Rochi vs. Department of Energy

8/23/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 527
696 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Gerochi vs. Department of Energy
*
G.R. No. 159796. July 17, 2007.
ROMEO P. GEROCHI, KATULONG NG BAYAN (KB) and

ENVIRONMENTALIST CONSUMERS NETWORK, INC.
(ECN), petitioners, vs. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
(DOE), ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION (ERC),
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION (NPC), POWER
SECTOR ASSETS AND LIABILITIES MANAGEMENT
GROUP (PSALM Corp.), STRATEGIC POWER UTILITIES
GROUP (SPUG), and PANAY ELECTRIC COMPANY INC.
(PECO), respondents.
Courts; Judicial Review; Hierarchy of Courts; Petitioners

violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts when they filed this
“Complaint” directly with the Supreme Court—the Court’s
jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus,
quo warranto, and habeas corpus, while concurrent with that of
the regional trial courts and the Court of Appeals, does not give
litigants unrestrained freedom of choice of forum from which to
seek such relief.—Petitioners filed before us an original action
particularly denominated as a Complaint assailing the
constitutionality of Sec. 34 of the EPIRA imposing the Universal
Charge and Rule 18 of the EPIRA’s IRR. No doubt, petitioners
have locus standi. They impugn the constitutionality of Sec. 34 of
the EPIRA because they sustained a direct injury as a result of
the imposition of the Universal Charge as reflected in their
electric bills. However, petitioners violated the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts when they filed this “Complaint” directly with
us. Furthermore, the Complaint is bereft of any allegation of
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the ERC or any of the
public respondents, in order for the Court to consider it as a
petition for certiorari or prohibition. But this Court’s jurisdiction
to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,
and habeas corpus, while concurrent with that of the regional
trial courts and the Court of Appeals, does not give litigants
unrestrained freedom of choice of forum from which to seek such
relief. It has long been established that this Court will not
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016cbf051277e0c06dcd003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/32
entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be

obtained in the appropriate courts, or where
_______________
* EN BANC.
697
VOL. 527, JULY 17, 2007 697
exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a

remedy within and call for the exercise of our primary
jurisdiction. This circumstance alone warrants the outright
dismissal of the present action.
Police Power; Taxation; Police power is the power of the state
to promote public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of
liberty and property—it is the most pervasive, the least limitable,
and the most demanding of the three fundamental powers of the
State and the justification is found in the Latin maxims salus
populi est suprema lex (the welfare of the people is the supreme
law) and sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (so use your property
as not to injure the property of others); The theory behind the
exercise of the power to tax emanates from necessity, without taxes,
government cannot fulfill its mandate of promoting the general
welfare and well-being of the people; That the power to “regulate”
means the power to protect, foster, promote, preserve, and control,
with due regard for the interests, first and foremost, of the public,
then of the utility and of its patrons.—The power to tax is an
incident of sovereignty and is unlimited in its range,
acknowledging in its very nature no limits, so that security
against its abuse is to be found only in the responsibility of the
legislature which imposes the tax on the constituency that is to
pay it. It is based on the principle that taxes are the lifeblood of
the government, and their prompt and certain availability is an
imperious need. Thus, the theory behind the exercise of the power
to tax emanates from necessity; without taxes, government cannot
fulfill its mandate of promoting the general welfare and well-
being of the people. On the other hand, police power is the power
of the state to promote public welfare by restraining and
regulating the use of liberty and property. It is the most
pervasive, the least limitable, and the most demanding of the
three fundamental powers of the State. The justification is found
in the Latin maxims salus populi est suprema lex (the welfare of
the people is the supreme law) and sic utere tuo ut alienum non
laedas (so use your property as not to injure the property of
others). As an inherent attribute of sovereignty which virtually
extends to all public needs, police power grants a wide panoply of
instruments through which the State, as parens patriae, gives
effect to a host of its regulatory powers. We have held that the
power to “regulate” means the power to protect, foster, promote,
preserve, and control, with due regard for the interests, first and
foremost, of the public, then of the utility and of its patrons.
698
Same; Same; Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001

(EPIRA); If generation of revenue is the primary purpose and
regulation is merely incidental, the imposition is a tax; but if
regulation is the primary purpose, the fact that revenue is
incidentally raised does not make the imposition a tax; In exacting
the assailed Universal Charge through Sec. 34 of the Electric
Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA), the State’s police
power, particularly its regulatory dimension, is invoked.—The
conservative and pivotal distinction between these two powers
rests in the purpose for which the charge is made. If generation of
revenue is the primary purpose and regulation is merely
incidental, the imposition is a tax; but if regulation is the primary
purpose, the fact that revenue is incidentally raised does not
make the imposition a tax. In exacting the assailed Universal
Charge through Sec. 34 of the EPIRA, the State’s police power,
particularly its regulatory dimension, is invoked. Such can be
deduced from Sec. 34 which enumerates the purposes for which
the Universal Charge is imposed and which can be amply
discerned as regulatory in character.
Same; Same; Same; It is a well-established doctrine that the
taxing power may be used as an implement of police power.—It is
a well-established doctrine that the taxing power may be used as
an implement of police power. In Valmonte v. Energy Regulatory
Board, et al., 162 SCRA 521 (1988), and in Gaston v. Republic
Planters Bank, 158 SCRA 626 (1988), this Court held that the Oil
Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) and the Sugar Stabilization
Fund (SSF) were exactions made in the exercise of the police
power. The doctrine was reiterated in Osmeña v. Orbos, 220
SCRA 703 (1993), with respect to the OPSF. Thus, we disagree
with petitioners that the instant case is different from the
aforementioned cases. With the Universal Charge, a Special Trust

Fund (STF) is also created under the administration of PSALM.
Delegation of Powers; Separation of Powers; A logical
corollary to the doctrine of separation of powers is the principle of
nondelegation of powers, as expressed in the Latin maxim potestas
delegata non delegari potest (what has been delegated cannot be
delegated).—The principle of separation of powers ordains that
each of the three branches of government has exclusive
cognizance of and is supreme in matters falling within its own
constitutionally allocated sphere. A logical corollary to the
doctrine of separation of powers is
699
VOL. 527, JULY 17, 2007 699
the principle of non-delegation of powers, as expressed in the

Latin maxim potestas delegata non delegari potest (what has been
delegated cannot be delegated). This is based on the ethical
principle that such delegated power constitutes not only a right
but a duty to be performed by the delegate through the
instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the
intervening mind of another.
Same; Subordinate Legislation; Completeness Test and
Sufficient Standard Test; Given the volume and variety of
interactions in today’s society, it is doubtful if the legislature can
promulgate laws that will deal adequately with and respond
promptly to the minutiae of everyday life, hence, the need to
delegate to administrative bodies the authority to promulgate rules
and regulations to implement a given statute and effectuate its
policies; All that is required for the valid exercise of this power of
subordinate legislation is that the regulation be germane to the
objects and purposes of the law and that the regulation be not in
contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed
by the law, which requirements are denominated as the
completeness test and the sufficient standard test.—In the face of
the increasing complexity of modern life, delegation of legislative
power to various specialized administrative agencies is allowed as
an exception to this principle. Given the volume and variety of
interactions in today’s society, it is doubtful if the legislature can
promulgate laws that will deal adequately with and respond
promptly to the minutiae of everyday life. Hence, the need to
delegate to administrative bodies—the principal agencies tasked
to execute laws in their specialized fields—the authority to
promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given statute

and effectuate its policies. All that is required for the valid
exercise of this power of subordinate legislation is that the
regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law and
that the regulation be not in contradiction to, but in conformity
with, the standards prescribed by the law. These requirements
are denominated as the completeness test and the sufficient
standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in
all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such
that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to
do is to enforce it. The second test mandates adequate guidelines
or limitations in the law to determine the boundaries of the
delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.
The Court finds that the EPIRA, read and appreciated in its
700
entirety, in relation to Sec. 34 thereof, is complete in all its

essential terms and conditions, and that it contains sufficient
standards.
Same; Same; Same; Provisions of the Electric Power Industry
Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA) such as, among others, “to ensure the
total electrification of the country and the quality, reliability,
security and affordability of the supply of electric power” and
“watershed rehabilitation and management” meet the
requirements for valid delegation, as they provide the limitations
on the Energy Regulatory Commission’s (ERC’s) power to
formulate the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR).—As to
the second test, this Court had, in the past, accepted as sufficient
standards the following: “interest of law and order”; “adequate
and efficient instruction”; “public interest”; “justice and equity;”
“public convenience and welfare;” “simplicity, economy and
efficiency”; “standardization and regulation of medical education”;
and “fair and equitable employment practices.” Provisions of the
EPIRA such as, among others, “to ensure the total electrification
of the country and the quality, reliability, security and
affordability of the supply of electric power” and “watershed
rehabilitation and management” meet the requirements for valid
delegation, as they provide the limitations on the ERC’s power to
formulate the IRR. These are sufficient standards.
Police Power; Over the years, however, the range of police
power was no longer limited to the preservation of public health,
safety and morals, which used to be the primary social interests in

earlier times. Police power now requires the State to “assume an
affirmative duty to eliminate the excesses and injustices that are
the concomitants of an unrestrained industrial economy,” and
police power is now exerted “to further the public welfare—a
concept as vast as the good of society itself.”—In his Concurring
and Dissenting Opinion in the same case, then Associate Justice,
now Chief Justice, Reynato S. Puno described the immensity of
police power in relation to the delegation of powers to the ERC
and its regulatory functions over electric power as a vital public
utility, to wit: Over the years, however, the range of police power
was no longer limited to the preservation of public health, safety
and morals, which used to be the primary social interests in
earlier times. Police power now requires the State to “assume an
affirmative duty to eliminate the excesses and injustices that are
the concomitants of an unrestrained industrial economy.” Police
power is now exerted “to further the public welfare—a concept as
vast as the
701
VOL. 527, JULY 17, 2007 701
good of society itself.” Hence, “police power is but another name for
the governmental authority to further the welfare of society that is
the basic end of all government.” When police power is delegated
to administrative bodies with regulatory functions, its exercise
should be given a wide latitude. Police power takes on an even
broader dimension in developing countries such as ours, where
the State must take a more active role in balancing the many
conflicting interests in society. The Questioned Order was issued
by the ERC, acting as an agent of the State in the exercise of
police power. We should have exceptionally good grounds to
curtail its exercise. This approach is more compelling in the field
of rate-regulation of electric power rates. Electric power
generation and distribution is a traditional instrument of
economic growth that affects not only a few but the entire nation. It
is an important factor in encouraging investment and promoting
business. The engines of progress may come to a screeching halt if
the delivery of electric power is impaired. Billions of pesos would
be lost as a result of power outages or unreliable electric power
services. The State thru the ERC should be able to exercise its
police power with great flexibility, when the need arises.
Taxation; Judicial Review; The determination of whether or
not a tax is excessive, oppressive or confiscatory is an issue which
essentially involves questions of fact, and thus, this Court is

precluded from reviewing the same.—Petitioners failed to pursue
in their Memorandum the contention in the Complaint that the
imposition of the Universal Charge on all end-users is oppressive
and confiscatory, and amounts to taxation without representation.
Hence, such contention is deemed waived or abandoned per
Resolution of August 3, 2004. Moreover, the determination of
whether or not a tax is excessive, oppressive or confiscatory is an
issue which essentially involves questions of fact, and thus, this
Court is precluded from reviewing the same.
Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA); One of
the landmark pieces of legislation enacted by Congress in recent
years is the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA)
which established a new policy, legal structure and regulatory
framework for the electric power industry—the new thrust is to tap
private capital for the expansion and improvement of the industry
as the large government debt and the highly capital-intensive
character of the industry itself have long been acknowledged as the
critical constraints to the
702
program.—As a penultimate statement, it may be well to recall

what this Court said of EPIRA: One of the landmark pieces of
legislation enacted by Congress in recent years is the EPIRA. It
established a new policy, legal structure and regulatory
framework for the electric power industry. The new thrust is to
tap private capital for the expansion and improvement of the
industry as the large government debt and the highly capital-
intensive character of the industry itself have long been
acknowledged as the critical constraints to the program. To
attract private investment, largely foreign, the jaded structure of
the industry had to be addressed. While the generation and
transmission sectors were centralized and monopolistic, the
distribution side was fragmented with over 130 utilities, mostly
small and uneconomic. The pervasive flaws have caused a low
utilization of existing generation capacity; extremely high and
uncompetitive power rates; poor quality of service to consumers;
dismal to forgettable performance of the government power
sector; high system losses; and an inability to develop a clear
strategy for overcoming these shortcomings. Thus, the EPIRA
provides a framework for the restructuring of the industry,
including the privatization of the assets of the National Power
Corporation (NPC), the transition to a competitive structure, and

the delineation of the roles of various government agencies and
the private entities. The law ordains the division of the industry
into four (4) distinct sectors, namely: generation, transmission,
distribution and supply. Corollarily, the NPC generating plants
have to privatized and its transmission business spun off and
privatized thereafter.
ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Romeo P. Gerochi and Rene Alfonso R. Eñano for
petitioners.
Salvador A. Altura, Jr. for Panay Electric Company,
Inc.
The Government Corporate Counsel for Power Sector
Assets & Liabilities Management Group.
703
VOL. 527, JULY 17, 2007 703

NACHURA, J.:
Petitioners Romeo P. Gerochi, Katulong Ng Bayan (KB),

and Environmentalist Consumers Network, Inc. (ECN)
(petitioners), come before this Court in this original action
praying that Section 34 of Republic Act (RA) 9136,
otherwise known as the “Electric Power Industry Reform 1
Act of 2001” (EPIRA), imposing the Universal2
Charge, and
Rule 18 of the Rules and Regulations (IRR) which seeks to
implement the said imposition, be declared
unconstitutional. Petitioners also pray that the Universal
Charge imposed upon the consumers be refunded and that
a preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining
order (TRO) be issued directing the respondents to refrain
from implementing,
3
charging, and collecting the said
charge. The assailed provision of law reads:
“SECTION 34. Universal Charge.—Within one (1) year from the

effectivity of this Act, a universal charge to be determined, fixed
and approved by the ERC, shall be imposed on all electricity
endusers for the following purposes:
4
(a) Payment for the stranded debts in excess of the amount
assumed by the National Government and stranded
_______________
1 Sec. 4 (ddd) of the EPIRA provides that the Universal Charge refers to
the charge, if any, imposed for the recovery of the stranded cost and other
purposes pursuant to Section 34 hereof.
2 Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 9136, entitled
“Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001, (IRR) approved on February
27, 2002, particularly Rule 4 (rrrr) provides that the “Universal Charge”
refers to the charge, if any, imposed for the recovery of the Stranded
Debts, Stranded Contract Costs of NPC, and Stranded Contract Costs of
Eligible Contracts of Distribution Utilities and other purposes pursuant to
Section 34 of the EPIRA.
3 Particularly denominated as Complaint dated September 15, 2003;
Rollo, pp. 3-15.
4 Sec. 4 [vv] of the EPIRA provides that Stranded Debts of NPC refer to
any unpaid financial obligations of NPC which have not been liquidated
by the proceeds from the sales and privatization of NPC assets.
704

5
contract costs of NPC and as well as qualified stranded
contract costs of distribution utilities resulting from the
restructuring of the industry;
6
(b) Missionary electrification;
(c) The equalization of the taxes and royalties applied to
indigenous or renewable sources of energy vis-à-vis
imported energy fuels;
(d) An environmental charge equivalent to one-fourth of one
centavo per kilowatt-hour (P0.0025/kWh), which shall
accrue to an environmental fund to be used solely for
watershed rehabilitation and management. Said fund
shall be managed by NPC under existing arrangements;
and
(e) A charge to account for all forms of cross-subsidies for a
period not exceeding three (3) years.
The universal charge shall be a non-bypassable charge which

shall be passed on and collected from all end-users on a monthly
basis by the distribution utilities. Collections by the distribution
utilities and the TRANSCO in any given month shall be remitted
to the PSALM Corp. on or before the fifteenth (15th) of the
succeeding month, net of any amount due to the distribution
utility. Any end-user or selfgenerating entity not connected to a
distribution utility shall remit its corresponding universal charge
directly to the TRANSCO. The PSALM Corp., as administrator of

the fund, shall create a Special Trust Fund which shall be
disbursed only for the purposes specified herein in an open and
transparent manner. All amount collected for the universal
charge shall be distributed to the respective beneficiaries within a
reasonable period to be provided by the ERC.”
_______________
5 Sec. 4 [uu] of the EPIRA also provides that Stranded contract costs of
NPC or distribution utility refer to the excess of the contracted cost of
electricity under eligible contracts over the actual selling price of the
contracted energy output of such contracts in the market. Such contracts
shall have been approved by the ERB as of December 31, 2000.
6 Rule 4 (ddd) of the IRR provides that Missionary Electrification refers
to the provision of basic electricity service in Unviable Areas with the
ultimate aim of bringing the operations in these areas to viability levels.
705
VOL. 527, JULY 17, 2007 705

The Facts
Congress enacted the 7

EPIRA on June 8, 2001; on June 26,
2001, it took effect.
On April 5, 2002, respondent National 8
Power
CorporationStrategic Power Utilities Group (NPC-SPUG)
filed with respondent Energy Regulatory Commission
(ERC) a petition for the availment from the Universal
Charge of its share for Missionary
9
Electrification, docketed
as ERC Case No. 2002-165.
On May 7, 2002, NPC filed another petition with ERC,
docketed as ERC Case No. 2002-194, praying that the
proposed share from the Universal Charge for the
Environmental charge of P0.0025 per kilowatt-hour (/kWh),
or a total of P119,488,847.59, be approved for withdrawal
from the Special Trust Fund (STF) managed by respondent
Power Sector
10
Assets and Liabilities Management Group
(PSALM) for the 11
rehabilitation and management of
watershed areas. 12
On December 20, 2002, the ERC issued an Order in
ERC Case No. 2002-165 provisionally approving the
computed amount of P0.0168/kWh as the share of the NPC-
SPUG from the Universal Charge for Missionary
Electrification and authorizing the National Transmission

Corporation (TRANSCO)
_______________
7 Manila Electric Company, Inc. v. Lualhati, G.R. Nos. 166769 and

166818, December 6, 2006, 510 SCRA 455.
8 IRR, Rule 4 (bbbb) states that Small Power Utilities Group or SPUG
refers to the functional unit of NPC created to pursue Missionary
Electrification function.
9 ERC Record for ERC Case No. 2002-165, pp. 1-7.
10 PSALM is a government-owned and controlled corporation created
under Sec. 49 of the EPIRA, which shall take ownership of all existing
NPC generation assets, liabilities, IPP contracts, real estate and all other
disposable assets. All outstanding obligations of the NPC arising from
loans, issuances of bonds, securities and other instruments of
indebtedness shall be transferred to and assumed by the PSALM.
11 ERC Record for ERC Case No. 2002-194, pp. 1-5.
12 Supra note 9, at pp. 110-122.
706

and Distribution Utilities to collect the same from its

endusers on a monthly basis. 13
On June 26, 2003, the ERC rendered its Decision (for
ERC Case No. 2002-165) modifying its Order of December
20, 2002, thus:
“WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the

provisional authority granted to petitioner National Power
CorporationStrategic Power Utilities Group (NPC-SPUG) in the
Order dated December 20, 2002 is hereby modified to the effect
that an additional amount of P0.0205 per kilowatt-hour should be
added to the P0.0168 per kilowatt-hour provisionally authorized
by the Commission in the said Order. Accordingly, a total amount
of P0.0373 per kilowatt-hour is hereby APPROVED for
withdrawal from the Special Trust Fund managed by PSALM as
its share from the Universal Charge for Missionary Electrification
(UC-ME) effective on the following billing cycles:
(a) June 26-July 25, 2003 for National Transmission

Corporation (TRANSCO); and
(b) July 2003 for Distribution Utilities (Dus).
Relative thereto, TRANSCO and Dus are directed to collect the

UC-ME in the amount of P0.0373 per kilowatt-hour and remit the
same to PSALM on or before the 15th day of the succeeding
month.
In the meantime, NPC-SPUG is directed to submit, not later
than April 30, 2004, a detailed report to include Audited Financial
Statements and physical status (percentage of completion) of the
projects using the prescribed format.
Let copies of this Order be furnished petitioner NPC-SPUG
and all distribution utilities (Dus).
SO ORDERED.”
On August 13, 2003, NPC-SPUG filed a Motion 14

for
Reconsideration asking the ERC, among others, to set
aside the
_______________
13 Id., at pp. 215-224.

14 NPC-SPUG’s Motion for Reconsideration dated August 13, 2003 also
prayed that it be allowed (1) to have flexibility in the utilization of UC-ME
considering its mandate to implement the MEDP
707
VOL. 527, JULY 17, 2007 707

above-mentioned Decision, which the ERC granted in its

Order dated October 7, 2003, disposing:
“WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the “Motion

for Reconsideration” filed by petitioner National Power
Corporation-Small Power Utilities Group (NPC-SPUG) is hereby
GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision dated June 26, 2003 is
hereby modified accordingly.
Relative thereto, NPC-SPUG is directed to submit a quarterly
report on the following:
1. Projects for CY 2002 undertaken;

2. Location
3. Actual amount utilized to complete the project;
4. Period of completion;
5. Start of Operation; and
6. Explanation of the reallocation of UC-ME funds, if any.
15
SO ORDERED.”
Meanwhile, on April 2, 2003, ERC decided ERC Case No.

2002-194, authorizing the NPC to draw up to
P70,000,000.00 from PSALM for its 2003 Watershed
Rehabilitation Budget subject to the availability of funds
for the 16Environmental Fund component of the Universal
Charge.
On the basis of the said ERC decisions, respondent
Panay Electric Company, Inc. (PECO) charged petitioner
Romeo P. Gerochi and all other end-users with the
Universal Charge as reflected in their respective
17
electric
bills starting from the month of July 2003.
_______________
responsive to the needs and constraints of missionary electrification; (2)

to authorize it to re-prioritize its CAPEX and its OPEX to the extent
possible, for CY 2003; and (3) to give it the flexibility to reallocate
available UC-ME funds among the revised priority activities/projects for
CY 2003, Id., at pp. 225-236.
15 Id., at pp. 237-239.
16 Supra note 11, at pp. 110-122.
17 Rollo, p. 8.
708

Hence, this original action.

Petitioners submit that the assailed provision of law and
its IRR which sought to implement the same are
unconstitutional on the following grounds:
“1) The universal charge provided for under Sec. 34 of

the EPIRA and sought to be implemented under
Sec. 2, Rule 18 of the IRR of the said law is a tax
which is to be collected from all electric end-users
and self-generating entities. The power to tax is
strictly a legislative function and as such, the
delegation of said power to any executive or
administrative agency like the ERC is
unconstitutional, giving the same unlimited
authority. The assailed provision clearly provides
that the Universal Charge is to be determined,
fixed and approved by the ERC, hence leaving to
the latter complete discretionary legislative
authority.
2) The ERC is also empowered to approve and

determine where the funds collected should be
used.
3) The imposition of the Universal Charge on all end-
users is oppressive and confiscatory and amounts to
taxation without representation as the consumers
were not given
18
a chance to be heard and
represented.”
Petitioners contend that the Universal Charge has the

characteristics of a tax and is collected to 19fund the
operations of the NPC. They argue that the cases invoked
by the respondents clearly show the regulatory purpose of
the charges imposed therein, which is not20so in the case at
bench. In said cases, the respective funds were created in
order to balance and stabilize the prices of oil and sugar,
and to act as buffer to counteract the changes and
adjustments in prices, peso devaluation, and other
variables which cannot be adequately
_______________
18 Supra note 3.
19 Osmeña v. Orbos, G.R. No. 99886, March 31, 1993, 220 SCRA 703;
Valmonte v. Energy Regulatory Board, G.R. Nos. L-79601-03, June 23,
1988, 162 SCRA 521; and Gaston v. Republic Planters Bank, No. L-77194,
March 15, 1988, 158 SCRA 626.
20 These funds are the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) and Sugar
Stabilization Fund (SSF).
709
VOL. 527, JULY 17, 2007 709

and timely monitored by the legislature. Thus, there was a 21

need to delegate powers to administrative bodies.
Petitioners posit that the Universal Charge is imposed not
for a similar purpose.
On the other hand, respondent PSALM through the
Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC)
contends that unlike a tax which is imposed to provide
income for public purposes, such as support of the
government, administration of the law, or payment of
public expenses, the assailed Universal Charge is levied for
a specific regulatory purpose, which is to ensure the
viability of the country’s electric power industry. Thus, it is
exacted by the State in the exercise of its inherent police

power. On this premise, PSALM submits that there is no
undue delegation of legislative power to the ERC since the
latter merely exercises a limited authority or discretion as
to the execution
22
and implementation of the provisions of
the EPIRA.
Respondents Department of Energy (DOE), ERC, and
NPC, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
share the same view that the Universal Charge is not a tax
because it is levied for a specific regulatory purpose, which
is to ensure the viability of the country’s electric power
industry, and is, therefore, an exaction in the exercise of
the State’s police power. Respondents further contend that
said Universal Charge does not possess the essential
characteristics of a tax, that its imposition would redound
to the benefit of the electric power industry and not to the
public, and that its rate is uniformly levied on electricity
end-users, unlike a tax which is imposed based on the
individual taxpayer’s ability to pay. Moreover, respondents
deny that there is undue delegation of legislative power to
the ERC since the EPIRA sets forth sufficient determinable
standards which would guide the ERC in
_______________
21 Petitioners’ Memorandum dated October 6, 2004; Rollo, pp. 123-138.

22 PSALM’s Memorandum dated December 8, 2004; Id., at pp. 154-167.
710

the exercise of the powers granted to it. Lastly, respondents

argue that the imposition of the Universal Charge is not
oppressive and confiscatory since it is an exercise of the
police power of the State23 and it complies with the
requirements of due process.
On its part, respondent PECO argues that it is duty-
bound to collect and remit the amount pertaining to the
Missionary Electrification and Environmental Fund
components of the Universal Charge, pursuant to Sec. 34 of
the EPIRA and the Decisions in ERC Case Nos. 2002-194
and 2002-165.
24
Otherwise, PECO could be held liable under
Sec. 46 of the EPIRA,
_______________
23 OSG’s Memorandum dated January 4, 2005; Id., at pp. 168187.

24 SECTION 46. Fines and Penalties.—The fines and penalties that
shall be imposed by the ERC for any violation of or noncompliance with
this Act or the IRR shall range from a minimum of Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) to a maximum of Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00).
Any person who is found guilty of any of the prohibited acts pursuant to
Section 45 hereof shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor and a fine
ranging from Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) to Ten million pesos
(P10,000.000.00), or both, at the discretion of the court.
The members of the Board of Directors of the juridical companies
participating in or covered in the generation companies, the distribution
utilities, the TRANSCO or its concessionaire or supplier who violate the
provisions of this Act may be fined by an amount not exceeding double the
amount of damages caused by the offender or by imprisonment of one (1)
year or two (2) years or both at the discretion of the court. This rule shall
apply to the members of the Board who knowingly or by neglect allows the
commission or omission under the law.
If the offender is a government official or employee, he shall, in
addition, be dismissed from the government service with prejudice to
reinstatement and with perpetual or temporary disqualification from
holding any elective or appointive office.
711
VOL. 527, JULY 17, 2007 711

which imposes fines 25and penalties for any violation of its

provisions or its IRR.
The Issues
The ultimate issues in the case at bar are:
_______________
If the offender is an alien, he may, in addition to the penalties

prescribed, be deported without further proceedings after service of
sentence.
Any case which involves question of fact shall be appealable to the
Court of Appeals and those which involve question of law shall be directly
appealable to the Supreme Court.
The administrative sanction that may be imposed by the ERC shall be
without prejudice to the filing of a criminal action, if warranted.
To ensure compliance with this Act, the penalty of prision correccional
or a fine ranging from Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) to Five million
pesos (P5,000,000.00), or both, at the discretion of the court, shall be
imposed on any person, including but not limited to the president,

member of the Board, Chief Executive Officer or Chief Operating Officer of
the corporation, partnership, or any other entity involved, found guilty of
violating or refusing to comply with any provision of this Act or its IRR,
other than those provided herein.
Any party to an administrative proceeding may, at any time, make an
offer to the ERC, conditionally or otherwise, for a consented decree,
voluntary compliance or desistance and other settlement of the case. The
offer and any or all of the ultimate facts upon which the offer is based
shall be considered for settlement purposes only and shall not be used as
evidence against any party for any other purpose and shall not constitute
an admission by the party making the offer of any violation of the laws,
rules, regulations, orders and resolutions of the ERC, nor as a waiver to
file any warranted criminal actions.
In addition, Congress may, upon recommendation of the DOE and/or
ERC, revoke such franchise or privilege granted to the party who violated
the provisions of this Act.
25 PECO’s Memorandum dated April 18, 2005; Rollo, pp. 205210.
712

1) Whether or not, the Universal Charge imposed

under Sec. 34 of the EPIRA is a tax; and
2) Whether or not there is undue delegation 26
of
legislative power to tax on the part of the ERC.
Before we discuss the issues, the Court shall first deal with
an obvious procedural lapse.
Petitioners filed before us an original action particularly
denominated as a Complaint assailing the constitutionality
of Sec. 34 of the EPIRA imposing the Universal Charge and
Rule 18 of the EPIRA’s IRR. No doubt, petitioners have
locus standi. They impugn the constitutionality of Sec. 34
of the EPIRA because they sustained a direct injury as a
result of the imposition of the Universal Charge as
reflected in their electric bills.
However, petitioners violated the doctrine of hierarchy
of courts when they filed this “Complaint” directly with us.
Furthermore, the Complaint is bereft of any allegation of
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the ERC or any of
the public respondents, in order for the Court to consider it
as a petition for certiorari or prohibition.
Article VIII,
27
Section 5(1) and (2) of the 1987
Constitution categorically provides that:
“SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following

powers:
1. Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting

ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over
petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, and habeas corpus.
2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or
certiorari, as the law or the rules of court may provide,
final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any

treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presi
_______________
26 Supra note 21, at p. 125.

27 Emphasis supplied.
713
VOL. 527, JULY 17, 2007 713

dential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,

ordinance, or regulation is in question.”
But this Court’s jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari,

prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus,
while concurrent with that of the regional trial courts and
the Court of Appeals, does not give litigants unrestrained 28
freedom of choice of forum from which to seek such relief.
It has long been established that this Court will not
entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired
cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, or where
exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment
of a remedy 29within and call for the exercise of our primary
jurisdiction. This circumstance alone warrants the
outright dismissal of the present action.
This procedural infirmity notwithstanding, we opt to
resolve the constitutional issue raised herein. We are
aware that if the constitutionality of Sec. 34 of the EPIRA
is not resolved now, the issue will certainly resurface in the
near future, resulting in a repeat of this litigation, and
probably involving the same parties. In the public interest
and to avoid unnecessary delay, this Court renders its
ruling now.
The instant complaint is bereft of merit.
The First Issue
To resolve the first issue, it is necessary to distinguish the

State’s power of taxation from the police power.
The power to tax is an incident of sovereignty and is
unlimited in its range, acknowledging in its very nature no
limits,
_______________
28 Francisco, Jr. v. Fernando, G.R. No. 166501, November 16, 2006, 507
SCRA 173 citing People v. Cuaresma, 172 SCRA 415, 423424 (1989).
29 Lacson Hermanas, Inc. v. Heirs of Cenon Ignacio, G.R. No. 165973,
June 29, 2005, 462 SCRA 290, 294 and Santiago v. Vasquez, G.R. Nos.
99289-90, January 27, 1993, 217 SCRA 633, 652.
714

so that security against its abuse is to be found only in the

responsibility of the legislature which30
imposes the tax on
the constituency that is to pay it. It is based on the
principle that taxes are the lifeblood of the government,
and their
31
prompt and certain availability is an imperious
need. Thus, the theory behind the exercise of the power to
tax emanates from necessity; without taxes, government
cannot fulfill its mandate of promoting
32
the general welfare
and well-being of the people. On the other hand, police
power is the power of the state to
promote public welfare by33restraining and regulating the
use of liberty and property. It is the most pervasive, the
least limitable, and the most demanding of the three
fundamental powers of the State. The justification is found
in the Latin maxims salus populi est suprema lex (the
welfare of the people is the supreme law) and sic utere tuo
ut alienum non laedas (so use your property as not to injure
the property of others). As an inherent attribute of
sovereignty which virtually extends to all public needs,
police power grants a wide panoply of instruments through
which the State, as parens
34
patriae, gives effect to a host of
its regulatory powers. We have held that the power to
“regulate” means the power to protect, foster, promote,
preserve, and control, with due regard for the
_______________
30 Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Marcos, 330 Phil.

392, 404; 261 SCRA 667 (1996).
31 Proton Pilipinas Corporation v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No.
165027, October 16, 2006, 504 SCRA 528 citing Province of Tarlac v.
Alcantara, 216 SCRA 790, 798 (1992).
32 National Power Corporation v. City of Cabanatuan, 449 Phil. 233,
248; 401 SCRA 259, 270 (2003).
33 Didipio Earth-Savers’ Multi-Purpose Association, Inc. (DESAMA) v.
Gozun, G.R. No. 157882, March 30, 2006, 485 SCRA 586, 604, citing U.S.
v. Torribio, 15 Phil. 85, 93 (1910) and Rubi v. The Provincial Board of
Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660, 708 (1919).
34 JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
120095, August 5, 1996, 260 SCRA 319, 324.
715
VOL. 527, JULY 17, 2007 715

interests, first and foremost,

35
of the public, then of the
utility and of its patrons.
The conservative and pivotal distinction between these
two powers rests in the purpose for which the charge is
made. If generation of revenue is the primary purpose and
regulation is merely incidental, the imposition is a tax; but
if regulation is the primary purpose, the fact that revenue 36
is incidentally raised does not make the imposition a tax.
In exacting the assailed Universal Charge through Sec.
34 of the EPIRA, the State’s police power, particularly its
regulatory dimension, is invoked. Such can be deduced
from Sec. 34 which enumerates 37
the purposes for which the
Universal Charge is imposed and which can be amply
discerned as
_______________
35 Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Hon. Ruben D.

Torres, G.R. No. 101279, August 6, 1992, 212 SCRA 298, 304, citing
Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation v. Alcuaz, 180 SCRA
218 (1989).
36 Progressive Development Corporation vs. Quezon City, G.R. No.
36081, April 24, 1989, 172 SCRA 629, 635, citing Manila Electric
Company v. El Auditor General y La Comision de Servicios Publicos, 73
Phil. 133 (1941); Republic v. Philippine Rabbit Lines, 143 Phil. 158, 163;
32 SCRA 211, 215 (1970).
37 The purposes are:
(a) Payment for the stranded debts in excess of the amount assumed
by the National Government and stranded contract costs of NPC
and as well as qualified stranded contract costs of distribution
utilities resulting from the restructuring of the industry;
(b) Missionary electrification;
(c) The equalization of the taxes and royalties applied to indigenous
or renewable sources of energy vis-à-vis imported energy fuels;
(d) An environmental charge equivalent to one-fourth of one centavo
per kilowatt-hour (P0.0025/kWh), which shall accrue to an
environmental fund to be used solely for watershed rehabilitation
and management. Said fund shall be managed by NPC under
existing arrangements; and
716

regulatory in character. The EPIRA resonates such

regulatory purposes, thus:
“SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy.—It is hereby declared the

policy of the State:
(a) To ensure and accelerate the total electrification of the

country;
(b) To ensure the quality, reliability, security and
affordability of the supply of electric power;
(c) To ensure transparent and reasonable prices of electricity
in a regime of free and fair competition and full public
accountability to achieve greater operational and economic
efficiency and enhance the competitiveness of Philippine
products in the global market;
(d) To enhance the inflow of private capital and broaden the
ownership base of the power generation, transmission and
distribution sectors;
(e) To ensure fair and non-discriminatory treatment of public
and private sector entities in the process of restructuring
the electric power industry;
(f) To protect the public interest as it is affected by the rates
and services of electric utilities and other providers of
electric power;
(g) To assure socially and environmentally compatible energy
sources and infrastructure;
(h) To promote the utilization of indigenous and new and

renewable energy resources in power generation in order
to reduce dependence on imported energy;
(i) To provide for an orderly and transparent privatization of
the assets and liabilities of the National Power
Corporation (NPC);
(j) To establish a strong and purely independent regulatory
body and system to ensure consumer protection and
enhance the competitive operation of the electricity
market; and
_______________
(e) A charge to account for all forms of cross-subsidies for a period not
exceeding three (3) years.
717
VOL. 527, JULY 17, 2007 717

(k) To encourage the efficient use of energy and other

modalities of demand side management.
From the aforementioned purposes, it can be gleaned that

the assailed Universal Charge is not a tax, but an exaction
in the exercise of the State’s police power. Public welfare is
surely promoted.
Moreover, it is a well-established doctrine that the
taxing 38power may be used as an implement of police 39
power. In Valmonte v. Energy Regulatory 40
Board, et al.
and in Gaston v. Republic Planters Bank, this Court held
that the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) and the Sugar
Stabilization Fund (SSF) were exactions made in the
exercise of the police
41
power. The doctrine was reiterated in
Osmeña v. Orbos with respect to the OPSF. Thus, we
disagree with petitioners that the instant case is different
from the aforementioned cases. With the Universal Charge,
a Special Trust Fund (STF) 42
is also created under the
administration of PSALM. The STF has
_______________
38 Osmeña v. Orbos, supra note 19, at p. 710, Gaston v. Republic

Planters Bank, supra note 19, at p. 632, Tio v. Videogram Regulatory
Board, No. L-75697, June 18, 1987, 151 SCRA 208, 216, and Lutz v.
Araneta, 98 Phil. 148 (1955).
39 Supra note 19, at p. 539; Decided jointly with Citizen’s Alliance for
Consumer Protection v. Energy Regulatory Board, G.R. Nos. L-78888-90,
and Kilusang Mayo Uno Labor Center v. Energy Regulatory, Board, G.R.
Nos. L-79690-92.
40 Supra note 19, at pp. 632-633.
41 Id., at pp. 710-711.
42 Last paragraph, Sec. 34, EPIRA provides: The PSALM Corp., as
administrator of the fund, shall create a Special Trust Fund which shall
be disbursed only for the purposes specified herein in an open and
transparent manner. All amount collected for the universal charge shall
be distributed to the respective beneficiaries within a reasonable period to
be provided by the ERC.
IRR of the EPIRA, Rule 18, SECTION 6, also provides:
(a) Pursuant to the last paragraph of Section 34 of the Act, PSALM
shall act as the administrator of the funds generated from the Universal
Charge. For this purpose, the PSALM shall create a
718

some notable characteristics similar to the OPSF and the

SSF, viz.:
“1) In the implementation of stranded cost recovery,

the ERC shall conduct a review to determine
whether there is under-recovery or over recovery
and adjust (true-up) the level of the stranded cost
recovery charge. In case of an over-recovery, the
ERC shall ensure that any excess amount shall be
remitted to the STF. A separate account shall be
created for these amounts which shall be held in
trust for any future claims of distribution utilities
for stranded cost recovery. At the end of the
stranded cost recovery period, any remaining
amount in this account shall be 43used to reduce the
electricity rates to the end-users.
2) With respect to the assailed Universal Charge, if
the total amount collected for the same is greater
than the actual availments against it, the PSALM
shall retain the balance within 44the STF to pay for
periods where a shortfall occurs.
3) Upon expiration of the term of PSALM, the
administration of the STF shall be transferred to
the DOF or any of the DOF attached 45
agencies as
designated by the DOF Secretary.”
The OSG is in point when it asseverates:
“Evidently, the establishment and maintenance of the Special

Trust Fund, under the last paragraph of Section 34, R.A. No.
9136, is well within the pervasive and non-waivable power and
responsibility of the government to secure the physical and
economic survival and
_______________
STF to be established in the Bureau of Treasury (BTr) or in a

Government Financing Institution (GFI) that is acceptable to the DOF.
Separate STFs shall be established for each of the intended purposes of
the Universal Charge. Funds shall be disbursed in an open and
transparent manner and shall only be used for the intended purposes
specified in Section 3 of this Rule.
43 EPIRA, Sec. 33, last paragraph and IRR, Sec. 5 (f), Rule 17.
44 IRR, Sec. 6 (f), Rule 18.
45 IRR, Sec. 4, Rule 21.
719
VOL. 527, JULY 17, 2007 719

well-being of the community, that comprehensive 46sovereign

authority we designate as the police power of the State.”
This feature of the Universal Charge further boosts the

position that the same is an exaction imposed primarily in
pursuit of the State’s police objectives. The STF reasonably
serves and assures the attainment and perpetuity of the
purposes for which the Universal Charge is imposed, i.e., to
ensure the viability of the country’s electric power industry.
The Second Issue
The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of

the three branches of government has exclusive cognizance
of and is supreme in matters falling within its own
constitutionally allocated sphere. A logical corollary to the
doctrine of separation of powers is the principle of non-
delegation of powers, as expressed in the Latin maxim
potestas delegata non delegari potest (what has been
delegated cannot be delegated). This is based on the ethical
principle that such delegated power constitutes not only a
right but a duty to be performed by the delegate through
the instrumentality of his own judgment

47
and not through
the intervening mind of another.
In the face of the increasing complexity of modern life,
delegation of legislative power to various specialized
administrative
48
agencies is allowed as an exception to this
principle.
_______________
46 Supra note 23, at pp. 177-178, citing Osmeña v. Orbos, supra note 19.
47 Abakada Guro Party List v. Ermita, G.R. Nos. 168056, 168207,
168461, 168463 and 168730, September 1, 2005, 469 SCRA 10, 115-116.
48 The recognized exceptions to the general principle are as follows:
(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28(2) of

Article VI of the Constitution;
(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section
23(2) of Article VI of the Constitution;
720

Given the volume and variety of interactions in today’s

society, it is doubtful if the legislature can promulgate laws
that will deal adequately with and respond promptly to the
minutiae of everyday life. Hence, the need to delegate to
administrative bodies—the principal agencies tasked to
execute laws in their specialized fields—the authority to
promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given
statute and effectuate its policies. All that is required for
the valid exercise of this power of subordinate legislation is
that the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes
of the law and that the regulation be not in contradiction
to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by the
law. These requirements are denominated as the
completeness test and the sufficient standard test.
Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its
terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such
that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will
have to do is to enforce it. The second test mandates
adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to determine
the boundaries of the delegate’s 49
authority and prevent the
delegation from running riot.
The Court finds that the EPIRA, read and appreciated
in its entirety, in relation to Sec. 34 thereof, is complete in
all its
_______________
(3) Delegation to the people at large;

(4) Delegation to local governments; and
(5) Delegation to administrative bodies. Abakada Guro Party List v.
Ermita, supra note 47, at p. 117 and Santiago v. Commission on
Elections, 336 Phil. 848, 897-898; 270 SCRA 106, 154 (1997), citing
People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937).
49 Equi-Asia Placement, Inc. v. Department of Foreign Affairs, G.R. No.

152214, September 19, 2006, 502 SCRA 295 citing Beltran v. Secretary of
Health, 476 SCRA 168, 191 (2005); The Conference of Maritime Manning
Agencies v. Philippine Overseas Employment Agency, 313 Phil. 592, 606;
243 SCRA 666 (1995); and Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Philippine
Overseas Employment Agency, G.R. No. L-76633, October 18, 1998, 166
SCRA 533, 543.
721
VOL. 527, JULY 17, 2007 721

essential terms and conditions, and that it contains

sufficient standards.
Although Sec. 34 of the EPIRA merely provides that
“within one (1) year from the effectivity thereof, a
Universal Charge to be determined, fixed and approved by
the ERC, shall be imposed on all electricity end-users,” and
therefore, does not state the specific amount to be paid as
Universal Charge, the amount nevertheless is made certain
by the legislative parameters provided in the law itself. For
one, Sec. 43(b)(ii) of the EPIRA provides:
“SECTION 43. Functions of the ERC.—The ERC shall promote

competition, encourage market development, ensure customer
choice and penalize abuse of market power in the restructured
electricity industry. In appropriate cases, the ERC is authorized
to issue cease and desist order after due notice and hearing.
Towards this end, it shall be responsible for the following key
functions in the restructured industry:
xxxx
(b) Within six (6) months from the effectivity of this Act,
promulgate and enforce, in accordance with law, a National Grid
Code and a Distribution Code which shall include, but not limited
to the following:
xxxx
(ii) Financial capability standards for the generating companies, the

TRANSCO, distribution utilities and suppliers: Provided, That in the
formulation of the financial capability standards, the nature and function
of the entity shall be considered: Provided, further, That such standards
are set to ensure that the electric power industry participants meet the
minimum financial standards to protect the public interest. Determine,
fix, and approve, after due notice and public hearings the universal
charge, to be imposed on all electricity endusers pursuant to Section 34
hereof;
Moreover, contrary to the petitioners’ contention, the ERC

does not enjoy a wide latitude of discretion in the
determina-
722

tion of50the Universal Charge. Sec. 51(d) and (e) of the

EPIRA clearly provides:
“SECTION 51. Powers.—The PSALM Corp. shall, in the

performance of its functions and for the attainment of its
objective, have the following powers:
xxxx
(d) To calculate the amount of the stranded debts and

stranded contract costs of NPC which shall form the
basis for ERC in the determination of the universal
charge;
(e) To liquidate the NPC stranded contract costs, utilizing the
proceeds from sales and other property contributed to it,
including the proceeds from the universal charge.”
Thus, the law is complete and passes the first test for valid
delegation of legislative power.
As to the second test, this Court had, in the past,
accepted as sufficient
51
standards the following: “interest of52
law and order”; 53“adequate and efficient instruction”;
54
“public interest”; “justice
55
and equity”; “public
convenience 56
and welfare”; “simplicity, economy and
efficiency”; 57 “standardization and regulation of medical
education”;58 and “fair and equitable employment
practices.” Provisions of the EPIRA such as, among
others, “to ensure the total electrification of the coun-
________________
50 Emphasis supplied.
51 Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, supra note 33, at p. 706.
52 Philippine Association of Colleges and University v. Secretary of
Education, 97 Phil. 806, 814 (1955).
53 People v. Rosenthal, 68 Phil. 328, 342 (1939).
54 Antamok Gold Fields v. CIR, 70 Phil. 340 (1940).
55 Calalang v. Williams, 70 Phil. 726, 733 (1940).
56 Cervantes v. Auditor General, 91 Phil. 359, 364 (1952).
57 Tablarin v. Gutierrez, No. L-78164, July 31, 1987, 152 SCRA 731.
58 The Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies, Inc. v. Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration, supra note 49.
723
VOL. 527, JULY 17, 2007 723

try and the quality, reliability, security

59
and affordability of
the supply of electric power” 60
and “watershed
rehabilitation and management” meet the requirements
for valid delegation, as they provide the limitations on the
ERC’s power to formulate the IRR. These are sufficient
standards. It may be noted that this is not the first time
that the ERC’s conferred powers were challenged. In
Freedom from 61
Debt Coalition v. Energy Regulatory
Commission, the Court had occasion to say:
“In determining the extent of powers possessed by the ERC, the

provisions of the EPIRA must not be read in separate parts.
Rather, the law must be read in its entirety, because a statute is
passed as a whole, and is animated by one general purpose and
intent. Its meaning cannot to be extracted from any single part
thereof but from a general consideration of the statute as a whole.
Considering the intent of Congress in enacting the EPIRA and
reading the statute in its entirety, it is plain to see that the law
has expanded the jurisdiction of the regulatory body, the ERC in
this case, to enable the latter to implement the reforms sought to
be accomplished by the EPIRA. When the legislators decided to
broaden the jurisdiction of the ERC, they did not intend to abolish
or reduce the powers already conferred upon ERC’s predecessors.
To sustain the view that the ERC possesses only the powers and
functions listed under Section 43 of the EPIRA is to frustrate the
objectives of the law.”
62
In his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in the same
case, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice, Reynato S.
Puno described the immensity of police power in relation to
the delegation of powers to the ERC and its regulatory

functions over electric power as a vital public utility, to wit:
_______________
59 Sec. 2(a) and (b), Declaration of Policies of the EPIRA.

60 Supra note 37.
61 G.R. No. 161113, June 15, 2004, 432 SCRA 157, 182.
62 Id., at pp. 219-220 (Emphasis supplied).
724

“Over the years, however, the range of police power was no longer
limited to the preservation of public health, safety and morals,
which used to be the primary social interests in earlier times.
Police power now requires the State to “assume an affirmative duty
to eliminate the excesses and injustices that are the concomitants
of an unrestrained industrial economy.” Police power is now
exerted “to further the public welfare—a concept as vast as the
good of society itself.” Hence, “police power is but another name for
the governmental authority to further the welfare of society that is
the basic end of all government.” When police power is delegated
to administrative bodies with regulatory functions, its exercise
should be given a wide latitude. Police power takes on an even
broader dimension in developing countries such as ours, where
the State must take a more active role in balancing the many
conflicting interests in society. The Questioned Order was issued
by the ERC, acting as an agent of the State in the exercise of
police power. We should have exceptionally good grounds to
curtail its exercise. This approach is more compelling in the field
of rate-regulation of electric power rates. Electric power
generation and distribution is a traditional instrument of
economic growth that affects not only a few but the entire nation. It
is an important factor in encouraging investment and promoting
business. The engines of progress may come to a screeching halt if
the delivery of electric power is impaired. Billions of pesos would
be lost as a result of power outages or unreliable electric power
services. The State thru the ERC should be able to exercise its
police power with great flexibility, when the need arises.”
This was reiterated in National Association of Electricity 63

Consumers for Reforms v. Energy Regulatory Commission
where the Court held that the ERC, as regulator, should
have sufficient power to respond in real time to changes
wrought by multifarious factors affecting public utilities.
From the foregoing disquisitions, we therefore hold that

there is no undue delegation of legislative power to the
ERC.
_______________
63G.R. No. 163935, February 2, 2006, 481 SCRA 480, 515-516, citing
Freedom from Debt Coalition v. Energy Regulatory Commission, supra
note 61.
725
VOL. 527, JULY 17, 2007 725

Petitioners failed to pursue in their Memorandum the

contention in the Complaint that the imposition of the
Universal Charge on all end-users is oppressive and
confiscatory, and amounts to taxation without
representation. Hence, such contention
64
is deemed waived
65
or abandoned per Resolution of August 3, 2004.
Moreover, the determination of whether or not a tax is
excessive, oppressive or confiscatory is an issue which
essentially involves questions of fact, 66and thus, this Court
is precluded from reviewing the same.
As a penultimate statement, it may be well to recall
what this Court said of EPIRA:
“One of the landmark pieces of legislation enacted by Congress in

recent years is the EPIRA. It established a new policy, legal
structure and regulatory framework for the electric power
industry. The new thrust is to tap private capital for the
expansion and improvement of the industry as the large
government debt and the highly capital-intensive character of the
industry itself have long been acknowledged as the critical
constraints to the program. To attract private investment, largely
foreign, the jaded structure of the industry had to be addressed.
While the generation and transmission sectors were centralized
and monopolistic, the distribution side was fragmented with over
130 utilities, mostly small and uneconomic. The pervasive flaws
have caused a low utilization of existing generation capacity;
extremely high and uncompetitive power rates; poor quality of
service to consumers; dismal to forgettable performance of the
government power sector; high system losses; and an inability to
develop a clear strategy for overcoming these shortcomings.
Thus, the EPIRA provides a framework for the restructuring of
the industry, including the privatization of the assets of the
National Power Corporation (NPC), the transition to a
competitive structure, and the delineation of the roles of various

government agencies and the private entities. The law ordains the
division of the industry into
_______________
64 Rollo, pp. 108-109.

65 Republic v. Kalaw, G.R. No. 155138, June 8, 2004, 431 SCRA 401,
406.
66 Lopez v. City of Manila, G.R. No. 127139, February 19, 1999, 303
SCRA 448, 460, citing Ty v. Trampe, 250 SCRA 500 (1995).
726

four (4) distinct sectors, namely: generation, transmission,

distribution and supply. Corollarily, the NPC generating plants
have to privatized and 67
its transmission business spun off and
privatized thereafter.”
Finally, every law has in its favor the presumption of

constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there must
be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution and 68
not one that is doubtful, speculative, or argumentative.
Indubitably, petitioners failed to overcome this
presumption in favor of the EPIRA. We find no clear
violation of the Constitution which would warrant a
pronouncement that Sec. 34 of the EPIRA and Rule 18 of
its IRR are unconstitutional and void.
WHEREFORE, the instant case is hereby DISMISSED
for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Puno (C.J.), Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,

SandovalGutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona,
Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Garcia and
Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.
Petition dismissed.
Notes.—The motivation behind many taxation

measures is the implementation of police power goals.
(Southern Cross Cement Corporation vs. Cement
Manufacturers Association of the Philippines, 465 SCRA
532 [2005])
The promotion of public health is a fundamental
obligation of the State—the health of the people is a
primordial governmental concern. (Beltran vs. Secretary of

Health, 476 SCRA 168 [2005])
_______________
67 Freedom from Debt Coalition v. Energy Regulatory Commission,

supra note 61, at pp. 171-172.
68 Arceta v. Mangrobang, G.R. Nos. 152895 & 153151, June 15, 2004,
432 SCRA 136, 142, citing Lacson v. The Executive Secretary, 361 Phil.
251, 263; 301 SCRA 298, 311 (1999).
727
VOL. 527, JULY 17, 2007 727

Bulos, Jr. vs. Yasuma
Police power does not rely upon the existence of definitive

studies to support its use—the yardstick has always been
simply whether the governments’ act is reasonable and not
oppressive. Scientific certainty and conclusiveness, though
desirable, may not be demanded in every situation,
otherwise, no government will be able to act in situations
demanding the exercise of its residual powers because it
will be tied up conducting studies. (Mirasol vs. Department
of Public Works and Highways, 490 SCRA 318 [2006])
——o0o——
© Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

Rochi vs. Department of Energy

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Rochi vs. Department of Energy

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Rochi vs. Department of Energy

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

8/23/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 527

696 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

ROMEO P. GEROCHI, KATULONG NG BAYAN (KB) and

Courts; Judicial Review; Hierarchy of Courts; Petitioners

entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be

VOL. 527, JULY 17, 2007 697

Gerochi vs. Department of Energy

exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a

698 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Gerochi vs. Department of Energy

Same; Same; Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001

aforementioned cases. With the Universal Charge, a Special Trust

VOL. 527, JULY 17, 2007 699

Gerochi vs. Department of Energy

the principle of non-delegation of powers, as expressed in the

promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given statute

700 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Gerochi vs. Department of Energy

entirety, in relation to Sec. 34 thereof, is complete in all its

safety and morals, which used to be the primary social interests in

VOL. 527, JULY 17, 2007 701

Gerochi vs. Department of Energy

essentially involves questions of fact, and thus, this Court is

702 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Gerochi vs. Department of Energy

program.—As a penultimate statement, it may be well to recall

Corporation (NPC), the transition to a competitive structure, and

ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

VOL. 527, JULY 17, 2007 703

Petitioners Romeo P. Gerochi, Katulong Ng Bayan (KB),

“SECTION 34. Universal Charge.—Within one (1) year from the

704 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The universal charge shall be a non-bypassable charge which

directly to the TRANSCO. The PSALM Corp., as administrator of

VOL. 527, JULY 17, 2007 705

Congress enacted the 7

Electrification and authorizing the National Transmission

7 Manila Electric Company, Inc. v. Lualhati, G.R. Nos. 166769 and

706 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

and Distribution Utilities to collect the same from its

“WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the

(a) June 26-July 25, 2003 for National Transmission

Relative thereto, TRANSCO and Dus are directed to collect the

On August 13, 2003, NPC-SPUG filed a Motion 14

13 Id., at pp. 215-224.

VOL. 527, JULY 17, 2007 707

above-mentioned Decision, which the ERC granted in its

“WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the “Motion

1. Projects for CY 2002 undertaken;

Meanwhile, on April 2, 2003, ERC decided ERC Case No.

responsive to the needs and constraints of missionary electrification; (2)

708 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Hence, this original action.

“1) The universal charge provided for under Sec. 34 of

2) The ERC is also empowered to approve and

Petitioners contend that the Universal Charge has the

VOL. 527, JULY 17, 2007 709

and timely monitored by the legislature. Thus, there was a 21