17-02 Republic Vs.

Sereno GR 237428, 11 May 2018

Republic of the Philippines Vs. Maria Lourdes Sereno G.R. No. 237428, 11 May 2018

Quo Warranto Case Against CJ Sereno

DIGEST: SUPREME COURT DECISION

The digest printed below was prepared by the Ateneo de Manila University School of Law.
Ponente: Associate Justice Noel Tijam

Facts:
The Republic of the Philippines, represented by Solicitor General Jose C. Calida, filed a Petition for the
issuance of the extraordinary writ of quo warranto to declare void Respondent Sereno’s appointment
as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court (SC) and to oust and altogether exclude her therefrom.

Respondent served as a member of the faculty of the UP College of Law (UP) from 1986 to 2006. She
also served as legal counsel for the Republic of the Philippines for several agencies from 1994 until
2009. On July 2010, Respondent submitted her application for the position of Associate Justice of the
SC.

Despite the span of 20 years of employment with UP from 1986 to 2006 and despite having been
employed as legal counsel of various government agencies from 2003 to 2009, records from the UP
Human Resources Development Office, Central Records Division of the Office of the Ombudsman, and
the Office of Recruitment Selection and Nomination (ORSN) of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) show
that the only Statements of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALN) available on record and filed by
Respondent were those for the years 1985, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, and
2002, or only 11 out of 25 SALNs that ought to have been filed. No SALNs were filed from 2003 to 2006
when she was employed as legal counsel for the Republic. Neither was a SALN filed when she resigned
from U.P. College of Law as of 1 June 2006 and when she supposedly re-entered government service
as of 16 August 2010.

Respondent was appointed Associate Justice in August 2010 by President Benigno Aquino III.

When the position for Chief Justice was declared vacant in 2012, the JBC announced the opening for
applications and nominations, requiring applicants to submit all previous SALNs up to 31 December
2011 (instead of the usual last two years of public service) and stating that, “applicants with
incomplete or out-of-date documentary requirements will not be interviewed or considered for
nomination.”

Respondent accepted several nominations for the position of Chief Justice, and submitted
requirements in support thereof.

On 20 July 2012, the JBC in a special meeting en banc deliberated on nominees with incomplete
documentary requirements. The minutes of the deliberation show that Respondent has not submitted
her SALNs for a period of ten years, from 1986 to 2006, the duration for which, according to Senator

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Escudero (ex officio member of the JBC), she was a professor in UP and was therefore required to
submit SALNs.

Apart from Respondent, several other candidates had incomplete documents such that the JBC En
Banc agreed to extend the deadline for submission. It also delegated to the Execom the determination
of whether or not the EXCERPTS: SUPREME COURT DECISION The excerpts printed below were
prepared by the Ateneo de Manila School of Law. 1 candidate has substantially complied, failure to do
so resulting in the exclusion from the list of candidates to be interviewed and considered for
nomination.

Pursuant to this, the OSRN required Respondent to submit her SALNs for the years 1995-1999, the
period within which she was employed by UP. Respondent replied through a letter that considering
that such government records in UP are more than 15 years old, “it is reasonable to consider it
infeasible to retrieve all those files.” She also assured OSRN that UP has cleared her of all
responsibilities, accountabilities, and administrative charges in 2006. Lastly, she emphasized that her
service in the government was not continuous, having had a break between 2006 (when her service in
UP ended) and 2010 (when she was appointed to the SC).

Such letter was not examined or deliberated upon by the JBC. Neither can the JBC Execom produce
minutes of the deliberations to consider the issue of substantial compliance with documentary
requirements. However, despite having submitted only three SALNs (2009-2011), the Report regarding
documentary requirements and SALNs of candidates shows that her name was annotated with
“COMPLETE REQUIREMENTS”, noting her letter that it was infeasible to retrieve all files. The same
annotation was found in another list regarding SALN submissions of 20 candidates, including
Respondent.

Respondent was appointed by President Benigno Aquino III on 25 August 2012. Five years later, an
impeachment complaint was filed by Atty. Larry Gadon with the House Committee of Justice. Included
in the complaint was the allegation that Respondent failed to make a truthful statement of her SALNs.
Such complaint filed in the House spawned a letter dated 21 February 2018 of Atty. Eligio Mallari to
the OSG requesting the latter to initiate a quo warranto proceeding against Respondent.

Case for the Petitioner:

The OSG (Petitioner) argues that quo warranto is an available remedy in questioning the validity of
Respondent’s appointment, and that the one-year bar rule does not apply against the State. It also
argues that the SC has jurisdiction over the petition. The petition alleges that the failure of
Respondent to submit her SALNs as required by the JBC disqualifies her, at the outset, from being a
candidate for the position of Chief Justice. Lacking the required number of SALNs, Respondent has not
proven her integrity, which is a requirement under the Constitution. The Republic thus concludes that
since Respondent is ineligible for the position of Chief Justice for lack of proven integrity, she has no
right to hold office and may therefore be ousted via quo warranto.

Case for the Respondent:

Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Chief Justice may only be ousted from office by
impeachment on the basis of the Constitution and a long line of jurisprudence. Alternatively, she

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argues that the present petition is time-barred, as it should have been filed within one year from the
cause of ouster, and not from the discovery of the disqualification.

It is likewise the contention of Respondent that public officers without pay or those who do not
receive compensation are not required to file a SALN. Thus, Respondent argues that for the years that
she was on official leave without pay, she was actually not required to file any SALN. She adds that to
require the submission of SALNs as an absolute requirement is to expand the qualifications provided
by the Constitution. Respondent urges the Court to apply in her favor the case of Concerned Taxpayer
v. Doblada, Jr., and deem as sufficient and acceptable her statement that she “maintains that she
consistently filed her SALNs.”

Respondent argues that the Court’s rationale in Doblada that one cannot readily conclude failure to
file SALNs simply because these documents are missing in the Office of the Court Administrator's files
should likewise be made applicable to her case.

In Respondent’s Reply, she also raised the issue of forum-shopping against Petitioner.

Motions for Inhibition:

Respondent filed motions for the inhibition of five Justices (Bersamin, Peralta, Jardeleza, Tijam, and
Leonardode Castro), imputing actual bias for having testified in the House Committee for Justice on
the impeachment complaint and on Justice Tijam for allegedly stating, in a Manila Times article, that
Respondent is in culpable violation of the Constitution if she continues to ignore the impeachment
process. She alleged that their testimonies show that they harbored personal resentment and ill
feelings towards her, and that she has already been pre-judged by some as having committed a
culpable violation of the Constitution for having failed to submit her SALNs, among others. She also
sought to disqualify Justice Martires for his insinuations during the Oral Arguments questioning her
mental and psychological fitness.

Issues:
A. Preliminary Issues

1. Whether the grant of the motions to intervene is proper.

2. Whether the grant of the motions for inhibition against the Associate Justices on the basis of actual
bias is proper.

B. Substantive Issues

1. Whether the Court can assume jurisdiction and give due course to the instant petition for quo
warranto against Respondent who is an impeachable officer and against whom an impeachment
complaint has already been filed with the House of Representatives;

2. Whether the petition is dismissible outright on the ground of prescription;

3. Whether Respondent is eligible for the position of Chief Justice:

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 a. Whether the determination of a candidate’s eligibility for nomination is the sole and
exclusive function of the JBC, and whether such determination partakes of the character of a
political question outside the Court’s supervisory and review powers;

b. Whether Respondent failed to file her SALNs as mandated by the Constitution and required
by the law and its implementing rules and regulations; and if so, whether the failure to file
SALNs voids the nomination and appointment of Respondent as Chief Justice;

c. Whether Respondent failed to comply with the submission of SALNs as required by the JBC;
and if so, whether the failure to submit SALNs to the JBC voids the nomination and
appointment of Respondent as Chief Justice; and

d. In case of a finding that Respondent is ineligible to hold the position of Chief Justice,
whether the subsequent nomination by the JBC and the appointment by the President cured
such ineligibility.

4. Whether Respondent is a de jure or de facto officer.

Three (3) Ruling on the Preliminary Issues:

1. Motions for Intervention

The Court noted the IBP’s intervention and resolved to deny the motions for intervention filed
by several other groups. It observed that intervention is not a matter of right but of sound
judicial discretion; that movantintervenors have no legal interest in the case, as required in
order to qualify a person to intervene; and that the remedy of quo warranto is vested in the
people, and not in a particular group. Lastly, such individuals do not claim a right to the
questioned position, which is the only time when an individual himself/herself may
commence an action for quo warranto. In this case, the movants-intervenors are neither
individuals claiming to be entitled to the questioned position nor are they the ones charged
with the usurpation thereof.

2. Motions for Inhibition

There is no basis for the Associate Justices to inhibit. Movant must prove bias and prejudice
by clear and convincing evidence to disqualify a judge. Justice Tijam’s statement, taken as a
whole, was only to prod the Respondent to observe and respect the constitutional process of
impeachment. It does not appear that there are grounds for compulsory inhibition. As to
voluntary inhibition, the mere fact that some of the Associate Justices participated in the
hearings of the Committee on Justice determining probable cause for the impeachment of
Respondent does not disqualify them to hear the instant petition. Their appearance was in
deference to the House of Representatives whose constitutional duty to investigate the
impeachment complaint filed against Respondent could not be doubted. Their appearance
was with the prior consent of the Supreme Court En Banc and they faithfully observed the
parameters that the Court set for the purpose. Their statements in the hearing should be
carefully viewed within this context, and should not be hastily interpreted as an adverse
attack against Respondent.

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Ruling on the Substantive

Issues:

1. Whether the Court can assume jurisdiction and give due course to the instant petition for quo
warranto against Respondent who is an impeachable officer and against whom an impeachment
complaint has already been filed with the House of Representatives. YES .

a. SC has original jurisdiction over an action for quo warranto. Section 5, Article VIII of the
Constitution states that the SC has original jurisdiction over petitions for quo warranto.
This jurisdiction is concurrent with the Court of Appeals (CA) and the Regional Trial Court
(RTC). Section 7, Rule 66 of Rules of Court provides that the venue for an action for quo
warranto is in the RTC of Manila, CA, or SC when commenced by the Solicitor General.

While the hierarchy of courts serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum
for petitions for the extraordinary writs, a direct invocation of the SC’s original jurisdiction
in this case is justified considering that the qualification of a Member of the Court is in
question, and the issue is of public concern.

The petition for quo warranto is of transcendental importance. The instant petition is one
of first impression and of paramount importance to the public in the sense that the
qualification, eligibility and appointment of an incumbent Chief Justice, the highest official
of the Judiciary, are being scrutinized through an action for quo warranto.

b. On the argument that Respondent is an impeachable officer such that a quo warranto
petition cannot prosper, the Court held that the origin, nature and purpose of
impeachment and quo warranto are materially different. While both impeachment and
quo warranto may result in the ouster of the public 4 official, the two proceedings
materially differ. At its most basic, impeachment proceedings are political in nature; while
an action for quo warranto is judicial or a proceeding traditionally lodged in the courts.

Furthermore, there is no forum-shopping, as alleged by the Respondent, because quo

warranto and impeachment can proceed independently and simultaneously, as they differ
as to
(1) jurisdiction
(2) grounds,
(3) applicable rules pertaining to initiation, filing and dismissal, and
(4) limitations.

The causes of action in the two proceedings are unequivocally different. In quo warranto,
the cause of action lies on the usurping, intruding, or unlawfully holding or exercising of a
public office, while in impeachment, it is the commission of an impeachable offense.
Likewise, the reliefs sought in the two proceedings are different. Respondent in a quo
warranto proceeding shall be ordered to cease holding a public office, which he/she is
ineligible to hold. On the other hand, in impeachment, a conviction shall result in the
removal of the Respondent from the public office that he/she is legally holding.

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 Furthermore, the impeachment case is yet to be initiated by the filing of the Articles of
Impeachment before the Senate. Thus, at the moment, there is no pending impeachment
case against the Respondent. The proceedings in the House are merely in the nature of a
preliminary investigation whereby probable cause is sought to be determined.

c. Impeachment is not an exclusive remedy by which an invalidly appointed or invalidly

elected impeachable official may be removed from office. Even the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal (PET) Rules expressly provide for the remedy of either an election protest or a
petition for quo warranto to question the eligibility of the President and the Vice-
President, both of whom are impeachable officers. In fact, this would not be the first time
the Court shall take cognizance of a quo warranto petition against an impeachable officer
(see cases of Estrada v. Desierto, et al. and Estrada v. MacapagalArroyo where SC took
cognizance of a quo warranto petition against former President MacapagalArroyo
considering whether former President Estrada’s act of resignation ended his official status
as President).

Furthermore, the language of Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution does not foreclose a
quo warranto action against impeachable officers: “[T]he Members of the Supreme Court,
the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed
from office ...” The provision uses the permissive term “may” which, in statutory
construction, denotes discretion and cannot be construed as having a mandatory effect.
An option to remove by impeachment admits of an alternative mode of effecting the
removal.

That the enumeration of “impeachable offenses” is made absolute such that only those
enumerated offenses are treated as grounds for impeachment does not mean that it is to
be taken as a complete statement of the causes of removal from office. The word “may”
cannot also be understood to qualify only the imposable penalties because it would lead
to the conclusion that other lesser penalties may be imposed — a situation not
contemplated in the language of the Constitutional provision.

The courts should be able to inquire into the validity of appointments even of
impeachable officers. To hold otherwise is to allow an absurd situation where the
appointment of an impeachable officer cannot be questioned, on the basis of citizenship
or membership in the Bar, for example. Unless such an officer commits any of the grounds
for impeachment and is actually impeached, he can continue discharging the functions of
his office even when he is clearly disqualified from holding it. Such would result in
permitting unqualified and ineligible public officials to continue occupying key positions,
exercising sensitive sovereign functions until they are successfully removed from office
through impeachment.

d. The Supreme Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction over a quo warranto petition is not
violative of the doctrine of separation of powers. At the outset, an action for quo
warranto does not try a person’s culpability of an impeachment offense, neither does a
writ of quo warranto conclusively pronounce 5 such culpability. The Court’s exercise of its
jurisdiction over quo warranto proceedings does not preclude the House of
Representatives from enforcing its own prerogative of determining probable cause for

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 impeachment, to craft and transmit the Articles of Impeachment, nor will it preclude the
Senate from exercising its constitutionally committed power of impeachment.

In this case, it is incidental that the non-filing of SALNs also formed part of the allegations
in the Articles of Impeachment, which in itself is a Constitutional requirement, the
violation of which constitutes culpable violation of the Constitution. But unlike other
impeachable officers, Respondent’s position also demands compliance with the
qualifications of having to be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and
independence — and the failure to submit SALNs goes into the very qualification of
integrity.

For the guidance of the bench and the bar, and to obviate confusion in the future as to
when quo warranto as a remedy to oust an ineligible public official may be availed of, and
in keeping with the Court’s function of harmonizing the laws and the rules with the
Constitution, the Court herein demarcates that an act or omission committed prior to or at
the time of appointment or election relating to an official’s qualifications to hold office as
to render such appointment or election invalid is properly the subject of a quo warranto
petition, provided that the requisites for the commencement thereof are present. On the
contrary, acts or omissions, even if it relates to the qualification of integrity, being a
continuing requirement but nonetheless committed during the incumbency of a validly
appointed and/or validly elected official, cannot be the subject of a quo warranto
proceeding, but of something else, which may either be impeachment if the public official
concerned is impeachable and the act or omission constitutes an impeachable offense, or
disciplinary, administrative or criminal action, if otherwise.

e. The exercise of judicial restraint on the ground that the Senate, sitting as an impeachment
court, has the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment, is thus misplaced.
An outright dismissal of the petition based on speculation that Respondent will eventually
be tried on impeachment is a clear abdication of the Court’s duty to settle an actual
controversy squarely presented before it. There is also no possibility of a constitutional
crisis upon which an abdication of such duty is to be premised because, as discussed, it is
within the Court’s judicial power to settle justiciable issues or actual controversies
involving rights, which are legally demandable and enforceable. It is not arrogating upon
itself the power to impeach, which is a political exercise.

f. Seeking affirmative relief from the Court is tantamount to voluntary appearance.

Respondent cannot now be heard to deny the Court’s jurisdiction over her person even as
she claims to be an impeachable official because Respondent in fact invoked and sought
affirmative relief from the Court by praying for the inhibition of several Members of this
Court and by moving that the case be heard on Oral Arguments, albeit ad cautelam.

2. Whether the petition is dismissible outright on the ground of prescription. NO a.

a. Prescription does not lie against the State. The one-year limitation is not applicable when
the Petitioner is not a mere private individual pursuing a private interest, but the
government itself seeking relief for a public wrong and suing for public interest. In the
three instances enumerated by Rules of Court, the Solicitor General is mandated under

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 the Rules to commence the necessary quo warranto petition, as seen in the use of the
word “must.” In Agcaoili v. Suguitan, “As a general principle it may be stated that ordinary
statutes of limitation, civil or penal, have no application to quo warranto proceeding
brought to enforce a public right.” In effect, when the government is the real party in
interest, and is proceeding mainly to assert its rights, there can be no defense on the
ground of laches or prescription. Indubitably, the basic principle that “prescription does
not lie against the State” which finds textual basis under Article 1108 (4) of the Civil Code,
applies in this case.

b. Circumstances obtaining in this case preclude the application of the prescriptive period.
That prescription does not lie in this case can also be deduced from the very purpose of an
action for quo warranto, which is to prevent a continuing exercise of an authority
unlawfully asserted. The Republic, then, cannot be faulted for questioning Respondent’s
qualification for office only upon discovery of the cause of ouster. Respondent cleverly hid
the fact of non-filing by stating that she should not be required to submit the said
documents as she was considered to be coming from private practice; that it was not
feasible to retrieve most of her records in the academe considering that the same are
more than fifteen years old; and that U.P. already cleared her of “all
academic/administrative responsibilities, money and property accountabilities and from
administrative charges”. She has never been clear on whether she had filed the required
SALNs or not. Given the foregoing, there can be no acquiescence or inaction, in this case,
on the part of the Republic as would amount to an abandonment of its right to seek
redress against a public wrong and vindicate public interest.

Lastly, the Court finds it more important to rule on the merits of the novel issues imbued
with public interest presented before Us than to dismiss the case outright merely on
technicality.

3. Whether Respondent is eligible for the position of Chief Justice. NO

a. Whether the determination of a candidate’s eligibility for nomination is the sole and
exclusive function of the JBC and whether such determination partakes of the character of
a political question outside the Court’s supervisory and review powers. NO

The Court’s supervisory authority over the JBC includes ensuring that the JBC complies
with its own rules. In interpreting the power of the Court vis-a-vis the power of the JBC, it
is consistently held that the Court’s supervisory power consists of seeing to it that the JBC
complies with its own rules and procedures. Furthermore, while a certain leeway must be
given to the JBC in screening aspiring magistrates, the same does not give it an unbridled
discretion to ignore Constitutional and legal requirements. The question of whether or not
a nominee possesses the requisite qualifications is determined based on facts and
therefore does not depend on, nor call for, the exercise of discretion on the part of the
nominating body. Proceeding from this, qualifications under the Constitution cannot be
waived or bargained away by the JBC — one such qualification is the requirement of
possession of proven integrity required not only in the Constitution, but also mentioned in
administrative cases, in the Canons of the New Code of Judicial Conduct as a continuing
requirement, the Code of Professional Integrity, and in the JBC009 Rules.

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b. Whether Respondent failed to file her SALNs as mandated by the Constitution and
required by the law and its implementing rules and regulations; and if so, whether the
failure to file SALNs voids the nomination and appointment of Respondent as Chief
Justice. YES

i. Compliance with the Constitutional and statutory requirement of filing of SALN

intimately relates to a person’s integrity. Contrary to Respondent’s postulation
that the filing of SALN bears no relation to the requirement of integrity, the filing
of SALN itself is a Constitutional and statutory requirement, under Section 17,
Article XI of the Constitution, R.A. No. 3019, and the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees. Faithful compliance with the
requirement of the filing of SALN is rendered even more exacting when the public
official concerned is a member of the Judiciary.

ii. Compliance with the SALN requirement indubitably reflects on a person’s

integrity. To be of proven integrity, as required by qualifications under the
Constitution, means that the applicant must have established a steadfast
adherence to moral and ethical principles. In this line, failure to file the SALN is
clearly a violation of the law. The offense is penal in character and is a clear
breach of the ethical standards set for public officials and employees. It disregards
the requirement of transparency as a deterrent to graft and corruption. For these
reasons, a public official who has failed to comply with the requirement of filing
the SALN cannot be said to be of proven integrity and the Court may consider
him/her disqualified from holding public office. Respondent’s argument that
failure to file SALN does not negate integrity does not persuade. Whether or not
Respondent accumulated unexplained wealth is not in issue at this time, but
whether she, in the first place, complied with the mandatory requirement of filing
of SALNs.

iii. Respondent chronically failed to file her SALNs and thus violated the Constitution,
the law and the Code of Judicial Conduct. A member of the Judiciary who commits
such violations cannot be deemed to be a person of proven integrity. Respondent
could have easily dispelled doubts as to the filing or non-filing of the unaccounted
SALNs by presenting them before the Court. Yet, Respondent opted to withhold
such information or such evidence, if at all, for no clear reason. Her defenses do
not lie: 1) The Doblada doctrine does not persuade because in that case Doblada
was able to present contrary proof that the missing SALNs were, in fact,
transmitted to the OCA, thus rendering inaccurate the OCA report that she did not
file SALNs for a number of years, as opposed to the present case where no proof
of existence and filing were presented; 2) Being on leave from government service
is not equivalent to separation from service such that she was still required to
submit SALNs during her leave; 3) While Respondent is not required by law to
keep a record of her SALNs, logic dictates that she should have obtained a
certification to attest to the fact of filing; 4) That UP HRDO never asked
Respondent to comply with the SALN laws holds no water as the duty to comply
with such is incumbent with the Respondent, and because there was no duty for

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 the UP HRDO to order compliance under the rules implemented at that time; 5)
That Respondent’s compliance with the SALN requirement was reflected in the
matrix of requirements and shortlist prepared by the JBC is dispelled by the fact
that the appointment goes into her qualifications which were mistakenly believed
to be present, and that she should have been disqualified at the outset.

iv. Respondent failed to properly and promptly file her SALNs, again in violation of
the Constitutional and statutory requirements. The SALNs filed by Respondent
covering her years of government service in U.P. appear to have been executed
and filed under suspicious circumstances; her SALNs filed with the UPHRDO were
either belatedly filed or belatedly notarized, while SALNs filed as Chief Justice
were also attended by irregularities. This puts in question the truthfulness of such
SALNs, and would amount to dishonesty if attended by malicious intent to conceal
the truth or to make false statements.

c. Whether Respondent failed to comply with the submission of SALNs as required by the
JBC; and if so, whether the failure to submit SALNs to the JBC voids the nomination and
appointment of Respondent as Chief Justice. YES

i. The JBC required the submission of at least ten SALNs from those applicants who are
incumbent Associate Justices, absent which, the applicant ought not to have been
interviewed, much less been considered for nomination. The established and
undisputed fact is Respondent failed to submit the required number of SALNs in
violation of the rules set by the JBC itself during the process of nomination. The JBC
determined that she did not submit her SALNs from 1986 to 2006 and that, as
remarked by Senator Escudero, the filing thereof during those years was already
required. There was no indication that the JBC deemed the three SALNs (for the years
2009, 2010 and 2011) submitted by Respondent for her 20 years as a professor in the
U.P. College of Law and two years as Justice, as substantial compliance. Respondent
was specifically singled out from the rest of the applicants for having failed to submit
a single piece of SALN for her years of service in the U.P. College of Law.

In the end, it appears that the JBC En Banc decided to require only the submission of
the past ten (10) SALNs, or from 2001-2011, for applicants to the Chief Justice position.
It is clear that the JBC En Banc did not do away with the requirement of submission of
SALNs, only that substantial compliance therewith, i.e., the submission of the SALNs
for the immediately preceding 10 years instead of all SALNs, was deemed sufficient.
Records clearly show that the only remaining applicant-incumbent Justice who was
not determined by the JBC En Banc to have substantially complied was Respondent,
who submitted only three SALNs, i.e., 2009, 2010 and 2011, even after extensions of
the deadline for the submission to do so. Her justifications do not persuade. Contrary
to her argument that the SALNs are old and are infeasible to retrieve, the Republic
was able to retrieve some of the SALNs dating back to 1985.

Furthermore, Respondent sought special treatment as having complied with the

submission of the SALN by submitting a Certificate of Clearance issued by the U.P.
HRDO. This clearance, however, hardly suffice as a substitute for SALNs.

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 Respondent curiously failed to mention that she, in fact, did not file several SALNs
during the course of her employment in U.P. Such failure to disclose a material fact
and the concealment thereof from the JBC betrays any claim of integrity especially
from a Member of the Supreme Court.

For these reasons, the JBC should no longer have considered Respondent for interview
as it already required the submission of, at least, the SALNs corresponding to the
immediately preceding 10 years up to December 31, 2011.

ii. Respondent’s failure to submit to the JBC her SALNs for several years means that her
integrity was not established at the time of her application. Contrary to Respondent’s
argument that failure to submit her SALNs to the JBC is not cause for disqualification,
the requirement to submit the SALNs, along with the waiver of bank deposits, is not
an empty requirement that may easily be dispensed with, but was placed by the JBC
itself for a reason — in order to allow the JBC to carry on its mandate of
recommending only applicants of high standards and who would be unsusceptible to
impeachment attacks due to inaccuracies in SALNs. Without 9 submission of such
requirement, the JBC and the public are without opportunity to measure the
candidate’s fitness or propensity to commit corruption or dishonesty. Respondent’s
failure to submit her SALNs to the JBC means that she was not able to prove her
integrity at the time of her application as Chief Justice.
d. Whether the subsequent nomination by the JBC and the appointment by the President
cured such ineligibility.

i. Respondent’s ineligibility for lack of proven integrity cannot be cured by her nomination
and subsequent appointment as Chief Justice. As the qualification of proven integrity
goes into the barest standards set forth under the Constitution to qualify as a Member
of the Court, the subsequent nomination and appointment to the position will not
qualify an otherwise excluded candidate. In other words, the inclusion of Respondent in
the shortlist of nominees submitted to the President cannot override the minimum
Constitutional qualifications.

The Court has ample jurisdiction to void the JBC nomination without the necessity of
impleading the JBC as the Court can take judicial notice of the explanations from the JBC
members and the Office of the Executive Officer (OEO), as regards the circumstances
relative to the selection and nomination of Respondent submitted to this Court. Neither
will the President’s act of appointment cause to qualify Respondent. The action of the
JBC, particularly that of the Secretary of Justice as ex-officio member, is reflective of the
action of the President. Such as when the JBC mistakenly or wrongfully accepted and
nominated Respondent, the President, through his alter egos in the JBC, commits the
same mistake and the President’s subsequent act of appointing Respondent cannot
have any curative effect.

While the Court surrenders discretionary appointing power to the President, the
exercise of such discretion is subject to the non-negotiable requirements that the

Page 11 of 15 17-02 Republic Vs. Sereno GR 237428, 11 May 2018

 appointee is qualified and all other legal requirements are satisfied, in the absence of
which, the appointment is susceptible to attack.

ii. The Court also took into account, while conceding that the petition is not an
administrative case nor an inquiry into tax evasion against her, that Respondent’s
disposition to commit deliberate acts and omissions demonstrating dishonesty and lack
of forthrightness are discordant with any claim of integrity. In addition to the suspicious
and highly questionable circumstances surrounding the execution of her SALNs, the
following untruthful statements and dishonest acts ultimately negate Respondent's
claim that she is a person of proven integrity:

a. She engaged in private practice even if she had no permit from U.P. to do so while
she was in government service.

b. She represented that after her resignation from U.P. in 2006, she was engaged, full
time, in private practice. However, in her Personal Data Sheet (PDS), it was stated
that she was engaged as counsel by the government in the PIATCO cases from
1994 up to 2009.

c. She claims that it is the ministerial duty of the Head of the Office to ensure that
the SALNs of its personnel are properly filed and 10 accomplished. However, U.P.
HRDO could not have been expected to perform its ministerial duty of issuing
compliance orders to Respondent because such rule was not yet in existence at
that time.

d. Her PDS shows that she was Deputy Commissioner of the Commission on Human
Rights only later to be disclaimed by her during the Oral Argument stating that it
was only a functional title.

e. In her Letter dated July 23, 2012 to the JBC, respondent represented that her
SALNs were infeasible to retrieve when the SALNs that she selectively filed were
available all along in U.P. and in fact the OSG was able to get copies of the same.

f. In the Letter, the Respondent reasoned that it is "infeasible to retrieve" all her
SALNs because of the age of said documents, i.e., that they are more than fifteen
years old. However, during her Oral Arguments, she explained that it was
"infeasible" to retrieve them only because of time constraints.

g. She claims that the other candidates for the Chief Justice position did not comply
with the SALN requirement for the application, when it was only she who did not
comply.

h. She committed tax fraud when she failed to truthfully declare her income in her
income tax returns for the years 2007-2009 and in her value-added tax (VAT)
returns for the years 2005-2009.

Page 12 of 15 17-02 Republic Vs. Sereno GR 237428, 11 May 2018

iii. Further, Respondent's disposition and propensity to commit dishonesty and lack of
candidness are manifested through her subsequent acts committed during her
incumbency as Chief Justice, which are now matters of public record and also
determined to be constituting probable cause for impeachment:

a. Caused the procurement of a brand-new Toyota Land Cruiser worth at least

Php5,000,000.00;

b. Caused the hiring of Ms. Helen Macasaet without the requisite public bidding and
who received excessive compensation amounting to more than Php
11,000,000.00;

c. Misused at least Php3,000,000.00 of government funds for hotel accommodation

at Shangri-La Boracay as the venue of the 3rd ASEAN Chief Justices meeting;

d. Created the Judiciary Decentralized Office (JDO) in the guise of reopening the
Regional Court Administration Office (RCAO) without being sanctioned by the
Court En Banc;

e. Issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) in Coalition of Associations of Senior

Citizens in the Philippines v. COMELEC contrary to the Supreme Court's internal
rules misrepresented that the TRO was issued upon the recommendation of the
Member-incharge;

f. Manipulated the disposition of the DOJ request to transfer the venue of the
Maute cases outside of Mindanao;

g. Ignored rulings of the Supreme Court with respect to the grant of survivorship
benefits which caused undue delay to the release of survivorship benefits to
spouses of deceased judges and Justices;

h. Appointed Geraldine Econg as Head of the JDO and Brenda Jay Angeles-Mendoza
as Chief of the Philippine Mediation Center Office (PMCO) without the approval of
the Court En Banc;

i. Failed and refused to appoint qualified applicants to several high-ranking positions

in the Supreme Court;

j. Ordered the dissemination of erroneous information on what transpired during

the Supreme Court En Banc deliberations in A.M. No. 16-08-04-SC on the alleged
involvement of four (4) incumbent judges in illegal drugs and undermined the co-
equal power of the Executive Department by ordering the Executive Secretary
himself to file cases against the judges;

k. Manipulated the processes of the JBC to exclude then Solicitor General, now
Associate Justice Francis Jardeleza, by using highly confidential document
involving national security against the latter;
Page 13 of 15 17-02 Republic Vs. Sereno GR 237428, 11 May 2018
 l. Clustered the nominees for the six (6) vacant positions of Associate Justice in the
Sandiganbayan without legal basis and in so doing, impaired the power of the
President to appoint members of the Judiciary;

m. Misrepresented to the members of the Supreme Court En Banc that there were
Justices who requested to do away with the voting of recommended applicants to
the vacant positions in the Supreme Court;

n. Manipulated the processes .of the JBC to exclude Court of Appeals Associate
Justice Fernanda Lampas-Peralta from the shortlist of nominees for the position of
Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals;

o. Interfered with the investigation conducted by the House of Representatives on

the alleged misuse of the tobacco funds in the Province ofllocos Norte by
unilaterally preparing a Joint Statement, asking the House of Representatives to
reconsider its show cause order against the Justices of the Court of Appeals, and
then pressuring then Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals, now Associate
Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. to likewise sign the same; and

p. Undermined and disrespected the impeachment proceedings conducted by the

House of Representatives against her.

4. Whether Respondent is a de jure or de facto officer. DE FACTO

The effect of a finding that a person appointed to an office is ineligible therefor is that his
presumably valid appointment will give him color of title that confers on him the status of a
de facto officer. For lack of a Constitutional qualification, Respondent is ineligible to hold the
position of Chief Justice and is merely holding a colorable right or title thereto. As such,
Respondent has never attained the status of an impeachable official and her removal from the
office, other than by impeachment, is justified. The remedy, therefore, of a quo warranto at
the instance of the State is proper to oust Respondent from the appointive position of Chief
Justice.

Upon a finding that Respondent is in fact ineligible to hold the position of Chief Justice and is
therefore unlawfully holding and exercising such public office, the consequent judgment
under Section 9, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court is the ouster and exclusion of Respondent from
holding and exercising the rights, functions and duties of the Office of the Chief Justice.

Blatant Disregard and Open Defiance of the Sub Judice Rule:

The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to judicial proceedings in
order to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of
justice.

It is thus perturbing that certain officials of the separate branches of the Government and
even men and women learned in law had succumbed to the tempting affray that tends to
Page 14 of 15 17-02 Republic Vs. Sereno GR 237428, 11 May 2018
divert the instant quo warranto action from its primary purpose. Even worse, Respondent and
her spokespersons chose to litigate Respondent's case, apart from her Ad Cautelam
submissions to the Court, before several media-covered engagements. Through her
actuations, Respondent appears to have forgotten that this is a court action for quo warranto,
and as such, the concomitant rule on sub judice applies.

Such actions, indeed, resulted in the obfuscation of the issues on hand, camouflaging the
charges against her with assaults to judicial independence, and falsely conditioning the
public's mind that this is a fight for democracy. Once and for all, it should be stated that this is
not a fight for democracy nor for judicial independence. This is an undertaking of the Court's
duty, as it is called for by the Republic, to judicially determine and settle the uncertainty in the
qualification, or otherwise, of Respondent to occupy the highest position in the Judiciary.

Fallo:

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Quo warranto is GRANTED. Respondent Maria Lourdes P.A.
Sereno is found DISQUALIFIED from and is hereby adjudged GUILTY of UNLAWFULLY HOLDING
and EXERCISING the OFFICE OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE. Accordingly, Respondent Maria Lourdes P.
A. Sereno is OUSTED and EXCLUDED therefrom.

The position of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is declared vacant and the Judicial and
Bar Council is directed to commence the application and nomination process.

This Decision is immediately executory without need of further action from the Court.

Respondent Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno is ordered to SHOW CAUSE within ten (10) days from
receipt hereof why she should not be sanctioned for violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the Code of Judicial Conduct for transgressing the sub judice rule and for
casting aspersions and ill motives to the Members of the Supreme Court.

Page 15 of 15 17-02 Republic Vs. Sereno GR 237428, 11 May 2018