Vita Vs Montano

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 194 18/10/2019, 11)28 AM
180 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Vita vs. Montanano
*
G.R. No. 50553. February 19, 1991.
NAZARIO VITA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. SOLEDAD

MONTA-NANO, ESTANISLAO JOVELLANO AND
ESTEBANA JOVEL-LANO, defendants-appellants. JOSE,
ELENA AND ALODIA, ALL SURNAMED MONTANANO,
intervenors-appellants.
Civil Law; Paraphernal Property; Evidence; Documentary and

Testimonial Evidence; The three (3) parcels of land mentioned in the
complaint were paraphernal properties of Isidra Montanano, being
supported by documentary and testimonial evidence.·We are in
conformity with the finding of the trial court that the three (3)
parcels of land mentioned in the complaint were paraphernal
properties of Isidra Montanano, being supported by documentary
and testimonial evidence (p. 48, Record on Appeal): „x x x, plaintiff
claims that in accordance with the inventory prepared by Edilberto
Vita of his properties before his death (Exhs. „O‰, „O-1‰, „O-1-A‰, „O-
1-B‰ and „O-1-C‰), the parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration No.
4 (old) was a paraphernal property of his wife Isidra Montanano
while the parcels of land covered by Tax Declaration Nos. 72 (old)
and 73 were conjugal properties of the spouses Edilberto Vita and
Isidra Montanano as they were donated to the latter by Francisca
Asilo during their marriage. It is the contention of the plaintiff that
upon the death of Isidra Montan-ano, her husband Edilberto Vita
acquired ownership of these properties. „This contention of the
plaintiff in effect corroborates the claim of the defendants and
intervenors that all the three (3) parcels of land, subject-matter of
the complaint, including all the parcels of land being claimed by
them in the intervenorÊs counterclaim, were all parapher-nal
properties of Isidra Montanano. The two (2) parcels of land
supposedly received as donation by Isidra Montanano during her
http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016ddce3e272ba059cfe003600fb002c009e/p/APX459/?username=Guest Page 1 of 19
marriage with Edilberto Vita should be classified as her

paraphernal properties, it being acquired by her through lucrative
title (Art. 148, Civil Code). On the other hand, plaintiff Ês testimony
that the third parcel of land covered in the complaint was inherited
by Edilberto Vita from Isidra Montanano is an admission that the
said property was the paraphernal property of the latter. „The
defendants and intervenors claim that the above-stated three (3)
parcels of land and the properties covered in their counterclaim
were donated to them by Isidra Montan-ano by virtue of two (2)
deeds of donation she executed on November 22, 1938 and
December 20, 1940. They presented testimonial and
________________
* FIRST DIVISION.
181
VOL. 194, FEBRUARY 19, 1991 181
Vita vs. Montanano
documentary evidence to prove that Isidra Montanano acquired all

these parcels of land, either by inheritance or donation, from her
father Domingo Montanano, her aunt Francisca Asilo and her uncle
Juan Asilo. Aside from this, the tax declarations covering the
properties involved in the complaint and counterclaim are mostly in
the name of Isidra Montanano, except one each in the name of her
father Domingo Montanano, her aunt Francisca Asilo and her
nephew Jose Samonte. The court is convinced, therefore, that all
the properties involved in this litigation were the paraphernal
properties of the deceased Isidra Montanano.‰
Same; Conjugal Property; Remedial Law; Special Proceedings;
Settlement of Estate of deceased persons; It is not necessary to file a
separate proceeding in court for the proper disposition of the estate of
Isidra Montanano. If both spouses died, the conjugal partnership
shall be liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedngs of either.·
Whatever merit there may be in plaintiff-appellantÊs claim that
upon the death of Isidra Montanano, the ownership of these parcels
of land (except with respect to the parcel of land covered by Tax

Declaration No. 1253 (4, old) which was validly donated to
defendants-appellants and inter-venors-appellants by Isidra
Montanano, as We shall discuss later) are vested upon Edilberto
Vita by operation of law, subject only to the right of her nephew and
nieces, liquidation of the conjugal partnership of Isidra Montanano
and Edilberto Vita must be undertaken prior to the adjudication of
properties to the heirs (Vicente J. Fran-cisco, The Revised Rules of
Court in the Philippines, 1970 Edition, p. 619). In this connection,
contrary to the trial courtÊs ruling, it is not necessary to file a
separate proceeding in court for the proper disposition of the estate
of Isidra Montanano. Under Rule 73, Section 2 of the Rules of
Court, if both spouses have died, the conjugal partnership shall be
liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of either. In the
present case, therefore, the conjugal partnerhip of Isidra
Montanano and Edilberto Vita should be liquidated in the testate
proceedings of the latter.
Same; Donation; Acceptance; Acceptance is necessary in a
donation. This applies to all kinds of donation because the law does
not make any distinction.·It is explicit in Article 725 of the Civil
Code that acceptance is necessary in a donation. This applies to all
kinds of donation because the law does not make any distinction.
The rationale behind the requirement of acceptance is that nobody
is obliged to receive a benefit against his will (Arturo M. Tolentino,
Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the
Philippines, Volume II, 1972 Edition, p. 521). We uphold the trial
court that (p. 50, Record on
182
Vita vs. Montanano
Appeal): „x x x, notwithstanding the fact that from the secondary

evidence presented, the said deed of donation mortis causa of
Novem-ber 22, 1938 seems to have been legally and validly
executed, it cannot be given force and effect as the acceptance
thereof by the donees is void and illegal in as much (sic) as they
were made at the time of the execution of the document, not after
the death of the donor Isidra Montanano. A donation mortis causa

takes effect only after the death of the donor, consequently it is only
after the latterÊs death that its acceptance maybe made.
Same; Donation inter vivos; It was obviously the intention of
Isidra Montanano to grant a donation inter vivos to defendants-
appellants and intervenors-appellants in the second deed of
donation.·The quoted provision in the second deed of donation
should be understood in its entirety. Thus, based on the first part of
the paragraph which states „ Â[n]a bagaman at sa kasulatang ito ay
lubusan ng ibinibigay at ipinagkakaloob sa bawat isa x x x na iyon
ay patuluyan nang ngayoÊy iguinagawad sa kanila ng walang
pasubali, na magagawa na nila ang buong karapatan ngayon
bilang tunay na may-ari x x xÊ ‰ (italics supplied), supra, it was
obviously the intention of Isidra Montanano to grant a donation
inter vivos to defendants-appellants and intervenors-appellants.
Although the rest of the paragraph states „ Âgayon man, ay kami pa
ring mag-asawa ang mananatili sa pag-mamayari, pakikina-bang
at pamomosision,·na kani-kaniyang pag-aaring ditoÊy ipinag-
kakaloob, sa buong panahon na ang bawat isa sa amin mag-asawaÊy
nabubuhay, at kung kailan bawian kami ng hiram na buhay, ay
saka at saka pa lamang maaring matamo nila ang ganap na
pagmamayari at pakikinabang sa mga pag-aaring iyan x x x,Ê ‰
supra, We have adjudged in the case of Heirs of Juan Bonsato, et al.
v. Court of Appeals, et al., 95 Phil. 481, 488: „It is true that the last
paragraph in each donation contains the phrase Âthat after the
death of the donor the aforesaid donation shall become effective.Ê x x
x However, said expression must be construed together with the
rest of the paragraph, and thus taken, its meaning clearly appears
to be that after the donorÊs death, the donation will take effect so as
to make the donees the absolute owners of the donated property,
free from all liens and encumbrances; for it must be remembered
that the donor reserved for himself a share of the fruits of the land
donated. Such reservation constituted a charge or encumbrance
that would disappear upon the donorÊs death, when full title would
become vested in the donees.‰
Same; Same; When the main consideration of the donation is
not the death of the donor but rather the services rendered to him by
the donee or his affection for the latter, the donation should be
considered
183
VOL. 194, FEBRUARY 19, 1991 183
Vita vs. Montanano
as inter vivos.·As We have ruled in Concepcion, et al. v.

Concepcion, 91 Phil. 823, 830. „x x x, even if he (donor) says it (the
donation) is to take effect after his death, when from the body of the
instrument or donation it is to be gathered that the main
consideration of the donation is not the death of the donor but
rather services rendered to him, by the donee or his affection for the
latter, then the donation should be considered as inter vivos, x x x,
and the condition that the donation is to take effect only after the
death of the donor should be interpreted as meaning that the
possession and enjoyment of the fruits of the property donated
should take place only after donorÊs death.‰
APPEAL from the decision of the then Court of First

Instance of Biñan, Laguna, Br. I.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
In a resolution dated March 16, 1979, the Court of Appeals

certified this case to Us because it involves pure questions
of law (pp. 70-80, Rollo).
The pertinent facts are as follows:
A complaint was filed before the Court of First Instance
(now Regional Trial Court) of Laguna by plaintiff-appellant
Nazario Vita, in his capacity as judicial administrator of
the estate of deceased Edilberto Vita, seeking to recover
from defendants-appellants Soledad Montanano,
Estanislao Jovellano and Estebana Jovellano the
possession of three (3) parcels of land located in Barrio
Talangan, Nagcarlan, Laguna and their annual yield since
January, 1962 in the amount of P1,100.00 a year. Plaintiff-
appellant claims that during the lifetime of Edilberto Vita,
he was the owner and possessor of these three (3) parcels of
land covered by: Tax Declaration No. 1252 (73, old) with an
area of 3,640 square meters, Tax Declaration No. 1231 (72,
old) with an area of 1,000 square meters, and Tax
Declaration No. 1253 (4, old) with an area of 640 square
meters; and he was enjoying the fruits therefrom. When he

died on January 23, 1962, defendants-appellants, through
stealth and strategy, took possession of the above-stated
parcels of land and gathered the fruits therefrom.
Notwithstanding demands from plaintiff-appellant,
defendants-appellants refused to surrender the posses-
184

Vita vs. Montanano
sion of these parcels of land. Plaintiff-appellant further

claims reimbursement in the sum of P2,000.00 as
attorneyÊs fees and P1,000.00 as actual or compensatory
damages.
In their answer dated December 1, 1964, defendants-
appellants deny that the three (3) parcels of land belong to
the estate of Edilberto Vita. Instead, they claim that the
two parcels of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 1252
and Tax Declaration No. 1231 belong to Soledad
Montanano as these were conveyed to her by Isidra
Montanano (her aunt and wife of Edilberto Vita) and
Edilberto Vita in a document signed and executed by them
on November 22, 1938 and ratified by one Mr. Matienzo, a
Notary Public from Nagcarlan, Laguna. However, all copies
of said document were lost during the last war. The parcel
of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 1253 is owned in
common by Soledad Montanano, her brother Jose and
sisters Elena and Alodia. It originally belonged to
Francisca Asilo, deceased sister of their grandmother,
Micaela Asilo. Its ownership was transferred to them under
the arrangement sanctioned by Edilberto Vita himself
wherein all the proceeds from the yearly harvests
therefrom shall be spent for the yearly masses to be held
for the souls of Francisca Asilo and Isidra Montanano. This
being the case, plaintiff-appellant is now estopped from
instituting this action. Defendants-appellants claim also
that Edilberto Vita could not have inherited these parcels
of land from Isidra Montanano as the latterÊs estate has
never been the subject of a judicial or extra-judicial
proceeding. The erroneous inclusion of these parcels of land
in the inventory of the estate of Edilberto Vita in Special

Proceedings No. SC-136 of the Court of First Instance of
Laguna does not make them actually a part of his estate.
There is no fixed income from these parcels of land because
since 1962, plaintiff-appellant, with unknown persons, has
been gathering whatever crops that may be taken
therefrom. And, by reason of the malicious filing of this
complaint, they seek reimbursement of the amount of
P1,000.00 representing attorneyÊs fees and other litigation
expenses.
Replying to defendants-appellantsÊ answer, plaintiff-
appellant claims that Isidra Montanano and Edilberto Vita
never executed any document on November 22, 1938 and if
they had, it was thereafter repudiated, canceled and
destroyed, for which reason, the three (3) parcels of land
remained in the possession
185
VOL. 194, FEBRUARY 19, 1991 185

Vita vs. Montanano
of Isidra Montanano and Edilberto Vita; that upon the

death on September 25, 1957 of Isidra Montanano, who left
neither descendants nor ascendants, her surviving spouse
Edilberto Vita succeeded her and took immediate
possession of her estate; and that from the time
defendants-appellants took possession of these parcels of
land, they have continuously gathered the fruits therefrom.
In a petition dated August 20, 1966, Jose, Elena and
Alodia Montanano sought leave of court to intervene in this
case. In the order of the trial court dated April 12, 1967,
the amended answer dated September 10, 1966, which
intervenors-appel-lants filed jointly with Soledad
Montanano, was admitted as their answer-in-intervention.
Incorporated therein is a counter-claim that Soledad, Jose,
Elena and Alodia Montanano are the co-owners of (pp. 43-
44, Record on Appeal):
„(a) A parcel of coconut land situated in Bo. Bangbang,

Nagcar-lan, Laguna, containing an area of 2,450
square meters, more or less, covered by Tax
Declaration No. 8953;

„(b) A parcel of coconut and secano land situated in Bo.
Buboy, Nagcarlan, Laguna with an area of 15,096
square meters, more or less, and covered by Tax
Declaration No. 10228;
„(c) A parcel of coconut land, with its improvements,
situated in Bo. Yucos, Nagcarlan, Laguna, with an
area of 2,500 square meters, more or less, and
covered by Tax Declaration No. 7999;
„(d) A parcel of coconut land, with its improvements,
situated in Bo. Talangan, Nagcarlan, Laguna, with
an area of 12,865 square meters, more or less, and
covered by Tax Declaration No. 1233 (sic) (third
parcel of land in the complaint); and
„(e) A parcel of residential land, with its improvements,
situated in Gen. Luna, Nagcarlan, Laguna, with an
area of 167.50 square meters, more or less, and
covered by Tax Declaration No. 102;‰
that Jose Montanano is the sole owner of (p. 44, ibid):
„(a) A parcel of coconut land, with improvements

thereon, situated in Bo. Bangbang, Nagcarlan,
Laguna, with an area of 10,000 square meters,
more or less, and covered by Tax Declaration No.
6493; and
„(b) A parcel of coconut land, with improvements
thereon, situated in Bo. Banago, Nagcarlan,
Laguna, with an area of 9,604 square meters, more
or less, and covered by Tax Declaration No. 8304;‰
186

Vita vs. Montanano
that Soledad Montanano is the sole owner of (p. 44,

ibid):
thereon, situated in Bo. Talangan, Nagcarlan,
Laguna, with an area of 4,165 square meters more

or less, and covered by Tax Declaration No. 123 (sic)
(the second parcel of land in the complaint); and
thereon, situated in Bo. Talangan, Nagcarlan,
Laguna, containing an area of 10,434 square
meters, more or less; and covered by Tax
Declaration No. 1252 (the first parcel of land in the
complaint);‰
that Alodia Montanano is the sole owner of (p. 44, ibid):
„(a) A parcel of coconut land and irrigated riceland, with

improvements thereon, situated in Bo. Buboy,
Nagcarlan, Laguna, containing an area of 24,153
square meters, more or less and covered by Tax
Declaration No. 10268; and
thereon, situated in Bo. Buboy, Nagcarlan, Laguna,
containing an area of 1,619 square meters, more or
less, and covered by Tax Declaration No. 8510;‰
that Elena Montanano is the sole owner of (p. 44, ibid):

thereon, situated in Bo. Buboy, Nagcarlan, Laguna,
containing an area of 6,242 square meters, more or
less, and covered by Tax Declaration No. 8511; and
„(b) A portion of a parcel of riceland situated at C. Lirio
St., Nagcarlan, Laguna, containing an area of 9,691
square meters, more or less and covered by Tax
Declaration No. 1184.‰
They alleged therein that they acquired ownership of the

three (3) parcels of land mentioned in the complaint, which
are in the possession of Soledad Montanano, and the other
parcels of land mentioned in their counterclaim, which are
in the possession of plaintiff-appellant, by virtue of a
donation mortis causa executed by Isidra Montanano on
November 22, 1938 or by a donation executed by her on
December 20, 1940 which was confirmed by Edilberto Vita.
They pray that these parcels of land be adjudicated to them
in the manner set forth in their counterclaim; that

plaintiff-appellant be ordered to account for
187
VOL. 194, FEBRUARY 19, 1991 187

Vita vs. Montanano
the harvests from these parcels of land from the time he

took possession; and that they be awarded damages
corresponding to their litigation expenses.
In his reply dated July 4, 1967, plaintiff-appellant
denied all the allegations contained in the answer-in-
intervention and reiterated that there was no such
donation executed by Isidra Montanano. If such donation
were really executed, she was forced to do so at a time
when she was not mentally in a position to execute and
sign freely said document.
On September 15, 1973, the trial court rendered
judgment adverse to all parties, the dispositive portion of
which reads (p. 52, Record on Appeal):
„Considering that the plaintiff has not shown by preponderating

evidence that the three (3) parcels of land covered in the complaint
belong to the estate of Edilberto Vita and it appearing likewise that
the defendants and intervenors have not shown that the parcels of
land covered in the counterclaim were validly donated to them and
that they have legally accepted the donation made by Isidra
Montan-ano, the complaint filed by the plaintiff and the
counterclaim filed by the intervenors are hereby DISMISSED. This
is without prejudice to the filing of a separate proceedings (sic) in
Court for the proper disposition of the estate of the deceased Isidra
Montanano, including that of her share in the fruits of the
properties donated to her during her marriage with Edilberto Vita
which is considered part of their conjugal properties. No assessment
is hereby made with respect to the damages sustained by the
parties as they offset each other, if any.
„Without pronouncement as to costs.
„SO ORDERED.‰
All parties appealed to the Court of Appeals. The case is

now before Us raising mainly the following legal issues:
1) whether or not the three (3) parcels of land

mentioned in the complaint are included in the
estate of Edilberto Vita (as regards the appeal of
plaintiff-appel-lant); and
2) whether or not acceptance is necessary in a
donation mortis causa; and whether the donation
dated December 20, 1940 is mortis causa or inter
vivos (with respect to the appeal of defendants-
appellants and intervenors-appel-lants).
188

Vita vs. Montanano
Plaintiff-appellant avers that the trial court failed to

consider that Edilberto VitaÊs right to the conjugal half in
the first two parcels as surviving spouse had ceased to be
inchoate upon the death of Isidra in 1957, and that such
right had been vested upon him by operation of law. With
respect to the conjugal half pertaining to Isidra in said two
parcels, and the entirety of the third parcel as her
paraphernal property, they were likewise vested upon him
by operation of law, subject only to the right of her nephew
and nieces, pursuant to Articles 995 and 1001 of the New
Civil Code.
In other words, plaintiff-appellant is again claiming that
the parcels of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 1252
(73, old) and Tax Declaration No. 1231 (72, old) are
conjugal properties of Isidra Montanano and Edilberto Vita
whereas the parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration No.
1253 (4, old) is the paraphernal property of Isidra
Montanano. We are in conformity with the finding of the
trial court that the three (3) parcels of land mentioned in
the complaint were paraphernal properties of Isidra
Montanano, being supported by documentary and
testimonial evidence (p. 48, Record on Appeal):
„x x x, plaintiff claims that in accordance with the inventory

prepared by Edilberto Vita of his properties before his death (Exhs.
„O‰, „O-1‰, „O-1-A‰, „O-1-B‰ and „O-1-C‰), the parcel of land covered
by Tax Declaration No. 4 (old) was a paraphernal property of his

wife Isidra Montanano while the parcels of land covered by Tax
Declaration Nos. 72 (old) and 73 were conjugal properties of the
spouses Edilberto Vita and Isidra Montanano as they were donated
to the latter by Francisca Asilo during their marriage. It is the
contention of the plaintiff that upon the death of Isidra Montanano,
her husband Edilberto Vita acquired ownership of these properties.
„This contention of the plaintiff in effect corroborates the claim of
the defendants and intervenors that all the three (3) parcels of land,
subject-matter of the complaint, including all the parcels of land
being claimed by them in the intervenorÊs counterclaim, were all
paraphernal properties of Isidra Montanano. The two (2) parcels of
land supposedly received as donation by Isidra Montanano during
her marriage with Edilberto Vita should be classified as her
paraphernal properties, it being acquired by her through lucrative
title (Art. 148, Civil Code). On the other hand, plaintiff Ês testimony
that the third parcel of land covered in the complaint was inherited
by Edilberto Vita from Isidra Montanano is an admission that the
said property was the
189
VOL. 194, FEBRUARY 19, 1991 189

Vita vs. Montanano
paraphernal property of the latter.

„The defendants and intervenors claim that the above-stated
three (3) parcels of land and the properties covered in their
counterclaim were donated to them by Isidra Montanano by virtue
of two (2) deeds of donation she executed on November 22, 1938 and
December 20, 1940. They presented testimonial and documentary
evidence to prove that Isidra Montanano acquired all these parcels
of land, either by inheritance or donation, from her father Domingo
Montanano, her aunt Francisca Asilo and her uncle Juan Asilo.
Aside from this, the tax declarations covering the properties
involved in the complaint and counterclaim are mostly in the name
of Isidra Montanano, except one each in the name of her father
Domingo Montanano, her aunt Francisca Asilo and her nephew
Jose Samonte. The court is convinced, therefore, that all the
properties involved in this litigation were the paraphernal
properties of the deceased Isidra Montanano.‰
Whatever merit there may be in plaintiff-appellantÊs claim

that upon the death of Isidra Montanano, the ownership of
these parcels of land (except with respect to the parcel of
land covered by Tax Declaration No. 1253 (4, old) which
was validly donated to defendants-appellants and
intervenors-appellants by Isidra Montanano, as We shall
discuss later) are vested upon Edilberto Vita by operation
of law, subject only to the right of her nephew and nieces,
liquidation of the conjugal partnership of Isidra Montanano
and Edilberto Vita must be undertaken prior to the
adjudication of properties to the heirs (Vicente J. Francisco,
The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines, 1970
Edition, p. 619). In this connection, contrary to the trial
courtÊs ruling, it is not necessary to file a separate
proceeding in court for the proper disposition of the estate
of Isidra Montanano. Under Rule 73, Section 2 of the Rules
of Court, if both spouses have died, the conjugal
partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or intestate
proceedings of either. In the present case, therefore, the
conjugal partnership of Isidra Montanano and Edilberto
Vita should be liquidated in the testate proceedings of the
latter.
Defendants-appellants and intervenors-appellants allege
the following: 1) that a donation mortis causa (as in the
case of the November 22, 1938 donation), being in the
nature of a legacy, need not be accepted; their acceptance of
that donation is superfluous; and 2) that the December 20,
1940 donation is a
190

Vita vs. Montanano
donation inter vivos because: a) there is no stipulation or

provision therein that the donation is essentially revocable;
b) there was an acceptance of the donation; c) the donation
was not simply made in consideration of the death of the
donor but of her affection for the **donees.
It is explicit in Article 725 of the Civil Code that
acceptance is necessary in a donation. This applies to all
kinds of donation because the law does not make any
distinction. The rationale behind the requirement of

acceptance is that nobody is obliged to receive a benefit
against his will (Arturo M. Tolentino, Commentaries and
Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Phil-ippines, Volume
II, 1972 Edition, p. 521). We uphold the trial court that (p.
„x x x, notwithstanding the fact that from the secondary evidence

presented, the said deed of donation mortis causa of November 22,
1938 seems to have been legally and validly executed, it cannot be
given force and effect as the acceptance thereof by the donees is void
and illegal in as much (sic) as they were made at the time of the
execution of the document, not after the death of the donor Isidra
Montanano. A donation mortis causa takes effect only after the
death of the donor, consequently it is only after the latterÊs death
that its acceptance maybe made.
„x x x.
However, We adopt a view contrary to that of the trial court

regarding the second allegation of defendants-appellants
and intervenors-appellants. According to the trial court (p.
„The defendants and intervenors further claim that all the

properties covered by that counterclaim were donated to them by
Isidra Montanano pursuant to a second deed of donation executed
by the latter on December 20, 1940 (Exh. Â3Ê). A careful study of the
said document, however, shows that it is another deed of donation
mortis
_______________
** Article 725 of the Civil Code provides:
„ART. 725. Donation is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously of a thing or
right in favor of another, who accepts it.‰
(see also Articles 734, 745 and 746 of the same Code).
191
VOL. 194, FEBRUARY 19, 1991 191

Vita vs. Montanano
causa, considering the following provisions appearing therein with

respect to its effectivity:
ÂNa bagaman at sa kasulatang ito ay lubusan ng ibinibigay at

ipinagkakaloob sa bawat isa ng pag-aaring ditoÊy itinungod sa kani-
kanila, matangi ang ganang napaukol sa kay Dr. Vicente C. Chipongian
at kay Maria Osuna, na iyon ay patuluyan nang ngayoÊy iguinagawad sa
kanila ng walang pasubali, na maga-gawa na nila ang buong karapatan
ngayon bilang tunay na may-ari, gayon man, ay kami pa ring mag-asawa
ang mananatili sa pag-mamayari, pakikinabang at pamomosision, sa
kani-kaniyang pag-aaring ditoÊy ipinagkakaloob, sa buong panahon na
ang bawat isa sa amin mag-asawaÊy nabubuhay, at kung kailan bawian
kami ng hiram na buhay, ay saka at saka pa lamang maaring matamo
nila ang ganap na pagmamayari at pakikina-bang sa mga pag-aaring
iyan na ditoÊy inihayag nila ang pagtan-gap.Ê
„From this provision of the document, it clearly appears that the

donors shall continue to be the owner and possessors of the
properties involved in the donation and shall continue to enjoy the
fruits of said properties while they are still living and it is only
upon their death that ownership will transfer to the donees. It was
the evident intent of the donors in this case to give the donation
after their death. In the meantime, they retain full or naked
ownership and control of the properties while they are still living
and title will pass to the donees only after their death. This is
donation mortis causa (Heirs of Bonsato v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. L-6600, July 30, 1954, 50 O.G. 3568; Howard v. Padilla, G.R. L-
7064, 7098, April 22, 1955).‰
The quoted provision in the second deed of donation should

be understood in its entirety. Thus, based on the first part
of the paragraph which states „ Â[n]a bagaman at sa
kasulatang ito ay lubusan ng ibinibigay at ipinagkakaloob
sa bawat isa x x x na iyon ay patuluyan nang ngayoÊy
iguinagawad sa kanila ng walang pasubali, na magagawa
na nila ang buong karapatan ngayon bilang tunay na may-
ari x x xÊ ‰ (italics supplied), supra, it was obviously the
intention of Isidra Montanano to grant a donation inter
vivos to defendants-appellants and intervenors-appellants.
Although the rest of the paragraph states „ Âgayon man, ay
kami pa ring mag-asawa ang mananatili sa pag-mama-
yari, pakikinabang at pamomosision,·na kani-kaniyang
pag-aaring ditoÊy ipinagkakaloob, sa buong panahon na ang
bawat isa sa amin mag-asawaÊy nabubuhay, at kung kailan

bawian
192

Vita vs. Montanano
kami ng hiram na buhay, ay saka at saka pa lamang

maaring matamo nila ang ganap na pagmamayari at
pakikinabang sa mga pag-aaring iyan x x x,Ê ‰ supra, We
have adjudged in the case of Heirs of Juan Bonsato, et al. v.
Court of Appeals, et al., 95 Phil. 481, 488:
„It is true that the last paragraph in each donation contains the
phrase Âthat after the death of the donor the aforesaid donation
shall become effective.Ê x x x However, said expression must be
construed together with the rest of the paragraph, and thus taken,
its meaning clearly appears to be that after the donorÊs death, the
donation will take effect so as to make the donees the absolute
owners of the donated property, free from all liens and
encumbrances; for it must be remembered that the donor reserved
for himself a share of the fruits of the land donated. Such
reservation constituted a charge or encumbrance that would
disappear upon the donorÊs death, when full title would become
vested in the donees.‰
It was also Our observation therein that (ibid, at p. 487):
„x x x. The donor only reserved for himself, during his lifetime, the
ownerÊs share of the fruits or produce x x x, a reservation that
would be unnecessary if the ownership of the donated property
remained with the donor. Most significant is the absence of
stipulation that the donor could revoke the donations x x x.‰
Furthermore, mention must be made of the fact that the

consideration of the second deed of donation is love and
services rendered by defendants-appellants and
intervenors-appellants to Isidra Montanano, as revealed by
the third and fourth paragraphs therein (Exhibit „3,‰ for
the defendants):
„Na sapagkat ang banal kong nais ay kung bawian man ako ng
aking hiram na buhay ay matumbasan man lamang sa pamamag-

itan ng isinasagawa kong pagkakaloob sa hinaharap na kasulatan
yuong manga pagdamay, pagmamahal at paghahasikaso na
tinangap ko at tunay na ipinakita sa akin ng mga ditoÊy itinangi ko,
·
„KayaÊt dahil diyaÊy buong puso kong ibinibigay, isinusulit at
ganap na IPINAGKAKALOOB, ang mga natitira ko pang mga
pagaari, na wala pang kinatutunguran o napagbibigyan, sa
kaparaanang ditoÊy itinatagubilen ko, sa manga taong gaya nitong
mga sumusunod:
„x x x.‰
193
VOL. 194, FEBRUARY 19, 1991 193

Vita vs. Montanano
As We have ruled in Concepcion, et al. v. Concepcion, 91

Phil. 823, 830:
„x x x, even if he (donor) says it (the donation) is to take effect after

his death, when from the body of the instrument or donation it is to
be gathered that the main consideration of the donation is not the
death of the donor but rather services rendered to him, by the donee
or his affection for the latter, then the donation should be
considered as inter vivos, x x x, and the condition that the donation
is to take effect only after the death of the donor should be
interpreted as meaning that the possession and enjoyment of the
fruits of the property donated should take place only after donorÊs
death.‰
Along the same line of ratiocination is Our holding in

Balaqui, et al. v. Dongso, et al., 53 Phil. 673, 677:
„x x x, that as the donor guaranteed the right which she conferred

on the donee by virtue of the deed of gift, wherein, in recompense of
the latterÊs good services to the former, she donates to her the two
parcels of land with their improvements, said gift is inter vivos and
irrevocable, and not mortis causa, notwithstanding the fact that the
donor stated in said deed that she did not transfer the ownership of
the two parcels of land donated, save upon her death, for such a
statement can mean nothing else than that she only reserved to
herself the possession and usufruct of said property, and because

the donor could not very well guarantee the aforesaid right after
her death.‰
ACCORDINGLY, the appeal of plaintiff-appellant is hereby

DENIED whereas the appeal of defendants-appellants is
hereby PARTLY GRANTED. The decision of the Court of
First Instance of Laguna dated September 15, 1973 is
MODIFIED as follows: 1) the dismissal of the complaint of
plaintiff-appellant is AFFIRMED; 2) the dismissal of the
counterclaim of defen-dants-appellants and intervenors-
appellants is SET ASIDE; and 3) plaintiff-appellant is
ordered: a) to deliver the possession of the properties
donated to defendants-appellants and interve-nors-
appellants by virtue of the deed of donation dated Decem-
ber 20, 1940, and b) to render an accounting of the products
harvested therefrom from January 23, 1962 up to the
present.
194

Locsin vs. Valenzuela
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (Chairman), Cruz, Gancayco and Griño-

Aquino, JJ., concur.
Appeal of plaintiff-appellant denied. Appeal of

defendants-appellants, partly granted. Decision modified.
Note.·Determination of whether a donation is inter

vivos or mortis causa depends upon the nature of the
disposition to be made. (National Treasurer of the
Philippines vs. Vda. de Meim-ban, 131 SCRA 264.)
··o0o··
© Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

Vita Vs Montano

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Vita Vs Montano

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Vita Vs Montano

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 194 18/10/2019, 11)28 AM

180 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

NAZARIO VITA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. SOLEDAD

Civil Law; Paraphernal Property; Evidence; Documentary and

marriage with Edilberto Vita should be classified as her

VOL. 194, FEBRUARY 19, 1991 181

Vita vs. Montanano

documentary evidence to prove that Isidra Montanano acquired all

of land (except with respect to the parcel of land covered by Tax

182 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Vita vs. Montanano

Appeal): „x x x, notwithstanding the fact that from the secondary

the death of the donor Isidra Montanano. A donation mortis causa

VOL. 194, FEBRUARY 19, 1991 183

Vita vs. Montanano

as inter vivos.·As We have ruled in Concepcion, et al. v.

APPEAL from the decision of the then Court of First

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

In a resolution dated March 16, 1979, the Court of Appeals

meters; and he was enjoying the fruits therefrom. When he

184 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

sion of these parcels of land. Plaintiff-appellant further

in the inventory of the estate of Edilberto Vita in Special

VOL. 194, FEBRUARY 19, 1991 185

of Isidra Montanano and Edilberto Vita; that upon the

„(a) A parcel of coconut land situated in Bo. Bangbang,

Declaration No. 8953;

that Jose Montanano is the sole owner of (p. 44, ibid):

„(a) A parcel of coconut land, with improvements

186 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

that Soledad Montanano is the sole owner of (p. 44,

Laguna, with an area of 4,165 square meters more

that Alodia Montanano is the sole owner of (p. 44, ibid):

„(a) A parcel of coconut land and irrigated riceland, with

that Elena Montanano is the sole owner of (p. 44, ibid):

„(a) A parcel of coconut land, with improvements

They alleged therein that they acquired ownership of the

in the manner set forth in their counterclaim; that

VOL. 194, FEBRUARY 19, 1991 187

the harvests from these parcels of land from the time he

„Considering that the plaintiff has not shown by preponderating

All parties appealed to the Court of Appeals. The case is

1) whether or not the three (3) parcels of land

188 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Plaintiff-appellant avers that the trial court failed to

„x x x, plaintiff claims that in accordance with the inventory

by Tax Declaration No. 4 (old) was a paraphernal property of his

VOL. 194, FEBRUARY 19, 1991 189

paraphernal property of the latter.

Whatever merit there may be in plaintiff-appellantÊs claim

190 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

donation inter vivos because: a) there is no stipulation or

distinction. The rationale behind the requirement of

„x x x, notwithstanding the fact that from the secondary evidence

However, We adopt a view contrary to that of the trial court

„The defendants and intervenors further claim that all the

** Article 725 of the Civil Code provides:

right in favor of another, who accepts it.‰