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Quirino Abad Santos For Appellant. Attorney-General Avanceña For Appellee

The appellant was convicted of bigamy for entering into marriage with the private complainant while still married to another woman. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that (1) a person who contracts a second marriage while still validly married to someone else is criminally liable for bigamy, regardless of whether the second marriage is later declared void; and (2) all the essential elements for a valid marriage were present between the appellant and private complainant, even though it was later declared void due to the appellant's prior existing marriage. The criminal act of bigamy was already consummated upon celebration of the second marriage.
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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
22 views4 pages

Quirino Abad Santos For Appellant. Attorney-General Avanceña For Appellee

The appellant was convicted of bigamy for entering into marriage with the private complainant while still married to another woman. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that (1) a person who contracts a second marriage while still validly married to someone else is criminally liable for bigamy, regardless of whether the second marriage is later declared void; and (2) all the essential elements for a valid marriage were present between the appellant and private complainant, even though it was later declared void due to the appellant's prior existing marriage. The criminal act of bigamy was already consummated upon celebration of the second marriage.
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G.R. No.

L-12262 February 10, 1917

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,


vs.
ANTONIO ABAD SANTOS, defendant-appellant.

Quirino Abad Santos for appellant.


Attorney-General Avanceña for appellee.

MORELAND, J.:

The appellant here is accused of violating the Internal Revenue Law. He was convicted and
sentenced to pay a fine of P10. He appealed.

Section 185 of Act No. 2339 (now section 2727 of the Administrative Code) reads as follows:

A person who violates any provision of the Internal Revenue Law or any lawful regulation of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue made in conformity with the same, for which delinquency no
specific penalty is provided by law, shall be punished by a fine of not more than three
hundred pesos or by imprisonment for not more than six months, or both.

Pursuant to the authorization in the Internal Revenue Law, the Collector of Internal Revenue issued
Circular No. 467, the third section of which reads as follows:

3. Printers, publishers, contractors, common carriers, etc. — Each printer, publisher,


contractor, warehouseman, proprietor of a dockyard, keeper of a hotel or restaurant, keeper
of a livery stable or garage, transportation contractor and common carrier by land or water,
and so forth, subject to the tax imposed by sections 42, 43, and 44 of Act No. 2339, shall
keep a day book in which he shall enter in detail, in English or Spanish, each amount of
money received in the conduct of his business. Before being used for said purpose, the
pages of the book must be numbered serially in a permanent and legible manner, and the
book itself presented to an internal revenue agent or office for approval. In this book the cash
receipts of the owner thereof shall be entered under the corresponding date within the
twenty-four hours next following the date the money was received. If no money is received
on any day, then that fact shall be noted in the book within the said twenty-four hours under
the corresponding date.

The appellant is the owner of a printing establishment called "The Excelsior" and as such was
required by law to keep a book in which he should make the entire required by the above quoted
regulation. It is charged in the information that he violated the provisions of said regulation in that he
failed to make any entry for the 5th day of January, 1915, indicating whether any business was done
on that day or not.

We are of the opinion that the accused must be acquitted. It appears undisputed that he regularly
employed a bookkeeper who was in complete charge of the book in which the entries referred to
should have been made and that the failure to make the entry required by law was due to the
omission of the bookkeeper of which appellant knew nothing.

We do not believe that a person should be held criminally liable for the acts of another done without
his knowledge or consent, unless the law clearly so provides. In the case before us the accused
employed a bookkeeper, with the expectation that he would perform all the duties pertaining to his
position including the entries required to be made by the Collector of Internal Revenue. It is
undisputed that the accused took no part in the keeping of the book in question in this case and that
he personally never made an entry in it. He left everything to his bookkeeper. Under such
circumstances we do not believe that the mere proof of the fact that the bookkeeper omitted to make
the entries required by the Internal Revenue Circular for the 5th day of January, 1915, is an act upon
which the conviction of the accused can be based. No knowledge on his part was shown with regard
to the bookkeeper's omission and the Government does not contend that he had any knowledge.
Nor is it contended that the bookkeeper omitted the entry under the direction of the accused or with
his connivance. No connection between the accused and the omission of the bookkeeper is shown
or claimed. On the contrary the board contention is that the accused is responsible for the acts and
omissions of his bookkeeper, and that, if any act or omissions of his bookkeeper, violates the
criminal law, the principal is responsible criminally.

With this we cannot agree. Neither the statute nor the circular of the Collector of Internal Revenue,
nor both together, expressly require such a result nor can we say from the circular or the law that the
intention to do so was so clear as to leave no room for doubt. Courts will not hold one person
criminally responsible for the acts of another, committed without his knowledge or consent, unless
there is a statute requiring it so plain in its terms that there is no doubt of the intention of the
Legislature. Criminal statutes are to be strictly construed. No person should be brought within their
terms who is not clearly within them, nor should any act be pronounced criminal which is not clearly
made so by the statute. (U. S. vs. Madrigal, 27 Phil. Rep., 347.)

The judgment of conviction is reversed and the accused acquitted. Costs de officio. So ordered.

Arellano, C. J., Torres and Araullo, JJ., concur.


Carson and Trent, JJ., dissent.

VERONICO TENEBRO, petitioner, v.


THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
G.R. No. 150758. February 18, 2004.

Facts:

Petitioner Veronico Tenebro contracted marriage with private complainant Leticia


Ancajas on April 10, 1990. The two were wed by Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City
Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City. Tenebro and Ancajas lived together continuously and
without interruption until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that
he had been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986.
Tenebro showed Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage contract between him and
Villareyes. Invoking this previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left
the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit
with Villareyes.

On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain
Nilda Villegas, before Judge German Lee, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court ofCebu
City, Branch 15. When Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she verified from
Villareyes whether the latter was indeed married to petitioner. In a handwritten letter,
Villareyes confirmed that petitioner, Veronico Tenebro, was indeed her husband.

Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner.


The trial court rendered a decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of bigamy. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial
court.

Issue:

Whether or not the court erred in convicting the accused for the crime of bigamy despite
clear proof that the marriage between the accused and private complainant had been
declared null and void ab initio and without legal force and effect

Ruling:

As such, an individual who contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the


subsistence of a valid marriage is criminally liable for bigamy, notwithstanding the
subsequent declaration that the second marriage is void ab initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity.

As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioner’s


valid marriage to Villareyes, petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab
initio completely regardless of petitioner’s psychological capacity or incapacity. Since a
marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the
nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal
liability for bigamy.

Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on April 10, 1990,
during the subsistence of the valid first marriage, the crime of bigamy had already been
consummated. Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity is not an indicator that petitioner’s marriage to
Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity. In this case, all the essential and
formal requisites for the validity of marriage were satisfied by petitioner and Ancajas.
Both were over eighteen years of age, and they voluntarily contracted the second
marriage with the required license before Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial
Court of Lapu-lapu City, in the presence of at least two witnesses. The decision of the
Court of Appeals convicting petitioner Veronico Tenebro of the crime of Bigamy is
AFFIRMED.

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