Law Commission Sample Report On Surrogacy by Vaishnavi
Law Commission Sample Report On Surrogacy by Vaishnavi
Law Commission Sample Report On Surrogacy by Vaishnavi
VAISHNAVI MISRA
1550274
9 B.A. LLB ‘B
SUBMITTED TO:
ASSISTANT PROFESSOR
SCHOOL OF LAW
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
8 Case Studies 37
9 Conclusion 43
10 Suggestions and Recommendations 45
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CHAPTER - 1
INTRODUCTION
1
Smith Chandra, Surrogacy and India : A legal Perspective, NALSAR University of Law,
file:///C:/Users/Vaishnavi%20.LAPTOP-NB5VU17G/Downloads/SSRN-id1762401.pdf
(Last Accessed 18th September, 2019)
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SURROGACY - MEANING
The word „surrogate‟ has its origin from a Latin word „surrogatus‟, meaning
a substitute, that is, a person appointed to act in the place of another. 2 Hence
a surrogate mother is a woman who carries a child on behalf of another
woman, either from her ovum or from the implantation in her womb of a
fertilized egg from other woman. Black‟s Law Dictionary, defines surrogacy
as the process of carrying and delivering a child for another person. The
Britannica defines „surrogate motherhood‟ as the practice in which a woman
bears a child for a couple unable to produce children in the usual way. The
Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilization and
Embryology or the Warnock Report (1984) termed surrogacy as the practice
whereby one woman carries a child for another with the intention that the
child should be handed over after birth. A standard definition of „surrogacy‟
is offered by the American Law Reports in the following manner: “…a
contractual undertaking whereby the natural or surrogate mother, for a fee,
agrees to conceive a child through artificial insemination with the sperm of
the natural father, to bear and deliver the child to the natural father, and to
terminate all of her parental rights subsequent to the child's birth.”3
According to another classification, surrogacy can be traditional, gestational
and donor surrogacy. Traditional surrogacy involves the artificial
insemination of the surrogate mother by using the sperm of the intended
father. Gestational surrogacy, on the other hand, involves the creation of an
embryo in a Petri dish and its implantation into the womb of the surrogate
who carries it to the term.4 Lastly, in donor surrogacy there is no genetic
relationship between the child and the intended parents as the surrogate is
inseminated with the sperm, not of the intended father, but of an outside
donor.
2
Ibid
3
Ibid
4
Ibid
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CHAPTER -2
3. In Javed v. State of Haryana7 , though the Supreme Court upheld the two
living children norm to debar a person from contesting a Panchayati Raj
election it abstain from stating that the right to procreation is not a basic
human right. Now, if reproductive right gets constitutional umbrella,
surrogacy which allows an infertile couple to exercise that right also gets the
same constitutional protection.
The moral issues associated with surrogacy are pretty obvious, yet of an eye-
opening nature. This includes the criticism that surrogacy leads to
commoditization of the child, breaks the bond between the mother and the
child, interferes with nature and leads to exploitation of poor women in
underdeveloped countries who sell their bodies for money. Sometimes,
psychological considerations may come in the way of a successful surrogacy
5
AIR 2000 A. P. 156
6
316 US 535
7
(2003) 8 SCC 369
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arrangement. As far as the legality of the concept of surrogacy is concerned it
would be worthwhile to mention that Article 16.1 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights 1948 says, inter alia, that “men and women of
full age without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion have the
right to marry and found a family”. The Judiciary in India too has recognized
the reproductive right of humans as a basic right.8
8
Izabela Jargilo, Regulating the Trade of Commercial Surrogacy in India, 15 J. INT'L BUS.
& L. 337, 360 (2016)
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CHAPTER -3
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aspect. The purpose of this Act is to lay down consistent standards and
procedural safeguards for the protection of all parties involved in a
gestational surrogacy contract in this State and to confirm the legal status of
the new born as a result of these contracts. These standards and safeguards
are meant to facilitate the use of this type of reproductive contract in accord
with the public policy of the State. Later Johnson v. Calvert13 , the American
judiciary took a libertarian approach. Through this case the Supreme Court
extended constitutional umbrella to surrogacy controls and gave them a legal
validity. The court held that the surrogacy contract involved free, informed
and rational choice by a woman to use her body. In Surrogacy Parenting
Associate v. Commonwealth of Kentucky14, the court propounded the
intension test for the determination of natural mother. In re Marriage of John
A15, the court held that even though the commissioning parents are not
biologically related to the child, they are still her lawful parents given their
initiating role as the intended parents in her conception and birth. Even after
separation of married couple who opted for artificial insemination, the
husband would still continue to be the father of the of the offspring thus
produced as held in another case of People v. Sorensen16 In Lamaritata v.
Lucas17 the court held, a person who gives sperm for a woman to conceive a
child by artificial insemination is not a parent. Thus, the sperm donor has no
legal rights. As to the statutory response, different states of America have
responded through legislation to the question of legalization of surrogacy.
Some states18 took a liberal approach and some totally shun their eyes
13
5 cal.4th 84, 19 cal.Rptr.2d 494, 851 P.2d 776
14
704 s.w. 2d 209(February 06,1986)
15
61 Cal.App.4th 1410 (1998)
16
68 Cal.2d 280 (1968)
17
So.2d 316 (2002)
18
Kentucky, Louisiana, Nebraska, and Washington, on the other hand, have taken a less
restrictive approach, passing legislation that voids only those surrogacy contracts that
provide for compensation to the surrogate. In contrast, Florida, New Hampshire, and
Virginia have adopted the minority approach by making them legal and enforceable but they
prohibit commercial surrogacy, with an exception of expenses incurred as a result of
pregnancy and childbirth.
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towards the validity of surrogacy contracts making them completely illegal19.
Surrogacy legislation in New Hampshire requires judicial preauthorization of
all surrogacy contracts subject to three conditions viz. informed consent by
parties, completion of psychological counselling and evaluation, absence of
unconscionable terms in the contract and orientation towards best interests of
child. In Australia, Kirkman sisters‟ case20 sparked much community and
legal debate and soon states in Australia attempted to settle the legal
complications in surrogacy. Now in Australia, commercial surrogacy is
illegal, contracts in relation to surrogacy arrangement is unenforceable and
any payment for soliciting a surrogacy arrangement is illegal.
In 2004, the Illinois legislature passed the Gestational Surrogacy Act, which
provides that a child conceived through in vitro fertilization (IVF) and born
to a surrogate mother automatically becomes the legal child of the intended
parents at birth if certain conditions are met. Under the Act, the woman who
bears the child has no parental status.'21 The bill generated modest media
attention, but little controversy; it passed unanimously in both houses of the
legislature and was signed into law by the governor.' This mundane story of
the legislative process in action stands in sharp contrast to the political tale of
surrogacy that unfolded in the 1980s and early 1990s as the Baby M case left
its mark on American law.22 It was through the lens of Baby M that this
innovative use of reproductive technology was first scrutinized as an issue of
social, political, and legal interest.' Over the course of the litigation between
the intended parents, William and Elizabeth Stern, and the surrogate mother,
Mary Beth Whitehead, hostility toward commercial surrogacy arrangements
19
New York, North Dakota and Utah, the legislatures have taken a blanket approach,
deeming all surrogacy contracts to be void and unenforceable
20
In Victoria, Linda Kirkman agreed to gestate the genetic child of her older sister
Maggie(1988).
21
Elizabeth S. Scott, Surrogacy and the Politics of Commodification, 72 Law & Contemp.
Probs. 109 (2009)
22
Ibid
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hardened.23 Opponents of surrogacy-mostly feminists and religious groups-
argued that the contracts were baby-selling arrangements that exploited poor
women who either were coerced or did not understand the consequences of
their decisions. Opponents argued that surrogacy degraded the female
reproductive function and undermined the family. This framing of the
transaction as illegitimate commodification was adopted by the New Jersey
Supreme Court in Baby M and prevailed for several years thereafter, with far
reaching effects on legal regulation.24 By the early 1990s, many states had
enacted laws prohibiting or severely restricting surrogacy agreements. Some
observers predicted the end of this particular use of reproductive technology.
But that did not happen. In fact, the politics and social meaning of surrogacy
arrangements have slowly changed, and the alarm and hostility that
surrounded this issue have diminished substantially. An alternative frame has
emerged, in which altruistic surrogates (contractually bound and
compensated nonetheless) provide the "gift of life" to deserving couples who
otherwise would be unable to have children. News stories about surrogacy
arrangements in the past decade have tended to be upbeat, human-interest
tales describing warm relationships between surrogates and the couples for
whom they bear children - a far cry from the acrimonious battle between Ms
Whitehead and the Sterns over Baby M25. The political and judicial response
to surrogacy has also changed in recent years. In Illinois and other states, the
contemporary legislative approach has been largely pragmatic, driven by a
perception that parties will continue to enter these agreements and thus, that
it is important to have procedures that establish parental status in intended
parents." In the absence of statutory authority, several courts, including the
California Supreme Court, have also enforced gestational-surrogacy contracts
23
Ibid
24
Ibid
25
Ibid
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and have held that the intended parents can be named on the birth
certificate."26
BABY M-
26
Ibid
27
Ibid
28
Ibid
29
Ibid
11 | P a g e
M story are familiar. In February 1985, Mary Beth Whitehead and Bill Stern
executed the surrogacy contract, brokered by the Infertility Center of New
York and its director Noel Keane Days after Ms. Whitehead gave birth, she
delivered the baby to the Sterns (who named her Melissa), but she returned
the next day and told them that she "could not live without [the] baby."'
Shortly thereafter, Ms. Whitehead and her husband took the baby to Florida
to hide out with relatives.30 After Ms. Whitehead was apprehended and the
baby returned to the Sterns, Ms. Whitehead fought Mr. Stern's effort to
enforce the contract in a highly publicized and messy trial that stretched over
two months. At its end, Judge Harold Sorkow held the surrogacy contract
valid, ordering that Ms. Whitehead's parental rights be terminated and that
Mr. Stern receive sole custody; shortly thereafter, the judge entered an order
allowing Ms. Stern's adoption of Melissa. On appeal, the New Jersey
Supreme Court reversed the lower court, holding that the contract was
unenforceable under New Jersey statutory law and that it violated public
policy. The court found that the contract offended public policy because it
was effectively "the sale of a child," prohibited in this context for the same
reason that it was banned under state adoption law: because women needing
money might be coerced into giving up their children.' Moreover, the pre-
birth agreement by the mother to relinquish parental rights was explicitly
prohibited under the adoption statute. “The Court concluded that a surrogacy
contract could never be voluntary or informed, because a woman could not
know what it would mean to give up her baby."
Media coverage of the Baby M case was intense from the time the
Whiteheads fled with Melissa to Florida, and it persisted through the New
Jersey Supreme Court decision. This is not surprising. The case raised
compelling questions about the uncertain impact of a novel use of
reproductive technology on family structure, the nature of motherhood, the
30
Ibid
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welfare of children, and the role of law in this unfamiliar terrain. The story
also had powerful elements of human drama. Over the course of the trial,
reporters observed a shift in public attitudes." At the outset, the Sterns were
viewed sympathetically as an infertile couple eager to have a child, while Ms.
Whitehead was seen as an erratic woman who had reneged on her agreement.
But as the trial progressed, Ms. Whitehead increasingly was portrayed as a
victim, a working-class mother who was exploited and unfairly attacked by
powerful adversaries. Trial narratives, repeated in the media, may have
contributed to these shifts in attitude. Some observers were offended by the
depiction of Whitehead as a bad mother by Stern's experts, who questioned
her parenting abilities on the basis of her lifestyle, shaky finances, and failure
to provide intellectual stimulation to the child31.'
Feminists and liberals were among the most active advocates, unifying
against surrogacy as the Baby M litigation played out. Early in the trial,
feminists acknowledged that surrogacy was a hard issue; news reports
described them as "torn between support [of] a women's right to use her body
31
Ibid
32
Ibid
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as she chooses" and concerns about the exploitation of women." But feminist
columnists advocated vehemently in support of Whitehead and against
surrogacy, criticizing the Sterns, Judge Sorkow, and Noel Keane, the broker."
Moreover, women's advocates became increasingly angry at the attacks on
Ms. Whitehead by the Sterns' lawyers and mental-health experts, believing
that the emphasis on her lifestyle and financial problems was infused with
class bias and the gender discrimination typical of child-custody disputes.'
Ms. Whitehead was, in their view, "being held to an unfair standard of
motherhood." Feminists also targeted intermediaries such as Noel Keane,
who charged high fees for arranging the contracts. As one feminist put it,
these brokers, who exploited poor women with few options, were "the pimps
of the surrogacy movement."" By the time the trial concluded with a
judgment upholding the contract, feminists and women's groups presented a
united front in opposition to surrogacy; few defended the judge's decision. On
the last day of trial testimony, prominent women released a statement
supporting Ms. Whitehead's right to keep the child and denouncing
surrogacy." Prominent feminists also submitted an amicus brief to the New
Jersey Supreme Court arguing for reversal of the trial-court decision, as did
the New Jersey Catholic Congress, the Family Research Council, and the
National Committee for Adoption." Amicus briefs arguing for reversal of the
trial-court decision greatly outnumbered those that favoured upholding the
decision. Over the course of the Baby M litigation, advocates in the political
arena effectively framed surrogacy as illegitimate commodification. First, the
characterization of the surrogacy transaction as baby selling was invoked
repeatedly by opponents; ultimately it was adopted by the New Jersey
Supreme Court and by lawmakers in other states.' Surrogacy, it was argued,
threatened not only the specific children who were produced through these
arrangements, but the social value of children generally. Second, opponents
also argued that these arrangements exploited poor women who did not
understand the serious consequences of their decisions to bear children for
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the benefit of wealthier, more-powerful men." The intense focus on surrogacy
over the course of the trial and appeal profoundly influenced public and
political opinion about these arrangements. At the outset surrogacy contracts
were unfamiliar, but were likely viewed by most people with curiosity rather
than alarm. Over time, opposition to surrogacy grew in the political arena; the
New Jersey Supreme Court decision simply reinforced and solidified the
emerging social meaning of surrogacy as an undesirable commercial
arrangement that involved the selling of children and exploitation of women.
15 | P a g e
agency had brokered the Whitehead Stern contract, the legislature changed
course mid-stream in response to the Baby M decision. In early 1987, a bill
that had been aimed at protecting women and children against exploitation
while ensuring judicial enforcement of surrogacy contracts that met statutory
requirements was making its way quietly through the legislature. By June,
this bill was withdrawn in the face of intense opposition from a coalition of
religious organizations and women's groups. A task force created by
Governor Mario Cuomo, an opponent of surrogacy, held hearings dominated
by surrogacy opponents. The task force issued a report that referred
frequently to Baby M and emphasized the threat posed by contracts
commodifying children and exploiting poor women. The report proposed
statutory reform banning surrogacy and subjecting brokers to criminal
penalties.34
In the wave of legislation that followed Baby M, little attention was directed
toward the distinction between traditional and gestational surrogacy35. This
may not be surprising, in that Baby M herself was the product of traditional
surrogacy, and gestational surrogacy was not common in the 1980s." Most
statutes enacted in the late 1980s and early 1990s applied generically to all
surrogacy contracts, as did the ABA Model Act and the Uniform Act.36 The
difference between gestational- and traditional-surrogacy contracts has
become an important legal distinction. In the absence of statutory authority,
numerous courts have directed that intended parents, and not the surrogate,
be named on the birth certificate in gestational arrangements. Moreover, the
new Uniform Parentage Act and most of the surrogacy statutes enacted since
2000 deal exclusively with requirements for enforcement of gestational-
surrogacy agreements, leaving traditional arrangements in a legal void.37
34
Ibid
35
Ibid
36
Ibid
37
Ibid
16 | P a g e
Second wave of Surrogacy Laws38 –
The recent statutory reforms in surrogacy law have been driven largely by
pragmatic concerns. As couples eager to have children have increasingly
shown themselves ready to turn to surrogates, even when the agreements are
of uncertain legality, lawmakers have recognized the potential harms posed
by the lack of regulation. In a legal vacuum, and even when surrogacy
contracts are prohibited, a host of legal problems can arise regarding the
rights and obligations of the participants toward the child. Along with the risk
of acrimonious custody litigation between the surrogate and the intended
parents, costly uncertainty can result when the intended parents‟ divorce or
decline to accept the child, perhaps because the baby is born with a medical
condition or disability.39 Against this background, many lawmakers
concluded that because surrogacy arrangements would continue with or
without facilitating legislation, the appropriate legal response was to establish
rules under which parental status was clearly prescribed. The Illinois
legislation is representative. In 2003, the Illinois Supreme Court implored the
legislature to safeguard the interests of children born as a result of assisted
reproduction by clarifying the parental status of the involved adults.' The
legislature responded in 2004 by passing the Gestational Surrogacy Act
(GSA). Like other contemporary laws, this statute limits enforcement to
gestational (and not traditional) surrogacy contracts and mandates that the
intended parents automatically become the child's legal parents at birth.91
Also like other contemporary statutes, the GSA restricts enforcement to
arrangements in which the surrogate has given birth before and the intended
parents have a medical need for the surrogacy. But the Illinois law creates a
more efficient (and less expensive) process than other states by providing a
pre-birth registration process rather than a judicial proceeding to establish the
38
Ibid
39
Ibid
17 | P a g e
status of the intended parents40. An account of the 2004 legislative process in
Illinois illustrates how much the legal and political landscape had changed
since the days of Baby M. No reports indicate that the bill was challenged as
promoting baby selling or that it was criticized for being exploitative of
women who served as surrogates. Indeed, one is hard-pressed to find
opposition to the proposed Illinois law.' Advocating for the bill were parents'
groups, the Illinois State Bar Association, and attorneys who practiced in the
area of adoption and assisted reproduction.41 News coverage was also
positive, with reports of warm relationships between surrogates and grateful
couples, and explanations of how the new law would avoid the "horror
stories" in which surrogates or intended parents backed out of agreements.
The bill was passed without opposition in both houses of the legislature.
Despite the equanimity with which the GSA was enacted in Illinois,
opposition to surrogacy arrangements continues in some quarters. In 2008,
the Minnesota legislature passed a bill almost identical to the Illinois statute,
but in the face of stiff opposition from social and religious conservatives,
including several anti-abortion groups. The Catholic Church criticized the bill
in measured terms, but the Minnesota Family Council called the legislation
"legalized baby-selling" and charged the statute with promoting single-parent
and same-sex-parent households.' Lobbying in favor of the bill were the
Minnesota State Bar Association and Resolve, an increasingly active
organization of adults dealing with infertility problems. The legislature voted
almost 2-1 in favor of the bill-which was then vetoed by Republican
Governor Tim Pawlenty.42 As in Illinois, no evidence indicates that any
women's organizations or civil-liberties groups participated in the legislative
process in Minnesota. The history of surrogacy regulation over the past
twenty years presents several puzzles. How did one case generate such
intense hostility and alarm about an arrangement that had attracted little
40
Ibid
41
Ibid
42
Ibid
18 | P a g e
attention until that time? Women's groups and social conservatives seldom
ally on matters of reproductive choice. How did that alliance form and why
was it so short-lived? And what are the forces that altered the social meaning
and political dynamic of surrogacy in a relatively short period? The
discussion that follows is intended to unravel these puzzles and to shed some
light on the social and political framing and reframing of surrogacy.43
43
Ibid
19 | P a g e
CHAPTER - 4
The world's second and India's first IVF (in vitro fertilization) baby,
Kanupriya alias Durga was born in Kolkata on October 3, 1978 about two
months after the world's first IVF boy, Louise Joy Brown born in Great
Britain on July 25, 1978. Since then the field of assisted reproductive
technology (ART) has developed rapidly.
The growth in the ART methods is recognition of the fact that infertility as a
medical condition is a huge impediment in the overall wellbeing of couples
and cannot be overlooked especially in a patriarchal society like India. A
woman is respected as a wife only if she is mother of a child, so that her
husband's masculinity and sexual potency is proved and the lineage
continues. Some authors put it as follows: The parents construct the child
biologically, while the child constructs the parents socially. The problem
however arises when the parents are unable to construct the child through the
conventional biological means. Infertility is seen as a major problem as
kinship and family ties are dependent on progeny. Herein surrogacy comes as
a supreme saviour. In India, according to the National Guidelines for
Accreditation, Supervision and Regulation of ART Clinics, evolved in 2005
by the Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR) and the National
Academy of Medical Sciences (NAMS), the surrogate mother is not
considered to be the legal mother. The birth certificate is made in the name of
the genetic parents. The US position as per the Gestational Surrogacy Act
2004 is pretty similar to that of India.
The legal issues related with surrogacy, as we have seen, are very complex
and need to be addressed by a comprehensive legislation. After a long wait
for so many years, the Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR) has come
out with a draft Assisted Reproductive Technology (Regulation) Bill and
20 | P a g e
Rules 2008. The draft Bill contains 50 clauses under nine chapters. The Bill
acknowledges surrogacy agreements and their legal enforceability. This will
ensure that surrogacy agreements are treated on par with other contracts and
the principles of the Indian Contract Act 1872 and other laws will be
applicable to these kinds of agreements. The Bill provides that single persons
may also go for surrogacy arrangements.
The Bill provides that a foreigner or foreign couple not resident in India or a
non-resident Indian individual or couple, seeking surrogacy in India, shall
appoint a local guardian who will be legally responsible for taking care of the
surrogate during and after pregnancy till the child is delivered to the foreigner
or foreign couple or the local guardian. It is further provided that the
commissioning parents or parent shall be legally bound to accept the custody
of the child irrespective of any abnormality that the child may have, and the
refusal to do so shall constitute an offence. A surrogate mother shall
relinquish all parental rights over the child. The birth certificate in respect of
a baby born through surrogacy shall bear the name(s) of genetic
parents/parent of the baby. The Bill also provides that a child born to a
married couple or a single person through the use of ART shall be presumed
to be the legitimate child of the couple or the single person, as the case may
be. If the commissioning couple separates or gets divorced after going for
surrogacy but before the child is born, then also the child shall be considered
to be the legitimate child of the couple. The Bill further provides that a
couple or an individual shall not have the service of more than one surrogate
at any given time. A couple shall also not have simultaneous transfer of
embryos in the woman and in a surrogate.
21 | P a g e
ART clinics. Chapter IV prescribes duties of ART clinics. One of the duties
is to make couples or individuals, as the case may be, aware of the rights of a
child born through the use of ART. The duties also include the obligation not
to offer to provide a couple with a child of a pre-determined sex. Chapter V
provides for sourcing, storage, handling and record-keeping for gametes,
embryos and surrogates. Chapter VI regulates research on embryos. Chapter
VII discusses rights and duties of patients, donors, surrogates and children.
Chapter VIII deals with offences and penalties therefor. Chapter IX is titled
„Miscellaneous‟ and includes power to search and seize records etc. and the
power to make rules and regulations. This legislation is intended to be in
addition to, and not in derogation of, other relevant laws in force. The Bill
neither creates, nor designates or authorizes any court or quasi-judicial forum
for adjudication of disputes arising out of surrogacy, ART and surrogacy
agreements. Disputes may, inter alia, relate to parentage, nationality, issuance
of passport, grant of visa. There is already a conflict on adoption and
guardianship as non-Hindus cannot adopt in India. Such disputes need to be
resolved before a child is removed from India to a foreign country. The draft
Bill prepared by the ICMR is full of lacunae, nay, it is incomplete. However,
it is a beacon to move forward in the direction of preparing legislation to
regulate not only ART clinics but rights and obligations of all the parties to a
surrogacy including rights of the surrogate child.
22 | P a g e
CHAPTER -5
It may also be pointed out that the Indian law on the subject of adoption,
entitled 'the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act 1956', is an Act to amend
and codify the law relating to adoptions and maintenance among Hindus
only. Likewise, 'the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act 1956', is an Act to
amend and codify certain parts of the laws relating to minority and
guardianship among Hindus. These personal laws governing Hindus permit
adoption as laid down in the said laws.
The Indian law applicable in the present case is the Guardians and Wards Act
1890 (GWA) which is the legislation meant to consolidate and amend the law
relating to guardians and wards in India. This is because under the Hindu
Minority and Guardianship Act 1956 (HMGA) and under the Hindu
Adoptions and Maintenance Act 1956 (HAMA) only those persons in India
who are Hindu by religion can adopt or be appointed as guardians of Hindu
minor children.
23 | P a g e
In the case of normal inter-country adoptions, to enable any foreign adoptive
parents to take a Hindu child in adoption from India, such parents would be
required to obtain a guardianship order from the Court of the Guardian Judge
in the appropriate jurisdiction within India and thereafter obtain adoption
orders in accordance with the law applicable to such foreign parents in the
country of their nationality. The position therefore in this regard can be
summed up as follows:
(a) In so far as the law in India is concerned, only persons who are Hindus by
religion can adopt children in India since s 2 of the HAMA and s 3 of HMGA
make it explicitly clear that the respective Acts are applicable only to those
persons who are Hindus by religion.
(b) As per the provisions of the GWA applicable to all persons in India, the
adoptive parents are permitted to be appointed as guardians of minor children
in India and are thereafter free to adopt them in the country of their
nationality to which they are allowed to take the children for adoption by the
Guardian Judge in India.
(c) It is relevant to quote and extract Sections 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 17 and 26 of
the GWA which are relevant in the present case. 44
44
Rajya Sabha Report, One Hundred Second Report, The Surrogacy (Regulation) Bill, 2016,
DEPARTMENT-RELATED PARLIAMENTARY STANDING COMMITTEE ON
HEALTH AND FAMILY WELFARE
45
WRIT PETITION (C) NO. 369 OF 2008
24 | P a g e
Municipality46, the Gujarat High Court reiterated the apex court judgment
legalizing commercial surrogacy in India and further elucidated that
commercial surrogacy was held legal in India as there was no law prohibiting
womb lending or surrogacy agreements. Both these judgments directed for
the enactment of law on surrogacy in India. Consequent to this, the ICMR
drafted the National Guidelines for Accreditation, Supervision and
Regulation of ART Clinics in India in 2005 as the first ever national
guidelines for laying down standards of conduct for surrogacy in India. Later,
the draft ART Bill was formulated in 2008, reviewed and redrafted in 2010
and 2014 but was never passed as law.47
46
AIR 2010 Guj 21
47
Rajya Sabha Report, One Hundred Second Report, The Surrogacy (Regulation) Bill, 2016,
DEPARTMENT-RELATED PARLIAMENTARY STANDING COMMITTEE ON
HEALTH AND FAMILY WELFARE
25 | P a g e
for two years or more to commission surrogacy in India. Medical visa for
commissioning of surrogacy in India was stopped through the Notification
No. 2502/74/2011-F-1 dated 9th July, 2012. The Punjab HC upheld the
Home Ministry guidelines as a binding law. Restrictions on surrogacy were
also provided in the Ministry of Commerce, Notification No. 25/ 2015-2020
dated 26th October, 2015 prohibiting the import of human embryo except for
the purpose of research. Another Notification (No. 25022/74/2011-F-1) dated
3rd November, 2015 of the Ministry of Home Affairs prohibited foreign
nationals, PIO and OCI card holders from commissioning surrogacy in
India48. The Department of Health Research notification (No.
250211/119/2015-HR) dated 4th November, 2015 validated the notification
of the Home Ministry banning commercial surrogacy in India. State
Governments were accordingly advised in this matter.49
48
Rajya Sabha Report, One Hundred Second Report, The Surrogacy (Regulation) Bill, 2016,
DEPARTMENT-RELATED PARLIAMENTARY STANDING COMMITTEE ON
HEALTH AND FAMILY WELFARE
49
Ibid
26 | P a g e
Parliament Assurances pending on the matter. The Law Commission of India
has strongly recommended for prohibiting commercial surrogacy. Hon‟ble
Supreme Court has been intimated of the commitment of the Government to
bring the legislation in this regard. As per the Affidavit filed in the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court of India, the Government intends to ban commercial
surrogacy through a proper legislation.50
• The couples should be legally married for at least five years and should be
Indian citizens.
• The couples should not have any surviving child biologically or through
adoption or through surrogacy earlier except when they have a child and who
is mentally or physically challenged or suffer from life threatening disorder
with no permanent cure.
• The couples shall not abandon the child, born out of a surrogacy procedure
under any condition.
• The child born through surrogacy will have the same rights as are available
for the biological child.
• The surrogate mother should be a close relative of the intending couple and
should be between the age of 25-35 years. She will carry a child which is
50
Ibid
27 | P a g e
genetically related to the intending couple and can act as surrogate mother
only once.
The Bill provides for setting up of a National Surrogacy Board and State
Surrogacy Boards which shall exercise the powers and shall perform
functions conferred on the Board under this Act. The National Surrogacy
Board shall consist of the Minister in-charge of the Ministry of Health and
Family Welfare, as the Chairperson, Secretary to the Government of India in-
charge of the Department dealing with the surrogacy matter, as Vice-
Chairperson and three women Members of Parliament, of whom two shall be
elected by the House of the People and one by the Council of State as
Members. The total number of members of National Surrogacy Board will be
24.
• The National Surrogacy Board and State Surrogacy Board shall be the
policy making bodies and Appropriate Authority will be the implementation
body for the Act. The total number of members of State Surrogacy board will
be 24.
51
Ibid
28 | P a g e
below the rank of a Deputy Secretary, and an eminent registered medical
practitioner, as members.
• The surrogacy clinics shall have to maintain all records for a period of 25
years.
52
Rajya Sabha Report, One Hundred Second Report, The Surrogacy (Regulation) Bill, 2016,
DEPARTMENT-RELATED PARLIAMENTARY STANDING COMMITTEE ON
HEALTH AND FAMILY WELFARE
29 | P a g e
CHAPTER - 6
The donors should relinquish parental rights at the time of donation, and
the surrogate mother, shortly after birth.
53
For more information see, www.heal-india.com/sites/default/files/sep-oct.pdf, on 10
September 2012
54
ART (Regulation) Bill 2010, n. 2, Chapter V, pg. 20-35
30 | P a g e
Traditional surrogacy is no longer allowed. The reason for this is that when
the surrogate is also the genetic mother the risk of legal complications
increases
NRIs and foreign couples are required to assign a local resident who is in
charge of the surrogate‟s welfare until the act of relinquishment
The surrogate mother may receive monetary compensation from the couple
or individual for agreeing to act as a surrogate mother.
The Rules of the Bill assume that ART is being used only by heterosexual
infertile couples. The ART Bill, 2010 has provided for many informed
consent forms to be filled and records to be kept. But it does not require that
adequate information be given to the surrogate mother about the possible
side-effects.55 Registration of surrogates with a sperm bank further underlines
the fact that the surrogate is seen as just another component of the
technology. Thus, a Bill that is meant to safeguard the provider and to
55
The Assisted Reproductive Technologies (Regulation) Bill-2010, Indian Council of
Medical Research (ICMR), Ministry of Health &Family Welfare, Govt. of India, p. 4
31 | P a g e
commissioning couples does not seem to protect the rights of the surrogate.
She is the most marginalized and vulnerable one in this triad. Therefore,
surrogacy is both a threat and an opportunity. On the one hand it gives
infertile couples and surrogate mothers the possibility to fulfil their desires: a
child and the opportunity to take better care of their family respectively. On
the other hand there is a risk that with the commoditization of children and
parenthood, women are exploited and turned into baby producers.
Rights of the Surrogate Mother under the ART Bill, 2010 provisions:
According to the provisions of the ART Bill, 2010 there are so many rights
has been provided to the surrogates.
- The surrogate mother will receive monetary compensation from the couple
or individual, as the case may be, for agreeing to act as such surrogate.
- No woman less than twenty one years of age and over thirty five years of
age shall be eligible to act as a surrogate mother under this Bill, provided that
no woman shall act as a surrogate for more than five successful live births in
her life, including her own children.
32 | P a g e
- If the first embryo transfer has failed in a surrogate mother, she may, if she
wishes, decide to accept on mutually agreed financial terms, at most two
more successful embryo transfers for the same couple that had engaged her
services in the first instance. No surrogate mother shall undergo embryo
transfer more than three times for the same couple.
- Only Indian citizens shall have a right to act as a surrogate, and no ART
bank/ART clinics shall receive or send an Indian for surrogacy abroad56.
The commissioning parent shall ensure that the surrogate mother and the
child she deliver are appropriately insured until the time the child is handed
over to the commissioning parent or any other person as per the agreement
and till the surrogate mother is free of all health complications arising out of
surrogacy. So, these are the certain rights which lie with the surrogate under
the ART Bill, 2010.
56
Supra Note 10
33 | P a g e
Commissioning Parents:
The Commissioning Parents, sometimes also called the intended parents. The
intended parents opting for surrogacy can be Indians Non-Resident Indians
(NRIs) or Foreigners. In India, surrogacy is increasingly becoming a popular
and well-accepted practice amongst childless couples; most of such
Commissioning Parents hail from the creamy layer of the society who can
bear the huge cost of surrogacy57. India is emerging as a leader in
international surrogacy and a destination in surrogacy-related fertility
tourism. Indian surrogates have been increasingly popular with fertile couples
in industrialized nations because of the relatively low cost. Indian clinics are
also becoming more competitive, not just in the pricing, but in the hiring and
retention of Indian females as surrogates58. Clinics charge exorbitant amount
for the complete package, including fertilization, the surrogate's fee, and
delivery of the baby at a hospital, including the costs of flight tickets, medical
procedures and hotels.
57
Gail Dutton, A Matter of Trust: The Guide to Gestational Surrogacy, Clouds Publishing,
1997, p. 217. This book is a step-by-step guide to surrogate parenting
58
Ashley Dyson, Standing in Two Places: A New Landscape of Motherhood, Aberdeen Bay
Publishing, 2009, p.168.
34 | P a g e
CHAPTER -7
Europe
59
Martha A Field, Surrogate Motherhood, Harvard University Press, 1988, p. 224. As Field
explains so vividly, the problem is not an absence of law but an excess of available law
including contract law, criminal laws against baby selling, adoption laws, laws governing the
rights of sperm donors, or those establishing the rights of unmarried biological parents.
60
Supra Note 58
35 | P a g e
like Germany, Sweden, Norway and Italy banned all forms of the
surrogacy61.
Asia
Oceania
61
Ibid
62
Ibid
63
Ibid
36 | P a g e
CHAPTER - 8
CASE STUDIES
64
See Dhananjay Mahapatra, Baby Manji's Case Throws Up Need For Law On Surrogacy,
TIMES OF INDIA, Aug. 25, 2008, http:// articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2008-08-
25/india/27946185_l_surrogacy-agreements-surrogate-mother-surrog ate-contract.
65
In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1237 (N.J. 1988)
66
Ibid
67
Commercial Surrogacy and Fertility Tourism in India: The Case of Baby Manji, KENAN
INST. FOR ETHICS AT DUKE UNIV., (2009),
http://www.duke.edu/web/kenanethics/CaseStudies/BabyManji.pdf
68
Supra
69
Supra
37 | P a g e
Pritiben Mehta would carry the baby to term and then relinquish all rights
and responsibilities for the baby to the Yamadas.70 However, the Yamadas
divorced one month prior to Baby Manji's birth, which complicated the legal
determination of her rightful parents.71 The intended father, Ikufumi Yamada,
still wished to raise Baby Manji, but the intended mother Yuki Yamada did
not72. First, Ikufumi Yamada petitioned the Japanese embassy in India for a
Japanese passport for Baby Manji, but the embassy would not issue the baby
a Japanese passport because of Japan's requirement of birth citizenship73.
Then Ikufumi Yamada approached the Indian embassy for an Indian passport
for Baby Manji in order to take the baby back to Japan. However, Indian law
did not recognize Ikufumi Yamada's status as a single adoptive father74.
Thus, the Indian embassy was unable to issue a passport for the baby
because, in India, a child is issued a passport based upon the child's mother's
citizenship.75 None of the potential mothers the surrogate, the intended
mother, or the egg donor would claim Baby Manji as her own76. While the
city of Anand issued a birth certificate for Baby Manji, indicating that
Ikufumi Yamada was her father77, the slot for the name of Baby Manji's
mother remained blank78. Although Ikufumi Yamada was the biological
father of Baby Manji, he now confronted the potential need to legally adopt
her because of the unique legal situation he and the baby faced. Again, Indian
70
Supra
71
Ibid
72
Additionally, Yuki Yamada refused to accompany Ikufumi Yamada to India to claim her.
The surrogacy contract that the Yamadas had entered into at the Akanksha Infertility Clinic
in Anand, Gujurat did not directly address this issue, but it did state that the intended father
would raise the child if the intended mother did not wish to. This contractual provision did
not prevent the legal turmoil that resulted from this unique situation, which neither Indian
nor Japanese law was equipped to handle.
73
See Rohit Parihar, Identity Crisis, INDIA TODAY, Aug. 9, 2008,
http://indiatoday.intoday.in/site/story/Identity+crisis/1/12831.html; India-Japan Baby in
Legal Wrangle, BBC NEWS, Aug. 6, 2008, http:// news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7544430.stm.
74
Supra Note 9
75
The Japanese embassy insisted that Baby Manji needed travel documents from India, her
birthplace. Parihar
76
Supra Note 9
77
Ibid
78
Ibid
38 | P a g e
law presented a barrier: India's adoption laws prevent a single male from
adopting a female child79. While Ikufumi Yamada worked to resolve this
legal disarray, political turmoil and bombings in Baby Manji's birthplace
required that she be moved to another hospital shortly after her birth80.
Simultaneously, doctors treated her for a variety of hospital-borne illnesses,
including septicemia81. Adding yet another “mother” to her life, Ikufumi
Yamada's friend's wife temporarily housed and breastfed Baby Manji82.
Eventually, Ikufumi Yamada prevailed in taking Baby Manji home to Japan,
but not before his Indian tourist visa expired. Instead, he returned to Japan
and left the care of Baby Manji to his mother, Emiko Yamada83. Emiko
Yamada petitioned to adopt Baby Manji, and the case went up to the
Supreme Court, the highest court in India84. The court referred Emiko
Yamada to the National Commission for Protection of Child Rights. After
much legal wrangling, the state finally issued Baby Manji a certificate of
identity, a legal document given to those who are stateless or cannot get a
passport from their home country85. With this certificate, Ikufumi Yamada
was able to obtain a Japanese visa to bring Baby Manji home to Japan86. The
Baby Manji case demonstrates the complexity of international surrogacy.
Laws and regulations concerning adoption, surrogacy, and citizenship have
not been able to accommodate international arrangements borne out of the
rapidly emerging technology used to create babies such as Baby Manji.
79
The Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, No. 78 of 1956 (1956), vol. 7,
http://punjabrevenue.nic.in/hadoptact(l).htm#_ftnrefl.
80
Supra Note 8
81
Ibid
82
Ibid
83
Ibid
84
. In the meantime, Satya, a non-governmental organization based in Jaipur, attempted
unsuccessfully to petition a lower court, the Rajasthan High Court, claiming that Emiko
Yamada's custody of Baby Manji was illegal due the lack of laws on surrogacy in India and
Japan. See Japan Gate-Pass For Baby Manji, THE TELEGRAPH, October, 17, 2008, http://
www.telegraphindia.com/1081018/jsp/nation/story_9984517.jsp.
85
Yamada v. Union of India, 2008 S.C.A.L.E. 76, 13 (India),
http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/helddis.aspx.
86
Ibid
39 | P a g e
Although the Indian Courts finally allowed Baby Manji to leave India with
her biological father, the case exposed the lack of clear guidelines and laws
related to international surrogacy in India.
87
Kateryna Grushenko, French Couple's Desire for Child Brings Trouble, KYIV POST,
April 15, 2011, http:// www.kyivpost.com/news/nation/detail/102433/#ixzzlWM80ko3W.
88
Ibid
89
Ibid
90
Ibid
91
Ibid
92
Ibid
93
Ibid
40 | P a g e
surrogates as the only lawful parents of a surrogate-born child94. But
conversely, Ukraine does not recognize such children as enjoying birth
citizenship through the surrogate mother. Thus, the twins also could not
obtain Ukrainian passports. Under Ukrainian law, the twins were French
because their legal parents were French95. Since France would not recognize
the twins, the babies were effectively stateless. It is worth mention that, at the
time, the French Embassy in Kyiv, Ukraine warned French citizens on its
website against engaging in local surrogacy to prevent exactly this type of
scenario96. Facing this legal limbo, Patrice Le Roch, and his father Bernard
Le Roch, hid the twins under a mattress in their Mercedes and attempted to
cross into Hungary at the Ukrainian border without proper documentation97.
Upon discovery, Ukrainian authorities charged both men with attempting to
illegally transport children without proper documentation under Ukrainian
child trafficking laws98. Initially, the babies were taken away from the Le
Roches but have since been returned to them99. Ukraine fined both men
$2,130 for the smuggling attempt100. Patrice and Aurelia Le Roch have tried
to petition other European countries to give their twins a passport and remain
in Kyiv with their twins waiting for French authorities to rule on their
daughters' status101.
94
Apparently, this situation is not unique and occurs to an estimated 400 French couples
each year. See Richard F. Storrow, Travel into the Future of Reproductive Technology, 79
UMKC L. REV. 295, 305 (2010)
95
The baby smugglers: French family arrested trying to sneak two-month-old surrogate twins
out of Ukraine in a chest, DAILY MAIL, March 24, 2011,
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1369561/French-family-arrested-trying-smuggle-
monthold-surrogate-twi ns-Ukraine.html#ixzzlWM0sAKqe
96
Ibid
97
Ibid
98
Ibid
99
Frenchman Faces Fine In Ukraine For Baby Smuggling, KYIV POST, May 5, 2011,
http://www.kyivpost.com/news/nation/detail/103727/ #ixzzlWON0LZ0.
100
Ibid
101
Ibid
41 | P a g e
A Case of Successful International Commercial Surrogacy Despite
Ambiguities About Payment
102
Ibid
103
MADE IN INDIA (Rebecca Haimowitz & Vaishali Sinha 2011) at minute 12:16
104
Ibid
105
Ibid
106
Ibid
42 | P a g e
CHAPTER -9
CONCLUSION
107
Smith Chandra, Surrogacy and India : A legal Perspective, NALSAR University of Law,
file:///C:/Users/Vaishnavi%20.LAPTOP-NB5VU17G/Downloads/SSRN-id1762401.pdf
(Last Accessed 18th September, 2019)
43 | P a g e
surrogacy is the gift of those people who cannot conceive their own child, but
now they will have their own child with the help of surrogacy.
44 | P a g e
CHAPTER - 10
In the end of this research we conclude with that there are some ethical issues
arising from the surrogacy arrangements. It is appears to be the primary
concern for surrogate arrangements since the surrogate mother is providing
germinal material only upon the assurance that someone else will take
responsibility for the child she helps to create. The surrogate mother provides
her ovum with the clear understanding that she has to avoid responsibility for
the life she creates and she has to dissociate herself from the child in
exchange of some other benefit such as money. In such a way, at the deepest
level surrogate arrangements cannot be viewed as ethical, because they
involve a change in motive for giving birth for the sake of some other
benefits money.108 There are certain recommendations are provided for the
surrogacy in India.
- The surrogate mother should be provided by the copy of the contract as she
is a party in the agreement and her interests should be taken into account. It is
crucially important to maintain and monitor the anonymity of the surrogate
mothers.
108
Keshav Gaur, Sarthak Garg, Reproduction Rights of Women: Ethical or Viable Role of
Surrogate Mother, NALSAR University of Law, file:///C:/Users/Vaishnavi%20.LAPTOP-
NB5VU17G/Downloads/SSRN-id2178623.pdf ( Last Accessed, 13th September, 2019)
45 | P a g e
- The surrogate mother should not undergo more than 3 trials and if she does
not conceive the child of the person in first time.
- Health Insurance for both the surrogate mother and the child is essential to
ensure a healthy life.
- The contract signed between the commissioning parents and the surrogate
mother should mention something about insurance and emergency needs that
the surrogate mother may require during the pregnancy; it has to mention
something about her future after relinquishing the baby.109
- Surrogacy agreements are to be treated on par with other contracts and the
principles of the Indian Contract Act 1872 and other laws will be applicable
to these kinds of agreements.
- A surrogate mother shall relinquish all parental rights over the child. The
birth certificate in respect of a baby born through surrogacy shall bear the
name(s) of genetic or intended parents/parent of the baby.
-The child born to a married couple or a single person through the use of
ART shall be presumed to be the legitimate child of the couple or the single
person, as the case may be.
109
Supra Note 9
46 | P a g e
- If the commissioning couple separates or gets divorced after going for
surrogacy but before the child is born, then also the child shall be considered
to be the legitimate child of the couple110
110
Supra Note 10
111
Ibid
47 | P a g e