Stalking Ableism Using Disability To Exp PDF
Stalking Ableism Using Disability To Exp PDF
Stalking Ableism Using Disability To Exp PDF
Introduction
One may wonder what museums and classification systems have in common.
They share a feature of working with the systematisation and reification of
relics and objects. For too long there has been an almost indecent preoc-
cupation with measuring and quantifying the existence of disabled people
with the grand and commendable objective to know ‘us’ more. Despite
these obsessions with disability, the sociocultural relations of impairment
and disabled people have remained an afterthought in civic consciousness
and at best peripheral in sociologies of the body. The aberrant, the anoma-
lous, the monster or the disabled have formed ‘the background noise, as it
were, the endless murmur of nature’, where disability is nonetheless always
present in its absence (Foucault, 1970: 155). An act of speaking otherwise,
this chapter shifts to a focus on abled(ness) to think about the production
of ableism. We all live and breathe ableist logic, our bodies and minds daily
become aesthetic sculptures for the projection of how we wish to be known
in our attempt to exercise competency, sexiness, wholeness and an atomistic
existence. It is harder to find the language and space to examine the impli-
cations of a failure to meet the standard or any ambivalence we might have
about the grounds of the perfectibility project. This chapter first will outline
an approach to expressing ableism (its theoretical features and character)
and secondly it will provide an example of how ableism works globally in
the knowledge production of disability. Finally I will discuss the possibility
of disabled people turning their backs on emulating abledness as a strategy
for disengagement both ontological and theoretical.
I start our discussion by providing a brief sketch of the project of ableism (if
you want more elaboration and complexity, see Campbell, 2009). A survey
of the literature suggests that the term is often referred to in a fleeting way
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This imaging of the neo-liberal subject insists that all people fit Macpherson’s
regulatory ideal. Ableism involves a degree of mastery over the mind and
body in particular ways where styles of comportment and habits are ranked.
The tool of comparison, of normativity, is the ‘benchmark man’, the nor-
mative citizen who is ‘who is invariably White, heterosexual, able-bodied,
politically conservative, and middle class’ (Thornton, 1996: 2). Of course
these characteristics then are put out as aspirational markers. These beliefs
do not take account of differences in the ways we express our emotions,
use our thinking and bodies in different cultures and in different situations.
There is pressure in modern societies, particularly in developing economies
for us to show we are always productive (doing something ‘useful’) and con-
tributing. Ableist belief values certain things as felicitous and particular sorts
of contributions. Disabled people are often seen as a burden, a problem,
a drain on the system, who make no civic contribution. According to this
understanding of ableism, ‘disability’ refers to people who do not make the
grade, are unfit in someway – and therefore are not properly human.
My first claim is that the notion of ableism is not just useful for thinking
about disability but also other forms of difference that result in marginality
or disadvantage. Theory far from being abstract can help each of us make
sense of our lived experiences and provide the tools for considering what is
‘going on’, to help us ask the critical and vital questions of contemporary
life. Interrogating ableism means thinking about what being abled means to
us today in Britain, the US, Australia, South Africa or Sri Lanka. A focus on
ableism can also unpack what is produced phenomenologically by the dis-
ability experience. The nuances of ableism are not static; they are transcate-
gorical, having specific cultural alignments with other factors such as race,
gender, sexuality and coloniality. Compulsory abledness and its conviction
to and seduction of sameness as the basis to equality claims results in a
resistance to consider peripheral lives as distinct ways of being human lest
they produce marginalisation. Pointing to difference can be quite dangerous
on a number of grounds. Differences can be reduced to the lowest common
denominator, with attributable and immutable (pigeonholing) characteris-
tics that can become signs of deviancy or delight. A call to sameness appears
to be easier as these requests galvanise and rearticulate the normative even if
such a norm is somewhat vacuous and elusive.
Often there is confusion about impairment and its relationship to social
conditions that cause poverty, distress and difficulties. An ableist disposition
makes it difficult to speak of imaginations of impairment as an animating,
affirmative modality of subjectivity (see chapters by Goodley; Roets and
Braidotti in this volume for counter ableist approaches). To speak about
disability in this different, unfamiliar way constitutes a disability offence
What Normal? While it might be easy to speculate about the kinds of peo-
ple that may be regarded as disabled and their interior life, when thinking
about the essential aspects pertaining to able-bodiedness, this task becomes
difficult and elusive. Being able-bodied is always relational to that which is
considered its opposite, whereas disability involves assigning labels to bod-
ies and mentalities outside the norm. With the development of enhance-
ment technologies (cosmetic neurology and surgery for instance) the notion
of the norm is constantly sliding, maybe creating a larger pool of ‘abnormal’
persons who because of ‘choice’ or limited resources cannot improve them-
selves and hence lapse into deficiency. Disabled people have not yet estab-
lished their entitlement to exist unconditionally as disabled people. This
ambivalent status means it is less certain whether we could regard disabled
Turning to the realm of tacit knowledge gained from social relations, the
second aspect to enforcing a constitutional divide is translation. Let us take a
look at this. No human is self-contained and our lives are constantly chang-
ing and (trans)formed through the context in which we move. Humans are
endowed by their relations with technologies (cars, clothing, implements,
time, communications devices, prosthesis and drugs etc.). Relations between
human and non-human entities (actors) are already hybridised and made up
of changeable aspects. Our relationship to context (people, environments,
mental and bodily changes) means that human typologies are endless and
shifting (Goodley, 2007). The character of impairment can change through
interfaces with behaviour modifying drugs and the use of apparatus (speech,
hearing and mobility enhancing). Most of us rarely fit into the definitive
classifications of purification – yet such confusion or ‘grey zones’ of daily
life are neatened up into zones of distinction ~ he is ‘this’ and she is ‘that’.
Enshrined in ableism is a metaphysical system which feeds into an ethics of
disability. A critical question to be asked is what is the nature of the ethics
or ethos invoked by ableist practices? Does ableism produce a form of nar-
cissism in the disabled person or are ableist practices themselves essentially
narcissistic?
Geodisability knowledge
clarity about the populations they are dealing with and the kinds of quality
of life outcomes they can expect in supra culture and context. The argument
of enumeratists and actuarialists is that systematisation will assist in social
planning. This will only work however if disability is reduced to its lowest
common denominator (Altman, 2001), resembling what I would call a ‘skel-
etal model’ where embodiment (flesh, memory, circumstances) are deflayed
and peeled off to reveal a definitive cripped (disabled) essence. In terms of
negative production, purification sharpens the divide of exclusion by forcing
different bodies and mentalities to adopt emulative compartmentalisation
and then to explain the reality of their daily experiences from within that
categorical prism.
Foucault’s early work on the panopticonal gaze whereby ‘inspection
functions ceaselessly [and …] the gaze is alert everywhere’ (1977: 195) is
invoked in nodes of geodisability structures of systemisation and measure-
ment. Without seeking to review the extensive studies of panopticism, it
is important to summarise its key features. Jeremy Bentham’s proposal for
penal management in the form of a panopticon an architectural design
for the surveillance and observation of prisoners has had long-ranging
consequences for institutional monitoring at the local and global level. For
Foucault the panopticon became a motif, a genealogical marker for order-
ing socio-material realities. The panopticon is a space not just of visibility
through strategic gaze or scrutiny, but its space is ordered to produce norms
and geoprofiles, for example hospital space, client areas, high security zones,
silent spaces, international waters and airspace. The panopticon can be
described as a type of socio-material assemblage for grouping and arranging
social categories. Today the individual is compelled both individually and
collectively, to attune and align themselves into observable, streamlineable
and thus countable data. A good citizen is one that can be easily counted
and their lives reducible to statistical aggregates and coded nuances. A more
obtuse example is the French conceptualisation of disability as ‘situation of
disability’ (handicap de situation). This idea bears witness to certain aspects
of impairment that arise and then decline relationally and in situational
contexts (Winance, Ville and Ravaud, 2007).
Geopolitical scrutiny does not need to be localised and is in effect trans-
spatial. Governing from a distance (be it Geneva or New York) operates
through two discursive modalities. One modality is denotative – a carto-
graphical description of a particular spatial zone (our interest is in the
mapping of ableist zones of ‘health’ and ‘not-health’). The second modality
forms an authoritative atonement, a discursive canon (such as international
disability norms and conventions) which constructs and enacts founda-
tional and thus sayable ‘statements’ (e.g ‘who’ is legally a ‘disabled person’)
to guide policy formulation. United Nations (hereafter known as UN)-based
international norm standard setting, in the form of geodisability knowledge
production, is a form of panopticonism. The institutional strategic gaze,
elements, this framing within a disease paradigm most likely ensures that
etiological factors remain pre-eminent and the social context eclipsed. In
the mental health arena, mental health is described by WHO along the lines
of coping with the ‘normal stresses of life’. But as Fernandopulle, Thalagala
and Barraclough (2002) point out, the notion of normalcy in the Sri Lankan
context explodes given the almost normalised extra stress of living with 25
years of inter-ethnic conflict and war.
Among the major outcomes of the Decade of Disabled Persons was the
adoption, by the General Assembly, of the Standard Rules on the Equalization
of Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities in 1993. While the Standard Rules
are not legally binding, they ‘represent a strong moral and political commitment
of Governments to take action to attain equalization of opportunities for
persons with disabilities. The rules serve as an instrument for policy-making
and as a basis for technical and economic cooperation’ (UN, Division for
Social Policy and Development, 2003–4, my emphasis). Member states
are required to adopt legislative reforms in conformity with these rules.
These instruments have come about through years of vigorous activism.
A recent tool of governance is the 2006 Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities. The strength of the Convention is that its formulation
of disability transcends functional and medical orientation of traditional
disability models. The Preamble states:
Disability is an evolving concept and that disability results from the interac-
tion between persons with impairments and attitudinal and environmen-
tal barriers that hinders their full and effective participation in society on
an equal basis with others.
(Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,
6 December 2006, at [e], my emphasis)
Article 1 of the Convention goes on to list the more usual type of func-
tional and classificatory approaches to disability, yet there is room to even
interpret these categories through the lens of an intercultural understanding
as made possible through the emphasis of the Convention’s Preamble. The
impact of countries in the Global South in their disability affairs is uncer-
tain. The Convention might stimulate debate and change around disability
or alternatively impose little understood legal standards and obligations.
An alternate reading of international norms is to interpret geodisability
knowledge as a mechanism to naturalise hegemonic ways of seeing (know-
ing), citing (summoning and hailing) and situating (localising) disability and
thus an attempt to codify unruly forms of impairment differences. Of course
increased geosurveillance can be associated with growing global concerns
about risk and dangerousness. In Foucault’s exposition of governmentality,
there is recognition that the craft of welfare requires that individual iden-
tity concur and be formed within the matrix of administrative structures in
[For liminal subjects] … style is both the sign of their exclusion and the
mode by which they survive nonetheless.
(Halberstam, 2005: 153)
Difference can be a vexed issue even within modern liberal societies. The
tendency for many people is still to emulate or at least appear to refashion
normative ways of being. Much of the intellectual traffic for the rethinking
of disability in terms of anti-sociality has emerged through debates about
the merits of social inclusion and liberal notions of equality and resilience
strategies to break the abled stranglehold. Legal theorists like Ruth Colker
who argues that anti-subordination rather than integration should be the
measure of equality are the exception (Colker, 2006). There is limited work
within disability studies, especially in approaches influenced by the social
model of disability or social role valorisation theory, that take a trans-integra-
tion or post-normalisation perspective. What if we turned our backs on ‘fitting
in’ – what would be the opportunities, the consequences and maybe dangers, to
give ‘attention to the lived intricacies of embodiment offer[ing] alternatives
to normalization efforts aimed at homogenizing social outsiders (Snyder &
to argue that we are not quite queer yet, that queerness, what we will
know as queerness, does not yet exist. I suggest that holding queerness, in
a sort of ontologically humble state, under a conceptual grid wherein we
do not claim to always already know queerness in the world, potentially
staves off the ossifying effects of neoliberal ideology.
(Muñoz, 2007: 454)
Those who are truly contemporary, who truly belong to their time, are
those who neither perfectly coincide with it nor adjust themselves to
its demands. They are in this sense irrelevant [inattuale]. But precisely
because of this condition, precisely through this disconnection and this
anachronism, they are more capable than others of perceiving and grasp-
ing their own time.
(2009: 40)
This radical passivity, for disabled people, would indeed have to be radical, as
disabled people already live under the enormous weight of being character-
ised as passive. It is a tough ask to claw back and produce a cripped notion of
passivity. Sunny Taylor does this in her quest for the right not to work:
I try to use the concept of queer time to make clear how respectability,
and notions of the normal on which it depends, may be upheld by
Cripped time can be staggered, frenzied, coded, meandering and be the dis-
tance between two events. Some of our time is shaped according to another’s
doing – service time – the segmenting and waiting on assistive agencies. Aside
from service time, there is a transient time whereby our cripped selves rub
up against biology, environmental barriers and relationality. Like queerness,
the lifecycle refuses patterning – there is a different vision with localised
goals. Instead of proposing argument based on normalisation and similar-
ity to the heteronormative (and by extension ableist normativity), Edelman
(2004) proposes a politics of negativity, on the basis that queers, as outsid-
ers, are embodied differently having counter-intuitive, queered forms of
negative knowing (Halberstam, 2008: 141). Edelman implores queers to be
norm resisters, to come out from normative shadows and fess up to futurist
‘inability’: ‘instead of fighting this characterization by dragging queerness
into recognition, he proposes that we embrace the negativity’ (Halberstam,
2008: 141). Relinquishing the norm as a lost cause enables an outlaw flower-
ing of beingness that is anti-social.
The disabled life puts out fear and possibility. This is a conflict over limi-
nality that many disabled people experience. How does the person with a
disability negotiate the expectations and compulsions of ableism? In other
words, do they choose to conform to or hypermimic ableism or do they go it
alone and explore alternative ways of being? People with impairments have
impairment – mediated proprioceptive ways of experiencing being in the
world. In contrast there is the unspeakability of communality and commo-
nality where disabled people can, as Overboe does in his spasms ‘give [him]
great joy… [becoming] a life-affirming presence’ (2007, 221). Elsewhere I
have argued that disabled people ‘are in effect strangers in ableist home-
lands – who because of their strangeness have the possibility of a new vision
or orientation’ (Campbell, 2009: 161).
Reading ‘disability’ in a positive (anti-social) light requires an apriori nego-
tiation with what Foucault (1976) refers to as the effects of the ‘implantation
I walk slow and look pathetic. What’s wrong with that? ... We are outsid-
ers. We really are. We can never be insiders. Those who think they are
insiders may end up being outsiders. Why don’t they realize that? That’s
the point we are trying to make.
(Hiroshi, in Kazuo, 1972)
Foucault is correct that we can never really ‘know’ the outside, the limi-
nal margins because its ‘essence’ remains inherently unknowable and
ambiguous. To step outside the normative trajectories of negativity not
only destabilises the conception of disability, but also confuses and disrupts
the processes of subjectification by confronting the ‘goodness’ of disability.
Hiroshi is emblematic of the anti-sociality stance of disability. Such an act
is subversive as Hiroshi positions his impaired body as queered and per-
verse. He is perverse because Hiroshi in effect does not ‘give a damn’ about
presumed appearances – he is his own man in his embrace of outsiderness.
Conclusion
SiA are an approach within disability studies that can provide a mecha-
nism for interrogating the premises that underpin the notion of abledness.
A focus on abledness can help expose the different kinds of beingness for
more typical bodies and mentalities. In stalking ableism, it is possible to gen-
erate new kinds of research around ways people are enabled and prohibited
in their internalisation of an ableist ethos. In this chapter I have introduced
some of the core theoretical ideas underpinning the notion of and operation
of ableist thought and practices. I have used as an example the emergence
of geodisability knowledge, a system to systematise and stabilise not only
disability figurings but ultimately a belief in a universal teleological system
of species-typical functioning. In the final part of the chapter I present a
sample counterpoint to ableism, namely anti-social or negative relational
theory. Refuting an ableist narcissist preoccupation with perfection can pave
the way for more work on natality, flourishing and beauty where the human
continuum is more processional and relational.
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