1. PCGG vs.

Dumayas to UCPB and COCOLIFE’s investments not sourced from the

coconut levy funds.
Doctrine  It is the allegations in the complaint that determine the
cause of action and what court has jurisdiction over such
 Exclusive jurisdiction conferred on the Sandiganbayan would evidently cause of action, and not the defenses raised in the motion to
extend not only to the principal causes of action, i.e., the recovery of dismiss and/or answer.
alleged ill-gotten wealth, but also to “all incidents arising from,  Contrary to PCGG’s position, proceeding to hear the cases
incidental to, or related to, such cases,” such as the dispute over the below will not pave the way for re-examining the findings of
sale of the shares, the propriety of the issuance of ancillary writs or this Court in its Decision in COCOFED v. Republic. This is
provisional remedies relative thereto, the sequestration thereof, which because the subject matter of the petitions for declaratory
may not be made the subject of separate actions or proceedings in relief is not the coconut levy funds but their own
another forum. investments in the CIIF OMG and consequent indirect
ownership of the CIIF SMC Block of Shares.
Facts  their title and interest in the subject properties remained
unaffected by the sequestration by PCGG considering that
 UCPB and COCOLIFE filed separate civil cases wherein they both assert the CIIF companies had not done anything to disown or
entitlement over certain shares of some Coconut Industry Investment deny UCPB and COCOLIFE’s stockholdings, as in fact, in their
Fund Companies. They sought for the declaration of their rights over Answer to the petition for declaratory relief, these
the said shares. However, the said claims were opposed by the PCGG companies expressly admitted the existence of respondents’
and the latter filed their motion to dismiss the respective cases. The stockholdings in each respective company.
said cases were later on consolidated.  The SC issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) immediately
 The RTC issued an omnibus order denying the motion to dismiss filed enjoining the respondent judge from proceeding with the hearing of
by the PCGG. the petitions for declaratory relief.
 PCGG contends that
 The RTC has no jurisdiction over the acts performed by Issue
PCGG pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions, particularly
those relating to the issuance of writs of sequestration, and  Whether or not it is the RTC, not the Sandiganbayan, has
that all cases involving ill-gotten wealth assets are under the jurisdiction over suits involving the sequestered coco levy assets
unquestionable jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. and coco levy funds?
 The petitions for declaratory relief of UCPB and Cocolife
actually seek to modify or alter the Decision of the Court Ruling
in COCOFED v. Republic, which has become final and
executory.  No
 UCPB and COCOLIFE are now estopped from asserting any  Respondents’ petitions for declaratory relief filed in the
right over the said properties on account of their inaction for RTC asserted their claim of ownership over the
more than 25 years on the issue of ownership over the sequestered CIIF companies and indirectly the CIIF
sequestered CIIF companies and CIIF SMC Block of Shares. SMC Block of Shares. Undeniably, these are related to
 On the other hand, UCPB and COCOLIFE argue that the ill-gotten wealth cases involving the issue of
 Since they have properly alleged a case for declaratory ownership of the aforesaid sequestered companies and
relief, jurisdiction over the subject matter lies in the regular shares of stock, which have been tried and decided by
courts such as the RTC of Makati City. the Sandiganbayan, and the decision had been
 The Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction if the subject matter appealed to and finally disposed of by this Court.
of the case does not involve or has no relation to the  Exclusive jurisdictionconferred on the
recovery of ill-gotten wealth Sandiganbayan would evidently extend not only to the
 The subject matter of their petitions is the declaration of principal causes of action, i.e., the recovery of alleged
their rights under corporate documents, which in turn relate ill-gotten wealth, but also to “all incidents arising from,
incidental to, or related to, such cases,” such as the
 dispute over the sale of the shares, the propriety of the 2. Escobal vs. Garchitorena
issuance of ancillary writs or provisional remedies
relative thereto, the sequestration thereof, which may Doctrine
not be made the subject of separate actions or
proceedings in another forum.  For the Sandiganbayan to have exclusive jurisdiction over crimes
 In the interest of orderly administration of justice and committed by public officers in relation to their office, it is essential
the policy against multiplicity of suits, it is but proper that the facts showing the intimate relation between the office of the
that all incidents affecting the coconut levy funds and offender and the discharge of official duties must be alleged in the
assets be addressed and resolved by the information.
Sandiganbayan.
 With the final determination made by this Court Facts
in COCOFED v. Republic that these properties
unquestionably belong to the Government as they were  Accused Escobal, a police senior inspector, along with his team,
acquired using the coconut levy funds, the PCGG can conducted a surveillance operation at a certain resto bar in Naga City
now exercise full acts of ownership. due to allegations of drug trafficking.
 Claims of ownership of a portion of the subject CIIF  A shooting incident ensued wherein a certain individual was shot dead.
companies and SMC shares by private entities such as  Due to the said circumstance, Escobal was indicted at the RTC of Naga
UCPB and COCOLIFE are inextricably related to the City and the said court ordered for his suspension.
aforementioned ill-gotten wealth cases filed in the  Escobal filed a motion to quash and asserted that it is the Court Martial
Sandiganbayan. which has jurisdiction over criminal cases against PNP officers.
 Escobal further argued that as a public officer, it is the Sandiganbayan
which has jurisdiction over him since the act complained of was
committed in relation to his office.
 The RTC ordered the prosecution to transmit the case to the
Sandiganbayan.
 However, the Sandiganabayan remanded the case back to the RTC on
the ground that Escobal only had salary grade 23 and that the RTC can
no longer be ousted with its jurisdiction since the prosecution already
rested its case and that the defense had likewise started presenting its
evidence.

Issue

 Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case

against Escobal who is a police senior inspector?

Ruling

 No
 The amended information (to include that the crime
was committed in relation to his office) had no
allegation as to the relation between the office held and
duty discharged.
 For the Sandiganbayan to have exclusive jurisdiction
over crimes committed by public officers in relation to
their office, it is essential that the facts showing the
intimate relation between the office of the offender and
 the discharge of official duties must be alleged in the 3. Serana vs. Sandiganbayan
information.
 It is not enough to merely allege in the information that Doctrine
the crime charged was committed by the offender in
relation to his office because that would be a conclusion  Compensation is merely incidental and not essential to the public
of law. office in order to be considered as a public officer. What makes
 Sec. 2, R.A. 7975 an individual a public officer is the investment of some portion of
 Accused who committed a crime in relation to the sovereign functions of the government to him to be exercised
his office having a salary grade below salary for the benefit of the public.
grade 27 shall be under the jurisdiction of the
proper RTC or MTC as the case may be
depending on the crime charged and the
imposable penalty. Facts

 Serana, in her capacity as student regent of UP, received from the

Office of President Estrada, a financial assistance in the amount of P15
Million for the renovation of a certain school building in UP.
 Apparently, the said project did not materialize.
 Consequently, Serana’s successor as student regent instituted a
complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman. The said office charged
Serana with estafa.
 Serana questioned the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan contending
that:
 Estafa is an offense under Title 10 of the RPC and not from
Title 7 of the RPC wherein the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction
 There was no public fund or property to speak of since the
P15 Million personally came from purse of President Estrada
and not from the the Office of the President
 She is not a public officer as she does not receive any form
of compensation from the government
 She is not empowered to receive any money since the said
power is vested over the Board of Regents as a body
 There was no allegation that the crime was committed in
relation to her office (Soller vs. Sandiganbayan)
 Nonetheless, the Sandiganbayan still assumed jurisdiction over
Serana’s case citing Sec. 4(b) of R.A. 8249

Issue

 Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case

against Serana as student regent of UP?

Ruling

 Yes
 Estafa fall under the jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan 4. Duncano vs. Sandiganbayan
when the public officer committed the crime in relation
to their office such that the crime charged or the act Doctrine
complained of need not be under Title 7 of the RPC
 Compensation is merely incidental and not essential to  Except for those officials specifically included in Section 4 a. (1) (a) to
the public office in order to be considered as a public (g), regardless of their salary grades, over whom the Sandiganbayan
officer has jurisdiction, all other public officials below SG 27 shall be under
 What makes an individual a public officer is the the jurisdiction of the proper trial courts "where none of the principal
investment of some portion of the sovereign functions accused are occupying positions corresponding to SG 27 or higher.
of the government to him to be exercised for the
benefit of the public. Facts
 The UP Board of Regents is similar to a Board of
Trustee of a non-stock corporation such that the  Duncano, a regional director of the BIR,was charged by the Office of
student regent is an officer of the state university the Special Prosecutor (OSP), Office of the Ombudsman, for failure to
regardless of compensation. disclose in his SALN his financial and business interests/connection on
 The Sandiganbayan still acquired jurisdiction in business entities of which he and his family are the registered owners
accordance with the averments in the information. Said thereof, and the SUV registered in the name of his son which are part
jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas and whims of of his assets, to the damage and prejudice of public interest.
the party.  Duncano questioned the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan asserting
 A public office is the right, authority and duty, created that as a public officer, he only had salary grade 26 which is below the
and conferred by law, by which, for a given period, salary grade 27 requirement in order for Sandiganbayan to acquire
either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the jurisdiction
creating power, an individual is invested with some  In Opposition,the OSP argued that a reading of Section 4 (A) (1) (a) to
portion of the sovereign functions of the government, (g) of the subject law would clearly show that the qualification as to
to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The Salary Grade 27 and higher applies only to officials of the executive
individual so invested is a public officer. branch other than the Regional Director and those specifically
enumerated.
 The fact that the position of Regional Director was specifically
mentioned without indication as to its salary grade signifies the
lawmakers’ intention that officials occupying such position, regardless
of salary grade, fall within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
 The Sandiganbayan still assumed jurisdiction over the case

Issue

 Whether or not only Regional Directors with Salary Grade of 27

and higher fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan?

Ruling

 Yes
 Petitioner is not an executive official with Salary Grade
27 or higher. Neither does he hold any position
particularly enumerated in Section 4 (A) (1) (a) to (g).
 As he correctly argues, his case is, in fact, on all fours 5. De Lima vs. Guerrero
with Cuyco.
 The Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over violations Doctrine
of Section 3(a) and (e), Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, unless committed by public officials and  It is true that Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over crimes and
employees occupying positions of regional director and offenses of an official who has a salary grade higher than SG27.
higher with Salary Grade "27" or higher, under the However, since there is an express provision of law which vests
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 the RTC the exclusive original jurisdiction over drug cases, then it
(Republic Act No. 6758) in relation to their office. should prevail.
 Those that fall within the original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan are: (1) officials of the executive Facts
branch with Salary Grade 27 or higher, and (2) officials
specifically enumerated in Section 4 (A) (1) (a) to (g),  A petition was filed by De Lima to assail the issuance of a warrant
regardless of their salary grades. of arrest against her by Judge Juanita Guerrero of the Regional
 Republic Act No. 7975 divested the Sandiganbayan of Trial Court of Muntinlupa, Branch 204 in the criminal case for
jurisdiction over public officials whose salary grades Illegal Drug Trading filed by the government after the resolution
were at Grade "26" or lower, devolving thereby these of the preliminary investigation conducted by the Department of
cases to the lower courts, and retaining the jurisdiction Justice.
of the Sandiganbayan only over public officials whose  Petitioner argues that, based on the allegations of the
salary grades were at Grade "27" or higher and over Information, the Sandiganbayan has the jurisdiction to try and
other specific public officials holding important positions hear the case against her.
in government regardless of salary grade  Sandiganbayan has the exclusive jurisdiction to try the case
 Except for those officials specifically included in Section considering that the acts described in the Information were
4 a. (1) (a) to (g), regardless of their salary grades, intimately related to her position as the Secretary of Justice.
over whom the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction, all  Respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the RTC has
other public officials below SG 27 shall be under the exclusive jurisdiction to try violations of RA 9165, including the
jurisdiction of the proper trial courts "where none of the acts described in the Information against the petitioner.
principal accused are occupying positions corresponding  They contended that Sandiganbayan was specifically created as
to SG 27 or higher. an anti-graft court, it was never conferred with the power to try
drug-related cases even those committed by public officials.

Issue

 Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over violations

of Republic Act No. 9165 committed by a public officer?

Ruling

 No
 RA 9165 specifies the RTC as the court with the jurisdiction
to "exclusively try and hear cases involving violations of [RA
9165)."
 This is an exception, couched in the special law on
dangerous drugs, to the general rule under Section 4(b) of
PD 1606, as amended by RA 10660.
 It is a canon of statutory construction that a special law 6. City of Manila vs. Judge Cuerdo
prevails over a general law and the latter is to be considered
as an exception to the general. Doctrine
 Section 4(b) of PD 1606, as amended by RA 10660*, is the
general law on jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over crimes  the power of the CTA includes that of determining whether or not
and offenses committed by high-ranking public officers in there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
relation to their office; excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC in issuing an
 Section 90 of RA 9165 is the special law excluding from the interlocutory order in cases falling within the exclusive appellate
Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction violations of RA 9165 jurisdiction of the tax court.
committed by such public officers. In the latter case,  It, thus, follows that the CTA, by constitutional mandate, is
jurisdiction is vested upon the RTCs designated by the vested with jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari in these cases.
Supreme Court as drugs court, regardless of whether the
violation of RA 9165 was committed in relation to the public Facts
officials' office.
 petitioner City of Manila assessed taxes against private
respondents who are certain companies under the SM Group.
 said assessment covered the local business taxes petitioners were
authorized to collect under Section 21 of the Revised Revenue
Code of Manila.
 Because payment of the taxes assessed was a precondition for
the issuance of their business permits, private respondents were
constrained to pay the ₱19,316,458.77 assessment under
protest.
 private respondents filed with the RTC of Pasay City a complaint
for tax refund with Prayer to Issue TRO and Writ of Preliminary
Injunction" before public respondent's sala.
 private respondents alleged that the tax assessment
were violative of the limitations and guidelines under
Local Government Code on double taxation.
 the RTC granted private respondents' application for a writ of
preliminary injunction
 Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the RTC denied
it in its Order. Petitioners then filed a special civil action for
certiorari with the CA assailing the Orders of the RTC.
 the CA dismissed petitioners' petition for certiorari holding that it
has no jurisdiction over the said petition.
 The CA ruled that since appellate jurisdiction over
private respondents' complaint for tax refund, which
was filed with the RTC, is vested in the Court of Tax
Appeals (CTA), pursuant to its expanded jurisdiction
under RA 9282, it follows that a petition for certiorari
seeking nullification of an interlocutory order issued in
the said case should, likewise, be filed with the CTA.

Issue

 Whether or not the CTA has jurisdiction over a special civil action
for certiorari assailing an interlocutory order issued by the RTC in a
local tax case?
 7. CE Casecnan Water and Energy Co. vs. Province of Nueva Ecija
Ruling
Doctrine
 Yes
 with respect to the CTA, Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987  It is the CTA which has the power to rule on a Petition for Certiorari
Constitution provides that judicial power shall be vested in assailing an interlocutory order of the RTC relating to a local tax case.
one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law and that judicial power includes the duty Facts
of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and  petitioner CE Casecnan Water and Energy Co. was assessed by
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has the local government of Nueva Ecija with Real Property Taxes
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or  petitioner CE Casecnan Water and Energy Co. questioned the
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or validity and propriety of the said assessment.
instrumentality of the Government.  petitioner filed with the RTC of San Jose City, Nueva Ecija a
 On the strength of the above constitutional provisions, it can Complaintfor injunction and damages with application for
be fairly interpreted that the power of the CTA includes that temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary
of determining whether or not there has been grave abuse injunctionpraying to restrain the collection of the RPT
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on Reassessment.
the part of the RTC in issuing an interlocutory order in cases  the RTC denied petitioner's application for writ of preliminary
falling within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the tax injunction in its Order. It also denied petitioner's Motion for
court. It, thus, follows that the CTA, by constitutional Reconsideration thereof in an Order.
mandate, is vested with jurisdiction to issue writs of  petitioner filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorariunder Rule 65
certiorari in these cases. of the Rules of Court seeking to annul and set aside the
 Indeed, in order for any appellate court to effectively aforementioned RTC Orders.
exercise its appellate jurisdiction, it must have the authority  The CA dismissed the said petition for certiorari contending that
to issue, among others, a writ of certiorari. In transferring since in resolving the issue of whether the RTC committed grave
exclusive jurisdiction over appealed tax cases to the CTA, it abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's application for a writ of
can reasonably be assumed that the law intended to transfer preliminary injunction, the issue of the validity of the assessment
also such power as is deemed necessary, if not and the collection of the RPT against petitioner must also be
indispensable, in aid of such appellate jurisdiction. resolved, thus jurisdiction over the case lies within the Court of
 if a case may be appealed to a particular court or judicial Tax Appeals (CTA).
tribunal or body, then said court or judicial tribunal or body  petitioner argues that it is the CA, not the CTA, which has
has jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writ of certiorari, jurisdiction over the subject matter of its Petition for Certiorari.
in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. Petitioner maintains that its petition relates to an ordinary civil
 It is more in consonance with logic and legal soundness to action for injunction and not to a local tax case.
conclude that the grant of appellate jurisdiction to the CTA  On the other hand, respondents argue that in resolving the issue
over tax cases filed in and decided by the RTC carries with it on the propriety of issuing a writ of injunction, the CA will have to
the power to issue a writ of certiorari when necessary in aid inevitably pass upon the propriety of the assessment of RPT on
of such appellate jurisdiction. The supervisory power or the Casecnan Project, a local tax matter which is within the
jurisdiction of the CTA to issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its jurisdiction of the CTA.
appellate jurisdiction should co-exist with, and be a
complement to, its appellate jurisdiction to review, by Issue
appeal, the final orders and decisions of the RTC.
 Based on the foregoing disquisitions, it can be reasonably  Whether or not it is the CA, not CTA, which has jurisdiction over the
concluded that the authority of the CTA to take cognizance subject matter of petitioner’s Petition for Certiorari?
of petitions for certiorari questioning interlocutory orders
issued by the RTC in a local tax case is included in the Ruling
powers granted by the Constitution as well as inherent in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.  No
 It is the CTA which has the power to rule on a Petition 8. G.R. No. 192463 July 13, 2015
for Certiorari assailing an interlocutory order of the RTC
relating to a local tax case. OMAIRA LOMONDOT and SARIPA LOMONDOT, Petitioners,
 Jurisdiction over the subject matter is required for a court to
act on any controversy. It is conferred by law and not by the
vs.
consent or waiver upon a court. As such, if a court lacks
jurisdiction over an action, it cannot decide the case on the
merits and must dismiss it. HON. RASAD G BALINDONG, Presiding Judge, Shari'a District Court, 4th
 With respect to the CTA, its jurisdiction was expanded and Shari'a Judicial District, Marawi City, Lanao del Sur and AMBOG
its rank elevated to that of a collegiate court with special PANGANDAMUAN and SIMBANATAO DIACA, Respondents.
jurisdiction by virtue of Republic Act No. 9282. This
expanded jurisdiction of the CTA includes its exclusive
appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal the decisions, A. DOCTRINE
orders or resolutions of the RTC in local tax cases originally
decided or resolved by the RTC in the exercise of its original
Until such time that the Shari’a Appellate Court shall have been organized, however,
or appellate jurisdiction.
appeals or petitions from final orders or decisions of the SDC filed with the CA shall be
 the power of the CTA includes that of determining whether
referred to a Special Division to be organized in any of the CA stations preferably
or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting
composed of Muslim CA Justices.
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC in
issuing an interlocutory order in cases falling within the
exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the tax court. It, thus, B. RELEVANT FACTS
follows that the CTA, by constitutional mandate, is vested
with jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari in these cases. The petitioners Lomondot filed with the Shari’a District Court (SDC) an action against
 The Court finds, however, that in praying to restrain the respondents Pangandamuan and Diaca for the recovery of possession of a parcel of
collection of RPT, petitioner also implicitly questions the land which they owned in Marawi City. Lomondot alleged that Pangandamuan and
propriety of the assessment of such RPT. This is because in Diaca illegally entered and encroached upon a portion of the said land. The SDC
ruling as to whether to restrain the collection, the RTC must decided in favor of the petitioners Lomondot. Lomondot filed with the SDC the
first necessarily rule on the propriety of the assessment. In appropriate motion for the issuance of a writ of execution and and writ for demolition.
other words, in filing an action for injunction to restrain The said motions were denied by the SDC. Instead, the SDC ordered for the survey of
collection, petitioner was in effect also challenging the the land. Unsatisfied with the decision of the SDC, Lomondot filed for certiorari before
validity of the RPT assessment. the Cagayan de Oro station of the Court of Appeals assailing the denial of the SDC
because the Shari’a Appellate Court was not yet in operation at that time. The CA
dismissed the petition due to lack of jurisdiction. Petitioners came to the Supreme
Court for relief.

C. PERTINENT ISSUE

Whether or not the CA may exercise appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the
Shari’a District Court?

D. CATEGORICAL RULING

Yes, the CA may exercise appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the Shari’a District
Court up until such that the Shari’a Appellate Court has been organized, as previously
held in the case of Tomawis v. Hon. Balindong.

In the said case, the Supreme Court said that until such time that the Shari’a
Appellate Court shall have been organized, appeals or petitions from final orders or
decisions of the SDC filed with the CA shall be referred to a Special Division to be
organized in any of the CA stations preferably composed of Muslim CA Justices. It is an elementary principle that a municipality has a personality that is separate and
distinct from its mayor, vice-mayor, sanggunian, and other officers composing it. The
Shari' a District Court had no jurisdiction under the law to decide private respondents'
complaint because not all of the parties involved in the action are Muslims. Since it
9. G.R. No. 193340 January 11, 2017 was clear from the complaint that the real party defendant was the Municipality of
Tangkal, the Shari'a District Court should have simply applied the basic doctrine of
THE MUNICIPALITY OF TANGKAL, PROVINCE OF LANAO DEL NORTE, separate juridical personality and motu proprio dismissed the case.
Petitioner,

vs.

HON. RASAD B. BALINDONG, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Shari’a

District Court, 4th Judicial District, Marawi City, and HEIRS OF THE LATE
MACALABO ALOMPO, represented by SULTAN DIMNANG B. ALOMPO,
Respondents.

A. DOCTRINE

Juridical persons are artificial beings with "no consciences, no beliefs, no feelings, no
thoughts, no desires." A municipality falls under this category, which "is neither a
Muslim nor a Christian.” The Shari'a District Court had no jurisdiction under the law to
decide a complaint when not all of the parties involved in the action are Muslims.

B. RELEVANT FACTS

The heirs of Alompo, who were Muslims, filed a complaint before the Shari’a District
Court (SDC) for the recovery of possession of a parcel land against the Municipality of
Tangkal. The heirs said that the previous owner of the land allowed the Municipality to
“borrow” said parcel with condition that the municipality should pay the full value of
the land within the period of 35 years. The Municipality failed to comply with the
condition hence the ownership of the land reverted back to the original owner. The
municipal mayor of Tangkal is also a Muslim. However, the Municipality opposed the
complaint due to lack of jurisdiction. It argued that since it has no religious affiliation
and represents no cultural or ethnic tribe, it cannot be considered as a Muslim under
the Code of Muslim Personal Laws. The SDC denied the motion and proceeded to hear
the case. The Municipality elevated the denial to the Supreme Court on certiorari.

C. PERTINENT ISSUE

Whether or not the Shari’a District Court has jurisdiction over cases involving a
municipality whose mayor is a Muslim

D. CATEGORICAL RULING

No, the Shari’a District Court has no jurisdiction over cases involving a municipality
even though its mayor is a Muslim.
10. G.R. No. 195450 February 1, 2017 No, the Regional Trial Court has no residual jurisdiction over cases that were
dismissed without prejudice.
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner
The RTC dismissed the replevin case on the ground of improper venue. Such dismissal
vs. is one without prejudice and does not bar the refiling of the same action; hence, it is
not appealable. Clearly, the RTC did not reach, and could not have reached, the
residual jurisdiction stage as the case was dismissed due to improper venue, and such
HON. EMMANUEL C. CARPIO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional
order of dismissal could not be the subject of an appeal. Without the perfection of an
Trial Court, Branch 16, Davao City, COUNTRY BANKERS INSURANCE
appeal, let alone the unavailability of the remedy of appeal, the RTC did not acquire
CORPORATION, DABAY ABAD, HATAB ABAD, OMAR ABAS, HANAPI
residual jurisdiction. Hence, it is erroneous to conclude that the RTC may rule on
ABDULLAH, ROJEA AB ABDULLAH, ABDULLAH ABEDIN, ALEX ABEDIN, et al.,
DBP's application for damages pursuant to its residual powers.
represented by their Attorney-in-Fact, MR. MANUEL L. TE, Respondents

A. DOCTRINE

The "residual jurisdiction" of the trial court is available at a stage in which the court is
normally deemed to have lost jurisdiction over the case or the subject matter involved
in the appeal. This stage is reached upon the perfection of the appeals by the parties
or upon the approval of the records on appeal, but prior to the transmittal of the
original records or the records on appeal. In either instance, the trial court still retains
its so-called residual jurisdiction to issue protective orders, approve compromises,
permit appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal, and allow the
withdrawal of the appeal.

B. RELEVANT FACTS

Abad et al filed filed a complaint for delivery of certificates of title, damages, and
attorney's fees against petitioner Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) and
Guarantee Fund for Small and Medium Enterprise (GFSME) before the RTC. The titles
came into the possession of the DBP for safekeeping pursuant to the loan agreement
entered into by the parties. DBP opposed the complaint on the ground of improper
venue. The RTC dismissed the complaint. Even after the case’s dismissal, DBP filed a
motion requiring Abad et al to deliver the titles. The RTC granted the motion but Abad
et al still failed to return the titles. DBP claimed it suffered damages due to the non-
delivery of the tiles hence it filed another motion with the RTC to run after the surety
bond of Abad et al. The RTC denied on the ground that it was beyond its residual
jurisdiction. The case was elevated to the CA because DBP did not move for
reconsideration of the assailed decision making such final and executory. Hence, DBP
came to the Supreme Court for relief

C. PERTINENT ISSUE

Whether or not the Regional Trial Court has residual jurisdiction over cases that were
dismissed without prejudice

D. CATEGORICAL RULING
11. G.R. No. 181284 October 20, 2015
C. PERTINENT ISSUE
LOLOY UNDURAN, BARANGAY CAPTAIN ROMEO PACANA, NESTOR
MACAPAYAG, RUPERTO DOGIA, JIMMY TALINO, ERMELITO ANGEL, PETOY Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over this case involving ancestral domain of
BESTO, VICTORINO ANGEL, RUEL BOLING, JERMY ANGEL, BERTING SULOD, an indigenous cultural community
RIO BESTO, BENDIJO SIMBALAN, and MARK BRAZIL, Petitioners
D. CATEGORICAL RULING
vs.
Yes, this case is well within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
RAMON ABERASTURI, CRISTINA C. LOPEZ, CESAR LOPEZ JR., DIONISIO A.
The Court notes that respondents neither alleged therein that the parties are
LOPEZ, MERCEDES L. GASTON, AGNES H. LOPEZ, EUSEBIO S. LOPEZ, JOSE
members of ICCs/IPs nor that the case involves a dispute or controversy over
MARIA S. LOPEZ, ANTON B. ABERASTURI, MA. RAISSA A. VELEZ, ZOILO
ancestral lands/domains of ICC/IPs. Rather, the allegations in respondents' original
ANTONIO A. VELEZ, CRISTINA ABERASTURI, EDUARDO LOPEZ JR., ROSARIO
complaint make up for an accion reivindicatoria, a civil action which involves an
S. LOPEZ, JUAN S. LOPEZ, CESAR ANTHONY R. LOPEZ, VENANCIO L. GASTON,
interest in a real property with an assessed value of P683,760.00, while the
ROSEMARIE S. LOPEZ, JAY A. ASUNCION, NICOLO ABERASTURI, LISA A.
allegations in their amended complaint make out a case for injunction, a civil action
ASUNCION, INEZ A. VERAY, HERNAN A. ASUNCION, ASUNCION LOPEZ,
which is incapable of pecuniary estimation. The Court therefore finds that the CA
THOMAS A. VELEZ, LUIS ENRIQUE VELEZ, ANTONIO H. LOPEZ, CHARLES H.
correctly ruled that the subject matter of the amended complaint based on allegations
LOPEZ, ANA L. ZAYCO, PILAR L. QUIROS, CRISTINA L. PICAZO, RENATO
therein was within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
SANTOS, GERALDINE AGUIRRE, MARIA CARMENCITA T. LOPEZ, and as
represented by attorney-in-fact RAMON ABERASTURI, Respondents
The mere fact that this case involves members of ICCs/IPs and their ancestral land is
not enough for it to fall under the jurisdiction of the NCIP.
A. DOCTRINE

Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by
the allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate
facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action. The nature of an action, as well as
which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the allegations
contained in the complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is
entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. The averments in
the complaint and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted.
Once vested by the allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested
irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of
the claims asserted therein.

B. RELEVANT FACTS

Petitioners Unduran et al are members of the Talaandig tribe living on a parcel of land
in Bukidnon, which they have inherited from their forefathers. Aberasturi et al,
respondents of this case, claimed that they are the lawful owners of the said
unregistered agricultural land and thereafter filed Accion Reivindicatoria before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC). Unduran et al opposed the action alleging that the RTC
does not have jurisdiction because it involved the ancestral land of an indigenous
cultural community and moved that the case be referred to National Commission on
Indigenous People (NCIP). RTC denied the said motion so Unduran et al elevated the
matter to the Court of Appeals on certiorari. The action was dismissed and Unduran et
al moved for consideration but was ultimately denied. Hence, this petition with the
Supreme Court
12. G.R. No. 190004 August 8, 2017 Congress expressly granted the RTC, acting as SAC, the original and exclusive
jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, landowners. Only the legislature can recall that power. The DAR has no authority to
qualify or undo that.
vs.

EUGENIO DALAUTA, Respondent

A. DOCTRINE

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction tells us that courts cannot, and will not, resolve a
controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative
tribunal, especially where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative
discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the
administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.

B. RELEVANT FACTS

Dalauta was the registered owner of a land in Butuan City, which was placed under
compulsory acquisition of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program of the
government. Daulata received an offer for compensation from the Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP) but he later declined such for being too low. Dalauta thereafter filed
a case with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), sitting as Special Agrarian Court (SAC), for
the determination of just compensation. The court did not follow the valuation of LBP
so it filed a petition for review before the CA contending that the SAC erred in taking
cognizance of the case because the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB)’s decision on just compensation had long been final and executory.
Still unsatisfied, the LBP raised the issue with the Supreme Court

C. PERTINENT ISSUE

Whether or not the trial court had properly taken jurisdiction over the case to
determine just compensation for the land covered by agrarian reform despite
administrative determination.

D. CATEGORICAL RULING

Yes, the court properly took cognizance of the case.

The final determination of just compensation is a judicial function; that the jurisdiction
of the Regional Trial Court, sitting as Special Agrarian Court, is original and exclusive,
not appellate.

The valuation of property in eminent domain is essentially a judicial function which

cannot be vested in administrative agencies.
13. G.R. No. 168539 March 25, 2014 No, the Sandiganbayan is not divested of its jurisdiction over the person of the co-
accused private individual where the accused public officer dies during the pendency
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, of the case.
vs.
HENRY T. GO, Respondent. It is true that by reason of Secretary Enrile's death, there is no longer any public
officer with whom respondent can be charged for violation of R.A. 3019. It does not
A. DOCTRINE mean, however, that the allegation of conspiracy between them can no longer be
proved or that their alleged conspiracy is already expunged. The only thing
By reason of the death of the [public officer], it does not follow that the SB is already extinguished by the death of Secretary Enrile is his criminal liability. His death did not
divested of its jurisdiction over the person of and the case involving herein respondent extinguish the crime nor did it remove the basis of the charge of conspiracy between
[private individual]. To rule otherwise would mean that the power of a court to decide him and private respondent. Stated differently, the death of Secretary Enrile does not
a case would no longer be based on the law defining its jurisdiction but on other mean that there was no public officer who allegedly violated Section 3 (g) of R.A.
factors, such as the death of one of the alleged offenders. 3019. In fact, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause to
indict Secretary Enrile for infringement of Sections 3 (e) and (g) of R.A. 3019. Were it
B. RELEVANT FACTS not for his death, he should have been charged.

A complaint was filed with the Office of the Ombudsman against several individuals The requirement before a private person may be indicted for violation of Section 3(g)
for alleged violation of R.A. 3019. Among those charged was Henry T. Go, who was of R.A. 3019, among others, is that such private person must be alleged to have
then the Chairman and President of PIATCO, for having supposedly conspired with acted in conspiracy with a public officer. The law, however, does not require that such
then DOTC Secretary Arturo Enrile (Secretary Enrile) in entering into a contract which person must, in all instances, be indicted together with the public officer. If
is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government. The Office of the circumstances exist where the public officer may no longer be charged in court, as in
Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause to indict, among others, Henry T. the present case where the public officer has already died, the private person may be
Go, for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. While there was likewise a finding of indicted alone.
probable cause against Secretary Enrile, he was no longer indicted because he died
prior to the issuance of the resolution finding probable cause. The prosecution The SB is a special criminal court which has exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
contended that (1) the SB has already acquired jurisdiction over the person of involving violations of R.A. 3019 committed by certain public officers, as enumerated
respondent by reason of his voluntary appearance, when he filed a motion for in P.D. 1606 as amended by R.A. 8249. This includes private individuals who are
consolidation and when he posted bail; and (2) that the SB has exclusive jurisdiction charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the said public officers. In
over respondent's case, even if he is a private person, because he was alleged to the instant case, respondent is being charged for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A.
have conspired with a public officer. Henry T. Go filed a Motion to Quash the 3019, in conspiracy with then Secretary Enrile. Ideally, under the law, both
Information filed against him on the ground that the operative facts adduced therein respondent and Secretary Enrile should have been charged before and tried jointly by
do not constitute an offense under Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, citing the show cause the Sandiganbayan. However, by reason of the death of the latter, this can no longer
order of the SB, also contended that, independently of the deceased Secretary Enrile, be done. Nonetheless, for reasons already discussed, it does not follow that the SB is
the public officer with whom he was alleged to have conspired, respondent, who is not already divested of its jurisdiction over the person of and the case involving herein
a public officer nor was capacitated by any official authority as a government agent, respondent. To rule otherwise would mean that the power of a court to decide a case
may not be prosecuted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. would no longer be based on the law defining its jurisdiction but on other factors,
such as the death of one of the alleged offenders.
C. PERTINENT ISSUE

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan is divested of its jurisdiction over the person of
the co-accused private individual where the accused public officer dies during the
pendency of the case.

D. CATEGORICAL RULING
14. G.R. No. 180771 April 21, 2015 right to demand that they be accorded the benefits granted to them in multilateral
international instruments that the Philippine Government had signed, under the
RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS OF THE PROTECTED SEASCAPE TAÑON STRAIT, concept of stipulation pour autrui; (2) that there should be no question of their right
e.g., TOOTHED WHALES, DOLPHINS, PORPOISES, AND OTHER CETACEAN to represent the Resident Marine Mammals as they have stakes in the case as
SPECIES, Joined in and Represented herein by Human Beings Gloria Estenzo forerunners of a campaign to build awareness among the affected residents of Tañon
Ramos and Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio, In Their Capacity as Legal Guardians of Strait; (3) as stewards of the environment since the primary steward, the
the Lesser Life-Forms and as Responsible Stewards of God's Creations, Government, had failed in its duty to protect the environment pursuant to the public
Petitioners, trust doctrine ; and (3) that this Court may lower the benchmark in locus standi as an
exercise of epistolary jurisdiction.

vs.
In opposition, public respondents argue that (1) the Resident Marine Mammals have
no standing because Section 1, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court requires parties to an
SECRETARY ANGELO REYES, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of
action to be either natural or juridical persons, viz.: Section 1. Who may be parties;
Energy (DOE), SECRETARY JOSE L. ATIENZA, in his capacity as Secretary of
plaintiff and defendant. - Only natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), LEONARDO
law may be parties in a civil action. The term "plaintiff may refer to the claiming
R. SIBBALUCA, DENR Regional Director-Region VII and in his capacity as
party, the counter-claimant, the cross-claimant, or the third (fourth, etc.)-party
Chairperson of the Tañon Strait Protected Seascape Management Board,
plaintiff. The term "defendant" may refer to the original defending party, the
Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR), DIRECTOR MALCOLM J.
defendant in a counterclaim, the cross-defendant, or the third (fourth, etc.)-party
SARMIENTO, JR., BFAR Regional Director for Region VII ANDRES M. BOJOS,
defendant; (2) Oposa has no applicability, pointing out that the petitioners therein
JAPAN PETROLEUM EXPLORATION CO., LTD. (JAPEX), as represented by its
were all natural persons, albeit some of them were still unborn; (3) the Stewards do
Philippine Agent, SUPPLY OILFIELD SERVICES, INC. Respondents.
not have legal standing on the ground that they are representing animals, which
cannot be parties to an action; and (4) the Stewards are not the real parties-in-
A. DOCTRINE interest for their failure to show how they stand to be benefited or injured by the
decision in this case.
This Court had already taken a permissive position on the issue of locus standi in
environmental cases. The need to give the Resident Marine Mammals legal standing C. PERTINENT ISSUE
has been eliminated by our Rules, which allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward of
nature, to bring a suit to enforce our environmental laws. It is worth noting here that
Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi to file the instant petition for
the Stewards are joined as real parties in the Petition and not just in representation of
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.
the named cetacean species.

D. CATEGORICAL RULING
B. RELEVANT FACTS

Yes, the petitioners have locus standi to file the instant petition for certiorari,
The Government of the Philippines, acting through the DOE, entered into a
prohibition and mandamus.
Geophysical Survey and Exploration Contract-102 with JAPEX which involved
geological and geophysical studies of the Tañon Strait. Protesting the adverse
ecological impact of JAPEX's oil exploration activities in the Tañon Strait, petitioners Recently, the Court passed the landmark Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards aver that a study made after the seismic Cases, which allow for a "citizen suit," and permit any Filipino citizen to file an action
survey showed that there would be "reduced fish catch" and incidences of "fish kill." before our courts for violations of our environmental laws:
Public respondents, through the Solicitor General, contend that petitioners Resident
Marine Mammals and Stewards have no legal standing to file the present petition. SEC. 5. Citizen suit. - Any Filipino citizen in representation of others,
including minors or generations yet unborn, may file an action to
The Resident Marine Mammals, through the Stewards, (1) claim that they have the enforce rights or obligations under environmental laws. Upon the
legal standing to file this action since they stand to be benefited or injured by the filing of a citizen suit, the court shall issue an order which shall contain a
judgment in this suit. Citing Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., they also assert their right to sue brief description of the cause of action and the reliefs prayed for, requiring
for the faithful performance of international and municipal environmental laws created all interested parties to manifest their interest to intervene in the case
in their favor and for their benefit. In this regard, they propound that they have the within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof. The plaintiff may publish the
 order once in a newspaper of a general circulation in the Philippines or
furnish all affected barangays copies of said order.
In light of the foregoing, the need to give the Resident Marine Mammals legal
Citizen suits filed under R.A. No. 8749 and R.A. No. 9003 shall be governed standing has been eliminated by our Rules, which allow any Filipino citizen, as a
by their respective provisions. steward of nature, to bring a suit to enforce our environmental laws. It is worth
noting here that the Stewards are joined as real parties in the Petition and not just in
representation of the named cetacean species. The Stewards, Ramos and Eisma-
Osorio, having shown in their petition that there may be possible violations of laws
concerning the habitat of the Resident Marine Mammals, are therefore declared to
Explaining the rationale for this rule, the Court, in the Annotations to the Rules of
possess the legal standing to file this petition.
Procedure for Environmental Cases, commented:

Citizen suit. To further encourage the protection of the environment, the

Rules enable litigants enforcing environmental rights to file their cases as
citizen suits. This provision liberalizes standing for all cases filed enforcing
environmental laws and collapses the traditional rule on personal and direct
interest, on the principle that humans are stewards of nature. The
terminology of the text reflects the doctrine first enunciated in Oposa v.
Factoran, insofar as it refers to minors and generations yet unborn.

Although this petition was filed in 2007, years before the effectivity of the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases, it has been consistently held that rules of
procedure "may be retroactively applied to actions pending and undetermined at the
time of their passage and will not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is
adversely affected, inasmuch as there is no vested rights in rules of procedure."

Elucidating on this doctrine, the Court, in Systems Factors Corporation v. National

Labor Relations Commission held that:

Remedial statutes or statutes relating to remedies or modes of procedure,

which do not create new or take away vested rights, but only operate in
furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights already existing, do not
come within the legal conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule
against retroactive operation of statutes. Statutes regulating the procedure
of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retroactive
in that sense and to that extent, x x x.

Moreover, even before the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases became
effective, this Court had already taken a permissive position on the issue of locus
standi in environmental cases. In Oposa, we allowed the suit to be brought in the
name of generations yet unborn "based on the concept of intergenerational
responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned."
Furthermore, we said that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology, a right that
does not even need to be stated in our Constitution as it is assumed to exist from the
inception of humankind, carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing
the environment.
Equity Jurisdiction
YES. Execution shall be applied for in the court of origin, in accordance with
15. Regulus Dev. Inc. v. De la Cruz, G. R. No. 198172, January 25, 2016 Section 1, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. The court of origin with respect to the
[Brion, J.; Second Division] assailed RTC orders is the court which issued these orders. The RTC is the court with
jurisdiction to order the execution of the issued RTC orders.
Doctrine: Equity jurisdiction aims to provide complete justice in cases where a court
of law is unable to adapt its judgments to the special circumstances of a case because It is well-settled in jurisprudence that jurisdiction is vested by law and
of a resulting legal inflexibility when the law is applied to a given situation. The cannot be conferred or waived by the parties. “Even on appeal and even if the
purpose of the exercise of equity jurisdiction, among others, is to prevent unjust reviewing parties did not raise the issue of jurisdiction, the reviewing court is not
enrichment and to ensure restitution. precluded from ruling that the lower court had no jurisdiction over the case.” Even
assuming that the case has been rendered moot due to the respondent’s redemption
FACTS:Regulus Development (Petitioner) and Antonio De la Cruz (respondent). of the property, the CA may still entertain the jurisdictional issue since it poses a
situation capable of repetition yet evading judicial review.
Petitioner Corporation is the owner of San Juan apartment in Pasay and
respondent Dela Cruz leased two units. The contract of lease for each of the two units The appellate jurisdiction of courts is conferred by law. The appellate court
similarly provides a lease period of one month, subject to automatic renewals, unless acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties when an appeal is perfected.
terminated by the petitioner upon written notice. Petitioner sent the respondent a On the other hand, equity jurisdiction aims to provide complete justice in cases where
letter to terminate the lease of the two subject units. Due to the respondent’s refusal a court of law is unable to adapt its judgments to the special circumstances of a case
to vacate the units, the petitioner filed a complaint for ejectment before the MTC of because of a resulting legal inflexibility when the law is applied to a given situation.
Pasay City. MTC ordered the respondent to vacate the premises, and pay the rentals The purpose of the exercise of equity jurisdiction, among others, is to prevent unjust
due until the respondent actually complies. Respondent then appealed to the RTC. enrichment and to ensure restitution. The RTC orders which allowed the withdrawal of
Pending appeal, the respondent consigned the monthly rentals to the RTC due to the the deposited funds for the use and occupation of the subject units were issued
petitioner’s refusal to receive the rentals. RTC affirmed the decision of the MTC and pursuant to the RTC’s equity jurisdiction. The RTC’s equity jurisdiction is separate and
denied the motion for reconsideration filed by the respondent. distinct from its appellate jurisdiction on the ejectment case. The RTC could not have
issued its orders in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction since there was nothing
In a Petition for Review filed by the Respondent, the CA reversed the lower more to execute on the dismissed ejectment case. As the RTC orders explained, the
court’s decisions and dismissed the ejecment case. The Petitioner filed a motion to dismissal of the ejectment case effectively and completely blotted out and cancelled
withdraw funds deposited by the respondent praying for the withdrawal of the rentals the complaint. Hence, the RTC orders were clearly issued in the exercise of the
consigned the respondent with the RTC. RTC granted the motion and explained that RTC’s equity jurisdiction, not on the basis of its appellate jurisdiction.
the effect of the complaint’s dismissal would mean that there was no complaint filed
at all. The petitioner, however, is entitled to the amount of rentals for the use and Hence, the petitioner correctly moved for the issuance of the writ of
occupation of the subject units, as provided in the executed contracts of lease and on execution and levy of the respondent’s real property before the RTC as the court of
the basis of justice and equity. origin. Petition is GRANTED.
Consequently, respondent filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before
the CA to assail the RTC Orders which granted the petitioner’s motion to withdraw
funds. CA dismissed the petition and held that the assailed RTC Orders were issued
pursuant to its equity jurisdiction, in accordance with Section 5, Rule 39, and Rules 5
and 6 of Rule 135 of the Rules of Court. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a motion
praying the RTC to levy upon the respondent’s property to satisfy the judgment. The
RTC granted the motion. The CA reversed and set aside the orders of the RTC direting
to levy the respondent’s property. The CA held that while the approval of the
petitioner’s motion to withdraw the consigned rentals was within the RTC’s
jurisdiction, it has no jurisdiction to levy on the respondent’s real property.

ISSUE:Whether or not RTC had jurisdiction to levy on the respondent’s real property

HELD:
Jurisdiction Estoppel Respondent filed with the Court of Appeals, a petition for certiorari which
the latter granted.
16. Duero v. CA, G.R. No. 131282, January 4, 2002 [Quisimbing, J.; 2nd
Division] ISSUE/S:

Doctrine: The fundamental rule is that, the lack of jurisdiction of the court over an 1) Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction over the case
action cannot be waived by the parties, or even cured by their silence, acquiescence
or even by their express consent. Further, a party may assail the jurisdiction of the 2) Whether or not the respondent Eradel is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction
court over the action at any stage of the proceedings and even on appeal. of RTC after he has successfully sought affirmative relief therefrom

FACTS: GABRIEL L. DUERO (Petitioner) and BERNARDO A. ERADEL (Respondent) HELD:

Sometime in 1988, respondent Eradel entered and occupied petitioner's 1) No. The case falls under the jurisdiction of the MTC based on Republic Act 7691
land covered by Tax Declaration No. A-16-13-302, located in Baras, San Miguel, amending BP 129.
Surigao del Sur. As shown in the tax declaration, the land had an assessed value of
P5,240. Petitioner informed respondent that the land was his, and requested the latter 2) No. While participation in all stages of a case before the trial court, including
to vacate the land. However, despite repeated demands, respondent remained invocation of its authority in asking for affirmative relief, effectively bars a party by
steadfast in his refusal to leave the land. estoppel from challenging the court's jurisdiction, estoppel has become an equitable
defense that is both substantive and remedial and its successful invocation can bar a
On June 16, 1995, petitioner filed before the RTC a complaint for Recovery right and not merely its equitable enforcement. Hence, estoppel ought to be applied
of Possession and Ownership with Damages and Attorney's Fees against respondent with caution. For estoppel to apply, the action giving rise thereto must be unequivocal
and two others, namely, Apolinario and Inocencio Ruena. and intentional because, if misapplied, estoppel may become a tool of injustice.

Petitioner and the Ruenas’ executed a compromise agreement, which In the present case, respondent questions the jurisdiction of RTC in Tandag,
became the trial court's basis for a partial judgment rendered on January 12, 1996. In Surigao del Sur, on legal grounds. It was petitioner who filed the complaint against
this agreement, the Ruenas’ recognized and bound themselves to respect the respondent and two other parties before the said court, believing that the RTC had
ownership and possession of Duero. Herein respondent Eradel was not a party to the jurisdiction over his complaint. But by then, Republic Act 7691 amending BP 129 had
agreement, and he was declared in default for failure to file his answer to the become effective, such that jurisdiction already belongs not to the RTC but to the MTC
complaint. pursuant to said amendment.

Petitioner presented his evidence ex parte on February 13, 1996. On May 8, Respondent, an unschooled farmer, in the mistaken belief that since he was
1996, judgment was rendered in his favor, and respondent was ordered to peacefully merely a tenant of the late Artemio Laurente Sr., his landlord, gave the summons to a
vacate and turn over the lot. Hipolito Laurente, one of the surviving heirs of Artemio Sr., who did not do anything
about the summons. For failure to answer the complaint, respondent was declared in
On June 10, 1996, respondent filed a Motion for New Trial, alleging that he default. He then filed a Motion for New Trial in the same court and explained that he
has been occupying the land as a tenant of Artemio Laurente, Sr., since 1958. He defaulted because of his belief that the suit ought to be answered by his landlord. But
explained that he turned over the complaint and summons to Laurente in the honest his motion was denied. He filed before the RTC a Motion for Relief from Judgment.
belief that as landlord, the latter had a better right to the land and was responsible to Again, the same court denied his motion, hence he moved for reconsideration of the
defend any adverse claim on it. However, the trial court denied the motion for new denial. In his Motion for Reconsideration, he raised for the first time the RTC's lack of
trial. jurisdiction. This motion was again denied.

Respondent then filed before the RTC a Petition for Relief from Judgment, Under these circumstances, we could not fault the Court of Appeals in
reiterating the same allegation in his Motion for New Trial. The RTC again denied the overruling the RTC and in holding that private respondent was not estopped from
Petition. Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration in which he alleged that the questioning the jurisdiction of the regional trial court. The fundamental rule is that,
RTC has no jurisdiction over the case since the value of the land is only P5,240, which the lack of jurisdiction of the court over an action cannot be waived by the parties, or
is within the jurisdiction of the MTC. However, the RTC denied the MR. even cured by their silence, acquiescence or even by their express consent. Further, a
party may assail the jurisdiction of the court over the action at any stage of the
proceedings and even on appeal. The appellate court did not err in saying that the 17. Gonzaga v. CA, G. R. No. 144025, December 27, 2002 [Corona, J.; 3rd
RTC should have declared itself barren of jurisdiction over the action. Even if Division]
respondent actively participated in the proceedings before said court, the doctrine of
estoppel cannot still be properly invoked against him because the question of lack of
jurisdiction may be raised at anytime and at any stage of the action. Precedents tell Doctrine: While an order or decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity
us that as a general rule, the jurisdiction of a court is not a question of acquiescence and may be assailed at any stage, active participation in the proceedings in the court
as a matter of fact, but an issue of conferment as a matter of law. Also, neither which rendered the order or decision will bar such party from attacking its jurisdiction.
waiver nor estoppel shall apply to confer jurisdiction upon a court, barring highly
meritorious and exceptional circumstances. FACTS: SPS. GONZAGA (Petitioner) and CA et., al. (Respondents)

In 1970, spouses Gonzaga bought a parcel of land from Lucky Home Inc.
Said lot denominated as Lot No. 19 and which the spouses mortgaged to the Social
Security Commission as a security for their housing loan. Meanwhile, the spouses
started to construct their house on Lot No. 18, and not on Lot No. 19. They
mistakenly identified Lot No. 18 as Lot No. 19. Lucky Homes then informed them of
such mistake but the spouses instead offered to buy Lot No. 18 to widen their
premises, thus they continued building their house thereon. However for failure on
the part of the spouses to pay their obligation to the SSS, Lot No. 19 was
consequently foreclosed. The title thereto was cancelled and a new one was issued in
the name of SSS. After such foreclosure, the spouses offered to swap Lot Nos.18 and
19 and demanded from lucky homes to reform their contract. Lucky home however
refused.

This prompted the spouses to file an action for reformation of contract with
damages before the RTC. The RTC however dismissed the action for lack of merit and
awarded lucky homes moral damages and attorney’s fees. Subsequently then, a writ
of execution was issued. Spouses urgently filed a motion to recall such writ,
questioning now the jurisdiction of the RTC on the ground that the case falls within
the jurisdiction of the Housing and land use regulatory board. Subsequently, the
spouses went to the CA to annul RTC’s decision. CA dismissed the petition on the
ground that the spouses were estopped from question RTC’s jurisdiction pursuant to
the case of Tijam. On the other hand spouses contended that the doctrine in Tijam
case has been abandoned.

ISSUE: Whether or not the spouses Gonzaga is estopped from questioning the
jurisdiction of the trial court

HELD: Yes. Petitioners claim that the recent decisions of this Court have already
abandoned the doctrine laid down in Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy. We do not agree. In
countless decisions, this Court has consistently held that, while an order or decision
rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be assailed at any stage, active
participation in the proceedings in the court which rendered the order or decision will
bar such party from attacking its jurisdiction. In the case at bar, it was petitioners
themselves who invoked the jurisdiction of the court a quo by instituting an action for
reformation of contract against respondents. It appears that, in the proceedings
before the trial court, petitioners vigorously asserted their cause from start to finish.
Not even once did petitioners ever raise the issue of the courts jurisdiction during the
entire proceedings which lasted for two years. It was only after the trial court practice of a party participating in the proceedings and submitting its case for decision
rendered its decision and issued a writ of execution against them in 1998 did and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of
petitioners first raise the issue of jurisdiction ─ and it was only because said decision jurisdiction, when adverse.
was unfavorable to them. Petitioners thus effectively waived their right to question
the courts jurisdiction over the case they themselves filed. Here, petitioner failed to raise the question of jurisdiction before the trial
court and the Appellate Court. In effect, petitioner confirmed and ratified the trial
court’s jurisdiction over this case. Certainly, it is now in estoppel and can no longer
question the trial court’s jurisdiction.
18. Manila Bankers v. Ng Kok Wei, G.R. No. 139791, December 12, 2003 [
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.; 3rd Division]
Doctrine:

Doctrine: Where a party failed to raise the question of jurisdiction before the trial
court and the appellate court, it, in effect, confirmed and ratified the trial court’s
jurisdiction over the case and is now in estoppel and can no longer question the trial
court’s jurisdiction.

Exception to the general rule that jurisdiction is not conferred by consent, silence or
acquiesce– estoppel by laches.

FACTS: Manila Bankers (Petitioner) and Eddy Ng Kok Wei (Respondent)

Eddy Ng Kok Wei, respondent, is a Singaporean businessman, purchased a

condominium unit at Valle Verde Terraces. Petitioner, through its President, Mr.
Antonio Puyat, executed a Contract to Sell in favor of respondent which states that
the unit shall be substantially completed and delivered to the respondent within 15
months from Feb. 8, 1989 or on May 8, 1990, and that should there be no substantial
completion and failure to deliver the unit on the date specified, a penalty of 1% of the
total amount paid by respondent shall be charged against petitioner. Upon his third
return to the Philippines and the notices of delivery being sent to him despite the
uninhabitable condition of the unit, he was constrained to demand payment in a letter
dated Nov. 21, 1990 for the damages he sustained but petioner ignored his demand
prompting him to file with the RTC Makati a complaint for specific performance and
damages. The RTC found petitioner liable for the contractual penalty plus moral and
exemplary damages. The CA affirmed the RTC decision. Hence, the petition for review
on certiorari was filed by petitioner. It contends that RTC has no jurisdiction and that
jurisdiction over such case is vested in the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
pursuant to PD 957 (The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protective Decree).

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner may assail the jurisdiction of the RTC.

HELD: No. It is the HLURB which has the exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide
cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by
buyers of condominium units against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or
salesman (Section 1 (c) of PD No. 1344). While it may be true that the trial court is
without jurisdiction over the case, petitioner’s active participation in the proceedings
estopped it from assailing such lack of it. We have held that it is an undesirable
19. Boston Equity Resources, Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 173946, June 19, 2013 Sibonghanoy, et al. petitioner claimed that respondent’s failure to raise the question
[Perez, J; 2nd Division] of jurisdiction at an earlier stage bars her from later questioning it, especially since
she actively participated in the proceedings conducted by the trial court.
Doctrine: The aspect of jurisdiction which may be barred from being assailed as a
result of estoppel by laches is jurisdiction over the subject matter. Petitioner’s argument is misplaced, in that, it failed to consider that the
concept of jurisdiction has several aspects, namely: (1) jurisdiction over the subject
matter; (2) jurisdiction over the parties; (3) jurisdiction over the issues of the case;
FACTS: Boston Equity Resources Inc., (Petitioner) and LOLITA G. TOLEDO and (4) in cases involving property, jurisdiction over the res or the thing which is the
(Respondent) subject of the litigation.

Petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money with a prayer for issuance of The aspect of jurisdiction which may be barred from being assailed as a
writ of preliminary attachment against Sps. Manuel and Lolita Toledo. Respondent in result of estoppel by laches is jurisdiction over the subject matter. Thus, in Tijam, the
her answer alleged that her husband Manuel is already dead. During the trial, case relied upon by petitioner, the issue involved was the authority of the then Court
respondent moved to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds: of First Instance to hear a case for the collection of a sum of money in the amount of
₱1,908.00 which amount was, at that time, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
1. Complaint failed to plead an indispensable party; the municipal courts.
2. Trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Manuel
pursuant to Section 5, Rule 86 of BP 129 as amended by RA 7691; In subsequent cases citing the ruling of the Court in Tijam, what was
3. Trial court erred in ordering substitution of deceased Manuel by his likewise at issue was the jurisdiction of the trial court over the subject matter of the
heirs; and case. Accordingly, in Spouses Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals, the issue for consideration
4. Trial court must also dismiss case against Lolita in accordance to Section was the authority of the regional trial court to hear and decide an action for
6, Rule 86; reformation of contract and damages involving a subdivision lot, it being argued
therein that jurisdiction is vested in the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
However, RTC denied the motion for having been filed out of time or after 6 pursuant to PD 957 (The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protective Decree). In
years. Lee v. Presiding Judge, MTC, Legaspi City, petitioners argued that the respondent
Respondent filed a petition for certiorari to the CA which granted the municipal trial court had no jurisdiction over the complaint for ejectment because the
petition on the ground that when petitioner filed the complaint, Manuel was already issue of ownership was raised in the pleadings. Finally, in People v. Casuga, accused-
dead such being the case, the trial court could not have acquired jurisdiction over the appellant claimed that the crime of grave slander, of which she was charged, falls
person of Manuel. Further, that the issue on jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of within the concurrent jurisdiction of municipal courts or city courts and the then
the proceeding, even for the first time on appeal. The complaint should have courts of first instance, and that the judgment of the court of first instance, to which
impleaded the estate of Manuel as defendant, not only the wife, considering that the she had appealed the municipal court's conviction, should be deemed null and void for
estate of Manuel is an indispensable party. want of jurisdiction as her appeal should have been filed with the Court of Appeals or
ISSUE: the Supreme Court.

Whether or not respondent may still assail the question of jurisdiction of Manuel on In all of these cases, the Supreme Court barred the attack on the
her motion to dismiss? jurisdiction of the respective courts concerned over the subject matter of the case
based on estoppel by laches, declaring that parties cannot be allowed to belatedly
HELD: adopt an inconsistent posture by attacking the jurisdiction of a court to which they
submitted their cause voluntarily.
No. Here, what respondent was questioning in her motion to dismiss before
the trial court was that court’s jurisdiction over the person of defendant Manuel. Thus,
the principle of estoppel by laches finds no application in this case. Instead, the
principles relating to jurisdiction over the person of the parties are pertinent herein.

According to petitioner, respondent had several opportunities, at various

stages of the proceedings, to assail the trial court’s jurisdiction but never did so for six
straight years. Citing the doctrine laid down in the case of Tijam, et al. v.
20. Figueroa v. People, G.R. No. 147406, July 14, 2008 [Nachura, J; 3rd CA. Sibonghanoy is an exceptional case because of the presence of laches. In the
Division] case at bar, the factual settings attendant in Sibonghanoy are not present. Petitioner
counsel, Atty. Regalado, after the receipt of the Court of Appeals resolution finding
Doctrine: The general rule should, however, be, as it has always been, that the her guilty of contempt, promptly filed a Motion for Reconsideration assailing the said
issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, court’s jurisdiction based on procedural infirmity in initiating the action. Her
and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel – Estoppel by laches, to bar a litigant from compliance with the appellate court’s directive to show cause why she should not be
asserting the court’s absence or lack of jurisdiction, only supervenes in exceptional cited for contempt and filing a single piece of pleading to that effect could not be
cases similar to the factual milieu of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy. considered as an active participation in the judicial proceedings so as to take the case
within the milieu of Sibonghanoy. Rather, it is the natural fear to disobey the mandate
FACTS: Venancio Figueroa (Petitioner) and People of the Philippines (Respondent) of the court that could lead to dire consequences that impelled her to comply.

Petitioner was charged with the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in The petitioner is in no way estopped by laches in assailing the jurisdiction of
homicide. The RTC found him guilty. In his appeal before the CA, the petitioner, for the RTC, consideringthat he raised the lack thereof in his appeal before the appellate
the first time, questioned RTCs jurisdiction on the case .The CA in affirming the court. At that time, no considerable period had yet elapsed for laches to attach.
decision of the RTC, ruled that the principle of estoppel by laches has already
precluded the petitioner from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC—the trial went
on for 4 years with the petitioner actively participating therein and without him ever
raising the jurisdictional infirmity. The petitioner, for his part, counters that the lack of
jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter may be raised at any time even for the
first time on appeal. As undue delay is further absent herein, the principle of laches
will not be applicable.Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner’s failure to raise the issue of jurisdiction during the
trial of this case, constitute laches in relation to the doctrine laid down in Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy, notwithstanding the fact that said issue was immediately raised in
petitioner’s appeal to the CA.

HELD: No. Citing the ruling in Calimlim vs. Ramirez, the Court held that as a general
rule, the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on
appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.

Estoppel by laches may be invoked to bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction

only in cases in which the factual milieu is analogous to that of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy.
Indeed, the fact that a person attempts to invoke unauthorized jurisdiction of a court
does not estop him from thereafter challenging its jurisdiction over the subject
matter, since such jurisdiction must arise by law and not by mere consent of the
parties. This is especially true where the person seeking to invoke unauthorized
jurisdiction of the court does not thereby secure any advantage or the adverse party
does not suffer any harm.

Laches should be clearly present for the Sibonghanoy doctrine to be

applicable, that is, lack of jurisdiction must have been raised so belatedly as to
warrant the presumption that the party entitled to assert it had abandoned or
declined to assert it.

In Sibonghanoy, the party invoking lack of jurisdiction did so only after

fifteen years and at a stage when the proceedings had already been elevated to the
Hierarchy of Courts Both petitioners and respondents agree that these cases are of
21. Agan, Jr. v. Phil International Air Terminal, Co. Inc. G.R. No. transcendental importance as they involve the construction and operation of the
155001, May 5, 2003 [Puno, J.; En Banc] country’s premier international airport. Moreover, the crucial issues submitted for
resolution are of first impression and they entail the proper legal interpretation of key
Doctrine: The rule on hierarchy of courts may be relaxed when the redress desired provisions of the Constitution, the BOT Law and its Implementing Rules and
cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling Regulations.
circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of this
Court's primary jurisdiction. Thus, considering the nature of the controversy before the Court,
procedural bars may be lowered to give way for the speedy disposition of the instant
FACTS: Agan et.al.,(Petitioners) and Phil. International Air Terminal et.,al. cases. It is also established that petitioners in the present case who have presented
(Respondents) legitimate interests in the resolution of the controversy are not parties to the PIATCO
Contracts. Accordingly, they cannot be bound by the arbitration clause and hence,
Asia’s Emerging Dragon Corp. (AEDC) submitted a proposal to the DOTC for the cannot be compelled to submit to arbitration proceedings. A speedy and decisive
development of NAIA Terminal 3. After a careful examination, the DOTC created the resolution of all the critical issues in the present controversy, including those raised by
Pre-qualification Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) for the implementation of the petitioners, cannot be made before an arbitral tribunal. The object of arbitration is
project. PBAC however, awarded the project to Phil. International Air Terminals Co precisely to allow an expeditious determination of a dispute. This objective would not
(PIATCO). The Government and PIATCO signed the “Concession Agreement.” be met if this Court were to allow the parties to settle the cases by arbitration as
Meanwhile, the MIAA which is charged with the maintenance and operation of the there are certain issues involving non-parties to the PIATCO Contracts which the
NAIA Terminals I and II, had existing concession contracts with various service arbitral tribunal will not be equipped to resolve.
providers to offer international airline airport services.

Later, AEDC filed before the RTC of Pasig a Petition for Nullity of the
Proceedings. Consequently, the other air service providers of MIAA also claimed that
the awarding of the project to PIATCO would somehow jeopardize their employment
or concession-contracts.Petitioners and petitioners-in-intervention filed then a petition
for prohibition before the Supreme Court seeking to enjoin and prohibit MIAA and
DOTC from implementing the Concession Agreements executed by the Philippine
Government through the DOTC and the MIAA and the PIATOCO.

PIATCO commenced an arbitration proceeding before the International

Chamber of Commerce against the Government of the Philippines acting through the
DOTC and MIAA and alleged that Philippine courts are without jurisdiction to review its
case against the government and that the submission of the case to the Supreme
Court is a violation of the rule on hierarchy of courts as trial courts have concurrent
jurisdiction with the Supreme Court with respect to a special civil action for
prohibition, thus, resort must first be had before the trial courts.

ISSUE: Whether or not the arbitration proceedings availed of by PIATCO deprived the
Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over the case.

HELD: No. The rule on the hierarchy of courts will also not prevent the Supreme
Court from assuming jurisdiction as the rule may be relaxed when the redress sought
cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts and where exceptional and compelling
reasons justify the availment of the remedy. In the present case, It is easy to discern
that exceptional circumstances exist in the cases at bar that call for the relaxation of
the rule.
22. G.R. No. 154599 January 21, 2004 exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) the tribunal, board, or officer must
THE LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY NATIONAL vs.THE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
HON. ATIENZA amounting lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
DOCTRINE: Hierarchy of Courts: Concurrent Jurisdiction: The concurrence of
jurisdiction is not to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an
A respondent is said to be exercising judicial function where he has the power to
absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefore
determine what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are, and then
will be directed. There is hierarchy of courts which is determinative of the venue of
undertakes to determine these questions and adjudicate upon the rights of the
appeals, and a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the
parties.The respondents do not fall within the ambit of tribunal, board, or officer
extraordinary writs. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. The enactment by the City Council of
issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important
Manila of the assailed ordinance and the issuance by respondent Mayor of the
reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition.
questioned executive order were done in the exercise of legislative and executive
functions, respectively, and not of judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
FACTS: The Liga is the national organization of all the barangays in the Philippines
which isin pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1991, and constitutes the duly
Second, although the instant petition is styled as a petition for certiorari, in essence,
elected presidents of highly-urbanized cities, provincial chapters, the metropolitan
it seeks the declaration by this Court of the unconstitutionality or illegality of the
Manila Chapter, and metropolitan political subdivision chapters. The Liga adopted and
questioned ordinance and executive order. It, thus, partakes of the nature of a
ratified its own Constitution and By-laws to govern its internal organization. By virtue
petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has only appellate, not original,
of one of its provisions, Liga adopted and ratified its own Election Code. Thereafter,
jurisdiction.
Liga came out with its Calendar of Activities and Guidelines, setting the
synchronized elections on October 22 for highly urbanized city chapters, such as
Third, even granting arguendo that the present petition is ripe for the extraordinary
the Liga Chapter of Manila, together with independent component city, provincial and
writ of certiorari, there is here a clear disregard of the hierarchy of courts. No special
metropolitan chapters.
and important reason or exceptional and compelling circumstance has been adduced
by the petitioner or the intervenor why direct recourse to this Court should be
On the other hand, the City Council of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8039, Series of
allowed.
2002, providing among other things, for the election of representatives of the District
Chapters in the City Chapter of Manila and setting elections for both chapters
thirty days after the barangay elections.The said ordinance was then forwarded
to the Office of the City Mayor, which was assailed by the Liga, as it encroached upon,
or even assumed the functions of the Liga through legislation, which was clearly
beyond the ambit of the powers of the City Council. However, despite that, the Mayor
signed and approved said ordinance and issued an Executive Order to implement it.
The Liga argues that Ordinance No.8039, Series of 2002, and EOH No. 011, Series of
2002, contradict the Liga Election Code and are therefore invalid. Hence, the Liga filed
the petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to nullify said ordinance
and EO. It prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary
injunction to prevent the implementation of the said ordinance and executive order.

ISSUE/S:Whether the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is
meritorious.

RULING: No, the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is not
meritorious. The Supreme Court resolved to dismiss the petition.

A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is a special
civil action that may be invoked only against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions. For a writ of certiorari to issue, the following
requisites must concur: (1) it must be directed against a tribunal, board, or officer
23. G.R. No. 176508 January 12, 2015 by notice of appeal within 15 days from notice of the denial of its motion for
SAINT MARY CRUSADE TO ALLEVIATE POVERTY OF BRETHREN FOUNDATION, reconsideration. By allowing the period of appeal toelapse without taking action, it
INC., squandered its right to appeal. Its present resort to certiorari is impermissible, for an
vs.HON. TEODORO T. RIEL
extraordinary remedy like certiorari cannot be a substitute for a lost appeal. That the
DOCTRINE: Hierarchy of Courts: Although the Supreme Court has concurrent extraordinary remedy of certiorari is not an alternative to an available remedy inthe
jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals in issuing the writ of certiorari, direct resort is ordinary course of law is clear from Section 1 of Rule 65, which requires that there
must be no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
allowed only when there are special, extraordinary or compelling reasons to justify the
same. The filing of special civil action directly in the SC is in disregard of the doctrine of law. Indeed, no error of judgment by a court will be corrected by certiorari, which
of hierarchy of courts. Also, an extraordinary remedy like certiorari cannot be a corrects only jurisdictional errors.
substitute for a lost appeal.

FACTS: Saint Mary claimed in its petition for reconstitution that the original copy of
OCT No. 1609 had been burnt and lost in the fire that gutted the Quezon City Register
of Deeds in the late 80’s. Initially, respondent Judge gave due course to the petition,
but after the preliminary hearing, he dismissed the petition for reconstitution through
the first assailed order. Saint Mary moved for reconsideration of the dismissal, but the
RTC denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of any cogent or justifiable ground
to reconsider.Hence, Saint Mary came directly to the Court alleging that respondent
Judge had unfairly abused his discretion and unlawfully neglected the performance of
an act which is specifically enjoined upon him as a duty, and that it (Saint Mary) had
no other remedy in the course of law except through the present petition for certiorari
and mandamus. The Court directed the respondent Judge and the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) to comment on the petition for certiorari and mandamus. The
University of the Philippines sought leave to intervene, which was granted. The
respondent Judge justified the dismissal of the petition for reconstitution by citing the
opposition by the OSG and the UP, as well as the recommendation of the Land
Registration Authority (LRA), and that Saint Mary did not present its purported
Torrens Title to be reconstituted, and that its claim was doubtful given the magnitude
of the 4,304,623 square meters as the land area involved, and that the UP’s
ownership of the portion of the land covered by such petition had long been settled by
the Court in a long line of cases.

ISSUE/S: Whether the petition for certiorari and mandamus is meritorious.

RULING: No,the petition for certiorari and mandamus, is devoid of procedural and
substantive merit, and is hereby dismissed.

Certiorari, being an extraordinary remedy, is granted only under the conditions

defined by the Rules of Court. The conditions are that: (1) the respondent tribunal,
board or officer exercising judicial or quasi judicial functions has acted without or
inexcess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction; and (2) there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

With the questioned orders of the RTC having finally disposed of the application for
judicial reconstitution, nothing more was left for the RTC to do in the case. As of then,
therefore, the correct recourse for the petitioner was to appeal to the Court of Appeals
24. G.R. No. 196795 April 12, 2018 Neither can the jurisdiction of the court be made to depend upon the defenses made
INTRAMUROS ADMINISTRATIONvs.OFFSHORE CONSTRUCTION by the defendant in his answer or motion to dismiss. If such were the rule, the
DEVELOPMENT COMPANY question of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely upon the defendant."

DOCTRINE: The doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not inviolable, and this Court has
2. Yes, direct resort of Intramuros to the SC instead of the CA is proper and
provided several exceptions to the doctrine.One of these exceptions is the exigency of
warranted under the circumstances. Although as sanctioned by the rules, it violates
the situation being litigated.
the principle of hierarchy of courts, nonetheless, the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is
not inviolable, and this Court has provided several exceptions to the doctrine. One of
FACTS: Intramuros leased certain real properties of the national government, which it
these exceptions is the exigency of the situation being litigated.Here, the controversy
administered to Offshore Construction and became the subject of three (3) Contracts
between the parties has been dragging on since 2010, which should not be the case
of Lease and also made reference to a memorandum of stipulations. Offshore
when the initial dispute-an ejectment case-is, by nature and design, a summary
Construction occupied and introduced improvements in the leased premises. During
procedure and should have been resolved with expediency. Moreover, this Court's
the lease period, Offshore Construction failed to pay its utility bills and rental fees,
rules of procedure permit the direct resort to this Court from a decision of the
despite several demand letters. Intramuros tolerated the continuing occupation,
Regional Trial Court upon questions of law, such as those which petitioner raises in
hoping that Offshore Construction would pay its arrears. To settle its arrears, Offshore
this case.
Construction proposed to pay the Department of Tourism's monthly operational
expenses for lights and sound equipment, electricity, and performers at the Baluarte
Plano Luneta de Sta. Isabel. Intramuros and the Department of Tourism accepted the
offer, and the parties executed a Memorandum of Agreement. However, Offshore
Construction continued to fail to pay its arrears. Intramuros filed a Complaint for
Ejectment before the Manila Metropolitan Trial Court. Offshore Construction filed a
Very Urgent Motion, praying that Intramuros’s complaint be dismissed on the ground
of non-forum shopping, lack of jurisdiction over the case, and litispendentia. The MTC
granted the motion and dismissed the case, while a motion to dismiss is a prohibited
pleading under the Rule on Summary Procedure, it found that Offshore Construction’s
motion was grounded on the lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. It held that
while there were lease contracts between the parties, the existence of other contracts
between them made Intramuros and Offshore Construction’s relationship as one of
concession. Under this concession agreement. The MTC found that the issues could
not be mere possession and rentals only. The case was appealed to the RTC, which
affirmed the MTC Order in toto.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether the Metropolitan Trial Court had jurisdiction over the ejectment
complaint filed by Intramuros Administration;
2. Whether the direct resort of Intramurosto the Supreme Court is proper

RULING:

I. Yes, the MTC had jurisdiction over the ejectment complaint filed by Intramuros
Administration, therefore, it seriously erred in finding otherwise, because the parties’
situation allegedly has already become “more complicated” than one of lease. It is
axiomatic that what determines the nature of an action as well as which court has
jurisdiction over it, are the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief
sought. "Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined upon the allegations made
in the complaint, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon a
claim asserted therein - a matter resolved only after and as a result of the trial.
25. G.R. No. 220832, February 28, 2018 requirement, there must be a concrete, compelling, and valid reason for the failure to
BUREAU OF CUSTOMS (BOC), et al. vs. HON. PAULINO Q. GALLEGOS comply with the requirement.

However, petitioners failed to show sufficient justification for dispensing with the
The BOC, through the Department of Budget and Management-Procurement Service requirement of a prior motion for reconsideration. Indeed, "petitioners may not
(DBM-PS), invited prospective bidders (consultants) in the eligibility screening for the arrogate to themselves the determination of whether a motion for reconsideration is
Phase Two project to develop the Philippine National Single Window System (PNSW necessary or not."
2). Among the bidders that submitted the eligibility documents were: (1) Joint
Venture of Omniprime Marketing Inc. (Joint Venture), and Intrasoft International, Inc. Likewise, the direct filing of this petition in this Court is in disregard of the doctrine of
(Intrasoft); and (2) E-Konek& ILS & FS JV, whose biggest shareholder is petitioner hierarchy of courts. The concurrence of jurisdiction among the Supreme Court, CA
BOC Commissioner Alberto D. Lina (Com. Lina).The announcement of the shortlist of and the RTC to issue the writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,
eligible consultants and of the highest bidder was delayed, due to the interview of the habeas corpus and injunction did not give petitioners the unrestricted freedom of
Project Team members of Joint Venture and Intrasoft, as requested by former Dep. choice of court forum. Stated differently, although this Court has concurrent
Com. Primo Aguas, which, was neither required by law nor by regulation. Thereafter, jurisdiction with the CA and the RTC in issuing the writ of certiorari, direct resort is
the DBM-PS Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) issued a Notice of HRB (Highest Rated allowed only when there are special, extraordinary or compelling reasons that justify
Bid) to Omniprime as the highest bidder, which later commenced its financial proposal the same. Absent any showing of any special, important or compelling reason to
and contract negotiation. justify the direct filing of the petition will cause the dismissal of the recourse, as in
this case.
Subsequently, Lina was appointed as BOC Com., and wrote a letter to DBM-PS Exec.
Dir. Syquia requesting for the discontinuance of the procurement process of the PNSW Substantive Aspect
2 project, in line with Sec. 41(c) of RA No. 9184, the Gov’t. Procurement Reform Act,
which grants to the head of the procuring agency the right to reject bids for justifiable Even if petitioners' direct resort to this Court is allowed, the dismissal of their petition
and reasonable grounds where the award of the contract will not redound to the remains.For certiorari to lie, it must be shown that the respondent Judge acted with
benefit of the government. Dir. Siquiathen issued a Notice of Cancellation, aborting grave abuse of discretion, or more specifically, that he exercised his power arbitrarily
the bidding process for the PNSW 2 project. Omniprime moved for a reconsideration or despotically when he issued the omnibus order and the WPI, by reason of passion
of the Notice of Cancellation, but it was denied by the BOC. Hence, Omniprimefiled a or personal hostility; and such exercise was so patent and gross as to amount to an
petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with Prayer for Issuance of TRO and/or Writ of evasion of positive duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform it or to act in contemplation
Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction (WPPI) and Writ of Preliminary Mandatory of law.Petitioners, however, failed in this respect.
Injunction (WPMI) before the RTC for the annulment of the decision of Dir. Syquia,
and instead to continue the last remaining process of the competitive bidding for the
PNSW 2 project, which is the signing of the contract and issuance of the Notice to
Proceed. The RTC ruled in favor of Omniprime. It consequently grant its application
for the issuance of an injunctive writ. The BOC, through Com Lina, and DPM-PS
through Dir. Syquiafiled this instant petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court.

ISSUE/S: Whether the petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the ROC is meritorious

RULING: No, the petition is not meritorious.

Procedural Aspect

Certiorari under Rule 65 inherently requires the filing of a motion for reconsideration,
which is the tangible representation of the opportunity given to the office to correct
itself. The plain and adequate remedy referred to in Section 1 of Rule 65 is a motion
for reconsideration of the assailed decision, which in this case, is the RTC's omnibus
order. The purpose of the motion is to enable the court or agency to rectify its
mistakes without the intervention of a higher court. To dispense with this
26. G.R. No. 151149 September 7, 2004 the evidence on record. In the four excepted instances, the court shall motuproprio
GEORGE KATON vs MANUEL PALANCA JR., et al. dismiss the claim or action.

DOCTRINE: Where prescription, lack of jurisdiction or failure to state a cause of

Residual jurisdiction is embodied in Section 9 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. The
action clearly appear from the complaint filed with the trial court, the action may be
dismissed motuproprio by the Court of Appeals, even if the case has been elevated for "residual jurisdiction" of trial courts is available at a stage in which the court is
review on different grounds. Verily, the dismissal of such cases appropriately ends normally deemed to have lost jurisdiction over the case or the subject matter involved
useless litigations. in the appeal. This stage is reached upon the perfection of the appeals by the parties
or upon the approval of the records on appeal, but prior to the transmittal of the
FACTS: Katon filed a request for the re-classification of the 18-hectare land in original records or the records on appeal. In either instance, the trial court still retains
Sombrero Island, Palawan with the Bureau of Forestry District (FD District). The its so-called residual jurisdiction to issue protective orders, approve compromises,
bureau thereafter conducted the investigation, inspection and survey of the area in
permit appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal, and allow the
the presence of Katon, and found that there were no actual occupants on the islands
but there were some coconut trees claimed to be planted by Manuel Palanca. The withdrawal of the appeal.
application for conversion of the whole Sombrero Island was favorably endorsed by
the FD District to its main office for appropriate action. Corpuz, Magdayao, Gapilango
and Fresnillo were included in the endorsement. Later, the subject land is certified The CA’s motuproprio dismissal of petitioner’s Complaint could not have been
and released as agricultural land for disposition under the Public Land Act. Thereafter, based, therefore, on residual jurisdiction under Rule 41. Undeniably, such order
Palanca was issued his homestead patent. Katon filed his petition with the RTC to
of dismissal was not one for the protection and preservation of the rights of the
assail the validity and to nullify the homestead patents and original certificates of title
covering certain portions of Sombrero Island issued in favor of Palanca and the rest of parties, pending the disposition of the case on appeal. What the CA referred to
the respondents, as well as the reconveyance of the whole island in his favor. Katon as residual prerogativeswere the general residual powers of the courts to
claimed that he has the exclusive right to file an application for homestead patent dismiss an action motuproprio upon the grounds mentioned in Section 1 of Rule
over the whole island since it was he who requested for its conversion. The RTC ruled 9 of the Rules of Court and under authority of Section 2 of Rule 114 of the same
in favor of the respondents, granting their Motion to Dismiss Katon’s petition. The rules.
latter then filed an MR, which was denied by the RTC for being a third and prohibited
motion. In his Petition for Certiorari before the CA, Katon charged the trial court with
grave abuse of discretion on the ground that the denied Motion was his first and only
MR. The CA, held that while petitioner had never applied for a homestead patent
under the Public Land Act. Hence, he never acquired title to that land.The CA added
that the annulment and cancellation of a homestead patent and the reversion of the
property to the State were matters between the State and the homestead grantee.
Finally, he was already barred by laches for having slept on his right for almost 23
years from the time Palanca’s title had been issued.

ISSUE/S:

Is the CA correct in invoking its alleged “residual prerogative” under Sec. 1, Rule 9 of
the Rules in Civ Pro in resolving the petition on an issue not raised in the petition?

RULING:

The petition of Katon has no merit.

Dismissal for Prescription and Lack of Jurisdiction

Katon has confused what the CA adverted to as its "residual prerogatives" under
Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court with the "residual jurisdiction" of trial
courts over cases appealed to the CA. Under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court,
defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are
deemed waived, except when (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2)
litispendentia, (3) res judicata and (4) prescription are evident from the pleadings or
27. G.R. No. 198755 June 5, 2013 CSC, as the central personnel agency of the government, has the inherent power to
ALBERTO PAT-OG, SR. vs.CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION supervise and discipline all members of the civil service, including public school
teachers.Indeed, under Section 9 of R.A. No. 4670, the jurisdiction over
administrative cases of public school teachers is lodged with the investigating
DOCTRINE: The Civil Service Commission, Department of Education, Board of committee constituted therein.Also, under Section 23 of R.A. No. 7836 (the Philippine
Professional Teachers-Professional Regulatory Commission have concurrent Teachers Professionalization Act of 1994), the Board of Professional Teachers is given
jurisdiction over administrative cases against public school teachers. Where the power, after due notice and hearing, to suspend or revoke the certificate of
concurrent jurisdiction exists in several tribunals, the body that first takes cognizance registration of a professional teacher for causes enumerated therein.
of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others.
When the law bestows upon a government body the jurisdiction to hear and decide
FACTS: Robert Bang-on, a 14 yr. old high school student of Antado National High cases involving specific matters, it is to be presumed that such jurisdiction is exclusive
School in Sagada, Mountain Province filed a complaint against Alberto Pat-og, Sr., a unless it be proved that another body is likewise vested with the same jurisdiction, in
high school teacher from the same school before the Civil Service Commission- which case, both bodies have concurrent jurisdiction over the matter.Where
Cordillera Administrative Region (CSC-CAR). Bang-on alleged that he attended his concurrent jurisdiction exists in several tribunals, the body that first takes cognizance
class at the basketball court of the school where Pat-og and his third year students of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others. In this case,
were also holding a separate class, and that he joined the latter’s students who were it was CSC which first acquired jurisdiction over the case because the complaint was
practising basketball shots. When Pat-og instructed them to form two lines, he filed before it. Thus, it had the authority to proceed and decide the case to the
mistakenly stayed in between the two lines, thinking they were to form three lines. exclusion of the DepEd and the Board of Professional Teachers.
Pat-og then held his right arm and punched his stomach without warning for failing to
follow instructions. As a result, Bang-on suffered stomach pain for several days and At any rate, granting that the CSC was without jurisdiction, the petitioner is indeed
was confined for three days. Bang-on then filed a criminal case against Pat-og for the estopped from raising the issue. Although the rule states that a jurisdictional question
crime of Less Serious Physical Injury with the RTC of Bontoc, Mountain Province. The may be raised at any time, such rule admits of the exception where, as in this case,
CSC-CAR took cognizance of the case and found the existence of prima facie case for estoppel has supervened. Here, instead of opposing the CSC’s exercise of jurisdiction,
misconduct and formally charged Pat-og. While the administrative proceedings were the petitioner invoked the same by actively participating in the proceedings before the
ongoing, the RTC rendered its judgment in the criminal case finding Pat-og guilty of CSC-CAR and by even filing his appeal before the CSC itself; only raising the issue of
the offense as charged. Likewise, the CSC-CAR also found Pat-og guilty of Simple jurisdiction later in his motion for reconsideration after the CSC denied his appeal.
Misconduct. Pat-og filed an MR which was denied for lack of merit. On appeal, the CSC This Court has time and again frowned upon the undesirable practice of a party
affirmed the decision of the CSC-CAR with modification finding him guilty of grave submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment only if favorable,
misconduct. Pat-og filed an MR questioning for the first time the jurisdiction of the but attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when adverse.
CSC, contending that administrative charges against a public school teacher should
have been initially heard by a committee to be constituted pursuant for the Magna
Carta for Public School Teachers (RA No. 4670). The MR was denied by the CSC,
ruling that Pat-og was estopped from challenging its jurisdiction considering that he
actively participated in the administrative proceedings against him. On appeal with
the CA, it affirmed the resolutions of the CSC, and denied the subsequent MR filed by
Pat-og.

ISSUE/S: Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that
Pat-og is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission to
hear and decide the administrative case against him

RULING: No, the argument of Pat-nog that the administrative case against him can
only proceed under RA 4670 is misplaced. Under Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution,
the CSC is the body charged with the establishment and administration of a career
civil service which embraces all branches and agencies of the government. E.O. No.
292 (the Administrative Code of 1987) and P.D. No. 807 (the Civil Service Decree of
the Philippines) expressly provide that the CSC has the power to hear and decide
administrative disciplinary cases instituted with it or brought to it on appeal. Thus, the
 repeated pronouncement that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined
28. G.R. No. 202836, June 19, 2018 by examining the material allegations of the complaint and the relief sought.As
FIRST SARMIENTO PROPERTY HOLDINGS, INC., v. PHILIPPINE BANK OF stated in Heirs of Dela Cruz v. Heirs of Cruz, “It is axiomatic that the jurisdiction
COMMUNICATIONS of a tribunal, including a quasi-judicial officer or government agency, over the
nature and subject matter of a petition or complaint is determined by the
DOCTRINE: To determine the nature of an action, if the principal relief sought is material allegations therein and the character of the relief prayed for,
not for the recovery of sum of money or real property, even if a claim over a irrespective of whether the petitioner or complainant is entitled to any or all such
sum of money or real property results as a consequence of the principal relief, reliefs.However, Lapitan stressed that where the money claim is only a
the action is incapable of pecuniary estimation. consequence of the remedy sought, the action is said to be one incapable of
pecuniary estimation.
FACTS:First Sarmiento Property Holdings, Inc. (First Sarmiento) obtained a loan
from Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCom) secured by a real estate A careful reading of petitioner's Complaint convinces the Court that petitioner
mortgage over some parcels of land. First Sarmiento failed to pay the principal never prayed for the reconveyance of the properties foreclosed during the
amount and accrued interest on the loan despite several demand letters from auction sale, or that it ever asserted its ownership or possession over them.
PBCom. The latter then resorted to extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgaged Rather, it assailed the validity of the loan contract with real estate mortgage that
properties, a recourse granted to it under the loan agreement. First Sarmiento it entered into with respondent because it supposedly never received the
attempted to file a complaint for the annulment of the real estate mortgage with proceeds of the P100,000,000.00 loan agreement.
the RTC, however, the Clerk of Court refused to accept the complaint in the
absence of the mortgage properties’ tax declarations, to assess the docket fees. Considering that petitioner paid the docket fees as computed by the clerk of
Upon its urgent motion, the RTC granted First Sarmiento’s Motion to Consider court, upon the direction of the Executive Judge, this Court is convinced that the
the Value of the Subject Matter of the Complaint as Not Capable of Pecuniary Regional Trial Court acquired jurisdiction over theComplaint for annulment of real
Estimation, and ruled that First Sarmiento’s action for annulment of real estate estate mortgage.
mortgage was incapable of pecuniary estimation. Meanwhile, the mortgaged
properties were auctioned and sold to PBCom as the highest bidder. Thereafter, Furthermore, even if it is assumed that the instant case were a real action and
First Sarmiento filed a Complaint for the annulment of real estate mortgage and the correct docket fees were not paid by petitioner, the case should not have
its amendments, with prayer for the issuance of TRO and preliminary injunction, been dismissed; instead, the payment of additional docket fees should have
an paid the filing fee. It claimed that it never received the loan proceeds from been made a lien on the judgment award. The records attest that in filing its
PBCom, yet the latter still sought the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate complaint, petitioner readily paid the docket fees assessed by the clerk of court;
mortgage. An ex-parte TRO enjoining the certificate of sale with the RD of hence, there was no evidence of bad faith or intention to defraud the
Bulacan was then issued. Later, the RTC directed the parties to observe the government that would have rightfully merited the dismissal of the Complaint
status quo ante. However, the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of Malolos
City issued a certificate of sale to PBCom. In its opposition, PBCom asserted that
the RTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over the First Sarmiento’s Complaint
because the action for annulment of mortgage was a real action; thus, the filing
fees filed should have been based on the fair market value of the mortgaged
properties. The RTC then dismissed the Complaint for lack of jurisdiction, and
denied First Sarmiento’s MR. First Sarmiento filed a Petition for Review under
Rule 45 with the SC.

ISSUE/S: Whether the RTC obtained jurisdiction over First Sarmiento Corp.,
Inc’s Complaint for annulment of the real estate mortgage

RULING: Yes, RTC obtained jurisdiction over the complaint of First Sarmiento
Corp on the matter.
Lapitan v. Scandia instructed that to determine whether the subject matter of an
action is incapable of pecuniary estimation, the nature of the principal action or
remedy sought must first be established. This finds support in this Court's
 29. ALDAY vs. FGU INSURANCE CORPORATION accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee
within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or
DOCTRINE: It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory reglementary period.
pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with
jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the 2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and similar
initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed
allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the therefor is paid. The court may allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but
applicable prescriptive or reglamentary period. also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the
appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the
FACTS: FGU Insurance Corporation (FGU) filed a complaint for sum of money with judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati against Evangeline Alday (Alday) amounting been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall
to P114,650.76. Alday filed her Answer by way of counterclaim and asserted that it is constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or
FGU who owes them P104,893.45 in direct commissions, profit commissions, and his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional
bonuses from July 1, 1986 to December 7, 1986 and for premium reserves amounting fee.
to P500,000. She also prayed for attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, moral damages
and exemplary damages for the allegedly unfounded actions filed by FGU. FGU then The above mentioned ruling in Sun Insurance has been reiterated in the
moved to strike out Alday’s answer and to declare her in default for filing the answer recent case of Susan v. Court of Appeals. In Suson, the Court explained that although
out of time. The motion was denied. FGU again moved to dismiss Alday’s counterclaim the payment of the prescribed docket fees is a jurisdictional requirement, its non-
by contending that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the same because payment does not result in the automatic dismissal of the case provided the docket
of non-payment of docket fees. Alday also in response, asked the trial court to declare fees are paid within the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. Coming now to
her counterclaim as exempt from payment of docket fees since it is compulsory and the case at bar, it has not been alleged by respondent and there is nothing in the
that FGU be declared in default for failing to answer such counterclaim. records to show that petitioner has attempted to evade the payment of the proper
docket fees for her permissive counterclaim. As a matter of fact, after respondent
The trial court ruled in favor of FGU by dismissing Alday’s counterclaim and filed its motion to dismiss petitioner's counterclaim based on her failure to pay docket
consequently denied Alday’s motion. It found Alday’s counterclaim to be merely fees, petitioner immediately filed a motion with the trial court, asking it to declare her
permissive and that failure to pay the docket fees prevented the court from acquiring counterclaim as compulsory in nature and therefore exempt from docket fees and, in
jurisdiction over the same. Alday moved for reconsideration but was denied. The addition, to declare that respondent was in default for its failure to answer her
Court of Appeals (CA) sustained the trial court, and her motion for reconsideration counterclaim. However, the trial court dismissed petitioner's counterclaim. Pursuant to
was denied. Hence this petition. this Court's ruling in Sun Insurance, the trial court should have instead given
petitioner a reasonable time, but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period, to pay the filing fees for her permissive counterclaim.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is bound to pay for docket fees for her
counterclaims?

HELD: NO, the Supreme Court ruled that there is no need for need for petitioner to
pay docket fees for her compulsory counterclaim. On the other hand, in order for the
trial court to acquire jurisdiction over her permissive counterclaim, petitioner is bound
to pay the prescribed docket fees. The rule on the payment of filing fees has been laid
down by the Court in the case of Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. V. Hon. Maximiano
Asuncion

1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the
payment of the prescribed docket fee that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the
subject-matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not
 30. KOREAN TECHNOLOGIES vs. CA 1998, which was subsequently extended until July 22, 1998. On July 17, 1998,
PGSMC filed its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim9 asserting that it had the full
right to dismantle and transfer the machineries and equipment because it had paid for
them in full as stipulated in the contract; and that KOGIES was liable for damages
DOCTRINE: Effective August 16, 2004 under Sec. 7, Rule 141, as amended by amounting to PhP 4,500,000 for altering the quantity and lowering the quality of the
A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC, docket fees are now required to be paid in compulsory machineries and equipment.
counterclaim or cross-claims.
KOGIES move to dismiss the counterclaim on the ground that PGSMC failed
to comply with the requirements of payment of docket fees and certification of non-
forum shopping. On September 21, 1998, the trial court issued an Order denying
FACTS: Petitioner Korea Technologies Co., Ltd. (KOGIES) is a Korean corporation KOGIES’ motion to dismiss PGSMC’s compulsory counterclaims as these counterclaims
which is engaged in the supply and installation of Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) fell within the requisites of compulsory counterclaims. Such Order was sustained by
Cylinder manufacturing plants, while private respondent Pacific General Steel the Court of Appeals.
Manufacturing Corp. (PGSMC) is a domestic corporation. On March 5, 1997, PGSMC
and KOGIES executed a Contract1 whereby KOGIES would set up an LPG Cylinder
Manufacturing Plant in Carmona, Cavite. The contract was executed in the Philippines.
On April 7, 1997, the parties executed, in Korea, an Amendment for Contract No. ISSUE: Whether or not the counterclaim shall be dismissed.
KLP-970301 dated March 5, 1997 amending the terms of payment. The contract and
its amendment stipulated that KOGIES will ship the machinery and facilities necessary
for manufacturing LPG cylinders for which PGSMC would pay USD 1,224,000. KOGIES
would install and initiate the operation of the plant for which PGSMC bound itself to HELD: NO, The Supreme Court held that as aptly ruled by the CA, the
pay USD 306,000 upon the plant’s production of the 11-kg. LPG cylinder samples. counterclaims of PGSMC were incorporated in its Answer with Compulsory
Thus, the total contract price amounted to USD 1,530,000. Subsequently, the Counterclaim dated July 17, 1998 in accordance with Section 8 of Rule 11, 1997
machineries, equipment, and facilities for the manufacture of LPG cylinders were Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, the rule that was effective at the time the Answer
shipped, delivered, and installed in the Carmona plant. PGSMC paid KOGIES USD with Counterclaim was filed. Sec. 8 on existing counterclaim or cross-claim states, "A
1,224,000. However, gleaned from the Certificate executed by the parties on January compulsory counterclaim or a cross-claim that a defending party has at the time he
22, 1998, after the installation of the plant, the initial operation could not be files his answer shall be contained therein.”
conducted as PGSMC encountered financial difficulties affecting the supply of
materials, thus forcing the parties to agree that KOGIES would be deemed to have On July 17, 1998, at the time PGSMC filed its Answer incorporating its
completely complied with the terms and conditions of the March 5, 1997 contract. For counterclaims against KOGIES, it was not liable to pay filing fees for said
the remaining balance of USD306,000 for the installation and initial operation of the counterclaims being compulsory in nature. We stress, however, that effective August
plant, PGSMC issued two postdated checks. When KOGIES deposited the checks, 16, 2004 under Sec. 7, Rule 141, as amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC, docket fees
these were dishonored for the reason "PAYMENT STOPPED." Thus, on May 8, 1998, are now required to be paid in compulsory counterclaim or cross-claims. As to the
KOGIES sent a demand letter to PGSMC threatening criminal action for violation of failure to submit a certificate of forum shopping, PGSMC’s Answer is not an initiatory
Batas PambansaBlg. 22 in case of nonpayment. On the same date, the wife of pleading which requires a certification against forum shopping under Sec. 524 of Rule
PGSMC’s President faxed a letter dated May 7, 1998 to KOGIES’ President who was 7, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. It is a responsive pleading, hence, the
then staying at a Makati City hotel. She complained that not only did KOGIES deliver courts a quo did not commit reversible error in denying KOGIES’ motion to dismiss
a different brand of hydraulic press from that agreed upon but it had not delivered PGSMC’s compulsory counterclaims.
several equipment parts already paid for.

On June 23, 1998, PGSMC again wrote KOGIES reiterating the contents of
its June 1, 1998 letter threatening that the machineries, equipment, and facilities
installed in the plant would be dismantled and transferred on July 4, 1998.

On July 3, 1998, KOGIES filed a Complaint for Specific Performance,

docketed as Civil Case No. 98-117 against PGSMC before the Muntinlupa City Regional
Trial Court (RTC). The RTC granted a temporary restraining order (TRO) on July 4,
 31. MERCADO vs. CA however, denied the motion. Instead, it set the case for pre-trial. Thereafter, trial
ensued.

Meanwhile, Mercado passed away and was substituted by his heirs.

DOCTRINE: A counterclaim (or a claim which a defending party may have Petitioners subsequently filed this petition asserting that the CA erred in affirming the
against any party)16 may be compulsory17 or permissive. A counterclaim that (1) RTC decision in toto. The said decision (insofar as it ordered Mercado to pay SMC
arises out of (or is necessarily connected with) the transaction or occurrence that is ₱7,468,153.75) was void. SMC’s counterclaim was permissive in nature. Inasmuch as
the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim; (2) falls within the jurisdiction of the SMC did not pay docket fees, the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over the
court and (3) does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties over counterclaim.
whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction, is compulsory.18 Otherwise, a
counterclaim is merely permissive.

ISSUE: Whether or not payment of docket fees was necessary for the validity of the
counterclaim
FACTS: Leonides Mercado had been distributing respondent San Miguel
Corporation’s (SMC’s) beer products in Quiapo, Manila since 1967. In 1991, SMC
extended to him a ₱7.5 million credit line allowing him to withdraw goods on credit.
To secure his purchases, Mercado assigned three China Banking Corporation (CBC) HELD: NO, The Supreme Court explained that a counterclaim (or a claim which a
certificates of deposit amounting to ₱5 million to SMC and executed a continuing hold- defending party may have against any party) may be compulsory or permissive. A
out agreement stating: “Any demand made by [SMC] on [CBC], claiming default on counterclaim that (1) arises out of (or is necessarily connected with) the transaction
my/our part shall be conclusive on [CBC] and shall serve as absolute authority for or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim; (2) falls within
[CBC] to encash the [CBC certificates of deposit] in accordance with the third the jurisdiction of the court and (3) does not require for its adjudication the presence
paragraph of this Hold-Out Agreement, whether or not I/we have in fact defaulted on of third parties over whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction, is compulsory.
any of my/our obligations with [SMC], it being understood that the issue of whether Otherwise, a counterclaim is merely permissive.
or not there was factual default must be threshed out solely between me/us and
[SMC]”. He also submitted three surety bonds from Eastern Assurance and Surety When Mercado sought to annul the continuing hold-out agreement and deed
Corporation (EASCO) totaling ₱2.6 million. of assignment (which he executed as security for his credit purchases), he in effect
sought to be freed from them. While he admitted having outstanding obligations, he
On February 10, 1992, SMC notified CBC that Mercado failed to pay for the nevertheless asserted that those were not covered by the assailed accessory
items he withdrew on credit. Consequently, citing the continuing hold-out agreement, contracts. For its part, aside from invoking the validity of the said agreements, SMC
it asked CBC to release the proceeds of the assigned certificates of deposit. CBC therefore sought to collect the payment for the value of goods Mercado purchased on
approved SMB’s request and informed Mercado. On March 2, 1992, Mercado filed an credit. Thus, Mercado’s complaint and SMC’s counterclaim both touched the issues of
action to annul the continuing hold-out agreement and deed of assignment in the whether the continuing hold-out agreement and deed of assignment were valid and
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 55. He claimed that the continuing hold- whether Mercado had outstanding liabilities to SMC. The same evidence would
out agreement allowed forfeiture without the benefit of foreclosure. It was therefore essentially support or refute Mercado’s claim and SMC’s counterclaim.
void pursuant to Article 2088 of the Civil Code. On March 18, 1992, SMC filed its
answer with counterclaim against Mercado. It contended that Mercado delivered only Based on the foregoing, had these issues been tried separately, the efforts
two CBC certificates of deposit amounting to ₱4.5 million and asserted that the of the RTC and the parties would have had to be duplicated. Clearly, SMC’s
execution of the continuing hold-out agreement and deed of assignment was a counterclaim, being logically related to Mercado’s claim, was compulsory in nature.
recognized business practice. Furthermore, because Mercado admitted his outstanding Consequently, the payment of docket fees was not necessary for the RTC to acquire
liabilities, SMC sought payment of the lees products he withdrew (or purchased on jurisdiction over the subject matter.
credit) worth ₱7,468,153.75. On April 23, 1992, SMC filed a third-party complaint
against EASCO. It sought to collect the proceeds of the surety bonds submitted by
Mercado. On September 14, 1994, Mercado filed an urgent manifestation and motion
seeking the dismissal of the complaint. He claimed that he was no longer interested in
annulling the continuing hold-out agreement and deed of assignment. The RTC,
 32. PROTON PILIPINAS vs. BANQUE NATIONAL DE PARIS HELD: NO, the Court held that while the payment of the prescribed docket fee is a
jurisdictional requirement, even its non-payment at the time of filing does not
automatically cause the dismissal of the case, as long as the fee is paid within the
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period, more so when the party involved
DOCTRINE: Plainly, while the payment of the prescribed docket fee is a demonstrates a willingness to abide by the rules prescribing such payment.
jurisdictional requirement, even its non-payment at the time of filing does not
automatically cause the dismissal of the case, as long as the fee is paid within the It also stated that where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period, more so when the party involved the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but,
demonstrates a willingness to abide by the rules prescribing such payment. subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if
specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing
fee therefore shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of
the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and
FACTS: It appears that sometime in 1995, petitioner Proton Pilipinas Corporation collect the additional fee.
(Proton) availed of the credit facilities of herein respondent, BanqueNationale de Paris
(BNP). To guarantee the payment of its obligation, its co-petitioners Automotive In the case at bar, BNP merely relied on the assessment made by the clerk
Corporation Philippines (Automotive), Asea One Corporation (Asea) and Autocorp of court which turned out to be incorrect. Under the circumstances, the clerk of court
Group (Autocorp) executed a corporate guarantee to the extent of US$2,000,000.00. has the responsibility of reassessing what respondent must pay within the prescriptive
BNP and Proton subsequently entered into three trust receipt agreements dated June, period, failing which the complaint merits dismissal. The Court ordered the Clerk of
1996, January 14, 1997, and April 24, 1997. Under the terms of the trust receipt Court of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City to reassess and determine the docket
agreements, Proton would receive imported passenger motor vehicles and hold them fees that should be paid by respondent, BNP, in accordance with the Decision of this
in trust for BNP. Proton would be free to sell the vehicles subject to the condition that Court, and direct respondent to pay the same within fifteen (15) days, provided the
it would deliver the proceeds of the sale to BNP, to be applied to its obligations to it. applicable prescriptive or reglementary period has not yet expired. Thereafter, the
In case the vehicles are not sold, Proton would return them to BNP, together with all trial court is ordered to proceed with the case with utmost dispatch.
the accompanying documents of title. Allegedly, Proton failed to deliver the proceeds
of the sale and return the unsold motor vehicles. Pursuant to the corporate
guarantee, BNP demanded from Automotive, Asea and Autocorp the payment of the
amount of US$1,544,984.40 representing Proton's total outstanding obligations.
These guarantors refused to pay, however. Hence, BNP filed on September 7, 1998
before the Makati Regional Trial Court (RTC) a complaint against petitioners praying
that they be ordered to pay (1) US$1,544,984.40 plus accrued interest and other
related charges thereon subsequent to August 15, 1998 until fully paid and (2) an
amount equivalent to 5% of all sums due from petitioners as attorney's fees. The
clerk of court assessed the docket fee.

Proton et al. filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the court cannot
exercise jurisdiction over the case because BNP did not properly pay the docket fees.
The RTC denied the motion to dismiss. On appeal, the Court of Appeals denied the
motion of Proton et al. Hence this present petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the case shall be dismissed for the failure to comply with
the requirement of paying the proper docket fees
 33. RUBY SHELTER BUILDERS vs. FORMARAN ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is liable to pay for the additional docket fees

HELD: YES, the Supreme Court ruled that the true nature of the action instituted
DOCTRINE: A real action indisputably involves real property. The docket fees by petitioner against respondents is the recovery of title to and possession of real
for a real action would still be determined in accordance with the value of the real property. It is a real action necessarily involving real property, the docket fees for
property involved therein; the only difference is in what constitutes the acceptable which must be computed in accordance with Section 7(1), Rule 141 of the Rules of
value. In computing the docket fees for cases involving real properties, the courts, Court, as amended. The Court of Appeals, therefore, did not commit any error in
instead of relying on the assessed or estimated value, would now be using the fair affirming the RTC Orders requiring petitioner to pay additional docket fees for its
market value of the real properties (as stated in the Tax Declaration or the Zonal Complaint in Civil Case No. 2006-0030.
Valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, whichever is higher) or, in the absence
thereof, the stated value of the same. The docket fees for a real action would still be determined in accordance
with the value of the real property involved therein; the only difference is in what
constitutes the acceptable value. In computing the docket fees for cases involving real
properties, the courts, instead of relying on the assessed or estimated value, would
FACTS: Ruby Shelter, herein petitioner, obtained a loan amounting to now be using the fair market value of the real properties (as stated in the Tax
P95,700,620.00 from respondents Romeo Y. Tan (Tan) and Roberto L. Obiedo Declaration or the Zonal Valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, whichever is
(Obiedo) secured by real estate mortgages consisting of five (5) parcels of land in the higher) or, in the absence thereof, the stated value of the same.
name of the petitioner. After several negotiations and despite the extension granted
by Tan and Obiedo, petitioner still wasn't able to pay. Tan and Obiedo, by virtue of
real estate mortgages, executed Deeds of Absolute Sale in their favor consisting the
five parcels of land. It is provided for in the Memorandum Agreement that if petitioner
fails to pay the loaned amount, five Deeds of Absolute Sale would be executed in
favor of Tan and Obiedo.

On March 16, 2006, petitioner filed a Complaint before the Regional Trial
Court for declaration of nullity of the deeds of sale and damages believing that
respondents' action was one which was incapable of pecuniary estimation. Upon filing
its complaint, petitioner paid docket fees amounting to P13,644.25 as assessed by the
Office of the Clerk of Court. It was stated that it only wanted to annul the deeds of
absolute sale, so therefor, no issue of title or recovery of possession is present to
classify it as a real action.

Pursuant to the Memorandum of Agreement, there was a provision which

states that if Ruby Shelter brought suit against respondents, it would be amounting to
P10,000,000.00 as liquidated damages inclusive of costs and attorney's fees. Tan and
Obiedo moved to dismiss the complaint contending that the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
did not acquire jurisdiction over the case since the case involved recovery of real
property making it a real action which requires payment of docket fees equivalent to a
percentage of the fair market value of the land amounting to P720,392.60.

RTC and Court of Appeals both ruled in favor of Tan and Obiedo ordering
Ruby Shelter to pay additional docket fees. Hence, this petition.
 34. ST. LOUIS UNIVERSITY vs. COBBARUBIAS that the appeal is not perfected if only a part of the docket fee is deposited within the
reglementary period and the remainder is tendered after the expiration of the period.

Procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their

DOCTRINE: In cases of appeal, payment in full of docket fees within the non-observance may have prejudiced a party's substantive rights; like all rules, they
prescribed period is not only mandatory, but also jurisdictional. It is an essential are required to be followed. However, there are recognized exceptions to their strict
requirement, without which, the decision appealed from would become final and observance, such as: (1) most persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a
executory as if no appeal has been filed. litigant from an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the
prescribed procedure; (3) good faith of the defaulting party by immediately paying
within a reasonable time from the time of the default; (4) the existence of special or
compelling circumstances; (5) the merits of the case; (6) a cause not entirely
FACTS: Respondent is an associate professor of the petitioner and an active attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the
member of the union of faculty and employees. The Collective Bargaining Agreements rules; (7) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and
contained the following provision that for teaching employees in college who fail the dilatory; (8) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud,
yearly evaluation, who are retained for three (3) cumulative years in five (5) years, accident, mistake or excusable negligence without the appellant's fault; (10) peculiar,
shall be on forced leave for one (1) regular semester during which period all benefits legal and equitable circumstances attendant to each case; (11) in the name of
due them shall be suspended. Petitioner placed respondent on forced leave for failing substantial justice and fair play; (12) importance of the issues involved; and (13)
to achieve the required rating points. Respondent sought recourse from the CBA’s exercise of sound discretion by the judge, guided by all the attendant
grievance machinery, but to no avail. Respondent filed a case with DOLE but circumstances.52 Thus, there should be an effort, on the part of the party invoking
circulation and mediation again failed. The parties submitted the issues between them liberality, to advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for his/her failure to
for voluntary arbitration before Voluntary Arbitrator (VA). Respondent argued that the comply with the rules.
CA already resolved the forced leave issue in a prior case between the parties, ruling
that the forced leave for teachers who fail their evaluation for three (3) times within a In the present case, Cobarrubias filed her petition for review on December
five-year period should be coterminous with the CBA in force during the same five- 5, 2007, fifteen (15) days from receipt of the VA decision on November 20, 2007, but
year period. Petitioner argued that said CA decision is not yet final. The VA dismissed paid her docket fees in full only after seventy-two (72) days, when she filed her
the complaint. Respondent filed with the CA a petition for review under Rule 43 of the motion for reconsideration on February 15, 2008 and attached the postal money
Rules of Court but failed to pay the filing fees and to attach the material portion of the orders for ₱4,230.00. Undeniably, the docket fees were paid late, and without
records. Motion for reconsideration was filed, complying with the procedural lapses, payment of the full docket fees, Cobarrubias’ appeal was not perfected within the
and CA reinstated the petition. reglementary period. Other than insisting that the ends of justice and fair play are
better served if the case is decided on its merits, Cobarrubias offered no excuse for
her failure to pay the docket fees in full when she filed her petition for review. To us,
Cobarrubias’ omission is fatal to her cause.
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in reinstating Cobarrubias’ petition despite her failure
to pay the appeal fee within the reglementary period

HELD: YES, the Supreme Court held that ayment in full of docket fees within the
prescribed period is not only mandatory, but also jurisdictional. It is an essential
requirement, without which, the decision appealed from would become final and
executory as if no appeal has been filed. As early as the 1932 case of Lazaro v.
Endencia and Andres,we stressed that the payment of the full amount of the docket
fee is an indispensable step for the perfection of an appeal. In Lee v. Republic, we
decided that even though half of the appellate court docket fee was deposited, no
appeal was deemed perfected where the other half was tendered after the period
within which payment should have been made. In Aranas v. Endona, we reiterated
 35. GIPA vs. SOUTHERN LUZON INSTITUTE ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in dismissing the appeal
filed by the petitioners for failure to remit the meager amount amount of ₱30.00 after
having advanced a substantial portion of the docket fees

DOCTRINE: Payment of the full amount of appellate court docket and lawful
fees is mandatory and jurisdictional.
HELD: NO, the Supreme Court ruled that Payment of the full amount of appellate
court docket and lawful fees are mandatory and jurisdictional. Relaxation of the rule
on payment of appeal fee is unwarranted in this case. Section 4, Rule 41 of the Rules
FACTS: On February 26, 1996, respondent Southern Luzon Institute (SLI), an of Court provides:
educational institution in Bulan, Sorsogon, filed a Complaint for Recovery of
Ownership and Possession with Damages against petitioners Alonzo Gipa, Imelda Sec. 4.Appellate court docket and other lawful fees. – Within the period for
Marollano, JuanitoLudovice, DemarBitangcor, VirgilioGojit, Felipe Montalban and four taking an appeal, the appellant shall pay to the clerk of court which
others namely, Arturo Rogacion, VirgilioGracela, Rosemarie Alvarez and Rosita rendered the judgment or final order appealed from, the full amount of the
Montalban (Rosita). During trial, defendant Rosita executed a Special Power of appellate court docket and other lawful fees. Proof of payment of said fees
Attorney in favor of her sister Daisy M. Placer (Placer) authorizing the latter to shall be transmitted to the appellate court together with the original record
represent her in the case and to sign any and all papers in relation thereto. or the record on appeal. (Emphases supplied)

Finding SLI to have proven its ownership of the property by preponderance In Gonzales v. Pe, the Court’s explanation anent the requirement of full
of evidence, the RTC rendered a Decision in its favor on January 5, 2005. payment of docket and other lawful fees under the above-quoted provision was
iterated, viz:
Petitioners and their co-defendants filed a Notice of Appeal which was
granted by the RTC in its Order of January 27, 2005. The CA, however, dismissed the In Far Corporation v. Magdaluyo, as with other subsequent cases of the
appeal in its Resolution of August 26, 2005 since it was not shown that the appellate same ruling, the Court explained that the procedural requirement under Section 4 of
court docket fees and other lawful fees were paid. Petitioners and their co-defendants Rule 41 is not merely directory, as the payment of the docket and other legal fees
promptly filed a Motion for Reconsideration to which they attached a Certification from within the prescribed period is both mandatory and jurisdictional. It bears stressing
the RTC that they paid the appeal fee in the amount of₱3,000.00 under Official that an appeal is not a right, but a mere statutory privilege. An ordinary appeal from
Receipt No. 18091130 dated January 25, 2005. In view of this, the CA granted the a decision or final order of the RTC to the CA must be made within 15 days from
said motion and consequently reinstated the appeal through a Resolution dated notice. And within this period, the full amount of the appellate court docket and other
November 2, 2005. Subsequently, however, the CA further required petitioners and lawful fees must be paid to the clerk of the court which rendered the judgment or final
their codefendants, through a Minute Resolution dated March 1, 2006, to remit within order appealed from. The requirement of paying the full amount of the appellate
ten days from notice the amount of ₱30.00 for legal research fund, which apparently docket fees within the prescribed period is not a mere technicality of law or
was not included in the ₱3,000.00 appeal fee previously paid by them. Copy of the procedure. The payment of docket fees within the prescribed period is mandatory for
said resolution was received on March 13,2006 by petitioners‘ counsel, Atty. Jose G. the perfection of an appeal. Without such payment, the appeal is not perfected. The
Gojar of the Public Attorney‘s Office. Despite the lapse of nine months from their appellate court does not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action and
counsel‘s receipt of the said resolution, petitioners and their co-defendants, however, the Decision sought to be appealed from becomes final and executory. Further, under
failed to comply with the CA‘s directive. Hence, the said court dismissed the appeal Section 1 (c), Rule 50, an appeal may be dismissed by the CA, on its own motion or
through its Resolution of December 20, 2006. Petitioners and their co-defendants filed on that of the appellee, on the ground of the non-payment of the docket and other
a Motion for Reconsideration invoking the principle of liberality in the application of lawful fees within the reglementary period as provided under Section 4 of Rule 41.
technical rules considering that they have paid the substantial amount of ₱3,000.00 The payment of the full amount of the docket fee is an indispensable step for the
for docket and other legal fees and fell short only by the meager amount of ₱30.00. perfection of an appeal. In both original and appellate cases, the court acquires
As compliance, they attached to the said motion a postal money order in the sum of jurisdiction over the case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees.
₱30.00 payable to the Clerk of Court of the CA. The CA, however, was not swayed,
hence, the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration in its Resolution of March 30,
2007.
36. REYES V PEOPLE 763 SCRA 226 (2015) (2) petitioner failed to pay the complete docket fee.

DOCTRINE
The rule under Rule 42 is that payment in full of the docket fees within the prescribed
Payment in full of the docket fees within the prescribed period is mandatory. In period is mandatory. In Manchester v. Court of Appeals, it was held that a court
Manchester v. Court of Appeals, it was held that a court acquires jurisdiction over any acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket
case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. The strict application of this fee. The strict application of this rule was, however, relaxed two (2) years after in the
rule was, however, relaxed two (2) years after in the case of Sun Insurance Office, case of Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion, wherein the Court decreed that where
Ltd. v. Asuncion, wherein the Court decreed that where the initiatory pleading is not the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by the payment of the docket fee, the court
accompanied by the payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable period of time, but in no case
fee within a reasonable period of time, but in no case beyond the applicable beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. This ruling was made on
prescriptive or reglementary period. the premise that the plaintiff had demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules
by paying the additional docket fees required. Thus, in the more recent case of United
FACTS Overseas Bank v. Ros,the Court explained that where the party does not deliberately
intend to defraud the court in payment of docket fees, and manifests its willingness to
Private respondent Salud M. Gegato filed a complaint against petitioner Rodging abide by the rules by paying additional docket fees when required by the court, the
Reyes for Grave Threats before the MCTC of Bayugan, Agusan del Sur. The MCTC liberal doctrine enunciated in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., and not the strict regulations
found him guilty of Grave Threats. Upon appeal, the RTC instead found him guilty of set in Manchester, will apply.
Other Light Threats.
Admittedly, this rule is not without recognized qualifications. The Court has declared
With Petitioner’s MR denied by the RTC, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a that in appealed cases, failure to pay the appellate court docket fee within the
Motion for Extension of Time to File a Petition for Review. However, instead of filing a prescribed period warrants only discretionary as opposed to automatic dismissal of
petition for review within the 15-day period allowed by the CA, petitioner filed a the appeal and that the court shall exercise its power to dismiss in accordance with
second Motion for Extension of Time asking for another 15 days within which to file the tenets of justice and fair play, and with great deal of circumspection considering
his petition for review. Afterwhich, petitioner filed his petition. all attendant circumstances.

The CA, in its Resolution dated August 2, 2007, dismissed the petition. The Resolution In that connection, the CA, in its discretion, may grant an additional period of fifteen
partly reads, as follows: (15) days only within which to file the petition for review upon proper motion and the
payment of the full amount of the docket and other lawful fees and the deposit for
Petitioner's first Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review asking costs before the expiration of the reglemetary period and that no further extension
for fifteen (15) days from June 6, 2007 or until June 21, 2007 is DENIED for
shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed
failure to pay the full amount of the docket fees pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 42 of
the Rules of Court. His second motion for extension is likewise DENIED as no fifteen (15) days. Therefore, the grant of any extensions for the filing of the petition is
further extension may be granted except for most compelling reason. discretionary and subject to the condition that the full amount of the docket and
lawful fees are paid before the expiration of the reglementary period to file the
Petitioner filed 3 MR’s with the CA, all of them denied. Hence this petition. Petitioner petition.
insists that the CA erred in favoring procedural technicalities over his constitutional
right to due process.

ISSUE

WON The CA erred in denying petitioners various MR’s thus denying him of due
process

HELD

NO. It is significant to emphasize that the CA dismissed the petition due to the
following procedural infirmities: (1) it was filed beyond the reglemetary period; and
37. SY-VARGAS V ESTATE OF OSGOS 805 SCRA 438 RESPONDENTS’ COUNTERCLAIM IS PERMISSIVE. The nature of a counterclaim is
determinative of whether or not the counterclaimant is required to pay docket fees.
DOCTRINE The rule in permissive counterclaims is that for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction,
the counterclaimant is bound to pay the prescribed docket fees. On the other hand,
Respondents' failure to pay the required docket fees, per se, should not necessarily the prevailing rule with respect to compulsory counterclaims is that no filing fees are
lead to the dismissal of their counterclaim. It has long been settled that while the required for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter.
court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed
docket fees, its non-payment at the time of filing of the initiatory pleading does not The four tests to determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or not are the
automatically cause its dismissal provided that: (a) the fees are paid within a following, to wit:
reasonable period; and (b) there was no intention on the part of the claimant to
defraud the government. (a) Are the issues of fact or law raised by the claim and the counterclaim
largely the same?
FACTS
(b) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant's claims, absent the
Ogsos, Sr. and the Heirs of Fermina Pepico entered into a Contract of Lease from 94- compulsory counterclaim rule?
95 till 00-01.Based on the contract, Ogsos, Sr. agreed to pay the Heirs of Fermina a
certain amount of sugar every crop year as lease rental. (c) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiff's claim as
well as the defendant's counterclaim? and
Petitioner and Kathryn, who are among the heirs of Fermina, claimed that the lease
rentals from crop year 1994-1995 to 1998-1999 were not paid. Thus, on April 27, (d) Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim, such
2000, they filed a Complaint for Specific Performance and Damages against that the conduct of separate trials of the respective claims of the parties would
respondents, before the RTC. entail a substantial duplication of effort and time by the parties and the court?

In their answer, respondents alleged that they had faithfully complied with their If these tests result in affirmative answers, the counterclaim is compulsory.
obligations under the lease contract. They claimed that sometime in December 1998,
petitioner and Kathryn unlawfully took possession of the leased premises and The Court finds that the counterclaim of respondents is permissive in nature. This is
appropriated for themselves the sugarcane ready for harvest under the pretext that because: (a) the issue in the main case, i.e., whether or not respondents are liable to
they would apply the proceeds thereof to the unpaid rent. Thus, when petitioner and pay lease rentals, is entirely different from the issue in the counterclaim, i.e., whether
Kathryn took possession of the leased premises, respondents lost their profits. or not petitioner and Kathryn are liable for damages for taking over the possession of
Accordingly, respondents filed a counterclaim for these lost profits plus damages. the leased premises and harvesting and appropriating respondents' crops planted
therein; (b) since petitioner and respondents' respective causes of action arose from
On October 17, 2006, petitioner and Kathryn filed a motion to dismiss respondents' completely different occurrences, the latter would not be barred by res judicata had
counterclaim arguing that the same were permissive and that respondents had not they opted to litigate its counterclaim in a separate proceeding; (c) the evidence
paid the appropriate docket fees. However, the RTC, in its November 16, 2006 Order, required to prove petitioner's claim that respondents failed to pay lease rentals is
denied the said motion, declaring respondents' counterclaim as compulsory; thus, likewise different from the evidence required to prove respondents' counterclaim that
holding that the payment of the required docket fees was no longer necessary. petitioner and Kathryn are liable for damages for performing acts in bad faith; and (d)
the recovery of petitioner's claim is not contingent or dependent upon proof of
The RTC granted respondents’ counterclaim and ordered petitioners to pay damages. respondents' counterclaim, such that conducting separate trials will not result in the
The CA affirmed the RTC’s finding that respondents' counterclaim is not permissive substantial duplication of the time and effort of the court and the parties.
but compulsory; hence, payment of docket fees was not necessary.
In view of the finding that the counterclaim is permissive, and not compulsory as held
ISSUE by the courts a quo, respondents are required to pay docket fees. However, it must
be clarified that respondents' failure to pay the required docket fees, per se, should
WON respondents’ counterclaim is compulsory or permissive, which required the not necessarily lead to the dismissal of their counterclaim. It has long been settled
payment of docket fees that while the court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the
prescribed docket fees, its non-payment at the time of filing of the initiatory pleading
HELD does not automatically cause its dismissal provided that: (a) the fees are paid within a
reasonable period; and (b) there was no intention on the part of the claimant to 38. CAMASO V TSM SHIPPING INC 807 SCRA
defraud the government.
DOCTRINE
Here, respondents cannot be faulted for non-payment of docket fees in connection
with their counterclaim, primarily because as early as November 16, 2006, the RTC It appears that when Camaso filed his certiorari petition through his counsel and via
had already found such counterclaim to be compulsory in nature. Such finding was mail, a Metrobank check dated July 6, 2015 was attached thereto to serve as
then upheld in the July 2, 2007 RTC Decision and affirmed on appeal by the CA in its payment of docket fees. Although this was not an authorized mode of payment under
assailed Decision. As such, the lower courts did not require respondents to pay docket Section 6, Rule VIII of the 2009 IRCA, the attachment of such personal check shows
fees and even proceeded to rule on their entitlement thereto. Verily, respondents' that Camaso exerted earnest efforts to pay the required docket fees. Clearly, this
reliance on the findings of the courts a quo, albeit erroneous, exhibits their good faith exhibits good faith and evinces his intention not to defraud the government.
in not paying the docket fees, much more their intention not to defraud the
government. Thus, the counterclaim should not be dismissed for nonpayment of FACTS
docket fees. Instead, the docket fees required shall constitute a judgment lien on the
monetary awards in respondents' favor. On July 15, 2014, Camaso signed a contract of employment with respondents TSM
Shipping to work as a Second Mate on-board the vessel "M/V Golfstraum," for a
period of six (6) months. On October 18, 2014, he joined his vessel of assignment.

Sometime in November 2013, Camaso complained of a noticeable obstruction in his

throat and was eventually diagnosed with tonsillar cancer. He was medically
repatriated to the Philippines, underwent chemotherapy and radiation therapy, which
was paid by respondents, and likewise received sickwage allowances from the latter.

Thereafter, respondents refused to shoulder Camaso's medical expenses, thus, forcing

the latter to pay for his treatment. Believing that his sickness was work-related and
that respondents remained silent on their obligation, Camaso filed the instant
complaint for disability benefits, sickwage allowance, reimbursement of medical and
hospital expenses, and other consequential damages before NLRC.

The LA ruled in favor of Camasoand ordered respondents to pay him permanent

disability benefits. The NLRC reversed the LA and dismissed his complaint for lack of
merit. Thus, Camaso filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. The CA dismissed
Camaso's petition "for non-payment of the required docketing fees as required under
Section 3, Rule 46. In his MR, Camaso claimed that he attached a personal check
representing the payment of docket fees. However, the CA dismissed the MR citing
that under the 2009 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals (2009 IRCA) such personal
check is not a sanctioned mode of payment; only payment in cash, postal money
order, certified, manager's or cashier's checks payable to the CA are allowed.

ISSUE

WON the CA correctly dismissed Camaso’s petition for non-payment of docket fees

HELD

NO. Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court provides that in original actions filed
before the CA, such as a petition for certiorari, the payment of the corresponding
docket fees is required, and that the failure to comply with the same shall be 39. DYNAMIC BUILDERS V PRESBITERO 755 SCRA 90
sufficient ground for the dismissal of such action.
DOCTRINE
In Bibiana Farms & Mills, Inc. v. NLRC,[23] the Court nevertheless explained that while
non-payment of docket fees may indeed render an original action dismissible, the rule Rule 2, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that "[a] party may not institute more
on payment of docket fees may be relaxed whenever the attending circumstances of than one suit for a single cause of action." Moreover, Section 4 discusses the splitting
the case so warrant of a single cause of action in that "if two or more suits are instituted on the basis of
the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one
The rule is that a court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the subject is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others." The splitting of a cause of
matter of a case, unless the docket fees are paid. And where the filing of action "violate[s] the policy against multiplicity of suits, whose primary objective [is]
the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket to avoid unduly burdening the dockets of the courts.
fees, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time
but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary FACTS
period.
The Municipality of Valladolid published an invitation to potential bidders for the
The strict application of the rule may be qualified by the following: first, construction of a seawall, among the bidders was Petitioner Dynamic Builders.
failure to pay those fees within the reglementary period allows only
discretionary, not automatic, dismissal; second, such power should be While Dynamic submitted the lowest bid, The Bids and Awards Committee awarded
used by the court in conjunction with its exercise of sound discretion in the project to HLJ Construction and Enterprise, the bidder with the second lowest bid.
accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play, as well as with a It found that Dynamic’s bid was “'not substantially responsive.”
great deal of circumspection in consideration of all attendant
circumstances. Dynamic Builders lodged a formal protest with the head of the procuring entity, Mayor
Ricardo P. Presbitero, Jr. (Mayor Presbitero), to set aside the Bids and Awards
Verily, the failure to pay the required docket fees per se should not necessarily lead to Committee decision. Mayor Presbitero dismissed the protest. According to Mayor
the dismissal of a case. It has long been settled that while the court acquires Presbitero’s decision, the bidders underwent preliminary examination and it showed
jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees, its that Dynamic Builders had a negative Financial Contracting Capability
non-payment at the time of filing of the initiatory pleading does not automatically
cause its dismissal provided that: (a) the fees are paid within a reasonable period; On September 4, 2006 and pursuant to Article XVII, Section 58 of Republic
and (b) there was no intention on the part of the claimant to defraud the government. Act No. 9184, otherwise known as the Government Procurement Reform Act,
Dynamic Builders filed the Petition for Certiorari before the RTC of Bago City,
Here, it appears that when Camaso filed his certiorari petition through his counsel and Negros Occidental, assailing Mayor Presbitero's Decision and Resolution.
via mail, a Metrobank check dated July 6, 2015 was attached thereto to serve as
payment of docket fees. Although this was not an authorized mode of payment under Simultaneously, Dynamic Builders filed this Petition dated September 4,
Section 6, Rule VIII of the 2009 IRCA, the attachment of such personal check shows 2006 for prohibition with application for temporary restraining order and/or
that Camaso exerted earnest efforts to pay the required docket fees. Clearly, this writ of preliminary injunction before the SC.
exhibits good faith and evinces his intention not to defraud the government. In this
relation, the assertion of the Officer-in-Charge of the CA Receiving Section that there Petitioner argues that in Section 58, the "law conferring on the Supreme Court the
was no check attached to Camaso'scertiorari petition is clearly belied by the fact that sole jurisdiction to issue temporary restraining orders and injunctions relating to
when it was examined at the Office of the Division Clerk of Court, the check was Infrastructure Project of Government" refers to Republic Act No. 8975 33 in relation to
found to be still stapled thereto. Presidential Decree No. 1818.34 Petitioner then submits that "while R.A. No. 8975
appears to apply only to national government infrastructure projects . . . the resulting
amendment to P.D. No. 1818 (by virtue of Sections 3 and 9 of R.A. No. 8975)
removing any restriction upon the Honorable Supreme Court to issue injunctive relief,
would similarly apply to the infrastructure projects . . . subject of, or covered by, P.D.
No. 1818, which would include those infrastructure projects undertaken for or by local
governments."
Public respondents counter that petitioner "grossly violated the rules against splitting This Petition seeks to enjoin the execution of public respondent's Decision
a single cause of action, multiplicity of suits, and forum shopping . . . [and] availed of and Resolution on the protest — the same Decision and Resolution sought to
an improper remedy and disregarded the rule on 'hierarchy of courts. be set aside in the Petition before the Regional Trial Court. In essence,
petitioner seeks the same relief through two separate Petitions filed before
Public respondents argue that Article XVII, Section 58 of Republic Act No. 9184, separate courts. This violates the rule against forum shopping.
Presidential Decree No. 1818, and Republic Act No. 8975 do not envision
simultaneous resort to remedies before the trial court and this court. They submit that
Section 58 provides for alternative remedies between an action under Rule 65 before The second paragraph of Article XVII, Section 58 of Republic Act No. 9184 simply
the Regional Trial Court and a proper action directly before this court. means it does not preclude a direct filing before this court in proper cases.

ISSUE The Rules of Court provides for original concurrent jurisdiction by the Regional Trial
Court, the Court of Appeals, and this court in entertaining petitions for certiorari,
WON Article XVII, Section 58 of Republic Act No. 9184 contemplates simultaneous prohibition, or mandamus.62 However, parties must adhere to the principle of
filing of a petition for prohibition seeking injunctive reliefs from this court and a hierarchy of courts. The hierarchy of courts must be respected. The doctrine with
petition for certiorari before the Regional Trial Court respect to hierarchy of courts was designed so that this court will have more time to
focus on its constitutional tasks without the need to deal with causes that also fall
HELD within the lower courts' competence. This court acts on petitions for extraordinary
writs under Rule 65 "only when absolutely necessary or when serious and important
NO. IT DOES NOT. THE REMEDIES ARE ALTERNATIVE reasons exist to justify an exception to the policy."

Petitioner counters that it was compelled to file the separate petitions pursuant to, Consistent with these rules and doctrines, the remedy contemplated by Article XVII,
and in view of, Article XVII, Section 58 of Republic Act No. 9184: Section 58 of Republic Act No. 9184 is either an action under Rule 65 before the
Regional Trial Court or the proper action filed before this court. However, direct resort
Sec. 58. Report to Regular Courts; Certiorari. - Court action may be resorted to this court can prosper only when the requisites for direct invocation of this court's
to only after the protests contemplated in this Article shall have been
original jurisdiction are present.
completed. Cases that are filed in violation of the process specified in this
Article shall be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The regional trial court
shall have jurisdiction over final decisions of the head of the procuring
entity. Court actions shall be governed by Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure.

This provision is without prejudice to any law conferring on the

Supreme Court the sole jurisdiction to issue temporary restraining
orders and injunctions relating to Infrastructure Projects of
Government. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 58 could not have envisioned a simultaneous resort to this court by one that
had already filed an action before the Regional Trial Court without violating the basic
rules on proscription against the splitting of a cause of action, multiplicity of suits, and
forum shopping.

Rule 2, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that "[a] party may not institute more
than one suit for a single cause of action." Moreover, Section 4 discusses the splitting
of a single cause of action in that "if two or more suits are instituted on the basis of
the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one
is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others." The splitting of a cause of
action "violate[s] the policy against multiplicity of suits, whose primary objective [is]
to avoid unduly burdening the dockets of the courts.
40. RELUCIO V LOPEZ 373 SCRA 578 Nor can petitioner be a necessary party in Special Proceedings M-3630. A necessary
party as one who is not indispensable but who ought to be joined as party if complete
DOCTRINE relief is to be accorded those already parties, or for a complete determination or
settlement of the claim subject of the action.20 In the context of her petition in the
lower court, respondent would be accorded complete relief if Alberto J. Lopez were
A real party in interest is one who stands "to be benefited or injured by the judgment ordered to account for his alleged conjugal partnership property with respondent, give
of the suit. If petitioner is not a real party in interest, she cannot be an indispensable support to respondent and her children, turn over his share in the co-ownership with
party petitioner and dissolve his conjugal partnership or absolute community property with
respondent.
FACTS

On September 15, 1993, Private respondent Angelina Mejia Lopez filed a petition for
appointment as sole administratrix of conjugal properties. She alleges that her
husband, Alberto Lopez abandoned her and their children and maintained an illicit
relationship and cohabited with petitioner Imelda Relucio. During this time, Alberto
Lopez and petitioner amassed a fortune consisting of various properties.

On December 8, 1993, a Motion to Dismiss the Petition was filed by herein petitioner
on the ground that private respondent has no cause of action against her.

The RTC denied petitioner Relucio's Motion to Dismiss on the ground that she is
impleaded as a necessary or indispensable party because some of the subject
properties are registered in her name and defendant Lopez, or solely in her name.

Thus, petitioner filed with the CA a petition of certiorari assailing the RTC’s denial of
her motion to dismiss. The CA sustained the RTC and denied the petition.

ISSUE

WON petitioner's inclusion as party defendant is essential in the proceedings for a

complete adjudication of the controversy.

HELD

NO. petitioner is not an indispensable party

A real party in interest is one who stands "to be benefited or injured by the judgment
of the suit." In this case, petitioner would not be affected by any judgment in Special
Proceedings M-3630.

If petitioner is not a real party in interest, she cannot be an indispensable party. An

indispensable party is one without whom there can be no final determination of an
action.19 Petitioner's participation in Special Proceedings M-36-30 is not indispensable.
Certainly, the trial court can issue a judgment ordering Alberto J. Lopez to make an
accounting of his conjugal partnership with respondent, and give support to
respondent and their children, and dissolve Alberto J. Lopez' conjugal partnership with
respondent, and forfeit Alberto J. Lopez' share in property co-owned by him and
petitioner. Such judgment would be perfectly valid and enforceable against Alberto J.
Lopez.
41. DE CASTRO V CA 386 SCRA 301 However, the rule on mandatory joinder of indispensable parties is not applicable to
the instant case.
DOCTRINE
There is no dispute that Constante appointed Artigo in a handwritten note dated
January 24, 1984 to sell the properties of the De Castros for P23 million at a 5
When the law expressly provides for solidarity of the obligation, as in the liability of
percent commission. The authority was on a first come, first serve basis.The authority
co-principals in a contract of agency, each obligor may be compelled to pay the entire
reads in full:
obligation. The agent may recover the whole compensation from any one of the co-
principals. Solidarity does not make a solidary obligor an indispensable party
in a suit filed by the creditor.
"24 Jan. 84

FACTS

Petitioners CONSTANTE AMOR DE CASTRO and CORAZON AMOR DE CASTRO To Whom It May Concern:
were the owners of 4 lots in EDSA. They authorized private respondent FRANCISCO
ARTIGoto act as a real estate broker and sell the properties. Artigo was to This is to state that Mr. Francisco Artigo is authorized as our real estate
receive a 5% commission. He was only able to sell 2 lots, and received from broker in connection with the sale of our property located at Edsa Corner
appellants P48,893.76 as commission. New York & Denver, Cubao, Quezon City.

Artigo claims that he was not paid the full amount of his commission and Asking price P 23,000,000.00 with 5% commission as agent's fee.
sought to collect the balance of P303,606. Petitioners, on the other hand, are
arguing that private respondent is selfishly asking for more than what he truly
deserved as commission to the prejudice of other agents who were more instrumental C.C. de Castro
in the consummation of the sale. owner & representing
co-owners
Private respondent filed a case in the RTC of QC against petitioners for the collection
of his unpaid balance. The RTC granted his petition and ordered petitioners to pay for
damages. Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision. This authority is on a first-come

Petitioners argue that the CA erred for not ordering the dismissal of the complaint for First serve basis -CAC"
failure to implead necessary parties. The De Castros argue that Artigo's complaint
should have been dismissed for failure to implead all the co-owners of the two lots. Constante signed the note as owner and as representative of the other co-owners.
Under this note, a contract of agency was clearly constituted between Constante and
ISSUE Artigo. Whether Constante appointed Artigo as agent, in Constante's individual or
representative capacity, or both, the De Castros cannot seek the dismissal of the case
WON the CA erred in not dismissing the petition for failure to implead necessary for failure to implead the other co-owners as indispensable parties.The solidary
liability of the four co-owners, however, militates against the De Castros' theory that
parties
the other co-owners should be impleaded as indispensable parties.

HELD
When the law expressly provides for solidarity of the obligation, as in the liability of
co-principals in a contract of agency, each obligor may be compelled to pay the entire
NO.
obligation. The agent may recover the whole compensation from any one of the co-
principals, as in this case.
An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the court's action in
the litigation, and without whom no final determination of the case can be had.7 The Thus, the Court has ruled in Operators Incorporated vs. American Biscuit Co., Inc.
joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory and courts cannot proceed without their that -
presence. Whenever it appears to the court in the course of a proceeding that an
indispensable party has not been joined, it is the duty of the court to stop the trial
and order the inclusion of such party.
 "x x x solidarity does not make a solidary obligor an indispensable party spouses, through an alias writ of execution, to remove the house they constructed on
in a suit filed by the creditor. Article 1216 of the Civil Code says that the the land they were occupying.
creditor `may proceed against anyone of the solidary debtors or some or all of
them simultaneously'.
To prohibit the RTC from issuing a writ of demolition and the Quezon City sheriff from
implementing the alias writ of execution, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for prohibition with prayer for a restraining order and preliminary injunction
on April 17, 1998. Petitioners alleged that they bought the subject parcel of land in
42. ORQUIOLA V CA 389 SCRA 461 good faith and for value, hence, they were parties in interest. Since they were not
impleaded in Civil Case No. Q-12918, the writ of demolition issued in connection
DOCTRINE therewith cannot be enforced against them because to do so would amount to
deprivation of property without due process of law.
As builders in good faith and innocent purchasers for value, petitioners have rights
over the subject property and hence they are proper parties in interest in any case The CA dismissed their petition. It held that as buyers and successors-in-interest of
thereon. Consequently, private respondents should have impleaded them in Civil Case Mariano Lising, petitioners were considered privies who derived their rights from
No. Q-12918. Since they failed to do so, petitioners cannot be reached by the decision Lising by virtue of the sale and could be reached by the execution order in Civil Case
in said case. No man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, No. Q-12918.
and strangers to a case are not bound by any judgment rendered by the court. In the
same manner, a writ of execution can be issued only against a party and not against ISSUE
one who did not have his day in court. Only real parties in interest in an action are
bound by the judgment therein and by writs of execution and demolition issued WON petitioners are parties in interest and should have been impleaded in Civil Case
pursuant thereto. No. Q-12918

HELD

FACTS YES. PETITIONERS ARE BUYERS AND BUILDERS IN GOOD FAITH. THEY HAVE RIGHTS
OVER THE SUBJECT PROPERTY AND ARE PROPER PARTIES IN INTEREST
Private respondent Pura Kalaw Ledesma was the registered owner of Lot 689. This
parcel of land was adjacent to certain portions of Lot 707, namely, Lot 707-A and Petitioners are buyers in good faith. A person is a buyer for value if he pays a full and
707-B, registered in the name of Herminigilda Pedro. On October 29, 1964, fair price at the time of the purchase or before he has notice of the claim or
Herminigilda sold Lot 707-A and 707-B to Mariano Lising who then registered both interest of some other person in the property. In this case, Petitioners purchased
lots and Lot 707-C in the name of M.B. Lising Realty and subdivided them into smaller the subject land in 1964 from Mariano Lising. Civil Case No. Q-12918 was commenced
lots. sometime in 1969. The Court of Appeals overlooked the fact that the purchase of the
land took place prior to the institution of Civil Case No. Q-12918. In other words, the
The subdivided lots were sold to third persons including herein petitioners, spouses sale to petitioners was made before Pura Kalaw Ledesma claimed the lot. Petitioners
Victor and HonorataOrquiola, who purchased a portion of Lot 707-A-2. The other could reasonably rely on Mariano Lisings Certificate of Title which at the time of
portions were registered in the name of the heirs of Pedro, heirs of Lising, and other purchase was still free from any third party claim. Hence, considering the
third persons. circumstances of this case, we conclude that petitioners acquired the land subject of
this dispute in good faith and for value.
In 1969, Pura Kalaw Ledesma filed a complaint with the RTC of QC, docketed as Civil
Case No. Q-12918, against Herminigilda Pedro and Mariano Lising for allegedly Petitioners are also builders in good faith. A builder in good faith is one who builds
encroaching upon Lot 689. Tandang Sora Development Corporation replaced Pura with the belief that the land he is building on is his, and is ignorant of any defect or
KalawLadesma by virtue of assignment. flaw in his title. As earlier discussed, petitioner spouses acquired the land in question
without knowledge of any defect in the title of Mariano Lising. Shortly afterwards,
On August 21, 1991, the trial court finally adjudged defendants Pedro and Lising they built their conjugal home on said land. It was only in 1998, when the sheriff of
jointly and severally liable for encroaching on plaintiffs (Tandang Sora Dev Corp) land. Quezon City tried to execute the judgment in Civil Case No. Q-12918, that they had
As a result, in February 1998, the Deputy Sheriff of Quezon City directed petitioner notice of private respondents adverse claim. The institution of Civil Case No. Q-12918
cannot serve as notice of such adverse claim to petitioners since they were not file its answer to the complaint. The trial court granted the motion and declared
impleaded therein as parties. petitioner in default.

As builders in good faith and innocent purchasers for value, petitioners have rights Consequently, petitioner Chinabank filed a supplemental petition seeking annulment
over the subject property and hence they are proper parties in interest in any case of said order. It argued that the special civil action for certiorari filed in the CA
thereon. Consequently, private respondents should have impleaded them in Civil Case interrupted the proceedings before the trial court, thereby staying the period for filing
No. Q-12918. Since they failed to do so, petitioners cannot be reached by the decision the answer.
in said case. No man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger,
and strangers to a case are not bound by any judgment rendered by the court. In the In its decision, CA found no grave abuse of discretion committed by the trial judge in
same manner, a writ of execution can be issued only against a party and not against ruling that the Rules of Court provided the manner of impleading parties to a case and
one who did not have his day in court. Only real parties in interest in an action are in suggesting that petitioner file an appropriate action to bring the mortgagor within
bound by the judgment therein and by writs of execution and demolition issued the court’s jurisdiction. The appellate court said that Rule 6, Section 11 of the Rules of
Court allows petitioner to file a third-party complaint against the mortgagor.
pursuant thereto.

Issues:

43. CHINA BANKING CORP. VS. MERCEDES M. OLIVER (1) W/N Oliver 1 is an indispensable party
G.R. NO. 135796 OCT. 3, 2002 (2) W/N R3 S7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is applicable in this
case

Doctrine: An indispensable party is a party in interest, without whom no final Ruling:

determination can be had of an action.

(1) No. It is true that mortgagor Oliver 1 is a party in interest, for she will
Facts:In August 1995, Pangan Lim, Jr. and a certain Mercedes M. Oliver (Oliver 1) be affected by the outcome of the case. She stands to be benefited in
opened a joint account in China Banking Corporation (hereinafter Chinabank) at EDSA case the mortgage is declared valid, or injured in case her title is
Balintawak Branch. Lim and Oliver 1 applied for and was approved a P17 million loan, declared fake. However, mortgagor Oliver 1’s absence from the case
offering as collateral a lot located in Muntinlupa and covered by a TCT in the name of does not hamper the trial court in resolving the dispute between
Oliver 1. On November 17, 1995, Lim and Oliver 1 executed in favor of Chinabank a respondent Oliver Two and petitioner. A perusal of Oliver 2’s
promissory note for P16,650,000, as well as a Real Estate Mortgage on the property. allegations in the complaint shows that it was for annulment of
The mortgage was duly registered and annotated and showed Oliver 1’s address to be mortgage due to petitionerChinabank’s negligence in not determining
in Diliman, Quezon City. the actual ownership of the property, resulting in the mortgage’s
annotation on TCT No. S-50195 in the Registry of Deeds’ custody. To
support said allegations, respondent Oliver 2 had to prove (1) that she
On November 18, 1996, respondent claiming that she is Mercedes M. Oliver (Oliver 2)
is the real Mercedes M. Oliver referred to in the TCT, and (2) that she
with address in San Pedro, Laguna, filed an action for annulment of mortgage and
is not the same person using that name who entered into a deed of
cancellation of title with damages against Chinabank.She contended that she was the
mortgage with the petitioner. This, respondent Oliver 2 can do in her
registered and lawful owner of the land subject of the real estate mortgage and that
complaint without necessarily impleading the mortgagor Oliver 1.
she did not apply for a loan or surrender her title to Chinabank.
Hence, Oliver 1 is not an indispensable party in the case filed by Oliver
2.
Chinabank moved to dismiss the case for lack of cause of action and non-joinder of an
indispensable party, the mortgagor, Oliver 1. The trial court denied the same on the (2) No. Instead, it is Section 11, Rule 3, that applies.Non-joinder of parties
ground thatplaintiff Oliver 2 was able to sufficiently aver that defendants negligently is not a ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be added by
failed to ascertain the genuineness of the title of the land mortgaged to it upon the order of the court, either on its own initiative or on motion of the
claim of ownership by the mortgagors. parties.Hence, CA committed no error when it found no abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial court for denying Chinabank’s motion
Chinabank filed with CA a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a writ to dismiss and, instead, suggested that petitioner file an appropriate
of preliminary injunction and/or restraining order to enjoin enforcement of the March action against mortgagor Oliver 1. A person who is not a party to an
13, 1997 order and further action on the case. Thereafter, Oliver 2 moved to declare action may be impleaded by the defendant either on the basis of
petitioner Chinabank in defaultconsidering that since petitioner received the order liability to himself or on the ground of direct liability to the plaintiff.
denying the motion to dismiss on March 21, 1997, it had only until April 7, 1997 to
44. LOTTE PHIL. CO. INC. VS. ERLINDA DELA CRUZ, ET.AL. 45. DOMINGO CARABEO VS. SPS. NORBERTO AND SUSAN DINGCO
G.R. NO. 166302 JULY 28, 2005 G.R. NO. 190823 APR. 4, 2011

Doctrine: An indispensable party is a party in interest without whom no final Doctrine:The question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the nature
determination can be had of an action, and who shall be joined either as plaintiffs or of the action and the damage sued for. In the causes of action which survive, the
defendants. The joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory. The presence of wrong complained [of] affects primarily and principally property and property rights,
indispensable parties is necessary to vest the court with jurisdiction, which is “the the injuries to the person being merely incidental, while in the causes of action which
authority to hear and determine a cause, the right to act in a case”. do not survive, the injury complained of is to the person, the property and rights of
property affected being incidental.
Facts:On December 14, 1995 and yearly thereafter until the year 2000, 7J
Maintenance and Janitorial Services (7J) entered into contract with Lotte to provide Facts:Domingo Carabeo (Carabeo) and Spouses Norberto and Susan Dingco (Sps.
the latter manpower for needed maintenance, utility, janitorial and other services. Dingco) entered into a contract “KasunduansaBilihan ng KarapatansaLupa” whereby
Respondent workers were hired and assigned to Lotte as repackers or sealers. Carabeo agreed to sell his rights over a land situated in Bataan to the spouses for
However, in October 1999 or February 9, 2000, Lotte dispensed with the respondents’ P38,000.00.
services allegedly due to the expiration/termination of its service contract with 7J.
Sps. Dingco tendered their initial payment of P10,000 upon the signing of the
Respondent workers filed a labor complaint for illegal dismissal, regularization, contract, the remaining balance to be paid on September 1990. When they were
payment of corresponding backwages and related employment benefits, 13 th month about to pay the remaining balance, Carabeo requested them to keep it first as he
pay, service incentive leave, moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. was yet to settle an on-going “squabble” over the land. The spouses continued giving
Carabeo small sums of money which totaled P9,100 due to the spouses’ inability to
LA rendered judgment declaring 7J as employer of respondents. Respondent workers pay the amount in full.
appealed to the NLRC praying that Lotte be declared as their direct employer because
7J is merely a labor-only contractor but the same was denied. A subsequent MR was Despite the alleged problem over the land, they insisted that Carabeo accept the
likewise denied. remaining balance of P18,900 but Carabeo remained firm in his refusal, reasoning out
that he would register the land first. In 1994, Sps. Dingco learned that the problem
In the petition for certiorari filed with the CA, Lotte prayed for the dismissal of the has been settled. Hence, they offered to pay the balance but Carabeo declined,
same for failure to implead 7J who is a party interested in sustaining the proceedings drawing them to file a complaint before the KatarunganPambarangay. No settlement
in court. CA reversed and set aside the rulings of the LA and the NLRC. It held that was reached, thus, a complaint for specific performance was filed before RTC Bataan.
Lotte is the real employer of the respondent workers and 7J is engaged in labor-only
contracting.
Petitioner countered in his Answer to the Complaint that the sale was void for lack of
object certain, the kasunduan not having specified the metes and bounds of the land.
Issue:W/N 7J is an indispensable party In any event, petitioner alleged that if the validity of the kasunduan is upheld,
respondents’ failure to comply with their reciprocal obligation to pay the balance of
Ruling: Yes. It is a party in interest because it will be affected by the outcome of the the purchase price would render the action premature. For, contrary to respondents’
case. The LA and the NLRC found 7J to be solely liable as the employer of claim, petitioner maintained that they failed to pay the balance of ₱28,000 on
September 1990 to thus constrain him to accept installment payments totaling
respondents. CA however rendered Lotte jointly and severally liable with 7J who was
₱9,100.
not impleaded by holding that the former is the real employer of respondents. Plainly,
its decision directly affected 7J.
After the case was submitted for decision, Carabeo passed away. The records do not
Although 7J was a co-party in the case before the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, show that petitioner’s counsel informed Branch 1 of the Bataan RTC, where the
respondents failed to include it in their petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. complaint was lodged, of his death and that proper substitution was effected in
Hence, the Court of Appeals did not acquire jurisdiction over 7J. No final ruling on this accordance with Section 16, Rule 3, Rules of Court. The trial court ruled in favor of
matter can be had without impleading 7J, whose inclusion is necessary for the Sps. Dingco ordering Carabeo to sell his right over the land.
effective and complete resolution of the case and in order to accord all parties with
due process and fair play. Carabeo’s counsel filed a Notice of Appeal before the CA which affirmed the decision.

Issues:
 (1) W/N the appellate court erred in upholding the validity of the contract 46. JUANA COMPLEX I HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION INC. ET.AL. VS. FIL-
despite the lack of spousal consent ESTATE LAND, INC. ET.AL.
(2) W/N the death of Carabeo causes the dismissal of the action filed by G.R. NO. 152272 MAR. 5, 2012
Sps. Dingco; their action being an action in personam
Doctrine:The necessary elements for the maintenance of a class suit are: 1) the
Ruling:
subject matter of controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons;
2) the parties affected are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all to
(1) No. In the present case, respondents are pursuing a property right
arising from the kasunduan, whereas petitioner is invoking nullity of court; and 3) the parties bringing the class suit are sufficiently numerous or
the kasunduan to protect his proprietary interest. Assuming arguendo, representative of the class and can fully protect the interests of all concerned.
however, that the kasunduan is deemed void, there is a corollary
obligation of petitioner to return the money paid by respondents, and Facts:JCHA and other neighboring subdivisions instituted a complaint for damagesin
since the action involves property rights,it survives. its own behalf and as a class suit representing the regular commuters and motorists
of Juana Complex I and neighboring subdivisions who were deprived of the use of La
(2) No. Since the trial court was not informed of Carabeo’sdeath, it may Paz Road. They alleged that they had been using La Paz Road for more than ten (10)
not be faulted for proceeding to render judgment without ordering his years; that in August 1998, Fil-estate excavated, broke and deliberately ruined La Paz
substitution. Its judgment is thus valid and binding upon Carabeo’s Road that led to SLEX so JCHA, et al. would not be able to pass through the said road;
legal representatives or successors-in-interest, insofar as his interest that La Paz Road was restored by the residents to make it passable but Fil-estate
in the property subject of the action is concerned. excavated the road again; that JCHA reported the matter to the Municipal
Government but the latter failed to repair the road to make it passable and safe to
motorists and pedestrians; that the act of Fil-estate in excavating La Paz Road
In another vein, the death of a client immediately divests the counsel
caused, inconvenience, annoyance, and loss of precious hours to them.
of authority. Thus, in filing a Notice of Appeal, petitioner’s counsel of
record had no personality to act on behalf of the already deceased
client who, it bears reiteration, had not been substituted as a party A TRO was issued as the RTC conducted several hearings to determine the propriety
after his death. The trial court’s decision had thereby become final and of the issuance of the WPI. Fil-Estate filed a MTD arguing that the complaint failed to
executory, no appeal having been perfected. state a cause of action and that it was improperly filed as a class suit. RTC denied the
MTD.

On certiorari, CA annulled and set aside the decision of the RTC, hence, the petitions
for review.

Issues:

(1) W/N not the complaint states a cause of action

(2) W/N the complaint has been properly filed as a class suit
(3) W/N a WPI is warranted

Ruling:

(1) Yes. A complaint states a cause of action when it contains three (3)
essential elements of a cause of action, namely:

(1) the legal right of the plaintiff,

(2) the correlative obligation of the defendant, and

(3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right.
In the present case, the Court finds the allegations in the complaint sufficient to 47. ROGER V. NAVARRO VS. HON. JOSE L. ESCOBIDO AND KAREN GO
establish a cause of action. First,JCHA, et al.’s averments in the complaint show a G.R. NO. 153788 NOV. 27, 2009
demandable right over La Paz Road. These are: (1) their right to use the road on the
basis of their allegation that they had been using the road for more than 10 years;
and (2) an easement of a right of way has been constituted over the said roads. There Doctrine: In suits to recover properties, all co-owners are real parties in interest.
is no other road as wide as La Paz Road existing in the vicinity and it is the shortest, However, pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code and relevant jurisprudence, any
convenient and safe route towards SLEX Halang that the commuters and motorists one of them may bring an action, any kind of action, for the recovery of co-owned
may use. Second, there is an alleged violation of such right committed by Fil-Estate, properties. Therefore, only one of the co-owners, namely the co-owner who filed the
et al. when they excavated the road and prevented the commuters and motorists suit for the recovery of the co-owned property, is an indispensable party thereto. The
from using the same. Third, JCHA, et al. consequently suffered injury and that a valid
other co-owners are not indispensable parties. They are not even necessary parties,
judgment could have been rendered in accordance with the relief sought therein.
for a complete relief can be accorded in the suit even without their participation, since
the suit is presumed to have been filed for the benefit of all co-owners.
(2) Yes. The subject matter of the instant case, i.e., the closure and
excavation of the La Paz Road, is initially shown to be of common or Facts: Karen Go filed 2 complaints before the RTC for replevin and/or sum of money
general interest to many persons. The records reveal that numerous
with damages against Navarro. In these complaints, Karen Go prayed for the issuance
individuals have filed manifestations with the lower court, conveying
their intention to join private respondents in the suit and claiming that of writs of replevin for the seizure of 2 motor vehicles in Navarro’s possession which
they are similarly situated with private respondents for they were also were eventually granted.
prejudiced by the acts of petitioners in closing and excavating the La
Paz Road. Moreover, the individuals sought to be represented by
private respondents in the suit are so numerous that it is impracticable In his Answers, Navarro alleged as a special affirmative defense that the two
to join them all as parties and be named individually as plaintiffs in the complaints stated no cause of action, since Karen Go was not a party to the Lease
complaint. These individuals claim to be residents of various barangays Agreements with Option to Purchase (collectively, the lease agreements) – the
in Biñan, Laguna and other barangays in San Pedro, Laguna. actionable documents on which the complaints were based.

(3) No. The requisites for its issuance are: (1) the existence of a clear and RTC dismissed the case on the ground that the complaints did not state a cause of
unmistakable right that must be protected; and (2) an urgent and action. In response to the MR filed by Karen Go, RTC set aside the order of
paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. In the dismissal.Acting on the presumption that Glenn Go’s leasing business is a conjugal
case at bench, JCHA, et al. failed to establish a prima facie proof of property, the RTC held that Karen Go had sufficient interest in his leasing business to
violation of their right to justify the issuance of a WPI. Their right to file the action against Navarro. However, the RTC held that Karen Go should have
the use of La Paz Road is disputable since they have no clear legal included her husband, Glenn Go, in the complaint based on Section 4, Rule 3 of the
right therein. They merely anchor their purported right over the La Paz Rules of Court (Rules). Thus, the lower court ordered Karen Go to file a motion for the
Road on the bare allegation that they have been using the same as inclusion of Glenn Go as co-plaintiff.
public road right-of-way for more than ten years. A mere allegation
does not meet the standard of proof that would warrant the issuance
of the injunctive writ. Failure to establish the existence of a clear right When the RTC denied Navarro’s MR, Navarro filed a petition for certiorari with the CA,
which should be judicially protected through the writ of injunction is a essentially contending that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it
sufficient ground for denying the injunction. reconsidered the dismissal of the case and directed Karen Go to amend her
complaints by including her husband Glenn Go as co-plaintiff. According to Navarro, a
complaint which failed to state a cause of action could not be converted into one with
a cause of action by mere amendment or supplemental pleading.

Issues:

(1) W/N Karen Go is a real party in interest

(2) W/N the properties of the Kargo Enterprise are paraphernal or conjugal
properties
(3) Who is the proper party to bring an action against Navarro

Ruling:
(1) Yes. The central factor in appreciating the issues presented in this case 48. LAND BANK OF THE PHILS. VS. EDUARDO M. CACAYURAN
is the business name Kargo Enterprises. The name appears in the title G.R. NO. 191667 APR. 17, 2013
of the Complaint where the plaintiff was identified as "KAREN T. GO
doing business under the name KARGO ENTERPRISES," and this
identification was repeated in the first paragraph of the Complaint. As Doctrine: It is hornbook principle that a taxpayer is allowed to sue where there is a
the registered owner of Kargo Enterprises, Karen Go is the party who claim that public funds are illegally disbursed, or that public money is being deflected
will directly benefit from or be injured by a judgment in this case. to any improper purpose, or that there is wastage of public funds through the
Thus, contrary to Navarro’s contention, Karen Go is the real party-in- enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.
interest, and it is legally incorrect to say that her Complaint does not
state a cause of action because her name did not appear in the Lease
Facts: The Sangguniang Bayan (SB) of La Union passed a multi-phased
Agreement that her husband signed in behalf of Kargo Enterprises.
Redevelopment plan to redevelop the Agoo Public Plaza. To finance phase 1 of the
Whether Glenn Go can legally sign the Lease Agreement in his capacity
as a manager of Kargo Enterprises, a sole proprietorship, is a question plan, a resolution was passed authorizing then Mayor Eriguel to obtain a loan (1 st
we do not decide, as this is a matter for the trial court to consider in a loan) from Land Bank in the amount of P4M, with the southeast portion of the Agoo
trial on the merits. Plaza as collateral. To serve as additional security, it further authorized the
assignment of a portion of its internal revenue allotment (IRA) and the monthly
(2) Conjugal. The registration of the trade name in the name of one income from the proposed project in favor of the Land Bank. After the ratification of
person – a woman – does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that
the resolution, the proceeds of the 1st loan were used to construct 10 kiosks which
the trade name as a property is hers alone, particularly when the
woman is married. By law, all property acquired during the marriage, were later on rented out.
whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or
registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be Another resolution was passed approving the construction of a commercial center on
conjugal unless the contrary is proved. Thus, for purposes solely of the plaza lot as part of the phase 2 of the plan. To finance the project, Mayor Eriguel
this case and of resolving the issue of whether Kargo Enterprises as a was again authorized to obtain a loan (2nd loan) from Land Bank in the amount of
sole proprietorship is conjugal or paraphernal property, we hold that it
P28M. This time, some residents of the municipality had been vehemently objecting.
is conjugal property.
Led by Eduardo Cacayuran, they claimed that the proceeds from the 1 st and 2nd loan
(3) In this connection, Article 1811 of the Civil Code provides that "[a] were “highly irregular, violative of the law, and detrimental to public interests, and
partner is a co-owner with the other partners of specific partnership will result to wanton desecration of the said historical and public park." This was
property." Under this ruling, either of the spouses Go may bring an embodied in a Manifesto launched through a signature campaign conducted by the
action against Navarro to recover possession of the Kargo Enterprises- residents and Cacayuran. A letter was even made to Mayor Eriguel expressing the
leased vehicles which they co-own. This conclusion is consistent with growing public clamor against the conversion of the Agoo Plaza into a commercial
Article 124 of the Family Code, supporting as it does the position that
center.
either spouse may act on behalf of the conjugal partnership, so long as
they do not dispose of or encumber the property in question without
the other spouse’s consent. Cacayuran was not able to get any response, hence, he invoked his right as a
taxpayer and filed a complaint invoking the validity of the Subject Loans on the
ground that the Plaza used as collateral is property of public dominion and is beyond
the commerce of men.

The MTD of the implicated officers was denied, so they filed their respective answers.
While the proceedings were pending, the construction of the commercial center was
completed and the structure later became known as the Agoo’s People Center (APC).

RTC ruled in favour of Cacayuran and declared the nullity of the said loans.

CA affirmed with modification, excluding Vice Mayor Eslao from any personal liability.

Issues:
(1) W/N Cacayuran has standing to sue the municipality’s power is considered as an ultra vires act subject to ratification
and/or validation. To the former belongs municipal contracts which (a) are entered
(2) W/N the subject resolutions were validly passed into beyond the express, implied or inherent powers of the local government unit; and
(b) do not comply with the substantive requirements of law e.g., when expenditure of
(3) W/N the subject loans are ultra vires public funds is to be made, there must be an actual appropriation and certificate of
availability of funds. Records disclose that the said loans were executed by the
Ruling: Municipality for the purpose of funding the conversion of the Agoo Plaza into a
commercial center pursuant to the Redevelopment Plan. However, the conversion of
the said plaza is beyond the Municipality’s jurisdiction considering the property’s
(1) Yes. For a taxpayer’s suit to prosper, two requisites must be met namely, (1)
nature as one for public use and thereby, forming part of the public dominion.
public funds derived from taxation are disbursed by a political subdivision or
instrumentality and in doing so, a law is violated or some irregularity is committed;
and (2) the petitioner is directly affected by the alleged act. First, although the
construction of the APC would be primarily sourced from the proceeds of the Subject
Loans, which Land Bank insists are not taxpayer’s money, there is no denying that
public funds derived from taxation are bound to be expended as the Municipality
assigned a portion of its IRA as a security for the foregoing loans. Needless to state,
the Municipality’s IRA, which serves as the local government unit’s just share in the
national taxes, is in the nature of public funds derived from taxation. The Court
believes, however, that although these funds may be posted as a security, its
collateralization should only be deemed effective during the incumbency of the public
officers who approved the same, else those who succeed them be effectively deprived
of its use. In any event, it is observed that the proceeds from the Subject Loans had
already been converted into public funds by the Municipality’s receipt thereof. Funds
coming from private sources become impressed with the characteristics of public
funds when they are under official custody.

Second, as a resident-taxpayer of the Municipality, Cacayuran is directly affected by

the conversion of the Agoo Plaza which was funded by the proceeds of the Subject
Loans. It is well-settled that public plazas are properties for public use and therefore,
belongs to the public dominion. As such, it can be used by anybody and no one can
exercise over it the rights of a private owner. In this light, Cacayuran had a direct
interest in ensuring that the Agoo Plaza would not be exploited for commercial
purposes through the APC’s construction. Moreover, Cacayuran need not be privy to
the Subject Loans in order to proffer his objections thereto. In Mamba v. Lara, it has
been held that a taxpayer need not be a party to the contract to challenge its validity;
as long as taxes are involved, people have a right to question contracts entered into
by the government.

(2) No. In the present case, while Mayor Eriguel’s authorization to contract the
Subject Loans was not contained – as it need not be contained – in the form of an
ordinance, the said loans and even the Redevelopment Plan itself were not approved
pursuant to any law or ordinance but through mere resolutions. The distinction
between ordinances and resolutions is well-perceived. While ordinances are laws and
possess a general and permanent character, resolutions are merely declarations of
the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter and are temporary
in nature. As opposed to ordinances, "no rights can be conferred by and be inferred
from a resolution."

(3) Yes. An act which is outside of the municipality’s jurisdiction is considered as a

void ultra vires act, while an act attended only by an irregularity but remains within
49. MA. ELENA R. DIVINAGRACIA VS. CORONACION PARILLA, ET.AL. document, as a vendee, he merely steps into the shoes of the vendors-heirs. Since
G.R. NO. 196750 MAR. 11, 2015 his interest over the subject land is merely derived from that of the vendors-heirs, the
latter should first be determined as co-owners thereof, thus necessitating the joinder
Doctrine: An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the court’s of all those who have vested interests in such land, i.e., the aforesaid heirs of
action in the litigation, and without whom no final determination of the case can be Conrado, Sr., in Santiago’s complaint. In fine, the absence of the aforementioned
had. The party’s interest in the subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought are indispensable parties in the instant complaint for judicial partition renders all
so inextricably intertwined with the other parties’ that his legal presence as a party to subsequent actions of the RTC null and void for want of authority to act, not only as
the proceeding is an absolute necessity. In his absence, there cannot be a resolution to the absent parties, but even as to those present.
of the dispute of the parties before the court which is effective, complete, or
equitable. (2) No. The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of
an action. At any stage of a judicial proceeding and/or at such times as are just,
Facts: A complaint for judicial partition is the subject of the case wherein the parties may be added on the motion of a party or on the initiative of the tribunal
deceased Conrado Sr. had three families. With his first wife he had 2 children, with his concerned. If the plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order
second wife he had 7 children, 2 predeceased him but were survived by their children of the court, that court may dismiss the complaint for the plaintiff’s failure to comply
(his grandchildren), and had 3 other illegitimate children. Upon Conrado Sr.’s death, with the order. The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be
7/10 heirs sold their respective shares to Santiago for the consideration of indispensable.Tthe correct course of action in the instant case is to order its remand
P447,695.66. In a supplemental contract, the parties agreed that only P109,807.93 to the RTC for the inclusion of those indispensable parties who were not impleaded
will be paid and that the remaining balance of P337,887.73 will be paid upon the and for the disposition of the case on the merits.
partition of the subject land. However, Santiago was not able to have the TCT
cancelled as 3 of the heirs refused to surrender the title. Said heirs maintained that
Santiago had no legal right to file an action for judicial partition nor compel them to
surrender the TCT because Santiago did not pay the full purchase price of the shares
sold to him and because the subject land is a conjugal asset of Conrado Sr. and the
second wife, Eusela Niangar.

RTC found that Santiago became a co-owner of the subject land and has the right to
demand the partition of the same.

CA set aside the decision of the RTC and ruled that the 3 heirs are indispensable
parties and their non-inclusion as defendants in Santiago’s complaint would
necessarily result in its dismissal.

Issues:

(1) W/N the Felcon siblings, Cebeleo Sr. and Maude’s children are indispensable
parties to Santiago’s complaint for judicial partition

(2) W/N CA validly dismissed Santiago’s complaint for his failure to implead said
omitted heirs

Ruling:

(1) Yes. In actions for partition, the court cannot properly issue an order to divide the
property, unless it first makes a determination as to the existence of co-ownership.
The court must initially settle the issue of ownership, which is the first stage in an
action for partition. In this case, while it is conceded that Santiago bought the
interests of majority of the heirs of Conrado, Sr. as evidenced by the subject
 50. ROSARIO ENRIQUEZ VDA. DE SANTIAGO vs ANTONIO VILAR without the presence of indispensable parties to a suit or proceeding,
judgment of a court cannot attain real finality.
GR No. 225309 ; 6 March 2018  Rosario is an indispensable party in the petition before the CA as she is the
widow of the original party-plaintiff Eduardo.
 In ruling for Vilar’s substitution, the right of Rosario as to the proceeds of the
judgment award was thwarted as the CA effectively ordered that the proceeds
By definition, an indispensable party is a party-in- interest without whom no final pertaining to Rosario be awarded instead to Vilar.
determination can be had of an action, and who shall be joined either as plaintiffs or  The Court finds merit in Rosario’s contention that her failure to participate in
defendants. the proceedings before the CA constitutes a denial of her constitutional right
to due process. Hence, failure to implead Rosario as an indispensable party
Facts: rendered all the proceedings before the CA null and void for want of authority
to act.
 This case involves TCT No 26105 ofSps. Zulueta which secured various loans
from GSIS. Said TCT was divided into 199 lots, 78 of which were excluded
from the Spouses’ first mortgage.
 Sps.Zulueta defaulted in their payment causing GSIS to extrajudicially
foreclose the mortgages. GSIS consolidated its title on all three mother titles,
including the 78 lots expressly excluded from the mortgage contract.
 Sps. Zulueta were succeeded by Antonio, who transferred all his rights and
interests in the excluded lots to Eduardo Santiago.
 Eduardo sent a letter to GSIS for the return of the excluded 78 lots. Eduardo
filed an Action for Reconveyance against GSIS, and was later on substituted
by Rosario, his widow.
 RTC ordered GSIS to reconvey to Rosario the excluded lots or to pay the
market value of said lots in case reconveyance is not possible. CA affirmed
trial court’s rulings.
 Respondent Vilar filed a Verified Ombinus Motion for substitution of party-
plaintiff alleging that Eduardo assigned to Vilar 90% of his interest in the
judgment proceeds of the reconveyance case.
 RTC merely noted the motion with action in its Order.
 Vilar filed a Petition for Certiorari before CA.
 CA granted Vilar’s petition holding the later as party-plaintiff in substitution of
Rosario.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA erred in impleading Vilar as party-plaintiff in

substitution of Rosario

Held:

 Yes. The joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory. The presence of

indispensable parties is necessary to vest the court with jurisdiction, which is
the authority to hear and determine a cause, the right to act in a case. Thus,
 51. PACIFIC CONSULTANTS INTERNATIONAL ASIA, INC., and JENS PETER not, as a rule, supersede the general rule set forth in Rule 4 of the Revised
HENRICHSEN vs KLAUS SCHONFELD Rules of Court in the absence of qualifying or restrictive words.
 They should be considered merely as an agreement or additional forum, not
GR No. 166920 ;19 February 2007 as limiting venue to the specified place. They are not exclusive but, rather
permissive.
 If the intention of the parties were to restrict venue, there must be
accompanying language clearly and categorically expressing their purpose and
Venue stipulations in a contract do not, as a rule, supersede the general rule set forth design that actions between them be litigated only at the place named by
in Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court in the absence of qualifying or restrictive them.
words.

Facts:

 This case involves the termination of employment of respondent, a Canadian

citizen employed to work in the Philippines, by Pacific Consultants
International of Japan (PCIJ). Respondent was sent to work at PCIJ’s its
subsidiary, Pacicon Philippines, through the latter’s president, Henrichsen.
 Respondent arrived in the Philippines and assumed his position as PPI Sector
Manager with a DOLE granted Alien Employment Permit. On 5 May 1999,
respondent received a letter from Henrichsen informing of his termination.
 Despite several money claims, PPI failed to pay respondent’s salary, air fare
and cost of shipments. Respondent then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
against PPI and Henrichsen with the Labor Arbiter.
 Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss alleging that LA had no jurisdiction over
the subject matter and that the venue was improperly laid. Petitioners aver
that conditions of employment include an agreement to bring any dispute
before London Court of Arbitration.
 LA granted motion to dismiss holding that Philippines was only the duty
station. NLRC upheld.
 Respondent filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with CA.
 CA held that the even under the contract of employment, the parties were not
precluded from bringing a case related thereto in other venues. The venue is
not exclusive, since there is no stipulation that the complaint cannot be filed
in any other forum other than in the Philippines.

Issue:

Whether or not the labor arbiter has jurisdiction over the claim despite the
contractual agreement on venue of filing dispute.

Held:

 Yes. As held by the Court in Philippine Banking Corporation v. Tensuan, while

they are considered valid and enforceable, venue stipulations in a contract do
52. MA. TERESA CHAVES BIACO vs PHILIPPINE COUNTRYSIDE RURAL BANK  In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is
necessary for the court to validly try and decide the case, while in a
GR No. 161417 ; 8 February 2007 proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court provided
that the court acquires jurisdiction over the res.
 Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (1) by the seizure of the property
under legal process, whereby it is brought into actual custody of the law; or
In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary (2) as a result of the institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of
for the court to validly try and decide the case, while in a proceeding in rem or quasi the court is recognized and made effective.
in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer  Nonetheless, summons must be served upon the defendant not for the
purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction but merely for satisfying the
jurisdiction on the court provided that the court acquires jurisdiction over the res.
due process requirements.
 In the case at bar, summons was not served on Teresa, violating her
constitutional right to due process.
 Where the trial court only acquired jurisdiction over the res, its jurisdiction
Facts: is limited to a rendition of judgment on the res—it cannot extend its
jurisdiction beyond the res and issue a judgment enforcing a party’s
personal liability.
 This case involves a real estate mortgage executed in favor of respondent
 Hence, judgment is set aside.
bank, by Ernesto Biaco, husband of petitioner, to covering several loans
obtained from said bank. Said mortgage bore the signature of spouses Biaco.
 Respondent bank filed a complaint for foreclosure of mortgage against
SpsBiaco after the demand letter sent by former proved futile. Ernesto
received the summons but failed to answer. Thus spouses were declared in
default.
 RTC held in favor of respondent bank ordering Sps to pay, otherwise, property
with be sold at public auction. Judgment was personally served by the sheriff
to Ernesto at his office.
 Writ of execution was served to Spouses Biaco at their residence. The amount
of property sold being insufficient, 2 notices of levy against properties
registered under Teresa were executed.
 Petitioner sought the annulment of RTC decision contending that extrinsic
fraud perpetrated by the bank prevented her from participating in the judicial
foreclosure proceedings.
 CA held that judicial foreclosure proceedings are actions in rem, as such,
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not essential as long as court
acquires jurisdiction over the res. Court further noted that the fraud
committed was by her husband, therefore cannot be considered extrinsic
fraud.
Issue:

Whether or not jurisdiction over parties is necessary in actions quasi in rem.

Held:

 No. The question of whether the trial court has jurisdiction depends on the
nature of the action, i.e., whether the action is in personam, in rem, or
quasi in rem. The rules on service of summons under Rule 14 of the Rules
of Court likewise apply according to the nature of the action.
 An action in personam is an action against a person on the basis of his
personal liability. An action in rem is an action against the thing itself
instead of against the person. An action quasi in rem is one wherein an
individual is named as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to
subject his interest therein to the obligation or lien burdening the property.
  It is basic that the venue of an action depends on whether it is a real or a
53. BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK INC vs SPOUSES BENEDICTO & TERESITA personal action. The determinants of whether an action is of a real or a
YUJUICO personal nature have been fixed by the Rules of Court and relevant
jurisprudence.
 Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, a real action is one that affects title
GR No. 175796 ; 22 July 2015
to or possession of real property, or an interest therein. Thus, an action for
partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real property is
a real action. The real action is to be commenced and tried in the proper
court having jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved,
In civil proceedings, venue is procedural, not jurisdictional, and may be waived by the or a portion thereof, is situated, which explains why the action is also
defendant if not seasonably raised either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer. referred to as a local action.
 An action to recover the deficiency after the extrajudicial foreclosure of the
real property mortgage is a personal action, for it does not affect title to or
possession of real property, or any interest therein
 As it relates to the place of trial, indeed, venue is meant to provide
Facts: convenience to the parties, rather than to restrict their access to the courts.
 In civil proceedings, venue is procedural, not jurisdictional, and may be
 This case involves a complaint for expropriation of 5 parcels of land in Tondo waived by the defendant if not seasonably raised either in a motion to
registered in the name of respondent. Two of the 5 lands were previously dismiss or in the answer. Unless the defendant seasonably objects, any
mortgaged to Citytrust Banking Corporation, petitioner’s predecessor-in- action may be tried by a court despite its being the improper venue.
interest. Hence, CA decision reversed and set aside.
 Petitioner extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgaged on the 2 parcels of land,
and subsequently sold at public auction. Claiming deficiency amounting to
over P18M, petitioner sued respondent to recover.
 Respondents moved to dismiss the complaint alleging that suit was barred by
res judicata, that complaint stated no cause of action, and that claim has been
waived, abandoned or extinguished. RTC denied the motion to dismiss.
 Respondents filed their reply to petitioner’s comment, raising the ground of
improper venue contending that the recovery being a supplemental action of
the foreclosure proceedings, was a real action that should have been brought
in Manila because it was where the properties were located.
 Makati RTC denied the motion for lack of merit holding that ground of
improper venue was not raised in defendant’s motion to dismiss, thus cannot
be alleged thereafter.
 CA granted the petition for certiorari of respondents holding that the suit for
recovery is precisely to enforce the mortgage contract thus, venue of action
must necessarily be the same.

Issue:

Whether or not improper venue as a ground for motion to dismiss may be

waived.

Held:

 Yes. Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court thus expressly stipulates that
defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the
answer are deemed waived.
54. PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK vs SPOUSES VICTORIANO and MELANIE  In this case, it was agreed that any suit or action that may arise from the
RAMOS mortgage contracts or the promissory notes must be filed and tried in
Makati only—that MORTGAGOR waives for this purpose any other venue.
Not being contrary to law or public policy, the stipulation on venue, which
GR No. 228617 ; 20 September 2017
PDB and Spouses Ramos freely and willingly agreed upon, has the force of
law between them, and thus, should be complied with in good faith.
 Spouses Ramos had validly waived their right to choose the venue for any
suit or action arising from the mortgages or promissory notes when they
Written stipulations as to venue may be restrictive in the sense that the suit may be agreed to limit the same to Makati City only and nowhere else. It is crystal
filed only in the place agreed upon, or merely permissive in that the parties may file clear that the intention was not just to make the said place an additional
forum or venue but the only jurisdiction where any suit or action pertaining
their suit not only in the place agreed upon but also in the places fixed by law.
to the mortgage contracts may be filed.
 Spouses Ramos impliedly admitted the authenticity and due execution of
the mortgage contracts. There being no showing that such waiver is invalid
or the stipulation on venue was against public policy, the agreement of
Facts: parties should be upheld.
 Such being the case, the stipulation on venue stands and should have been
upheld by RTC and the CA.
 This case involves a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of Real Estate
Mortgage filed before RTC San Jose, Nueva Ecija by petitioner against
respondent spouses.
 Spouses Ramos filed a complaint for annulment of Real Estate Mortgages and
Promissory Notes before RTC of San Jose.
 PDB filed an urgent motion to dismiss alleging that the venue of the action
was improperly laid considering that the real estate mortgages signed by
parties contained a stipulation that any suit arising therefrom shall be filed in
Makati only.
 RTC denied the urgent motion to dismiss based on the contention of Spouses
Ramos that the contact is in the form of an adhesion, thus Sec 1 of Rule 4
shall be applied.
 PDB filed a petition for certiorari with the CA imputing grave abuse of
discretion on the RTC for denying its motion to dismiss despite the fact that
venue was improperly laid.
 CA denied the petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the exclusive stipulation on venue by parties is valid.

Held:

 Yes.
 The general rules on venue admit of exceptions in Section 4 thereof, i.e.,
where a specific rule or law provides otherwise, or when the parties agreed
in writing before the filing of the action on the exclusive venue thereof. As
in any other agreement, what is essential s the ascertainment of the
intention of the parties respecting the matter.
 In the absence of qualifying or restrictive words, the stipulation should be
deemed as merely an agreement on an additional forum, not as limiting
venue to the specified place.