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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

d to require that defendant to recover by good and sufficient conveyance the title to such properties; to refund to the plaintiff a certain
damages.

, whether she will pay the plaintiff the sum of P7,274 with interest on P6,500 thereof at 6 per cent per annum from September 5, 1911
o her on the 4th day of April, 1913, to the plaintiff upon plaintiff's paying her the sum of P7,500, with interest thereon at 6 per cent per

hether he will pay the plaintiff the sum of P8,910.41 and retain the property sold to him by the plaintiff, and described as follows (desc
um of P8,089.59, with interest thereon at 6 per cent per annum from October 17, 1911.

as to performance shall be in the plaintiff, who may immediately enforce his election by execution, compelling the defendants to execu
ff.

st thereon at 6 per cent per annum from the 24th day of October, 1913, and, for the costs of the action.

nt Maria Guia Garcia, wife of the defendant Simeon A. Villa.

 3) Calle Nebraska, district of Ermita, together with the lots whereon said buildings are erected, said houses and lots having an asses
he same is erected; (c) one house of strong materials, known and designated as No. 45 (now 221-225) Calle Mercado, district of Erm
ejon Maria Paz, and numbered 47a, 47b, and 11, 13, 15 and 17, respectively, together with the lots wherein the same are erected.

uted to her a conveyance of the properties above described in consideration of the debt, the conveyance containing a clause giving to
March 22, 1909, having become indebted to Felipa Silvestre in an additional sum of P5,000, he, on that day, conveyed the premises
was the debt of P20,000, the purchase price named in the conveyance of 1904, and P5,000, the additional debt which had been crea
reement between him and the defendants entered into at the time the conveyance was executed and delivered, giving him the right t
troversy thus raised is the origin of all the difference between the parties to this action.

was sold to Judge Jocson, and still later a second parcel, the defendant Maria Guia Garcia appearing in both conveyance as the vend

ubject of this action, but not a part of the property described in the conveyance of the 22d of March, 1909, located on Calle Salsipued
On the 4th day of April, 1913, the defendant Maria Guia Garcia conveyed to plaintiff the properties described in the conveyance of M
ng that he had paid long before the full sum of P25,000 which entitled him to the reconveyance without further consideration.

ssession of the properties described therein as virtual owner thereof, and that all he paid for such possession was the interest on the
self did not personally occupy and that he had the benefits of such rents, collecting them and using them for his own personal purpos
ia Guia Garcia and that he paid rent to her continuously while in the occupancy thereof, the amount of the rent being reduced as port
plaintiff. Defendants also say that, while it is admitted that the plaintiff rented portions of the properties to other tenants, he acted in so

him as the real owner of the property and that P10,000 thereof was paid to the defendant Maria Guia Garcia as a part payment of th
n full. He makes the same claim with regard to the purchase price of the property sold to Garchitorena, asserting that he received the
n sale, constituting the full amount due to defendant under the verbal agreement to reconvey attached to the conveyance of the 22d o
e 22d of March, 1909, remaining unsold.

negotiations. Defendants, however, deny that he acted in such negotiations as owner, but allege that he acted as their agent. They a
ed the full purchase price in each case, and that the only sum that plaintiff received was that paid him by the defendant for his service

om him and that he was induced to execute conveyances therefor in favor of the defendant Maria Guia Garcia under the threat that, i
was attached to that conveyance. He asserts that the consideration paid by the defendant for these properties was grossly inadequate
ed and also specifically deny that such threat or any threat was made or that the conveyances of the property referred to were obtain

s is not essentially different. While there is, of course, a wide difference in the claims of the parties to the action, that difference consis
d. Counsel for the plaintiff claim that the conveyance subsequent to that of the 22d of March, 1909, which is the origin of all the contro
l other acts against his own interests, were induced either by the fraud of the defendants or by the force and undue influence which th
elements of the alleged fraud and undue influence was that there was no consideration for the transfers to defendants or if there wa

ements of counsel in their brief in this court. With respect to the conveyance of March 22, 1909, counsel say:

rty beyond the reach of an impecunious brother-in-law, the plaintiff was induced to execute a writing, in the form of an absolute deed
ument) that the plaintiff was to pay interest at the rate of 9 per cent per annum upon his indebtedness of P25,000 and was to have a r
been conveyed to the defendant Maria Guia Garcia under pacto de retro for P20,000, that since that time the plaintiff had received for
intiff, was the so-called consideration upon which the conveyance under pacto de retro was converted into an apparently absolute co
 absolute possession of the properties (test., p. 9) and administered the same for his own use and benefit, free from any control on th
ousted from the remainder as hereinafter stated.

dge Jocson, who paid P14,000 for the premises at No. 49 Calle Mercado. Of this sum P2,000 was employed in building a stable and
he plaintiff was required to increase his interest payments from 9 per cent to 10 per cent, and the monthly payments of P187.50 were

ommitted a folly in executing a deed to property worth P78,500 to secure a debt of only P25,000 without expressing therein its real ob
ndoned his efforts to secure a higher price, and the money was paid to plaintiff by Judge Jocson in the presence of the defendants, w
y Vales that although he was the owner of the property he had allowed the title to stand in the name of the defendant Maria Guia Gar
e in the event of the death of said Guia Garcia, and that in view of said explanation Vales requested the judge to prepare a suitable d
7-8). When this document was presented to defendant Villa and his wife, Guia Garcia, upon one pretext or another they failed to exec
maining balance of his indebtedness. He accordingly engaged the service of brokers to find a buyer for the house and lots at Nos. 10
r real value, as shown by the testimony of Goyena, a competent and disinterested witness, who appraises the said properties at over

med him that the property in question belonged to Vales, the plaintiff; that he received all his instructions regarding the sale from the
P20,000 were received from Garchitorena for the sale of the property in question P5,000 of it was turned over to Vales. He also testif
er defendants, said that that would be done after Holy Week (sten. notes, page 39). The details of what transpired on this occasion w

endants the whole amount of his indebtedness to them, but the titles to the remaining properties, which had stood as security for the d

ty, but was informed that this would not be done until he had sold them for P7,500 a house and lot of his on Calle Salsipuedes, the va
testimony. The final upshot was that the defendants told plaintiff that if he would finish the house as they wanted it and sell it to them
the defendant Maria Guia Garcia. Fearing that he would be deprived of his property, and yielding to the threat of the defendants, the

laintiff to defendant Maria Guia Garcia. He then again preferred his request for the restoration of his Ermita properties, but the rapaci
y had apparently excited the avarice and cupidity of defendants, and under the guise of punishing him for his ingratitude in telling the
pleted to the taste and requirements of Dr. Villa for the meager sum of P8,000. The mere fact that the plaintiff had meekly been haled
ce. The temerity of plaintiff in even mentioning his rights was deemed worthy of chastisement, especially such as would redound to th
P14,800) was advanced by Dr. Villa, and so, when finished the poor plaintiff was owing to defendants the sum of P6,800 or the exce

of a strip of land adjoining the house and lot already wrested from him and having made unsuccessful demands upon him for the tra
on thereof, collected the rentals thereof and even compelled the plaintiff to pay them rental for that part occupied by himself and famil

time. Finally, in April 1913, he succeeded in borrowing this sum from one Rafael Alonso, and with this sum (P6,800) as a nominal con
h an equity of about P18,000 is surprising. Doubtless the delay in procuring for their demands the ultimate P6,800, or the threatened f

he coloring given them by the disclosure by the plaintiff of what he alleges to have been the motives and forces which drove him to th

ants on the ground of duress.

f real estate transactions on the ground of duress. More correctly this is an action to compel the defendants to account unto the plaint

ounsel for plaintiff have this to say respecting the real issue in the action:

this plaintiff, counsel for appellant seeks strenuously to avoid the issue of duress.

al obligation to reconvey, manifestly their refusal to do so could not have coerced plaintiff's volition. Our law would be indeed a traves

ed evidence shows they were worth P78,515:

lling to sell property of this value for less than a third of its actual worth.

e in bold face type descriptive of its contents. They are "Argument," "Duress," "Ratification, "Res judicata." There is no division of the
d not an absolute conveyance. This is followed by the part marked "Duress" where counsel say:

conspiring together, and taking advantage of the fact that the conveyance by way of mortgage was in the form of an absolute deed, p
y the duress to which he was subjected by the defendants, and that they are bound to make restitution to him of every dollar which th

o make up the deficiencies, etc.

ry of the action is duress. We might say, however, inasmuch as fraud and deceit are so prominently mentioned, that we find no fraud
acts as well as the defendants. There was no deception. This is a necessary deduction not only form the fact that there was no misrep
ndants to reconvey. Under his own statement and according to his own theory the defendants did no more than break their verbal con
acts can be said to constitute fraud or deceit. It is well recognized however, that a mere failure to live up to a contract is not fraudulent
intent to break it, after getting all he can out of the other party, and that purpose and intent enter into a the contract as the main elem
been made; and that, by virtue of that state of mind, the other party was deprived of property. That fact however must be alleged and
ined by deceit in any of the transactions. There did not exist in any one of the transactions complained of a condition where "by word

self from a series of foolish transactions, if we may accept his allegations respecting them. As we have said, the sales were all made
properties described in the deed of March 22, 1909, remaining unsold. But, as appears from the evidence, the plaintiff has already re
to recover all through thus dealings with defendants and to obtain which he claims he had suffered so much. Having secured before t
which he so much desired was not procured by fraud or deceit; and it was a complete termination of the relations existing between the
able under the circumstances, did he not thereby terminate all relations between himself and defendants with respect to, or growing o
nt of view, that plaintiff, having been deprived of property by fraud and deceit, may recover that property through a voluntary agreeme

ined in that form by force or thereat. The validity of that conveyance is admitted; as is also the fact that the verbal agreement to recon
se of the fact that the agreement was verbal and, therefore, difficult to prove, as clever by which they forced him to convey to them ad
conveyance was an extortion, using that word in its popular and not in its legal sense, the defendants, in order to intimidate him and th
verbally, as a consideration therefor, to reconvey to him the properties remaining, but each time refused to do so and proceeded, afte
that he executed and delivered the subsequent conveyances for the purpose of extricating himself from the unfortunate situation so p
self.

s. When of age and sane, they must take care of themselves. In their relation with others in the business of life, wits, sense, intelligen
elves — upon their own abilities, talents, training, sense, acument, judgment. The fact that one may be worsted by another, of itself, fu
annot murmur if the battle goes against him. The law furnishes no protection to the inferior simply because he is inferior, any more tha
e small, the strong and the weak. The foolish may lose all they have to the wise; but that does not mean that the law will give it back t
acts. Courts cannot constitute themselves guardians of persons who are not legally incompetent. Courts operate not because one p
by them — indeed, all they have in the world; but not for that alone can the law intervene and restore. There must be, in addition, a v

rvene, the person injured may renounce his right to take the matter to the courts and may compromise with the wrong-doer. Or, havin
s enemy or go to the courts for redress. In such case the payment of an additional sum as a means of escape is not necessarily a pa
be relieved. His judgment, operating upon this condition, told him to pay the additional sum rather than to suffer the inconvenience an
e original wrong and a ratification of the relation which the wrongful act was intended to establish between the parties.

another, has put him in a disadvantageous position — a position which another may unjustly make use of to his injury. The failure to
etc., may place a person in a disadvantageous position with respect to another; and the demand that he pay to secure his extrication
round for relief.

ntly and even against his good sense and judgment, and where he, in reality, gives no consent at all, as where he executes a contrac
he acts spontaneously and joyously. Legally speaking he acts as voluntarily and freely when he acts wholly against his better sense a
s nevertheless overcome by force or intimidation to such an extent that he becomes a mere automation and acts mechanically only,
ing the force or making use of intimidation. While his hand signs, the will which moves it is another's. While a contract is made, it has

ne within which class it falls. If it is within the first class it is not duress in law, if it falls in the second, it is.

tract and to recover damages. He may do this expressly or impliedly. He may expressly accept the agreement as it stands, or in a mo
ny one of which cases, and there are others not now necessary to mention, he renounces and waives his defense of intimidation and

imidation, or deceit shall be void." Article 1267 provides that "violence exists when, in order to exact consent, irresistible force is used

by a third person who did not take part in the contract.

midation resulting from the fear of losing his property, if he did not comply with defendants' demands, is the element relied on.

as related by plaintiff himself, leaving out of account the conclusions drawn and stated in the brief of counsel? Summing up the who
oice. He could refuse to pay again for the right which he had paid for once, and go into court for relief, or he could pay the price asked
found himself in precisely the situation he was before. The verbal agreement to reconvey, which he claims he had twice paid for, wa
nstead, with the very persons who had refused to live up to their original agreement because it was verbal, he not only made another
nts having refused to fulfill the second verbal agreement and having refused to give him credit for the P10,000 paid, he entered into a
ried time, there was a refusal to fulfill and the plaintiff, to obtain the very thing which had been the subject-matter of these prior verbal

no intimidation in law. There was a lack of sense and judgment; but there was no imminent and serious injury threatened to his perso
to refuse to live up to a contract is equivalent to a threat of imminent and serious injury to the person or property of the other contrac
elf therefrom entailed no consequences; nor does it mean that he was not dealing at arm's length with the defendants. There was no
he courts at the first refusal of defendants, as he ultimately did; and his chances for obtaining the relief sought would have been far b
ations, but he also laid himself to open accusation of having compromised with his enemies, with having ratified and confirmed all that
act are the commonest cause of litigation; and settlements and readjustments between the parties after a breach of contract whereb
for intimidation. A threat to refuse to comply with the terms of a contract without an additional consideration is not, of itself, intimidatio
in the power or under the control of the one making the threat. He is still free to act as he pleases. He can still exercise judgment and
h can produce intimidation. There is nothing which can engender a well-grounded fear of imminent and serious injury to person or pro
Faura properties and the payment of the consideration of P6,800 for the recovery of the properties described in the original conveyan
ed to recover on the record. His acts in general not only contradicted the most material portions of his testimony, but he must be held

or the plaintiff appears to have fallen in their brief. Under the heading "Statement of facts" counsel say:

ntroverted and undisputed. The recital of woeful abuse which constituted the plaintiff's complaint might stagger the credence were it t
unusual opportunities afforded to the defendants of correcting it in any particular in which it may have been distorted, overdrawn or m

this plaintiff, counsel for appellant seeks strenuously to avoid the issues of duress.

stimony of Felipa Silvestre, Maria Guia Garcia, and Simeon A. Villa, the three defendants. These witnesses, or some of them, deny th
on which plaintiff bases this case. They declare that the sale of the 22d of March, 1909, was an absolute sale and was intended as s
aura properties was voluntary on the part of the plaintiff and for a consideration regarded at the time as adequate in each cae. They d
o Judge Jocson and to Garchitorena as owner, but allege that he acted as their agent in doing so. They deny that he paid interest an
r corroboration, they point to the fact that the only receipt introduced in evidence by plaintiff to substantiate his claim that he was payi
d denied that there was any agreement to reconvey. They deny that plaintiff received any of the purchase price of the properties sold

the fact that they obtained Torrent title thereto with the assistance of the plaintiff who testified to the absolute character of their title; t
e defendants had repudiated his contention of the existence of a verbal agreement to reconvey; to his failure to act when he was eje
nce for a period of six months after such repurchase before the present action was commenced. They call attention to the inherent im
escribed in the original conveyance but also to those which plaintiff claims they obtained from him by threats and intimidation; and in t
.

by the denial of the defendants and a history of his own acts; and in doing so our attention is drawn to the admission of counsel for th
is opponent, or by a single witness or document offered in their behalf; "and we necessarily recur to the fact that the defendants did c
e is a grave question whether or not the plaintiff is not bound by their testimony. They were his witness, called by him by virtue of sect
f counsel for the plainful. We do not find it necessary to decide this question at this time, but refer to it simply to call attention to the p

action of nullity is extinguished from the moment the contract may have been validly confirmed;" and article 1311 declares that "the co
t, the person who may have a right to invoke it should execute an act which necessarily implies his wish to renounce such a right;" wh

eyance of March 22, 1909, occurred in June or the last part of July of 1909 when the defendants refused to sign an instrument presen
of these rejections, however, plaintiff continued his dealings with the defendants, selling them the Salsipuedes and Padre Faura prop
remaining unsold. Not only this, but after such rejections, or at least one of them, the plaintiff assisted the defendants in obtaining To
after having been deprived of property by intimidation, to recover that property through a voluntary agreement between him and those
erties in April, 1913, he accepted everything as it stood at that time and elected to take from the defendants a conveyance of the rem

re was, the plaintiff has placed himself in a position where he was not entitled to urge it as a defense.

ordered.
Vales vs Villa (35 Phil. 769)
March 26, 2016

G.R. No. 10028 December 16, 1916

JOSE VALES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
SIMEON A. VILLA, FELIPE S. SILVESTRE, and MARIA GUIA GARCIA, defendants-
appellants.

Lawrence, Ross and Block and Manuel Torres for appellants.

Haussermann, Cohn and Fisher and Orense and Gonzalez Diez for appellee.

MORELAND, J.:

FACTS

This is an action to set aside certain transfers of real estate from the plaintiff to one of the
defendants and to require that defendant to recover by good and sufficient conveyance the
title to such properties; to refund to the plaintiff a certain sum paid by plaintiff for the
recovery of certain other real estate; and for an accounting by the defendants of the rents,
issues and profits of certain real estate during a certain period; and for P25,000 damages.

It appears that the defendant Felipa Silvestre is a widow, 70 years of age, and is the aunt of
the defendant Maria Guia Garcia, wife of the defendant Simeon A. Villa.

With regard to the Salsipuedes and Padre Faura properties the plaintiff claims that they
were obtained from him and that he was induced to execute conveyances therefor in favor
of the defendant Maria Guia Garcia under the threat that, if he did not do so, the defendants
would not reconvey to him the properties described in the conveyance of the 22d of March
1909; that is, that they would repudiate the verbal agreement which plaintiff alleges was
attached to that conveyance.

That fact however must be alleged and proved and relied upon before it can be utilized by
the person asserting its existence. It was not alleged or proved in this case and plaintiff
does not rely upon it in his brief in this court. His consent was not obtained by deceit in any
of the transactions. There did not exist in any one of the transactions complained of a
condition where “by words and insidious machinations on the part of one of the
contracting parties the other is (was) induced to execute a contract which, without them,
he would not have made.”

ISSUE

Whether or not it is valid to annul a series of real estate transactions on the ground of
duress.

HELD

The same may be said with greater force of a case where a person’s own voluntary act,
uninfluenced by another, has put him in a disadvantageous position — a position which
another may unjustly make use of to his injury. The failure to reduce a contract to writing,
or to have witnesses present when a verbal agreement is made, or to record an instrument,
or to exclude from the operation of its terms things verbally agreed to be excluded, etc.,
may place a person in a disadvantageous position with respect to another; and the demand
that he pay to secure his extrication is not illegal, and a payment made pursuant to such
demand is not necessarily voidable. He pays for his lack of foresight. While the demand
may be reprehensible morally, it is not illegal’ and of itself is not ground for relief.

There must, then, be a distinction to be made between a case where a person gives his
consent reluctantly and even against his good sense and judgment, and where he, in reality,
gives no consent at all, as where he executes a contract or performs an act against his will
under a pressure which he cannot resist. It is clear that one acts as voluntarily and
independently in the eye of the law when he acts reluctantly and with hesitation as when
he acts spontaneously and joyously. Legally speaking he acts as voluntarily and freely when
he acts wholly against his better sense and judgment as when he acts in conformity with
them. Between the two acts there is no difference in law. But when his sense, judgment, and
his will rebel and he refuses absolutely to act as requested, but is nevertheless overcome by
force or intimidation to such an extent that he becomes a mere automation and
acts mechanically only, a new element enters, namely, a disappearance of the personality of
the actor. He ceases to exist as an independent entity with faculties and judgment, and in
his place is substituted another — the one exercising the force or making use of
intimidation. While his hand signs, the will which moves it is another’s. While a contract is
made, it has, in reality and in law, only one party to it; and, there being only one party, the
one using the force or the intimidation, it is unenforceable for lack of a second party.

From these considerations it is clear that every case of alleged intimidation must be
examined to determine within which class it falls. If it is within the first class it is not
duress in law, if it falls in the second, it is.
But into whichever class it falls the party coerced may, as we have seen, waive his right to
annul the contract and to recover damages. He may do this expressly or impliedly. He may
expressly accept the agreement as it stands, or in a modified from, and live up to it as thus
accepted. Or, he may compromise by paying something to be relieved from its effects or to
have its terms changed. Or, he may accept benefits under the contract. In any one of which
cases, and there are others not now necessary to mention, he renounces and waives his
defense of intimidation and thereby eliminates that element as one having any influence on
the case thereafter.

Article 1265 of the Civil Code tells us when duress exists: “Consent given by error, under
violence, by intimidation, or deceit shall be void.” Article 1267 provides that “violence
exists when, in order to exact consent, irresistible force is used;” and the “intimidation
exists when one of the contracting parties is inspired with a reasonable and well-grounded
fear of suffering an imminent and serious injury to his person or
property. . . .” Article 1268 declares the effect of violence and intimidation on the contract.
It provides:

Violence or intimidation shall annul the obligation, even if it should have been employed by
a third person who did not take part in the contract.

There is no question of error or violence in this case; and we have already disposed of that
of deceit. Intimidation resulting from the fear of losing his property, if he did not comply
with defendants’ demands, is the element relied on.

First, then, applying the principles already enunciated: Was there intimidation in this case
under the facts as related by plaintiff himself, leaving out of account the conclusions drawn
and stated in the brief of counsel? Summing up the whole case under these facts, it is clear
that all that defendants did was to refuse to live up to their verbal agreement with the
plaintiff unless he gave them an additional consideration therefor. Plaintiff had his choice.
He could refuse to pay again for the right which he had paid for once, and go into court for
relief, or he could pay the price asked. His judgment operated upon the situation thus
presented and he concluded that, from his point of view, his interests would be best
subserved by paying the additional consideration. But having paid it, he found himself in
precisely the situation he was before. The verbal agreement to reconvey, which he claims
he had twice paid for, was still verbal, and he was no better off than before. He took no
receipt showing the purpose of the payment; he required no writing to protect himself
from the very trap into which he had once fallen; but, instead, with the very persons who
had refused to live up to their original agreement because it was verbal, he not only
made another verbal agreement but also paid them, without a scrap of paper to show for it
or specify its object, the sum of P10,000 on that agreement. Not only this, but he did the
same thing a second time. The defendants having refused to fulfill the second verbal
agreement and having refused to give him credit for the P10,000 paid, he entered into
a third agreement under which he paid them P15,000. But still the agreement was verbal.
Still there was no receipt, no writing, nothing but the naked word that had twice before
been repudiated. Again, for the tried time, there was a refusal to fulfill and the plaintiff, to
obtain the very thing which had been the subject-matter of these prior verbal contracts,
paid a fourth consideration of P6,800. This time he succeeded. On the payment of
the fourth consideration he secured in black and white the title to the property which had
so eluded him.

But, even though it should be found that the execution of the conveyance of the Salsipuedes
and Padre Faura properties and the payment of the consideration of P6,800 for the
recovery of the properties described in the original conveyance remaining unsold, together
with all the other acts of the plaintiff which militate against his interest, were obtained and
procured by means of intimidation, still we believe that the plaintiff would not be entitled
to recover on the record. His acts in general not only contradicted the most material
portions of his testimony, but he must be held to have ratified the conveyances, payments,
and acts referred to and to have renounce the right o interpose the defense which
intimidation originally offered him.