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The FTC respectfully requests reconsideration of the Court’s July 17, 2012
Order (“Order”) (ECF No. 4) to permit it a full and fair opportunity to respond to
the motion to quash subpoenas for deposition and the production of documents
12:33 P.M., on July 17, 2012, the fourteenth day after Hi-Tech, Wheat, and
Schilleci’s filing of that motion, this Court granted the motion on the grounds that:
1) the FTC had failed to respond in the intervening two weeks; and 2) the
subpoenas were “overly broad and would very likely result in the disclosure of
Case 2:12-mc-02375-KOB Document 5 Filed 07/17/12 Page 2 of 14
law or manifest injustice.” Solutia, Inc. v. McWane, Inc., 726 F. Supp. 2d 1316,
1328 (N.D. Ala. 2010). The Local Rules for the Northern District of Alabama do
not provide a standard time for the filing of oppositions to motions. The FTC
consulted with the Court’s chamber rules, which provide that “ALL briefs, whether
on pretrial or post trial motions, must comply with the requirements of “Appendix
II” as far as practicable given the nature of the particular motion, including page
limitations, unless the court grants specific permission to deviate. Unless the
motion is dispositive, parties are not required to comply with Section D.” See
provides that oppositions to motions are due 21 days after the filing of the initial
motion. See Appendix II, attached as Plaintiff’s Exhibit B. In any event, the FTC
intended to file its response today, which is, in fact, the fourteenth day after the
1
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 6, which governs the computation of time under the
Federal Rules, when calculating a period of days, parties are to “exclude the day of
the event that triggers the period.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(1)(A). Thus, July 3, the
date on which the motion was filed, is excluded. Fourteen days from July 4, the
first day of any applicable deadline period, is July 17. Moreover, Rule 6 also
provides that “[u]nless a different time is set by a statute, local rule, or court order,
the last day [of a filing period] ends: (A) for electronic filing, at midnight in the
court’s time zone.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(4).
2
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the FTC an opportunity to be heard and avoid clear error and/or manifest injustice.
To that end, the FTC includes its substantive response to the motion herein.
ongoing contempt action against Hi-Tech, Wheat, Stephen Smith, and Mark
inappropriate where, as here, a waiver applies and when there is no undue burden.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 45. Judge Pannell ruled on January 20, 2012, that Hi-Tech and
to the FTC’s contempt allegations that they relied in good faith on the advice of
counsel that they were in compliance with Judge Pannell’s final judgment.
Moreover, the information sought by the FTC is not overly broad or unduly
documents that contain or relate to the advice that counsel gave them about the
compliance of their advertising with the final judgment and the FTC Act,” see
Defs.’ Mot. Exhibit D at 3, the very subject of the waiver. Accordingly, the FTC
requests that the Court deny the motion to quash or, to the extent the Court has
questions regarding the scope of the waiver found by Judge Pannell, to transfer the
2
Schilleci does not represent Smith or Wright and, thus, they are not parties to Hi-
Tech’s and Wheat’s motion.
3
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motion to the Nothern District of Georgia so that he may interpret the subpoena in
A. Background
On November 1, 2011, the FTC filed a motion for an order to show cause
why Hi-Tech and Wheat should not be held in contempt for violating the final
and Stimerex-ES with claims that were not supported by competent and reliable
scientific evidence as required by the final judgment.4 On May 31, 2012, Judge
Pannell ordered Hi-Tech and Wheat to show cause why they should not be held in
contempt. In opposition to the show cause motion, Hi-Tech and Wheat asserted
the affirmative defense that they relied in good-faith on the advice of counsel,
3
Moreover, at a status conference before Judge Pannell, held on May 31, 2012,
counsel for Hi-Tech and Wheat stated their intention to file a motion for a
protective order in response to any subpoenas directed to Mr. Schilleci, and Judge
Pannell clearly contemplated that such a motion would be filed in the Northern
District of Georgia for his consideration. See Tr. of 5/31/12 Hearing at 27-29
(attached as Plaintiff’s Exhibit C) (“THE COURT: Well, he can file this motion. I
can see that no matter what I do today I’m still going to have to redo it in some
kind of Order pursuant to some kind of motion.”). Subsequently, on June 4, 2012,
during a conference call with FTC counsel, Mr. Wenik reiterated that he expected
that any discovery disputes in the matter would be handled by Judge Pannell.
Instead, in an attempt to get a second bite at the apple and obtain a conflicting
ruling on the issue of waiver, Hi-Tech, Wheat, and Schilleci filed a motion with
this Court.
4
The FTC also moved for an order to show cause against defendants Stephen
Smith and Mark Wright, who are not before this court.
4
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On December 14, 2011, the FTC filed a motion to determine the scope of
Hi-Tech and Wheat’s attorney-client privilege waiver through the assertion of the
advice of counsel defense. On January 20, 2012, after the motion was fully
briefed, Judge Pannell granted the FTC’s motion and found that Hi-Tech and
defense. Specifically, Judge Pannell decided that the scope of the waiver was not
limited to “the single attorney [Novotny] they consulted regarding compliance with
the judgment” but extended “to all other communications relating to the same
subject matter.” Defs.’ Mot., Ex. D. at 3 (emphasis added). Thus, he found that
communications and other documents that contain or relate to advice that counsel
gave them about the compliance of their advertising with the final judgment and
To conduct discovery into the advice of counsel defense, the FTC served the
demonstrated that he also gave advice about the compliance of Hi-Tech advertising
5
Ga. Dkt. No. 346 at 11-12 (Memorandum Of Law Of Defendants Hi-Tech
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. And Jared Wheat In Opposition To Plaintiff’s Motion For
An Order To Show Cause And Plaintiff’s Motion To Modify The Final Judgment);
Ga. Dkt. No. 346-1 at 7-8 (Declaration Of Jared Wheat In Support Of Contempt
Defendants’ Response To Plaintiff’s Motion For Order To Show Cause And
Motion To Modify The Final Judgment).
5
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with the final judgment.6 The FTC served nearly identical subpoenas on Novotny.
about Hi-Tech and Wheat’s compliance with the final judgment. In an attempt to
hide unfavorable evidence and disclose only favorable evidence, Hi-Tech and
Wheat have moved to quash the Schilleci subpoenas, but not the Novotny
subpoenas.7 Hi-Tech and Wheat are therefore impermissibly attempting to use the
Hi-Tech, Wheat, and Schilleci base their motion to quash on Fed. R. Civ. P.
45(c)(3)(iii) and (iv), which provide that “the issuing court must quash or modify a
Emphasis added. The motion to quash should be denied because a waiver applies
to the documents and testimony requested by the subpoenas, and the subpoenas do
6
Ga. Dkt. No. 366 at 11-14 (Plaintiff’s Reply In Support Of Its Motion For An
Order To Show Cause Why Contempt Defendants Hi-Tech Pharmaceuticals, Jared
Wheat And Stephen Smith Should Not Be Held In Contempt For Violating The
Final Judgment And Permanent Injunction And Its Motion To Modify The Final
Judgment) (attached as Plaintiff’s Exhibit D).
7
On
July 16, 2012, John S. Hicks, Assistant General Counsel and Ethics Counsel
for Baker, Donelson, informed the FTC that Hi-Tech and Wheat have consented to
the disclosure of advice from Novotny in response to subpoenas that are nearly
identical to those the FTC served on Schilleci.
6
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communications and other documents that contain or relate to advice that counsel
gave them about the compliance of their advertising with the final judgment and
the FTC Act” is law of the case. See Order at 2; see also United States v. Exxon
Corp., 94 F.R.D. 246, 247-8 (D.D.C. 1981) (court’s prior discovery opinion
established as the law of the case that defendant had waived its attorney-client
privilege and that any documents pertinent to defendant’s defense of good faith
were therefore discoverable).8 Judge Pannell’s ruling on the waiver and its scope
8
Because
Judge Pannell has ruled that Hi-Tech and Wheat waived privilege over
not only communications with Novotny but “all other communications . . . relating
to the same subject matter,” Defs.’ Mot. to Quash, Ex. D, at 3, the Alabama Rules
of Professional Conduct do not prohibit Schilleci from disclosing the requested
information. See Comments to Alabama Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6
(Disclosures Otherwise Required or Authorized); Chesnoff v. United States (In re
Grand Jury Proceedings), 13 F.3d 1293, 1296-97 (9th Cir. 1993) (relying on
Comments to Rule 1.6 of the Model Code of Professional Conduct, which is the
same as Alabama Rule 1.6, court held that district court did not abuse its discretion
in holding attorney in contempt of court for his refusal to testify before a grand
jury). Schilleci has not cited to any case prohibiting him from disclosing attorney-
client communications when a judge has issued a court order, as Judge Pannell has,
finding that the attorney-client privilege has been waived.
7
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The FTC’s subpoena specifications are not overly broad. The FTC drafted
the subpoena specifications with an eye towards Judge Pannell’s waiver order. As
the Court has recognized, Judge Pannell found that Hi-Tech and Wheat waived
9
See Cox v. Administrator United States Steel & Carnegie, 17 F.3d 1386, 1418-19
(11th Cir. 1994) (“[I]t would be inequitable to allow . . . [a party] to present
evidence tending to show that it intended to comply with the law, while allowing it
to cloak in privilege those documents tending to show it might have known its
actions did not conform to the law.” ); Mohawk Indus. v. Interface, Inc., 2008 WL
5210386, at *7 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 29, 2008) (“Once a party waives the attorney-client
privilege as to a communication, the waiver generally ‘extends to all other
communications relating to the same subject matter.’”); Chick-Fil-A v. ExxonMobil
Corp., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109588, at *17 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 10, 2009) (finding
that subject matter waiver was warranted under Fed. R. Evid. 502(a) because it
would be unfair to permit party to produce privileged information supporting its
contentions while at the same time withholding other privileged information that
may undermine them).
10
The final judgment against Hi-Tech and Wheat defines “advertisement” as “any
written or verbal statement, illustration, or depiction that is designed to effect a sale
or create interest in the purchasing of goods or services, whether it appears in a
brochure, newspaper, magazine, pamphlet, leaflet, circular, mailer, book insert,
free standing insert, letter, catalogue, poster, chart, billboard, public transit card,
point of purchase display, packaging, package insert, label, film, slide, radio,
television, or cable television, audio program transmitted over a telephone system,
program-length commercial (“infomercial”), Internet website (including metatags),
or in any other medium.” See Final Judgment and Permanent Injunction Against
National Urological Group, Inc., Hi-Tech Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Jared Wheat,
8
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concerning the compliance of Hi-Tech and Wheat’s advertising with the final
9
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Defs.’ Mot. To Quash, Ex. A. at 13. Although Subpoena Specification 1 does not
Hi-Tech and Wheat’s advertising since the injunctive provisions of the final
expressly permits the Court to modify the subpoena, rather than impose the more
Petroleum Co., 392 F.3d 812, 818 (5th Cir. 2004). Thus, to the extent the Court is
10
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Inc., 258 F.R.D. 501, 507 (S.D. Fla. 2007); see also Wiwa, 392 F.3d at 818.11
To the extent that questions concerning the scope of the waiver exist,
Given that Judge Pannell has already ruled that Hi-Tech’s and Wheat’s assertion of
the advice of counsel defense operates as a subject-matter waiver that extends to all
counsel with whom they consulted regarding the compliance of their advertising
with the final judgment, Judge Pannell is in the best position to answer any
Moreover, the Court has the authority to transfer the motion to Judge
Pannell. See Melder v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
34118 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 25, 2008) (court transferred motion to quash as best way to
ensure that ruling on motion would be consistent with trial court’s other discovery
rulings); see also In re Digital Equipment Corp., 949 F.2d 228 (8th Cir. 1991)
(court issuing subpoena can remit objections to trial court to give trial court
11
Hi-Tech,
Wheat, and Schilleci’s argument to this Court that the FTC can obtain
the information it seeks from another source, Novotny, boils down to the same
argument Judge Pannell rejected. They are again attempting to rely only on advice
of counsel favorable to their defense, while hiding advice of counsel that is
unfavorable. The specific advice that Schilleci gave is not available from any other
source. The evidence already in hand demonstrates that Schilleci and Novotny
gave contradictory advice to Hi-Tech and Wheat concerning the advertisements’
compliance with the final judgment. See Plaintiff’s Exhibit D at 12-14.
11
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jurisdiction to rule on objections); Petersen v. Douglas County Bank & Trust Co.,
940 F.2d 1389, 1391-92 (10th Cir. 1991) (a magistrate who transferred a motion to
quash from the issuing court to a trial court acted within his authority).
in the Northern District of Georgia and, having done so, is subject to personal
Semiconductor Corp., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22823 (D. Ariz. Mar. 4, 2009) (court
transferred motion to quash because trial court was acquainted with the facts
alleged to have produced a waiver, trial court made a prior ruling on a closely-
related discovery issue, and trial court had before it key parties and lawyers
The Court may also stay deciding the motion, allow Hi-Tech and Wheat to
seek relief (e.g., a protective order) with Judge Pannell, and defer to Judge
Pannell’s decision. Staying the motion is warranted here because counsel for Hi-
Tech and Wheat already informed Judge Pannell that they intended to file a motion
for a protective order and Judge Pannell indicated that he expected that he would
hear any such motion. See n.3, supra. This Court has the legal authority to stay a
decision on the motion to quash to allow Hi-Tech, Wheat, and Schilleci to file a
12
See Local Rule 83.1, Northern District of Georgia. Indeed, given that the
privilege belongs to Hi-Tech and Wheat and not Schilleci, it is odd that Schilleci
appears to be asserting the privilege not only on behalf of his clients but on his
own as well.
12
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motion for a protective order with Judge Pannell. See, e.g., Clausnitzer v. Fed.
Express Corp., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61699, *9-13 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 21, 2007)
(issuing court transferred motion for protective order to trial court, stayed motion
to quash pending trial court’s decision, and stated that it would issue a ruling on
the motion to quash not inconsistent with the trial court’s decision).
13
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 17th day of July, 2012, I caused a copy of
Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration and Opposition to Motion to Quash
Subpoenas Directed to Joseph P. Schilleci, Jr. to be served via electronic mail and
Federal Express to the following counsel of record:
14