Referendum Act.

The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least twelve per
centum (12%) of all registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at least three per centum (3%) of its
registered voters. The Lambino Group also claimed that COMELEC election registrars had verified the signatures of the
6.3 million individuals.

The Lambino Group’s initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI (Legislative
Department)4 and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department) and by adding Article XVIII entitled “Transitory
Provisions.” These proposed changes will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary
form of government.
On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC indicating modifications in the
proposed Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their initiative.

The COMELEC denied the petition citing Santiago v. COMELEC declaring RA 6735 inadequate to implement the initiative
clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the Lambino Group’s initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on
amendments to the Constitution through a people’s initiative;

2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 “incomplete, inadequate or wanting in
essential terms and conditions” to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution; and

HELD:

1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct Proposal by the
People

Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional provision that allows a people’s initiative to
propose amendments to the Constitution. This section states:

Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

The framers of the Constitution intended that the “draft of the proposed constitutional amendment” should be “ready and
shown” to the people “before” they sign such proposal. The framers plainly stated that “before they sign there is already
a draft shown to them.” The framers also “envisioned” that the people should sign on the proposal itself because the
proponents must “prepare that proposal and pass it around for signature.”

The essence of amendments “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition” is that the entire
proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential elements must be present. First, the people
must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as an
initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition.

These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first shown to the people who
express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is “directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition” only if the people sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed
amendments.

There is no presumption that the proponents observed the constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures. The
proponents bear the burden of proving that they complied with the constitutional requirements in gathering the
signatures – that the petition contained, or incorporated by attachment, the full text of the proposed amendments.

The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this Court a copy of the paper that the people signed as
their initiative petition. The Lambino Group submitted to this Court a copy of a signature sheet after the oral arguments
of 26 September 2006 when they filed their Memorandum on 11 October 2006.

Lozano vs. Nograles G.R. No. 187883 June 16, 2009 Locus Standi

FACTS:

The two petitions, filed by their respective petitioners in their capacities as concerned citizens and taxpayers, prayed for
the nullification of House Resolution No. 1109 entitled “A Resolution Calling upon the Members of Congress to Convene
for the Purpose of Considering Proposals to Amend or Revise the Constitution, Upon a Three-fourths Vote of All the
Members of Congress.” In essence, both petitions seek to trigger a justiciable controversy that would warrant a
definitive interpretation by this Court of Section 1, Article XVII, which provides for the procedure for amending or
revising the Constitution.

ISSUE:
Do petitioners have legal standing?

RULING:

No.
In the present case, the fitness of petitioners’ case for the exercise of judicial review is grossly lacking. In the first place,
petitioners have not sufficiently proven any adverse injury or hardship from the act complained of. In the second place,
House Resolution No. 1109 only resolved that the House of Representatives shall convene at a future time for the
purpose of proposing amendments or revisions to the Constitution. No actual convention has yet transpired and no rules
of procedure have yet been adopted. More importantly, no proposal has yet been made, and hence, no usurpation of
power or gross abuse of discretion has yet taken place. In short, House Resolution No. 1109 involves a quintessential
example of an uncertain contingent future event that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all. The
House has not yet performed a positive act that would warrant an intervention from this Court.

Neither can the lack of locus standi be cured by the claim of petitioners that they are instituting the cases at bar as
taxpayers and concerned citizens. A taxpayer’s suit requires that the act complained of directly involves the illegal
disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. It is undisputed that there has been no allocation or disbursement of
public funds in this case as of yet.

Gonzales vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-28196, November 9, 1967

FACTS:
On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed three resolutions which aim to:
• Increase the number of the House of Representatives from 120 to 180 members (First Resolution).
• Call a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution (Second Resolution).
• Permit Senators and Congressmen to be members of the Constitutional Convention without forfeiting their seats
(Third Resolution).
Subsequently, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 4913, which took effect on June 17, 1967. RA 4913 is an Act
submitting to the Filipino people for approval the amendments to the Constitution proposed by the Congress in the First
and Third Resolutions.
Petitioner Gonzales, as taxpayer, voter and citizen, and allegedly in representation thru class suit of all citizens of this
country, filed this suit for prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain COMELEC from implementing Republic Act
4913 assailing said law as unconstitutional.
Petitioner PHILCONSA, as a civic, non-profit and non-partisan corporation, assails the constitutionality not only of
Republic Act 4913 but also of First and Third Resolutions.
ISSUES/HELD:
1. Whether RA 4913 is constitutional – YES.
2. Whether the submission of the amendments to the people of the Philippines violate the spirit of the Constitution –
NO.
RATIO:
1. RA 4913 is constitutional.
The measures undertaken by RA 4913 to inform the populace about the amendments are sufficient under the
Constitution. The Constitution does not forbid the submission of proposals for amendment to the people except under
certain conditions.
2. The submission of the amendments to the people of the Philippines do not violate the spirit of the
Constitution.
People may not be really interested on how the representatives are apportioned among the provinces of the Philippines
as per First Resolution. Those who are interested to know the full details may enlighten themselves by reading copies of
the amendments readily available in the polling places. On the matter of Third Resolution, the provisions of Article XV of
the Constitution are satisfied so long as the electorate knows that it permits Congressmen to retain their seats as
legislators, even if they should run for and assume the functions of delegates to the Convention.
NOTE: The majority voted that the Resolutions and RA 4913 were unconstitutional but they did not reach specific
number of votes to invalidate these congressional acts under the 1935 Constitution, which is two-thirds of the Supreme
Court.

Occena vs. Commission on Elections

[GR 56350, 2 April 1981]; also Gonzales vs. National Treasurer [GR 56404]
Facts: The challenge in these two prohibition proceedings against the validity of three Batasang Pambansa Resolutions
proposing constitutional amendments, goes further than merely assailing their alleged constitutional infirmity. Samuel
Occena and Ramon A. Gonzales, both members of the Philippine Bar and former delegates to the 1971 Constitutional
Convention that framed the present Constitution, are suing as taxpayers. The rather unorthodox aspect of these petitions
is the assertion that the 1973 Constitution is not the fundamental law, the Javellana ruling to the contrary
notwithstanding.
Issue: Whether the 1973 Constitution was valid, and in force and effect when the Batasang Pambansa resolutions and
the present petitions were promulgated and filed, respectively.
Held: It is much too late in the day to deny the force and applicability of the 1973 Constitution. In the dispositive portion
of Javellana v. The Executive Secretary, dismissing petitions for prohibition and mandamus to declare invalid its
ratification, this Court stated that it did so by a vote of six to four. It then concluded: "This being the vote of the majority,
there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect." Such a statement
served a useful purpose. It could even be said that there was a need for it. It served to clear the atmosphere. It made
manifest that as of 17 January 1973, the present Constitution came into force and effect. With such a pronouncement by
the Supreme Court and with the recognition of the cardinal postulate that what the Supreme Court says is not only
entitled to respect but must also be obeyed, a factor for instability was removed. Thereafter, as a matter of law, all
doubts were resolved. The 1973 Constitution is the fundamental law. It is as simple as that. What cannot be too strongly
stressed is that the function of judicial review has both a positive and a negative aspect. As was so convincingly
demonstrated by Professors Black and Murphy, the Supreme Court can check as well as legitimate. In declaring what the
law is, it may not only nullify the acts of coordinate branches but may also sustain their validity. In the latter case, there
is an affirmation that what was done cannot be stigmatized as constitutionally deficient. The mere dismissal of a suit of
this character suffices. That is the meaning of the concluding statement in Javellana. Since then, this Court has invariably
applied the present Constitution. The latest case in point is People v. Sola, promulgated barely two weeks ago. During the
first year alone of the effectivity of the present Constitution, at least ten cases may be cited.

Tolentino v. COMELEC

G.R. No. L-34150; October 16, 1971

Ponente: Barredo, J.

FACTS:

After the election of delegates to the Constitutional Convention held on November 10, 1970, the convention held its
inaugural session on June 1, 1971. On the early morning of September 28, 1971, the Convention approved Organic
Resolution No. 1 which seeks to amend Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution, lowering the voting age to 18. On
September 30, 1971, COMELEC resolved to inform the Constitutional Convention that it will hold the plebiscite together
with the senatorial elections on November 8, 1971. Arturo Tolentino filed a petition for prohibition against COMELEC and
prayed that Organic Resolution No. 1 and acts in obedience to the resolution be null and void.

ISSUE:

1. Does the court have jurisdiction over the case?

2. Is the Organic Resolution No. 1 constitutional?

HELD:

1. The case at bar is justiciable. As held in Gonzales vs. Comelec, the issue of whether or not a resolution of Congress,
acting as a constituent assembly, violates the constitution is a justiciable one and thus subject to judicial review. The
jurisdiction is not because the Court is superior to the Convention but they are both subject to the Constitution.

2. The act of the Convention calling for a plebiscite on a single amendment in Organic Resolution No. 1 violated Sec. 1
of Article XV of the Constitution which states that all amendments must be submitted to the people in a single election or
plebiscite. Moreover, the voter must be provided sufficient time and ample basis to assess the amendment in relation to
the other parts of the Constitution, not separately but together.