3NUALSLJ1
3NUALSLJ1
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-Justice K. T. Thomas'
What happens when some elected persons join the other party?
The party which won an election becomes minority, whereas the party
which lost the election becomes the majority. The party which lost will
form the government and the party which won the election is then asked
to sit in opposition. This is a negation of people's verdict. That apart, this
involves political morality and ethics. Election is a mode by which voters
ANTI-DEFECTION LAWS 3
Schedule to the Constitution which became the Magna Carta of the law
of defection.
The salient features of this anti defection law were these: (i) If a
member has voluntarily given up membership of his political party or if
he votes or abstains from voting contrary to a direction issued by his
political party, he shall be disqualified for being a member of the House
(ii) The members who vote against their party whip would amount to one
third of the total strength of the legislative party the defection then was
called "split" in the party and then those defectors will not suffer
disqualification. (iii) The question whether a member has acquired
disqualification will be decided by the Speaker and his decision will be
final. (iv) No court shall have jurisdiction to deal with any question
relating to defection.
After the law of defection was so incorporated in the
Constitution, some developments took place, which had great impact on
this law. The first development happened when somebody challenged the
constitutional validity of this law which finally reached the Supreme
Court for consideration. A bench of five judges heard it and rendered a
decision which became the land mark decision on this law it is called
"Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillihu2 " reported in 1992 SCR (1) page 686 The
Supreme Court held that the Clause which debarred courts from dealing
with the questions of defection is invalid because it was not ratified by
one half of the legislative assemblies, as required in Article 368(2) of the
Constitution. However, the Supreme Court upheld the clause stating
about the finality of Speaker's decision, but said that this decision is
subject to the constitutional remedies provided in Article 136, 226 and
227 of the Constitution. This is the premise that the Speaker is
discharging a judicial function. The third is that even Supreme Court
cannot interfere with the decision of the Speaker unless the decision is in
violation of constitutional mandates or violation of the rules of natural
justice or vitiated by malafides or perversity.
The second development happened when Mayavati's party
(Behujan Samaj Party) secured 67 MLAs in UP Assembly. She became
Chief Minister with the support of BJP on the understanding that after a
term she would vacate for Kalyan Singh of the BJP. Later she vacated
and Kalyan Singh became Chief Minister with the support of Mayavati's
BSP. After some time, Mayavati withdrew the support but 12 MLAs of
the BSP defected and supported Kalyan Singh government. Mayavati
then filed a petition to the Speaker of the Assembly pleading to
disqualify the 12 MLAs on the ground that they violated the whip isued
by her. The Speaker who belonged to BJP did not take a decision for a
long time. Mayavati approached the Supreme Court and a direction was
issued to the Speaker to take a decision. In the decision so taken the
Sneaker found that initially 26 MLAs of BSP party defected though
finally only 12 remained to support Kalyan Singh as the remaining went
back to the original BSP. Those remaining MLAs filed individual
affidavits to the Speaker that they never, at any time, joined the defectors
group. So Mayavati approached the Supreme Court again in challenge of
the decision of the Speaker. This was heard by a bench of three judges
headed by the Chief Justice of India. I was also a Judge of that bench.
Justice Srinivasan wrote a judgment that Speaker's decision was final of
facts and could not be interfered with. But I disagreed. According to me
the Speaker could not subvert the law of arithmetics by holding that 12
out of 67 would constitute 1/ P 3 for making a split. I also said that
Speaker's decision hinged on perversity since he ignored the affidavits of
14 MLAs who asserted that they never defected at all and even the
petitioner Mayavati had no case that those deponents or affidavits were
in the category of defectors. I therefore, declared in my judgment that 13
MIAs who defected were disqualified to continue as MLAs. When the
opinion of justice Srinivasan and mine became so glaringly at variance,
the Chief Justice of India should have joined with one of us or written a
different judgment. Instead of that he only said that the matter must be
heard by a larger bench. Our Judgments are reported in 1998(7) SCC
517.3
The above opinion of Chief Justice of India created a legal
conundrum because, the then Chief Justice (Mr. Justice Punchi) retired on
the same day after pronouncing the judgment. The Registry of the
Supreme Court found it difficult to place the case before a larger bench in
the absence of a judicial order of the bench. The successor CJI (Dr. A.S.
Anand) was in a difficult situation to solve the imbroglio. However, the
case became infractuous by lapse of time.
The third development took place in 2003 when Parliament
3
Mayawati v. Markandeya Chand & others 1998(7) SCC 517.
6 N'UALS L. J. [3] (2009)
Now. the- question is, should the Anti Defection, Law be mpdified
further? In my view the law requires further modification. No doubt the
present law curbs the chameleon habits involving political and ethical
immorality of defection to a great extent. ]ut would it protect the
foundation of Parliamentqry democracy? Let me ponder over it.
You all know that there are two wings for a political patty in a
Parliamentary Democracy. One wing controlled by the party bosses
titled either as President or as General Secretary or as the Executive
Committee or as Polit bureau central committee in different parties. The
othbr is a legislature party cbnsistirig of th6 representatives elected by
voters on the party tickets based on adult franchise. At present, the stark
reality is that the legislature party has no role irf evolving any decision
which might' go to the Parliament or Assembly, including decisions
concerning legislation. Their only role is t6 obey the diriectiVes of the'
bosses of 'their political party. In other words, people's 'representatives
are made subordinates of party manigers in their parliamentary'
exercises. Before the party bosses issue the" 'vhip they are not govetned
by a condition that the matter should have been discussed in the
legislature party for ascertaining the majority view of .the legislature
party. 'According to.,me this will destroy, the core of parliamentary
democracy and would create party plutocracy.
(1) Areas for issuing whip should be vivisected into three spheres:
(i) Whip can be issued as the political party desires in
respect of those Bills concerning financial and
administrative functions of the government
(ii) But the legislations brought before the Parliament or the
Assembly must have the backing of a pre-discussion in
the legislature party where the views of the majority of
the legislature party should be the base for issuing whip.
(iii) There are areas where no whip shall be issued at all e.g.
when parliament is exercising its constituent power for
amending the Constitution, when Parliament takes up
impeachment of persons holding high constitutional
offices like President, judges of the Supreme Court and
High Courts, Election Commission, Comptroller and
Auditor General of India, when Parliament is exercising
questions of supreme national importance like imposition
of emergency by suspending fundamental rights.