*

G.R. No. 139792. November 22, 2000.

ANTONIO P. SANTOS, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE

COURT OF APPEALS, METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY,
now known as METROPOLITAN MANILA
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, and THE CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION, respondents.

Civil Service Commission; Separation Pay; For the purpose of

computing or determining petitioner’s separation pay under
Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7924, his years of service in the
Judiciary should be excluded and his separation pay should be
solely confined to his services in the Metropolitan Manila
Authority.—We affirm the assailed judgment. We agree with the
Court of Appeals and the Civil Service Commission that for the
purpose of computing or determining petitioner’s separation pay
under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7924, his years of service in the
Judiciary should be excluded and that his separation pay should
be solely confined to his services in the MMA.
Same; Same; Republic Act No. 7924 allows the grant of
separation pay to employees who were to be displaced thereby the
separation pay can

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* EN BANC.

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554 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Santos vs. Court of Appeals

be based only on the length of service in the Metropolitan Manila
Authority; The separation pay must relate only to the employment
thus affected.—In the first place, the last paragraph of Section 11
of R.A. No. 7924 on the grant of separation pay at the rate of “one
and one-fourth (1 1/4) months of salary for every year of service”
cannot by any stretch of logic or imagination be interpreted to
refer to the total length of service of an MMA employee in the
government, i.e., to include such service in the government
outside the MMA. Since it allows the grant of separation pay to
employees who were to be displaced thereby the separation pay
can be based only on the length of service in the MMA. The
displacement amounted to an abolition of the office or position of
the displaced employees, such as that of petitioner. The rule is
settled that Congress may abolish public offices. Such a power is a
consequent prerogative of its power to create public offices.
However, the power to abolish is subject to the condition that it be
exercised in good faith. The separation partook of the nature of a
disturbance of compensation; hence, the separation pay must
relate only to the employment thus affected.

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

     Antonio F. Navarrete for petitioner.
     The Solicitor General for respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

In this petition for review on certiorari petitioner assails

1
the decision of 19 August 1999 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 48301, which held that petitioner’s
separation pay under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7924 should be
limited to the number of years of his service in the
Metropolitan Manila Authority (MMA) only, excluding his
years of service as judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC) of Quezon City for which he has already been given
retirement gratuity and pension.
The undisputed facts are as follows:

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1 Rollo, 31-41. Per Barcelona, R., J., with Demetria, D., and
GozoDadole, M., JJ., concurring.
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VOL. 345, NOVEMBER 22, 2000 555

Santos vs. Court of Appeals

On 18 January 1983, petitioner was appointed Judge of the

MeTC of Quezon City, and he thereafter assumed office.
After the military-backed EDSA revolt, petitioner was
reappointed to the same position.
On 1 April 1992, petitioner 2 optionally retired from the
Judiciary under R.A. No. 910, as amended, and received
his retirement gratuity under the law for his entire years
in the government service; and five years thereafter he has
been regularly receiving a monthly pension.
On 2 December 1993, petitioner re-entered the
government service. He was appointed Director III of the
Traffic Operation Center of the MMA. His appointment
was approved by the Civil Service Commission (CSC).
On 1 March 1995, Congress enacted R.A. No. 7924,
which reorganized the MMA and renamed it as
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA).
Section 11 thereof reads:

Section 11. Transitory Provisions.—To prevent disruption in the

delivery of basic urban services pending the full implementation
of the MMDA’s organizational structure and staffing pattern, all
officials and employees of the interim MMA shall continue to
exercise their duties and functions and receive their salaries and
allowances until they shall have been given notice of change of
duties and functions, and of being transferred to another office or
position.
...
The civil service laws, rules and regulations pertinent to the
displacement of personnel affected by this Act shall be strictly
enforced. The national government shall provide such amounts as
may be necessary to pay the benefits accruing to displaced
employees at the rate of one and one-fourth (1 1/4) month’s salary
for every year of service: Provided,That, if qualified for retirement
under existing retirement laws, said employees may opt to receive
the benefits thereunder.

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 2 Not R.A. No. 901 as stated in the challenged decision of the Court of
Appeals (Rollo, 31), or R.A. No. 601 as stated in Resolution No. 97-4266 of
the Civil Service Commission (Rollo, 50 and 52). R.A. No. 910, as
amended, was further amended by R.A. No. 5095 and P.D. No. 1438.

556

556 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Santos vs. Court of Appeals

On 16 May 1996, the President of the Philippines issued

Memorandum Order No. 372 approving the Rules and
Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 7924. Pursuant
thereto, the MMDA issued Resolution No. 16, series of
1996, which, inter alia, authorized the payment of
separation benefits to the officials and employees of the
former MMA who would be separated as a result of the
implementation of R.A. No. 7924.
On 30 August 1996, the MMDA issued a Memorandum
to petitioner informing him that in view of his “voluntary
option to be separated from the service” his services would
automatically cease effective at the close of office hours on
15 September 1996, and that he would be entitled to
“separation benefits equivalent to one and one-fourth (1
1/4) monthly salary for every year of service as provided
under Section 11 of the MMDA Law.”
In view of some doubt or confusion as to the extent of his
separation benefits, petitioner submitted a Position Paper
wherein he asserted that since the retirement gratuity he
received under R.A. No. 910, as amended, is not an
additional or double compensation, all the years of his
government service, including those years in the Judiciary,
should be credited in the computation of his separation
benefits under R.A. No. 7924. The Assistant Manager for
Finance of the MMDA referred the Position Paper to the
Regional Office of the CSC-NCR.
On 7 October 1996, Director IV Nelson Acebedo of the
CSC-NCR handed down an opinion that the payment of
petitioner’s separation pay must be in accordance with
Civil Service Resolution No. 92-063, pertinent portions of
which read:

[T]he payment of separation/[retirement] benefits cannot be

subject to the prohibition against the [sic] double compensation in
cases when officers and employees who were previously granted
said benefits are rehired or reemployed in another government
Agency or Office. Thus, there is no need for separated employees
to refund the separation/retirement benefits they received when
subsequently reemployed in another government agency or office.
. . . This being so, while an employee who was paid
separation/retirement benefits is not required to refund the same
once reemployed in the government service, as aforestated, for
reasons of equity however, it would be proper and logical that said
separation/retirement benefits should never-

557

VOL. 345, NOVEMBER 22, 2000 557

Santos vs. Court of Appeals

theless be deducted from the retirement/[separation] pay to be

received by the employee concerned. Moreover, in this instance,
the employee concerned has the option either to refund his
separation/retirement benefits and claim his gross
retirement/separation pay without any deduction corresponding
to his separation pay received, or not [to] refund his
separation/retirement pay but suffer a deduction of his
retirement/separation gratuity for the total amount representing
his previous separation/retirement pay received.

His motion for reconsideration having been denied,

petitioner elevated the opinion of Director Acebedo to the
CSC.
On 21 October 1997, the CSC promulgated Resolution
No. 974266 affirming the opinion of Director Acebedo and 3
dismissing petitioner’s appeal. Citing Chaves v. Mathay, it
held that petitioner cannot be paid retirement benefits
twice—one under R.A. No. 910, as amended, and another
under R.A. No. 7924—for the same services he rendered as
MeTC Judge. He can only exercise one of two options in the
computation of his separation pay under R.A. 7924. These
options are (1) to refund the gratuity he received under
R.A. No. 910, as amended, after he retired from the MeTC
and get the full separation pay for his entire years in the
government, that is 9 years and 2 months with the MeTC
plus two (2) years and eight (8) months for his services as
Director III in the defunct MMA, at the rate of one and one-
fourth salary for every year of service pursuant to MMDA
Memorandum dated 30 August 1996; or (2) to retain the
gratuity pay he received for his services as MeTC Judge
but an equivalent amount shall be deducted from the
separation benefits due from the former MMA for his entire
government service.
On 9 June 1998, the CSC promulgated Resolution No.
98-1422 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
Accordingly, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition to set aside these Resolutions.
On 19 August 1999, the Court of Appeals promulgated
its decision, now challenged in this case. It held that the
CSC was “correct

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3 37 SCRA 776 [1971].

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558 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Santos vs. Court of Appeals

in dismissing petitioner’s appeal from the opinion of

Director Acebedo.” It ratiocinated as follows:

There is no specific rule of law which applies to petitioner’s case.

Nevertheless, the Court finds it equitable to deny his claim for
payment of separation pay at the rate of one and one-fourth (1
1/4) month’s salary for every year of his service in government,
that is, inclusive of the number of years he served as Judge of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila [sic].
Petitioner already received and is continually receiving
gratuity for his years of service as a Metropolitan Trial Court
Judge. Equity dictates that he should no longer be allowed to
receive further gratuity for said years of service in the guise of
separation pay.
Suffice it to state that upon his retirement from his office as a
Judge, petitioner has already closed a chapter of his government
service. The State has already shown its gratitude for his services
when he was paid retirement benefits under Republic Act No. 901
[sic]. For that is what retirement benefits are for. Rewards [are]
given to an employee who has given up the best years of his life to
the service of his country (Gov’t. Service Insurance System v.
Civil Service Commission, 245 SCRA 179, 188).
 Now, the state again wishes to show its gratitude to petitioner
by awarding him separation pay for his services as a director of
the Metro Manila Authority (MMA), another chapter of
petitioner’s government service which has come to a close by the
reorganization of the MMA into the Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority.
The Court, in limiting the computation of petitioner’s
separation pay to the number of years of his service at the MMA,
merely is implementing the ruling in “Chavez, Sr. vs. Mathay” (37
SCRA 776), which ruling, if not actually in point, is nevertheless
applicable owing to its “common-sense consideration.” Said ruling
reads:

“The ‘common-sense consideration’ stated by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes for

the Court in Espejo, that if a retiree is being credited with his years of
service under his first retirement in computing his gratuity under his
second retirement, it is but just that the retirement gratuity received by
him under his first retirement should also be charged to his account,
manifestly govern the case at bar. It is but in accordance with the rule
consistently enunciated by the Court as in Anciano v. Otadoy,affirming
Borromeo, that claims for double retirement or pension such as
petitioner’s, ‘would run roughshod over the well-settled rule that in the
absence of an express legal excep

559

VOL. 345, NOVEMBER 22, 2000 559

Santos vs. Court of Appeals

tion, pension and gratuity laws should be so construed as to preclude any

person from receiving double pension.’ (p. 780, italics supplied)

The case at bench is not, strictly speaking, about ‘double

pension.’ It is, however, about the interpretation of a gratuity law,
viz., Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7924 which awards separation
pay to those government employees who were displaced by the
reorganization of the MMA into the MMDA, which should be
construed to preclude a government employee from receiving
double gratuity for the same years of service.

We affirm the assailed judgment. We agree with the Court

of Appeals and the Civil Service Commission that for the
purpose of computing or determining petitioner’s
separation pay under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7924, his years
of service in the Judiciary should be excluded and that his
separation pay should be solely confined to his services in
the MMA.
In the first place, the last paragraph of Section 11 of
R.A. No. 7924 on the grant of separation pay at the rate of
“one and onefourth (1 1/4) months of salary for every year
of service” cannot by any stretch of logic or imagination be
interpreted to refer to the total length of service of an MMA
employee in the government, i.e., to include such service in
the government outside the MMA. Since it allows the grant
of separation pay to employees who were to be displaced
thereby the separation pay can be based only on the length
of service in the MMA. The displacement amounted to an
abolition of the office or position of the displaced
employees, such as that of petitioner. The rule is settled
that Congress may abolish public offices. Such a power is a4
consequent prerogative of its power to create public offices.
However, the power to abolish is5 subject to the condition
that it be exercised in good faith. The separation partook
of the nature of a disturbance of compensation; hence, the
separation pay must relate only to the employment thus
affected.

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4 Manalang v. Quitoriano, 94 Phil. 903 [1954]; Rodriguez v. Montinola,

94 Phil. 964 [1954]; Castillo v. Pajo, 103 Phil. 515 [1958]; Ulep v.
Carbonell, 4 SCRA 375 [1962]; Llanto v. Dimaporo, 16 SCRA 599 [1966];
Canonizado v. Aguirre, G.R. No. 133132, 25 January 2000, 323 SCRA 312.
5 Cruz v. Primicias, 23 SCRA 998 [1968]; Canonizado v. Aguirre, supra.

560

560 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Santos vs. Court of Appeals

Second, petitioner himself must have realized that Section

11 does not allow the tacking in of his previous government
service. If he were convinced that it does he could have
instead applied for retirement benefits, since by adding his
years of service in the MMA to his previous years of service
in the Government he could have retired under the third
paragraph of Section 11, which pertinently reads:
Provided, That, if qualified for retirement under existing
retirement laws, said employee may opt to receive the benefits
thereunder.

Third, after the approval of his optional retirement on 1

April 1992, petitioner was fully paid of his retirement
gratuity under R.A. No. 910, as amended; and five years
thereafter he has been receiving a monthly pension.
The petitioner cannot take refuge under the second
paragraph of Section 8 of Article IX-B of the Constitution,
which provides:

Pensions or gratuities shall not be considered as additional,

double, or indirect compensation.

This provision simply means that a retiree receiving

pension or gratuity can continue to receive such pension or
gratuity even if he accepts another government
6
position to
which another compensation is attached.
Indeed, the retirement benefits which petitioner had
received or has been receiving under R.A. No. 910, as
amended, do not constitute double compensation. He could
continue receiving the same even if after his retirement he
had been receiving salary from the defunct MMA as
Director III thereof. This is but just because said
retirement benefits are rewards for his services as MeTC
Judge, while his salary was his compensation for his
services as Director III of the MMA.
However, to credit his years of service in the Judiciary
in the computation of his separation pay under R.A. No.
7924 notwithstanding the fact that he had received or has
been receiving the

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6 II JOAQUIN BERNAS, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC

OF THE PHILIPPINES (A Commentary) 341 (1988 ed.).

561

VOL. 345, NOVEMBER 22, 2000 561

Santos vs. Court of Appeals
retirement benefits under R.A. No. 910, as amended, would
be to countenance double compensation for exactly the
same services, i.e., his services as MeTC Judge. Such would
run counter to the policy of this Court against7 double
compensation for exactly the same services. More
important, it would be in violation of the first paragraph of
Section 8 of Article K-B of the Constitution, which
proscribes additional, double, or indirect compensation.
Said provision reads:

No elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive

additional, double, or indirect compensation, unless specifically
authorized by law. . . .

Section 11 of R.A. No. 7924 does not specifically authorize

payment of additional compensation for years of
government service outside of the MMA.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the
judgment appealed from, the petition in this case is
DENIED for want of merit, and the decision of 19 August
1999 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 48301 is
AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

          Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,

Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes,
Ynares-Santiago and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Petition denied, judgment affirmed.

Note.—The general proposition is that a public official

is not entitled to any compensation if he has not rendered
any service—as he works, he shall earn. (Bangalisan vs.
Court of Appeals, 276 SCRA 619 [1997])

——o0o——

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7 Espejo v. Auditor General, 97 Phil. 216 [1955]; Borromeo v. GSIS, 110

Phil. 1 [1960]; Anciano v. Otadoy, 27 SCRA 200 [1969]; Chavez v. Mathay,
supra note 3.

562
 562 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Biglang-awa vs. Bacalla

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