Cuaycong V Benedicto

EDUARDO CUAYCONG v RAMONA BENEDICTO et.
al
Facts:
The issues in this case relate to the right of plaintiffs to make use of two roads
existing on the Hacienda Toreno, a tract of land in the municipality of Victorias, Negros
Occidental, the property of the defendants, Blasa Benedicto and Ramona Benedicto. One
of these roads is referred to in the proceedings as the Nanca-Victorias road and the
other as the Dacuman — Toreno road. As the issue regaring the Documan – Toreno road
has been dismissed, the issue that remains to be settled is the one pertaining to the Nanca
– Victorias road.
The allegations provide that the appellees are the owners of a group of haciendas
situated between the southern boundary of the Hacienda Toreno and the barrio of Nanca
and that the appellees are the lessees of part of said haciendas; that more than twenty
years the appellees and their predecessors in interest have made use of the Nanca-
Victorias road, which crosses the Hacienda Toreno, openly, publicly, and continiously, with
the knowledge of the owners of the said hacienda, for the purpose of conveying the
products of their haciendas to the town of Victorias and to the landing place there
situated, and for the purpose of transporting supplies from those points to their
haciendas, making use of the said road by means of carts, carabaos, and other usual means
of transportation; that there is no outlet to a public road from the hacienda occupied by
these plaintiffs, the only road and way by which the products of the plaintiffs' property
can be taken to the town of Victorias and to the landing place there being across the
Hacienda Toreno by the road marked on the plan attached to the complaint; that on the
fifteenth day of November, 1912, the defendants closed the road in question at the point
at which it crosses the Hacienda Toreno, and refused to permit plaintiffs to continue using
it; that plaintiffs were about to commence to grind their crop of sugar cane, and that, if
prevented from transporting their sugar across the Hacienda Toreno to their point of
embarkation, would suffer damages difficult to estimate. Upon these averments of fact
the plaintiffs prayed for a judgment that they are entitled to use the road in question as
they have been using it in the past, and that a perpetual injunction be issued against
plaintiffs restraining them from impending such use. Upon the filing of the complaint,
plaintiffs moved the court to issue a preliminary injunction restraining defendants from
interfering with the use of the road during the pendency of the suit, which motion was
granted by the court.
Defendants in their answer put in issue all the special averments of the complaint,
as above set forth, and by way of counterclaim and special defense, averred that the road
crossing the Hacienda Toreno, over which plaintiffs claim the right of passage, is the
private property of defendants; and, further, that they have not refused plaintiffs
permission to pass over this road but have required them to pay toll for the privilege of
doing so. Defendants also claimed damages for the use of the road by plaintiffs during the
pendency of the suit, alleging that the preliminary injunction had been improvidently issued
upon false statements contained in the verified complaint filed by plaintiffs.
ISSUE: WON THE NANCA – VICTORIAS ROAD AT THE POINT WHICH IT TRAVERSES
THE HACIENDA TORENA IS A PUBLIC HIGHWAY.
Ruling:
No, the Nanca – Victorias road at the point which it traverses the Hacienda Torena
is not a public highway.
It is settled of law that a property is assumed to be free from all encumbrance

unless the contrary is proved.
There is admittedly no evidence to show that the land occupied by the road here in
question was any time conveyed to the general government or any of its political
subdivisions by the present or any of the former owners of the Hacienda Toreno. There is
no evidence, even remotely, tending to show that the road existed prior to the time when
the property now known as the Hacienda Toreno passed from the State into private
ownership. The record fails to disclose any evidence whatever tending to show that the
Government has at any time asserted any right or title in or to the land occupied by the
road, or that it has incurred any expense whatever in its upkeep or construction. The Civil
Code defines as public roads those which are constructed by the State (art. 339), and as
provincial and town roads those "the expense of which is borne by such towns or
provinces." While it is not contended that this definition is exclusive, it does show that
during the Spanish regime, under normal conditions, roads which were public were
maintained at the public expense, and that the fact that at no time was any expense
incurred by the Government with respect to the road here in question tends strongly to
support the contention of the defendants that it is private way.
The evidence shows that the repairs were made by the owners of the estates
benefited by the road, and by their laborers, as a pure voluntary act for their own
convenience and interest. There being no evidence of a direct grant to the government of
the land occupied by the road in question or that any Government funds or labor were
expended upon it, the question presents itself whether the use to which the road has been
put was such as to justify the conclusion of the lower court that it has become public
property. There being no evidence that the original use of the road by plaintiffs'
predecessors was based upon any grant of the fee to the road or of an easement of way,
or that it began under the assertion of a right on their part, the presumption must be that
the origin of the use was the mere tolerance or license of the owners of the estates
affected.
ISSUE: IF IT BE HELD THAT THE ROAD IN QUESTION IS NOT A PUBLIC HIGHWAY,

WON THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE PROVER THEIR ACQUISITION OF AN EASEMENT OF
WAY OVER THE HACIENDA TORENA AT THE POINT TRAVERSE BY THE ROAD IN
QUESTION.
It is a fundamental principle of the law in this jurisdiction concerning the

possession of real property that such possession is not affected by acts of a possessory
character which are "merely tolerated" by the possessor, or which are due to his license.
This principle is applicable not only with respect to the prescription of the dominium as a
whole, but to the prescription of right in rem.
Possession, under the Civil Code, to constitute the foundation of a prescriptive

right, must be possession under claim of title (en concepto de dueno), or use the common
law equivalent of the term, it must be adverse. Acts of a possessory character performed
by one who holds by mere tolerance of the owner are clearly not en concepto de dueño, and
such possessory acts, no matter how long so continued, do not start the running of the
period of prescription.
In this case, witnesses have testified that they have known the road for a certain
period of years, beginning at a time prior to the enactment of the Civil Code, but no
evidence has been made to prove immemorial use by either of the means of proof
mentioned in this decision cited, nor is immemorial user averred in the complaint as the
basis of the right. It is evident, therefore, that no vested right by user from time
immemorial had been acquired by plaintiffs at the time the Civil Code took effect. Under
that Code (art 539) no discontinuous easement could be acquired by prescription in any
event. Assuming, without deciding, that this rule has been changed by the provisions of the
present Code of Civil Procedure relating to prescription, and that since its enactment
discontinuous easement may be required by prescription, it is clear that this would not
avail plaintiffs. The Code of Civil Procedure went into effect on October 1, 1901. The term
of prescription for the acquisition of rights in real estate is fixed by the Code (sec. 41) at
ten years. The evidence shows that in February, 1911, before the expiration of the term of
ten years since the time the Code of Civil Procedure took effect, the defendants
interrupted the use of the road by the plaintiffs by constructing and maintaining a toll
gate on it and collecting toll from persons making use of it with carts and continued to do
so until they were enjoined by the granting of the preliminary injunction by the trial court
in December, 1912. Our conclusion is, therefore, that the plaintiffs have not acquired by
prescription a right to an easement of way over the defendant's property; that their use
of the Nanca-Victorias road across the Hacienda Toreno was due merely to the tacit
license and tolerance of the defendants and their predecessors in title; that license was
essentially revokable; and that, therefore, the defendants were within their rights when
they closed the road in 1911.

Cuaycong V Benedicto

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EDUARDO CUAYCONG v RAMONA BENEDICTO et.

It is settled of law that a property is assumed to be free from all encumbrance

ISSUE: IF IT BE HELD THAT THE ROAD IN QUESTION IS NOT A PUBLIC HIGHWAY,

It is a fundamental principle of the law in this jurisdiction concerning the

Possession, under the Civil Code, to constitute the foundation of a prescriptive

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