STATE SECURITY DEPARTMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA

SECOND INVESTIGATION DEPARTMENT UNDER THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

NATIONAL
THREAT
ASSESSMENT
2019
STATE SECURITY DEPARTMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA

SECOND INVESTIGATION DEPARTMENT UNDER THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

NATIONAL
THREAT
ASSESSMENT
2019
Vilnius, 2019
CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION 3

SUMMARY 4

REGIONAL SECURITY 9

MILITARY SECURITY 19

ACTIVITY OF HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY 27 27

SERVICES 27

CYBER ESPIONAGE 35

PROTECTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 39

INFORMATION SECURITY 43

ECONOMIC AND ENERGY SECURITY 49

TERRORISM 55

CONCLUSIONS AND FORECASTS 61

3

INTRODUCTION

National Security Threat Assessment by the State Security Department

of the Republic of Lithuania (VSD) and the Second Investigation Depart-
ment under the Ministry of National Defence (AOTD) is presented to the
public in accordance with the Articles 8 and 26 of the Law on Intelli-
gence of the Republic of Lithuania. The document provides consoli-
dated, unclassified assessment of threats and risks to national security
of the Republic of Lithuania prepared by both intelligence services.

The document assesses events, processes and trends that make the
biggest influence on national security situation in the Republic of Lithu-
ania. Based on them and considering the long-term trends affecting
national security, the document provides the assessment of major
challenges that the Lithuanian national security is to face in the near
term (2019–2020). The assessments of long-term trends project the per-
spective up to 10 years.

The assessment is based on information available before 1 December

2018.

The table below outlines the language of probability and definition of

terms used in this assessment:

< 25 % 25–50 % 50–75 % > 75 %

UNLIKELY POSSIBLE LIKELY HIGHLY LIKELY

Short term: 0–6 months Near term: 6 months – 2 years Mid term: 3–5 years Long term: 6–10 years
 4

SUMMARY

In 2018, the international community witnessed Russia's ambitions in

global politics and means to achieve them. Western countries detected
and exposed aggressive measures employed by Russia: attempts
to interfere with domestic processes of the Western countries, use
of chemical weapon against the former Russian intelligence officer,
aggressive cyber operations conducted both from Russia and on Euro-
pean soil.

Russia's aggressive foreign policy became the key measure to justify

the ruling regime. Seeking to obtain an ‘inherent’ place in the global
system Russia combines diplomacy and influence operations against
the ‘weak’ West, looks for ways to diminish the US and European influ-
ence in other regions. However, so far Russia has not found trustwor-
thy allies to achieve its global ambitions, whereas the West becomes
increasingly aware of Russian threats and employs joint response
measures.

Russia's ruling regime recognizes challenges posed by the international

isolation and economic recession, but attempted reforms indicate that
the existing political system will not tackle fundamental problems.
There are no political changes in Russia and they are unlikely to occur.
The Kremlin further strengthens array of means to control society and
successfully manipulates attributes of the façade democracy – fake
elections, controlled opposition, tolerates socially, but not politically
oriented protests.
In 2018, Russia continued its overall military build-up including in
the Kaliningrad Oblast that neighbours Lithuania. In the short term,
it intends to deploy additional offensive elements there as well as air
defence and aviation capabilities. Russia strengthens its capabilities
to start execute combat orders with 24–48 hours' notice. Significance
of the military force as one of the main instruments of the Russian
foreign and security policy increases. However, growing defence capa-
bilities of the Baltic States and NATO military contingents deployed in
the region considerably reduce chances that Russia would resort to
military means against the Baltic States.

In the Lithuanian neighbourhood, Belarus is the most susceptible to

Russian influence. For the meantime, Minsk is incapable of implement-
ing fully independent policy because of financial dependence on Rus-
sia, unresolved bilateral issues and lack of economic reforms in the
public sector.

Russian intelligence and security services (RISS) try to adapt to West-

ern (including Lithuanian) defensive measures: use business, tourist
and other non-diplomatic cover, expand the geography of their oper-
ations, relocate intelligence operations to Russia or third countries,
employ proxies (particularly Belarus), manipulate common Soviet past,
search for individuals ideologically close to Russia, very actively recruit
Lithuanian and foreign citizens travelling to Russia and Belarus.
Russia develops cyber capabilities that became one of the main tools
to conduct intelligence and influence operations abroad. Implement-
ing these activities Russia has no ‘red lines’ regarding geography and
importance of the target and expects to escape responsibility. So far,
Russia likely considers that benefits gained from cyber operations out-
weighed potential costs incurred by response of the Western countries.

Aiming to disparage Lithuania's statehood Russia implements targeted

projects to promote history policy favouring Russian interpretation of
the past, denying Soviet occupation, and propagating positive image of
Soviet influence on Lithuania's development. Russia particularly seeks
to attract youth to these projects. In 2018, one of the main targets of the
Russian history policy was the Lithuanian post-war armed resistance.
Russia produces a constant stream of propaganda against Lithuania.
It particularly intensifies when Lithuania initiates response measures
against Russia's aggressive foreign policy.

Seeking to influence Lithuania's domestic processes Russia exploits

democratic freedoms and rights for its subversive activity. Under the
veil of care for its diaspora, Russia tries to fragment Lithuanian soci-
ety. Furthermore, while pretending to develop cultural relations, Russia
actually promotes its aggressive foreign policy. Russia seeks to influ-
ence political processes in Lithuania, but there are currently no solid
indications that Russia has achieved the desired influence.
7

As Chinese economic and political ambitions grow in Lithuania and

other NATO and EU countries, activities of the Chinese intelligence and
security services become increasingly aggressive. Seeking to gather rel-
evant information Chinese intelligence attempts to recruit Lithuanian
citizens.

Terrorism threat level in Lithuania remains low. In 2018, the number of

terrorist attacks in Europe has decreased, but the threat remains sig-
nificant. The terrorist organization Islamic State (ISIL) tries to adapt to
changing conditions in Syria and Iraq and encourages its supporters in
the West to conduct terrorist attacks.
 World Cup 2018 in Russia
allowed Putin to step into
the spotlight
REUTERS / Scanpix
9

REGIONAL
SECURITY

Russian ruling regime faces domestic

difficulties, but changes are unlikely
In spring 2018, Vladimir Putin was re-elected as the President and no
significant elections will take place in Russia until 2021. This provides
an opportunity to prepare for the major uncertainty of 2024 – the end
of the current presidential term. Political leadership is indicating that
they will respect the constitutional restriction regarding the number
of presidential terms, but it is highly likely that the Kremlin will seek
to find a continuity model to ensure functioning of the current ruling
regime without real changes.

Formation of the new Government and the Kremlin's first steps after
the presidential elections indicate the scope of likely changes in Rus-
sia. The ruling regime recognizes challenges posed by the economic
stagnation. It tries to implement certain reforms and stimulate the eco-
nomic growth with national mega-projects, but there are no plans to
reform the existing political system. Changes within the ruling elite are
negligible – domination of members of intelligence and security ser-
vices and regime-loyal technocrats continues. The Kremlin consistently
enhances control over society, expands the arsenal of tools to con-
trol internet, censors media, and limits activity of non-governmental
organizations. The Kremlin pays close attention to patriotic upbringing
and propaganda targeting essential groups of society. Regime critics
not only face persecutions of law enforcement, but also violence of
 regime loyalists. Journalists, who investigate crimes of the regime, dis-
appear, mysteriously perish or are forced to flee the country.

After the presidential elections, Russia's ruling regime embarked on

long-delayed structural reforms. However, the very first step – pension
reform – caused public resistance. Protest potential also surfaced dur-
ing regional elections in September 2018. The ruling party United Rus-
sia and the Kremlin-supported candidates delivered the worst results
in the last 10 years.

The Kremlin's reaction to pro-

tests was quite moderate. The
regime tolerated certain events
and sought to aggravate the
organization of some others with
preventive measures. The Krem-
lin regards social protests as one
of the means to reduce tensions
in society and resorts to repres-
sions only against individuals who
raise political demands. Moreover,
the protesters usually expressed
support to the conformist oppo-
sition  – the parliamentary Com-
munist and Liberal Democratic
parties that are completely loyal
Protests against pension to the regime. Such situation is
reform in Moscow
acceptable to the Kremlin as it can further manipulate the political
REUTERS / Scanpix
system without changing rules of the game.

Despite economic and social difficulties that gradually transform into

decreasing regime's approval ratings, regime's stability is not at risk
in the near term. However, it is unlikely that the Russian model of the
political system is fit for tackling systemic issues. Throughout his ten-
ure Putin created illusion of stability, which made the Russian soci-
ety allergic to changes. Therefore, even attempts to embark on truly
necessary reforms provoke discontent.
11

It is possible that while facing the inability to deliver growth and pros-
perity the Kremlin may continue resort to well-established practices –
aggressive foreign policy or even reckless adventurism. Slogans like
‘West is Russophobic’, ‘Russia needs to regain proper respect and its
place within international system’ and exaggeration of external threats
became the essential basis for legitimacy of the regime. Even though
the Kremlin does not feel a need to take immediate actions to change
the current situation, it is unlikely that deteriorating domestic situation
would lead Putin to softening the aggressive foreign policy towards the
West or refraining from attempts to increase its influence in neighbour-
ing countries.

Russian foreign policy – great

ambitions and mixed results
During his election campaign Putin demonstrated that Russia's foreign
policy could only change to be even more aggressive and more unilat-
eral. At one of the key events of his campaign, Putin neglected foreign
policy topic, instead he presented the most recent weaponry and dis-
played a simulated attack on the US. The Kremlin takes advantage of
favourable international situation, demonstrates its global ambitions,
and seeks to be recognised as a great power which has a privileged
zone of geopolitical interests.

Putin and his entourage expect that various disagreements among

Western countries regarding migration, terrorist threat alongside ris-
ing political populism would overwhelm the Russian threat. The Krem-
lin perceives the West as weak: the Western governments seek social
welfare and agreement within society that makes them prone to com-
promises; political leaders are accountable to the population there-
fore vulnerable; genuine elections take place and political leaders are
under constant pressure to be voted out; media freedom enables criti-
cism of government decisions. Decision-making in the Kremlin belongs
to several individuals and is prompt, election results are always clear
 beforehand, opponents are silenced or flee the country. The Kremlin
expects that polarization within of the EU and NATO would enhance
Russia‘s role in international arena, the world would be dominated by
the great powers, where the weak must submit or become part of the
deals between the leading states.

The Kremlin is not just a passive observer. Where deems necessary

and plausible it provides financial support, dispatches journalists who
present an ‘alternative truth’ or promotes the voice of ‘ordinary people’
that is often prefabricated
in the ‘kitchen’ of Yevgeny
Prigozhin. Russia actively
seeks contacts with these
strata of the Western soci-
eties that are dissatisfied
with their Governments.
Russia attempts to amplify
alleged loss of their sover-
eignty, downsides of glob-
alisation, alleged negative
aspects of integration into
NATO and the EU. It is the
Kremlin's desire to see the
rise of nationalist parties in
Europe. The Kremlin would
Russian oligarch Prigozhin
(in plain clothes) also known also welcome the rise of anti-globalist and radical powers. Most of such
as ‘Putin's chef’ participates
movements see the Kremlin as their natural ally that allegedly fosters
in a meeting with a military
delegation from Libya on traditions and conservative values, fights globalisation and questions
9 November 2018
the global role of the US.
AP / Scanpix
The Kremlin tries to develop relations with academia and specifically
targets those who feel unheard, initiates discussions where Moscow
gets a venue to present the Russian vision of the world and the Rus-
sian ways to tackle problems. In 2018, the international community
had many chances to witness the extent of Russia's attempts to med-
dle in domestic politics of other countries. Investigations on Russian
13

interference in domestic political processes in the US and attempted

assassination of Sergey and Yulia Skripals, exposed activities of Rus-
sian spies and hackers and revealed the scope of aggressive measures
the Kremlin employs to fulfil its global ambitions.

In global politics, Russia strengthened its positions in the Middle East

and Africa. The Kremlin's active support to Bashar-Al-Assad regime
made Russia indispensable in settlement of the Syrian conflict. Leaders
of Israel, Turkey and other countries regularly engage Putin regarding
other issues of regional matter. Russia's military activity in the Medi-
terranean indicates that the Kremlin's security interests stretch way
beyond Syrian borders. More and more actively, the Kremlin looks for
allies in Africa and seeks to counterbalance the influence of the EU, the
US and China in this continent. Egypt became one of its closest allies
in the region. Russian private military companies and military instruct-
ors operate in Central African Republic. The Kremlin is also actively
involved in Libya, sells arms to many countries and enhances economic
and energy ties. Increasing engagement with African countries not only
relieves Russia's international isolation, but also provides significant
support in votes on Russia-favourable United Nations resolutions. At
the same time, Russia enhances its cooperation with China. Beijing
enables Russia to procure technologies that became inaccessible due
to Western sanctions, buys its energy resources, and serves as an alter-
native source of investments.

The Kremlin prefers power tactics and actively employs it in its foreign
policy. Russia is not prone to compromises and considers concessions
as a sign of weakness. It is unlikely that the Kremlin would surrender
Crimea, withdraw from Donbas or retreat regarding other major inter-
national issues. It therefore waits for the Western position to change
gradually. This would be the Kremlin's major achievement. It would
confirm effectiveness of the power tactics and would encourage similar
Russian behaviour in the future.

Although the Kremlin is highly ambitious, the actual results of its for-
eign policy are mixed. Russia would like to normalize its relationship
with the West on its own terms, but so far without major success. It is
 unlikely that China would consider Russia as an equal partner because
of its considerably smaller economic potential. Across the world, Rus-
sia turned into the greatest supporter and arms provider to dictator-
ships. The Western countries tend to limit their relations with such
regimes, while Russia exploits them to increase its influence. However,
such allies provide limited possibilities to create an alternative world
Russia and Belarus – order or to develop a growth-stimulating economic cooperation.
a strained union
AP / Scanpix
15

Russia is gradually changing its foreign policy towards the Baltic States.
The Kremlin likely concluded that the key to the Baltic States is not in
Vilnius, Riga or Tallinn, but in Brussels or in other major world capitals.
Therefore, the Kremlin has refocused its effort in that direction. Russia
believes if it succeeds in normalising relations with the EU, the Baltic
States would either have to soften their positions towards Russia or
could be accused of subverting relations with the Kremlin.

Russia continues to increase its

influence in neighbouring countries
using structural dependence and
frozen conflicts
Despite Russia's great ambitions and aggressiveness, its foreign pol-
icy achievements are limited even in consolidating its influence in the
former Soviet Republics. However, due to their political, economic and
military dependence on Russia, the Kremlin is capable to exert much
greater influence over the decisions taken in these countries than over
those in the West.

After re-election of Putin, Russia has started tightening control over

Belarus, so that Minsk would not implement policy inconsistent with
the Kremlin's interests. When addressing bilateral problems Russia
exploits its neighbour's economic dependence and uses financial sup-
port in manipulative fashion. The Kremlin will seek to secure favourable
political decisions knowing that Russian subsidies and financial sup-
port are vital to the Belarusian budget. Moreover, the newly appointed
Russian Ambassador to Belarus Mikhail Babich has wider authority in
his capacity as the Special Envoy of the President for Trade and Eco-
nomic Cooperation with Belarus. This appointment indicates Putin's
increasing requirement for direct control over processes in Belarus.

The upcoming 2019–2020 elections in Belarus, intensifying bilat-

eral negotiations over unresolved energy, financial and trade issues
prompted Russia to enhance its information policy towards Belarus.
 An investigation by Belarusian journalists revealed that pro-Kremlin
internet news sites had been developed since 2016 with the aim to
target regional audience and to pose as an alternative to existing local
news sites. Such internet sites usually republish articles from other
The Velvet revolution refers
to the protests against the media outlets, some of them featuring anti-Belarusian and anti-West-
ruling Republican Party and
the election of the former
ern, as well as anti-Lithuanian propaganda.
President Sargsyan as the
Armenian Prime Minister Russia's role in frozen conflicts in the post-Soviet area enables it to
AFP / Scanpix influence foreign policy of the former Soviet republics particularly in
17

the case of Armenia. Armenia's dependence on Russia's support in the

Nagorno-Karabakh conflict drives Yerevan's need to maintain good
relationship with the Kremlin. The Velvet revolution will not change
country's foreign policy direction. However, changes in Armenia are not
in line with Russia's interests as they manifest that social protests can
overthrow Kremlin-favourable political leadership. The Kremlin cannot
allow protests in post-Soviet countries to become a positive example
and will seek to discredit political organizations and individuals that
promote political change. Elections in the Republic of Moldova in 2019
will be in the focus of Russia's attention. Although the pro-Kremlin
Socialist Party is the most popular political power in the Republic of
Moldova, the Kremlin cannot feel certain about its victory. Therefore, it
is likely that the Kremlin will meddle actively and overtly in the upcom-
ing elections.

Despite its aggression against Ukraine lasting since 2014, Russia has no
effective levers to impact Kiev's policy – the image of an aggressor has
significantly reduced support for pro-Kremlin parties in Ukraine. The
Kremlin's abilities to penetrate decision-making process with the help
of highest-level influence agents and exert direct influence over the
fundamental national processes in Ukraine will remain very limited.
The aggression has considerably reduced Russia's possibilities to use
‘soft power’ means, while granting autocephaly to the Ukrainian Ortho-
dox Church can weaken one of the main Russian influence tools.

Currently, Russia does not have a long-term strategy neither for reso-
lution of the conflict nor for normalization of relations with Ukraine.
Therefore, it seeks opportunities to destabilize internal situation in
Ukraine and discredit Kiev in the eyes of its Western allies and inter-
national community. Russian imposed restrictions on Ukrainian naviga-
tion through the Kerch Strait fuel tension in the Azov Sea Region – a risk
of armed incidents persists. It is likely that Russia will further seek to
provoke Kiev to use military force. Russia could respond by completely
closing Ukrainian navigation through the Kerch Strait. Situation in the
Azov Sea can increase military tension in Donbas between Ukraine and
Russia-controlled separatists. However, in the short term, resumption of
a full-scale armed conflict in Donbas is unlikely.
Military parade in
Kaliningrad
Sputnik / Scanpix
19

MILITARY
SECURITY

Russian Military Power is the

Essential Enabler of its Aggressive
Foreign Policy
The Russian Armed Forces (AF) still play a crucial role in supporting Rus-
sia's great power ambitions. Both Russia's domestic and foreign policy
are heavily militarized. Russia's military power remains one of the main
sources of national pride. Unlike fundamental economic reforms, the
military reform is consistent and successful. The AF undergo compre-
hensive modernisation – they reformed command and control, mod-
ernised equipment. The AF modernisation progress is also visible in
the AF operations in Syria and Ukraine. Putin also emphasized the sig-
nificance of the AF during his annual address and campaign speech
on 1  March 2018 at the Federal Assembly. The main messages of his
speech and herewith his electoral programme stressed achievements
of the military reform and the nuclear potential of the Russian AF,
which demonstrate superiority over other countries. Such messages
delivered by the state leader imply that the attention to the AF and the
determination to use military force will not decrease in the future.

In  2018, tempo of the Russian military operation in Syria decreased

allowing the AF to withdraw part of the military equipment and person-
nel. However, Russia's motivation and ambitions to expand its military
influence both in the Middle East and in Africa did not decline. The AF
have intensified their actions towards Libya and strengthened posi-
 20

tions in Central African Republic. It is highly likely that Russia's polit-

ical and military leaders will continue to search for ways to strengthen
country's global positions and will make effort to expand the network
of military bases abroad.

In 2018, no new hotbeds of potential military confrontation emerged

in the Baltic Sea region, but the trends of Russian military build-up in
the Western military district (including Kaliningrad Oblast) negatively
affect Lithuania's security environment. There are no indications that
Russia would intend to revise its policies
and posture towards de-escalation and
reduction of tension in the region.

Major Trends in
Russian Armed Forces
Russian defence spending has always
been neither clear nor transparent.
According to official numbers, in  2018
the nominal funding for Russian Defence
Ministry decreased and should not reach
3  percent of the GDP. Nonetheless, due
to a possibility to conceal spending and
allocate additional financing at any time,
Putin meets members of the
‘Young Army‘
the real defence spending is and will be
AP / Scanpix noticeably higher in comparison to the official statistics. However,
lack of modern technologies, demographic problems and sanctions
imposed by the Western countries will have a considerably larger neg-
ative impact than the reduced financing. The AF will remain quite attract-
ive compared to most employers in the public and private sector. It is
highly likely the allocated funding will allow to implement the modern-
isation programme and the nominal decrease of the funding will not
have a significant negative impact on Russian military potential.
Growing defence capabilities of the Baltic States and NATO military contingents deployed in the region
reduce Russia's ability to localize potential military conflict and rapidly achieve desirable results
avoiding a large-scale NATO involvement. This reduces probability that Russia would resort to military
means against the Baltic States. Despite this, Russia will further seek to convince Western (including
Lithuanian) politicians and societies that additional NATO security measures in the Baltic region are
counterproductive and increase tensions.

Russia develops military capabilities in all strategic directions. One of

the priorities is the Western strategic direction, which includes Lithu-
ania. Changes have been both, qualitative and quantitative in this stra-
tegic direction. Russia develops military infrastructure, establishes new
and re-equips existing units, includes experience gained in Ukraine
and Syria into combat training programmes. Moreover, the AF regularly
conduct large-scale strategic exercises simulating military conflict with
NATO.

Russia actively tackles the issue

of the combat readiness of its
forces. Manoeuvre units (bri-
gades and regiments) estab-
lish battalion tactical groups
(700–800 soldiers) that are fully
manned (with contract soldiers
exclusively) and equipped.
These groups are able to start
execute combat orders with
24–48 hours' notice. Russia's
ability to rapidly generate
forces and especially the Krem-
lin's fast and centralized de-
cision making process enables
it to gain (at least at the initial
stage of the conflict) an obvious Iskander-M
Sputnik / Scanpix
military advantage over the neighbouring states.

Strategic nuclear forces remain the main priority. Nonetheless, Rus-

sia intensively develops and deploys long-range dual capable pre-
cise strike systems. Russia develops systems like Iskander-M/SS-26/
SSC-7, Kh-101/102 air-to-surface cruise missiles, ship-borne and sub-
marine-born Kalibr cruise missiles. These systems enable Russia to
attack critical infrastructure of potential adversary within range up to
2.000 km.
 22

Russia Strengthens THE Military

Grouping in Kaliningrad Oblast
The processes in Kaliningrad Oblast are particularly important to Lithu-
ania's military security. Russia consistently strengthens the military
grouping based in Kaliningrad Oblast: it upgrades the old and devel-
ops new military infrastructure, establishes new military units, deploys
new equipment, conducts intensive com-
bat training in Kaliningrad's ground and
naval ranges.

In the short term, a new tank regiment

will be established in Kaliningrad Oblast.
Russia also plans to re-equip the Kalin-
ingrad-based artillery brigade with
new artillery systems. Current multiple
rocket launch systems Grad/BM-21 will
be replaced by longer-range Uragan/
BM-27. It will extend the effective range
from 20 km to 35 km. Russia also intends
to reinforce naval aviation capabilities in
Kaliningrad by re-establishing two avi-
ation regiments  – fighter aviation regi-
ment and naval assault aviation (bomber)
Su-30SM / Flanker-H
regiment. Russia started to supply modern
Sputnik / Scanpix combat planes and helicopters to Kaliningrad Oblast. In 2018, Kalinin-
grad Oblast received five antisubmarine combat helicopters Ka-27M/
HELIX and two multirole fighters Su-30SM/FLANKER-H.

Military activity particularly increased in Dobrovolsk range close to the

Lithuanian border, where the Kaliningrad-based 11th Army Corps units
and the Baltic Fleet naval aviation conduct training. Frequent activity of
the AF units at the border negatively affects Lithuania's security envir-
onment and increases the risk of unintentional incidents.
EXAMPLES OF MILITARY INFRASTRUCTURE EXPANSION IN KALININGRAD OBLAST:

 Completed upgrade of the Kaliningrad-based Chkalovsk military airfield, which is capable of

receiving most types of military aircraft including heavy bombers Tu-22M3/BACKFIRE.

 A large ammunition storage site is under construction in the western part of Kaliningrad
Oblast (close to the Prokhladnoye settlement). New-type reinforced ammunition bunkers are being
established.

 Reconstruction of nuclear weapons storage bunker is underway in the western part of Kaliningrad
Oblast (close to the Alekseyevka settlement).

 Home base of Iskander-M missile brigade is under intensive development in Chernyakhovsk.

New storages for Iskander-M missile systems were built, additional construction works are ongoing.

 A modern home base for a coastal defence unit in Donskoye area is being built. New permanent
storage hangars for Bastion-P/SSC-5 and Bal/SSC-6 coastal defence systems were built.

 A motor-rifle brigade is being relocated to Sovetsk, close to the Lithuanian border. Russia
develops additional military infrastructure to enable permanent deployment of the brigade.

Long-range weapon systems deployed in Kaliningrad Oblast and Bela-

rus create a complex anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) environment.
In the event of crisis or war this would hamper NATO operations in the
Baltic Sea region. A2/AD is a set of military instruments used to isolate
the region, prevent access and free movement of adversary forces in
the region in time of crisis or war.

MAIN WEAPON SYSTEMS DEPLOYED IN KALININGRAD OBLAST CONTRIBUTING TO A2/AD EFFECT:

 Long-range air defence systems S-400/SA-21 capable of destroying air targets within 250 km range.
In the short term, Russia plans to deploy additional S-400 systems.

 Coastal defence systems Bal and Bastion-P, capable of engaging ships up to 130 km and 300 km
range respectively.

 Missile systems Iskander-M can be equipped with both conventional and nuclear warheads and
are capable of destroying ground targets within 500 km range. In spring 2018, Russia fully upgraded the
missile brigade based in Chernyakhovsk with Iskander-M systems.

 The Baltic Fleet has three ships equipped with cruise missile systems Kalibr capable of destroying
targets within 2.000 km range.

 A2/AD also includes non-kinetic tools such as radioelectronic warfare systems primarily intended
for interference with opponent's communications and navigation.
 Belarus as Buffer State in Russian
Military Strategy
From the standpoint of Lithuanian national security, the role of Belarus
in Russian military planning is extremely important. In case of a con-
flict with the West / NATO, Russia plans to use Belarusian territory as a
bridgehead for combat actions against the West.

Belarus associates its mil-

itary security with Russia,
as it still perceives NATO
as the major source of ex-
ternal threats. Nevertheless,
military rhetoric regarding
expansion of NATO and the
US capabilities and activity
in the region is quite mod-
erate. Belarus is immensely
important for Russia due
to its geographical position
and historically intertwined
bilateral relations. Russian
military strategy refers to
Belarus as a ‘buffer’ state.
In view of common geopo-
litical and security interests
as well as perceived com-
Russian and Belarusian
Defence Ministers Sergei mon threats, Belarus and Russia established a Regional Military Group-
Shoigu and Andrei Ravkov ing and United Regional Air Defence System.
www.mil.by / Scanpix
Russia attributes Belarus to its zone of influence and uses its territ-
ory for military operation planning and demonstration of force. Bela-
25

rus and Russia joint strategic exercises ZAPAD simulate military con-
flict with NATO. Moreover, Belarus holds unannounced joint military
exercises with participation of Russian military equipment and per-
sonnel. In recent years, the number of joint exercises of Russian Air-
borne Troops and Belarus Special Operation Forces has considerably
increased. During the last joint Special Forces exercise in September
2018, Russian airborne troops brought their state of the art equip-
ment to Brest region. Russian military transport aircraft conducted an
airdrop of military equipment in Belarus territory for the first time in
its modern history. The gradually deepening military integration with
Russia reduces Belarus' ability to implement independent defence and
security policy.
AP / Scanpix
27

ACTIVITY OF HOSTILE
INTELLIGENCE AND
SECURITY SERVICES

Failure of aggressive Russian military

intelligence operations in the West
In 2018, most EU and NATO countries conducted intense counter-intel-
ligence activity. Russian intelligence operations detected and thwarted
in the recent years revealed the extent of Russian intelligence activity
and the extremely aggressive operations of Russian military intelli-
gence against the Western countries in peacetime.

The failed attempt of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the
Russian Armed Forces  (GRU) to poison its former officer Sergey Skri-
pal on British soil prompted a collective and unprecedented response
of Western countries and their allies. In March-April 2018, 29 countries
and NATO declared persona non grata 153 undeclared Russian intelli-
gence officers under diplomatic cover. Lithuania declared persona non
grata three Russian spies under diplomatic cover – one GRU and two
Foreign Intelligence Service' (SVR) officers. The ever-largest collective
response reduced (at least temporarily) Russian intelligence capabili-
ties in Lithuania and other Western countries. However, Russian intel-
ligence services now try to recover their lost positions.

The other failed GRU operation – the interception of GRU officers who
attempted to penetrate IT networks of the Organization for the Prohi-
bition of Chemical Weapons in the Netherlands – revealed that Russia
 28

conducts cyber espionage not only remotely, but when needed, Rus-
sian intelligence services dispatch their officers abroad to break into
IT networks.

The above-mentioned cases and other episodes of 2018 exposed GRU

activity revealed that Russian military intelligence breaks the estab-
lished ‘red lines’ even in peacetime and conducts aggressive and cynical
operations against the West. GRU activity reflects Russian foreign pol-
icy and constant confrontation with the West. For this purpose, Russia
invokes Cold War-like foreign espionage methods that fell into oblivion
in the West – influence operations, assassinations, and coup d'états.

Russia relocates its intelligence

operations against Lithuania to its
home territory or to third countries
Diplomatic cover – in Russian intelligence terminology defined as dip-
lomatic or legal rezidentura – one of the platforms for Russian intelli-
gence operations abroad. Russian intelligence services persistently try
to adapt to defensive measures used against them. They use business,
tourist and other non-diplomatic cover, expand the geographical spec-
trum of their operations. It came to light through revelation of infor-
mation on the travel routes in Europe and the cover of GRU officers
(‘tourists’) who attempted to assassinate the Skripals.

Russian intelligence services expanded the geography of their opera-

tions against Lithuania. Although Russian intelligence services increas-
ingly employ technical means against Lithuania, the intensity of human
intelligence (recruitment of Lithuanian citizens) remains high. The
tightening counter-intelligence regime in Lithuania increasingly limits
activity of Russian intelligence officers under diplomatic cover. As a
result, Russian spies adapt by using non-traditional cover and often
move their intelligence operations to Russia or third countries. In Lithu-
ania, Russian intelligence officers or their agents select and investigate
Russian intelligence has a worldwide network and conducts long-term operations which makes
it difficult to escape its sight once somebody has attracted its attention. For example, in 2008,
a Lithuanian civil servant with access to information of interest to Russian intelligence became
acquainted with a Russian diplomat who was actually an undercover intelligence officer. Russian
intelligence did not push him to cooperate, but during meetings confined itself to unsuspicious small
talk. Subsequently, the Lithuanian citizen went to work abroad and the relationship ended. 10 years
later an intelligence officer from the same Russian service approached that Lithuanian citizen in a
foreign country. When abroad, Russian intelligence was bolder, organized secret meetings, gave gifts,
treated him at restaurants, sought to involve him into intelligence collection. Russian intelligence also
intended to lure the Lithuanian citizen out to Russia, tempted him with lucrative business contracts
with a Russian energy company.

targets, make initial contacts, but relocate further intelligence work to

territories of third countries.

Russian intelligence uses Belarusian

Intelligence Services
Russian intelligence utilises intelligence collection capabilities of
friendly countries. Russia uses those countries as proxies both to fill
their intelligence gaps, to conceal their intelligence requirements,
and to mask its intelligence activities against certain targets. Belarus
remains Russia's closest ally in this field.

Belarussian intelligence services implement tasks of the Russian intel-

ligence services and provide support to their operations in Belarus. In
Belarusian territory, Russian intelligence freely recruits citizens of West-
ern countries. Therefore, both Russian and Belarusian intelligence ser-
vices may target Lithuanian and other Western citizens regularly trav-
elling to Belarus. Russian and Belarusian intelligence services are not
equal partners as Russians dictate their terms to Belarusian colleagues.

Russian intelligence services regularly analyse the lists of individuals who served in Soviet military
and search for Lithuanian citizens currently holding positions in law enforcement, military, politics
or business. Having identified a proper target, Russian intelligence services find and direct retired or
active duty Russian or Belarusian military officers to renew (directly or remotely) the relationship with
their former comrade in Lithuania. Russian intelligence officers seek to lure their targets out to Russia
or Belarus under the pretext of military occasions and commemorations, comrade reunions etc. If it
succeeds, Russian intelligence tries to gradually engage them in spying against Lithuania.
 Russian intelligence activity against
critical infrastructure in Lithuania
Russian intelligence and security services pay particular attention to
intelligence collection on the Lithuanian infrastructure of strategic
importance. They collect intelligence on industry companies, infrastruc-
ture of the Lithuanian Armed Forces (AF), Lithuania's communication
systems, naval ports and airports,
railway and road networks. Recently,
Russian intelligence became excep-
tionally interested in the objects of
Lithuanian energy sector.

Russia constantly exploits missions

of the Organization for Security
and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE),
aimed to build mutual confidence
and transparency between the
states-parties by sharing information
on military capabilities. Russia's rep-
resentatives gathered intelligence
on Lithuanian critical infrastructure
during observation flights within the
framework of the OSCE Open Skies
Russia-related UAV found in
Treaty and arms control inspections
the territory of Lithuania according to the Vienna Document. Russian residents visiting Lithuania
were used to collect information on the Lithuanian AF infrastructure
and objects of strategic importance by observing them, taking pho-
tos and recording videos. Lithuanian citizens recruited by the GRU also
received tasks to collect information on critical infrastructure in Lithu-
ania. Since 2016, the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) has been
observed. The UAVs are able to enter Lithuanian airspace unnoticed at
low altitude and conduct aerial photography.

In 2016, a Russia-related reconnaissance UAV was found in the territory

31

of Lithuania. Same type of aircraft conducted intelligence collection

flights over the territories of Syria, Libya and Eastern Ukraine, where
Russia supported the ongoing combat actions. The components of
the found UAV were made in several countries. However, it contained
Russian software and corresponded to known UAV analogues used by
the Russian intelligence and security services. The purpose of UAV is
to take photos of ground objects. The UAV contained a high-precision
gyroscope and accelerometer module that enables it to conduct a flight
on preplanned route even if its GPS is jammed.

In 2017, a Russian reconnaissance UAV was also found at the Polish bor-
der. Both cases prove that Russia uses UAVs for intelligence collection
not only in conflict zones but also in peacetime in neighbouring NATO
countries. Russia collects intelligence on objects of strategic impor-
tance in Lithuania for its military planning. Russia's usage of UAV tech-
nology significantly expands its possibilities of operational-tactical
intelligence collection abroad in peacetime, while defensive measures
against it are difficult to implement. Therefore, it is likely that in the
near to mid term the intensity of Russian intelligence activity against
critical infrastructure in Lithuanian will not decrease. Technological
progress will make this activity even harder to trace.

Soviet past and travels to Russia

and Belarus – in sights of hostile
intelligence
Russia and its intelligence services make use of the common experi-
ence in the Soviet Union and the nostalgia to Soviet past both when
spreading propaganda against Lithuanian statehood and recruiting
Lithuanian citizens. To develop a network of agents in Lithuania, Rus-
sian intelligence services are particularly keen on finding individuals
who are ideologically close to Russia or regularly visit Russia or Belarus
for certain reasons (business, tourism, visiting relatives and friends).
Russian and Belarussian intelligence services are particularly interested in Lithuanian politicians and
civil servants who have ties to Russia and Belarus. When an individual with family or other ties to
Russia or Belarus assumes an important position, he / she becomes subject to investigation of the
intelligence services. Their relatives in Russia or Belarus receive visits from local security services;
intelligence officers under diplomatic cover approach the targeted individuals other means are used
to gather information about them. Intelligence services assess all available information about such
Lithuanian citizens, including their regular visits and potential positive attitude towards Russia or
Belarus and plan further actions against them.

Russian and Belarusian intelligence services have well developed intel-

ligence from the territory against foreign citizens. Consistent trends
show that Russian and Belarusian intelligence have particular interest
in all Lithuanian citizens with intelligence access (especially, politi-
cians, law enforcement and military officers, businesspersons, journal-
ists) who have relatives in Russia
or Belarus or travel there for other
purposes. Such individuals may
become targets for recruitment
depending on their intelligence
access, vulnerabilities, benevo-
lence and dependency on Russia or
Belarus.

Chinese
Intelligence
Services expand
their area of
interest in
Lithuania
Russian intelligence services
search targets among
Lithuanian citizens crossing Growing China's economic and political ambitions in the West resulted
the border. The Queen
Louise Bridge connects
in the increasing aggressiveness of Chinese intelligence and security
Lithuania with Kaliningrad services' activities not only in other NATO and EU countries, but also in
Oblast.
15 min / Scanpix
Lithuania. Two Chinese intelligence services operate in Lithuania: Min-
istry of State Security and Military Intelligence Directorate.

When abroad, Chinese intelligence traditionally operates under diplo-

matic cover, utilises state-funded Confucius Institutes, Chinese compa-
nies and news agencies, use Chinese students studying abroad.
33

Primarily, China's domestic policy issues drive Chinese intelligence

activities in Lithuania. For example, it seeks that Lithuania would not
support independence of Tibet and Taiwan and would not address
these issues at the international level. However, Chinese intelligence
has broader interests in Lithuania: Lithuanian foreign policy and eco-
nomy, defence sector, information accessible to Lithuanian citizens
about foreign countries' international cooperation projects and future
plans with China. From Lithuanian citizens Chinese intelligence may
seek to obtain sensitive or clas-
sified national or NATO and EU
information.

Chinese intelligence looks for

suitable targets – decision-mak-
ers, other individuals sympa-
thizing with China and able to
exert political leverage. They
seek to influence such individ-
uals by giving gifts, paying for
trips to China, covering expenses
of training and courses organ-
ized there. Chinese intelligence
officers treat those gifts as a
commitment to support political
decisions favourable to China.
Chinese intelligence-funded
trips to China are used to recruit Scanpix

Lithuanian citizens.

Given the growing threat posed by Chinese intelligence and security

services in NATO and EU countries, their activity in Lithuania in the long
term is also likely to expand.
REUTERS / Scanpix
35

CYBER
ESPIONAGE

Threats posed by Russian cyber

capabilities
In 2018, hostile activity, which can be associated with both state and
non-state related actors, was observed in Lithuanian cyber domain.
Chinese industrial spying, North Korea's and Iran's actions raise serious
concerns in the world cyber domain but so far have been assessed as
unfocused and accidental activity in Lithuanian information systems.
Meanwhile, Russian intelligence and security services pose major
threat to Lithuanian cyber domain: they conduct intelligence gather-
ing, disturb the performance of IT systems, and contribute to influence
operations.

The activity of Russian cyber espionage groups is identified in almost

all countries of the world, yet the main attention is devoted to NATO
and the US as well as other regions geopolitically important to Rus-
sia. Russia's cyber activity is becoming one of the major tools used
to accomplish Russian geopolitical goals not only during a conflict,
but also at peacetime. Russian cyber activity has also been used as
a deterrence element against the states in conflict. By pursuing hos-
tile activity in cyber domain Russia does not restrict itself neither geo-
graphically, nor in terms of target significance, while hoping to avoid
responsibility. The benefit for Russia obtained from cyber operations
so far has been valued as more important than the potential response
of Western states.
 36

RISS hackers' intelligence gathering activity against Lithuanian infor-

mation systems has been constantly observed. Highly advanced cyber
tools are used in cyber spying operations against Lithuania. They can-
not be identified by usual system security programmes, therefore they
are able to conduct hostile activity within the infected networks unno-
ticed for a long period of time. GRU group Sofacy / APT28 and FSB cyber
group Agent.btz / Snake have been the most active in conducting cyber
espionage in Lithuania. Politics, military and economics are their main

Scanpix

areas of information collection. While conducting intelligence activ-

ity, the groups penetrate not only information systems of state insti-
tutions, but also those owned by private organizations or individual
persons. The obtained data is usually used for conducting influence
operations and infiltrating other systems, such as more secured net-
works, dedicated to processing sensitive information or critical state
infrastructure related systems.
THE USE OF CYBER TOOLS TO SUPPORT RUSSIA‘S STRATEGIC-POLITICAL LEVEL OPERATIONS

 In 2015–2018, amid Russian athletes doping scandal, information systems of international sports
organizations were penetrated with the aim to discredit the persons who investigated the the Russian
athletes' offences and other states' athletes.

 During 2016 US and 2017 France presidential elections Russian hackers infiltrated information
systems of the candidates and their campaign offices and used the obtained data in disinformation
campaigns in order to discredit them.

 In December 2017, an attempt to obtain information related to investigation of MH17 aircraft hit
over Ukraine was made in Malaysia.

 In spring 2018, Russia made two attempts to infiltrate the laboratories in Switzerland and the
Netherlands investigating the case of poisoning of Skripal and his daughter.

 In 2018, it was revealed that Russian hackers tried to intercept correspondence from the
Orthodox Church leaders, who supported granting of autocephaly to the Ukrainian Church.

 Despite so much attention from the Western states to Russian cyber-attacks, a new Russian
cyber-attack related to the mid-term elections in the US was observed in 2018.

Russia's strive to take control over foreign states' critical infrastruc-

ture's industrial control systems has been increasingly noticed.
Through these systems the physical processes, such as traffic, water
supply can be remotely controlled. Over the recent years, Russian
cyber groups' penetration or attempts to penetrate hundreds of energy
sector's industrial control systems have been identified in the United
Kingdom and the US. Access to energy sector's industrial control sys-
tems provides Russian hackers with a potential possibility to sabotage
industrial processes, i. e. disrupt electricity supply or cause irreparable
damage to facilities. Lithuania's energy sector is also one of the targets
of Russian cyber groups. In 2018, repeated Russian attempts to conduct
intelligence of Lithuania's energy sector systems were observed.

Russia exploits the cyber space in order to make an impact on politi-

cal processes in the West, seeks to influence the election results and
reduce society's trust in democratic processes as well as reliability of
political systems. In their response, the Western states publicly iden-
tified Russian cyber operations' targets, methodology, and partici-
pants. The US has imposed sanctions and issued charges against GRU
officers, whereas organizations in control of social networks have been
engaged in prevention of Russian influence operations. All these meas-
ures notwithstanding, it is highly likely that the benefit received from
cyber tools – obtained intelligence information and tested possibility
to affect political processes – will offset all the potential negative out-
comes to Russia.
 6th World Congress of
Compatriots Living Abroad held
in Moscow
Sputnik / Scanpix
39

PROTECTION OF
CONSTITUTIONAL
ORDER
Russia manipulates democracy
in order to influence social and
political processes
The Kremlin perceives the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subse-
quent Euro-Atlantic integration path chosen by the Eastern and Central
Europe countries as one of the greatest geopolitical catastrophes. Rus-
sia seeks to change the choice of these countries, including Lithuania,
by gaining influence over these societies and their political decisions.
In Lithuania, Russia abuses the democratic freedoms and rights guar-
anteed by the Lithuanian Constitution to conduct subversive activity
which poses threat to national security.

The Russian ruling elite, under the veil of attention to its diaspora –
an objective intrinsic to democratic countries – implements subversive
compatriot policy aimed at fomenting ethnic discord in the Lithuanian
society. During his address at a plenary session of the 6th World Con-
gress of Compatriots Living Abroad, held in Moscow in October  2018,
Putin criticized allegedly growing Russo-phobia in the Baltic States,
extreme nationalism and violations of Russian speakers' rights. To pro-
tect the latter, Russia sponsored two centres operating in Lithuania.
Representatives of these centres participated in international forums
for protection of human rights, disseminated disinformation and
accused Lithuania of allegedly violating Russian speakers' rights.
To discredit Lithuania, the Kremlin uses events that are not linked with purported violations of
Russian speakers' rights. In 2018, following a several year-long break individuals related to informal
extreme right groups engaged in violent incidents in Lithuania. These single crimes were not 40
Russo-phobic and did not indicate a rise of political extremism. Same individuals, well known to
law enforcement, usually engage in incidents that attract public attention and serve Russia in its
unfounded accusations.

Russia manipulates the freedom of speech to spread propaganda dis-

paraging Lithuanian statehood. The Kremlin abuses this fundamen-
tal democratic principle and portrays its propaganda as journalism,
which represents an alternative opinion and allegedly builds on cri-
teria of objectivity and need to convey information to society. There-
fore, in response to any attempts of Lithuanian institutions to limit
propaganda Russia accuses Lithuania of censorship and restriction of
freedom of expression. In  2018, the Lithuanian Radio and Television
Commission, due to continuous incitement of ethnic discord and war
propaganda, repeatedly suspended rebroadcasting of the Russian TV
channel ‘RTR Planeta’ for one year. The Kremlin escalated the case as
an aggressive attempt to restrict the freedom of expression. However,
the European Commission examined the case and decided that the
suspension of rebroadcasting of ‘RTR  Planeta’ was compatible with
EU law.

RUSSIAN INFLUENCE OPERATIONS IN SOCIAL MEDIA

In democratic societies, freedom to express ideas and engage in discussions is distorted if payed
trolls or bots that follow a preprogramed algorithm get to initiate and moderate these discussions.
Private structures that are close to the Russian authorities establish a dissemination network of fake
news and commentaries in the social media. It is likely that one centre coordinates directions and
topics of Russian activities in social media. The US special counsel Robert Mueller's investigation
and charges brought against employees of the Internet Research Agency and its sponsor, Russian
oligarch Prigozhin, for interference with the US presidential election indicate that Russian information
operations in the social media are an important component of Russian influence activity (‘active
measures’) abroad.

Russian meddling in electoral process in the US shows that Kremlin-related companies and
intelligence services seek to establish operational platforms in foreign social media that could
serve as a tool to destabilize the situation in a foreign country. Available data indicates that Russia
possesses required capabilities to disseminate propaganda and disinformation in the Lithuanian
social media. It is possible that Russia will use these capabilities during the 2019 election cycle in
Lithuania.
Russia is particularly interested in legitimizing the annexation of Crimea. It organizes large
international events in the occupied territory and invites foreign politicians and public figures
to attend them. In 2018, marginal political actors from Lithuania were invited and attended
the 4th International Yalta Economic Forum and the Livadia Forum. Lithuanian representatives
participating in these events contribute to the legitimation of the occupation of Crimea, which
contradicts the Lithuanian foreign policy.

While conducting aggressive foreign policy, Russia's representatives

use the cover of cultural cooperation among democratic countries to
sponsor events that spread pro-Kremlin ideas, seek to make contacts
with Lithuanian politicians, businesspersons and public figures. Rus-
sia's representatives seek to use these contacts in implementing the
Kremlin’s information, history and ideological policy that disparages
Lithuanian statehood. Russia employs networking and international
cooperation to reduce its international isolation, while the involvement
of Lithuanian representatives in ideological events serves to legitimize
Russia's aggressive foreign policy.

The Kremlin manipulates democratic freedoms and rights in order to

influence Lithuanian political processes. Russia's representatives liaise
with leaders of sparse pro-Kremlin social and political movements and
individual politicians. Russia employs available propaganda means to
support favourable politicians and seeks to discredit those opposing
its aggressive foreign policy. Moreover, in international organizations
the Kremlin disseminates disinformation about Lithuania and tries to
use it to harm Lithuania's interests.

Interference with Lithuanian domestic political processes is Russia's

persistent objective, but the upcoming elections in 2019 and 2020 pro-
vide an opportunity for Russia to seek influence in the Lithuanian polit-
ical processes from the municipal to the European level. The Kremlin
is interested to gain influence in supranational organizations, which
make decisions relevant for the entire region. Currently, there are no
well-founded presumptions to indicate that Russia has achieved influ-
ence over Lithuanian strategic political decisions. However, the Kremlin
makes constant attempts to meddle in Lithuanian political processes,
to reduce trust in democratic procedures, elected politicians and the
sovereign will of society.
 Lithuanian armed resistance
movement – a target of Russian
propaganda in 2018
43

INFORMATION
SECURITY

Unable to persuade, the Kremlin

seeks to raise doubts about
inconvenient truth
The Russian ruling elite considers propaganda one of the main ele-
ments of its subversive activity. The Kremlin seeks to dominate infor-
mation space and drown opinions that oppose its position. A well-de-
veloped propaganda dissemination system – state-owned or controlled
by the Kremlin-close oligarchs TV channels, internet news portals and
state-funded NGOs – generates an intense propaganda stream target-
ing different audiences.

The Kremlin aims to raise doubts about truth by presenting a myriad

of versions. This modus operandi was particularly visible in cases of
the attempted assassination of the Skripals in Salisbury, use of chem-
ical weapons by the Syrian regime, and the downing of the MH17 over
Eastern Ukraine. The Kremlin disseminates different versions to dis-
guise propaganda and create an image that the provided information is
objective and of equal value. Should the audience not buy the Russian
version, it will at least question all the other. This became particularly
relevant as NATO and EU countries turned more cautious about Russian
presentation of events.
In 2018, the spokesperson
of the Russian Ministry
of Foreign Affairs Maria
Zakharova actively
participated in propaganda
44
campaigns against
Lithuania. In her statements,
she sought to discredit
members of the Lithuanian
High-level Russian politicians and public officials actively engage in
resistance against the
such propaganda campaigns. Generally, their public statements indi-
Soviet occupation. Russian
cate the outset of larger and more intense propaganda campaigns
Foreign Minister Sergey
against Lithuania and serve as an ideological basis for the Kremlin's
Lavrov also disseminated
propaganda narrative.
false information about
deteriorating situation of The Kremlin uses the constant stream of propaganda to mislead
Russian-speakers in his and set society at variance. Propaganda messages targeting Russian
statements. domestic audience portray Lithuania as an unreliable and depend-
ent country lacking origin of
its statehood. In particular, the
Kremlin actively constructs the
image of Lithuania as an adver-
sary and a threat to Russia.
It paints the deterrence pol-
icy implemented by Lithuania
and NATO as a preparation for
aggression against Russia. The
Kremlin creates the adversarial
image of Lithuania by spread-
ing disinformation about per-
secuted Russian speakers and
resurgent Nazism. Propaganda
messages targeting Lithuanian
audience play on Soviet nos-
talgia, present Lithuania as a
country of economic break-
Sputnik / Scanpix
down and constant social unrest.

In pursuance of long-term goals, the Kremlin not only maintains a con-

stant stream of propaganda, but also expeditiously reacts to events
unfavourable to the ruling elite. In 2018, Russian propagandists inten-
sified their actions after Lithuania took responsive measures against
Russia's aggressive foreign policy. The commemoration of occasions
important to the Lithuanian statehood also became target of Russian
propaganda attacks. Employees of the Russian media holdings ‘VGTRK’
In 2018, the number of purposeful information attacks against NATO eFP and Allied forces in Lithuania
decreased but Russia maintained a constant stream of information targeting NATO and Lithuanian
defence system. Its aim was to discredit state institutions and undermine trust in the Lithuanian
defence and security policy. In 2018, the information attacks that reached society did not stand out
in terms of innovative technological or psychological impact solutions. Despite the flow of equivocal
messages and due to society’s consciousness, support and trust in the Lithuanian Armed Forces and
the Alliance remained high.

(Rossiya 1), ‘Gazprom-media’ (NTV) and the joint-stock company ‘Per-

vyj Kanal’ visited Lithuania and made propaganda coverages of Lithu-
anian centennial events portraying them as manifestations of resur-
gent Nazism. The above-mentioned TV channels broadcasted at prime
time (in the following shows: ‘The Venue’, ‘60 minutes hot on the trail’,
‘Let them have their say’) the biased and misleading reports about
Lithuanian ambitions to curb Russian propaganda and history policy.
These broadcasts featured pro-Kremlin individuals from Lithuania as
guest speakers.

Russian history
policy aimed
to justify
aggressive
actions abroad
Russia's confrontational strat-
egy towards the West and the
Eurasianism ideology empha-
sizing Russia's superiority
against the West increased
the need for politicized his-
tory. Russia's history policy
became one of the key instru-
ments of its confrontational Commemoration of the 9th May
in Lithuania
strategy and ideology. The Kremlin manipulates the Soviet victory in 15 min / Scanpix
the Second World War (WWII) seeking to justify its claims to control the
post-Soviet space.

The Kremlin accuses those opposing its narrative of history falsifica-

tion and alleged support for neo-Nazism or fascism. The Kremlin often
selectively employs these accusations to justify both the Soviet role
 and Russia's current aggressive actions (including military ones). Rus-
sian propaganda justifies the annexation of Crimea and actions of Rus-
sia-supported separatists in Donbas with historical arguments and its
duty to protect Russian speakers from alleged Ukrainian Nazis. Selec-
tive application of this narrative materializes in the Kremlin's support
to openly xenophobic political movements that helps Russia enhance
its leverage in the EU countries.

The main objective of Russia's history policy in Lithuania is to deny the

Soviet occupation and to propagate a positive image of Soviet influ-
ence on Lithuania's development. The Kremlin's propaganda portrays
Soviet invaders as liberators from Nazi Germany and argues that Soviet
repressions were necessary to modernize Lithuania and achieve pros-
perity. The Kremlin purposefully seeks to disparage Lithuanian state-
hood and shape the attitude that Lithuania historically belongs to the
zone of Russian interests.

These reasons explain why the Soviet victory and the perpetuation of
Soviet heritage are among priorities of Russian history policy in Lithu-
ania. In pursuance of these aims, Russia implements and actively pro-
motes projects of history policy, particularly seeking to attract the
youth. Leaders of the Soviet veteran and Russian compatriot organ-
izations in Lithuania implement this activity under coordination of

One of the main targets of the Russian history policy is the Lithuanian armed resistance movement,
as it denies clichés of the Kremlin's narrative about the positive Soviet influence to Lithuania's
development. Russian officials and subordinate propagandists seek to shape the attitude that only
Nazi collaborators and Holocaust-complicit criminals supported the resistance against the Soviet
occupation. To compromise the Lithuanian resistance the Kremlin cynically manipulates the Holocaust
tragedy to achieve the goals of its history policy. Russian propagandists further intensified this
activity as the Lithuanian Parliament declared 2018 the year of Adolfas Ramanauskas-Vanagas – one
of the leaders and symbols of the Lithuanian resistance movement. For the same reasons Lithuania's
aspirations to render legal assessment of Soviet crimes against Lithuanian people and the claim to
compensate damage suffered during the Soviet occupation trigger furious reaction from the Kremlin.
47

Russian diplomats. Every year on 9 May, they organize marches of the

Immortal Regiment in Vilnius and Klaipeda, where its participants carry
pictures of their relatives who took part in the WWII.

Russia exploits the preservation of the Soviet heritage in propagating

the image of Soviets as liberators. Russia sponsors various works in
this domain – mainly search and reburial of the remains of Soviet sol-
diers, maintenance and restoration of their graves, monuments and
memorial sites. Lithuanian legislation prevents the emergence of false,
scientifically unfounded and propagandistic notes and symbols at the
burial sites of Soviet soldiers. In response, in  2018 Russia organized
propaganda campaigns and denied access to Russia to participants of
Lithuania's annual expedition Mission Siberia who travel to Russia to
take care of deportees' graves.

The narrative spread by Russian propagandists disparages Lithuanian

statehood, whereas their accusations of history falsification and sup-
port to Nazism effectively shape the adversarial image of Lithuania
in the Russian society. Thus Russia's history policy lays basis for the
Kremlin's destructive actions against Lithuania and poses threat to
Lithuania's national security.
Belarus NPP – the nuclear energy
project of Russia and Belarus
REUTERS / Scanpix
49

ECONOMIC
AND ENERGY
SECURITY

Belarus nuclear power plant is

important to both Russia and Belarus
but the construction process is not
smooth
Construction of the Belarus nuclear power plant (BelNPP) in the neigh-
bourhood of Lithuania is a commercially groundless project, which
does not comply with international nuclear safety standards. Russia
provides funding and technologies to the BelNPP project that serves to
enhance Russia's positions in the region. Representatives of the Rus-
sian State Atomic Energy corporation Rosatom and Belarusian institu-
tions have publicly announced that the first reactor will be launched as
early as in late 2019, the second – in 2020.

Although the general contractor of the BelNPP, Rosatom subsidiary

company Atomstroyexport, makes every endeavour not to fall behind
schedule and Belarusian nuclear regulatory authorities tolerate disre-
gard for safety requirements with their ‘liberal’ attitude, BelNPP con-
struction process is not smooth. In September 2018, after a meeting
between Putin and Lukashenko, the Belarusian President announced
that the general contractor of BelNPP falls behind the schedule and
expressed a concern that the implementation of the project might take
longer than expected. Lukashenko demanded that Russia extended
the term of the loan for BelNPP construction and reduced the interest
rate. In defence of Rosatom reputation, Russian representatives prom-
ised that the first reactor will be launched by late 2019, as announced
publicly. After the above-mentioned statements of the Belarusian
President, the general contractor of BelNPP communicated that the
construction process of the plant is smooth and corresponds with the
agreed schedule.

Belarusian and Russian (Rosatom) representatives focus their attention

on shaping the opinion of international community, primarily seeking
to secure a favourable position of experts of the European Nuclear
Safety Regulators Group (ENSREG) and the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA). In July 2018, ENSREG endorsed the Peer Review Report of
the EU Stress Test in Belarus. Belarusian and Rosatom representatives
manipulate results of the report: they disregard arguments suggest-
ing that the BelNPP does not comply with international safety require-
ments, ignore identified shortcomings, and do not fulfil recommenda-
tions.

Belarus amplifies every positive review of IAEA experts and deempha-

sizes or conceals every criticism of international experts. Belarus seeks
to create an image that the BelNPP construction complies with nuclear
safety requirements and pays respect to recommendations of inter-
national experts but the Belarusian nuclear regulatory authorities do
not possess required expertise to supervise the BelNPP construction
properly.

Despite Putin's jokes that Russia is building a NPP for Belarus regardless
of its own interests (‘instead of supplying gas we build a nuclear power
plant’), this project is very important for Russia. Firstly, its implemen-
tation would enhance Russia's influence in Belarus – Rosatom would
be able to control the exploitation, provision of nuclear fuel and, ulti-
mately, the decommissioning of the BelNPP. Secondly, these long-term
processes would grant Russia another tool of political influence not
51

only in Belarus but also in the whole region. Thirdly, after commission-
ing of the BelNPP Russia would seek to regain a leading position in the
regional energy market. Finally, the project is important for Rosatom,
which actively seeks to enhance its positions in the market of nuclear
technologies.

Belarus has an ambition to become an important electricity provider

but the BelNPP project is commercially groundless. After commission-
ing of the BelNPP Belarus will generate a huge power surplus but has
not secured export markets for it. Belarus would like to export elec-
tricity not only to the region of Eurasian Economic Union but also to
the Baltic States. Belarusian officials declare that Belarus success-
fully trades electricity in the Nord Pool power market. Therefore, it is
highly likely that Belarus will seek to circumvent Lithuanian legislation
preventing electricity generated in unsafe nuclear power plants from
entering the Lithuanian electricity market.

Shady investors from third

countries operate through offshore
structures and EU-registered
companies
On 1 March 2018, the Law on the Protection of Objects of Importance to
Ensuring National Security came into force. It provides criteria for ver-
ification of an investor's conformity to national security interests. One
of the main criteria are investor's connections – relations with foreign
intelligence and security services or third countries' authorities that
increase the risk or pose threat to Lithuania's national security. In this
regard, not only potential investors from third countries but also Lithu-
anian companies and business entities of other EU and NATO countries'
investing in Lithuania are subject to verification.
 In 2018, a number of companies seeking to operate in the Lithuanian
financial sector has increased. Such possibilities also attracted atten-
tion of controversial figures – Lithuanian and foreign citizens many of
whom engage in financial operations through banks and other finan-
cial institutions based in preferential tax zones. The increasingly wid-
ening geography of potential investors in financial sector ranges from
Cayman Islands to Vanuatu. Seeking to conceal the actual beneficiar-
ies and reduce the tax burden, these actors employ sophisticated and
shady business management schemes that are implemented through
legal entities based in preferential tax zones.

The possibility to obtain the cover of EU-registered companies also

attracted third-country companies operating in other strategic sectors.
In 2018, a Lithuania-registered company was possibly used for attempts
to collect data relevant for the Russian Armed Forces. An EU-registered
investment company, a subsidiary of a Russian holding AFK  Sistema,
purchased the shares of the company. Russian oligarch Vladimir Yev-
tushenkov owns the controlling interest of the holding, while his son,
Felix Yevtushenkov, heads the above-mentioned subsidiary company.
AFK Sistema controls Kronstadt Group, which a few years ago won the
bid to establish digital cartographic data centres.

Russian Defence Ministry commissioned 'Kronstadt Group' to establish a system of digital

cartographic data that enables the use of cartographic data for development of battlefield simulators
and planning of military operations. The project was a part of the State Armament Programme of the
Russian Armed Forces (2008–2020), which is coordinated by the Military-Industrial Commission. Since
2014, the Commission is subordinate to Putin. 'Kronstadt Group' companies also design UAVs and their
control systems, develop software to collect and process geographical data and other technologies
required by the Russian military. Kronstadt Group closely cooperates with Russian military industry
entities and fulfils orders of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB).
53

Russia seeks to collect cartographic data which would enable an effi-

cient use of the new missile launching systems. For this purpose Rus-
sian entities made contacts with a Lithuanian company dealing with
aero-scanning and mapping in Lithuania and other EU countries. The
company uses helicopters or UAVs to collect cartographic and other
geographical information. Subsequently, it digitalizes the collected
Battlefield simulator by
high-definition video data and geographical information (landscape Kronstadt Group (based on
accurate cartographic data)
and infrastructure inspections) and loads it onto 3D  computer sim-
Source: Kronstadt Group
ulations. Their cooperation started
after a shareholder of the Kronstadt
Group invested in the Lithuanian com-
pany. It is highly likely that Russian
entities sought to obtain the cover of
an EU-based company and to conceal
the collection of data for the Rus-
sian Armed Forces. The scheme corre-
sponds to modus operandi of the Rus-
sian intelligence and security services
that employ local (EU) companies in
their activities against national secu-
rity interests of EU countries.

The above-mentioned Lithuanian com-

pany operates in an economic sector
of strategic importance to ensuring
national security. In accordance with
provisions of the Law on the Protec-
tion of Objects of Importance to Ensur-
ing National Security, a competent
national authority decided that this
investor does not conform to national
security interests of Lithuania.

Aero-scanning from an UAV

Source: Kronstadt Group
Online terrorism propaganda and
instructions for staging attacks
55

TERRORISM

ISIL inspired strikes in Europe replace

directed terrorist attacks
The US-led international coalition against the terrorist organization
Islamic State (ISIL) in Syria and Iraq achieved success. In 2017, the allies
defeated Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's pseudo-state (Caliphate). ISIL lost its
potential and resources to carry out and coordinate terrorist opera-
tions in the West, which led to a decrease of terrorist attacks in Europe
in 2018. ISIL still poses a major threat to Europe but its character has
changed.

ISIL METHODS TO CONDUCT TERRORIST ATTACKS

Directed – terrorist attacks, planned and coordinated by ISIL. Good tactical preparation, sophisticated
planning, significant damage, many victims. Some of these attacks were carried out by foreign fighters
returned from conflict regions in Syria and Iraq to Europe. ISIL coordinated its last successful terrorist
attacks in Brussels (in 2016) and in Manchester (in 2017).

Enabled – radicalized lone individuals and groups that act independently. They had contacts with ISIL
terrorists online, discussed possible actions and received approval. Usually poor tactical preparation,
no experience, unsophisticated attacks.

Inspired – radicalized lone individuals and groups that act independently, merely inspired by ISIL
propaganda. Possible contacts with local extremists; support of accomplices. Usually poor tactical
preparation, unsophisticated attacks, use of available means, low damage. Exceptions: terrorist attacks
in Nice (France) in 2016 as well as in Barcelona and in Cambrils (Spain) in 2017.
Individuals carrying out terrorist attacks in Europe on behalf of ISIL plan
their actions independently, usually utilize simple and easily accessi-
ble means. Most of them have no direct links to terrorist organization,
but are not completely independent either, as they communicate with
members of ISIL or like-minded radicals in Europe who assist in car-
rying out the attacks. These terrorists have chosen law enforcement
officers and random civilians as their targets in Europe.

Over the past three-four years, active ISIL propaganda has strength-
ened the trend of lone actor terrorism. During this period, ISIL distrib-
uted a considerable amount of terrorism propaganda (mainly intended
for youth), interpretations of religious texts and instructions for terror-
ist and paramilitary activity. This material will remain available to the
supporters of the jihad ideology for a long time.

Terrorism threat level in Lithuania

remains low
Terrorism trends in Europe affect security situation in all countries
within the Schengen area, including (indirectly) Lithuania. Terrorism
threat level in Lithuania remains low. In 2018, no activity of lone extrem-
ists or organized groups adverse to Lithuania has been identified. No
indications of individual ‘jihad’ terrorism propagated by ISIL online and
topical in Europe have been observed in Lithuania.

No trends of radicalization in the Lithuanian Muslim Community (LMC)

have been identified. Radicalization of the LMC could be externally
induced by representatives of foreign controversial Islamic organiza-
tions and movements exploiting its division and eager to alter local
traditions, promote radical interpretation of Islam, attempt to seize the
leadership of the Muslim communities and create isolated groups.
57

Illegal migration poses risk to

national security and public order
For three consecutive years, flows of illegal migration from the Mid-
dle East and North Africa to European countries continue to decrease.
According to the International Organization for Migration, more than
132,000 illegal migrants arrived to Europe in 2018 (in 2017, more than
189,000). Major illegal migration paths to Europe were the Western and
Eastern Mediterranean routes – from Morocco to Spain and from Turkey
to Greece, respectively.

It is possible that ISIL would attempt to exploit migrant flows to dis-

patch its members to Europe. Since 2014, around 50 refuges and asylum
seekers who arrived as illegal migrants took part in terrorist activity in
Europe – carried out a terrorist attack or participated in its planning.
Some of these foreigners resorted to such actions after denial of their
asylum application by a particular EU country.

In 2018, 18  Syrian citizens were relocated from Turkey to Lithuania

within the framework of the EU Relocation Programme. One foreigner
was denied access to Lithuania after vetting procedure.

Third-country nationals who are linked to terrorist or extremist organ-

izations, international organized crime and intelligence services of
non-democratic states or pose threat to national security and public
order could use the services of so-called ‘grey migration’ facilitators.
‘Grey migration’ is an arranged arrival of third country nationals to Lithu-
ania or other Schengen Area country and / or legalization of their fur-
ther stay by facilitators for a fee. Some suspected foreign radicals and
extremists used the schemes of ‘grey migration’ to arrive to Lithuania.
They obtained visas on false grounds at the invitation of companies or
individuals.
 Crisis regions
The long-running civil war in Syria approaches the end. In 2018, Damas-
cus regime fully dominated the battlefield in Syria. Pro-government
forces supported by Russia and Iran defeated or forced to surrender
militant opposition groups that operated in southern and central parts
of the country. The Idlib province in the north-west of Syria is the last
rebel stronghold. It is possible that in the short term pro-government
forces will try to attack
it as the regime seeks
to regain control of the
entire country. Fighting
between the regime and
rebels is likely to end
in 2019.

In  2018, ISIL in Syria still

controlled few minor ter-
ritories but the majority
of active fighters both
in Syria and Iraq, were
forced to operate under-
ground. ISIL has become
a much weaker organ-
ization but conducted
REUTERS / Scanpix
terrorist attacks in Iraq
and Syria targeting civilians and members of security services. Forces
opposing ISIL, including Syrian Kurds and Iraqi Shia fighters, also
gained strength. Therefore, ISIL ability to regain control of larger urban
areas in the short term will be minimal. It is highly likely that ISIL will
confine to underground activity and organizations of terror acts. It will
seek to survive this downfall and restore its capabilities in the future.

The fighting groups in Libya fail to find an agreement on the country's

future. Considerable power is concentrated in the hands of various
59

militant factions and their unwillingness to give up the power poses

a threat to a long-term stability in the country. The ongoing chaos in
Libya will pose security threats to the whole region and create favoura-
ble conditions for activity of radical groups. Amid disagreements of the
International Community about the resolution of Libyan crisis, Russia
will possibly take more active role in Libya.

The security situation in the northern and central Mali remains com-
plicated. The implementation of the peace agreement has been pro-
gressing slowly, as the ethnic conflict continues. The activity of radical
groups poses the biggest security threat. Although international forces
based in the region conduct antiterrorist operations, radical militants
remain strong. Ability to infiltrate into local communities through fam-
ily connections, trade relations and to exploit ethnic disagreements
and inaction of central authorities determine their resilience. Conse-
quently, it enables the extremist groups to spread their influence, ide-
ology, attract new members, and continue smuggling activities. Terror-
ist threat against international forces and in the region of Sahel will
persist.

In 2018, the Taliban fighters continued on pushing the Afghan Security

Forces in different provinces and succeeded to take temporary control
of several provincial centres. The ongoing strategic stalemate increases
perception that the by military resolution of the conflict will fail. In 2018,
the Afghan Government and the US made efforts in bringing the parties
to peace negotiations. So far, the Taliban has rejected the proposals
to negotiate with the Government and declared its intention to enter
direct talks with the USA. It is unlikely that in the short term the Taliban
would accept the proposal and halt the armed fighting. Security situa-
tion in Afghanistan will remain fragile. It is highly likely that the Taliban
and other radical groups will conduct attacks against members of the
Afghan Government, local and international forces. After parliamentary
elections in October situation remains unstable, political forces will
devote their primary attention to the presidential elections scheduled
in April 2019.
REUTERS / Scanpix
61

CONCLUSIONS
AND FORECASTS
In 2019, changes are unlikely in Russian domestic policy. In the mid term,
the Kremlin will prepare to address the problem of 2024 – the end of
Putin's term. Whatever the solution will be, it is highly likely that neither
the nature of the regime nor its implemented policy will change. There
are no real threats to the ruling regime in Russia but in the mid term
economic difficulties and international isolation will increase tensions
within the elite and the social discontent in the society.

Both deteriorating domestic situation and Russia's attitude towards

international relations could encourage the Kremlin to resort to for-
eign policy adventures. Russia strengthens its military power, develops
foreign influence toolkit, and enhances its presence in various regions
worldwide. Such Russian policy results in better awareness of Russian
threats in the Western countries and tightening of sanctions. However,
Russia is not willing to change its policy, as it perceives making any
concessions as a defeat. The Kremlin is set to a long-term confronta-
tion with the West. Russia will use every opportunity to incite conflicts
in other countries or provoke international crises if it perceives that as
a chance to increase its influence.

There are no indications that Russia would try to adjust its military
and security policy towards de-escalation and tension reduction. Both
Russia's domestic and foreign policy are heavily militarized. It is highly
likely that Russia will seek ways to enhance its global positions and
expand the network of military bases abroad. Ability to start execute
combat orders with 24–48 hours' notice, build-up of Russian military
capabilities and the determination to use them will be one of the main
factors negatively affecting Lithuanian national security.
In 2019, Russia will retain focus on post-Soviet countries and will
strengthen its influence over their domestic policies. In the Moldo-
van parliamentary election in February 2019, the Kremlin will seek to
secure the victory of political parties seen as more favourable to Rus-
sia's interests. Russia will tighten control over Belarus to ensure that
Belarusian decisions and domestic processes would conform to the
Kremlin's interests. Currently, Russia cannot influence Ukraine as much
as before the annexation of Crimea, in particular by the means of ‘soft
power'. It is highly likely that the Kremlin will seek opportunity to dest-
abilize situation in Ukraine and discredit Kiev in the eyes of the inter-
national community.

Despite unfavourable conditions to increase influence in Lithuania

Russia does not relinquish its ambition to manipulate Lithuanian
domestic processes and society. It is likely that in the short term Rus-
sia will intensify attempts to discredit and increase disappointment
with democracy, state institutions and officials. The 2019–2020 election
cycle will likely be the main object of Russian interests. It is possible
that Russia will seek to sway the course of elections by information and
cyber means.

It is highly likely that the intensity of activities of Russian and Bela-

rusian intelligence services will remain high. Russian intelligence
will step-up its activity during the 2019–2020 election cycle. In short
to mid  term, Russian intelligence services will increasingly employ
non-traditional intelligence methods and means in the EU and NATO
countries. Lithuanian residents with personal, business or ideological
ties to Russia and Belarus will remain permanent intelligence targets.
Russia will continue to employ its cyber capabilities for intelligence
and influence operations. It is highly likely that despite the condem-
nation and sanctions applied by the West in response to Russian cyber
operations Russia's activity in cyber space will not decrease but may
become less discernible.
63

In the short term, Russia's aggressive information and history policy

will aim to disparage Lithuanian statehood and polarize society. The
Kremlin will likely increase the variety and amount of projects that
implement its history policy. It is highly likely that Kremlin's main focus
will be on the case of attempted January 1991 coup and the respective
court ruling in 2019. On this occasion, the Kremlin will likely intensify
its propaganda campaigns spreading the ‘friendly fire’ narrative. Prov-
ocations are possible against former or incumbent Lithuanian officials
or law enforcement officers related to the January 1991 coup case. The
Kremlin will also embark on the long-term propaganda activity seeking
to impede initiatives that enhance NATO and Lithuanian security.

It is highly likely that in the near term the stream of investors who oper-
ate in third countries, often concealing their actual beneficiaries and
seeking to invest in Lithuania, will not decrease. This negative trend
will create additional risks to Lithuania, while some potential investors
with ties to hostile intelligence and security services will pose threat to
Lithuania's national security.

Considering the growing activity of Chinese intelligence and security

services in NATO and EU countries, it is likely that in the long term Chi-
nese intelligence activity in Lithuania will also expand.

It is highly likely that ISIL will go underground and seek to regain

strength. It is likely that due to the lack of resources and capabilities
ISIL will not be able to conduct directed terrorist attacks in the West,
but it will encourage its followers and sympathizers to conduct inde-
pendent attacks. The flow of foreign fighters and other residents of the
‘caliphate’, including women and children, returning from conflict areas
is not significant. However, it is possible that some of them will join
radicalized individuals in Europe and carry out terrorist attacks. Terror-
ist organization Al-Qaeda will seek to regain the leadership of ‘global
jihad’ from ISIL. It is likely that in order to be more visible Al-Qaeda will
more actively try to conduct terrorist attacks in the West. In the near
term, the terrorism threat level in Lithuania will remain low.
Author and Editor: State Security Department of the Republic of Lithuania and
Second Investigation Department under the Ministry of National Defence
10.01.2019. Circulation: 1000 units. Order GL-01
Layout by the Publishing Section of the General Affairs Department
of the Ministry of National Defence, Totorių str. 25, LT-01121 Vilnius.
Printed by the Military Cartography Centre
of the Lithuanian Armed Forces, Muitinės str.,
Domeikava, LT-54359 Kaunas District.
www.kam.lt

ISBN 978-609-412-162-3
© State Security Department of the Republic of Lithuania, 2019
© Ministry of National Defence Republic of Lithuania, 2019
4