RELEVANCY AND ADMISSIBILITY OF CONFESSIONS

Sections 6 to 55 of the Act deal with the relevancy of facts. The word
'relevant' is defined in section 3 of the Act as "one fact is said to be relevant to another
when the one is connected with the other in any of the ways referred to in the
provisions of the Act relating to relevancy of facts." Relevancy can be logical as well as
legal. A fact is said to be logically relevant to another -when it bears such casual
relation with the other as to render probable the existence or non-existence of the latter.
All facts logically relevant are not, however, legally relevant. The Act exhaustively
enumerates the kinds of casual connections which make a fact legally relevant to another.
Hence relevancy under the Act is not a question of pure logic but of law, as no fact,
however logically relevant, is receivable in evidence unless it is declared by the Act to
be relevant. Whatever is legally relevant is logically relevant but not vice- versa. The
statement of the accused: “I have kept in the field the knife with which I killed A’ is
logically relevant but Section 27 of the Act provides that only so much part of the
information as relates directly to the fact thereby discovered may be proved, i.e., is
relevant and hence the latter portion of accused’s statement, viz., “with which I killed A”
though logically relevant is not legally relevant.
Before going into the relevancy of confession, let us distinguish between
relevancy, admissibility and evidentiary value. Relevancy and admissibility are not
interchangeable terms. A fact may be legally relevant, yet its reception may be prohibited
on the grounds of public policy, e.g., communications during marriage. Every relevant
fact is therefore not necessarily admissible. Similarly, every admissible fact is not
necessarily relevant within sections 6 to 55 of the Act. Even if a confession is relevant
and admitted by the court, it is in the wisdom of the judge as to what weight shall be
attached to it. So determination of evidentiary value is a question to be decided by the
judge according to facts and circumstances of each case. The Supreme Court has also
observed in Sahoo v. State of U.P..^ that there is a clear distinction between relevancy,
admissibility and weight to be attached to a piece of evidence.
Switching over to the relevancy, three questions arise for determination
whenever a confession is tendered in evidence:-

i) has it been proved that the accused made the statement attributed to
him;
 ii) is the statement relevant; and

iii) what is the evidentiary value of the statement?

Questions (ii) and (iii) do not arise if question is answered in negative; question (iii)
does not arise if question (i) is answered in affirmative and question (ii) in negative.
The relevancy of confessions is discussed in sections 21 and 24 to 30 of the Act.
A close look reveals that these sections incorporate a set of rules of irrelevance (also
termed as Exclusionary Rules).4 Stephen while drafting the Act placed the rules of
Irrelevance under the chapter of relevancy. Strictly speaking rules of irrelevance should
be grouped under a separate head instead of including them in rules of relevancy.
Confessions, as a species of admissions are relevant under section 21of the Act
against the maker of it unless hit by rules of irrelevance or Exclusionary Rules of
sections 24, 25 or 26 of the Act or section 162 of the Cr. P.C., 1973. Section 21 of the
Act states that admissions are relevant and may be proved as against the person who
makes them. Accordingly, a statement made by an accused that he was present at the
scene of the crime and he was accompanying the persons who committed the crime is
relevant under section 21 as an admission. An oral confession by an accused person
not being hit by any of the exclusionary rules, is an admission which is relevant under
section 21. In Faddi v. State of M.P. ,5 it was held that an admission in F.I.R. is
admissible under section 21. Any statement not amounting to a confession does not come
within prohibition of Exclusionary Rules of sections 24, 25 and 26 and can be proved
as an admission.
If the relevancy of confession is excluded by any of the exclusionary rules,
the entire confessional statement in all its parts including the admission of minor
incriminating facts must also be excluded, unless it is made relevant by a rule of
relevance or Inclusionary Rule.6 Little substance and content will be left in sections
24, 25 and .26 if proof of admission incriminating facts in a confessional statement is
permitted. 7 To say this is to say that if the confession is caused by inducement, threat or
promise as contemplated by Section 24 of the Evidence Act, whole of confession is
irrelevant. Proof of not only the admission of the offence but also the admission of every
other incriminating fact such as motive, preparation and subsequent conduct is
excluded by section 24.To give any other interpretation to it would be to rob the
section of its practical utility and content. Extending the logic to sections 25 and 26 of the
Evidence Act, would reveal that sections 25 and 26 not only ban proof of confession
of an offence by the accused to a police officer but also admission contained in the
confessional statement of all incriminating facts related to the offence.
Rules of irrelevance in sections 24 to 26 are followed by a rule of relevance (also
termed as Inclusionary Rule)8 under section 27, which is in the form of a proviso.
Section 27 is one of the rule of relevance, which is infact based on the doctrine of
confirmation by subsequent facts. This rule states that whenever some facts are
discovered in consequence of information given by the accused in police custody so
much of such information as relates distinctly to the facts discovered thereby may be
proved. This rule partially lifts the ban imposed by sections 25 and 26 in respect of so
much of the information, whether it amounts to confession or not, as relates distinctly
to the facts discovered in consequence of information, if other conditions of section 27
are satisfied.
Another rule of relevance is contained in section 28. Section 28 is infact a
counterpart of section 24. Section 28 makes the confession relevant if it is made after
removal of impression caused by inducement, threat or promise. Under this rule when
effect of exclusionary rule is over and fully removed, confession becomes relevant.
All these Exclusionary and Inclusionary rules are designed to ensure
voluntariness of the confession. Confession if made voluntarily and untouched by any
of the exclusionary rules remains relevant not withstanding presence of five factors
mentioned in section 29 of the Act.
Section 29 enunciates a principle that a confession otherwise relevant does
not become irrelevant merely because it was made -

(a) under promise of secrecy;

(b) in consequence of deception practised on the accused;

(c) when the accused was drunk;

(d) in answer to questions which the accused need not have answered;
or
(e) he was not warned that he was not bound to make such confessions
and that it might be used against him.

It is important to note that section 29 pre- Supposes that there is no bar to the
relevancy of the confession and it is not hit by any of the exclusionary rules. If for any
of the reasons mentioned in sections 24, 25 and 26, the confession is irrelevant, then
there is no question of applying the provisions of section 29. This section gives five
non-vitiating factors which do not bar the relevancy of the confession provided
confession is not hit by any of the exclusionary rules.
 The expression "otherwise relevant" occuring in Section 29 furnish a key to the
interpretation of section 29 of the Act. Section 24 to 26 make certain
kinds of confessions irrelevant under certain conditions, conversely the absence of those
conditions mentioned in those sections makes a confession relevant. Thus if the effect
of any inducement, threat or promise has been fully removed when a confession was
made then it is relevant. So also a confession made to a Magistrate is relevant even
though it is made while the accused is in the custody of a police officer, under Section
21 of the Act.
 A confession made to a Magistrate and recorded by him under provisions of
section 164 of the Cr. P.C., 1973, is relevant and can be proved under section 21 of
the Act. It can also be proved under section 28 of the Act in the view that warning
administered by the Magistarate will end the impressions generated by inducement,
threat or promise or it may be relevant under Section 26 of the Act, even if confessing
accused was in police custody. Thus, extra- judicial confessions made to any other person
who is not a person in authority, are relevant and can be of four kinds :

i) confessions which are relevant under section 21 of the Act;

ii) confessions which are made by an accused person who was in

custody of the police, in the immediate presence of the Magistrate
(section 26) ;

iii) confessions which led to the discovery of a fact or thing (section

27); and

iv) confessions made after removal of inducement, threat or promise

(Section 28).

These four kinds of confessions remain relevant notwithstanding the presence of

five factors enumerated in Section 29.

ISSUES PRETAINING TO THEM

But the language of section 29, it is submitted, is not very clear as the
words "if such confession is otherwise relevant, it does not become irrelevant...”
create some doubt as they are capable of different interpretations :-

i) they might be taken as referring to the confessions referred to in

section 24. This is because the preceding section contains the words
"such a confession as is referred to in section 24";

ii) they may be taken as referring to confessions, not governed or

contemplated in sections 24 to 28, that is to say, extra- judicial
confessions not made to the police or other person in authority;

iii) such confession refers to confessions which have been dealt with in
the preceding sections and are relevant.
 The last two interpretations are the result of two different trends shown by the
appellate courts. This is mainly due to words "if such a confession" occuring in section
29 of the Act. Patna High Court in Emperor v. Jamuna Singh.9 speaking through
Ray, J., observed that the first interpretation is also possible because section 28 also
opens with similar words, namely, "If such a confession" but the latter are succeeded
words "as is referred in section 24" which words are absent in section 29. This may
lead one to think that the confession referred in both the sections is the same, and it is
for the sake of brevity, that the words "as is referred to in section 24" are omitted from
section 29.10
Second interpretation is also the result of contra opinion of Ray, J., in the
above-mentioned case. Ray,J., observed that "the phrase 'otherwise relevant' conveys the
meaning, 'relevant otherwise then as a confession; section 29, in this view of the matter
shall be taken to cover the field of confessions other than those dealt within its
preceding sections." Ray, J., substantiated his viewpoint with the help oF following
illustrations:
Suppose an accused makes a confession under a promise of secrecy
preceding from the recording Magistrate that his confession will be kept a
secret while every effort has been made by him to remove the impression
caused by inducement. . . and he has not told the accused that he was not
bound to make a confession and that his confession if made shall be used in
evidence against him... this amounts to saying, at least, that it will not be used
as evidence against him in court. Section 29, Evidence Act, would not make it
irrelevant. But is it not shocking to common sense that it should be so? Does it
not offend against the principle of law underlying section 24 of the Act?12

He further illustrated that :

When an accused is given to understand that the law is that any confession
made by him would be used against his co-accused but not against him, and
that the accused who confesses is more often than not given some concession
in the matter of punishment; ... . A confession made under such circumstances
is certainly a confession made in consequence of a deception within the
meaning of section 29 practised on the accused person for the purpose of
obtaining it, and this deception from a person in authority is hardly
distinguishable from an inducement within the Meaning of Section 24
Evidence Act which does not mention “deception” as one of the invalidating
circumstances.
He concluded that :
The result therefore will be that a confession, the making of which is caused by
a promise of secrecy or deception of above description from anybody
including a person in authority within the meaning of section 29, Evidence
Act, is not irrelevant because of such promise or deception but the promise or
deception, viewed as a promise or inducement within the meaning of section
24, makes the confession irrelevant.14

This absurdity and contradiction according to Ray, J., can be avoided

only if section 29 is construed not so as to cover the field already occupied by sections
24 to 28 of the Act. Section 29, therefore must refer to such confessions only as not
governed or contemplated in the preceding sections. Since some of the circumstances, if
not all, enumerated in section 29 are, in certain state of things identical with
circumstances contemplated in section 24 and that existence of identical factors operate
contrarily upon the same field of operation - a result never compatible nor consistent.
Mr. Justice Ray's hypothesis is further strengthened by one more reason
given by him, i.e., if the legislature intended section 29, to be a general provision
applicable to confessions at large, the purpose could have been well served or rather
better served by not enacting it, because confessions like admissions are relevant against
the person who has made it in the absence of circumstances delimiting their
admissibility. Finally he expressed his opinion as follows :
In my judgment, Section 29 was meant to dispel doubts with regards to
extra-judicial confessions made under circumstances similar to those which make the
judicial confessions inadmissible and with respect to confessions relevant otherwise than
as confessions; for example as admissions under conditions not requiring proof of guilt.
A different trend was shown by Bombay High Court in Ranaappa v.
State where Gajendragadkar J., observed that section 29 lays down that "if such a
confession is otherwise relevantit does not become irrelevant, inter alia, 'merely'
because before it was made by the accused was not warned that he was not bound to
make such a confession and that evidence' of it might be given against him. Opening
clause of section 29 refers to confessions which have dealt within the preceding sections
and it postulates that they are admissible under the said sections. In other words it
must not have been caused by inducement... , it must have been made in the immediate
presence of a Magistrate, and if inducement. . . was held to the confessor, it must have
been made after impression of such inducement... have been fully removed from his
mind. If for any of the reasons mentioned in the preceding sections the confession is
inadmissible, then there is no question of applying the section 29 at all.
Section 29, therefore, assumes that there is no bar to the admissibility of
the confession in question arising from any of the said earlier provisions and it then
proceeds to invalidate or negative other possible objections or bars that may be raised
against its admissibility. This, in effect, means that section 29 applies only to
confessions which have not become irrelevant under sections 24 to 28.
If it is urged that the confession which was made under a promise of
secrecy or made in consequence of deception practised on the accused or when he was
drunk or... . So it should not be admitted, the section provides answer by saying that these
objections are invalid and confession which is otherwise relevant is not rendered
irrelevant merely by the presence of circumstances on which the said objections are
raised.
Law Commission17 has endorsed the view taken by Gajendragadkar, J., in
Rancrappa v. State.18 that section 29 comes into operation only in respect of confession
which is 'otherwise relevant', that is to say, which is not excluded by sections 24 to 26
or by any other provisions of the law. This interpretation gives accurate and full meaning
to the words "such a confession" (which are the equivalent of" a confession made by an
accused person), and to the words “ otherwise relevant” (which are equivalent of “ a
confession not excluded by Sections 24 to 26 or by any other provision of law”). It is
submitted that this view is in harmony with the policy of exclusionary rules contained in
other sections. At the same time it tells us that the factors enumerated in section 29
are not vitiating per se.

Two alternatives are available to remove above controversy arising out of

different interpretations of words " otherwise relevant";

(a) replace the words "if such a confession is otherwise relevant", by the
words "if a confession made by an accused person is not irrelevant
or incapable of being proved under sections 24 to 27."

(b) omit the word 'such'.

The Law Commission. preferred the second alternative and recommended the omission of
the word 'such'.20
The last non-vitiating factor in section 29, i.e., "... , the accused was not
warned that he was not bound to make such confession, and that evidence of it might
be given against him, isprima facie in conflict with section 164 (2) Cr. P.C., 1973,21
which requires that warning must be given to the person concerned. This controversy
brings us to the question whether section 29 of the Act overrides section 164 of Cr. P.
C. ?
One view is that section 29 is an overriding provision. This is due to decision of
Bombay High Court in Ranaappa v. The State.22 where it was observed that
legislature was fully aware of the clear and unambiguous words used in section 29 of the
Evidence Act, while introducing section 164 (3) 23 in the Cr. P.C., 1898 (by
Amendment Act 18 of 1923) and did not think it necessary to provide for the
supersession or modification of Section 29. According to this view, non-compliance with
Section 164 (3) does not exclude confession, and the court is free to accept or reject the
confession, if it is voluntary or involuntary, as the case may be.
This view is also taken by Madras, Rajasthan and Allahabad High Court
in re Vellamoonii Goundan,24 Dhuula v. The State.25 and Emperor v. Nanua26
respectively.
The opposite view was taken by the Orrisa High Court in Bala Maihi vs. State
of Orrisa while laying down that Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. overrides Section 29 of the
Act.
The Mysore High Court has taken a middle path in re Madecrowden.2^ treating
the confession recorded without statutory warning as inadmissible only if the accused is
prejudiced thereby.
Law Commission of India has favoured the view of Orissa High Court.29
The Commission concluded that the whole object of section 164 of the Cr. P.C., 1973,
is to
ensure voluntariness in making of confessions and requisite warning is sine qua non of
it. Therefore, they recommended30 the addition of an exception to section 29 to make it
clear that section 29 will be subject to section 164 (2) Cr. P.C.
The result of the above recommendation will be that out of five non-vitiating
factors, fifth-one regarding statutory warning, will no longer remain non- vitiating,
because section 29 has expressly been made subject to section 164 of the Cr. P.C. Such
an amendment will be faithful to the proper import of section 164 of the Cr. P.C., as
interpreted by Privy Council in Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor. that where a power has
given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or
not at all. Meaning thereby that if a Magistrate is required by Law to give statutory
warning under section 164 (2) of Cr. P.C., 1973 he must do so before recording any
confession, failing which confession will stand vitiated. The Law Commission, thus
recommended a revised section 29 on the following lines :
If ... a confession is otherwise relevant, it does not become irrelevant merely because
a) It was made -

i) under a promise of secrecy, or

 ii) in consequence of a deception practised on the accused
person for the purpose of obtaining it, or

iii) when he was drunk, or

iv) in answer to questions which he need not have answered, or

b) the accused was not warned that he was not bound to make such
confession and that the evidence of it might be given against him.

Exception :
Nothing contained in this section shall effect the provisions of sub-section (2) of
section 164 of Code of Criminal Procedure. 1973, as to the recording of
confessions by Magistrates.32
Section 30 of the Act allows the court to take into consideration the confession
against other co- accused who are jointly tried with him for the same offence. This section
thus forms an exception to the general rule that confessions are relevant only against
its maker.
So far as relevancy of confession in India is concerned, the Legislature has
shown a big legislative trends while introducing section 15 in TADA 1987. Such a
provision was absent in TADA 1985 Legislature has accepted the recommendation of
Law Commission of India (69th Report),33
According to section 1534 of TADA 1987, not with standing anything in
the code or Indian Evidence, Act, 1872, but subject to provisions of section 15 itself,
a confession made by a person before a police officer not lower in rank than
suprintendent of Police and recorded by such Police officer either in writting or an any
mechanical device like cassettes, taps, or sound tracks from out of which sounds or
images can be reproduced, shall be admissible in the trial of such person or co-
accused, abettor or conspirator for an Offence under this Act or rules made
threreunder. Provided that the co-accused, abettor or conspirator is charged and tried
in the same case together with the acussed.
Initially such a confession was made admissible against the main accused only.
But later an legislature showed another trend and the confession was made admissible
against co-accused, abettor and conspirator as well. This trend was shown by legislature
by enacting TADA (Amendment) Act 1993 whereby a proviso and words "or co-
accused, abettor or conspirator were added in section 15 (1).
 Section 25 of the Evidence Act says that a confession made to a Police
officer is not to be proved against the accused person. But in TADA 1987 the
legislature has shown a great trend by making confession before S.P. as admissible. It is
submitted that Exclusionary rule of section 25 has been overridden in this respect by
Inclusionary rule of section 15 of TADA, 1987.35
Legislature while drafting section 15 has taken care of overriding effect of this
Inclusionary rule in as much as section 15 of TADA 1987 begins with the words
“Not with standing anything contained in the code or in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872
... ."
To confirm the overriding effect of above inclusionary rule along with, the
whole Act, legislature has enacted section 25 which says that the provisions of TADA,
1987 or any rule made thereunder or any order made under any such rule shall have
effect notwith standing any thing inconsistent therewith contained in any enactment
other than TADA, 1987 or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any enactment
other than this Act.
By enacting Section 15 of the TADA Act 1987, Confession of an accused person,
co-accused , abettor or conspirator has been made admissible against the accused person.
In Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, Supreme court has observed that
as per Section 15 (1) of TADA Act, 1987, a confession can either be reduced
into writing or recorded on any mechanical device like Cassettes, tapes or
sound tracks from which sound or images can be reproduced. Since the
recording of evidence on mechanical device can be tampered, tailored,
tinkered, edited and erased etc., there must be some severe safeguards which
should be scrupulously observed while recording a confession U/S 15 (1) so
that possibility of extorting any false confession can be prevented to some
appreciable extent, although section 15 (2) of the TADA enjoins a statutory
obligation on the part of the police officer recording the confession to explain
to the person making it that he is not bound to make a confession and to give
a statutory warning that if he does so it may be used as evidence against him.

Upholding the constitutional validity of section 15 of TADA, Supreme Court while

commenting upon Rule 15 observed as follows :-

"Rule 15 of the TADA Rules imposes certain conditions on the police officer
with regard to the mode of recording the confession and requires the police
officer to make a memorandum at the end of the confession to the effect that he
has explained to the maker that he was not bound to make the confession and
that the confession, if made by him, would be used as against him and that he
recorded the confession only on being satisfied that it was voluntarily made.
Rule 15 (5) requires that every confession recorded under Section 15 should be
sent forthwith either to the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or the Chief Judicial
Magistrate having jurisdiction over the area in which such confession has been
recorded and the Magistrate should forthwith forward the recorded confession
received by him to the Designated Court taking cognizance of the offence.
Therefore Section 15 is not liable to be struck down since that section does not
offend either Art. 14 or 21 of the Constitution"37
 Further, Supreme Court, in order to ensure that the confession obtained in the
preindictment interrogation by a Police officer not lower in rank than S.P. is not tainted with
any vice but is in stick confirmity of the well recognised and accepted principles of fairness,
laid down following guidelines which are six in number :-

(1) The confession should be recorded in a free atmosphere in the same language in
which the person is examined and as narrated by him.
(2) The person from whom a confession has been recorded under Section 15
(1) of the Act, should be produced before the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or
the Chief Judicial Magistrate to whom the confession is required to be sent
under Rule 15 (5) along with the original statement of confession, written or
recorded on mechanical device without unreasonable delay;
(3) The Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or the Chief Judicial Magistrate should
scrupulously record the statement, if any, made by the accused so produced and
get his signature and in case of any complaint of torture, the person should be
directed to be produced for medical examination before a Medical Officer not
lower in rank than of an Assistant Civil Surgeon;
(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973,
no police officer below the rank of an Assistant Commissioner of Police in the
Metropolitan cities and elsewhere of a Deputy Superintendent of Police or a
Police Officer of equivalent rank, should investigate any offence punishable
under this Act of 1987.
This is necessary in view of the drastic provisions of this Act. More so when the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 under Section 17 and the Immoral Traffic Prevention
Act, 1956 under Section 13, authorise only a police officer of a specified rank to investigate
the offences under those specified Acts.
(5) The Police Officer if he is seeking the custody of any person for pre-indictment
or pre-trial interrogation from the judicial custody, must file an affidavit sworn
by him explaining the reason not only for such custody but also for the delay, if
any, in seeking the police custody.
(6) In case the person taken for interrogation, on receipt of the statutory warning
that he is not bound to make a confession and that if he does so, the said
statement may be used against him as evidence, asserts his right to silence, the
 police officer must respect his right of assertion without making any
compulsion to give a statement of disclosure;38.
Supreme Court has directed the Central Government to take note of above
mentioned guidelines and incorporate them by appropriate amendments in the TADA and
Rules.
It is respectfully submitted that now Central Government has allowed TADA to expire
on 23rd May 1995. But Criminal Law amendment Bill 1995 to replace TADA is under
active consideration of the Central Government. Even if the guidelines given by the
Supreme Court are incorporated into new law, it entirely remains in the wisdom of Courts
trying the offence to decide the question of admissibility or reliability of confession.
Courts must satisfy itself that there was no trap, no track and no importune seeking of
evidence during the custodial interrogation. In other words Court should weigh all factors
before relying on the confession of an accused terrorist.

Doctrine of Voir Dire : Trial within the trial :

Under code of Criminal procedure in Malasia, confession before a police officer of the rank
of Inspector is admissible in evidence if judicial safeguards as mentioned in section 164 of
our Cr. P.C., 1973 are complied with.
Police officer recording the confession is required to give a statutory warning to the
accused person about his constitutional right of silence, and the police officer is required
to record the factum of giving statutory warning to the accused person. Additional
procedural safeguard provided under Malasian Law is .that the Police Officer will make
sure that no inducement, threat or promise was made before recording a confessional
statement.
Next, accused has a right to retract from his confession. If accused opts to retract
his confession then Magistrate will suspend the main trial and will start voir dire39. a mini
trial within the trial and will proceeed to decide the voluntariness of the confession. Court
will decide whether aforesaid safeguards were followed before recording of confession or
not.
If the accused is brought from Police lockup and a confession is immediately
recorded thereafter, chances of involuntary confession coming out of mouth of accused
are there. Hence accused should be given time for reflections or thinking before confession is
recorded.
 Under English Law also confession before a Police Officer is relevant against the
accused person. But higher burden of proof is not required under English Law. Accused is
tried on the basis of preponderence of probabilities.
In England too the involuntary statement of accused is rejected during voir dire (mini-
trial) when the accused challenges the charge sheet and retracts from his confession. Inspite
of rejection of statement during voir dire (mini - trial) that portion of the stateement is
made admissible against the accused which relates distinctly to the facts thereby
discovered in consequence of information given by the accused.
Under TADA or under any Indian Law if the system of recording the confession
operates without following the procedural safeguards as provided in section 164 &
281 Cr. P.C., and the guidelines laid down by Supreme Court ill Kartar Singh v. State of
Punjab.40 then, the situation has to be violative of fundamental rights guaranted under article
21 of our constitution.
Supreme Court indirectly has tried to introduce doctrine of voir dire through Rartar
Singh's Case.41 for trial of offences under TADA. It is submitted that the suggestion is a
welcome step to safeguard the interest of the acccused person. But Government now has
allowed TADA to expire on 23rd May 1995 and no such doctrine is introducced in the new
Criminal Law (Amendment) Bill, 1995, since in the new Bill there is no parallel provision to
that of section 15 of TADA, 1987. Thus, doctrine of voir dire loses its significance in view
of the decision of the Government to drop Inclusionary rule of section 15 of TADA from the
new Bill. Thus, the doctrine of voir dire remains of academic interest in view of
Exclusionary Rule of section 25 of the Evidence Act.42