Lacson vs. Executive Secretary, G.R. No.

128096, January 20, 1999

SEPTEMBER 12, 2018

FACTS:

On 18 May 1995, 11 members of the

Kuratong Baleleng gang, were killed
along Commonwealth Ave., QC by the
Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task
Group (ABRITG) headed by Chief Supt.
Jewel Canson of PNP. One of the
components of ABRITG is the Presidential
Anti-Crime Commission-Task Force
Habagat (PACC-TFH) headed by petitioner
Chief Supt. Panfilo Lacson.

SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes told the media

that what happened was a summary
execution (or a rub out) and not a
shoot-out between the Kuratong Baleleng
gang members and the ABRITG.

Omb. Aniano Desierto formed a panel of

investigators headed by the Deputy Omb.
for Military Affairs, Bienvenido Blancaflor,
to investigate the incident. This panel
found that the incident was a legitimate
police operation. However, a review
board led by Overall Deputy Omb.
Francisco Villa recommended the
indictment for multiple murder against 26
respondents, including Lacson.

Lacson was among those charged as

principal in information for murder before
the Sandiganbayan. All the accused filed
separate motions questioning its
jurisdiction.
Sandiganbayan ordered the cases
transferred to the QC RTC which has
original and exclusive jurisdiction under
RA 7975 (An Act to Strengthen the
Functional and Structural Organization of
the Sandiganbayan, Amending for that
Purpose PD 1606, as Amended), as none
of the principal accused has the rank of
PNP Chief Supt. or higher (Lacson is NOT
a PNP Chief Supt.)
The Office of the Special Prosecutor
moved for a reconsideration. While it is
pending, RA 8249 (An Act Further Defining
thr Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,
Amending for the Purpose PD 1606, as
Amended, Providing Funds Therefor, and
for Other Purposes) was enacted to law
which deletes the word “principal” from
the phrase “principal accused”. Thus, the
Sandiganbayan takes cognizance again of
the case.

Lacson now questions the

constitutionality of Secs. 4 and 7 of R.A.
8249 because the provisions are: (a)
introduced by the Congress in bad faith,
(b) ex post facto legislation and (c)
misleading as to the law’s title. The OSG
asserts otherwise.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not RA 8249 is

constitutional. (YES)
2. Whether or not Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction. (NO)

HELD:
1. RA 8249 is constitutional.

The Court mainly stresses that the

provisions are CONSTITUTIONAL
because: (a) there is presumption of
validity of laws and no showing that the
Congress pinpointed solely the
petitioners which would amount to a
violation of the Constitution’s Equal
Protection clause, (b) using the doctrine
in Calder v. Bull, the same is not an ex
post facto legislation and lastly, (c) law’s
title is comprehensive enough to fit in the
one-title-one-subject provision of the
Constitution.

2. Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction.

It’s QC RTC that has jurisdiction. The

jurisdiction of a court is defined by the
Constitution or statute. The elements of
that definition must appear in the
complaint or information so as to
ascertain which court has jurisdiction
over a case. Hence the elementary rule
that the jurisdiction of a court is
determined by the allegations in the
complaint or information,and not by the
evidence presented by the parties at the
trial.

The multiple murder charge falls under

Section 4(b) of R.A. 8249, which requires
that the offense charged must be
committed by the offender in relation to
his office in order for the Sandiganbayan
to have jurisdiction over it.
An offense is said to have been
committed in relation to the office if it
(the offense) is ‘intimately connected’
with the office of the offender and
perpetrated while he was in the
performance of his official functions.

While the information states that Lacson,

et al committed the crime of murder in
relation to their public office, there is,
however, no specific allegation of facts
that the shooting of the victim by the said
principal accused was intimately related
to the discharge of their official duties as
police officers. Likewise, the amended
information does NOT indicate that the
said accused arrested and investigated
the victim and then killed the latter while
in their custody.

While there is the allegation in the

amended information that the said
accessories committed the offense “in
relation to office as officers and members
of the (PNP),” the Court do not see the
intimate connection between the offense
charged and the accused’s official
functions. That phrase is merely a
conclusion between of law, not a factual
averment that would show the close
intimacy between the offense charged
and the discharge of the accused’s
official duties.

What is controlling is the specific factual

allegations in the information that would
indicate the close intimacy between the
discharge of the accused’s official duties
and the commission of the offense
charged, in order to qualify the crime as
 having been committed in relation to
public office.

CASE DIGEST : Restituto Ynot Vs IAC

G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987 RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner, vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE STATION COMMANDER,
INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE, BAROTAC NUEVO, ILOILO and THE
REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY, REGION IV, ILOILO
CITY, respondents.

On January 13, 1984, the petitioner transported six carabaos in a pump boat
from Masbate to Iloilo when the same was confiscated by the police station
commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for the violation of E.O. 626-A. A case
was filed by the petitioner questioning the constitutionality of executive
order and the recovery of the carabaos. After considering the merits of the
case, the confiscation was sustained and the court declined to rule on the
constitutionality issue. The petitioner appealed the decision to the
Intermediate Appellate Court but it also upheld the ruling of RTC.

Issue:

Is E.O. 626-A unconstitutional?

Ruling:

The Respondent contends that it is a valid exercise of police power to justify

EO 626-A amending EO 626 in asic rule prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos
except under certain conditions. The supreme court said that The
reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose
sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing the Supreme
Court do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of
carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they
can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another.
Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their
slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will make it
easier to kill them there

The Supreme Court found E.O. 626-A unconstitutional. The executive act
defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed
punishment, which was carried out forthright. Due process was not properly
observed. In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by
the police station commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he
had filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond of
P12,000.00. The measure struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner
without giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying due process.

DIMATULAC v VILLON

Facts:

§ In the prosecution of the Yabuts for the murder of Dimatulac, the

Office of the Public Prosecutor (particularly the Asst Prosecutor) and
two Judges (who handled the case) committed serious procedural
flaws resulting in the impairment of due process (prejudicial to both
the offended party and the accused).

§ Procedural irregularities in the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor:

o Warrants of arrest were issued by the MCTC, with no bail

recommended, but the Yabuts were not arrested or were never
brought unto the custody of the law. Yet, Asst Fiscal
Alfonso-Reyes conducted a reinvestigation. Though a
prosecutor may disagree with the findings of the judge who
 conducted the preliminary investigation (and conduct his own),
the circumstance that the accused waived the filing of their
counter-affidavits left Alfonso-Reyes no other choice but to
sustain the MCTC findings—which she did not do. And later on,
Alfonso-Reyes allowed the Yabuts to file their
counter-affidavits without first demanding that they surrender
by virtue of the standing warrants of arrest.

o Alfonso-Reyes recommended a bond of 20k for the Yabuts

despite the fact that they were charged of homicide and that
they were fugitives from justice (having avoided service of
warrant of arrest).

o Alfonso-Reyes was aware of the private prosecution’s appeal

to the DOJ from her resolution. (The subsequent resolution of
the DOJ Secretary exposed her blatant errors.) And despite the
pending appeal, she filed the Information. It would be more
prudent to wait for the DOJ resolution.

o Office of the Prosecutor did not even inform the trial court of
the pending appeal to the DOJ Secretary.

§ Judge Roura’s procedural lapses:

o Deferred resolution on the motion for a hold departure order

until “such time that all the accused who are out on bail are
arraigned”

o Denied the motion to defer proceedings for the reason that

“private prosecution has not shown any indication that the
appeal was given due course by DOJ”

§ Judge Villon’s procedural lapses:

o Ordered arraignment despite: a motion to defer proceedings; a

ten-day period with which the complainants can file petition
with the CA; resolution of the CA ordering the Yabuts to
comment on the complainants’ action; pending appeal with the
DOJ.

Issue:

Can the orders of Judge Roura and Judge Villon be sustained despite
procedural defects?

Held:
No. The orders of Judge Roura denying Motion to Defer proceedings are void
and set aside. The order of Judge Villon on the arraignment, and the
subsequent arraignment of the Yabuts are void and set aside. Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor is ordered to comply with the DOJ Secretary’s
resolution.

Prosecutors are the representatives not of an ordinary party to a controversy,

but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling
as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest in a criminal prosecution
is not that it shall win every case but that justice be done. They are servants
of the law whose two-fold aim is that guilt shall not escape and innocence
shall not suffer.

The judge “should always be imbued with a high sense of duty and
responsibility in the discharge of his obligation to promptly and properly
administer justice”. The judge’s action must not impair the substantial rights
of the accused, nor the right of the State and offended party.

When the State is deprived of due process in a criminal case by reason of

grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, the acquittal of the
accused or dismissal of the case is void.
LIANG VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES GR no. 125865 January 28, 2000

Petitioner: Jeffrey Liang

Respondent: People of the Philippines

FACTS:

Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB).

Sometime in 1994, for allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow
ADB worker Joyce Cabal, he was charged before the MeTC of Mandaluyong
City with two counts of oral defamation. Petitioner was arrested by virtue of
a warrant issued by the MeTC. After fixing petitioner’s bail, the MeTC
released him to the custody of the Security Officer of ADB. The next day, the
MeTC judge received an “office of protocol” from the DFA stating that
petitioner is covered by immunity from legal process under section 45 of the
Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine Government regarding the
Headquarters of the ADB in the country. Based on the said protocol
communication that petitioner is immune from suit, the MeTC judge without
notice to the prosecution dismissed the criminal cases. The latter filed a
motion for reconsideration which was opposed by the DFA. When its motion
was denied, the prosecution filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with
the RTC of Pasig City which set aside the MeTC rulings and ordered the latter
court to enforce the warrant of arrest it earlier issued. After the motion for
reconsideration was denied, the petitioner elevated the case to the SC via a
petition for review arguing that he is covered by immunity under the
Agreement and that no preliminary investigation was held before the
criminal case.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not the petitioner’s case is covered with immunity from legal
process with regard to Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and
the Philippine Gov’t.

(2) Whether or not the conduct of preliminary investigation was imperative.

HELD:

(1) NO. The petitioner’s case is not covered by the immunity. Courts cannot
blindly adhere to the communication from the DFA that the petitioner is
covered by any immunity. It has no binding effect in courts. The court needs
to protect the right to due process not only of the accused but also of the
prosecution. Secondly, the immunity under Section 45 of the Agreement is
not absolute, but subject to the exception that the acts must be done in
“official capacity”. Hence, slandering a person could not possibly be covered
by the immunity agreement because our laws do not allow the commission of
a crime, such as defamation, in the name of official duty.

(2) NO. Preliminary Investigation is not a matter of right in cases cognizable

by the MeTC such as this case. Being purely a statutory right, preliminary
investigation may be invoked only when specifically granted by law. The rule
on criminal procedure is clear that no preliminary investigation is required in
cases falling within the jurisdiction of the MeTC.

Hence, SC denied the petition.

494 Phil. 378

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the Resolution[1] of

the Sandiganbayan, dated April 6, 1999 in Criminal Case Nos. 23082, 23084,
23085, 23086, 23087, 23089, 23090, 23091, 23092, 23093, 23094, 23096 and
23097, ordering the reinstatement of said criminal cases.

Cresenciano Gatchalian and Zenaida Pia, faculty members of the

Polytechnic University of the Philippines (PUP), filed a complaint[2] for
violation of Republic Act No. 3019 with the Office of the Ombudsman against
the administrators of PUP, namely, petitioners Dr. Zenaida A. Olonan, the
President, Dr. Dante Guevarra, the Vice-President for Administration and
Finance, Atty. Augustus F. Cesar, Administrative Officer V, and Mr. Adriano A.
Salvador, the Acting Chief of the Accounting Office. The charges were made
in connection with certain questionable transactions entered into by the PUP.
A special audit team of the Commission on Audit (COA) had, likewise,
conducted a special audit of selected transactions, and its findings were
contained in SAO-SOG Report No. 93-19. The case was docketed as COA
Case No. 92-290. Petitioner Olonan submitted a copy of the said report, the
Memorandum of the COA Review Panel, and her request for reconsideration
of the findings of the special audit team in the said report.

An Information was, thereafter, filed in the Sandiganbayan against all the

accused, including petitioner Olonan. The accusatory portion of the
Information reads:

That on or about 1989 and for a period subsequent thereto, in

Sta. Mesa, Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, accused Dr. Zenaida A. Olonan, a public
officer, being then the President of the Polytechnic University
of the Philippines (P.U.P.), accused Dr. Dante G. Guevarra,
likewise a public officer, being then the Vice-President for
Administration and Finance, of the P.U.P., accused Atty.
Augustus F. Cesar, also a public officer, being then an
Administrative Officer V of the P.U.P., and accused Adriano A.
Salvador, a public officer too, being then the Acting Chief of the
Accounting Division of the P.U.P., taking advantage of their
positions and the offense being committed in relation to their
office, acting in evident bad faith and manifest partiality with a
single criminal intent, and all together, conspiring and
confederating with each other, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and criminally, commit the following acts, to wit:

1. After the construction of eight school buildings with a

total cost of P20,912,229.31, allow the non-turnover of
unused construction materials and scrap construction
materials to the P.U.P.;

2. Make an overpayment of P1,107,056.45 as terminal leave

benefits to Dr. Nemesio Prudente;

3. Make a payment of P1.74 Million to 64 employees of the

Bureau of Construction (B.O.C.), Department of Public
Works and Highways (DPWH), which amount is over and
above the prescribed fees for technical and supervision
services, and also make honoraria payments to 19 P.U.P.
officials in the amount of P556,367.00 without legal
basis;

4. Incur an overpayment of P133,200.00 on a parcel of land

in Lopez, Quezon Province, by failing to register on time a
Deed of Donation covering 1,332 square meters of the
aforestated property, which was embodied in a Deed of
Sale covering 15,919 square meters of land;

5. Make payments in the total amount of P10,646,230.28

based on blind certifications in violation of Sec. 46 of P.D.
1177, the names of creditors submitted to the DBM for
purposes of cash allocation, being different from the
names of the creditors in the Schedule of Accounts
payable;

6. Make payment for the purchase of curtains for the C.M.

Recto Auditorium, exceeding the required quantity of
159 yards worth P27,462.00;

7. Make payments with a total amount of P167,627.13

with the necessary documents to validate payments
thereto in the: repainting of the elevated concrete tank;
floor sanding and varnishing of the gymnasium;
 renovation of the four (4) tennis courts; and repair and
painting of the Pacia Board High School Building; and

8. Make an overpayment of P1.99 Million when six

change-work orders in the construction of the library
building were imposed with the indirect cost of 19%
instead of only 16%;

thus, causing undue injury to the government in the

aforestated amounts, to the damage and prejudice of the
government.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]

The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 22854 and raffled to the Second
Division of the Sandiganbayan. On motion of the Special Prosecutor, the
arraignment of the accused was reset to November 14, 1995.[4]

Graft Investigation Officer II Evelina S. Maglanoc-Reyes, recommended that

the charges be dismissed.[5] However, the Ombudsman disapproved this
recommendation and adopted that of Special Prosecution Officer I Cicero D.
Jurado, Jr., dated July 28, 1995, to charge the accused with 17 counts of
violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019.[6] The accused filed a motion
for the reconsideration of the Resolution.

Meanwhile, Special Prosecution Officer I Evelyn T. Lucero-Agcaoili reviewed

the recommendation of Jurado, and submitted a Memorandum to the
Ombudsman recommending that 17 Informations be filed against all the
accused, and that the Information in Criminal Case No. 22854 be
withdrawn. Hence, the Special Prosecutor filed a Motion to Withdraw
Criminal Case No. 22854[7] dated January 8, 1996. Appended thereto were
the 17 Informations adverted to by the Special Prosecutor.

On January 12, 1996, the Sandiganbayan granted the motion and dismissed
Criminal Case No. 22854. The bond posted by the accused was, likewise,
cancelled.[8] On February 28, 1996, Agcaoili submitted a Memorandum[9] to
the Office of the Ombudsman recommending that the 17 Informations be
maintained.

It appears, however, that the recommendation of Agcaoili was referred to

retired Court of Appeals Associate Justice Alfredo Marigomen, a Special
Assistant in the Office of the Ombudsman, for review. On May 24, 1996,
Justice Marigomen submitted a Report[10]recommending the dropping of
some of the charges against petitioner Olonan, and her retention as one of
the accused in Criminal Case Nos. 23083, 23088 and 23098. The
Ombudsman approved the recommendation.[11]
On June 4, 1996, the COA rendered a decision[12] in Case No. 92-290
granting the motion for reconsideration of petitioner Olonan in SAO-SOG
Report No. 93-19 and exonerating her of the charges therein. On August 15,
1996, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution[13]requiring the Prosecutor to
inform the Court when the Ombudsman received the decision of the COA in
Case No. 92-290 and whether the said decision will alter the position of the
prosecution.

On November 27, 1997, the Special Prosecutor filed a Manifestation and

Motion[14] praying, inter alia, that the arraignment of all the accused in
Criminal Case No. 23098 proceed as scheduled. They, likewise, manifested
that, based on the recommendation of retired Justice Marigomen, dated May
24, 1996, 13 cases filed against the accused, specifically Criminal Case Nos.
23082, 23084, 23085, 23086, 23087, 23089, 23090, 23091, 23092, 23093,
23094, 23096 and 23097 were recommended for dismissal; he had no
objection to the withdrawal of the Information in Criminal Case No. 23097
since it was merely a repetition of Criminal Case No. 23096; and with respect
to the remaining four cases, it appears that one of them, specifically Criminal
Case No. 23095 (withholding of RATA of Buscaino), was recommended for
dismissal; in regard to the three cases, Criminal Case No. 23083 (blind
certification); Criminal Case No. 23088 (floor sanding and varnishing of
gymnasium) and Criminal Case No. 23098 (irregular payment of salary of
COA Auditors), it appears that petitioner Olonan's participation was
undisputed.[15] The accused opposed the motion.

During the hearing of November 28, 1997, the graft court consequently,
directed the Special Prosecutor to file the appropriate motion with reference
to the 13 criminal cases.[16] On January 8, 1998, the Prosecutor filed a Joint
Reply to the pleadings of the accused, appending thereto the Report of
Justice Marigomen.[17] On January 26, 1998, the graft court issued an Order
dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 23082, 23084, 23085, 23086, 23087, and
23089, 23090, 23091, 23092, 23093, 23094 and 23096 to 23097; and, with
reference to Criminal Case Nos. 23083, 23088 and 23098, the Office of the
Special Prosecutor was given a period of 30 days within which to further
review the records of the said cases and to report to the graft court, within
the same period, its findings and recommendation, and the Ombudsman's
action thereon, more specifically as to whether the said cases should
proceed to trial or should be dismissed. The said order was purportedly
based on the recommendation of Justice Marigomen which was cited by the
Special Prosecutor in his Manifestation and Motion.

Consequently, the graft court held in abeyance the arraignment of

petitioners Olonan, Cesar and Salvador in Criminal Case Nos. 23083, 23088
and 23098 until further assignment. Likewise, the consideration of the
"Motion to Suspend Accused Pendente Lite" dated December 3, 1995 was
held in abeyance until the graft court had received the Memorandum of the
Office of the Special Prosecutor containing its findings and
recommendations in Criminal Case Nos. 23083, 23088 and 23098, and the
Ombudsman's final action thereon.[18]

When the Special Prosecutor received a copy of the Order of January 26,
1998, he filed, on February 20, 1998, a motion for the partial reconsideration
of the order contending that, in his report, Justice Marigomen merely
recommended that only petitioner Olonan be dropped as one of the accused
persons in Criminal Case Nos. 23082, 23084, 23085, 23086, 23087, 23089,
23090, 23091, 23092, 23093, 23094, 23096 and 23097; that the said cases
should be maintained as against the three other accused; that the inclusion
of accused Olonan in Criminal Case Nos. 23082, 23088 and 23098 remain
undisturbed; and that Criminal Case Nos. 23095 should be dismissed.[19]

The Special Prosecutor reasoned out that, as gleaned from the Memorandum
of retired Justice Marigomen, the recommendation of dropping of the 13
criminal cases applied only to petitioner Olonan. Hence, there was no legal
and factual basis for the dismissal of the 13 criminal cases as against
petitioners Guevarra, Cesar and Salvador.[20]

The Special Prosecutor then prayed that the January 26, 1998 Order of the
graft court, dismissing the above-mentioned cases against the petitioners,
be reconsidered, and the 13 cases filed against them be reinstated.[21]

The petitioners opposed the motion, contending that the January 26, 1998
Order of the graft court had become final and executory. Since no appeal or a
motion for reconsideration thereof was filed within the period therefor, the
order of the graft court was based on no less than the Manifestation and
Motion of the Special Prosecutor.

On April 6, 1999, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution granting the motion

of the Special Prosecutor and modified its January 26, 1998 Order. The graft
court set aside its Order dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 23082, 23084, 23085,
23086, 23087, 23089, 23090, 23091, 23092, 23093, 23094, 23096 and 23097
as against the petitioners and ordered the reinstatement of the said cases as
against them.[22]

The graft court declared that, while the motion of the Special Prosecutor was
filed three days beyond the period therefor, nevertheless, it granted the
motion in the interest of substantial justice.[23]

Hence, the present petition for certiorari, assailing the April 6, 1999
Resolution of the Sandiganbayan where the following issues are raised:
 1. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN REINSTATING THE
THIRTEEN (13) CRIMINAL CASES AGAINST THE
PETITIONERS ON THE BASIS OF THE MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION FILED BY THE PROSECUTION FILED
BEYOND THE FIFTEEN-DAY REGLEMENTARY PERIOD.

2. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED

GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN GRANTING THE
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION ON THE BASIS
SOLELY OF THE GROUNDS CITED BY THE
PROSECUTION.[24]

The petitioners aver that under Section 7 of Presidential Decree No. 1606
and Rule VIII of the Revised Rules of Procedure of the Sandiganbayan,
respondent People of the Philippines, as plaintiff, had only 15 days from
notice of the graft court's final order within which to file a motion for the
reconsideration thereof. The petitioners also assert that under Section 2,
Rule 45, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the respondent People of the
Philippines, had only 15 days from receipt of notice of the final order or the
resolution denying its motion for reconsideration thereof within which to file
a petition for review with this Court. The failure of the respondent People of
the Philippines to file the said motion within the period therefor rendered the
order issued by the graft court final and executory. As such, no matter how
erroneous the said orders may have been, it was beyond the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan to set aside or nullify them. Citing the ruling of this Court
in Icao v. Apalisok,[25] the petitioners posit that the rule applies even to
criminal cases. They further posit that penal laws should be observed strictly
against the State. The petitioners point out that the Special Prosecutor has
not cited any justification for his failure to file the motion for partial
reconsideration within the period therefore, given the fact that he was
present when the graft court issued its order in open court on January 26,
1998, dismissing the 13 cases.

The petitioners further assert that in resolving whether to dismiss the 13

cases or not, it behooved the respondent People of the Philippines and the
Sandiganbayan to consider not only the Report of Justice Marigomen, but
also the decision of the COA in Case No. 92-290.

In its comment on the petition, respondent People of the Philippines asserts

that the general rule that the periods prescribed to do certain acts must be
followed is subject to exceptional circumstances. A delay may be excused
on grounds of substantial justice and equity, and in the exercise of equity
jurisdiction. The respondent emphasized that when the graft court gave a
verbal order dismissing the 13 cases during the hearing of January 26, 1998,
the Special Prosecutor objected thereto. The respondent argues that the
graft court did not commit any grave abuse of its discretion in issuing its
April 6, 1999 Resolution, and insists that it acted in the interest of
substantial justice when it rectified its January 26, 1998 Order upon realizing
that it erred in dismissing the 13 cases on the basis of the Report of Justice
Marigomen since it did not contain any such recommendation of dismissal.

In their reply, the petitioners insist that substantial justice alone without any
justification of the respondent's failure to file a motion for reconsideration
within the reglementary period should not prevail over the clearly laid down
policy on finality of judgment and rules on reglementary period.

The petition has no merit.

The petitioners are correct in claiming that an order or resolution of the

Sandiganbayan ordering the dismissal of criminal cases becomes final and
executory upon the lapse of 15 days from notice thereof to the parties, and,
as such, is beyond the jurisdiction of the graft court to review, modify or set
aside, if no appeal therefrom is filed by the aggrieved party. However, if the
Sandiganbayan acts in excess or lack of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in dismissing a
criminal case, the dismissal is null and void. A tribunal acts without
jurisdiction if it does not have the legal power to determine the case; there is
excess of jurisdiction where a tribunal, being clothed with the power to
determine the case, oversteps its authority as determined by law.[26] A void
judgment or order has no legal and binding effect, force or efficacy for any
purpose. In contemplation of law, it is non-existent.[27] Such judgment or
order may be resisted in any action or proceeding whenever it is involved. It
is not even necessary to take any steps to vacate or avoid a void judgment or
final order; it may simply be ignored.[28]

In the present case, we find and so hold that the Sandiganbayan acted with
grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess of its jurisdiction when it
issued the Order of January 26, 1998 dismissing the 13 criminal cases based
on the Manifestation and Motion of the Special Prosecutor, which was, in
turn, based on the report of retired Court of Appeals Justice Marigomen. The
records further show that the report of Justice Marigomen was triggered by
the Recommendation of Special Prosecution Officer I Cicero Jurado, Jr.,
dated July 28, 1995, recommending that the 17 charges against the accused
be maintained which, in effect, denied the motion for reconsideration of
petitioner Olonan. The report of Justice Marigomen did not delve into and
resolve the matter of the retention or dismissal of the 13 criminal cases
against the petitioners precisely because the same was not referred to him
for study and recommendation. Hence, Justice Marigomen merely
recommended that petitioner Olonan be dropped as accused in the 13
criminal cases, and that her inclusion in Criminal Case Nos. 23083, 23088
and 23098 be maintained, thus:

WHEREFORE, it is hereby recommended that movant Dr.

Zenaida A. Olonan be dropped as one of the accused persons in
Criminal Case Nos. 23082, 23084, 23085, 23086, 23087, 23089,
23090, 23091, 23092, 23093, 23094, 23096 and 23097. Her
inclusion in Criminal Case Nos. 23083, 23088 and 23098 shall
remain undisturbed. The entire Criminal Case No. 23095
should be dismissed.[29]

The Sandiganbayan was well aware of Justice Marigomen's report since the
Special Prosecutor appended a copy thereof to his Joint Reply filed on
January 8, 1998, in compliance with the graft court's Order of December 10,
1997.

The Sandiganbayan ordered the dismissal of the 13 cases as against the

petitioners over the objection of the Special Prosecutor on its erroneous
perception that Justice Marigomen recommended in his report the dismissal
of the 13 cases against the petitioners. By its Order, the graft court deprived
the respondent People of the Philippines of its right to due process. In fine,
the Sandiganbayan acted in excess of its jurisdiction and committed grave
abuse of its discretion in dismissing the 13 criminal cases against the
petitioners.[30] Hence, its Order dated January 26, 1998 dismissing the 13
criminal cases, as against the petitioners, was null and void;[31] it may thus
be rectified, as did the graft court, per its Resolution dated April 6, 1999
despite the lapse of fifteen days from notice of the Special Prosecutor of its
January 26, 1998 Order. By rectifying its void Order, it cannot be said that
the graft court acted with grave abuse of its discretion, amounting to excess
or lack of jurisdiction.

Indeed, in so doing, the Sandiganbayan acted in accord with law. It bears

stressing that the State, like the accused, is also entitled to due process of
law. Not too long ago, the Court emphasized that:

Indeed, for justice to prevail, the scales must balance; justice

is not to be dispensed for the accused alone. The interests of
society and the offended parties which have been wronged
must be equally considered. Verily, a verdict of conviction is
not necessarily a denial of justice; and an acquittal is not
necessarily a triumph of justice, for, to the society offended and
the party wronged, it could also mean injustice. Justice then
must be rendered even-handedly to both the accused, on one
hand, and the State and offended party, on the other.[32]
The Special Prosecutor must share the blame with the Sandiganbayan
because in his Manifestation and Motion, the Special Prosecutor averred
therein that Justice Marigomen recommended the dismissal of the 13
criminal cases against all the accused, without specifically stating therein
that the recommendation for dismissal pertained only to petitioner Olonan,
and not to the other accused who are the petitioners herein. The Special
Prosecutor should have been more precise and forthright so as not to
mislead the graft court.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed

Resolution of the Sandiganbayan, dated April 6, 1999, is AFFIRMED. No
costs.

SO ORDERED.
Harden vs. Director of Prisons (Crim1)

Harden vs. Director of Prisons (81 Phil. 741)

Facts:

On July 12, 1941 Fred M. Harden was involved in a civil case with Mrs. Harden
concerning conjugal partnership, payment of alimony and accounting. A
preliminary injunction was issued restraining Mr. Harden from transferring or
alienating, except with consideration and consent of the court, all assets
(money, shares of stock, property, real, personal, whether in his name, her
name or both) in the partnership with Mrs. Harden. During 1946 however, Mr.
Harden transferred drafts and cash in overseas accounts. In the course of
two years, he received orders from the SC to return the amounts but Mr.
Harden kept filing for extensions. On March 24, 1948, he was committed to
jail because of contempt (failure to comply with the court’s orders of
producing the amounts) and held there until he can produce said amounts.

Issue:

Relevant: WoN the imprisonment sentence for Mr. Harden is excessive

punishment.

Irrelevant: WoN the property moved into foreign jurisdiction is still covered
by Philippine jurisdiction

Held and Ratio:

Relevant: No. Mr. Harden has “the keys to his prison” and his detainment is
something that he himself can end at any time. (Sec. 7, Rule 64 of the Rules
of Court: When the contempt consists in the omission to do an act which is
yet in the power of the accused to perform, he may be imprisoned by order of
a superior court until he performs it)

Irrelevant: Yes. “While a court cannot give its receiver authority to act in
another state without the assistance of the courts thereof (53 C. J., 390-391)
yet it may act directly upon the parties before it with respect to the property
beyond the limits of its territorial jurisdiction, and hold them in contempt if
they resist the court’s orders with reference to its custody or disposition.”

Decision: Petition is denied.

Separate Opinion: Perfecto, J.

He believes that it is indeed an excessive penalty because of Mr. Harden’s

claims that it is beyond his power to comply with the court order and would
thus result in life imprisonment for Mr. Harden.

G.R. No. L-47684 June 10, 1941

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. DIONISIO A. MANEJA,

Defendant-Appellee.

First Assistant Solicitor-General Reyes and Solicitor Barcelona for appellant.

Del Rosario & Del Rosario, Pelaez & Pelaez and Hilario B. Abellana for appellee.

Godofredo Reyes and Enrique Medina as private prosecutors.

MORAN, J.:
The sole question raised in this appeal is whether the period of prescription for the
offense of false testimony which, in the instant case, is five years (art. 180, No. 4, in
relation to art. 90, Revised Penal Code), should commence from the time the appellee,
Dionisio A. Maneja, adduced the supposed false testimony in criminal case No. 1872 on
December 16, 1933, as the lower court held, or, from the time the decision of the Court of
Appeals in the aforesaid basic case became final in December, 1938, as the prosecution
contends.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

We hold that the theory of the prosecution is the correct one. The period of prescription
shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended
party, the authorities or their agents. (Art. 91, Revised Penal Code.) With regard to the
crime of false testimony, considering that the penalties provided therefor in article 180 of
the Revised Penal Code are, in every case, made to depend upon the conviction or
acquittal of the defendant in the principal case, the act of testifying falsely does not
therefore constitute an actionable offense until the principal case is finally decided. (Cf. U.
S. vs. Opinion, 6 Phil., 662, 663; People vs. Marcos, et al., G.R. No. 47388, Oct. 22, 1940.)
And before an act becomes a punishable offense, it cannot possibly be discovered as
such by the offended party, the authorities or their agents.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library

If the period of prescription is to be computed from the date the supposed false
testimony is given, it would be impossible to determine the length of such period in any
particular case, depending, as it does depend, on the final outcome of the basic case. For
instance, a witness testifies falsely against an accused who is charged with murder. If the
accused is found guilty, the penalty prescribed by law for the perjurer is reclusion
temporal (art. 180, No. 1, Revised Penal Code), in which case the period of prescription is
twenty years (art. 90, idem). On the other hand, if the accused is acquitted, the penalty
prescribed for the perjurer is only arresto mayor (art. 180, No. 4, idem), in which case the
period for prescription is only five years. Upon these hypotheses, if the perjurer is to be
prosecuted before final judgment in the basic case, it would be impossible to determine
the period of prescription - whether twenty years or five years - as either of these two
periods is fixed by law on the basis of conviction or acquittal of the defendant in the main
case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The mere fact that, in the present case, the penalty for the offense of false testimony is
the same, whether the defendant in criminal case No. 1872 were convicted or acquitted, is
of no moment, it being a matter of pure coincidence. The four cases enumerated in article
180 of the Revised Penal Code - and the instant case falls on one of them - uniformly
presuppose a final judgment of conviction or acquittal in the basic case as a prerequisite
to the action ability of the crime of false testimony.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
Order of dismissal is reversed, and let the case be remanded to the court of origin for
further proceedings, without costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library

Avanceña, C.J., Diaz, Laurel and Horilleno, JJ., concur.